

The Best of the Grammarians

VISIT...

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Francesca Schironi

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Ann Arbor

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Preface

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2. Other Primary Sources and Secondary Literature Used in This Study
3. Content, Goals, and Limitations of This Study

Aristarchus of Samothrace (216–144 BCE) is the most famous Alexandrian grammarian and one of the most important scholars of antiquity. He wrote a large number of editions of and commentaries on Greek authors, as well as monographs on specific literary topics. Nonetheless, none of his works have reached us through a direct tradition. Ironically, this loss is partly due to the very fact that Aristarchus was considered such an eminent philologist. Generations of scholars copied, recopied, and epitomized his works over the centuries in order to learn from him. The result was that Aristarchus' original editions and commentaries were no longer considered 'texts' in themselves, which should be copied and preserved per se, but rather open sources for the most refined scholarship, which could be 'cut and pasted' into the margin of personal copies of Greek authors or in later running commentaries. Yet, if the processes of epitomization and transfer of Aristarchean material into larger works like collection of scholia and lexicæ led to the loss of his original works, they also allowed for the survival of many fragments of Aristarchus' scholarship. Much of Aristarchus' exegesis and editorial choices are thus preserved through quotations by other scholars in later disparate sources, including papyrus fragments of ancient commentaries, scholia, Byzantine *Etymologica*, and the commentaries by Eustathius of Thessaloniki.

Despite his importance, a complete modern edition of Aristarchus' fragments and a thorough study on his work are still lacking. In recent years, Stephanos Matthaios has collected the fragments dealing with the grammatical concepts used by Aristarchus,¹ I have collected the fragments found in a

1. Matthaios 1999.

particular type of sources, the Byzantine *Etymologica*,² and Helmut van Thiel has collected the fragments on the *Iliad*.³ For a brief period, I even contemplated diving into the *magnum opus* of a complete edition of Aristarchean fragments. Given the nature of Aristarchus' work and its preservation in so many sources of technical content, however, a collection of fragments turned out to be not only an immense task but actually less useful than a study of a sufficiently large sample of fragments organized by topic in order to examine Aristarchus' approach to literary texts.

Following this idea, I focused on a specific group of Aristarchean fragments, those from the *scholia maiora* to the *Iliad*.⁴ Moreover, within this evidence, I selected a specific group of scholia, which mostly deal with Aristarchus' exegesis rather than with the specific readings he adopted in the *Iliad*. In addition, and also because my focus was not Aristarchus' edition of the *Iliad* but rather *his exegesis and interpretation* of specific philological problems (using some of his notes to the *Iliad* as an example), I studied and organized the material, not following the order of Erbse's edition—which arranges the scholia according to the book and line of the *Iliad*—but rather by topic.

Once I began to work on this study, however, I recognized that, for any given topic, Aristarchus' analysis followed recognizable patterns, and I became more and more fascinated by them. Thus, the work I was undertaking partly changed nature, and also became a study of those patterns. The more I studied these patterns, the more a coherent picture started to emerge, which resembled a conscious, fully developed methodology. This is where the goal of this book finally took shape: to reconstruct Aristarchus' methodology, his technical tools, and where they came from.

The result is still a technical study, in which many scholia are presented and discussed, and which will be consulted in parts more often than read cover to cover. Yet the way the fragments are presented here (within chapters dedicated to specific subjects, provided with an English translation, and inserted in a narrative that puts them within a context) will, I hope, help interested readers to have a better picture of the true importance of Aristarchus' work: the development of a consistent methodology to study literary texts from a philological point of view, and how such methodology related to the cultural environment of his own times.

2. Schironi 2004.

3. Van Thiel 2014a. Van Thiel's criteria in selecting Aristarchus' fragments are, however, peculiar and idiosyncratic; see Chapter 1.2 § 2.2.

4. On the *scholia maiora*, see Chapter 1.1 §§ 2–3.

1. Main Sources and Method Followed in This Study

Aside from the many German dissertations and monographs dealing with several aspects of Aristarchean scholarship that flourished in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century⁵ and which are often outdated, my monograph is not the first modern study dealing with specific topics of Aristarchus' exegesis. Even before Matthaios' monograph on Aristarchus' grammatical ideas, which came out in 1999, the renewed interest in the Homeric scholia stimulated by Erbse's excellent edition of the *scholia maiora* to the *Iliad* led to some very good studies: Martin Schmidt's book on Aristarchus' analysis of the Homeric *Weltbild* in 1976⁶ and Dietrich Lührs' work on Aristarchus' *atheteseis* in 1992.⁷ I have benefited from all three of these excellent monographs, and I hope that my study will add another piece to our knowledge of this fascinating intellectual.

Since van Thiel's huge four-volume collection of fragments was not available when I started working on this project in 2006, I decided to focus on the most reliable, extensive, and self-consistent collection of Aristarchus' fragments available: the scholia to Homer, which, at least for the *Iliad*, have been edited in masterly fashion by Hartmut Erbse.⁸ Within this corpus, I have privileged the scholia by Aristonicus over the others, and specifically over those by Didymus. This choice has been instrumental to the goal of my work and has also shaped its outlook: rather than focusing on the specific readings and on the final Homeric text edited by Aristarchus (which is at the core of Didymus' scholia), my attention has been devoted to Aristarchus' commentaries, the repositories of his

5. The most important nineteenth-century works on Aristarchus are Lehrs 1882, a pioneering and consequential monograph on Aristarchus' Homeric studies, and Ludwich 1884–1885, who collected Didymus' fragments on Aristarchus' Homeric recension. There is also a series of German dissertations and monographs dealing with specific topics in Aristarchus' criticism: Gerhard 1850 (on Aristarchus' work on Aristophanes); Waeschke 1874 (on Aristarchus' work on Hesiod); Schimberg 1878 (on the concept of *ὁμωνυμία* in Aristarchus' exegesis); Goedhart 1879 (on Aristarchus' study of the geography of the Achaean camp); Ribbach 1883 (on Aristarchus' *ars grammatica*); Horn 1883 (on Aristarchus' work on Pindar); Bachmann 1902–1904 (on the aesthetic views of Aristarchus); Hofmann 1905 (on Aristarchus' studies *de cultu et victu heroum*); Lotz 1909 (on the concepts of *κατάχρησις*, *ἄκαιρον*, and *ποιητικὴ ἀρεσκεία* in Aristarchus' exegesis); Dimpfl 1911 (on Aristarchus' linguistic analysis); Dachs 1913 (on Aristarchus' *λύσεις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου*); Meinel 1915 (on the principle of *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον* in Aristarchus' exegesis); Wecklein 1919 (on Zenodotus and Aristarchus); Roemer 1912 (on Aristarchus' *atheteseis*); and Roemer 1924 (on Aristarchus' exegesis). On Roemer's methodological problems and how they have been dealt with in this study, see below § 2.

6. Schmidt 1976.

7. Lührs 1992.

8. Filippomaria Pontani is preparing an edition of the scholia to the *Odyssey*. At the time this book was sent to press, this edition had reached Book 6 of the *Odyssey*.

exegetical interpretations, and the explanations for his philological choices (the topics covered by Aristonicus).⁹

In writing this book I have not been interested in simply studying examples of Aristarchus' scholarship as found in a few scholia; rather, my goal has been to collect and comment on as many examples as possible in order to let certain methodological patterns emerge. My choice of aiming at the 'big picture' rather than focusing on in-depth analysis of just a few cases has not come without its share of problems. When studying fragments of ancient grammarians, it is often necessary to compare many sources in order to outline completely the ancient debate—as I did, for example, in my previous monograph on Aristarchus. In the present work, however, I have followed another path. I have collected all the fragments from the *scholia maiora* to the *Iliad*; my criterion has been to include all the scholia by Aristonicus plus all other scholia which explicitly mention Aristarchus. This has been the main body of evidence (consisting of some 4,300 scholia) with which I have started.¹⁰ I have then grouped and studied all these scholia looking for recurrent ideas, keywords, similar approaches, or problems—all elements that have allowed me to reconstruct Aristarchus' *modus operandi* in detail. No doubt, many of the fragments which I have selected for this volume (fewer, of course, than the total 4,300 scholia!) deserve a deeper analysis to discuss all their implications for the particular portion of the Homeric text to which they refer. Yet my main focus has been to study those fragments as reflecting a specific methodology or philological principle followed by Aristarchus, rather than to find what he precisely thought about every line of the *Iliad* for which an Aristarchean scholium is preserved. While the latter is a legitimate operation to carry out with scholia, my approach was different, because its goal was to obtain a more general picture of Aristarchus' methodology in studying Homer rather than to analyze every single Homeric issue he tackled.

2. Other Primary Sources and Secondary Literature Used in This Study

To produce a comprehensive study on Aristarchus, I had to make some choices, which need some explanation to help readers to use this book. First, to avoid cluttering the text with too many references or footnotes, I have decided not

9. For other reasons why I privileged Aristonicus over Didymus, see Chapter 1.1 § 4, as well as Schironi 2015.

10. For an explanation of this figure, as well as my criteria in selecting Aristarchus' fragments, see Chapter 1.1 § 5.

to quote all the *loci paralleli* for any specific scholium that I mention or even analyze. Unless a note from Eustathius' commentary, from the Homeric lexicon of Apollonius Sophista, or from other sources offers an element significant to the discussion, I avoid giving a full account of parallel sources. Similarly, I have limited the references to secondary literature to general topics, not systematically quoting all scholarly treatments of any single scholium that I survey. For these references, the apparatus of Erbse should be consulted. On the other hand, in general I have always provided references to and taken into account the fundamental monographs of Lehrs, Schmidt, Lührs, and Matthaïos as well as the several German dissertations and modern studies dealing with specific aspects of Aristarchus' scholarship. These references can normally be found at the beginning or at the end of a section treating a specific topic or when a particular scholium is discussed in detail.¹¹

In this regard, one important point must be made with reference to some of these early studies on Aristarchus. As an unfortunate result of the so-called Aristarchomania,¹² some scholars and especially Adolph Roemer became convinced that Aristarchus was always an excellent philologist according to *modern* standards.¹³ In order to maintain his thesis, however, Roemer distorted the evidence at disposal. For example, when a scholium which is generally considered as derived by Aristarchus (i.e., a scholium by Aristonicus and Didymus as preserved in the *Venetus A*; see Chapter 1.1 §§ 2–4) did not fit his own ideas of Aristarchus' ability, Roemer simply claimed that the scholium was wrongly transmitted or that Aristonicus (and Didymus) misunderstood and badly transcribed the original note of Aristarchus; to reconstruct the 'real' Aristarchean fragment, Roemer then used other sources (bT scholia, Porphyry, and Eustathius).¹⁴ This approach to the sources has been generally (and correctly) censured by scholars;¹⁵ yet, out of a desire for completeness and

11. In fact, with the exception of Bachmann 1902–1904, which still offers valuable insights and a balanced view of Aristarchus, many of the dissertations on Aristarchus mentioned above in footnote 5 often turn out to be unhelpful and outdated. On the one hand, they usually limit their analysis to the rephrasing of the scholia, with little comment; on the other hand, study and understanding of Homeric scholia, as well as assessment of the sources for Aristarchus' fragments, have dramatically changed and advanced after Erbse's work, so that pre-1960 studies on Aristarchus are to be dealt with cautiously. Yet for the sake of completeness and because they are often the only previous bibliography on specific topics and ideas in Aristarchus' scholarship, I have referred to these German dissertations.

12. On this 'mania', see Pfeiffer 1968, 232–233.

13. See, e.g., Roemer 1912, 115 and 507–508.

14. Roemer summarized well his method when stating (Roemer 1912, 506): "Ohne die vielfach so dringend angezeigte Zertrümmerung des Götzen *Venetus A*—kein Aristarch. Ohne Porphyrius, Eustathius und den Townleanus (B)—kein Aristarch—sondern nur ein lächerliches Zerrbild". See also Roemer 1912, 9–21, 123, 128–131, 499.

15. See, for example, Allen 1914; Ludwich 1914; Kohl 1921, 212–213; Pfeiffer 1968, 233 n. 1;

also to give a sense of how differently Aristarchus has been judged by scholars over the decades, I have, when discussing a fragment in detail, given references to the two monographs by Roemer on Aristarchus,¹⁶ as well as to those by his pupils.¹⁷ While sometimes their comments are still useful, it is important that readers be aware of the methodological principles followed by Roemer and his school in order to understand why his interpretation is at variance with the reading of the evidence offered by me in the main text as well as by other modern studies quoted in the footnotes together with Roemer's work.¹⁸

On the other hand, in order not to further expand an already bulky study where many references to scholia are given both in the main text and in the footnotes, I have decided not to give references to secondary studies for any scholium if I do not analyze it in detail. For the same reason, I have not provided references to Lehrs and other scholars when they simply mention a scholium in passing but do not discuss it. I have also referred to the recent collection of Aristarchus' and other Alexandrians' fragments in the *Iliad* by van Thiel (which came out when my monograph was undergoing the refereeing process) only when his comments (which are normally scanty and not always transparent) are relevant to the topic or scholia I discuss. Any interested reader will easily be able to find any other scholium included and discussed by van Thiel in his multivolume edition, as fragments in it are ordered according to book and line numbers of the *Iliad*.¹⁹

Finally, and again in order not to lengthen an already voluminous book, even if many Homeric problems tackled by Aristarchus are still debated by

Schmidt 1976, 13–15, 23; Lührs 1992, 1–2; Nünlist 2009, 4 n. 14; Nünlist 2012c, 193. Criticism of many specific cases dealt with by Roemer is found in Wecklein 1919.

16. Roemer 1912 and 1924 (the latter monograph was published posthumously by Emil Belzner).

17. Lotz 1909; Dachs 1913; and Meinel 1915. These studies present similar, if less extreme, attitudes and methodological flaws in using ancient sources; see criticism in Schmidt 1976, 23–24. A similarly unreliable use of the sources is often displayed by Dimpfl 1911.

18. To some extent, the same issue arises with van der Valk 1963–1964, who had the opposite approach to Alexandrian scholarship, generally criticizing Aristarchus and colleagues for their subjective response to the text. Even in this case, I have usually quoted van der Valk's important monograph among the secondary literature on the various fragments discussed.

19. On van Thiel's peculiar views about Aristarchus' fragments (which impact the way his edition is organized) and the nature of van Thiel's comments, see Chapter 1.2 § 2.2. Because of his peculiar views, van Thiel often gives an interpretation of a scholium that differs completely from how modern scholars, myself included, generally read the same evidence. For example, when a scholium mentions a variant 'written' by a scholar, he thinks it is just a parallel, 'written' on the margin of that scholar's edition; e.g., van Thiel 2014a, I 232, on *Il.* 2.502. Similarly, when a scholium mentions a reading present 'ἐν ἄλλῳ', he supplements the phrasing with τόπω/στίχῳ (not ἀντιγράφῳ, as generally scholars agree upon), concluding that it (again) indicates a parallel elsewhere in the poem; e.g., van Thiel 2014a, III 202, on *Il.* 18.505. I have sometimes quoted his comments to show how the same note can be read in a radically different way, but I have not done so for every scholium. Interested readers will easily find van Thiel's opinions in his four-volume monograph.

modern scholars, I have not provided complete bibliographical references to modern discussions on those topics; yet some important studies presenting current views on specific Homeric issues are quoted in footnotes as a starting reference.²⁰ These cuts were necessary, and I hope readers will understand that they had to be made in order to deal with this huge amount of material.

3. Content, Goals, and Limitations of This Study

Rudolf Pfeiffer, who titled his chapter on Aristarchus in his *History of Classical Scholarship* 'Aristarchus: The Art of Interpretation',²¹ highlighted that Aristarchus' innovation lay in his exegesis: while Zenodotus had already prepared editions and Aristophanes of Byzantium perfected them, Aristarchus was the first to develop literary exegesis to high standards through his commentaries.²² Ideally developing Pfeiffer's suggestion, the main focus of this book is Aristarchus' methodology and his approach to the Homeric text rather than his specific readings compared with our vulgate or other ancient readings. My goal has been to present Aristarchus' legacy in terms of methodology and principles for a discipline that, if he did not invent, he certainly perfected. Because in my view the most interesting part of Aristarchus' work is indeed its pioneering nature and its constant search for giving philology and literary exegesis a 'scientific' method, I have tried to build all the chapters of this study with a focus on the method followed by Aristarchus. Despite all its limitations, then, the broad approach I have followed has had the decisive advantage of allowing the identification of recurrent patterns and methodological trends across the entire body of Aristarchus' fragments in the Iliadic scholia. It is indeed paramount to show how recurrent and constant certain ideas and principles are in the scholia derived from Aristarchus in order to bring out his methodology and stress its self-consistency.

The accuracy and rigorous observance of the rules in his critical activity are

20. The same approach is adopted by Nünlist 2009, 4, concerning modern views on literary criticism.

21. Pfeiffer 1968, 210–233.

22. Aristarchus was not the first to have written commentaries; Orus (*Lex. Mess.* f. 283, 10–12, p. 411 Rabe) attributes to Euphronius, an Alexandrian grammarian who was also a member of the tragic Pleiad in the third century BCE, a commentary on Aristophanes' *Plutus*; cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 160–161. In fact, even the Derveni papyrus (fourth century BCE) and the 'commentary' to Simonides in Plato's *Protagoras* attest that commentaries as a genre were developed well before Aristarchus. Yet Aristarchus might be the first to have prepared a commentary closely connected with an edition of an author. In addition, as far as we know, he is the first to have written a running commentary on Homer.

what have fascinated me most in my study of Aristarchus and—I hope—will be fascinating for other readers as well. Yet, in order to convey Aristarchus' consistency and recurrent methodology, I also needed to discuss, or at least mention, many instances where the Alexandrian scholar applied the exact same principles. Consequently, my chapters are long and can sound repetitive in the material collected. I am aware of that. Still, for two reasons I have decided to report in the book as much evidence as possible. First, the main feature of Aristarchus' legacy is that he gave constant rules to a discipline that did not have any (or very few) before him. We should thus look at these 'recurrent' and repetitive instances in the scholia as testimony of a great method *in fieri*. Second, there is no complete edition of Aristarchus' fragments, nor a modern study dealing with every aspect of Aristarchus' activity. Thus, for most readers Aristarchus, though famous, is a virtually unknown figure in terms of what he actually did or said. Aristarchus is no Sophocles; he is not included in the 'reading lists' for classical studies anywhere in the world—and rightly so. Yet, given this situation, it would have been difficult to argue for a specific interpretation of Aristarchus' method without showing the evidence for it, which in most cases is unknown to readers not directly involved with Homeric scholia. Moreover, scholia are a technical type of text, often fairly difficult to approach without specific training. For this reason, referring readers to specific scholia in the edition of Erbse would not have been enough, as scholia often need to be discussed and explained since their wording is not obviously clear. This is what I have often tried to do in the book, and I do not deny that this choice accounts in large part for both its length and, at times, its repetitiveness. The result is in fact more similar to a 'commentary on selected fragments' or a reference book on Aristarchus than a monograph as we are nowadays used to in the field of classics. This outcome was inevitable when dealing with a highly technical author who has not enjoyed much popularity, especially in the English-speaking world. Aristarchus' fragments from the scholia are presented (mostly within the main text, but also in the footnotes, especially when they are numerous), most often translated into English,²³ and always briefly commented upon within a narrative which tries to make sense of this evidence. Since many fragments are discussed and analyzed, detailed final indexes will help readers

23. I have provided translations for most scholia and other Greek texts quoted in the book. All translations are mine. Occasionally, in footnotes or in the main text, when quoting a portion of a scholium or a brief scholium of easy interpretation, I have not added a translation, in order not to clutter the text unnecessarily. As for proper names of both ancient scholars and heroes as well as those of places, I have used the forms which are most familiar to readers; mostly, they are either English forms (e.g., Aristotle or Athens) and Latinized forms of those names (e.g., Aristarchus or Ilium), but sometimes the Greek forms have been preferred because they are more common (e.g., Theon, Tryphon, or Pylos).

to navigate in this bulky volume, which will be mostly consulted for specific problems. For those interested in a more discursive treatment of specific topics studied by Aristarchus, the concluding sections at the end of each chapter from Part 2 onward will provide a summary of the detailed analysis carried out in that chapter.

The title of my book consciously echoes the title of a well-known study on Achilles by a famous Homerist and my former colleague: Gregory Nagy. Part of the reason for such a title is the fact that Aristarchus became preeminent among the grammarians just as Achilles was the hero par excellence in Greek mythology. But there is also a more philological reason: if Achilles is considered ‘the best of the Achaeans’,²⁴ Aristarchus was also thought of as ‘the best of the grammarians’—at least that is how an anonymous scholiast commenting on *Il.* 2.316 labels him when explaining why he trusts the Alexandrian scholar: because Aristarchus is ὁ ἄριστος γραμματικός.²⁵ Similarly, in Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophists* Democritus calls Aristarchus ὁ γραμματικώτατος, ‘the ultimate grammarian’, when he introduces the Alexandrian’s exegesis of a literary passage of Anacreon.²⁶ One of the aims of my study is indeed to show why Aristarchus was ‘the best of the grammarians’. He deserves this title, in my view, because, at the very least, he followed a sound methodology, even though sometimes his conclusions or the extreme consequences of his ‘scientific’ method cannot be shared by modern scholars. My point of view, however, is not that of a Homerist, who can censure Aristarchus for his philological choices or for his interpretations because they are untenable according to modern scholarly views on Homeric language and poetry. Rather, my aim is to offer a historical reconstruction of what Aristarchus (the sole interest of my study) did when discussing the *Iliad*.²⁷

24. Achilles declares himself to be ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν (*Il.* 1.244, 412) and is so defined by Patroclus (*Il.* 16.271–272, 274); he is also addressed as φέρτατος Ἀχαιῶν, ‘bravest of the Achaeans’, at *Il.* 16.21 and 19.216; Homer, too, comparing Achilles with Ajax, clearly states that Achilles is the best, while Ajax is the second best (*Il.* 2.768–770); however, not only does Agamemnon himself also claim to be ἄριστος (*Il.* 1.91, 2.82), but both Ajax (*Il.* 7.289) and Diomedes (*Il.* 5.103, 414) also receive this title (ἄριστος or φέρτατος). Cf. Nagy 1999, 26–32. Still, despite the fact that other heroes can make such a claim, for the Greeks—as for us—Achilles is indeed ‘the best of the Achaeans’.

25. *Sch. D Il.* 2.316: . . . ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ οὕτως δοκεῖ στίζειν τῷ Ἀριστάρχῳ, πειθόμεθα αὐτῷ, ὥς πάντῳ ἀρίστῳ γραμματικῷ [but since it seems good to Aristarchus to mark it in this way [i.e., to write πτέρυγος as paroxytone, πτερύγος], we trust him, because he is without doubt the best grammarian].

26. *Athen.* 15.671f–672a: Ἀριστάρχος ὁ γραμματικώτατος, ἐταῖρε, ἐξηγούμενος τὸ χωρίον ἔφη ὅτι . . . [Aristarchus, the ultimate grammarian, explaining the passage, my friend, said that . . .].

27. Since this is not a book on Homer or on the *Iliad*, but on Aristarchus, the focus will be constantly on him, unless otherwise stated; hence comments on Homer and his poetry, even when not specifically attributed to Aristarchus, are Aristarchus’ opinions and should not be taken as shared by me or by other modern scholars.

I am sure that there are many faults in the final product as well as many places for improvement; but my hope is that this study will be another contribution to understanding an extremely important but shadowy figure of the ancient world—an endeavor that Aristarchus, the best of the grammarians, rightly deserves.

Part 1

Contexts and Sources

1.1

Aristarchus

Life, Sources, and Selection of Fragments

1. Aristarchus at Alexandria
2. The Aristarchean Tradition and the *Venetus A*
3. The *Scholia Maiora* to the *Iliad* and Erbse's Edition
4. Aristarchus in the Scholia
 - 4.1. Aristonicus at Work
 - 4.2. Didymus at Work
 - 4.3. Aristonicus versus Didymus
5. Selecting Aristarchus' Fragments for This Study
6. Words and Content in Aristarchus' Fragments

This chapter will serve as an introduction to the book. After a brief outline of what we know of Aristarchus' life, the focus will be on the sources for Aristarchus' fragments on the *Iliad* and especially on the Homeric scholia. I shall explain my criteria in selecting the evidence for the present study, how this evidence should be judged, and what its value and its limits are.

1. Aristarchus at Alexandria

Su. α 3892 Ἀρίσταρχος: Ἀλεξανδρεὺς θέσει, τῇ δὲ φύσει Σαμοθράξ, πατρὸς Ἀριστάρχου. γέγονε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ρνς' Ὀλυμπιάδα, ἐπὶ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλομήτορος, οὗ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπαίδευσε. λέγεται δὲ γράψαι ὑπὲρ ω' βιβλία ὑπομνημάτων μόνων. μαθητῆς δὲ γέγονεν Ἀριστοφάνους τοῦ γραμματικοῦ καὶ Κράτητι τῷ γραμματικῷ Περγαμηνῷ πλεῖστα διημιλλήσατο ἐν Περγάμῳ. μαθηταὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ γραμματικοὶ περὶ τοὺς μ' ἐγένοντο. τελευτᾷ δὲ ἐν Κύπρῳ

ἐαυτὸν ὑπεξαγαγὼν ἐνδεία τροφῆς, νόσῳ τῇ ὕδρωπι ληφθεὶς. ἔτη δὲ αὐτοῦ τῆς ζωῆς οβ'. καὶ παῖδας μὲν κατέλιπεν Ἀρίσταρχον καὶ Ἀρισταγόραν. ἄμφω δὲ ἐγένοντο εὐήθεις, ὥστε καὶ ἐπράθη ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐλθόντα παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐξωνήσαντο.

Aristarchus: Alexandrian by adoption, Samothracian by birth, his father [was called] Aristarchus. He lived during the 156th Olympiad, under Ptolemy Philometor, whose son he also taught. He is said to have written more than eight hundred books of commentaries alone. He was a pupil of the grammarian Aristophanes and had many disagreements with the Pergamene grammarian Crates in Pergamum. His pupils included ca. forty grammarians. He died in Cyprus, letting himself starve to death, affected by dropsy. He was seventy-two years old. And he left two children, Aristarchus and Aristagoras, and both were simple-minded, so that Aristarchus was even sold as a slave. When he arrived [in Athens], the Athenians bought him [from slavery].

This entry of the *Suda* is our most important source for Aristarchus' life, and even though scholars have often doubted the information provided by the tenth-century encyclopedia, it is a necessary starting point for Aristarchus' activity. According to the entry, he was born in Samothrace but spent most of his life in Alexandria, where he was a pupil of Aristophanes of Byzantium. He lived under Ptolemy VI Philometor (king from 180 to 145 BCE), who appointed him as a tutor to his son. *P.Oxy.* 1241 (second century CE), another important source for the head librarians at Alexandria, speaks, however, of 'sons'.¹ Hence scholars have concluded that Aristarchus taught both Ptolemy Eupator (born in ca. 164/3 BCE) and Neos Philopator (born in ca. 162/1 BCE).² The *Suda* entry also says that he 'lived' (γέγονε) during the 156th Olympiad (= 156–153 BCE), which is probably the date when Aristarchus started his appointment as royal tutor (when Philometor's sons were about to be teenagers) rather than his acme. The same entry also adds that he died when he was seventy-two years old and that he was a contemporary of Crates of Mallos,³ who was active under Eumenes II of Pergamum (king in 197–159 BCE) and famously went on an

1. *P.Oxy.* 1241, ii 11–15: μεθ' ὃν Ἀρίσταρχος Ἀρι|στάρχου Ἀλεξανδρεὺς ἄνω|θεν δὲ Σαμοθράξ οὔτος καὶ | διδ[ά]σκαλος [ἐ]γένε[το] τῶν | τοῦ Φιλοπάτορος τέκνων [after him [i.e., Apollonius the Eidograph; see below, footnote 5] Aristarchus, son of Aristarchus, of Alexandria, originally from Samothrace; he also became tutor of the sons of the Philopator]. Philopator is, in all probability, a mistake for Philometor; Grenfell and Hunt 1914, 108, suggest correcting it either into Φιλομήτορος or Ἐπιφανοῦς (since Aristarchus was also the teacher of Ptolemy Physcon, who was the brother of Philometor, and both were the sons of Ptolemy Epiphanes; see below, footnote 4).

2. See Eichgrün 1961, 19; Fraser 1972, I 332.

3. So also Strabo 13.1.55; Suet. *Gramm.* 2.1; *Su.* κ 2342. On Crates' life, see Broggiato 2001, xvii–xix; 131–132. On Aristarchus and Crates, see Chapter 4 § 4.

embassy to Rome in 168 BCE. For Aristarchus, then, the traditional dates for birth (216 BCE) and death (144 BCE) are very likely to be correct. According to Athenaeus (2.71b), Aristarchus was also the tutor of Ptolemy Physcon (born around 182/1 BCE), the future Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II and brother of Ptolemy VI Philometor. If this information is correct, Aristarchus taught two generations of royal pupils: the sons of Ptolemy V Epiphanes (Ptolemy Physcon and perhaps also Philometor) and the sons of Ptolemy VI Philometor (Eupator and Neos Philopator).⁴ At Alexandria the royal tutors often were also the head librarians in the Royal Library. Aristarchus occupied this role as a successor of other important scholars (Zenodotus, Apollonius Rhodius, Eratosthenes, and his own teacher Aristophanes of Byzantium)⁵ in the first half of the second century BCE, possibly from ca. 175 to 145 BCE,⁶ or even longer, from ca. 186 to 145 BCE.⁷

After the death of Ptolemy VI Philometor in 145 BCE, his brother Ptolemy Physcon killed the son of Philometor, Ptolemy Neos Philopator (who briefly may have been king as Ptolemy VII), and became king as Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II.⁸ He exiled the intellectuals who were friends with Ptolemy Neos Philopator, probably including Aristarchus, who had been his teacher (as well as the teacher of Ptolemy Physcon himself). In fact, Athenaeus, our source for these events, only remarks that under Ptolemy VIII many intellectuals left Alexandria and settled on islands and in cities of the Mediterranean, and that this intellectual ‘diaspora’ spread Alexandrian culture throughout the Mediterranean, giving rise to a new cultural renaissance outside of Egypt.⁹ The *Suda*, in addition, claims that Aristarchus died in Cyprus. These two pieces of evidence suggest

4. Cf. Eichgrün 1961, 18–22. These are the dates of the kings mentioned above (I have underlined those whom Aristarchus probably taught): Ptolemy V Epiphanes (king in 204–180 BCE), Ptolemy VI Philometor (king in 180–145 BCE), [Ptolemy VII Neos Philopator (king in 145 BCE?)], Ptolemy (Physcon) VIII Euergetes II (king in 145–116 BCE).

5. Tzetz. *Prol. XIa I*, 11–12: πρότερος [i.e., βιβλιοφύλαξ] δὲ ἦν Ζηνόδοτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος, πέμπτος δὲ ἢ τέταρτος μετ’ αὐτὸν ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος [the first librarian was Zenodotus of Ephesus, the fifth or the fourth after him was Aristarchus]. One of the problems of the list of the head librarians of Alexandria (as preserved especially by *P.Oxy.* 1241 and some *Suda* entries) is where to place the much lesser-known Apollonius the Eidograph (here Tzetzes does not seem to be sure whether to count him or not); Pfeiffer 1968, 172 n. 2, 184, 210, and Fraser 1972, I 332–333, place him between Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus; on the other hand, Rostagni 1914–1915, Herter 1942, 314–319, and Eichgrün 1961, 15–35, suggest he was librarian before Aristophanes and after Eratosthenes. The latter seems to be the most likely solution; see also Blum 1991, 130–133; D’Alessio 1997, 53.

6. So Fraser 1972, I 332–333.

7. So Eichgrün 1961, 21–22.

8. Cf. Bevan 1968, 306–307; Hölbl 2001, 194–195.

9. See Athen. 4.184b–c, quoting from Meneclēs of Barca (second century BCE) and Andron of Alexandria (second to first century BCE?). On this episode, see Zalateo 1981. On this period, with reference to Aristarchus and Comanus, see McKechnie 2011.

that he was part of this group of exiled or self-exiled intellectuals. Yet this is an inference, as no source explicitly states that Aristarchus had to leave Alexandria in 145 BCE *because* of Ptolemy VIII.¹⁰ What seems to be certain, however, is that after Aristarchus' death the heyday of Alexandrian scholarship was over, even if the activity of scholars like Didymus, Tryphon, and Theon—all of whom worked at Alexandria between the first century BCE and the first century CE—proves that scholarly work never really ceased in the Library.

As this brief summary makes clear, the name and life of Aristarchus are inextricably linked with Alexandria, almost the symbol of the philological work carried out under the patronage of the Ptolemies.¹¹ Even though scholars face countless problems in reconstructing the organization and intellectual work carried out in the Library¹² and the Museum¹³ (a topic still in need of a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment), the work of Aristarchus was dependent on these great institutions, not only because he benefited from such an immense library in his own work, but also because the presence of the Library also explains how fragments of his work have been preserved.

2. The Aristarchean Tradition and the *Venetus A*

One of the main problems in studying Aristarchus is dealing with the sources where his fragments are preserved, since none of his works has reached us by direct tradition.¹⁴ This is in part due to the fact that Aristarchus' editions and commentaries were not meant to reach a wide audience;¹⁵ they were not texts

10. An epigram of Herodicus, a grammarian from the Crateteian school, who attacks the Aristarcheans, inviting them 'to flee from Greece on the wide back of the sea' (Athen. 5.222a), has been brought up as additional evidence of the departure of Aristarchus and his pupils from Alexandria under Ptolemy VIII. These lines, however, probably mean something else; see Broggiato 2014, 45 and 59–68.

11. On Ptolemaic Alexandria, Fraser 1972 is still the fundamental work; see now also Jacob and Polignac 2000. On Ptolemaic royal patronage, see Fraser 1972, I 305–312; Erskine 1995; Murray 2008; Schironi 2019a.

12. On the Library of Alexandria, see Pfeiffer 1968, 98–104; Fraser 1972, I 320–335, 447–479 (the latter chapter is on Alexandrian scholarship); Canfora 1988; Blum 1991; MacLeod 2000; Bagnall 2002 (with further bibliography). For a comparative analysis between the Alexandrian Library and the Chinese imperial libraries, see Jacob 1998a.

13. On the Museum, see Pfeiffer 1968, 96–98, and Fraser 1972, I 312–319.

14. With the exception of the tiny fragment in *P.Amherst* 2.12, a third-century CE papyrus bearing the end of Aristarchus' commentary on Book 1 of Herodotus' *Histories* (with the *subscriptio* Ἀριστάρχου | Ἡροδότου | ᾧ | ὑπόμνημα). This commentary too, however, might be an abridged version of the original *hypomnema*.

15. On Aristarchus' Homeric editions and commentaries, see Chapter 1.2 §§ 2–4.

for laymen, but were rather used only in the Library by other scholars, so that their circulation was limited. Although his original works are lost, many fragments can still be recovered in later grammatical and exegetical literature. This is possible because scholarly texts are characterized by a continuous reuse of the same material, which is quoted, recopied, and epitomized over the centuries. Due to their ‘lack of originality’, later grammarians, scholars, and scribes have preserved fragments of Aristarchus that have been excerpted and recopied in many learned collections dating back to the Byzantine period. We can call this the ‘Aristarchean tradition’, and it is a necessary starting point to explaining the selection and use of the sources in this book.

Aristarchus’ original work did not endure for very long. Within a few generations after his death, his successors at Alexandria were desperately trying to reconstruct and preserve his work. The task of ‘saving’ Aristarchus was undertaken especially by two scholars from the Aristarchean school between the first century BCE and the early first century CE: Aristonicus and Didymus. Aristonicus wrote the treatise *On the Critical Signs of the Iliad and the Odyssey* (Περὶ τῶν σημείων τῶν τῆς Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας) to explain the meaning of the critical signs present in Aristarchus’ editions and commentaries,¹⁶ while in his *On the Aristarchean Recension* (Περὶ τῆς Ἀρισταρχείου διορθώσεως) Didymus focused on the readings chosen by Aristarchus in his Homeric recension. Later on, in the second century CE, two other scholars, Herodian and Nicanor, engaged with Aristarchus’ scholarship; the former analyzed questions of prosody and accentuation in the Homeric language in his *On the Iliadic and Odyssean Prosody* (Περὶ τῆς Ἰλιακῆς καὶ Ὀδυσσειακῆς προσωδίας), and the latter worked on the punctuation of the Homeric text in his *On the Homeric Punctuation* (Περὶ τῆς Ὀμηρικῆς στίγμης). Again, none of the works of these scholars has been preserved by direct tradition, but in the fifth to sixth century CE they were collected together in the so-called *Viermännerkommentar* (abbreviated VMK), the ‘commentary of the four men’, namely, Aristonicus, Didymus, Herodian, and Nicanor. This work did not survive either, but it was the basis of successive works of scholarship in later antiquity, some of which have been preserved, as outlined in the stemma at p. 11. Notably, the so-called codex *Venetus A*, more correctly *Marcianus Graecus Z. 454* (= 822) proves the existence of the VMK and its value as a source for Aristarchus’ work.¹⁷ This tenth-century manuscript of the *Iliad* is of paramount importance for the study of Aristarchus because in its margins it preserves the critical signs used by Aristarchus as well as an immense number of scholia—that is, marginal and interlinear annotations—many of which go back

16. On Aristarchus’ critical signs, see Chapter 2.1.

17. Now available online through the Homer Multitext Project carried out at the Center for Hellenic Studies (<http://www.homermultitext.org/>).

to him. In addition, the *Venetus A* has a *subscriptio* at the end of each book, which says that the scholia derive from the works of the ‘four men.’ For example, at the end of *Iliad* 3 we read:

Ven. A, fol. 51r: παράκειται τὰ Ἀριστονίκου σημεῖα καὶ τὰ Διδύμου περὶ τῆς Ἀριστάρχειου διορθώσεως, τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἰλιακῆς προσωδίας Ἡρωδιανοῦ καὶ Νικάνορος περὶ τῆς Ὀμηρικῆς στιγμῆς.¹⁸

The [work entitled] *Critical Signs* by Aristonicus and the [work] *On the Aristarchean Recension* by Didymus are here added; there are also some [excerpts] from the [work entitled] *Iliadic Prosody* by Herodian and [from] *On Homeric Punctuation* by Nicanor.

The note shows that the bulk of the scholia derive from Aristonicus¹⁹ and Didymus,²⁰ with some additions from the later works by Herodian²¹ and Nicanor.²² In other words, the scholia of the *Venetus A* are derived from the VMK. The filiation, however, is not a direct one. In the ninth century CE, the VMK was copied in the so-called commentary of ‘Apion and Herodorus’ (abbreviated ApH); this text is also lost, but its existence is guaranteed by Eustathius of Thessaloniki, who often says in his *Commentary* to the *Iliad* that he has found in the Homeric commentary of Apion and Herodorus (ἐν τοῖς Ἀπίωνος καὶ Ἡροδώρου εἰς τὸν Ὅμηρον ὑπομνήμασι) certain notes which overlap with the VMK scholia in the *Venetus A*.²³ Besides the VMK, ApH also used and excerpted collections of D scholia and exegetical commentaries.²⁴ ApH, in turn, is the basis for the three most important sources for recovering fragments of the VMK (and so ultimately of Aristarchus): the Homeric scholia of the *Venetus A*, the Homeric commentary of Eustathius of Thessaloniki, and the Byzantine *Etymologica*,²⁵ as

18. These subscriptions at the end of each book (with the exception of Book 17, where there is a lacuna in the manuscript, and of Book 24, which omits the subscription) have roughly the same wording with very minor variants; a slight variation occurs in the *subscriptio* of *Iliad* 18, which specifies: παράκειται τὰ Ἀριστονίκου σημεῖα μετὰ ὑπομνηματίου. The ὑπομνημάτιον, ‘little commentary’, by Aristonicus is an addition of the scholiast, who wanted to make it clear that it was not only a question of the critical signs added in the margins; rather, the very notes of Aristonicus’ work on *Critical Signs* had also been added as scholia. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 2.

19. Fragments collected by Friedländer 1853.

20. Fragments collected by Ludwich 1884–1885, I 175–506.

21. Fragments collected by Lentz 1868, 22–128. On the problems of this collection, see Dyck 1993, 783–786.

22. Fragments collected by Friedländer 1857.

23. E.g., Eust. 47.13 (ad *Il.* 1.59); 62.1 (ad *Il.* 1.116); 65.13 (ad *Il.* 1.129). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 364–368.

24. In the stemma, these lost exegetical commentaries are labeled as ‘Comm. Ex.’ On D scholia and exegetical scholia, see below, § 3.

25. The Byzantine *Etymologica* are a group of ‘etymological dictionaries’ written in the Byzantine period: they are the *Etymologicum Genuinum* (ninth century), the *Etymologicum Gudianum* (elev-

illustrated in the stemma at p. 11.²⁶ Although Eustathius and the *Etymologica* are important sources for Aristarchus' fragments, the scholia of the *Venetus A* are of unmatched value because (1) they are richer; (2) this codex also reports Aristarchus' critical signs placed next to the lines commented upon; and (3) it has the subscription explicitly stating that its scholia go back to 'the four men', and so ultimately to Aristarchus.²⁷ The importance of the *Venetus A* for ancient and especially Aristarchean Homeric criticism was realized in the eighteenth century, first by Jean-Baptiste-Gaspard d'Ansse de Villoison, who in 1788 published the codex, and then by Friedrich August Wolf, who with the *Prolegomena ad Homerum* (1795) gave rise to the 'Homeric Question', namely, the question of the authorship and composition of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Even now, the scholia in the *Venetus A* stemming from Aristonicus, Didymus, Herodian, and Nicanor are at the core of any study on Aristarchus.

3. The *Scholia Maiora* to the *Iliad* and Erbse's Edition

The present work focuses on the Homeric scholia to the *Iliad*, which are not preserved solely by the *Venetus A*, nor merely derived from the VMK. For this reason it is necessary to say a few words about them and how they are organized because, even though the *Venetus A* is without doubt the most important manuscript of scholia to the *Iliad*, the full picture is much richer and—alas—fairly complicated.²⁸ The scholia to the *Iliad* can be divided into three main groups:

1. The VMK scholia (notes from Aristonicus, Didymus, Herodian, and Nicanor) discussed above. Given the interests of the four men, these scholia deal with various technical aspects of (Alexandrian) textual criticism.
2. The exegetical scholia, of uncertain origin, which discuss Homeric exegesis

enth to twelfth century), the *Etymologicum Magnum* (twelfth century), the *Etymologicum Symeonis* (twelfth century), the *Μεγάλη Γραμματική* (twelfth to thirteenth century), and the *Zonarae lexicon* (twelfth to thirteenth century). The fragments of Aristarchus in the Byzantine *Etymologica* are collected and discussed in Schironi 2004.

26. On the Aristarchean tradition, the VMK, and the Homeric scholia (especially the *Venetus A*), see Lehrs 1882, 1–35 (a bit outdated but still useful); Erbse 1960; Erbse 1969, xlv–lix; Matthaios 1999, 38–43; Schmidt 2002, 165–170; Schironi 2004, 11–25; Pontani 2005a, 96–100, 148–156, 170–182 (with further bibliography). Van der Valk 1963–1964, I, offers a slightly different reconstruction of this tradition.

27. We can assume that such a tradition existed also for the *Odyssey*, as we do have Odyssean scholia that derive from the same four authorities. Even so, we do not have anything like the *Venetus A* for the *Odyssey*; moreover, Eustathius never speaks of any *hypomnema* of Apion and Herodorus in his commentaries to the *Odyssey*. Cf. Pontani 2005a, 148–150.

28. For two brief surveys in English on the Homeric scholia, see Dickey 2007, 18–23, and Schironi 2019b.

in the broadest sense—e.g., comments about Homeric art, characterization, plot, and storytelling, as well as other topics generally related with literary criticism—but very seldom discuss readings, technical issues related to accentuation, breathings, or grammatical questions typical of the textual criticism at the core of the VMK.²⁹

3. The D scholia, which stands for *Scholia Didymi*, because they were once believed to be the result of Didymus' work. The D scholia are mostly short glosses or discuss mythographical questions and Homeric problems (*zetemata*).³⁰

*The Aristarchean Tradition for the Iliad*³¹

Sigla (sources still available to us are in bold):

Ariston. = Aristonicus, *Περὶ τῶν σημείων τῶν τῆς Ἰλιάδος* (1st century BCE - early 1st century CE)

Did. = Didymus, *Περὶ τῆς Ἀρισταρχείου διορθώσεως* (1st century BCE - early 1st century CE)

Hrd. = Herodian, *Περὶ τῆς Ἰλιακῆς προσωδίας* (2nd century CE)

Nic. = Nicanor, *Περὶ τῆς Ὀμηρικῆς στιγμῆς* (2nd century CE)

VMK = *Viermännerkommentar* (5th-6th century CE)

a = Byzantine majuscule codex derived from the VMK and used by ApH (see Erbse 1969, liii)

C = lost archetype of the two main collections of exegetical scholia, T and b

'Comm. Ex.' = ancient exegetical commentaries

Porph. QH = Porphyry, *Homeric Questions* (3rd century CE)

D Sch. = so-called *Scholia Didymi*

Ap.H. = Commentary of Apion and Herodorus

Sch. A = scholia to the *Iliad* preserved in the *Codex Venetus A* (*Marc. Gr. 454*, 10th century)

Sch. A^a = scholia to the *Iliad* preserved in the *Codex Athous Gr. Vatopedi 595* (15th century)


Sch. b = scholia to the *Iliad* preserved in the b family (mss. BCE³E⁴)

Sch. T = scholia to the *Iliad* preserved in the *Codex Townleianus* (*Brit. Mus. Burney 86*, 1014 or 1059)

29. On the bT scholia, see Erbse 1960, 3–77, 169–173; van der Valk 1963–1964, I 133–201, 414–535; Schmidt 1976, 9–74; Schmidt 2002, 170–176. For studies on literary criticism in the exegetical scholia, see Schmidt 1976; Richardson 1980. In their monographs on ancient literary theories, Meijering 1987 and Nünlist 2009 also discuss many exegetical scholia to the *Iliad*.

30. On the D scholia and their composite tradition, see Montanari 1979, 3–25; Montanari 1995a, 69–85; van Thiel 2000, 1–13; Schmidt 2002, 162–165. Unlike the VMK and the exegetical scholia, which are the *scholia maiora*, the D scholia belong to the *scholia minora*, which also include short glossographical scholia on papyrus. This is why Erbse omits the D scholia in his edition of the *scholia maiora* of the *Iliad* (see below, footnote 34). The standard edition of the D scholia is now van Thiel 2014b.

31. Adapted from Erbse 1969, lviii, and Schironi 2004, 13–14. See also Erbse 1969, li.



Sch. Ge = scholia to the *Iliad* preserved in the *Codex Genavensis Gr. 44* (13th century)

EGen. = *Etymologicum Genuinum* (9th century)

EGud. = *Etymologicum Gudianum* (11th-12th century)

ESym. = *Etymologicum Symeonis* (12th century)

EM = *Etymologicum Magnum* (12th century)

Mg. Gr. = *Μεγάλη Γραμματική* (12th-13th century)

Zon. = *Zonarae Lexicon* (12th-13th century)

Eust. = *Eustathius, Commentary to the Iliad* (12th century)

In principle, the VMK scholia are found in the *Venetus A*; the exegetical scholia are more typical of the codex *Townleianus* (T) and of the b family (codices BCE³E⁴), all derived from a lost archetype C, which collected material from the VMK, from Porphyry's *Homeric Questions*, and from other Homeric exegetical commentaries (see stemma above, p. 11);³² and the D scholia are preserved in various manuscripts, some of which do not contain the text of the *Iliad* but have only the lemmata followed by explanations (i.e., the D scholia themselves). These latter manuscripts (the most famous of which is Z³³) also contain notes discussing mythographical questions (derived from the so-called *mythographus Homericus*, a lost commentary exclusively dealing with Homeric myths and derived from Alexandrian scholarship, probably composed in the first century CE), as well as the plot summaries placed at the beginning of each Homeric book.

Thus, one of the first elements that characterizes a scholium is the manuscript in which it is found. This criterion, however, is not sufficient because, as already noted, the *Venetus A* preserves not only the notes of Aristonicus, Didymus, Herodian, and Nicanor (that is, the excerpts from the VMK), but also other material, such as exegetical scholia, D scholia, and excerpts from Porphyry's *Homeric Questions* (which reached the *Venetus A* often through the exegetical corpus). Similarly, the bT family of exegetical scholia also has scholia derived (via C) from the VMK.

The *scholia maiora* to the *Iliad* (i.e., the VMK and the exegetical scholia) are available in the edition of the *Scholia Maiora ad Iliadem* by Hartmut Erbse, who did impressive work in distinguishing the kind of scholia preserved in all these manuscripts and making them available in a modern and informative edition.³⁴ Erbse's edition is a brilliant achievement not only for the number of manuscripts and secondary sources he inspected, but also and above all because the analysis

32. According to Erbse 1969, li, C used at least three ancient exegetical commentaries, in addition to Porphyry's *Homeric Questions*, a collection of the D scholia, and a copy of the VMK (a, in the stemma at p. 11).

33. The original codex (late ninth or early tenth century CE) was formed by two tomes, now in Rome (*Rom. Bibl. Naz. Gr. 6*) and Madrid (*Matrit. B. N. 4626*).

34. Erbse 1969–1988. In particular, Erbse systematically omits the D scholia and Porphyry's excerpts, which are present in AbT, because none of them are *scholia maiora*. A quotation from Dickey 2007, 19 n. 1, helps to clarify the ordering criteria adopted by Erbse in his edition: "identification as a D scholion takes precedence over identification as an A scholion, so material found in the main D-scholia manuscripts is considered to be D-scholia material even if it also occurs in A. Thus the different groups of scholia are grouped hierarchically in the order D, A, bT, other, and material is assigned to the first of these groups in which it is found. It is not accidental that this hierarchy matches the chronological order of creation of the earliest elements of each group". On the relationship among manuscripts containing scholia to the *Iliad*, see Erbse 1960, 3–209, and also Schmidt 1976, 1–7.

and attribution of the scholia is a daunting task. The difficulty in dealing with these texts arises not only from their nature, as scholia are technical texts that often employ esoteric terminology and condensed syntax, but also from the question of attribution. Even when we can read and understand the content of a scholium, on what basis can we label it as derived from Aristonicus, or from Herodian, or as exegetical rather than derived from the VMK?

The first criterion is the manuscript in which the scholium is found, but this is not always sufficient; as we have seen, the *Venetus A* also incorporates exegetical scholia, and the bT family includes scholia derived from the VMK. Another important criterion is the wording and content of the scholium itself, as there are certain stylistic features or keywords that seem to characterize some particular kinds of scholia. For example, the incipits ὅτι (for '[the critical sign is placed here] because') or πρὸς (for '[the critical sign is placed here] with reference to'), or the explicit mention of critical signs are all clear signposts of Aristonicus. Didymus also uses distinct phrasing: a reading is often introduced with οὕτως, 'so', while concurrent readings (both accepted by Aristarchus) are introduced by the adverb διχῶς, 'according to two readings', 'in two ways'. Verbs pertaining to the field of accentuation (e.g., βαρυτονεῖν, ὀξύνειν, περισπᾶν) or aspiration (e.g., ψιλοῦν, δασύνειν) indicate Herodian's notes, while the mention of punctuation marks (e.g., στιγμαί) or verbs indicating the articulation of a sentence (e.g., διαστέλλειν or συνάπτειν) point to Nicanor. A third criterion is the content: discussions of atheteseis, explanations of Homeric stylistic nuances, and polemical comments against Zenodotus or other scholars are typical of Aristonicus; mentions of variant readings, of manuscripts, and scholars' choices derive from Didymus; for questions of accentuation, prosody, or aspiration the source is Herodian; and scholia dealing with punctuation and articulation of the syntax in terms of pauses and punctuation marks derive from Nicanor. Needless to say, attributing a scholium to a specific scholar on the basis of keywords and content is partly circular reasoning as it is based only on internal evidence. Yet with scholia this is often the only way to proceed. Such a clear distinction in content and style for a VMK scholium is, however, valid primarily for the *Venetus A*. With the scholia in bT, specific style or content is not always so evident; for example, many scholia attributed to Aristonicus do not begin with ὅτι or πρὸς in bT. Also, the scholia in bT tend to be longer and more complex than the scholia in A. Hence, their content is not always so easy to 'box' into one single topic of interest.³⁵ In fact, the bT scholia often

35. In fact, in the parts of the *Iliad* where the *Venetus A* is missing some folios (those contain-

seem to have conflated different sources, partly from the VMK, and partly from the exegetical corpus.³⁶ These problems are inevitable when dealing with sources as complex as the scholia. Even so, since Erbse's edition is the fundamental work for everyone interested in ancient scholarship on the *Iliad*, I will follow his edition, textual choices, and scholia attributions as a basis for the present work.³⁷

4. Aristarchus in the Scholia

Even when one trusts Erbse's attribution, it is not easy to select Aristarchus' fragments within the scholia (or in any of the other sources, for that matter). The idea that any scholium which quotes Aristarchus verbatim is *in toto* a fragment of Aristarchus is not tenable because scholia by themselves are not a homogenous product and each single note could have been pieced together from many different sources. This is clearly the case with the exegetical scholia. Yet caution is necessary even with the VMK scholia. While Aristonicus and Didymus focused on Aristarchus' work on Homer, Aristonicus on his exegesis (broadly speaking) and Didymus on his readings, Herodian and Nicanor did not, as both of them were active much later and worked more independently. Herodian was concerned with problems of prosody, accentuation, and aspiration in Homer and in the Greek language, whereas Nicanor was interested in a system of punctuation and in articulating the Homeric text from a syntactic point of view. Of course, both of them knew Aristarchus' work and used it, but it was not the center of their interests. Therefore, Herodian and Nicanor

ing *Il.* 5.336–636; 17.277–577 and 729–761; 19.126–326; 24.405–504; see Erbse 1969, xiv), Erbse has identified very few scholia from the VMK. This is because the only scholia available for these sections come from non-VMK manuscripts, namely, bT and A^a (*Athous Gr. Vatopedi* 595, fifteenth century, containing D scholia and some scholia related to A).

36. The value of the bT family for reconstructing Aristarchus' work was put into serious question by Lehrs 1882, 32–33. Consequently, many scholars who dealt with Aristarchus used the bT scholia sparingly and as a less trustworthy source (e.g., Friedländer 1853 and Ludwig 1884–1885, on whom see Schmidt 1976, 9–10 and 28–30). Eventually, Schmidt 1976 and Lührs 1992 reevaluated the bT scholia, and Matthaios 1999 has taken them into consideration (cf. Matthaios 1999, 42–43). I have also included the bT scholia among my sources. Yet, since they are usually less informative than the corresponding scholia in A, I will mostly use the A scholia and refer to the bT scholia briefly, unless they add some important information.

37. Due to the peculiar views of van Thiel about Aristarchus' fragments (discussed in Chapter 1.2 § 2.2) I shall not use his edition of the scholia collecting the fragments of Aristarchus (van Thiel 2014a). I will, however, refer to it for the scholia I analyze in more detail when van Thiel's comments are relevant to the topic which I will be discussing.

preserve Aristarchus' fragments only when they quote him directly; otherwise, when their notes do not mention Aristarchus explicitly, they cannot be counted as Aristarchean fragments. In addition, even when they quote Aristarchus, their notes usually include their own comments and additions, and it is almost always impossible to distinguish between what they took from Aristarchus and what derives solely from them.

The majority of modern scholars, on the other hand, hold that Aristonicus and Didymus directly preserve Aristarchus' fragments because they explicitly aimed at that goal. Even if they are Aristarchus' main witnesses, Didymus and Aristonicus offer different types of information and used different sources, as I have shown elsewhere.³⁸ Here I would simply like to explain why I have given preference to Aristonicus over Didymus as the main source of evidence for this study.

4.1. Aristonicus at Work

Aristonicus lived between the first century BCE and the early first century CE, and taught in Rome.³⁹ He wrote about the critical signs (σημεῖα) used by Aristarchus for the Homeric poems and for Hesiod's *Theogony*, and composed a treatise on irregular nouns.⁴⁰ He also independently worked on Homer, Alcman, Stesichorus, Pindar, and Sophocles, as his quotations in the scholia to and papyri of these authors prove. Photius (*Bibl.* 161, 104b40–41) also mentions a monograph on the Museum. Despite this independent critical activity, of which only a few fragments remain, Aristonicus' main achievement was to save Aristarchus' work and, in particular, the reasons behind the critical signs that Aristarchus used to comment on Homer.

Because of his topic, Aristonicus' main source was Aristarchus' commentary to Homer; yet he rarely mentions it explicitly (exceptions are *Sch. Il.* 6.4a; 12.258a), and, unlike Didymus, he never refers to a different set of Aristarchean commentaries.⁴¹ Aristonicus also never mentions multiple

38. Schironi 2015.

39. *Su.* π 3036 Πτολεμαῖος: Ἀριστονίκου τοῦ γραμματικοῦ πατὴρ, καὶ αὐτὸς γραμματικός· ἄμφω δὲ ἐπεδείκνυντο ἐν Ῥώμῃ [Ptolemy, father of the grammarian Aristonicus, and he himself a grammarian. Both lectured in Rome]. On Aristonicus and other contemporary grammarians in Rome, see Jolivet 2010.

40. *Su.* α 3924 Ἀριστόνικος: Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, γραμματικός. ἔγραψε περὶ τῶν σημείων τῶν ἐν τῇ Θεογονίᾳ Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῶν τῆς Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας· ἀσυντάκτων ὀνομάτων βιβλία ς' [Aristonicus, from Alexandria, grammarian. He wrote on the critical signs in Hesiod's *Theogony* and on those of the *Iliad* and of the *Odyssey*. [He also wrote] six books [i.e., a work divided into six rolls] on irregular nouns].

41. On Aristarchus' two sets of Homeric *hypomnemata*, see Chapter 1.2 § 2 and § 4.

Homeric editions by Aristarchus, and when he sometimes remarks upon Aristarchus' second thoughts about a reading, they are never associated with different *ekdoseis*, as with Didymus. Aside from Aristarchus' commentary, Aristonicus consulted his monograph *On the Camp* (*Sch. Il.* 12.258a; 15.449–51a), but he refers to no other monograph of Aristarchus. For example, while Didymus quotes Aristarchus' treatise *Against Philitas*, Aristonicus mentions Aristarchus' opposition to some specific choices of Philitas (or Philetas),⁴² but never his polemical monograph on the topic. Together with Philitas in *Sch. Il.* 21.126–7a, Aristonicus also mentions Callistratus, another pupil of Aristophanes and contemporary of Aristarchus.⁴³ Since the focus in this specific case is on Aristarchus' rebuttal of these two scholars' reading, it is likely that Aristonicus did not consult their own works, but rather reported what he read in Aristarchus' commentary (or, perhaps, in the monograph *Against Philitas*, but without mentioning it).

Typically, the Aristonicus scholia never or almost never explicitly mention the name of Aristarchus. Although at first sight this might be considered suspicious, this is in fact seen by modern scholars as a strong indication that Aristonicus' entire work was dedicated to Aristarchus' opinions, so that it would have been superfluous to mention his name.⁴⁴ In fact, Aristonicus sometimes reports readings and interpretations that are different from those of Aristarchus, but these different choices seem to come from Aristarchus himself, who quoted them in his commentary in order to argue against them (especially those by Zenodotus⁴⁵). Aside from the specific mention of the opinions or editorial choices of Zenodotus, Aristophanes (rarely), or Crates, Philitas, and Callistratus (even more rarely), Aristonicus reports the opinions of other scholars anonymously, with expressions like *τινές* or *ἐνίοι*.⁴⁶ For example, he often notices that 'some' place a critical sign (*σημειοῦνται τινες*) next to a line (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.253a, 6.130–2, 6.219a, 6.472a, 7.156b, 7.303a, etc.). In this case, a question arises: is Aristarchus included among these scholars? Or are those *τινές* Aristarchus' colleagues or pupils, whose suggestions for the addition of a critical sign Aristarchus himself noted in his commentary? Or are they even later scholars whose opinions Aristonicus independently added from

42. In *Sch. Il.* 2.269c; 6.459; 7.171a; 21.126–7a; 22.308a¹; see Chapter 4 § 3.

43. Callistr., pp. 155–174 Barth. Callistratus is also quoted in some scholia to the *Odyssey* attributed to Aristonicus. On Callistratus, see Gudeman 1919; Pfeiffer 1968, 190–191 and 210; Barth 1984; West 2001, 59–61.

44. See Matthaios 1999, 37. Cf. also Lehrs 1882, 8; Lührs 1992, 5; Matthaios 1999, 43–44; Bouchard 2016, 25.

45. On Aristarchus' attitude toward Zenodotus, see Chapter 4 § 1.

46. For the similar expression *ἐν τισι* (which denotes 'some copies/editions' of the Homeric text), see Chapter 2.2 § 2.

other sources? It is impossible to answer these questions when the phrase σημειοῦνται τινες stands alone and is not opposed to Aristarchus' opinion. In one case, however, Aristarchus seems to be included in the group:

Sch. Il. 23.523a (Ariston.) δίσκουρα: σημειοῦνται τινες, ὅτι ἄ ἄνω (sc. *Il. 23.431*) εἶπε 'δίσκου οὔρα', νῦν {δὲ} συνθέτως δίσκουρα.

'A discus' cast (δίσκουρα): some mark the line because what he called δίσκου οὔρα above (sc. *Il. 23.431*) is now [called] δίσκουρα with a compound.

Sch. Il. 23.523b (Hrd.) {καὶ ἐς} δίσκουρα {λέλειπτο}: Πτολεμαῖος (p. 60 Baege) καὶ οἱ πλείους δίσκουρα ὡς 'λίπουρα' (Call., fr. 200b.2 Pfeiffer). καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος δέ φησιν. "ὅπερ ἄνω κατὰ διάλυσιν εἶπεν 'ὅσσα δὲ δίσκου οὔρα' (*Il. 23.431*), τοῦτο νῦν κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἐξήνεγκεν". καγὼ δὲ συγκατατίθεμαι.

'A discus' cast (δίσκουρα): Ptolemy [of Ascalon] (p. 60 Baege) and the majority [read] δίσκουρα like λίπουρα (Call., fr. 200b.2 Pfeiffer) and Aristarchus says: "what he said before in two words, 'as far as the cast of a discus (δίσκου οὔρα)' (*Il. 23.431*), now he has pronounced it as a compound", and I agree.⁴⁷

The interpretation which Aristonicus attributes to 'some' (τινές) is in fact Aristarchus' own analysis, as proven by the direct quotation of him in Herodian. Yet in other cases ἔνιοι/τινές seem to refer to someone else, so these instances must be decided on a case-by-case basis. It is also an open question whether when τινές does indeed refer to other scholars, this additional information was given by Aristarchus himself in his commentary or added by Aristonicus when he was working on Aristarchus' signs and consulted other sources.⁴⁸

In addition, Aristonicus sometimes quotes the opinions of Aristarchus' pupils. In *Sch. Il. 8.221b* he reports the interpretations of Apollodorus and of a certain Dionysius about the meaning of the expression ἔχων ἐν χειρί. According to Erbse, the Dionysius mentioned here is more probably Dionysius Thrax than Dionysius Sidonius;⁴⁹ both were direct pupils of Aristarchus, just like Apollodorus. In other cases Aristonicus mentions Dionysius Sidonius (*Sch.*

47. Cf. van Thiel 2014a, III 467–468.

48. According to Lehrs 1882, 9–13, most of these cases are simply the result of a hasty epitomization (so the note in fact refers to a sign apposed by Aristarchus); in other cases, however, he concedes (Lehrs 1882, 13) that τινές might refer to Aristarchus' pupils adding critical signs based on the lectures of Aristarchus.

49. See Erbse, ad loc. (Dion. Thr., fr. *37 Linke). This was also the opinion of Schmidt 1852, 374: "dann die [Stelle], welche nur Διονύσιος citiren, aber mit Lehrs p. 8 [= Lehrs 1882, 7] unzweifelhaft unserm Thraker zu vindicieren sind, da man den Sidonier nicht so schlecht weg ohne Zusatz konnte verstanden wissen wollen, wie den Thraker".

Il. 12.36c) or Dionysius Thrax (*Sch. Il.* 15.86a), or, much more frequently, he names a Dionysius without specifying which of the two is being quoted (*Sch. Il.* 12.301a; 15.712a; 16.810a; 17.24a; 17.125a; 17.218b¹; 19.49a; 22.379a).⁵⁰ Dionysius sometimes disagrees with his teacher,⁵¹ sometimes adds some further comment to Aristarchus' opinion,⁵² but most often gives a different reason for Aristarchus' signs than Aristonicus.⁵³ If this is Dionysius Thrax, Aristonicus could have found Dionysius' work in Rome, where—if not Dionysius Thrax himself—his pupil Tyrannion worked and had a school.⁵⁴

To conclude, in addition to the Homeric commentary, the treatise *On the Camp*, and perhaps the monograph *Against Philitas* by Aristarchus, Aristonicus seems to have had access to at least some specific opinions held by Aristarchus' pupils (Apollodorus, Dionysius Thrax, and Dionysius Sidonius).⁵⁵ He might have added these alternative explanations either because he found them quoted in Aristarchus' commentary or because he had access to works written by Aristarchus' pupils.

4.2. Didymus at Work

Compared with Aristonicus, Didymus is a much less opaque and better-known figure. He was a younger contemporary of Aristonicus who lived and worked between the first century BCE and first century CE at Alexandria. Apart from his work on Aristarchus' Homeric recension (διόρθωσις), he wrote monographs on various topics and commentaries on Hesiod, Pindar, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and the orators. Fragments of his enormous learned activity have reached us through the scholia (especially those on Aristophanes) and through papyri, including his commentary or monograph on Demosthenes in *P.Berol. inv.* 9780 (late second or early third century CE). This does not mean, however, that Didymus was a scholar of the same caliber as Aristarchus. He was clearly an epigone, who made an extremely good use of the great re-

50. Didymus and Herodian, who both quote Dionysius Thrax and Dionysius Sidonius, usually specify which of the two scholars they mean by adding the epithets Θράξ and Σιδώνιος—so for them the problem of which Dionysius they are referring to is less critical.

51. *Sch. Il.* 12.301a (Dion. Thr., fr. *38 Linke); *Sch. Il.* 15.712a (Dion. Thr., fr. *39 Linke); *Sch. Il.* 16.810a (Dion. Thr., fr. *40 Linke).

52. *Sch. Il.* 17.218b¹ (Dion. Thr., fr. *33 Linke).

53. *Sch. Il.* 15.86a (Dion. Thr., fr. 16 Linke); *Sch. Il.* 17.125a (Dion. Thr., fr. *12 Linke); *Sch. Il.* 19.49a (Dion. Thr., fr. *43 Linke); *Sch. Il.* 22.379a (Dion. Thr., fr. *13 Linke). In *Sch. Il.* 17.24a (Dion. Thr., fr. 41 Linke), only Dionysius' explanation of the sign is present, but the scholium does not look complete since it does not start with ὅτι; Aristonicus' opinion of Aristarchus' reason for the sign was probably lost.

54. The accuracy of *Su.* δ 1172 (Dion. Thr., T 1 Linke), which places Dionysius Thrax in Rome under Pompeius, was called into question by Cohn, who suggested that this piece of information refers to Dionysius' pupil Tyrannion. See Linke 1977, 9.

55. Aristonicus, on the other hand, never quotes Demetrius Ixion, Chaeris, or Ammonius, three other Aristarchean disciples often mentioned by Didymus.

sources of the Library, but whose work did not reach the standard of previous generations.⁵⁶ His learned, but subpar, production earned him the nicknames of χαλκέντερος, ‘brazen-guts’ (*Su.* δ 872), because he had ‘digested’ so many books, and βιβλιολάθας, ‘book-forgetter’ (*Athen.* 4.139c), because even he could not keep track of the books he had himself written. His scholia, in which a wealth of different sources are used,⁵⁷ further testify to the fact that, probably unlike Aristonicus, Didymus had the Library of Alexandria at his disposal.

Didymus mentions two sets of commentaries (*hypomnemata*) and two editions (*ekdoseis*) of Aristarchus, as well many monographs (*syngrammata*) by him.⁵⁸ Caution is necessary, however, when discussing Didymus’ use of Aristarchus’ commentaries. While it is sometimes clear that the commentaries which Didymus mentions are those by Aristarchus,⁵⁹ sometimes he refers to *hypomnemata*, but they are left anonymous (e.g., ἐν τισι τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, κατ’ ἓνα τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, κἄν τισι τῶν παλαιῶν ὑπομνημάτων, or τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων). In none of these cases does Didymus mention Aristarchus, or, if he does, the syntax does not allow us to unambiguously link Aristarchus with the *hypomnemata* that he quotes.⁶⁰ These quotations of anonymous commentaries cannot be linked with certainty to Aristarchus because there is at least one instance where Didymus explicitly refers to another commentary by a certain Diogenes (*Sch. Il.* 8.296b¹).⁶¹ In addition, Didymus quotes οἱ ὑπομνηματισταί, ‘the commentators’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.467a¹), and this label implies a plurality of sources that go beyond Aristarchus. Also, in many of the cases where Didymus quotes anonymous *hypomnemata* together with Aristarchus, the readings do not agree, as in the following example:

Sch. Il. 7.452a¹ (Did.) τό τ’ ἐγὼ καὶ Φοῖβος· χωρὶς τοῦ τέ ἐν ταῖς Ἀριστάρχου ‘τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ Φοῖβος’, κατ’ ἓνα δὲ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ‘τὸ δ’ ἐγώ’.

‘[The wall] which I and Phoebus (τό τ’ ἐγὼ καὶ Φοῖβος) [Apollo built with toil]’: without τέ in the editions of Aristarchus: ‘τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ Φοῖβος’. In some of the commentaries, [it is written]: τὸ δ’ ἐγώ.⁶²

56. See Pfeiffer 1968, 274–279, and West 1970 (the latter on Didymus’ work on Demosthenes).

57. On Didymus and his sources, see West 2001, 46–85, to whom I am indebted. Specific references to this chapter will be given in the following footnotes.

58. See Chapter 1.2 § 1 and § 2.

59. In *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4; 2.111b; 2.125a; 2.133a; 2.355a^{1,2}; 20.471a¹; 21.130–5a¹; 23.870–1a¹. In all probability Didymus also refers to Aristarchus’ commentaries in *Sch. Il.* 2.397b; 2.420a¹; 2.435a¹; 3.57a; 3.406a¹; 11.40a¹. More doubtful is the case of *Sch. Il.* 13.315a (see Erbse, ad loc.).

60. See also Erbse 1959, 278–279. On the *hypomnemata* quoted by Didymus, see West 2001, 73–75.

61. A Diogenes is also mentioned by Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 8.441a^{1,2}.

62. Cf. van Thiel 2014a, I 572. See also *Sch. Il.* 14.382d¹ (Did.) <δόσκειν> οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος ‘δόσκειν’. ἓνα δὲ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ‘δῶκεν’ ἀντὶ τοῦ δόσκειν· καὶ ἔστιν εὐφραδέστερον [δόσκειν:

On the other hand, unlike Aristonicus, when Didymus mentions Aristarchus' *hypomnemata*, he also often quotes Aristarchus' own words directly from them.⁶³ While these verbatim quotations no doubt testify to Didymus' obsession with sources, they also tell us something about how he used them. For his specific interest, Aristarchus' recension (*diorthosis*)⁶⁴ and not his exegesis, the exegetical notes in Aristarchus' *hypomnemata* were mostly useless. Yet in the commentaries he also found Aristarchus' discussion of variant readings and his reasons for specific textual choices. In fact, Didymus seems to have used the *hypomnemata* of Aristarchus exactly as he used the editions or the monographs: in order to find Aristarchus' variant readings.⁶⁵ For example, in *Sch. Il.* 23.870–1a¹ he quotes the edition of Marseilles (ἐν τῇ Μασσαλιωτικῇ), the edition of Antimachus (ἐν δὲ τῇ κατὰ Ἀντίμαχον), and Aristarchus in his *hypomnemata* (ὁ μέντοι Ἀρίσταρχος διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων).

Didymus also used other sources in his analysis of Aristarchus' *diorthosis*. He refers to other Homeric editions beyond those of Aristarchus: either city editions or editions prepared by other scholars.⁶⁶ This practice of referring to specific editions is in striking contrast to the attitude of Aristonicus, who never mentions any other edition explicitly. Not only did Didymus check other *hypomnemata* and other editions—from the cities as well as those of particular scholars—but he also checked exegetical works by other critics, as discussed in detail by Martin West.⁶⁷ Several of the authors most quoted by Didymus were

so Aristarchus [reads] δόσκειν; but some of the commentaries [have] δῶκειν instead of δόσκειν; and it is better].

63. In *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4; 2.111b; 2.125a; 20.471a¹. In addition, *Sch. Il.* 2.397b; 2.420a¹; 2.435a¹; 3.406a¹ are also likely to contain direct quotations by Didymus from Aristarchus' *hypomnema*. For example, in *Sch. Il.* 2.435a¹ (οὕτως αἱ Ἀριστάρχου. λέξεις ἐκ τοῦ Β τῆς Ἰλιάδος . . .) and in *Sch. Il.* 3.406a¹ (προσθήσειν μοι δοκῶ καὶ τὴν Ἀριστάρχου λέξιν οὕτως ἔχουσιν . . .), Didymus introduces Aristarchus' opinion, but does not explicitly say that it derives from the *hypomnemata*, even if this is probable, especially for *Sch. Il.* 2.435a¹, where ἐκ τοῦ Β τῆς Ἰλιάδος can only stand for ἐκ τοῦ Β τῆς Ἰλιάδος [ὑπομνήματος] (cf. *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4: λέξεις Ἀριστάρχου ἐκ τοῦ Α τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὑπομνήματος). On the other hand, *Sch. Il.* 3.57a and 11.40a¹ (see footnote 59) only contain a probable reference to Aristarchus' commentaries, not a verbatim quotation from them.

64. *Diorthosis* (διόρθωσις), literally 'correction', indicates the scholarly work of 'recension' of a text, that is, the establishment of the correct text by critical analysis and choice of specific readings. The *ekdosis* (ἐκδοσις) is the final result of such an operation. This distinction is clear in the titles of two treatises by Ammonius: *On the Fact That There Were No Multiple Editions of Aristarchus' Recension* (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι πλείονας ἐκδόσεις τῆς Ἀρισταρχείου διορθώσεως) and *On the Re-edited Recension* (Περὶ τῆς ἐπεκδοθείσης διορθώσεως); see Chapter 1.2 § 2.1. Yet, as will be discussed in Chapter 1.2 § 3 and § 4, the commentary (ὑπόμνημα) is also the result of the *diorthosis*, as in it Aristarchus explained and discussed his preferred readings. This is why Didymus had to look at both *ekdosis* and *hypomnema* to reconstruct Aristarchus' *diorthosis* of the Homeric text.

65. See Chapter 1.2 § 1.

66. See Chapter 2.2 § 1.

67. See West 2001, 75–83.

Aristarchus' pupils of the first or second generation: Apollodorus,⁶⁸ Dionysius Thrax,⁶⁹ Ammonius,⁷⁰ Chaeris,⁷¹ Parmeniscus,⁷² Dionysius Sidonius,⁷³ Demetrius Ixion,⁷⁴ and perhaps Ptolemy of Ascalon.⁷⁵ The pupils often support Aristarchus' readings, but sometimes are quoted as disagreeing with their teacher.⁷⁶ In some cases, Didymus does not seem sure of Aristarchus' textual choices and relies on Ammonius (*Sch. Il.* 10.397–9a and 19.365–8a¹);⁷⁷ elsewhere, Didymus mentions anonymous *τινές* (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 21.73a) or Dionysius Sidonius (*Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹) as additional sources for Aristarchus' recension. Evidently, Didymus had problems in reconstructing Aristarchus' work, both in terms of content and in terms of chronological development, and often used Aristarchus' pupils to collect more information on their teacher's choices. In the scholia Didymus also quotes other scholars contemporary to Aristarchus who often disagreed with him, such as Aristophanes' pupil Callistratus⁷⁸ and Ptolemy Epithetes.⁷⁹

68. *Sch. Il.* 24.110b¹ (*FGrHist* 244, 268). On Apollodorus, see Müntzel and Schwartz 1894; Pfeiffer 1968, 253–266.

69. *Sch. Il.* 1.607a¹ (Dion. Thr., fr. *10 Linke); 2.111b (Dion. Thr., fr. 14 Linke); 9.464b (Dion. Thr., fr. 15 Linke); 18.207a (Dion. Thr., fr. 19 Linke); 18.576a¹ (Dion. Thr., fr. *23 Linke); 24.110b¹ (Dion. Thr., fr. 20 Linke). Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 16.93–6 (Dion. Thr., fr. 18 Linke), which Erbse tentatively attributes to Didymus. On Dionysius Thrax, see Pfeiffer 1968, 266–272.

70. *Sch. Il.* 2.111b; 3.368a; 6.76b¹; 7.7a^{1,3}; 9.540a^{1,2}; 10.397–9a; 15.162b (Did.); 19.365–8a¹. On Ammonius, see Cohn 1894, and discussion in Chapter 1.2 § 2.1.

71. *Sch. Il.* 2.865 (Chaer., fr. 1 Berndt); 6.4b (Chaer., fr. 2 Berndt); 6.71a¹ (Chaer., fr. 3 Berndt). On Chaeris, see Cohn 1899.

72. *Sch. Il.* 8.513a¹ (Parm., fr. 2 Breithaupt); 9.197b (Parm., fr. 3 Breithaupt). On Parmeniscus, see Wendel 1949.

73. *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4; 2.192b¹; 5.746a; 14.40b; 17.155a; 19.365–8a¹; 23.587b. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 3.35d, which Erbse tentatively attributes to Didymus. On Dionysius Sidonius, see Cohn 1903.

74. *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4 (Dem. Ix., fr. 27 Staesche); 2.192b¹ (Dem. Ix., fr. 3 Staesche); 3.18a (Dem. Ix., fr. 28 Staesche); 6.171a (Dem. Ix., fr. 29 Staesche); 6.437a^{1,2} (Dem. Ix., fr. 30 Staesche); 8.103b¹ (Dem. Ix., fr. 9 Staesche); 10.41a^{1,2} (Dem. Ix., fr. 10 Staesche); 10.124a¹ (Dem. Ix., fr. 11 Staesche); 10.548 (Dem. Ix., fr. 12 Staesche); 14.316 (Dem. Ix., fr. 16 Staesche). On Demetrius Ixion, see Cohn 1901 and Ascheri 2003.

75. *Sch. Il.* 5.461b (Ptol. Asc., p. 46 Baege), which Erbse tentatively attributes partly to Herodian and partly to Didymus. In addition, it is not certain that Ptolemy of Ascalon was a pupil of Aristarchus; see Dihle 1959b.

76. In particular, Demetrius Ixion and Dionysius Sidonius. On the pupils of Aristarchus, see Blau 1883.

77. See discussion in Schironi 2015, 617–624 (with further bibliography) and Chapter 1.2 § 2.1.

78. *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4 (Callistr., pp. 21–51 Barth); 2.111b (Callistr., pp. 52–60 Barth); 2.131a¹ (Callistr., pp. 61–65 Barth); 2.435a¹ (Callistr., pp. 66–80 Barth); 3.18a (Callistr., pp. 81–90 Barth); 6.434a (Callistr., pp. 91–102 Barth); 14.255a.b (Callistr., pp. 119–132 Barth); 19.327a (Callistr., pp. 143–154 Barth). Some composite scholia also mention Callistratus and the source is probably Didymus: *Sch. Il.* 18.39–49 (Did. + Ariston.; Callistr., pp. 133–142 Barth); 21.169c (Did.; Callistr., pp. 175–180 Barth).

79. *Sch. Il.* 2.111b (Ptol. Epith., fr. 1 Montanari); 2.196c¹ (Ptol. Epith., fr. 2 Montanari); 14.37b^{1,2} (Ptol. Epith., fr. 3 Montanari); 14.249b (Ptol. Epith., fr. 4 Montanari). Ptolemy Epithetes was a pupil

Thus, the impression is that Didymus' goal is broader than simply presenting Aristarchus' *diorthosis* as best as he can. Rather than being only a 'collector' of Aristarchus' readings, he compares Aristarchus' *diorthosis* with that of other scholars and other editions in order to place Aristarchus' work in a wider context, namely, the Alexandrian scholarship of his generation. This *modus operandi* is very much in agreement with the bookish and encyclopedic attitude of Didymus 'of brazen entrails'. Didymus also shows a much larger degree of independence than Aristonicus—and not only by using sources and scholarly writings beyond those closely related to Aristarchus' *diorthosis*; his greater independence also emerges because he expresses his own ideas against Aristarchus. For example, he says that Aristarchus chose a certain reading 'badly' (κακῶς⁸⁰) or 'not in an elegant way' (οὐ καλῶς⁸¹); he notes that other variants are 'more graceful' (χαριέστερον⁸²), or 'not without grace' (οὐδὲ . . . ἄχαρι/οὐκ ἄχαρις ἢ γραφή⁸³) compared with those of Aristarchus. Sometimes Didymus comments that, though Aristarchus' reading is fine, another one 'has Homeric character even if it is not Aristarchean'⁸⁴ or simply 'makes sense'.⁸⁵

The Didymus scholia thus provide much more 'contextual' information than those of Aristonicus, giving us unique insight into the works of Aristarchus. It is through Didymus that we know about two editions of Homer, two sets of commentaries, treatises on particular topics (Περὶ Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας), and even polemical monographs (Πρὸς Φιλίταν, Πρὸς Κομανόν, Πρὸς τὸ Ξένωνος παράδοξον).⁸⁶ In addition, Didymus lets us glance into the Library of Alexandria and glimpse the editions collected there (at least by the time of Didymus), as well as the scholarship on Aristarchus. Yet just because his scholia are richer and more composite, we can only be sure that he is reporting an Aristarchean fragment when Didymus quotes Aristarchus explicitly. But when Didymus reports other readings or speaks about other editions, we cannot be certain that he took this information from Aristarchus.

of the grammarian Hellanicus and adversary of Aristarchus in the second century BCE; in his work, he defended readings of Zenodotus. See Dihle 1959a and Montanari 1988, 77–87.

80. *Sch. Il.* 1.106e; 21.162a² (cf. also *Sch. Il.* 21.162a¹).

81. *Sch. Il.* 2.355a².

82. *Sch. Il.* 7.428a¹.

83. *Sch. Il.* 2.462a^{2,3} (cf. also *Sch. Il.* 2.462a¹); 3.292a¹.

84. *Sch. Il.* 3.18a: . . . Ἀρίσταρχος ἄνευ τοῦ ἄρθρου, 'αὐτὰρ δοῦρε' . . . ἔχει δὲ τὸν Ὀμηρικὸν χαρακτήρα καὶ ἡ σὺν τῷ ἄρθρῳ γραφή, καίπερ οὐκ οὔσα Ἀριστάρχειος [Aristarchus writes it without the article, 'αὐτὰρ δοῦρε' . . . But the reading with the article ['αὐτὰρ ὁ δοῦρε'] also has a Homeric character even if it is not Aristarchean]. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 3.18b^{1,2} (Did.).

85. *Sch. Il.* 9.584a¹: κατὰ τὸ θηλυκὸν 'κασίγνηται' αἱ Ἀριστάρχου. ἔχει δὲ λόγον καὶ ἡ διὰ τοῦ ο [the editions of Aristarchus [have] κασίγνηται in the feminine. But the reading with ο [i.e., κασίγνητοι] also makes sense]. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 9.584a^{2,3}.

86. On these works, see Chapter 1.2.

4.3. Aristonicus versus Didymus

While Didymus aimed at the broader goal of putting Aristarchus in the context of the work of his colleagues and pupils, Aristonicus’ less complicated approach must not be seen as less valuable per se. In fact, a survey comparing Aristonicus and Didymus on the same Aristarchean fragment shows why the evidence derived from Aristonicus can be more valuable than that from Didymus for a certain type of inquiry. When the goal is to reconstruct Aristarchus’ methodology, Aristonicus’ focus on Aristarchus’ exegesis and *hypomnemata* has a great advantage over Didymus. When they report the same Aristarchean fragment, it is Aristonicus who says *why* Aristarchus made a certain choice, while Didymus normally limits himself to recording Aristarchus’ readings without explaining the reasons behind them. The following scholia provide excellent synoptic examples:

Aristonicus	Didymus
Sch. Il. 9.36b ἡμὲν νέοι ἡδὲ γέροντες: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες’. βέλτιον δὲ καθολικώτερον γεγράφθαι· καταλείπεται γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ δόξα τάνδρως· καὶ ὅτι νῦν γέροντας τοὺς καθ’ ἡλικίαν, ἐπεὶ μικρῷ πρότερον τὸν Νέστορα αὐτὸς ἐσεσώκει ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ (sc. Il. 8.90–171). ‘Both young and old (ἡμὲν νέοι ἡδὲ γέροντες)’: because Zenodotus writes ‘leaders and rulers’ (ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες). But it is better that it is written in a more general way, for the fame of the hero [i.e., Diomedes] is among everyone. And because now [he says] γέροντας [to mean] those according to age [i.e., the elders, not those in power], since a little before he himself has saved Nestor in battle (sc. Il. 8.90–171).	Sch. Il. 9.36a <ἡμὲν νέοι ἡδὲ γέροντες> οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος ‘ἡμὲν νέοι ἡδὲ γέροντες’. γράφεσθαι δὲ φησι καὶ ‘ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες’. ‘Both young and old (ἡμὲν νέοι ἡδὲ γέροντες)’: so Aristarchus, ‘both young and old’ (ἡμὲν νέοι ἡδὲ γέροντες). He says that it is also written ‘leaders and rulers’ (ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες).
Aristonicus	Didymus
Sch. Il. 16.522a¹ ὁ δ’ οὐδ’ οὖν παιδὸς ἀμύνει: ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι ἐλλείπει ἡ περί· ἔστι γάρ, οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ οὖν παιδὸς ἀμύνει. οἱ δὲ ἀγνοήσαντες γράφουσιν ‘ὁ δ’ οὐδ’ ὧ παιδὶ ἀμύνει’. ‘He does not defend even his own son (ὁ δ’ οὐδ’ οὖν παιδὸς ἀμύνει)’: the <i>diple</i> because περί is missing. For it is οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ οὖν παιδὸς ἀμύνει. Those who do not know this [rule] write: ὁ δ’ οὐδ’ ὧ παιδὶ ἀμύνει [i.e., ἀμύνειν and simple dative of person, rather than the Homeric construction with simple genitive].	Sch. Il. 16.522b¹ <ὁ δ’ οὐδ’ ὧ παιδί:> Ἀρίσταρχος ‘ὁ δ’ οὐ<δ’ οὖν> παιδός’. ‘He does not [defend] even his own son (ὁ δ’ οὐδ’ οὖν παιδί)’: Aristarchus writes ὁ δ’ οὐδ’ οὖν παιδός.

In both cases, Aristonicus gives a full explanation of Aristarchus’ choices, whereas Didymus only provides information on different readings (by Aristarchus and others). On the other hand, Didymus is a far better source for recovering Aristarchus’ readings, as is clear from two scholia dealing with variant readings on *Il.* 21.246:

Aristonicus	Didymus
<i>Sch. Il.</i> 21.246b <u>ἐκ δίνης</u> : ὅτι διχῶς γράφεται, <u>‘ἐκ λίμνης’</u> καὶ <u>‘ἐκ δίνης’</u> . τὸ μὲν οὖν <u>‘ἐκ δίνης’</u> ἐκ τῆς συστροφῆς τοῦ ῥοῦ, τὸ δὲ <u>‘ἐκ λίμνης’</u> ἐκ τοῦ καθ’ ὕδατος τόπου· διὸ καὶ τὸν Ὠκεανὸν λίμνην καλεῖ (sc. <i>Od.</i> 3.1).	<i>Sch. Il.</i> 21.246a <ἐκ δίνης> Ἀρίσταρχος <u>‘ἐκ δίνης’</u> , ἄλλοι <u>‘ἐκ λίμνης’</u> .
‘From the whirlpool (ἐκ δίνης)’: because there are two readings, <u>ἐκ λίμνης</u> and <u>ἐκ δίνης</u> . ἐκ δίνης means ‘from the whirling of the stream’, while ἐκ λίμνης means ‘from the pool in the water’; for this reason, he also calls Oceanus λίμνη (sc. <i>Od.</i> 3.1).	‘From the whirlpool (ἐκ δίνης)’: Aristarchus [reads] <u>ἐκ δίνης</u> , others <u>ἐκ λίμνης</u> .

On the basis of Aristonicus alone, it is impossible to determine which variant Aristarchus preferred; rather, it would seem to be a case of double readings, both accepted by him. It is Didymus, in this case, who reveals that Aristarchus read ἐκ δίνης and others ἐκ λίμνης. Didymus does not say anything else, however, and only Aristonicus provides some information about Aristarchus’ opinion on these two variants. Similarly, Didymus is much less informative than Aristonicus in this instance:

Aristonicus	Didymus
<i>Sch. Il.</i> 9.694b μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι: ὅτι ἐξ ἄλλων τόπων (sc. <i>Il.</i> 8.29) ἐστὶν ὁ στίχος· νῦν γὰρ οὐχ ἀρμόζει· τότε γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐπιφωνεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου καταπληκτικά τινα προενέγκηται. νῦν δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐπὶ Ὀδυσσέως λέγοιτο τοῦ μηνύοντος τὰ ὑπ’ Ἀχιλλέως εἰρημένα;	<i>Sch. Il.</i> 9.694a ² μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι: Ζηνόδοτος τὸν στίχον οὐ γράφει. Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ ἀθετεῖ. ^a
‘Wondering at his words’: because the line comes from other places (sc. <i>Il.</i> 8.29). For now it does not fit: for at that time it was customary to respond [with marvel] when the one in power had said something striking in his speech. But now how could this be said of Odysseus reporting Achilles’ words?	‘Wondering at his words’: Zenodotus does not write the line. Aristarchus athetizes it.

^aThis scholium is preserved in both A and T. Another short scholium in A does not even mention Aristarchus: *Sch. Il.* 9.694a¹ (Did.) <μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι> γράφεται καὶ ‘φρασσάμενοι’. Ζηνόδοτος δὲ τὸν στίχον οὐκ ἔγραφεν, Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ ἠθέτει [‘wondering at his words’: it is also written ‘φρασσάμενοι’ [pondering]. Zenodotus did not write the line and Aristophanes athetized it].

Aristarchus athetized the line, as both Didymus and Aristonicus report. While Didymus adds that Zenodotus did not even write it, only Aristonicus transmits the reason why Aristarchus had problems with that line.⁸⁷ There are even cases where Didymus does not notice Aristarchus' atheteseis, to which Aristonicus clearly attests, for example at *Il.* 24.20–21 (see Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 24.20–1a^{1.2} and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 24.20–1b^{1.2}).

Sometimes Aristonicus and Didymus even seem to contradict each other, when they give different accounts of Aristarchus' solution. A closer analysis, however, often shows that the discrepancy is due to the different sources they consulted. In particular, Aristonicus used the Homeric commentary and the monograph *On the Camp* but does not seem to know the latest stage of Aristarchus' work on Homer, which was not preserved in commentaries, but only in his final, second edition, possibly edited by his own students.⁸⁸ Even though Aristonicus may not report the latest stage of Aristarchus' editorial choices, he is the most valuable source for Aristarchus' exegesis as preserved in the commentaries. Indeed, the lack of originality of Aristonicus, who tended to disappear behind the 'master' and merely to report the reasons for a critical sign without independent analysis, makes him an excellent source for Aristarchus' actual thought. On the contrary, Didymus cannot be considered a trustworthy witness of Aristarchus' fragments by default: despite the fact that the title of his work was *On the Aristarchean Recension*, he comes across not only as a collector of Aristarchus' editorial choices but as a far more independent scholar who, though starting from Aristarchus' work, also discussed and judged it, inserting information from other sources. Moreover, the 'sloppiness' which Didymus, the 'book-forgetter', is famous for⁸⁹ should make us wary about placing excessive trust in him.⁹⁰ For a study on Aristarchus' methodology, then, Aristonicus is certainly the best source, even if he might not have reported the final stage of Aristarchus' Homeric recension.

87. See Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3 for a discussion of this athetesis. Similar is the case of Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 13.658–9b and Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 13.658–9a (discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2).

88. Aristarchus probably produced a first set of commentaries on Homer, then his first edition, then a second set of commentaries (used by Aristonicus), and then a final edition; see Chapter 1.2 § 4. Unlike Aristonicus, Didymus knows both editions, and so preserves the latest stage of Aristarchus' editorial work on Homer, which Aristonicus does not seem to have accessed; see Schironi 2015.

89. See West 1970.

90. On the contrary, because Didymus consulted more sources, Lehrs 1882, 27–28, Ludwich 1884–1885, I 23, 64–67, and van der Valk 1963–1964, I 554, gave preference to him over Aristonicus. Furthermore, Ludwich 1884–1885, I 115–118, considered every scholium beginning with οὐτως even without the mention of Aristarchus as preserving Aristarchus' readings. A more balanced assessment of Didymus at work is given by West 2001, 46–85.

5. Selecting Aristarchus' Fragments for This Study

This survey has shown just how complex the Aristarchean tradition is and how difficult it can be to isolate what is really an Aristarchean fragment from what is not. The complexity has undoubtedly been a discouraging factor to any attempt to produce a complete edition of Aristarchus' fragments.⁹¹ The goal of my work is more circumscribed: rather than assembling a complete collection of Aristarchus' fragments, my interest lies in presenting Aristarchus' work, methodology, and scholarship through the analysis of *some* of his fragments in the *scholia maiora* to the *Iliad*. Yet even for a more limited and less ambitious project like mine, some principles must be followed when selecting the evidence to work with. Thus, of all the scholia to the *Iliad* as edited by Erbse, I have considered those which explicitly mention the name of Aristarchus. This criterion holds for the exegetical scholia, for the D scholia, and for the scholia attributed by Erbse to Didymus, Herodian, and Nicanor. The exception is the scholia of Aristonicus (that is: those labeled 'Ariston.' by Erbse), which I considered fragments of Aristarchus even in the absence of direct reference to him.⁹²

With these selection criteria I have collected approximately 4,300 scholia: some of them are simply the same scholium repeated in A, bT, and Ge (meaning that they actually count as only one fragment). The scholia that derive only from the *Venetus A*—that is, fragments that in principle refer to different lines of the *Iliad* and so are really different fragments⁹³—make up more than 3,400 separate fragments.⁹⁴ As for the fragments derived from the VMK (as transmitted by A, bT, and Ge), my selection includes more than 3,000 scholia by Aristonicus, about 950 by Didymus, about 220 by Herodian, and 14 by Nicanor. This is a large amount of material, which has allowed me to study Aristarchus' approach to the *Iliad* in a systematic manner. Since the Aristonicus scholia will be the bulk of my evidence, in order not to clutter the text with repetitive labels, all the Aristonicus scholia will be normally quoted without reference to him, except in cases where the indication is necessary to avoid confusion; in all the other cases (D scholia, exegetical scholia, as well as

91. Van Thiel 2014a has finally produced an edition of Aristarchus' fragments to the *Iliad*; however, his ideas about what counts as a 'fragment' of an Alexandrian scholar are questionable (see Chapter 1.2 § 2.2). Nevertheless, his work is no doubt a starting point—whether or not it will be eventually accepted by the scholarly community.

92. Among the Aristonicus fragments I have also included those which Erbse doubtfully attributed to him (labeled 'Ariston.?'). Yet I have usually indicated when the scholium I discuss is considered a doubtful one by Erbse.

93. Unless we have concurrent scholia belonging to different typologies in A (for example, inter-linear and marginal scholia) and referring to the same line and the same lemma.

94. I also include in this figure the scholia from A^a (*Athous Gr. Vatopedi* 595) for the folios which are missing in the *Venetus A* since the two manuscripts are related (see above, footnote 35 and stemma at p. 11).

scholia by Didymus, Herodian, and Nicanor) the origin of the scholium will be given, either in brackets or by introducing it in a way which will make its origin explicit.⁹⁵ Moreover, I will not specify the manuscripts carrying the scholia I quote or refer to. For this information, one should refer to Erbse's edition.

6. Words and Content in Aristarchus' Fragments

Because the testimony provided by Didymus seems to be much more complex to analyze, and because my interest lies in Aristarchus' exegesis and methodology rather than in specific readings, I have focused my attention on Aristonicus. In considering Aristonicus a trustworthy witness for Aristarchus' views, I am following the modern scholarly consensus.⁹⁶

Yet, even so, the evidence I had to deal with was extensive and difficult to interpret. In order to study this large amount of material I have worked by isolating keywords and key issues. In fact, for this kind of inquiry, little can be learned by looking at individual scholia in isolation; in order to have a significant picture of Aristarchus' activity, one must look at all the scholia that deal with the same or similar questions and from there try to understand the principles and methodology that Aristarchus was using.

Many of the chapters and subsections in this book will center on a Greek term indicating a certain concept which Aristarchus employed in his exegetical activity. But caution is necessary here. First, with Aristarchus, we are dealing

95. This is also valid for the Odyssean scholia to which I will refer. While the new edition by Pontani indicates the origin of each scholium on Erbse's model, the old edition by Dindorf (Oxford 1855) does not provide this information. The VMK fragments in the scholia to the *Odyssey* are collected by Carnuth 1869 (Aristonicus), Ludwich 1884–1885, I 507–631 (Didymus), Lentz 1868, 129–165 (Herodian), and Carnuth 1875 (Nicanor). I have adopted Pontani's attributions for the scholia to *Od.* 1–6; for those to *Od.* 7–24 I have followed these collections and their attribution to the VMK authors; in particular, I have considered the scholia present in Carnuth 1869 as derived from Aristonicus and those in Ludwich 1884–1885, I 507–631, as derived from Didymus (see Index IV for specific references to the collections of Carnuth and Ludwich for *Odyssey* scholia discussed in this volume).

96. So Lehrs 1882, 13 (who considered both Aristonicus and Didymus the best sources for Aristarchus, but preferred the latter; see Lehrs 1882, 27–28); Schmidt 1976, 9, and 2002, 169; Lührs 1992, 4–5; Matthaios 1999, 37 and 43–45; West 2001, 46; Janko (private communication); Nagy 2009a, 35–36 (but he gives a different reason for why Didymus is less reliable); Bouchard 2016, 25. On the contrary, Roemer 1912 and 1924 as well as van der Valk 1963–1964, I 553–592, dismissed Aristonicus' testimony. Roemer did so in order to defend his thesis that Aristarchus was an infallible critic, and so he 'explained' all the mistakes in Aristarchus' exegesis as due to Aristonicus' misunderstanding of Aristarchus' comments or to the poor transmission of Aristonicus' notes in the *Venetus A* (in fact, Roemer used the bT scholia, Porphyry, and Eustathius to 'save' Aristarchus). Van der Valk, instead, thought that Aristonicus often (but not always) distorted Aristarchus' views; sometimes, however, Aristonicus' mistakes were also due to the fact that Aristarchus' reasons for a specific critical sign could no longer be ascertained (see esp. van der Valk 1963–1964, I 561). On Roemer's and van der Valk's use of the scholia, see Schmidt 1976, 13–15 and 23, and Preface § 2.

not with his own work, transmitted by direct tradition, but with the scholia from the VMK and in particular those by Aristonicus. Though beyond a doubt derived from Aristarchus, these scholia are excerpts of his work, and thus may not necessarily preserve Aristarchus' *ipsissima verba*. This is especially true for grammatical terminology, since grammatical and linguistic analysis evolved considerably between the time of Aristarchus (third to second century BCE) and that of Aristonicus (first century BCE to early first century CE). Thus, Aristonicus had at his disposal a much more precise and extended vocabulary for grammatical categories, and so we cannot exclude the possibility that he might have rephrased Aristarchus' original wording in order to update it with the new terminology of the 'art of grammar' (τέχνη γραμματική).⁹⁷ For a different kind of vocabulary, that of literary criticism and more generally of exegesis, the situation is somewhat different and more favorable. First, keywords found in the Aristarchean scholia (for example, περισσός, μεταφορά, πρόσωπον, πρέπον, σύνθεσις, διάνοια, to name just a few) are part of a common vocabulary, shared by all scholars discussing literary texts (including Crates and the *kritikoi* too)⁹⁸ between the fourth century BCE and the early first century CE. Thus, in this field, unlike with grammar and linguistics, the vocabulary available to Aristonicus was essentially the same as that available to Aristarchus. When dealing with interpretation and exegesis in a broader sense, therefore, it is much more likely that Aristonicus did not change the wording he found in Aristarchus' *hypomnemata*. Moreover, most of the terms in this field are not, strictly speaking, 'technical terminology', since adjectives like εὐτελής, ἀπίθανος, and περισσός and adverbs like ἰδίως and κυρίως are part of the standard Greek vocabulary. They were also used by Aristotle as well as other Greek authors in literary exegesis, but were not 'invented' to express technical notions (as happened for the parts of speech of the *techne grammatike*). Nevertheless, even if there is no guarantee that the terms in the Aristonicus scholia are really those utilized by Aristarchus, what really matters is not the 'form', but the 'content' of these words, i.e., the concepts that they express. Since Aristonicus' goal was to preserve Aristarchus' opinions concerning a line, what matters most are the *ideas* that his scholia disclose. Thus, in what follows, even if I use Greek nouns, adjectives, and phrases to indicate certain principles adopted by Aristarchus in his work on Homer, my focus is rather on the content they convey—Aristarchus' ideas—than on the very words used in

97. See Schenkeveld 1994, 276–278. Matthaïos himself is aware of this problem, and rightly sets out his method: a term attested in Aristonicus goes back to Aristarchus if the same term is also attested in a direct quotation of Aristarchus; otherwise, one must prove that a term used by Aristonicus was also employed with the same meaning at Aristarchus' time through the analysis of other sources. See Matthaïos 1999, 45–46, 520–522.

98. See, e.g., Schironi 2009, 304–312. On Crates and the *kritikoi*, see Chapter 6 § 6.

the Aristonicus scholia.⁹⁹ From this perspective, the analysis through keywords is fundamentally an analysis of ‘key ideas’, *normally* expressed in the scholia by certain terms. Whether or not the terms go back to Aristarchus is impossible to know; what counts, however, are the ideas underlying certain terms, and these ideas do go back to Aristarchus, once we have accepted that Aristonicus preserves Aristarchus’ ideas.

To conclude, recovering the original wording of Aristarchus is impossible, and this caveat should be constantly kept in mind when dealing with an Aristonicus scholium. Though the content is, with all probability, ascribable to Aristarchus, the actual wording may be not original. Yet the analysis through keywords is a very good procedure with which to track scholia dealing with specific issues and to isolate important critical, exegetical, and grammatical concepts. Readers could thus consider the Greek ‘labels’ which will be so often used in this book as proxies for Aristarchus’ ideas and convenient search-keywords to navigate scholiastic corpora and scholarly Greek literature.

99. See also Lührs 1992, 16, who compares the lack of a consistent terminology in the Aristonicus scholia with the lack of uniformity in Aristotelian terminology.

1.2

Aristarchus on Homer

Monographs, Editions, and Commentaries

1. Homeric Monographs
2. Editions (*Ekdoseis*) and Commentaries (*Hypomnemata*): The Evidence
 - 2.1. Ammonius and the Homeric *Ekdosis* of Aristarchus
 - 2.2. *Ekdoseis* and *Hypomnemata*: Different Reconstructions
3. The Impact of Aristarchus' Recension on the Text of Homer
4. *Ekdoseis* and *Hypomnemata*: Some Tentative Conclusions

The *Suda* says that Aristarchus prepared more than 800 books, among commentaries (*hypomnemata*) alone;¹ even if this figure is likely to be wrong,² his production was nonetheless extensive. In addition to Homer, we know that he also worked on Hesiod, Archilochus, Alcman, Alcaeus, Anacreon, Pindar, and perhaps Bacchylides; he might also have studied Sappho and Stesichorus, though the evidence for this is extremely slim.³ As for drama, he worked on Aeschylus, Sophocles, Aristophanes, and perhaps also Euripides and Ion of Chios. Among prose authors, he certainly wrote a *hypomnema* on Herodotus (*P.Amherst* 2.12), probably worked on Thucydides and Plato,⁴ and perhaps even wrote about Hippocrates.⁵ Even though Aristarchus' range of interests was not limited to Homer, his scholarly activity was mainly focused on him, with a

1. *Su.* α 3892 . . . λέγεται δὲ γράψαι ὑπὲρ ω' βιβλία ὑπομνημάτων μόνων.

2. See Pfeiffer 1968, 213.

3. For a survey, see Pfeiffer 1968, 219–225. The only evidence for Aristarchus' study of Sappho and Stesichorus is *P.Oxy.* 2506 (first or early second century CE), which collects many fragments coming from a monograph (*syngramma*) on lyric poets. Aristarchus is quoted in fr. 6a.6 and perhaps in fr. 79.7 (mostly in lacuna), but there is no way to link these two possible quotations of Aristarchus with Sappho and Stesichorus (who are mentioned in the papyrus elsewhere).

4. Cf. Schironi 2005.

5. See *Erot.* 5.14–19. Cf. Manetti 2015, 1144–1145.

fairly diverse output. He produced editions, commentaries, and monographs on Homer, as we gather from the scholia of Didymus and Aristonicus.⁶ The impression is that an interest in Homer accompanied Aristarchus throughout his life, and so his scholarly production on Homer is difficult to organize, both in terms of the kind of works he composed and their relative chronology.

1. Homeric Monographs

Aristarchus' activity on Homer was not limited to editions and commentaries: he also wrote monographs (συγγράμματα) addressing specific points. Most of the monographs are known through Didymus. He quotes a treatise *Against Co-manus* (Πρὸς Κομανόν) three times (*Sch. Il.* 1.97–9; 2.798a; 24.110b¹)⁷ and one *Against Philitas* (Πρὸς Φιλίταν) twice (*Sch. Il.* 1.524c; 2.111b).⁸ Didymus also mentions a work *Against the Paradox of Xenon* (Πρὸς τὸ Ξένωνος παράδοξον) in *Sch. Il.* 12.435a¹ and one *On the Iliad and the Odyssey* (Περὶ Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας) in *Sch. Il.* 9.349–50.⁹ Aristonicus mentions one more monograph: *On the Camp* (Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου), which is explicitly quoted twice (*Sch. Il.* 12.258a; 15.449–51a)¹⁰ but probably referred to in many other Aristonicus scholia (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 10.53b). Unfortunately, the paucity of available quotations does not make the content of these monographs clear.

6. On the basis of Erbse's attributions, I have collected all the references to Aristarchus' activity, including mentions of *hypomnemata*, monographs, editions by Aristarchus, other specific editions, etc. The following discussion thus will start from an analysis of Aristarchus' works quoted by Aristonicus and Didymus in order to understand what material was available to each of them. As discussed in Chapter 1.1 § 3, the very presence of some specific terms is also used to attribute a scholium to either Didymus or Aristonicus in the first place. For example, the mention of αἱ Ἀριστάρχου in a scholium suggests an attribution to Didymus, while references to critical signs indicate that the scholium is by Aristonicus. Thus, in part, this is circular reasoning. Once we accept Erbse's attributions (as I do in this work), however, a systematic analysis of these expressions and their use provides a precious window on Aristonicus' and Didymus' sources as well as on Aristarchus' production on Homer.

7. The work is openly said to be 'by Aristarchus' in *Sch. Il.* 24.110b¹.

8. The work is openly said to be 'by Aristarchus' in *Sch. Il.* 1.524c.

9. While *Sch. Il.* 9.349–50 attributes *On the Iliad and the Odyssey* to Aristarchus, *Sch. Il.* 12.435a¹ mentions the treatise *Against the Paradox of Xenon* without giving its author. According to the criteria established in Chapter 1.1 § 5 for considering a scholium a 'fragment' of Aristarchus, this scholium must be excluded from this study since Didymus does not explicitly mention Aristarchus. Still, the monograph *Against the Paradox of Xenon* is generally attributed to Aristarchus by scholars (cf. Montanari 1988, 119) and I will follow the scholarly consensus.

10. In these two scholia Aristonicus refers to this monograph without indicating its author; however, given his exclusive topic of interest and the fact that, as a rule, he never mentions the name of Aristarchus (see Chapter 1.1 § 4.1), it is clear that the author is Aristarchus.

In particular, Didymus, who quotes most of the monographs, is only interested in Aristarchus' readings, so the information we can get from his references about the content of these *syngrammata* is extremely limited. For example, both quotations from *Against Philitas* (*Sch. Il.* 1.524c and 2.111b) discuss a reading by Aristarchus, but do not say what Philitas' opinion was and how Aristarchus argued against it. Philitas might have chosen the concurrent reading, which Aristarchus rejects in these scholia—ἐπινεύσομαι instead of the Aristarchean κατανεύσομαι in *Il.* 1.524¹¹ and μέγα instead of the Aristarchean μέγας in *Il.* 2.111¹²—but this is speculative. More interesting is the way Didymus introduces the quotation from the monograph in *Sch. Il.* 2.111b: 'And if we are to give preference to the monographs over the commentaries, for the sake of accuracy we would write, following Aristarchus: Ζεὺς με μέγας'.¹³ This phrasing suggests that Didymus used the monographs as evidence of equal value to the commentaries in order to find out Aristarchus' preferred readings. The quotations from *Against Comanus* provide us with a similar picture. In *Sch. Il.* 2.798a, Didymus observes that the reading ἤδη μὲν (instead of ἦ μὲν δή) is to be found in the editions of Aristarchus (αἱ Ἀριστάρχου) and in the treatise *Against Comanus*. Thus, Aristarchus seems to have discussed the same philological problems in the monographs that he had treated in his *ekdoseis*, namely, variant readings. On the other hand, at *Il.* 24.110, the scholia by Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 24.110b^{1,2}) and Aristonicus (*Sch. Il.* 24.110a) agree on the reading of Aristarchus (προϊάπτω and not προτιάπτω), but Didymus adds that he found this reading in *Against Comanus*, a work that Aristonicus does not seem to know. Two scenarios are possible: either Aristonicus simply did not record the source of this information, or this reading was recorded both in the monograph *Against Comanus* (consulted by Didymus) and in the *hypomnema* (consulted by Aristonicus).

While these examples should be a warning against the idea that all the fragments of Aristarchus always come from his *hypomnemata*, they also make it difficult to guess what these monographs were about. In fact, the great similarity of content and phrasing between *hypomnemata* and monographs found in the Homeric scholia is probably more due to the way Didymus excerpted those sources than to a real overlap in content. In all the fragments from the treatises *Against Comanus* or *Against Philitas*, Didymus does not say anything about the possible criticisms which Aristarchus might have raised 'against' Comanus¹⁴ or

11. Cf. Dettori 2000, 184–185 (fr. dub. 30); Spanoudakis 2002, 379–380 (fr. 54).

12. Cf. Dettori 2000, 186 (fr. dub. 31); Spanoudakis 2002, 380 (fr. 55) and 394. On Aristarchus and Philitas, see also Chapter 4 § 3.

13. Cf. Schironi 2015, 612–615.

14. The same is valid for *Sch. Il.* 1.97–9, where Didymus quotes directly from the *Against Comanus*, but the quotation only explains the meaning of two Homeric expressions without any polemical content. On Comanus' and Aristarchus' statuses at the Ptolemaic court, see McKechnie 2011.

Philitas. His silence, however, does not mean that there was none. Aristarchus may have treated the same questions in both the Homeric commentaries and the monographs, but in the latter his attitude must have been polemical, as he was probably fighting against the proponent of a different solution. Didymus, however, ignored the polemical flavor of the monographs and used them in the same way and with the same goals as the *ekdoseis* or the *hypomnemata*: for getting information about Aristarchus' editorial choices and not for exploring his attitude toward other colleagues.

The last 'polemical' monograph, *Against the Paradox of Xenon*, is even more mysterious. It is again quoted only once by Didymus:

Sch. Il. 12.435a¹ (Did.) ἀεικέα: οὕτως μετὰ τοῦ ν 'ἀνεικέα', ἔξω νείκους, τὸ ἴσον αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμουσα. ἄμεινον δέ, φησὶν, 'ἀεικέα', τὸν εὐτελεῖ. ἐν δὲ τῷ Πρὸς τὸ Ξένωνος παράδοξον προφέρεται 'ἀμεμφέα {μισθόν}'.

'Meager (ἀεικέα) [wage]': so ἀνεικέα with ν, [meaning] 'without fraud', assigning an equal share to them. But, he says, it is better [to read] ἀεικέα, [which means] 'frugal'. In the work *Against the Paradox of Xenon*, he chooses ἀμεμφέα ['without reproach'].

Again, from the only fragment that Didymus transmits, it is impossible to have an idea of the 'polemical' content of this monograph and what Xenon's 'paradox' was. If Xenon is identified as one of the Chorizontes, the scholars who denied that Homer composed both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*,¹⁵ he would be a prime polemical target for Aristarchus.¹⁶ In this case, the paradox of Xenon might have been related to his denial of the unique authorship of the Homeric poems. This fragment is interesting because, assuming that the subject of the verb φησὶν is Aristarchus, then the scholium records Aristarchus' change of mind; after first choosing ἀεικέα (presumably in his *ekdosis*), in *Against the Paradox of Xenon* he chose ἀμεμφέα.¹⁷

15. The identification is suggested by Procl. *Chrest.* 102.2–3; see discussion in Chapter 5.2 § 2.1.

16. Even if the scholium anonymously refers to this monograph (see above, footnote 9), the fact that it was addressed against the 'separatist' Xenon makes its attribution to Aristarchus extremely plausible, as the Chorizontes were among the main targets of the Alexandrian scholar (see Chapter 5.2).

17. Cf. Montanari 1988, 120–121 (test. 2). From the scholium it is not possible to understand what came first, even if the ordering of the two readings seems to support the view that the monograph was written later. This would be against Dyck 1988, 224 n. 13, who suggested that the *syngrammata*, such as *Against Comanus*, *Against Philitas*, and *Against the Paradox of Xenon*, were a sort of preliminary work, which Aristarchus composed at the beginning of his career. The priority of the monographs over the commentaries, however, does not seem to be supported by the evidence; certainly, the treatise *On the Camp* was composed after the second set of commentaries; see below and Schironi 2015, 615 and 616.

Of the two nonpolemical monographs, *On the Iliad and the Odyssey* is quoted by Didymus only in *Sch. Il.* 9.349–50, where he notes that in this monograph Aristarchus chose two specific readings in lines 349 and 350 (‘καὶ ἤλασεν ἔκτοθι τάφρον’ and ‘περὶ δὲ σκόλοπας κατέπηξεν’). Interestingly enough, in two other scholia Didymus reports the same readings without specifying from which of Aristarchus’ works they originated: in *Sch. Il.* 9.349 (Ἀρίσταρχος ‘καὶ ἤλασεν ἔκτοθι τάφρον’) and in *Sch. Il.* 9.350b (Ἀρίσταρχος ‘περὶ δὲ σκόλοπας’). Without *Sch. Il.* 9.349–50, we would simply believe that these two readings were found in the *ekdosis*; this might be true, as they might have been present *also* in one of Aristarchus’ editions, but there is no evidence for this—Didymus simply says he found them in the monograph. This again shows that we must be cautious and not automatically ascribe any reading mentioned by Didymus to Aristarchus’ *ekdoseis* or *hypomnemata*. As in previous cases, it is impossible to know the topic of the treatise *On the Iliad and the Odyssey* simply from Didymus’ excerpting. As a mere hypothesis, I can suggest that, if Xenon is identified with the Chorizon and if the work *Against the Paradox of Xenon* was about the authorship of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, then *On the Iliad and the Odyssey* might be an alternative title for the same work.¹⁸

There is much more evidence for the monograph *On the Camp* (Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου),¹⁹ which is never quoted by Didymus but only by Aristonicus and (perhaps) Nicanor. Didymus’ silence can be explained in two ways: either Didymus did not have the monograph at his disposal, or he had it in the Library but did not consult it because he was not interested in it. Indeed, the topic of the work (the Achaean camp on the Trojan shore) seems to suggest that the treatise mostly dealt with the geography of the poem, and so was not a good source for Aristarchus’ readings—unlike the polemical monographs mentioned above, which instead also discussed variants in the poems. Aristonicus quotes the treatise *On the Camp* twice (*Sch. Il.* 12.258a and 15.449–51a). *Sch. Il.* 12.258a opposes the commentaries to the monograph (ὅτι κρόσσας ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι κεφαλίδας, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου κλίμακας), which shows that Aristonicus consulted both. In *Sch. Il.* 15.449–51a, he mentions an athetesis from which Aristarchus retreated later on in the work *On the Camp* (ὥστερον δὲ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου ἀπολογεῖται); such a comment proves that this monograph was composed later than the commentaries.²⁰ In addition,

18. As Tyler Mayo pointed out to me, Diogenes Laertius (3.57–60) tells us that Thrasyllus (d. 36 CE, close to Didymus) gave every Platonic dialogue (called by the names they have now) a *περί* title too. So Didymus could be following a common scholarly practice of his time. On the other hand, for Ludwich 1884–1885, I 305.1 (n.), the work *On the Iliad and the Odyssey* must have been an introduction to Homer, where the question of Homer’s dating was also discussed.

19. On this monograph and its content, see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.

20. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 6.4a, analyzed in Schironi 2015, 616–617.

many other scholia of Aristonicus discuss the Achaean camp; some also speak of τὰ περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου, ‘the question of the camp’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.53b; 10.110; 10.112; 11.6; 13.681a) or mention a drawing, a map (διάγραμμα) of the camp (*Sch. Il.* 11.166a; 11.807a). Still, all these Aristarchean fragments ‘on the camp’ could come either from the *hypomnema* or from the monograph.²¹

2. Editions (*Ekdoseis*) and Commentaries (*Hypomnemata*): The Evidence

Even if monographs were important, Aristarchus’ work on Homer was most famously concerned with editions and commentaries. Didymus often mentions the ‘edition’ (ἡ Ἀριστάρχου [sc. ἔκδοσις]), as well as the ‘editions’ of Aristarchus (αἱ Ἀριστάρχου and ἡ δευτέρα/ἑτέρα τῶν Ἀριστάρχου),²² or lists two variants given by him—comments that make it clear that he saw two editions of Aristarchus. Since Didymus once speaks of the ‘revised’ editions (*Sch. Il.* 7.130a¹: αἱ ἐξητασμένοι Ἀριστάρχου),²³ scholars have concluded that Aristarchus produced two successive editions. On the other hand, Aristonicus never mentions any *ekdosis* by Aristarchus. As for the commentaries, both Didymus and Aristonicus refer to Aristarchus’ *hypomnemata*, but Didymus also talks about *hypomnemata* based on the edition of Aristophanes (*Sch. Il.* 2.133a: τὰ κατ’ Ἀριστοφάνην ὑπομνήματα Ἀριστάρχου) and about the ‘perfected’ *hypomnemata* (*Sch. Il.* 2.111b: τὰ ἡκριβωμένα ὑπομνήματα).

In summary, Didymus seems to have known two editions and two sets of commentaries of Aristarchus. Aristonicus ignores the editions and focuses on the commentaries, but does not seem to have known that there was more than one set of commentaries.²⁴ Two questions thus are open: (1) What was the

21. Nicanor, too, refers to a Περὶ ναυστάθμου (without the article) twice, in *Sch. Il.* 12.258b and 18.68–9. In neither instance, however, does he mention Aristarchus, and the *Suda* (v 375) lists a work Περὶ ναυστάθμου among those of Nicanor. Yet in those scholia Nicanor voices Aristarchus’ views about the arrangements of the ships in the Achaean camp (see *Sch. Il.* 12.258a; 14.35a), so he was probably referring to Aristarchus’ monograph (cf. Goedhart 1879, 97, and West 2001, 79). From those references perhaps the false notion arose that Nicanor, too, had written a work *On the Camp*.

22. In full in *Sch. Il.* 2.221 (Did.): κὰν ταῖς Ἀριστάρχου ἐκδόσεσι.

23. If this is the correct way to understand the phrase (see, however, discussion in footnote 72), the plural ἐκδόσεις should be considered equivalent to the singular, as happens with the plural ὑπομνήματα, ‘commentaries’, which is analogous to the singular ὑπόμνημα to indicate ‘a’ commentary. The plural ὑπομνήματα is in fact more frequent and used by Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 6.4a and 12.258a and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 2.125a; 2.355a^{1,2}; 2.397b; 2.420a¹; 3.57a; 11.40a¹; 21.130–5a¹; 23.870–1a¹. Didymus employs the singular ὑπόμνημα in *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4 and 20.471a¹.

24. On the Aristarchean sources available to Didymus and Aristonicus, see West 2001, 61–67, 73–75, and Schironi 2015.

relationship between *ekdosis* and *hypomnema*? (2) How many *ekdoseis* and how many *hypomnemata* did Aristarchus produce?

2.1. Ammonius and the Homeric *Ekdosis* of Aristarchus

A key source for Aristarchus' Homeric *ekdoseis* is the testimony of Ammonius, a scholar quoted several times by Didymus. In one scholium (*Sch. Il.* 2.111b), Ammonius is simply listed as an Aristarchean adopting a reading of his teacher, but elsewhere Didymus considers him the successor of Aristarchus at the school (*Sch. Il.* 10.397–9a: Ἀμμωνίῳ τῷ διαδεξαμένῳ τὴν σχολήν). This information is confirmed by the *Suda*, which says that he took over the school of Aristarchus 'before Augustus' and that he was acquainted with 'Alexander', who might be Alexander Polyhistor (ca. 110–40 BCE).²⁵ Such a dating seems to accord with *P.Oxy.* 1241, which mentions one Ammonius 'under Ptolemy IX' (116–81 BCE). From Didymus' quotations, Ammonius appears to have suggested readings in Homer (*Sch. Il.* 15.162b [Did.?²⁶]) and written a monograph Πρὸς Ἀθηνοκλέα (*Sch. Il.* 3.368a; 7.7a¹) against the grammarian Athenocles of Cyzicus (third to second century BCE), as well as a treatise on Plato's borrowings from Homer (*Sch. Il.* 9.540a¹: Περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος μετενηνεγμένων ἐξ Ὁμήρου).

The two most important quotations from Ammonius in relation to Aristarchus' work (*Sch. Il.* 10.397–9a and 19.365–8a¹) are due to Didymus' uncertainties about Aristarchus' choices,²⁶ since Didymus seems to have consulted Ammonius when he had doubts about Aristarchus' readings.²⁷ In *Sch. Il.* 10.397–9a Ammonius is credited with a work entitled *On the Fact That There Were No Multiple Editions of Aristarchus' Recension* (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι πλείονας ἐκδόσεις τῆς Ἀρισταρχείου διορθώσεως), while in *Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹ Didymus mentions Ammonius' *On the Re-edited Recension* (i.e., of Aristarchus) (Περὶ τῆς ἐπεκδοθείσης διορθώσεως). The presence of these two

25. *Su.* α 1641 Ἀμμώνιος: Ἀμμωνίου, Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, Ἀλεξάνδρου γνώριμος, ὃς καὶ διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν Ἀριστάρχου πρὸ τοῦ μοναρχῆσαι τὸν Αὐγουστον [Ammonius: son of Ammonius, Alexandrian, acquainted with Alexander, who also took over the school of Aristarchus before the kingdom of Augustus]. On the meaning of Ἀλεξάνδρου γνώριμος in this entry (was Ammonius a friend of Alexander Polyhistor? Or was a certain Alexander Ammonius' predecessor at the head of the school of Aristarchus? Or is Ἀλεξάνδρου γνώριμος a mistake for Ἀριστάρχου γνώριμος?), see Blau 1883, 6 with n. 2; Perrotta 1928, 152–153.

26. For the analysis of Ammonius' quotation in these two sets of scholia, see Erbse 1959, 276–277, 296–298; Montanari 1998, 11–18 and Montanari 2000, 479–483; Nagy 2009a, 21–33 (*passim*); Schironi 2015, 617–624. On *Sch. Il.* 10.397–9a, cf. also Roemer 1912, 276–278; Lührs 1992, 229–231, 233–237; Filoni 2007.

27. On Didymus' uncertainties about Aristarchus' readings, see Lehrs 1882, 16–17, 27–28; Ludwig 1884–1885, I 38–41; West 2001, 63–67. Ludwig and West both explain those uncertainties by assuming that Didymus did not have the original work of Aristarchus any longer but copies which he did not trust. Cf. also Roemer 1912, 101–102.

titles compels us to consider whether they are the same work or two different ones. The titles are different, but it is well known that titles in antiquity were less fixed than today, and sometimes a title could simply be a description of the content of a work. Thus, if Ammonius wrote a treatise about Aristarchus' *ekdosis* supporting a certain thesis, both the title *On the Fact That There Were No Multiple Editions of Aristarchus' Recension* and *On the Re-edited Recension* could refer to the same work.

The testimony of Ammonius has been considered central to the question of Aristarchus' work on Homer. Lehrs suggested that the first title of Ammonius meant that there were no more than two editions of Aristarchus' recension, and that these were the two editions to which Didymus so often refers; for Lehrs, then, one had to supplement the title and read *Περὶ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι πλείονας ἐκδόσεις τῆς Ἀρισταρχείου διορθώσεως [τῶν δύο]*.²⁸ Without distorting the text (and the sense of the phrase), Villoison,²⁹ Wolf,³⁰ Erbse,³¹ Pfeiffer,³² and van Thiel³³ instead concluded that Aristarchus published only one edition and that a revised edition was published by his pupils; this would account for Ammonius' title about the existence of only one edition by Aristarchus, for his mention of a 're-edited recension', and for Didymus' awareness that Aristarchus had often given two different opinions on a particular reading.³⁴ More recently, Montanari³⁵ has tried to provide another solution to accommodate all the data and avoid the inconsistency in Ammonius' words. He suggests that the *ἐκδοθεῖσα διόρθωσις* and the *ἐπεκδοθεῖσα διόρθωσις* were two modified versions of the same text because Aristarchus' *diorthosis* was a work in progress. In the same roll containing his first *ekdosis*, which was a standard Homeric text furnished with critical signs and marginal variants,³⁶ Aristarchus kept annotating his ideas and readings, even after he had completed this first *ekdosis* and written the second

28. Lehrs 1882, 23–24. So also Ludwich 1884–1885, I 16–17.

29. Villoison 1788, xxvi–xxvii.

30. Wolf 1795/1985, 194–195.

31. Erbse 1959, 276–277 and 297.

32. Pfeiffer 1968, 216–217.

33. Van Thiel 1992, 1 n. 1, 29–30; van Thiel 1997, 25, 34; on van Thiel's reconstruction of Aristarchus' *ekdosis*, see below.

34. Villoison 1788, xxvii, also speculated that Ammonius might have thought that concurrent readings had been collected at the same time in his *ekdosis* by Aristarchus, who was not sure about which one was to be preferred (*fortasse Ammonius putavit Aristarchum simul uno eodemque tempore et in eadem editione duas diversas ejusdem Homerici loci lectiones, de quibus ambigebat, proposuisse et lectoris arbitrio permisisse*).

35. Montanari 1998, 18–19; Montanari 2000, 479–483; Montanari 2002, 125–127; and again Montanari 2015, 657–660.

36. The prevailing opinion of modern scholars is that an ancient 'critical edition' was not a new, 'clean' text edited by a scholar with his own preferred readings inserted in the text but rather a standard Homeric text 'edited' with marginal variants and critical signs; see below, § 3, and Chapter 2.1.

hypomnemata (in which he had explained and discussed his readings of the first *ekdosis*). Thus, Aristarchus' *diorthosis*, carried out throughout his life and in two phases, was physically contained in one and the same roll, which showed two sets of annotations (i.e., the two *ekdoseis*); the last one was what Ammonius calls the 're-edited recension' (ἐπεκδοθεῖσα διόρθωσις). Since Aristarchus did not write a third set of commentaries to explain the reasons for his latest readings and changes of mind, this second *ekdosis* or 're-edited recension' remained partly obscure, especially for readers who did not attend his lectures. The ἐπεκδοθεῖσα διόρθωσις remained in the Library and was available to Aristarchus' pupils, including Ammonius and Didymus. In conclusion, one could say that there was only one *ekdosis*, though it had been changed in the process of re-editing; this is what Ammonius' titles mean. Montanari's reconstruction is certainly plausible; yet the label ἐπεκδοθεῖσα seems to indicate some sort of 'edition' rather than a simple second set of comments on the same papyrus roll. If so, with the work *On the Fact That There Were No Multiple Editions of Aristarchus' Recension*, Ammonius could have said that Aristarchus himself did not publish a second *ekdosis*, but perhaps some of his pupils did, compelling Ammonius in turn to write a monograph denouncing this initiative, which he might have deemed illegitimate. Whichever reconstruction one chooses, whether or not the second recension was 'edited' by his pupils (as suggested by Villosion, Wolf, Erbse, Pfeiffer, and van Thiel) or was only preserved as annotations in Aristarchus' text (as suggested by Montanari), it seems certain that Aristarchus kept working on his Homeric recension and that at least two phases were recognizable in his editorial work.³⁷ Yet by the late second century or early first century BCE, when Ammonius was active, there were already doubts about the nature and development of Aristarchus' Homeric recension. This detail reinforces the dating of Ammonius as an Aristarchean pupil of the second or even third generation. His work on the editions of Aristarchus can be understood only if these editions were almost forgotten and if Aristarchus' direct disciples were no longer living.³⁸

2.2. *Ekdoseis* and *Hypomnemata*: Different Reconstructions

Ammonius' titles speak only of *diorthosis*, which is generally linked to an edition (*ekdosis*); the scholia by Didymus, however, also mention two sets of commentaries. Various solutions have been suggested in order to explain the relationship between these four different works (two *ekdoseis* and two sets of *hypomnemata*); here I will review the most important ones.

37. Cf. also West 2001, 62–63.

38. As noted by Perrotta 1928, 153.

In his *Prolegomena ad Homerum*,³⁹ Friedrich August Wolf was the first to address this question. According to him, Aristarchus had composed nothing but commentaries: there were two recensions of the *Iliad*, the first prepared by Aristarchus himself and discussed in the commentaries (so, not in a real 'edition'), and the second prepared by his pupils who 'edited' his notes. Karl Lehrs⁴⁰ instead suggested that Aristarchus did prepare two editions of Homer; among the commentaries quoted by Didymus, on the other hand, were both those prepared by Aristarchus himself (in part based on the edition of Aristophanes of Byzantium) and those prepared by his own pupils. This would explain why Didymus mentions many types of commentaries, some of which he seems to trust more than others (hence the expression τὰ ἡκριβωμένα ὑπομνήματα). This view was accepted by both Arthur Ludwich⁴¹ and Leopold Cohn.⁴²

Almost eighty years later, Hartmut Erbse⁴³ gave a different solution: Aristarchus prepared only one set of *hypomnemata* and did not prepare any separate edition; rather, he used the ancient vulgate as a working text. For Erbse, Aristarchus' critical activity was entirely limited to the commentaries because all his editorial choices were set out and discussed in the commentary, so the *ekdoseis* mentioned by Didymus are identical with the *hypomnemata*. The second 'commentary/edition' was simply a collection, assembled by Aristarchus' pupils on the basis of his lectures, of the places where he had changed his mind. With the title *On the Re-edited Recension*, Ammonius indicated that this work was an 'addition' to Aristarchus' *diorthosis*, containing his final ideas on Homer. Finally, according to Erbse, the references to two readings in Aristarchus' 'editions' is Didymus' way of framing what he found in Aristarchus' *hypomnemata* and in Ammonius' (or in other pupils') work.

As Rudolf Pfeiffer⁴⁴ pointed out, however, *ekdoseis* and *hypomnemata* seem to be distinguished as two different entities in the scholia, refuting Erbse's reconstruction when he equated these two scholarly products. Moreover, Didymus mentions τὰ ἡκριβωμένα ὑπομνήματα (*Sch. Il.* 2.111b) and τὰ κατ' Ἀριστοφάνην ὑπομνήματα (*Sch. Il.* 2.133a), which are clearly two distinct products and both by Aristarchus. This evidence suggests that Aristarchus wrote two sets of *hypomnemata*, the second more accurate than the first. Taking into account all these different sets of data, Pfeiffer concluded that the most persuasive reconstruction is the following: Aristarchus wrote a first set of commentaries based on the edition of Aristophanes; then he prepared his own

39. Wolf 1795/1985, 188–195; on Wolf's reconstruction, see Pfeiffer 1968, 213.

40. Lehrs 1882, 21–24, 26–27.

41. Ludwich 1884–1885, I 22–27.

42. Cohn 1895, 863–864.

43. Erbse 1959.

44. Pfeiffer 1968, 215–217. See also Lührs 1992, 6–9; West 2001, 64–65.

edition and wrote another set of commentaries (the ‘perfected’ ones). Finally, his pupils made a revision of Aristarchus’ *ekdosis*, which became the second ‘re-edited’ edition.

The most eccentric attempt to reconstruct Aristarchus’ work on Homer has been made by Helmut van Thiel,⁴⁵ who suggested that the Alexandrian editions were ‘annotated Homeric texts’ with a sort of marginal commentary (*Randkommentar*), namely, that they were papyrus rolls containing the vulgate text of Homer with marginal and interlinear notes. At the basis of van Thiel’s reconstruction is the idea that the interlinear and short marginal scholia found in the *Venetus A* (the ‘*Textscholien*’ or ‘*Kurznoten*’)⁴⁶ are basically the original annotations of Aristarchus.⁴⁷ The *ekdosis* of Aristarchus thus was the vulgate furnished with marginal or interlinear notes, which had the following content: (1) variants found in the manuscript tradition; (2) conjectures; (3) parallel passages offered as a sort of commentary; and (4) ‘real’ comments.⁴⁸ Aristarchus published this edition, while his pupils posthumously published his working text, which became his second edition. They misunderstood his methodology, however, and took many of the parallel passages and comments for variants.⁴⁹ As for the commentaries, according to van Thiel, they were not composed by Aristarchus, but were a later product of his successors, who published these marginal annotations, originally set in the *ekdosis*, as a separate commentary.⁵⁰

Even if van Thiel’s efforts had a noble aim, to free the Alexandrians from the charge of emending the text *ad libitum* and inserting bad or even incorrect variants (a criticism typical of van der Valk), his reconstruction has not found many followers.⁵¹ Pfeiffer’s reconstruction is still the most popular one among scholars.⁵² A variation of it has been suggested by Franco Montanari, who, as

45. Van Thiel 1991, X–XII (in German) and xxviii–xxx (in English); van Thiel 1992; van Thiel 1997 (the latter is a reply to the justified criticism by Schmidt 1997). The result of van Thiel’s ideas about Aristarchus’ work on Homer is now available in van Thiel 2014a.

46. Van Thiel opposes these scholia to the *Kommentarscholien* (or *Randscholien*), which are richer notes written in the margins of the *Venetus A*. The *Textscholien* are generally considered an abridgment of the longer *Kommentarscholien*; for van Thiel, however, the *Textscholien* (together with the critical signs) derive directly from Aristarchus’ edition, while the *Kommentarscholien* derive from the works of Didymus, Aristonicus, Herodian, and Nicanor (van Thiel 1997, 17–18; van Thiel 2014a, I 26–30).

47. According to van Thiel 1992, 25–27, and van Thiel 1997, 18–19, Homeric papyri with short marginal and interlinear annotations and critical signs (e.g., *P.Hawara* or *P.Oxy.* 445) would be proof that such an ‘annotated’ text was indeed typical in antiquity.

48. Van Thiel 1997, 16; van Thiel 2014a, I 8–9, 13–15. This analysis corrects (after Schmidt 1997’s criticism) the original thesis presented in van Thiel 1992. In this earlier article, he seemed to think that all the marginal and interlinear notes were only Homeric parallels and comments, which were taken as variants by later scholars.

49. Van Thiel 1992, 1 n. 1, 29–30; van Thiel 1997, 25, 34; van Thiel 2014a, I 8 and 14–15.

50. Van Thiel 1997, 20 and 34; van Thiel 2014a, I 8.

51. See especially Schmidt 1997; cf. also Montanari 1998, 4–6. West 2001 does not even discuss it.

52. See, for example, Nagy 2009a, 24–25.

already discussed, thinks that the second edition was not made by Aristarchus' pupils but was rather the same text of Homer in which Aristarchus had annotated his second thoughts, developed after he had completed his second set of *hypomnemata*. In this scenario, the two *diorthoseis* were in the same *ekdosis*, that is, the same text/papyrus roll furnished with two successive layers of variants.

3. The Impact of Aristarchus' Recension on the Text of Homer

As we discussed, Erbse's identification of the *hypomnemata* with the *ekdoseis* is too extreme. First, even if his proposal that the term *ekdosis* could be used as a synonym of *hypomnema* and *diorthosis* might be correct in some cases, the ancients generally did distinguish between 'editions' and 'commentaries'. This does not imply, however, that an *ekdosis* was a 'real' critical edition, with the readings preferred by the editor introduced in the main text and variants presented in a critical apparatus, as a modern philologist would do.⁵³ Rather, the *ekdosis* simply was a current Homeric text selected by the scholar, probably on the basis of its authoritativeness; this text was used as a basis for his *diorthosis*. When working on his recension, the scholar would furnish the selected text with marginal variants and critical signs. It is not clear whether the editor would also signal which variants he preferred in the *ekdosis*. He might have done so; still, when marginal variants are added in Homeric papyri, normally no preference is expressed.⁵⁴ Thus, the *ekdosis* was not a text 'revised and corrected' according to the scholar's judgment; rather, it was a standard Homeric text, 'edited' with marginal variants and critical signs. This 'apparatus' was the result of the scholar's 'recension' (*diorthosis*). The *hypomnema* (or, in the plural, *hypomnemata*) was instead the commentary where the same variants were discussed and other exegetical problems were treated.⁵⁵ Thus Erbse's suggestion about the nature of Alexandrian editions becomes correct if we understand it not as claiming that *hypomnemata* and *ekdoseis* were the same thing, but that they were both necessary to have a full understanding of the scholar's ideas,

53. On the meaning of *ekdosis* in antiquity, and in particular on the specific meaning of *ekdosis* when applied to Alexandrian scholarship, see van Groningen 1963a and Montanari 2015.

54. For example, *P.Hawara* (second half of the second century CE) reports the readings of the 'common edition' (ἡ κοινὴ), of Aristarchus, and of anonymous manuscripts (introduced with ἐν τοῖς in the papyrus) in its margins, without expressing a preference for any of them; cf. Sayce 1889, 26–27; McNamee 2007, 269–271. Similarly, *P.Oxy.* 445 (second to third century CE) reports variants from the κοινὴ and from the two editions of Aristarchus; cf. McNamee 2007, 272–273. For other Homeric examples, see McNamee 2007, 273–285 (passim).

55. See van Groningen 1963a, 16; Lührs 1992, 6–9, and Haslam 1997, 85, who concludes: "Neither their [i.e., the Alexandrians'] atheteses nor their readings were meant to supplant the given text, nor did they: they were scholarly apparatus in attendance on the received text".

preferred variants, and emendations concerning a text—that is, of his *diorthosis*. Papyrus fragments containing ancient ‘editions’ (with marginal variants and critical signs) and ‘commentaries’ (with exegetical discussions as well as examinations of variant readings, often with a specific reference to the critical sign present in the margin of an *ekdosis*) prove this reconstruction.⁵⁶ This scenario also explains the impact that Aristarchus’ *diorthosis* had on the text of Homer.

The scholarly consensus is that an ancient editor would choose a specific Homeric text which he considered particularly good for certain reasons and which would become the basis of his *diorthosis*.⁵⁷ In order to select his base version, Aristarchus probably inspected many different Homeric manuscripts collected in the Library.⁵⁸ We do not know which text he chose as a base copy, but since the Athenian edition is never mentioned by Didymus, it has been suggested that Aristarchus chose the Athenian copy of Homer as his working text.⁵⁹ Indeed, if Aristarchus had to choose an edition as a starting point for his *diorthosis*, the copy from Athens would have been very appealing to him: not only was Athens a prestigious cultural location, it was also the place where the earliest attempts at creating an ordered text of the Homeric poems took place. In addition, and most crucially, Aristarchus also believed that Homer was an Athenian who spoke ‘ancient Attic’ (παλαιὰ Ἀτθίς).⁶⁰ Whether or not this ‘selected’ text was the Athenian copy, Aristarchus probably checked it against other editions in the Library and eliminated lines which were badly attested in other manuscripts, so that his working text was a selected Homeric copy (possibly the Athenian one?), purged of scarcely attested lines.

This hypothesis about Aristarchus’ working text has been made to explain two distinct facts observed in the manuscript evidence of the Homeric text: (1) the so-called ‘wild papyri’ (i.e., Homeric papyri with many additional lines absent from the later manuscript tradition) disappear around 150 BCE,⁶¹ and

56. For a discussion of Aristarchus’ critical signs and the papyrological evidence available, see Chapter 2.1.

57. E.g., van Groningen 1963a, 16; Pfeiffer 1968, 110; Nagy 2009a, 9–10; Montanari 2015, 642–643 and 656. For example, according to West 2001, 43–45, Zenodotus chose an Ionic rhapsodic copy.

58. Whether or not at the time of Aristarchus all the editions mentioned by Didymus were present in the Library, at Aristarchus’ time the Library did have many copies of Homer, which he could consult. Indeed the Ptolemies embarked on an aggressive policy of book collecting under Ptolemy III, as recounted by Galen in the famous anecdote about the ‘books of the ships’ and about the copy of the tragedians stolen from the Athenians (*In Hipp. Epidem. iii*, 606.5 K = CMG 5.10.2.1, p. 79.7).

59. See Erbse 1959, 301–302; van Groningen 1963b, 36–37; Jensen 1980, 109–110. On the contrary, Nagy, who thinks that Aristarchus consistently inspected and collated many different manuscripts of Homer (see discussion in Chapter 2.2), suggests that the base Homeric text of Aristarchus was the one offered by the *koinai* texts (Nagy 2009a, 9–14).

60. See Chapter 5.1 § 4.

61. Oral performances led to the proliferation of different texts of the Homeric poems, which, though basically identical in terms of plot and structure, had different or additional lines (the so-

at the same time a relatively uniform text emerges, which is similar to the one preserved in medieval manuscripts in terms of number and sequence of lines as well as, to a lesser degree, of readings;⁶² and (2) the variants chosen by Aristarchus are generally not preserved in the medieval manuscripts.⁶³

According to Paul Collart⁶⁴ and Stephanie West,⁶⁵ this relatively uniform text was the final result of the book trade: copyists adopted Aristarchus' Homeric edition as the model for the book market but they were interested only in the lines considered genuine by the great scholar rather than in his specific readings. Thus, they eliminated from the books destined for the market lines which Aristarchus had removed from his Homeric text (because they were scarcely attested in the manuscript tradition) but did not bother copying the variants and emendations which he suggested.⁶⁶ Such an odd choice by booksellers, however, seems difficult to explain. Thus, first Hartmut Erbse⁶⁷ and then Michael Haslam⁶⁸ proposed that only Aristarchus' preparatory working text, purged of securely spurious lines, reached the market, but not his final *diorthosis* (preserved in his annotated *ekdosis* and above all in his *hypomnemata*, where he discussed both variant readings and *atheteseis*).⁶⁹ This working text impacted the Homeric textual tradition. Since only this preparatory text (a sort of pre-*ekdosis*, with no emendations or choices of specific variant readings) circulated beyond the scholarly circle, the only impact Aristarchus' work had on the Homeric tradition concerns the *numerus versuum* but not the actual readings or the *atheteseis*. Aristarchus' textual choices (both his readings and *atheteseis*) were perhaps annotated in his *ekdoseis* but above all were discussed in his *hypomnemata*, which were not meant to reach a wide audience but rather were intended to remain within the tight circle of the Alexandrian scholars. This scenario seems the most plausible.⁷⁰

called 'plus verses'), as demonstrated by Homeric quotations in Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, as well as by Ptolemaic Homeric papyri. After 150 BCE, on the other hand, papyri show a standardized text of Homer in which the number of lines is similar to our vulgate. On oral recitations of the Homeric poems and their pre-Alexandrian transmission, see the very different theories proposed by Janko 1994, 29–38, Nagy 1996, 107–206, and West 2001, 3–32.

62. See Grenfell and Hunt 1906, 67–75; Bolling 1925, 7; Collart 1932, 338–349; Collart 1933, 33–49; Collart 1939, 302–307; Pasquali 1962, 214–215; West 1967, 11–16; Apthorp 1980, 1–3; Haslam 1997, 55–56 and 63–69.

63. See Allen 1931, I 83–85, 199–200, and 209–216; Collart 1933, 49–54; Pasquali 1962, 210 and 213–214; West 1967, 16; Apthorp 1980, 9; Haslam 1997, 56 and 84; Janko 1994, 22.

64. Collart 1933, 53–54.

65. West 1967, 16–17.

66. This solution was endorsed by Bolling 1944, 22–23; Pasquali 1962, 216–217; Apthorp 1980, 9–10; Janko 1994, 22.

67. Erbse 1959, 301–303.

68. Haslam 1997, 84–87.

69. For Erbse, Aristarchus 'published' his working text for a larger audience, while his edition in the *hypomnema* (identified with the 'real' *ekdosis* by Erbse) was confined to scholarly use only.

70. See also Lührs 1992, 9–10.

4. *Ekdoseis* and *Hypomnemata*: Some Tentative Conclusions

The evidence about Aristarchus' works on Homer is complex and difficult to assess, as the different solutions proposed by many excellent scholars testify. Within such a complex set of data (or lack thereof), still the most likely scenario for Aristarchus' long engagement with Homer is the following:

Aristarchus started his activity with a *hypomnema* based on Aristophanes' text (*Sch. Il.* 2.133a: ἐν τοῖς κατ' Ἀριστοφάνην ὑπομνήμασιν Ἀριστάρχου); this could have happened quite early since Aristarchus was a pupil of Aristophanes and presumably attended his lectures where the master discussed his own *ekdosis*.⁷¹ Then, perhaps when he became head librarian, he decided to work on his own *diorthosis* of Homer. To do that, he first chose an edition of Homer as his starting text. This might have been the Athenian edition, a natural choice for Aristarchus, who thought that Homer was Athenian. He then 'normalized' this (Athenian?) edition by comparison with other editions and so 'freed' it from securely spurious lines; this was Aristarchus' working text (a pre-*ekdosis*), which circulated outside the Museum and is at the basis of the medieval vulgate. This working text became Aristarchus' *ekdosis* when it was 'edited' with critical signs and marginal variants in the same manuscript. On the basis of this *ekdosis*, he wrote a second set of commentaries, which Didymus calls the 'perfected' *hypomnemata* (*Sch. Il.* 2.111b: τὰ ἡκριβωμένα ὑπομνήματα).

Even after he finished his 'perfected' commentaries, which were thus considered his final word in terms of Homeric criticism, Aristarchus still continued lecturing in the Museum and discussing new variants and problems with his students. The result of these discussions was his second edition/*diorthosis*, which is often mentioned by Didymus (ἡ δευτέρα/έτέρα τῶν Ἀριστάρχου). The reference in *Sch. Il.* 7.130a¹ to the 'revised' editions (ἐν ταῖς ἐξητασμέναις Ἀριστάρχου) may also point to this second version of Aristarchus' recension.⁷² Physically, the second *diorthosis* could have been

71. I also wonder whether the following scholium by Didymus might refer to the first set of commentaries, where the focus was on Aristophanes' edition: *Sch. Il.* 21.130–5a¹ οὐδ' ὑμῖν ποταμός περ <— νόσφιν ἐμεῖο>: Ἀρίσταρχος διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων Ἀριστοφάνη φησὶ στίχους ἕξ ἡθετηκέναι . . . μήποτε μέντοι καὶ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος συγκατέθετο τῇ ἀθετήσει, μηδὲν ἀντειπὼν τῷ Ἀριστοφάνει [‘not even the river [will protect] you <— [Patroclus whom you slew] away from me’>: in his *hypomnemata* Aristarchus says that Aristophanes had athetized six lines . . . Perhaps Aristarchus too agreed with the athetesis, since he did not say anything against Aristophanes]. The scholium is discussed in Chapter 4 § 2.

72. Admittedly, the plural is puzzling; see footnote 23 above and West 2001, 61. In fact, Lehrs 1882, 23, suggested reading ἐν τοῖς ἐξητασμένοις Ἀριστάρχου [ὑπομνήμασι], i.e., the 'revised' *hypomnemata*, which would be identical with the ἡκριβωμένα ὑπομνήματα of *Sch. Il.* 2.111b, as did Ludwig 1884–1885, I 19, and Pfeiffer 1968, 217. On the contrary, Erbse 1959, 293, respected the transmitted reading because it confirmed his theory that *ekdosis* and *hypomnema* were the same product: “Man wird jedoch die Überlieferung unangetastet lassen und sich klarmachen, daß die

placed in the same text of the first *diorthosis*, as a second layer of brief notes and variants (as suggested by Montanari), or in an entirely new roll, with the working text of the vulgate ‘edited’ with new variants in the margins; this second edition might have been published by his pupils.

Aristarchus’ *ekdoseis/ekdosis* with marginal signs and variants added over time coincide with what Didymus calls αἱ Ἀριστάρχου or, in the singular, ἡ Ἀριστάρχου. By inspecting them, Didymus could know which variants Aristarchus discussed. As for Aristarchus’ specific ecdotic choices, it is impossible to know whether Aristarchus also signaled them in his *ekdosis* in some way. However, Aristarchus did discuss variant readings and chose his preferred ones in his *hypomnemata*, which Didymus also consulted. Therefore, using both editions and commentaries, Didymus was able to reconstruct Aristarchus’ *diorthosis*. The latter was very different from the Hellenistic vulgate, as is clear from the many scholia by Didymus in which the readings chosen by Aristarchus do not match the common editions (αἱ δημῶδεις or αἱ κοιναί).⁷³

This evidence suggests that Aristarchus’ engagement with Homer was continuous and his *diorthosis* was constantly evolving. Since Didymus was certain that there were at least two stages of philological choices (namely, the two *ekdoseis*), the perpetually fluid state of Aristarchus’ *diorthosis* would also explain why his pupils sometimes debated over his final readings. The problems in reconstructing the relative chronology of Aristarchus’ work on Homer also raise doubts about what can really be achieved in searching for Aristarchus’ specific ecdotic choices in the Homeric text.⁷⁴ On the other hand, for a study focused on Aristarchus’ *modus operandi*, such as the present one, the relative chronology and content of each of his specific works on Homer is of little consequence, since the focus is not on Aristarchus’ final ecdotic choices and whether they are good or not,⁷⁵ but rather on *how* he worked on the Homeric text and *what aspects* of it interested him.

Interpretation ἐν ταῖς ἐξητασμέναις (scil. ἐκδόσεσιν) genau das besagt, was man mit der Korrektur bezweckte; denn die ‘geprüften Ausgaben’ sind mit den ἡκριβωμένα ὑπομνήματα identisch”.

73. E.g., Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 2.53a¹; 4.170; 5.797a²; 13.289a¹; 20.228a²; 22.468c^{1,2}; 24.344. See also *Sch. Il.* 17.214a (Nic.).

74. Cf. also Schironi 2015, 627.

75. It might be worth stressing once again that my attitude will be that of a historian of ancient scholarship and not that of a Homerist. Hence, though I will sometimes discuss Aristarchus’ solutions in light of modern scholarly views, I will generally avoid ‘judging’ him according to modern standards, which would be anachronistic and unfair. My interest, rather, lies in him as one of the founders of philology from a historical perspective.

Part 2

2.1

Critical Signs

The Bridge between Edition and Commentary

1. The Critical Signs (σημεῖα) Used by the Alexandrians
2. *Ekdosis*, *Hypomnema*, and Critical Signs
3. Homeric *Hypomnemata* on Papyrus and Critical Signs
4. Homeric *Ekdoseis* on Papyrus and Critical Signs
5. Conclusions

Before delving into a detailed analysis of Aristarchus' work on the *Iliad*, it is necessary to introduce briefly some of the most important tools that Aristarchus employed throughout his exegetic and critical activity: (1) the critical signs, which linked the *ekdosis* to the *hypomnema*; (2) the manuscript evidence and the role it played (if any) in Aristarchus' *diorthosis*; and (3) the paraphrase, that is, the rewording of the Homeric text into Koine, a procedure which Aristarchus extensively used to discuss and solve many philological problems, beyond the simple understanding of the text. The next three chapters will be dedicated to analyzing each one of these tools.

1. The Critical Signs (σημεῖα) Used by the Alexandrians

Critical signs (σημεῖα) are a staple of Alexandrian criticism.¹ Even if they probably originated from the work on Homer, ancient scholars employed

1. This chapter is partly based on Schironi 2012a. For an overview on critical signs, see Gude-
man 1922 and Stein 2007. On critical signs and signs on papyri, see McNamee 1992 and Nocchi
Macedo and Scappaticcio 2017.

them for other authors as well, as papyrological evidence and some ancient and medieval sources demonstrate.² I will focus here only on the *semeia* which Aristarchus used to study Homer, which are listed in later compendia such as the so-called *Anecdota Romanum*,³ the *Anecdota Venetum*,⁴ and the *Anecdota Harleianum*.⁵

Aristarchus was not the inventor of critical signs. As far as we know, the scholar who introduced them was Zenodotus of Ephesus, who first used the *obelos* ('spit' in Greek), a short line (—) placed next to lines that he considered suspect.⁶ This operation, which is typical of the Alexandrian scholars, is called *athetesis* (ἀθέτησις; pl.: *atheteseis*, ἀθετήσεις) and consisted in marking a line as spurious without deleting it from the text.⁷ Aristophanes of Byzantium introduced other signs: the *asteriskos* (*), which indicated a line repeated elsewhere,⁸ and the *sigma* (C) and

2. Diogenes Laertius (3.65–66) and a papyrus (PSI 1488 = Plato 142T CPF, second century CE) list critical signs used on the text of Plato; cf. Bartoletti 1964 and Gigante 1998. On the philological activity on Plato at Alexandria, see Schironi 2005. In the short treatise entitled *Περὶ σημείων* the grammarian Hephaestion (second century CE) clearly says that critical signs were utilized for comedy, tragedy, and lyric poetry. Latin sources, such as the *Anecdota Parisinum* (Par. Lat. 7530, 780 CE, in GL 7, 533–536; Nauck 1867, 278–282, and Dindorf 1875, xlii–xlix) and Isidore of Seville (*Et.* I 21), incorporate the old material on Homer with some other critical signs of various meanings.

3. *Rom. Bibl. Naz. Gr.* 6 (tenth century), edited by Montanari 1979, 43–49 and 54–55; West 2003a, 450–455; cf. also Nauck 1867, 271–273, and Dindorf 1875, xlii–xliv. The *Anecdota Romanum* is the most important among the lists of Homeric critical signs. Very close to this list is the one preserved in the *Matrit. B.N.* 4629, copied by Constantine Lascaris (1434–1501) and edited by Montanari 1979, 65–71, esp. 69–70.

4. *Marc. Gr.* 483 (fourteenth century), edited by Nauck 1867, 274–276, and Dindorf 1875, xlii–xlv.

5. *Brit. Mus. Harl.* 5693 (fifteenth century), edited by Nauck 1867, 277, and Dindorf 1875, xlii. On the so-called *Περὶ Ἀριστάρχου σημείων Ἰλιάδος praefationis fragmentum* in the *Venetus A*, which discusses the Aristarchean critical signs, see Erbse 1969, lxiv–lxvi.

6. As we know from *Περὶ Ἀριστάρχου σημείων Ἰλιάδος praefationis fragmentum*, which introduces the *obelos* as follows (Erbse 1969, lxv): τὸν δὲ ὀβελὸν ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆς Ζηνοδότου διορθώσεως· παρατίθει δὲ αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐκβαλλομένοις ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως στίχοις ὡς τοῖς νεκροῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων [he [i.e., Aristarchus] took the *obelos* from Zenodotus' recension. He puts it next to the lines that are rejected from the poem like [the obol] for the dead among human beings]. On the connection between *obelos* (ὀβελός) and *obol* (ὀβολός), see Plut. *Lys.* 17.5 Ziegler and Poll. 9.77. On Zenodotus and the invention of *athetesis*, see Nickau 1977, 6–10; cf. also Lehrs 1882, 332 n. 240.

7. On the operation of *athetesis*, see Chapter 3.6.B §§ 1–3. The scholia also report that Zenodotus not only *athetized* lines but also 'did not write' some lines. In fact, we do not know that Zenodotus, any more than Aristarchus, actually deleted lines from the text. The lines which he 'did not write', as the scholia report it, may in all cases have simply been absent from the copy he used. On Zenodotus' *atheteseis* and 'deletions' of lines, see Chapter 4 § 1.6.

8. *Sch. Od.* 3.71a ὃ ξεῖνοι τίνες ἐστὲ: τοὺς μετ' αὐτὸν τρεῖς στίχους ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοφάνης ἐνθάδε σημειοῦται τοῖς ἀστερίσκοις, ὅτε δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κύκλωπος λέγονται καὶ ὀβελίσκους τοῖς ἀστερίσκοις παρατίθῃσιν, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν μετενηνεγμένων τῶν στίχων [‘strangers, who are you?': Aristophanes marks the next three lines after this one here [i.e., *Od.* 3.72–74] with *asteriskoi* but when they are said by the Cyclops (*Od.* 9.253–255) he also adds *obeloi* to the *asteriskoi*, as in his view the lines are transferred from here]. On the *asteriskos* in papyri of Homer and other authors, see Nocchi Macedo 2011.

antisigma (○), which were used together to mark two consecutive lines with identical content.⁹

Aristarchus adopted the Zenodotean *obelos* for atheteseis.¹⁰ Like Aristophanes, he also used the *asteriskos* for repeated lines¹¹ and a combination of an *asteriskos* with an *obelos* (*—) to mark repeated lines that he wanted to athetize because they did not belong to that specific passage.¹² In addition, Aristarchus introduced the *diple* (>), a sign with an arrow-like shape which marked lines where he had some comments to make (regarding language, content, myth, style, etc.).¹³ The *diple*, thus, had a generic meaning, equivalent to a ‘N(ota)B(ene)’ for us. Aristarchus also developed another particular type of *diple*, the so-called *diple periestigmene*, or the ‘dotted *diple*’ (>:), to mark those passages where he argued against his predecessor Zenodotus and perhaps against his Pergamene contemporary Crates of Mallos.¹⁴

These were the most common signs used by the three greatest Alexandrian scholars. The compendia and the scholia mention other signs as well, but their function is not clear and they do not occur very frequently in manuscripts and scholia. According to the *Anecdota Romana*, for example, Aristarchus used the *antisigma* (○) to indicate lines which had been transposed and did not fit the new context;¹⁵ he also employed the *antisigma periestigmenon*, the ‘dotted’

9. *Sch. Od.* 5.247a τέτρηνεν δ’ ἄρα πάντα ---- καὶ ἁρμονιῇσιν ἄρασσεν (l. 248): Ἀριστοφάνης τὸ αὐτὸ ὥρετο περιέχειν ἄμφω. διὸ τῷ μὲν σίγμα, τῷ δὲ ἀντίσιγμα ἐπιτίθησιν [‘he pierced all [the pieces] . . . and fitted them with joints’]: Aristophanes thought that both lines (*Od.* 5.247–248) had the same content; therefore he adds a *sigma* to one and an *antisigma* to the other].

10. *An. Rom.* 54.19–20: —ὁ δὲ ὀβελὸς πρὸς τὰ ἀθετοῦμενα ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἡγουν νενοθευμένα ἢ ὑποβεβλημένα [the *obelos* [is used] with reference to athetized [lines] in the poet, that is, [lines] which are spurious or interpolated].

11. *An. Rom.* 54.21–22: * ὁ δὲ ἀστερίσκος καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ὡς καλῶς εἰρημένων τῶν ἐπῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τόπῳ ἔνθα ἐστὶν ἀστερίσκος μόνος [the *asteriskos* by itself [is used] because [in the scholar’s mind] the lines are well said in that place where the *asteriskos* is alone].

12. *An. Rom.* 54.23–24: *—ὁ δὲ ἀστερίσκος μετὰ ὀβελοῦ ὡς ὄντα μὲν τὰ ἔπη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, μὴ καλῶς δὲ κείμενα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τόπῳ, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ [the *asteriskos* with the *obelos* [is used] because [in the scholar’s mind] the lines are by the poet, but are not well placed in that passage, but elsewhere].

13. *An. Rom.* 54.11–15: > ἡ μὲν οὖν διπλὴ ἀπερίστικτος παρατίθεται πρὸς τοὺς Γλωσσογράφους ἢ ἑτεροδόξως ἐκδεξαμένους τὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ καὶ μὴ καλῶς· ἢ πρὸς τὰς ἅπαξ εἰρημένας λέξεις ἢ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ μαχόμενα, καὶ ἕτερα σχήματα πάμπολλα καὶ ζητήματα [the *diple* without dots is used with reference to the Glossographers or those who maintain odd and unsound views regarding the poet’s work; or with reference to words occurring only once, or to what is contradictory and inconsistent, and to many other figures and questions].

14. *An. Rom.* 54.16–18: >: ἡ δὲ περιεστιγμένη διπλὴ πρὸς τὰς γραφὰς τὰς Ζενοδοτείου καὶ Κράτητος καὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀριστάρχου καὶ τὰς διορθώσεις αὐτοῦ [the dotted *diple* [is used] with reference to the readings of Zenodotus and of Crates, as well as to those of Aristarchus himself and to his recensions]. On Crates and the *diple periestigmene*, see Chapter 4 § 4.1.

15. *An. Rom.* 54.25–26: ○ τὸ δὲ ἀντίσιγμα καθ’ ἑαυτὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνηλλαγμένους τόπους καὶ ἀπάδοντας [the *antisigma* by itself [is used] with reference to passages which have been transposed and are at variance [with the context]].

antisigma (·⊙ or ·⊙·), for passages which contained tautologies.¹⁶ The testimony of the *Anecdota Romanum* does not always match the use of these signs in the scholia, which also mention another sign: the *stigma*, the ‘dot’ (·).¹⁷ Another very rare Homeric sign is the *keraunion* (‘sign shaped like a thunderbolt’: ⊥), whose meaning is uncertain; the Homeric scholia only attest to its use by Aristophanes.¹⁸ The *Anecdota Romanum* remarkably claims, moreover, that such a sign is very rare and indicates ‘many types of questions beyond those already mentioned’.¹⁹

In its margins, the *Venetus A* almost exclusively contains the most securely attested Aristarchean signs: the *obelos*, the *asteriskos*, the *asteriskos* with *obelos*, the *diple*, and the *diple periestigmene*; other signs appear only in a very few instances.²⁰ While I have discussed elsewhere the possible function of the less common Aristarchean critical signs (*antisigma*, *antisigma periestigmenon*, and *stigma*),²¹ for the rest of this chapter I will focus on the use of the *semeia* in the actual ‘physical’ products of Aristarchus’ activity: the *ekdosis* and the *hypomnema*.

2. *Ekdosis*, *Hypomnema*, and Critical Signs

There is an important difference between how Zenodotus and Aristophanes worked with critical signs, and how Aristarchus used them. As far as the evidence goes, neither Zenodotus nor Aristophanes ever wrote a commentary;²²

16. *An. Rom.* 54.27–28: ·⊙· τὸ δὲ ἀντίσιγμα περιεστιγμένον παρατίθεται ὅταν ταυτολογῇ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν διάνοιαν δεῦτερον λέγῃ [the dotted *antisigma* is used when [the poet] repeats himself and says the same concept twice]. The *Anecdota Romanum* has *antisigma* with two dots here, which is its main entry. The manuscript, however, has a second, shorter list of critical signs (*An. Rom.* 55.34–47) and there (at 55.41) the sign (called ἀντίσιγμα καὶ στιγμή) appears as ·⊙, with only one dot. Similarly, when this sign is used in the *Venetus A*, it has only one dot; see Schironi 2017, 613 with n. 21, 614.

17. See Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 2.192a; 2.203a; 8.535–7.

18. *Sch. H Od.* 18.282 . . . εὐτελὲς τοῦτο, διὸ καὶ κεραύνιον παρέθηκεν Ἀριστοφάνης [this is cheap; therefore Aristophanes also placed a *keraunion* next to it].

19. *An. Rom.* 55.29–30: ⊥ τὸ δὲ κεραύνιον ἐστὶ μὲν τῶν σπανίως παρατιθεμένων, δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ πολλὰς ζητήσεις πρὸς ταῖς προειρημέναις [the *keraunion* is one of the signs rarely used. It, too, marks many types of questions beyond those already mentioned]. On the so-called ἄλογος mentioned by Didymus as placed to *Il.* 16.613 in the second edition of Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 16.613), see Lehrs 1882, 341; Ludwig 1884–1885, I 412.14–21; van Thiel 2014a, III 81–82.

20. Bird 2009, 92–94, gives the following figures for the critical signs in the *Venetus A*: *diple* (1875), *diple periestigmene* (292), *obelos* (440), *asteriskos* (73); *asteriskos* and *obelos* (52); *obelos* and *asteriskos* (14), *antisigma* (5), *antisigma periestigmenon* (2), *sigma periestigmenon* (3), *stigma* (3).

21. Schironi 2017.

22. Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 115 and 212; Nickau 1977, 14–17.

still they used *semeia*. This means that, at least in their original conception, critical signs were linked only to the ecdotic process and their meaning should have been clear within the *ekdosis* of Zenodotus or Aristophanes, without any additional explanation in a separate commentary. On the other hand, as was discussed in Chapter 1.2, Aristarchus prepared editions (*ekdoseis*) of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and discussed in detail specific points related to textual variants, suspicious lines, mythological questions, and other exegetical issues in the commentaries (*hypomnemata*). The scholia derived from the work of Aristoniscus confirm that the explanations of the meaning of critical signs in the *ekdosis* were the core of the Aristarchean *hypomnema*.

The difference between Zenodotus' and Aristophanes' philological activity, on the one hand, and that of Aristarchus, on the other, is also reflected in the particular *semeia* that they employed. The meaning of the signs used by the former two scholars (*obelos*, *asteriskos*, and *sigma-antisigma*) was straightforward and unambiguous in an *ekdosis*: the *obelos* simply indicated an athetesis; the *asteriskos* meant that a line was repeated elsewhere; the pair *sigma* + *antisigma* together marked tautologies. No further elucidations were needed to explain these signs, unless the reader wanted to explore further why the lines were athetized or where the repeated lines occurred elsewhere in the text. On the contrary, the new sign invented by Aristarchus, the *diple*, necessarily required explanations since it had an intrinsically ambiguous meaning: 'NB'. While direct students of Aristarchus could hear their teacher expound on the signs during their scholarly gatherings,²³ the meaning of a specific *diple* was impossible to determine for a reader of an *ekdosis* without the *hypomnema* or without the opportunity to attend Aristarchus' lectures.²⁴ In all probability, Aristarchus did not write *hypomnemata* because he had to explain the *diple*; still, he could use an ambiguous sign like the *diple* and be confident that later generations of scholars could understand its meaning, *exactly because* he had a commentary where he could explain what it meant.²⁵

23. As Martin West *per litteras* wrote to me: "When Aristarchus lectured to a group of students, I imagine they had before them a text marked up with his signs, the significance of which he explained orally. There was probably not an individual copy for each student, but one that they could all see. It need not have contained all the readings he favoured, as he could explain in each case what he believed should be read. So the σημεῖα could exist at first without a written *hypomnema*, and still serve their purpose".

24. See McNamee 1981, 252; Schironi 2012a, 92 and 98–99. Yet, as McNamee 1992, 8, observes, the ambiguous *diple* is the most common Aristarchean sign in Homeric papyri.

25. Admittedly, the same is valid for the equally ambiguous *keraunion*, whose use is attested only for Aristophanes. Perhaps this sign was meant to be accompanied by some oral explanation by Aristophanes himself, which his pupils would have written down in their notes. Yet the thin evidence we have for the use of the *keraunion* makes any hypothesis all but speculative. In fact, the very circumstance that the *keraunion* was ambiguous and that, as far as we know, Aristophanes did not write any commentary which could explain the meaning of the *keraunion* itself with reference

The *ekdosis-hypomnema* system thus provided a new exegetical tool through which a scholar could discuss the interpretative issues in the Homeric texts and his editorial choices in detail. For modern scholars, however, Aristarchus' innovation has raised the question of how, in practical terms, he intended the critical signs in the *ekdosis* and the *hypomnema* to be used together and what these two products looked like. Rudolf Pfeiffer²⁶ explained the function of the critical signs with his idea of a *hypomnema* separate from the *ekdosis*: Aristarchus would write a critical sign in his *ekdosis* next to a line where he had some remarks to make, and then would repeat that critical sign followed by his comments in another roll, which contained the commentary. The critical signs were thus the link between the edition (*ekdosis*) and the commentary (*hypomnema*): they both alerted the reader of the *ekdosis* that a line was of special interest and indicated the corresponding comment in the accompanying *hypomnema*. The reader could easily find the scholar's note in the *hypomnema* since this was ordered as a running commentary by lemmata (indicating the lines commented upon) preceded by the same critical signs that were used in the *ekdosis*. In fact, critical σημεία were also helpful in finding the right lemmata—especially in a time when there was no line numbering and, in a commentary, lemmata were simply indicated by the incipit of the lines from which they came.

Figure 1 visualizes the application of Pfeiffer's hypothesis by comparing a Homeric *ekdosis* with remnants of Aristarchus' *hypomnema*. For the text, I have reproduced Allen's *editio maior* of the *Iliad*²⁷ and 'reconstructed' Aristarchus' *hypomnema* from the Aristonicus scholia preserved in the *Venetus A*. I simplified this model by introducing word-divisions rather than maintaining *scriptio continua*, as in a real text on papyrus.²⁸ This choice, which goes against an exact paleographical reconstruction, allows the reader to recognize more easily the lemmata in the *hypomnema*, and how they work with the reference text (*Il.* 2.109-124), as well as with the critical signs.²⁹

to a specific Homeric line might have contributed to its unpopularity and hence to its disappearance from the scholia and the Homeric manuscripts.

26. Pfeiffer 1968, 218–219.

27. Throughout this study, I quote the Homeric text according to Allen 1931 (*Iliad*) and Allen 1917 (*Odyssey*), since they often follow Aristarchus' choices (cf. Janko 1990, 333), rather than, for example, van Thiel's editions, which adopt the medieval vulgate. On the other hand, the more recent edition of the *Iliad* by West 1998–2000, though very good in many respects, is too idiosyncratic and far from the Hellenistic text to be useful. I have, however, normally referred to the critical apparatus of West 1998–2000. On West's *Iliad*, see Janko 2000b.

28. For example, the first three lines of the facsimile of the *ekdosis* (*Il.* 2.109–111) would have looked like this:

ΤΩΟΓΕΡΕΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΙΣΤΕΑΡΓΕΙΟΙΣΙΜΕΤΗΥΔΑ
 ΩΦΙΛΟΙΗΡΩΕΣΔΑΝΑΟΙΘΕΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣΑΡΗΟΣ
 ΖΕΥΣΙΜΕΓΑΚΡΟΝΙΑΗΕΑΤΗΕΝΕΔΗΕΒΑΡΕΙΗ

29. I have also added the critical signs expected from the content of the scholia; these are not always the critical signs present in the *Venetus A*, which has a *diple* at 109, a *diple periestigmene* at

- > τῷ ὁ γερειάμενος ἐπεὶ ἀργείοις μετ' ἤυδα·
- > ὦ φίλοι ἥρωες δᾶνᾶοι θεράπτοντες ἀρῆος
- >· ζεύς με μέγα κρονιάδης ἀτὴ ἐνέδησε βάρειν
 ἐχέτλιος ὅς πρην μὲν μοι ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατέψεν
 ἰλίον ἐκτερεῶν τευ τεύχεον ἀπὸνέεσθαι
 νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀστὰ τὴν βούλευσά το καὶ με κελεύει
- >· ἀγκλῆα ἀργός ἰκέσθαι ἐπεὶ πολὺν ὦλεσά λαόν·
- > * οὐτῷ πού δι' ἡμελλεὶ ὑπερμενεὶ φίλον εἶναι
 * ὅς δ' ἡ πολλῶν πολιῶν κατέψχε κάρηνα
 * ἡ δ' ἐτι καὶ λυγρὴ τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον·
- >· ἀϊσχρὸν γὰρ τόδε γ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πύθεσθαι
 μάτ' οὐτῷ τοῖον δὲ τόσον δὲ τέ λαὸν ἀχάων
 ἀπτήκτον πόλεμον πολεμίζειν ἡ δὲ μάχεσθαι
- >· ἀνδράσι πᾶυροτέροισι τέλος ἀοῦ πῶ τί πτεφάνται·
- >· εἰ περ γὰρ κ' ἐβελόιμεν ἀχάοι τε τρῶες τε
- ὀρκία πιστὰ τάμοντες ἀριθμέναι ἀμφώ

- > ἐπεὶ ἀργείοις μετ' ἤυδα· ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἐστὶ μετ' ἀργείοισιν
 ἐπεὶ ἤυδα.
- > ὦ φίλοι ἥρωες δᾶνᾶοι θεράπτοντες ἀρῆος· ὅτι πρὸς πάντας
 ἀποτεινόμενος τὸν λόγον ἥρωας λέγει. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορά πρὸς
 ἱκτρὸν λεγόντα μόνους τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἥρωας λέγεσθαι.
- >· ζεύς με μέγα κρονιάδης· ὅτι ζήνοδοτος γράφει ζεύς με μέγας
 κρονιάδης. καὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦτοῦ ἕως τοῦ ἀϊσχρὸν γὰρ τόδε γ'
 ἐστὶ οὕτως συντεμνεῖ ὦ φίλοι ἥρωες δᾶνᾶοι θεράπτοντες
 ἀρῆος λῶβῃ γὰρ τὰ δὲ γ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πύθεσθαι μάτ'
 οὐτῷ.
- >· ἀγκλῆα ἀργός· ὅτι κατὰ συστολήν οὐμῆρος τὰ τοιαῦτα
 ἐκφέρει ἀγκλῆα καὶ ἀκλῆα ἰωνικῶς, οἱ δὲ ἀττικοὶ
 ἐκτεινοῦσιν.
- > * οὐτῷ πού δι' ἡμελλεὶ – τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον· πρὸς
 τὸ μελλεῖ ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκέν, ὁ δὲ ἀστερικὸς ὅτι εἰς τὰς
 λίτας οὐκ ὀρθῶς μετακείνται οἱ τρεῖς.
- >· πύθεσθαι· ὅτι τὸ πύθεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀκούσαι τίθῃσιν.
- >· ἀνδράσι πᾶυροτέροισι· ὅτι ἡσσόνες κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ
 βαρβαροί.
- >· εἰ περ γὰρ κ' ἐβελόιμεν· ὅτι περίσος ὁ κε συνδεσμός.
- ὀρκία πιστὰ τάμοντες· ἀθετεῖται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀληθείας
 λέγεται ἀλλ' ὑπερβολικῶς τὰ τῶν δεκάδων, πρὸς τὶ οὖν ὀρκ

Fig. 1. Reconstruction of an ancient *ekdosis* (above) with corresponding *hypomnema* (below) to *Iliad* 2.109-124

3. Homeric *Hypomnemata* on Papyrus and Critical Signs

Pfeiffer's reconstruction is the most rational way to account for such an editorial practice. Nevertheless, no papyrus fragments have ever been found that provide an example of the presence of two rolls, one containing an *ekdosis* with critical signs, and the other containing the *hypomnema* referring to that *ekdosis*, where the critical signs link the two rolls. As Kathleen McNamee has shown,³⁰ papyrological evidence is fairly disappointing when it comes to Aristarchean signs in Homeric papyri. Yet some fragments from *hypomnemata* and *ekdoseis* on papyrus showing critical signs have been found. Though sparse and tiny, these fragments seem to confirm that the Aristarchean system of *ekdosis* and *hypomnema* linked by critical signs worked in the way that Pfeiffer proposed.

The closest example to what originally might have been an 'Aristarchean' *hypomnema* is *P.Oxy.* 1086. This is a fragment of a commentary dating to the first half of the first century BCE³¹ and commenting on *Il.* 2.751–827. Certain parts of the text either mention or explicitly show some critical signs, but they are not consistent: the *diple* is present before lemmata in only four instances (at lines 27, 54, 97, and 114, corresponding to *Il.* 2.767, 785, 809, and 819) and John Landon, who has recently re-edited the papyrus, adds this sign in lacuna in three other places where the commentary mentions a σημεῖον.³² Still at least in one place the *diple* has been omitted in the fully preserved margin, at line 44 (on *Il.* 2.781–782), while the commentary refers to it (at line 47). Three *obeloi* are present in the papyrus at lines 61–62 for the athetesis of *Il.* 2.791–795.³³ While it is certainly interesting to see at least one ancient *hypomnema* showing lemmata with critical signs, a total of seven signs for forty-six lemmatized lines (taken from *Il.* 2.751–827, which includes a total of seventy-seven Homeric lines) is relatively small.³⁴ In the papyrus, sigla would be expected in several places, for example, beside the many notes which clarify a Homeric expression, such as at lines 20–25 (on *Il.* 2.765), at lines 40–41 (on *Il.* 2.779), at lines 56–57 (on *Il.* 2.787), etc. There are also entries consisting of a paraphrase of Homeric

110, 111, and 115, an *asteriskos* and a *diple periestigmene* at 116, a *diple periestigmene* at 119 and 122, and an *obelos* at 124. According to Erbse, scholia ad loc., these discrepancies are due to a mistake of the scribe of the *Venetus A*. On other discrepancies between the critical signs in the *Venetus A* and what one would expect from the Aristonicus' notes, see Chapter 4 § 1.1.

30. McNamee 1981 and McNamee 1992, 8–11.

31. This is the new dating proposed by Landon 2002a, 17, in his new edition of the text. For another edition, see Erbse 1969–1988, I 164–174 (pap. II).

32. At lines 11 (referring to *Il.* 2.763, where, however, even the mention of a σημεῖον in the entry is in a lacuna), 82 (referring to *Il.* 2.801), and 106 (referring to *Il.* 2.816).

33. The lines forming the lemma (*Il.* 2.791–795) are written in full, one after the other, with the *obeloi* placed before the beginning of each line. In the papyrus, line 794 is omitted altogether, and the *obelos* before line 791 is missing.

34. On the lemmata included in *P.Oxy.* 1086, see Landon 2002a, 31–37.

syntax into Koine syntax (e.g., lines 41–42 on *Il.* 2.780, lines 51–54 on *Il.* 2.784, lines 57–58 on *Il.* 2.788); in none of these cases, however, is there a trace of any sign before the lemma (which is entirely preserved), nor any mention of a σημείον in the entry. This lack of critical signs to indicate linguistic problems is not what one would expect in an Aristarchean *hypomnema* because many Aristonicus scholia explicitly prove that explanations of difficult Homeric words and paraphrases were marked by the *diple*.³⁵ *P.Oxy.* 1086, therefore, does use critical signs, but sporadically and not as consistently as the actual Aristarchean *hypomnema* would have employed them.

As McNamee³⁶ and Lundon³⁷ have shown, *P.Oxy.* 1086 is a text with some ambition and of superior quality, as it goes beyond the simple paraphrase and the fundamentals of Homeric scholarship. Yet it is not exclusively an excerpt of the original *hypomnema* of Aristarchus.³⁸ In fact, even if much of its content is indeed Aristarchean, there is at least one sign which no source ascribes to him: the ⌘ sign (to be understood as meaning χρηστόν or χρήσιμον, ‘useful’, or χρήσις, ‘usage’), which appears in the margin next to lines 43 (on *Il.* 2.780), 57 (on *Il.* 2.788), and 112 (on *Il.* 2.816).³⁹ The overlap with many scholia from Aristarchus suggests that *P.Oxy.* 1086 was written by someone who had philological interests and probably had access both to the original *hypomnema* of Aristarchus (or a copy of it) and to other commentaries. The papyrus, the result of excerpting several different scholarly sources, is important as it is

35. See, for example, *Sch. Il.* 16.142a {πάλλειν} ἀλλά μιν οἷος ἐπίστατο πῆλαι: ἡ διπλή, ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐδύνατο, μόνος ἐδύνατο χρῆσασθαι τῷ δόρατι [‘but he alone knew how to wield it’: the *diple* [is placed here] because [ἐπίστατο is used] instead of ἐδύνατο: only he was able to use the spear]. For an example of paraphrase to clarify syntax, see *Sch. Il.* 18.283a¹ οὐδὲ ποτ’ ἐκπέρσει· <πρὶν μιν κύνες ἀργοὶ ἔδονται>: ἡ διπλή, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον, πρότερον αὐτὸν οἱ κύνες κατέδονται ἢ ἐκπέρσει. καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλλιπὴς ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐπ’ ἐκείνου· ‘τὴν δ’ ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω· πρὶν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν’ (*Il.* 1.29) [‘nor will he sack it; sooner will the swift dogs devour him’: the *diple* [is placed here] because this is the meaning: ‘the dogs will devour him before he sacks the city’. And the sentence is not elliptical, as it is not [elliptical] in this line: ‘I will not set her free; sooner will old age come upon her’ (*Il.* 1.29)]. On the use of paraphrase in Aristarchus’ criticism, see Chapter 2.3.

36. McNamee 1981, 249–250.

37. Lundon 2002a.

38. As Lundon 2001, 839, seemed to imply; Lundon 2002a, on the other hand, more correctly does not make such a claim, but simply labels the fragment as ‘Aristarchean’ (for example, in the title of his monograph: *Un commentario aristarcheo al secondo libro dell’Iliade: POxy VIII 1086*).

39. See Lundon 2002a, 23. On the ⌘ sign, see also McNamee 1992, 20–21, who notes how this sign was often equated with the *chi* sign (×). The latter is ascribed to Aristarchus once by Eust. 1921.55 (ad *Od.* 22.144): σημειῶσαι δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὸ περὶ τῶν δώδεκα σακέων καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς Ἀρίσταρχος ἀθετήσας κεχίακεν, ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἰπὼν τοσαῦτα βαστάσαι ἄνθρωπον [note also that Aristarchus athetized and marked with a *chi* the line about the twelve shields and the following one, saying that it was impossible for a person to carry all these [weapons]]. Even though I translated the perfect κεχίακεν as ‘marked with a *chi*’, McNamee 1992, 19 n. 60, is probably correct when she claims: “in the single case in which Eustathius uses χιάζω in a critical context (on *Od.* 22.144) he is actually discussing an Aristarchan athetesis, and clearly gives the verb the general meaning of ‘mark with a critical sign’”.

dated to the first half of the first century BCE; that is, it was written within ca. 100 years of Aristarchus' activity. Thus, *P.Oxy.* 1086 also shows how the original signs tended to be omitted or only partially reported even at a very early stage.

There are other minor fragments from *hypomnemata* preserving critical signs,⁴⁰ here listed in chronological order:

- *P.Pisa Lit.* 8 (first century CE),⁴¹ a commentary on *Odyssey* 11. At lines 3 and 14, the phrase σημείον ὅτι⁴² is used to introduce two explanations; for the first, the lemma is unknown; the second sign, on the other hand, refers to *Od.* 11.475–476, the only lemma recognizable in the fragment, at lines 11–13.⁴³ In the papyrus, however, no critical sign is evident (but the margin is in lacuna at lines 1–8).
- *P.Daris inv.* 118 (second century CE),⁴⁴ a commentary on *Il.* 4.164–169 (or 170?). At line 5, a *diple* in the text (> δὲ παράκειται[ι]) is followed by the explanation to *Il.* 4.164.⁴⁵
- *P.Cairo JE* 60566 (second century CE),⁴⁶ a commentary on *Il.* 6.240–241, 251–257, and 277–285. It has three *diplai* placed before lemmata: in fr. a, ii, 10 (on *Il.* 6.257) and in fr. b, i, 3 and 5 (on *Il.* 6.277 and 278); in the last two cases the explanation is introduced with τὸ σημείο(ν) ὅ(τι) (fr. b, i, 4 and 6).⁴⁷
- *P.Mich. inv.* 1206 (third to fourth century CE),⁴⁸ a commentary on *Il.* 14.316–348. It shows an *obelos* before the lemma at line 3 to introduce the athetesis of *Il.* 14.317–327.⁴⁹ At line 9 there is probably a *diple* (if it is not a *diple obelismene*),⁵⁰ but the explanation (on *Il.* 14.338) is lost.

Compared with *P.Oxy.* 1086, these *hypomnemata* on papyrus are later and much poorer in terms of critical signs. Nevertheless, they agree with the Aris-

40. As listed by Lundon 2011, 174–175 n. 85.

41. Edited by Carlini 1978, 89–93.

42. Abbreviated σ^η ὅτι at line 3 and fully written out at lines 13–14 (with an iotacistic mistake subsequently corrected): σημει^εον [ὅτι].

43. No Aristonicus scholium to those lines is preserved, so it is impossible to know if the commentary used Aristarchean material.

44. Edited by Daris 1975 and also by Erbse 1969–1988, VII 284–286 (pap. IIa).

45. The entry discusses the gender of the noun Ἥλιος, which is feminine in Homer, and derives from Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 4.164d); see Chapter 4 § 1.5.1.

46. Edited by Waddell 1934, 148–151, and also by Erbse 1969–1988, II 124–128 (pap. V).

47. All the *diplai* in the papyrus go back to Aristarchus, as proven by the corresponding Aristonicus scholia: *Sch. Il.* 6.257; 6.277; 6.278.

48. Edited by Luppe 1992.

49. The athetesis goes back to Aristarchus; see *Sch. Il.* 14.317a, discussed in Chapter 3.6.B § 6.

50. That is, a *diple* combined with an *obelos* on the right: >—. On the *diple obelismene*, see Barbis 1988.

tonicus scholia's mention of specific signs and confirm that the Aristarchean *hypomnemata* had *semeia* before the lemmata to introduce the explanations and to link them with an edition of reference.

4. Homeric *Ekdoseis* on Papyrus and Critical Signs

Ancient *ekdoseis* of Homer provide richer evidence than *hypomnemata* on papyrus since quite a few of them have critical signs, though they are a minority compared with all the Homeric papyri found in Egypt. McNamee counted a total of thirty-one papyri⁵¹ that present the critical signs of Aristarchus.⁵² While *obeloi* and *diplai* are fairly frequent, the other signs are far less numerous; only five of these papyri, for example, have the other common Aristarchean signs (*asteriskos* and *diple periestigmene*) in addition to the usual *obeloi* and *diplai*, and one has an *asteriskos* but no *obelos* or *diple*:

- *P.Tebt.* 1.4 (second century BCE): *diple periestigmene*, *obelos*, *asteriskos* with *obelos*, *antisigma*, but no *diple*.⁵³
- *P.Lond.Lit.* 27 (first half of the first century CE): *diple* and *asteriskos*.⁵⁴
- *PSI* 1.8 (first to second century CE): *obelos*, *asteriskos* with *obelos*, but no *diple*.⁵⁵
- *P.Hawara* (second half of the second century CE): *diple*, *obelos*, *diple periestigmene*.⁵⁶
- *P.Oxy.* 445 = *P.Lond.Lit.* 14 (second to third century CE): *diple*, *asteriskos*, but no *obelos*.⁵⁷

51. Originally, McNamee 1981, 247 n. 2, had a list with only seventeen papyri, but McNamee 1992, 28–29, has a more complete list (among the papyri in her table I have excluded *P.Cairo JE* 60566, as it is a *hypomnema*, not an *ekdosis*).

52. Papyri provide a wider array of critical signs but, as McNamee 1992 has demonstrated, it is impossible to trace most of them back to Alexandrian scholarship, much less to give them a specific meaning.

53. Cf. also Turner and Parsons 1987, 38–39 (no. 12); Bonati 2011.

54. McNamee 1992, 28, lists also the *obelos* in this papyrus, but Kenyon 1891, 101, Kenyon 1893, 297, and Erbse 1969, xlii, do not mention any *obelos*. Indeed, from the transcription in Kenyon 1893, all the ‘dashes’ seem *paragraphoi* rather than *obeloi*, as they are placed in the interlinear space, not in the margin next to the line (I have not, however, inspected the manuscript myself).

55. Cf. also Manfredi 1979, 47–51 (no. 6).

56. Cf. Sayce 1889, 24–28; Erbse 1969, xxxiv–xxxv; Turner and Parsons 1987, 38–39 (no. 13); McNamee 2007, 269–271.

57. Cf. also Erbse 1969, xxxvii–xxxviii; McNamee 2007, 272–273. The papyrus also has an *antisigma* at *Il.* 6.174, but the sign does not go back to Aristarchus since in *Sch. Il.* 6.174a Aristonicus says that there was a *diple* (which is absent in the papyrus); see Schironi 2017, 626.

- *P.Mich. inv.* 6653 (second to third century CE): *asteriskos*, but no *obelos* or *diple*.⁵⁸

Among these six papyri, the most ancient text preserving Aristarchean critical signs is *P.Tebt.* 1.4, dating back to the second century BCE. According to its first editors,⁵⁹ the papyrus included fragments of five columns covering *Il.* 2.95–210 and provided an *obelos* at *Il.* 2.124, 133, and 197, a *diple periestigmene* at *Il.* 2.156, and an *antisigma* at *Il.* 2.204.⁶⁰ Lastly, there was an *asteriskos* with *obelos* on the right margin of *Il.* 2.141; these two signs in all likelihood referred to the line in the next column, which was lost (probably to *Il.* 2.164).⁶¹ When I inspected the papyrus in Berkeley in September 2015, I was only able to see the *obeloi* at lines 124 and 197 and the *antisigma* at line 204, while the other signs are lost together with fragments of the original manuscript. Yet if we trust the first edition, most of these lines match the Aristonicus scholia reporting Aristarchus' choices,⁶² suggesting that this text might have indeed been an (abridged) copy of Aristarchus' *ekdosis*.

P.Hawara, a luxury edition of Book 2 of the *Iliad*, dated to the second half of the second century CE, has quite a few critical signs,⁶³ and is certainly the richest among these six Homeric papyri. Moreover, *P.Hawara* partly overlaps with the portion of *Iliad* 2 discussed by *P.Oxy.* 1086, and thus it allows for a comparison between an 'ancient' *ekdosis* and an 'ancient' *hypomnema*, as well as for a comparison with the critical signs in the *Venetus A*. The following table lists the critical signs reported by the Hawara Homer, the *Venetus A*, and *P.Oxy.* 1086 for *Il.* 2.751–827 (the range of lines commented upon by *P.Oxy.* 1086); blank spaces indicate where the lines (or the lemmata in the case of the *hypomnemata*) are fully preserved, but no sign is in evidence:⁶⁴

58. Edited by Merkelbach 1974; cf. also Priest 1979.

59. Grenfell, Hunt, and Smyly 1902, 12–17.

60. Other Homeric papyri have an *antisigma* (see McNamee 1992, 28–29); because of its uncertain meaning I am not counting them in this brief survey, but I have discussed them in Schironi 2017, 621–628.

61. See Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 2.164a¹.

62. *Sch. Il.* 2.124a (*obelos* at *Il.* 2.124); 2.130–3 (*obelos* at *Il.* 2.133); 2.156–69 (*diple periestigmene* at *Il.* 2.156); 2.193a^{1,2} (*obelos* at *Il.* 2.197); 2.203a (*antisigma* at *Il.* 2.204; this should probably be a *stigma* as the scholium suggests; see Schironi 2017, 626–628). On this papyrus and its relationship with Aristarchus' signs, see Schironi 2019d.

63. As reported by McNamee 2007, 269: *obelos* at *Il.* 2.737, 794, 860–861, 875–876; *diple* at *Il.* 2.481, 659, 701, 722, 727, 730, 741 (followed by a single dot), 742, 802, 807, 809, 827, 830, 838, 839, 856, 858, 863, 872; *diple periestigmene* at *Il.* 2.484, 634, 658, 674–675, 697, 724, 746, 801. On the *antisigma* in this papyrus, see Schironi 2017, 623–624.

64. The data and the table are taken from Lundon 2002a, 25–26. McNamee 2007, 269, deals only with *P.Hawara*, and her data have some discrepancies with those reported by Lundon for this papyrus (see footnote 63 above).

Critical signs reported by *P. Oxy.* 1086, *P. Hawara*, and the *Venetus A* for *Il.* 2.762–827

<i>Iliad</i> 2 (line numbers)	<i>P.Oxy.</i> 1086 (1 st cent. BCE)	<i>P.Hawara</i> (2 nd half of the 2 nd cent. CE)	<i>Venetus A</i> (10 th cent. CE)
763	Lemma in lacuna; <i>diple</i> restored by Lundon in the lacuna		<i>Diple</i>
767	<i>Diple</i>		<i>Diple</i>
782	Mention of a σημείον in the explanation, but no <i>diple</i> in the fully preserved lemma		
785	<i>Diple</i>	<i>Diple</i>	
791	No <i>obelos</i> in the fully preserved lemma		<i>Obelos</i>
792	<i>Obelos</i>		<i>Obelos</i>
793	<i>Obelos</i>		<i>Obelos</i>
794	Line omitted from the lemma (<i>Il.</i> 2.791–795)	<i>Obelos</i>	<i>Obelos</i>
795	<i>Obelos</i>		<i>Obelos</i>
801	Lemma partly in lacuna; <i>diple</i> restored by Lundon in the lacuna; mention of a σημείον in the explanation	<i>Diple</i>	<i>Diple</i>
802		<i>Diple</i>	<i>Diple</i>
807		<i>Diple</i>	<i>Diple</i>
809	<i>Diple</i>	<i>Diple</i>	<i>Diple</i>
816	Lemma partly in lacuna; <i>diple</i> restored by Lundon in the lacuna; mention of a σημείον in the explanation		
819	<i>Diple</i>		<i>Diple</i>
820	Line omitted from the commentary	Line in lacuna	<i>Diple</i>
827		<i>Diple</i>	<i>Diple</i>

P.Hawara has fewer signs than the *Venetus A* and the *hypomnema* in *P.Oxy.* 1086. This is probably because it is not a scholarly product like the other two texts. As McNamee has rightly pointed out,⁶⁵ the signs might have been added in *P.Hawara* specifically because it was a luxury copy with intellectual ambitions. Perhaps, in such ‘display’ editions, a scribe did not recopy every sign from the original as they were not essential to the text itself; he might have limited himself to copying enough critical signs to make the text look more scholarly. In fact, the critical signs preserved in papyri often are those dealing with very basic linguistic or content-related explanations, while those addressing more difficult and philologically oriented questions were often omitted.⁶⁶

65. McNamee 1981, 253.
66. See McNamee 1981, 248–251.

5. Conclusions

Despite all the problems and the scarcity of evidence, papyri bearing critical signs (σημεῖα) allow us to draw at least some important conclusions. Even in the absence of a fully preserved set of a corresponding *hypomnema* and *ekdosis* on papyrus, fragments of both *ekdoseis* and *hypomnemata* showing *semeia* provide enough evidence for the existence of the system which Aristarchus used and probably even invented. In particular, papyrus fragments from *hypomnemata* which refer to critical signs when introducing an explanation (especially with the formula⁶⁷ σημεῖον ὅτι) prove that the *ekdosis-hypomnema* system was indeed centered around the Aristarchean signs, exactly as suggested by Pfeiffer. The *semeia* were thus like signposts for Aristarchus' critical activity, marking his comments and exegesis on Homer. This is why Aristonicus, who focused on the meaning of these signs, is such an important source for understanding Aristarchus' work on Homer.

67. For the sake of clarity, in this book I will use the English formula/formulas to mean those 'fixed phrases' found in scholia to express a certain concept. I will use the Latin *formula/formulae* to indicate the typical phenomenon of oral poetry, that is "a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea" (Parry 1971, 272); for a concise survey of the different theories developed after Parry to explain and define Homeric *formulae*, see Russo 2011.

2.2

Aristarchus and Manuscript Evidence

1. Evidence from Didymus
2. Evidence from Aristonicus
3. Conclusions

One of the questions concerning Aristarchus' activity that has worried scholars most is whether he used manuscript evidence in his *diorthosis*. While Marchinus van der Valk held the extreme view that all Aristarchus' readings and philological solutions were conjectures and that he paid no attention to manuscript evidence,¹ most scholars, starting from Friedrich August Wolf up to most recent studies, tend to think that Aristarchus and his colleagues also selected readings attested in manuscripts which they had inspected. Yet the same scholars often differ in the relative weight they give to conjectures and attention to manuscript evidence in Alexandrian practice.² Martin West has partially come back to van der Valk's view, however, and suggested: "it is time to challenge this assumption, inherited from Wolf, that collation of different copies was a normal and essential part of what Aristarchus and his predecessors did . . . there is no evidence that they actively sought out a plurality of different manuscripts for comparative purposes".³

1. Van der Valk 1963–1964, II 84–263 (*passim*); in particular, 86: "I take the view that Aristarchus' readings are nearly always subjective and personal conjectures"; or 90: "we can say that he [Aristarchus] was not less prolific than Zen. in offering conjectures. Since, however, his emendations are less arbitrary, more scholarly and cautious, they have been less easily unmasked".

2. See Wolf 1795/1985, 158–162, 195–196; La Roche 1866, 21; Lehrs 1882, 353–354; Ludwich 1884–1885, I 3–8; Monro 1901, 430–435; Roemer 1912, 121; Erbse 1959, 280; Pfeiffer 1968, 94; Janko 1994, 26; Janko 2002, 659; Rengakos 2002a; Montanari 2002, 127–135; Montanari 2004; Montanari 2015, 660–671; Nagy 2004, 87–109; and Nagy 2009a, 9–21.

3. West 2001, 36. Especially for scholars such as West, Janko, and Nagy, these opposing views are often connected to their (very different) views about the Homeric Question. Cf. Montanari 2002, 132–133; Montanari 2004, 132–136.

In this regard, it is necessary to realize that there are at least three separate questions at stake here: (1) whether Aristarchus collected and looked at different manuscripts; and if he did, (2) whether manuscript evidence played an important and independent role in his *diorthosis* (i.e., whether it was a criterion for choosing a variant, as opposed to selecting it for internal reasons only), and (3) whether he bothered to list and distinguish among the different manuscripts which he checked in his own editions and/or commentaries. The answers to these questions largely depend on how the evidence provided by Didymus is interpreted, since the Didymus scholia are the richest in details about other editions, both from the cities and by individual editors. The scholars who believe that Aristarchus collected and used Homeric manuscripts coming from every part of the Greek world in order to prepare his own *diorthosis* (that is, the scholars who give an affirmative answer to all three questions above) base their conclusion on the assumption that the editions quoted by Didymus were actually examined and compared by Aristarchus himself—and that Didymus is simply reporting Aristarchus' findings.⁴ On the contrary, West, who strongly downplays Aristarchus' use of manuscript evidence, maintains that the editions reported by Didymus were quoted (and checked) solely by him and not by Aristarchus; hence, there is no evidence that Aristarchus systematically collected manuscripts.⁵ I would like to suggest an intermediate solution, which is certainly not new,⁶ but which, in my view, best fits the evidence at our disposal.

Before proceeding with an analysis of the evidence offered by Didymus and Aristonicus, it is worth recalling the caveats about drawing conclusions about Aristonicus' and Didymus' *modus operandi* on the basis of the scholia attributed to them, exactly because one of the main criteria for attributing a scholium to one of the four VMK commentators is the content of the note. We have discussed the problem elsewhere⁷ but in this case it is particularly important to recall the innate circularity of some of the following analysis, based on the distinction between information coming from Didymus and that coming from Aristonicus. Yet this is the evidence we have and, just like the other scholars before me, I will have to deal with it in order to address the specific question of manuscripts' role in Aristarchus' practice.

4. See Ludwich 1884–1885, I 3–5 and 44; Monro 1901, 433; Nagy 2004, 96–97 and 109.

5. West 2001, 36–37, 46–85 (in particular 69–72), and West 2004.

6. Lehrs seemed to think that the editions mentioned in the scholia were consulted by Didymus only (Lehrs 1882, 26), but he also had no doubts that Aristarchus was attentive to manuscript evidence (Lehrs 1882, 353–354).

7. See Chapter 1.1 § 3 and Chapter 1.2, footnote 6.

1. Evidence from Didymus

As shown in Chapter 1.1 § 4.2, Didymus emerges from the Homeric scholia as a fairly independent scholar who added much additional information to the Aristarchean material. In particular, he often quotes city editions (ἐκδόσεις κατὰ πόλεις) or personal editions (ἐκδόσεις κατ' ἄνδρα).⁸ The former either were the 'official' copies prepared by individual towns or simply came from such towns;⁹ the latter, on the other hand, were editions prepared by specific scholars. Didymus refers to the city editions fifteen times.¹⁰ For the *Iliad*, he quotes, in order of frequency: the *ekdosis* of Marseilles (ἡ Μασσαλιωτική, twenty-six times),¹¹ of Chios (ἡ Χία, fifteen times), of Argos (ἡ Ἀργολική, seven times), of Cyprus (ἡ Κυπρία, five times), of Sinope (ἡ Σινωπική, five times), and of Crete (ἡ Κρητική, once).¹² Among the editions κατ' ἄνδρα, Didymus obviously knows the editions of Zenodotus and Aristophanes, either by direct consultation or (only?)¹³ from the commentaries of Aristarchus, since Aristonicus also refers to them. In addition to these two, Didymus also mentions the editions of Rhianus (ἡ Ῥιανοῦ, at least thirteen times), of Antimachus (ἡ κατὰ Ἀντίμαχον, ἡ Ἀντιμάχου, or ἡ Ἀντιμάχειος, at least six times),¹⁴ of Sosigenes (ἡ Σωσιγένους, five times), of Callistratus (ἡ Καλλιστράτου, twice),¹⁵ and that of Philemon (ἡ κατὰ Φιλήμονα or Φιλήμονος, twice). Didymus also mentions an anonymous

8. On Didymus and the Homeric editions he consulted, see West 2001, 50–73.

9. On the identity and content of the city editions, see Citti 1966 and West 2001, 67–72 (with bibliography).

10. These editions are named with a periphrasis (αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων / αἱ ἐκ τῶν πόλεων / αἱ διὰ τῶν πόλεων / αἱ τῶν πόλεων / αἱ κατὰ πόλεις) or as αἱ πολιτικάι. These figures are based on the table in Citti 1966, 228, and also correspond to my personal counting (see, however, footnotes 11 and 12). Identical figures are given by West 2001, 67, with the exception for the edition of Cyprus and of Sinope, for which West counts three and four quotations respectively.

11. Citti 1966, 228, counts twenty-seven attestations, because Eust. 366.12 (ad *Il.* 2.865) mentions the edition of Marseilles. In *Sch. Il.* 2.865, however, Didymus does not mention it.

12. Citti 1966, 228, counts two attestations, but the second one is in *P.Oxy.* 221, xv, 27 (ad *Il.* 21.290); see below, footnote 20.

13. So West 2001, 56 and 60.

14. Without counting the cases in which the variant is introduced by phrases such as Ἀντίμαχος or οἱ περὶ Ἀντίμαχον [γράφει/γράφουσι]; cf. West 2001, 53. Antimachus' poetry (not his edition) is also quoted as a poetic parallel (often in a derogatory way, to show how the 'neoteris' Antimachus misunderstood Homer) in the Aristonicus scholia; see Schironi 1999 and Chapter 5.3 § 3.4.2. On a possible reference to the edition of Antimachus (οἱ περὶ Ἀντίμαχον) in *Sch. Il.* 24.71–3 (Ariston. | Did. | Nic.), see West 2001, 53–54. It is unclear whether this portion of the scholium is from Aristonicus (for example, Erbse attributes it to Didymus). If it came from Aristonicus, however, he could have learned of such a reference from Aristarchus' *hypomnema*.

15. This edition should not be confused with the other works by Callistratus, *Περὶ Ἰλιάδος*, *Πρὸς τὰς ἀθετήσεις*, and *Διορθωτικά*. Thus, when Didymus simply refers to 'Callistratus' (e.g., in *Sch. Il.* 6.434a), the reference is ambiguous, as the reading could also come from one of these monographs.

edition with ‘additional lines’ (ἡ πολύστιχος, three times).¹⁶ In addition to their origin, Didymus seems to have classified the quality of these editions, distinguishing between those which were common or less refined and those which were more accurate or sophisticated. The former are called αἱ κοιναί, ‘common’, or δημώδεις, ‘popular’, (i.e., ἐκδόσεις)¹⁷ or, with the comparative, αἱ κοινότεραι, ‘more common’, and αἱ εἰκαιότεραι, ‘more ordinary’. The ‘more refined’ editions (a group which includes both the editions κατὰ πόλεις and those κατ’ ἄνδρα) are labeled αἱ χαριέστεραι or, with the superlative, αἱ χαριέσταται. While αἱ πλείους seems to indicate the majority of manuscripts, when Didymus uses the expression αἱ ἅπασαι/πᾶσαι, he does not always mean ‘all’ the manuscripts, but a group of manuscripts which he might have considered particularly respectable (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 12.161b; 19.95b^{1.2}).¹⁸

These references to the city editions, to the editions of some specific scholar, to the ‘common’, ‘most/more refined’ editions, or, finally, to ‘all’ the editions are only to be found in Didymus’ notes. Aristonicus, if we trust Erbse’s attributions, never mentions them. The question is whether Didymus added this information because he took it from Aristarchus, or whether he added it as a result of his own research. If the former hypothesis is true, one should ask in which of Aristarchus’ works Didymus found such information. If we consider the reconstruction proposed for Aristarchus’ *ekdoseis* and *hypomnemata*, the only place where Aristarchus could have discussed specific readings found in other editions was the commentary. He might also have indicated variants coming from specific editions in the margins of his *ekdosis*, as we sometimes see in papyri preserving the Homeric text.¹⁹ Yet it would be odd if Aristarchus did not comment on his editorial choices and the manuscript evidence in the *hypomnemata* as well—after all, *hypomnemata* are the place where variant readings found in specific editions are discussed, as is proved, for example, by the so-called ‘Ammonius’ commentary’ in *P.Oxy.* 221, xv, 27 (on *Il.* 21.290).²⁰ But if Aristarchus listed readings from specific editions in his *hypomnemata*, why does Aristonicus, who used the *hypomnemata* as his main source, never once mention any specific edition? It could be an omission by Aristonicus himself, but such an odd choice is difficult to explain, given that Aristonicus otherwise

16. For these data, see West 2001, 52–61 and 72–73.

17. Κοιναί ἐκδόσεις are also mentioned by Nicanor in *Sch. Il.* 17.214a.

18. So West 2001, 51.

19. See Chapter 1.2, footnote 54.

20. *P.Oxy.* 221, xv, 24–27 (in Erbse 1969–1988, V 108): ἐν [δ]ὲ τῷ<ι> εἴ | [τ]ῶν Διορθωτικῶν ὁ αὐτὸς [ἀ]θετεῖ | σὺν τοῖς ἐξῆς βῆ ως περισσο[ύ]ς, οὐκ εἶναι δὲ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ<ι> Κρητικῇ<ι> [but in Book 5 of the work *On Textual Criticism* the same [i.e., Seleucus] athetizes it with the following two lines [sc. *Il.* 21.290–292] because they are superfluous. And [he says that?] they were not in the edition of Crete].

refers to the readings found in Zenodotus' and Aristophanes' editions.²¹ Since he was focused on preserving Aristarchus' exegesis in the *hypomnemata* (in contrast to Didymus), the fact that Aristonicus never calls attention to any specific edition indeed seems to invalidate the supposition that all the editions mentioned by Didymus go back to Aristarchus.

More importantly, in none of the cases where Didymus quotes different editions can it be demonstrated beyond doubt that the mention of these editions is taken from Aristarchus. I will here briefly discuss the scholia often quoted as evidence that Aristarchus looked at specific manuscripts. The most controversial case involves a direct quotation of Aristarchus' words (λέξεις Ἀριστάρχου):

Sch. Il. 1.423–4 (Did.) <Ζεὺς . . . μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας /> χθιζὸς ἔβη <κατὰ δαῖτα, θεοὶ δ' ἅμα πάντες ἔπονται>: λέξεις Ἀριστάρχου ἐκ τοῦ Α τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὑπομνήματος. “τὸ μὲν ‘μετ' ἀμύμονας’ (l. 423) ἐπ' ἀμύμονας, ὃ ἐστι πρὸς ἀμώμους, ἀγαθούς, τὸ δὲ ‘κατὰ δαῖτα’ (l. 424) ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ δαῖτα· οὕτως γὰρ νῦν Ὅμηρος τέθεικεν. ἔνιοι δὲ ποιοῦσι ‘μετὰ δαῖτα’, ὅπως ἦ αὐτοῖς αὐτόθεν τὸ μετὰ ἐπὶ. χρῶνται δὲ καὶ πλείονες ἄλλοι τῶν ποιητῶν τῇ κατὰ ἀντὶ τῆς ἐπὶ. Σοφοκλῆς· ‘ἐγὼ κατ' αὐτόν, ὡς ὁρᾷς, ἐξέρχομαι’ (*TrGF* 4, fr. 898). οὕτως δὲ εὔρομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ Μασσαλιωτικῇ καὶ Σινωπικῇ καὶ Κυπρία καὶ Ἀντιμαχείῳ (fr. 168 Matthews) καὶ Ἀριστοφανείῳ (p. 175 Slater)”. Καλλίστρατος δὲ ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τὰς ἀθετήσεις (pp. 21–51 Barth) ὁμοίως, καὶ ὁ Σιδώνιος καὶ ὁ Ἰξίων ἐν τῷ ἔκτῳ Πρὸς τὰς ἐξηγήσεις (fr. 27 Staesche). καὶ τὸ θεοὶ †δὲ† πάντες ἔπονται (l. 424) διὰ τοῦ αἰ.

‘Yesterday Zeus went to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians (μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας) for a banquet (κατὰ δαῖτα), and the rest of the gods are following’: quotation of Aristarchus from the commentary to *Iliad* 1: “the [expression] μετ' ἀμύμονας (l. 423) [is used instead of] ἐπ' ἀμύμονας, which means ‘to the faultless, valorous [Ethiopians]’; the [expression] κατὰ δαῖτα (l. 424) [is used] instead of ἐπὶ δαῖτα, for this is how Homer has used it here. Some, however, write ‘μετὰ δαῖτα’, so that for them μετὰ is simply ἐπὶ. But also the majority of the other poets use κατὰ instead of ἐπὶ. Sophocles [has]: ‘as you see, I am going to (κατὰ) him’ (*TrGF* 4, fr. 898). We also found this in the editions from Marseilles, from Sinope, from Cyprus and in those by Antimachus (fr. 168 Matthews) and by Aristophanes (p. 175 Slater)”. Callistratus in the work *Against the Atheteseis* (pp. 21–51 Barth) has the same reading and so do [Dionysius] Sidonius and [Demetrius] Ixion in Book 6 of the work *Against the Exegeses* (fr. 27 Staesche). And in θεοὶ δὲ πάντες ἔπονται (l. 424) [the verb ἔπονται is written] with αἰ.

21. See below, § 2.

Leaving aside the analysis of the verbatim quotation,²² I will focus on the last part of the scholium. Erbse (whose text I have reported above) also ascribes the comments about the readings in other editions to Aristarchus: οὕτως δὲ εὔρομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ Μασσαλιωτικῇ καὶ Σινωπικῇ καὶ Κυπρία καὶ Ἀντιμαχείῳ καὶ Ἀριστοφανεῖω.²³ West,²⁴ however, considers these remarks as Didymus' addition concerning what he found in other editions. I tend to agree with West, since there is no evidence that this sentence is still part of the verbatim quotation; rather, as West points out, the phrase οὕτως/ἐν . . . εὔρομεν/εὐρίσκομεν . . . to introduce variants found in manuscripts is typical of Didymus (see, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.131a¹; 2.517a; 15.469–70a¹; 16.636c¹).²⁵ In fact, in the direct quotation in this scholium, Aristarchus uses the ambiguous ἔνιοι to introduce a variant (ἔνιοι δὲ ποιοῦσι 'μετὰ δαῖτα', ὅπως ἦ . . .), which is exactly the type of 'vague' remark typical of Aristarchus, as transmitted by Aristonicus (see below, § 2).²⁶ In other words, this nonspecific note contrasts with Didymus' precision in indicating the sources of certain readings. Equally ambiguous is the following case:

Sch. Il. 19.386a (Did.) τῷ δ' εὔτε πτερὰ <γίγνετο>: οὕτως γραπτέον 'τῷ δ' εὔτε', ἵνα ἦ ὥσει πτερὰ διὰ τὴν κουφότητα {ἔξωθεν δὲ τὸ ὤς}. πρότερον δὲ γράφων ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος 'τῷ δ' εὔτε' καὶ κατὰ συστολὴν δεχόμενος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡῦτε, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ 'εὔτ' ὄρεος κορυφῇσι' (Il. 3.10), μετέγραψεν ὕστερον 'τῷ δ' αὔτε, ἐμφατικώτερον νομίσας εἶναι ὑπακουομένου τοῦ ὤς, ὥς κάκεῖ 'καιρ[οσέων δ' ὀθονέων] ἀπολείβεται <ύγρον ἔλαιον>' (Od. 7.107).

'To him [the armor] became as (εὔτε) wings': it must be written this way, τῷ δ' εὔτε ('to him as'), so that it is 'as if [they were] wings', because of their lightness. Aristarchus first wrote τῷ δ' εὔτε and understood it with a change of a long vowel into a short one—instead of ἡῦτε ('as'), as in 'just as (εὔτε) from the peaks of a mountain . . . ' (Il. 3.10)—afterward, he changed it into τῷ δ' αὔτε ('to him in turn'), thinking that it was more suggestive if ὤς was [left out and] supplemented, as in that passage 'from the close-woven linen fluid oil drops' (Od. 7.107).

22. See Chapter 3.2.B § 3.2.

23. Cf. also Erbse 1959, 280. This solution had been proposed before by La Roche 1866, 100, and Ludwich 1884–1885, I 194–196, and is followed by Nagy 2004, 89–90. On the other hand, van Thiel 2014a, I 124, not only excludes the reference to the editions from the verbatim quotation of Aristarchus, but considers only the paraphrase to be Aristarchus' *ipsissima verba* (i.e., τὸ μὲν 'μετ' ἀμύμονας' ἐπ' ἀμύμονας, ὃ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀμώμους, ἀγαθούς, τὸ δὲ 'κατὰ δαῖτα' ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ δαῖτα· οὕτως γὰρ νῦν Ὀμηρος τέθεικεν).

24. West 2001, 70–72, following Bekker and Bergk. This view is shared by van Thiel 2014a, I 125.

25. *Contra* Nagy 2004, 90–94.

26. So van Thiel's exclusion of this part from the direct quotation (see above, footnote 23) seems unjustified.

Sch. Il. 19.386b¹ (Did.) τῷ δ' εὔτε: οὕτως '<τῷ δ'> εὔτε' Ἀρίσταρχος· συνέσταλται δὲ τὸ ἥϋτε καὶ διὰ τοῦ ε εἴρηται. παρὰ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνει 'τῷ δ' ὥστε'. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων 'τῷ δ' αὔτε', <ἔξωθεν δὲ τὸ ὥς>.

'To him as [wings]': so τῷ δ' εὔτε ('to him as') Aristarchus; ἥϋτε has changed into a form with short vowel and it is pronounced with ε. In the edition of Aristophanes there is τῷ δ' ὥστε ('to him just as'), while in the city editions [the reading] is τῷ δ' αὔτε ('to him in turn') and ὥς [must be supplemented] from outside.

Didymus discusses Aristarchus' second thoughts concerning *Il.* 19.386. He first read τῷ δ' εὔτε, but then decided that τῷ δ' αὔτε was better.²⁷ The latter reading—Aristarchus' final choice—was also the reading of the city editions (ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων), according to Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 19.386b¹. These two pieces of information, however, allow us only to conclude that Aristarchus' reading coincided with that of the city editions, but nowhere is it said that Aristarchus found this reading in the city editions²⁸—much less that he adopted such a reading *because* he found it in the city editions. Also, even if he found the reading in those editions (which is certainly possible), this does not mean that he reported the origin of such reading in his *hypomnema*. When we have information about readings present in specific city editions, it always comes from a scholium by Didymus, and never from one by Aristonicus. If the latter did report at least one reading present in a city edition, it would provide evidence that this information was reported in Aristarchus' commentary and not simply added by Didymus. But, if we accept Erbse's attributions, we unfortunately lack such evidence. So the question must remain open.

The following scholia are equally ambiguous:

Sch. Il. 16.467b (Ariston.) ὁ δὲ Πήδασον οὔτασεν ἵππον: . . . καὶ ὅτι δοκεῖ συγκεχύσθαι τὸ οὔτασε· βεβλήκει γὰρ τὸ δόρυ.

'But he struck (οὔτασεν) the horse Pedasus': . . . and because οὔτασε seems to be confused [i.e., with βάλλειν]: for he [i.e., Sarpedon] has thrown a spear.

Sch. Il. 16.467c¹ (Did.) {σαρπηδῶν δ' αὐτοῦ μὲν ἀπήμβροτε δουρὶ φαιινῷ / δεύτερον ὀρμηθεῖς} ὁ δὲ Πήδασον <οὔτασεν ἵππον>: δοκεῖ διὰ τούτων συγχεῖσθαι ἢ διαφορὰ τοῦ βαλεῖν καὶ οὔτασαι· βέβληται γὰρ ὁ Πήδασος. καὶ μήποτε γραφή τις ἐφέρετο, δι' ἧς τὸ τῆς λέξεως σύνηθες ἐφύλασσαν Ὅμηρος.

27. On Aristarchus' readings, see Schironi 2004, 146–152 (fr. 15).

28. So West 2004 responding to Rengakos 2002a (cf. also Nagy 2009a, 11 n. 16).

οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸ ἀπαραμύθητον ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος ἀφῆκεν. ἐν τοίνυν τῇ Φιλήμονος οὕτως ἐφέρετο ‘ὁ δὲ Πήδασον ἤλασεν ἵππον’. ἔστιν γὰρ ὅτε ἐπὶ τῆς πληγῆς τὸ ἤλασεν κεῖται, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀρήτου ‘καὶ βάλεν Ἀρήτοιο’ (*Il.* 17.517), εἴτα ‘νειαίρη δ’ ἐν γαστρὶ διὰ ζωστήρος ἔλασσε’ (*Il.* 17.519).

‘But he struck the horse Pedasus’: in these lines the difference between βαλεῖν and οὐτάσαι seems to be confused: for Pedasus has been hit [by a spear]. **And perhaps there was a reading through which Homer could keep his linguistic usage: for Aristarchus would not have left it uncorrected.** Indeed in the edition of Philemon there was: ‘and he struck (ἤλασεν) the horse Pedasus’; for sometimes ἤλασεν is used for a blow, as with Aretus: ‘he hit [the shield] of Aretus’ (*Il.* 17.517), and then: ‘and he struck (ἔλασσε) into the lower belly through the belt’ (*Il.* 17.519).²⁹

Both Aristonicus and Didymus notice that this specific passage contradicts the clear difference in Homer between βαλεῖν (‘to hit by throwing missiles’) and οὐτάσαι (‘to strike in close combat’):³⁰ Pedasus has been hit by a spear, but the verb used is οὐτάσαι and not βαλεῖν. Aristonicus limits himself to this remark, but Didymus further conjectures that Aristarchus had probably another correct reading in his text (and quotes the reading of Philemon’s edition as an example), because it is unlikely that he would have left a line with such a mistake. This is, however, Didymus’ assumption, not a truthful description of what happened. Aristarchus no doubt aimed at producing a correct text of the *Iliad*, and he often changed a reading to reach that goal, but the fact that he ‘might have found’ a better reading somewhere is Didymus’ speculation. In fact, there is no secure evidence that Aristarchus changed the reading, and even less that he changed it because he found a better reading elsewhere.³¹ Aristonicus only suggests that Aristarchus commented on this ‘mistake’ in vocabulary by Homer, as he often does (and this without changing the original text).³²

This does not mean, however, that Aristarchus did not check manuscripts at

29. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 16.467c² (Did.).

30. On this difference, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.5.

31. The mention of the variant in the edition of Philemon with ἤλασεν is Didymus’ addition; see Lehrs 1882, 65–66; West 2001, 58–59. The information given in *Sch. Il.* 16.467–8 (ex.), that Aristarchus changed the text adding plus verses (*Il.* 16.467a and 467b), is not to be considered trustworthy; see Lehrs 1882, 53–55; Ludwich 1884–1885, I 409–410; Bolling 1925, 169–170; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 16.467–8; cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 152–154 (with a less-than-clear interpretation of the evidence).

32. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11. Similarly, I do not think that *Sch. Il.* 18.10–1a (Did.) shows that Aristarchus knew about the edition of Rhianus; see also West 2004 (responding to Rengakos 2002a).

all. In fact, both Didymus and Aristonicus prove that he did. Didymus confirms this when commenting on *Il.* 9.222:

Sch. Il. 9.222b¹ (Did.) αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος <ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο>: φαίνονται καὶ παρ' Ἀγαμέμνονι πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν πρεσβείαν στείλασθαι δειπνοῦντες· φησὶ γοῦν 'αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ σπεῖσαν τ' ἔπιόν θ', ὅσον ἤθελε θυμός, / ὠρμῶντ' ἐκ κλισίης' (*Il.* 9.177–178). ἄμεινον οὖν εἶχεν ἄν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, <εἰ> ἐγέγραπτο 'ἄψ ἐπάσαντο' ἢ 'αἰψ' ἐπάσαντο', ἵν' ὅσον χαρίσασθαι τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ γεύσασθαι μόνον καὶ μὴ εἰς κόρον ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν λέγωνται. ἀλλ' ὅμως ὑπὸ περιττῆς εὐλαβείας οὐδὲν μετέθηκεν, ἐν πολλαῖς οὕτως εὐρῶν φερομένην τὴν γραφήν.

'But when they had satisfied their desire of food and drink': they have clearly also eaten at Agamemnon's before being sent on the embassy. For he says 'but when they had poured libations and had drunk as much as their heart wanted, they left the hut' (*Il.* 9.177–178). It would be better, Aristarchus says, if it were written 'they had tasted food again' (ἄψ ἐπάσαντο) or 'they had quickly tasted food' (αἰψ' ἐπάσαντο), so that they are said to have a taste of food just to be gracious to Achilles and [they are] not [said] to eat and drink until full. But nevertheless he [i.e., Aristarchus] did not change anything out of excessive scruple, because he had found this reading in many [editions].³³

According to Didymus' account, Aristarchus would have preferred a certain reading but did not dare to change the text, because the transmitted reading was well attested in many editions. This is clear proof that Aristarchus did not indulge in compulsive emendations but kept an eye on the manuscript evidence.³⁴ This scholium comes from Didymus; unlike in the previous example, however, there is reason to believe that this is not an instance of Didymus simply speculating on Aristarchus' decision-making process, as he seems to quote Aristarchus almost verbatim. In fact, the reference here is to 'many editions' (ἐν πολλαῖς οὕτως εὐρῶν φερομένην τὴν γραφήν) but no further detail about them is given. This vagueness contrasts with Didymus' own precision in referring to specific editions and is consistent with another instance in *Sch. Il.* 6.4b, where Didymus states that 'later on, Aristarchus found this reading (ὥστερον δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος ταύτην εὐρῶν) and chose it'. In this scholium, too, no further detail about 'where' Aristarchus found the reading is provided.

33. See also *Sch. Il.* 9.222b^{2,3} (Did.); this scholium is also discussed in Chapter 3.6.C § 1.1.

34. As van der Valk himself must also recognize when discussing this scholium (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 89).

2. Evidence from Aristonicus

The Aristonicus scholia seem to confirm Aristarchus' vagueness about manuscript evidence, as Aristonicus often observes that other readings were 'written in some [editions]' (ἐν τισι γράφεται/γέγραπται),³⁵ or that lines are 'added in some [editions]' (ἐν τισιν ὑποτάσσονται τούτῳ),³⁶ or that 'some write' (ἐνιοι/τινὲς γράφουσι),³⁷ or that 'some add a line' (ἐνιοι ὑποτάσσουσι στίχον).³⁸ Aristonicus never explains what ἐν τισι means, but it probably stands for ἐν τισι ἀντιγράφοις or ἐκδόσει; similarly, the 'some' in ἐνιοι/τινὲς γράφουσι might indicate 'editors' or 'correctors', or even 'interpolators' in the case of 'some add (ὑποτάσσουσι) a line'. Still, these expressions are vague. Unlike Didymus, Aristonicus does not seem to be interested in explicitly mentioning the different editions of Homer which contain variants. The question is whether this lack of differentiation is due to Aristonicus' epitomization or comes directly from Aristarchus, who did check different manuscripts, but did not bother mentioning them in the first place, at least in his *hypomnemata*. A definitive answer is impossible to reach. Yet Aristonicus always seems to be very precise and rich in detail when reporting the notes found in Aristarchus' commentary, especially those concerning readings by Zenodotus and Aristophanes.³⁹ Thus, he can also be expected to be precise when reporting readings attested elsewhere, had such details been present in Aristarchus' *hypomnemata*. Of course, we cannot exclude that this is due to Aristonicus' personal choice, because he was not interested in reporting this specific information about readings found in city editions or in editions by scholars other than Zenodotus and Aristophanes. Nevertheless, this choice would seem arbitrary and odd. Rather, the vagueness might indeed have been present in Aristarchus' *hypomnemata* as suggested by Didymus' direct quotation from Aristarchus' commentary in *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4 when introducing a variant (ἐνιοι δὲ ποιοῦσι 'μετὰ δαῖτα' . . .).⁴⁰ This phrasing

35. As, for example, in *Sch. Il.* 2.412a; 6.241a; 7.5a; 8.213d; 9.212b; 11.297a; 11.694; 15.622; 21.575a¹.

36. As in *Sch. Il.* 23.538c¹.

37. As, for example, in *Sch. Il.* 1.197; 1.424c; 2.485; 3.11b; 5.764; 6.408; 7.149.

38. As, for example, in *Sch. Il.* 9.140a. See also *Sch. Il.* 8.168; 24.205b¹.

39. Normally, in the Aristonicus scholia, the reference to Zenodotus' and Aristophanes' editions is simply in the nominative (e.g., ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος . . . γράφει or ἡθέτει καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης); only twice does Aristonicus use words that point to an edition or text, in *Sch. Il.* 8.37a (ἐν τῇ Ζηνοδότου [ἐκδόσει?]) and in *Sch. Il.* 19.26a (ἐν τοῖς Ζηνοδότου [ἀντιγράφοις?]). Otherwise, equally rarely, we find παρά and the dative: παρὰ Ζηνοδότῳ (*Sch. Il.* 18.570a) and παρὰ Ἀριστοφάνει (*Sch. Il.* 18.597–8). On Aristarchus' attitude toward Zenodotus and Aristophanes, see Chapter 4 § 1 and § 2.

40. On the other hand, another direct quotation of Aristarchus by Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 2.435a¹ might further prove that Aristarchus specifically quoted Zenodotus' readings in his commentary; this, however, depends on whether the quotation includes the mention of Zenodotus' reading (just like with the previous example of *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4 [Did.]): 'Let us now not remain gathered here

reflects the many similar notes in Aristonicus in which we read that the reason for a *diple* is a variant ‘in some copies/editions’ (ἐν τισι) or which ‘some’ (ἐνίοι/τινές) wrote. The vague references to ‘some editions’ and ‘some’ editors thus seem to be Aristarchus’ *ipsissima verba* from the commentaries, which Aristonicus reported faithfully.

3. Conclusions

Both Didymus and Aristonicus give us compelling evidence that Aristarchus checked manuscripts. He certainly did so at least to assemble his own preparatory text;⁴¹ in fact, the preparation of a working text in which scarcely attested additional lines were completely eliminated was possible only through a collation of manuscripts.⁴² Aristarchus must have also checked manuscript evidence when he discussed certain variants, especially when the choice was difficult, such as in *Il.* 9.222. The evidence from Aristonicus, however, seems to suggest that, as a rule, Aristarchus did not bother distinguishing among different editions, at least in his *hypomnemata*. Aristarchus only seems to have mentioned by name the choices of Zenodotus and Aristophanes, while the references to other copies/editions were vague: ἐν πολλαῖς (as Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 9.222b¹) or ἐν τισι (as in the Aristonicus scholia). Only in the Didymus scholia are specific scholars’ editions or city editions mentioned, and there is no way to prove with any certainty that these references go back to Aristarchus.⁴³ Admittedly, it cannot be excluded that Didymus found this information in the margin

anymore (μηκέτι νῦν δὴθ’ αὖθι λεγόμεθα): the editions of Aristarchus [read] in this way. [Here are] his words from the commentary to *Iliad* 2: “δηθά [is] πολλὸν χρόνον [‘for a long time’], αὖθι [is] αὐτοῦ [‘here’], λεγόμεθα [is] συναθροίζόμεθα [‘let us gather together’]. This is what is being said: ‘let us not remain here assembled for a long time’. Zenodotus, on the other hand, writes: ‘Let us now not discuss these things anymore’ ” . . . (*Sch. Il.* 2.435a¹ [Did.]) In this case too, Erbse includes the reference to Zenodotus’ edition in the verbatim quotation of Aristarchus by Didymus; on the contrary and consistently with his previous choice (see above, footnote 23), van Thiel 2014a, I 223, does not include it.

41. On this ‘preparatory text’, see Chapter 1.2 § 3.

42. Cf. also Nagy 2009a, 17.

43. Didymus also extensively uses the ‘vague’ expression ἐν τισι. In the Didymus scholia, however, ἐν τισι can also stand for ἐν τισι τῶν ὑπομνημάτων (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 7.95a² compared to *Sch. Il.* 7.95a¹; *Sch. Il.* 14.382d² compared to *Sch. Il.* 14.382d¹) and not only for ἐν τισι τῶν ἀντιγράφων (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 13.224a² compared to *Sch. Il.* 13.224a¹). More importantly, with Didymus the phrase ἐν τισι is often an abbreviated formula found in interlinear scholia or in short bT scholia for a longer scholium in A where all the different editions are listed. This never happens in the Aristonicus scholia. On the relationship between the Aristonicus scholia where the phrase ἐν τισι occurs and the corresponding scholia by Didymus, see also West 2001, 49–50 (even if I do not agree with his conclusion that Didymus used Aristonicus; see Schironi 2015, 626–627).

of Aristarchus' *ekdosis*, as Homeric papyri have marginal variants for which the scribe also specifies the origin. On the other hand, the *modus operandi* of Didymus—who, as seen in Chapter 1.1 § 4.2, normally inserts additional information (from contemporaries of Aristarchus or from his pupils) in order to frame Aristarchus' *diorthosis* within a bigger picture—may suggest that the mention of these specific *ekdoseis* stems from the work of Didymus himself, the 'brazen-gut', who checked them in the Alexandrian Library.

Even if it seems certain that Aristarchus checked manuscripts to prepare his working text, to choose a reading in specifically difficult cases, or to decide on the authenticity of one or more lines, this does not necessarily mean that he *consistently* used manuscript evidence when he was working on his *diorthosis* and writing his *hypomnemata*. In fact, there is no way to conclude that he systematically did so. Moreover, and more importantly, even when Aristarchus mentions readings 'in certain' copies in the Aristonicus scholia, he does not use such evidence to decide about a reading or an athetesis; if anything, in these scholia Aristarchus criticizes the reading he found ἐν τισι, either because it is 'not Homeric' or because it is not fitting for the context.⁴⁴ Rather, *the reasons provided for an athetesis or for a particular reading are always internal ones*. *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4, analyzed above, is a clear further example of that, since it contains a verbatim quotation of Aristarchus by Didymus, no matter to whom (Aristarchus or Didymus) one attributes the reference to the editions of Marseilles, Sinope, Cyprus, and those by Antimachus and Aristophanes. In this case too, Aristarchus selects his reading based on a poetic parallel (with Sophocles), and not on manuscript evidence, even though he might have found this reading in some copies. We can therefore detect two different and coexisting behaviors in Aristarchus' textual criticism: (1) he did not change the text if a line or a reading was well attested (as seems to be proved by *Sch. Il.* 9.222b¹); and (2) he did not change the received text or choose a certain reading *only because* of manuscript evidence. When he did the latter, it was also because such a reading or athetesis was supported by other, internal reasons (as *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4 and plenty of other scholia prove).

To conclude, Aristarchus certainly could (and did) look at manuscripts in his *diorthosis*. In particular, he used manuscript evidence when establishing his working text. On the other hand, the question of whether or not he checked the editions mentioned by Didymus must be left open due to the lack of unambiguous evidence in either direction. It is also impossible to determine whether the readings in his own *diorthosis* were always chosen on the basis of manuscript evidence: he might have chosen certain readings because they were well attested, but he might also have improved the text with personal

44. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.412a; 8.213d; 9.212b; 11.100a; 11.694; 15.622; 21.575a¹; 23.538c¹.

conjectures.⁴⁵ Clearly, *pace* van der Valk, not all the readings offered by the Alexandrians were their own inventions, as comparison with Ptolemaic papyri or the reuse of Homeric lines and variant readings by the Hellenistic poets proves.⁴⁶ It is a matter of fact, however, that the fragments discussing his Homeric readings and *atheteseis* consistently show that Aristarchus' main criteria for editorial choices were internal reasons (in line with the principle of 'clarifying Homer from Homer'),⁴⁷ and not the fact that a reading was attested in the majority of manuscripts or in particularly authoritative copies.

45. These observations further confirm how tricky it is to discuss Aristarchus' textual choices and how he reached them, as we concluded in Chapter 1.2 § 4.

46. See, for example, Rengakos 2002b. Since in this study my focus is not Aristarchus' specific readings, I will not touch on this question. However, one such case of an 'old' variant present in an Alexandrian *ekdosis* (that of Zenodotus) will be discussed: the omission of *Il.* 21.195 (see Chapter 3.3.B § 4.1).

47. 'To clarify Homer from Homer' (Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὅμηρου σαφηνίζειν) is the well-known formula defining Aristarchus' critical activity. However, even if it describes Aristarchus' approach to Homer well (as will become clear in the following chapters, where I will often recall it), the exact formula is nowhere to be found in Aristarchus' fragments. Rather, it derives from Porphyry, who uses it to define his own way of approaching Homer in the *Homeric Questions* (Porph. *QH I*, 56.3–6 Sodano): ἀξιῶν δὲ ἐγὼ Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὅμηρου σαφηνίζειν αὐτὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἑαυτὸν ὑπεδείκνυον, ποτὲ μὲν παρακειμένως, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐν ἄλλοις [considering it right to clarify Homer from Homer, I have shown that Homer interprets himself sometimes in passages which are nearby, sometimes in other [more remote] passages]. On the origin of this maxim, see Pfeiffer 1968, 226–227; Wilson 1971; Lee 1975; Wilson 1976; Schäublin 1977; on this principle within Aristarchus' work, see Porter 1992, 70–84, and Nünlist 2015.

2.3

Paraphrase

A Ubiquitous Interpretative Tool

1. Aristarchus' Direct Quotations: Lecturing with Paraphrases
2. Close and Loose Paraphrases
3. Close Paraphrases: Homer 'Translated' into Koine
4. Loose Paraphrases: Discussing Homeric Content
5. Other Uses of Paraphrases
6. Conclusions

It goes without saying that the first task for an exegete is to understand the text he is working on and the information it conveys. This is a fairly easy task if such a text is written in a plain style with commonly used words and a straightforward syntax. Sometimes, however, a literary text can be written in a particularly complex style or in a language that, for various reasons, is far from daily usage. In this case, the first step often is to proceed to a paraphrase, that is, a rewording of a text (either in prose or poetry) into a simpler form, aimed at simplifying all the complexities in vocabulary, morphology, and syntax, as well as the stylistic peculiarities of the original text. The content and, normally, the general structure of the original are maintained, but difficult words are replaced with more common synonyms, odd morphological forms are turned into more standard ones, and the syntax is recast according to current usage and a more natural word order. Sometimes, if the original text is particularly dense or elliptical, the paraphrase expands it in order to clarify the logical relationship among the components of the sentences. When the original language is figurative and loaded with rhetorical devices, as often happens in poetry, the text is rephrased into a literal and plainer form, so that the content becomes clearer.

Paraphrasing is thus a form of translation, as Roman Jakobson has pointed

out when he divided translations into three types: (1) intralingual translation or *rewording*; (2) interlingual translation or *translation proper*; and (3) intersemiotic translation or *transmutation* (namely, interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems). Paraphrase corresponds to the first type, defined by Jakobson as ‘an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.’¹ This practice of translating a difficult text into a simpler form within the same language is therefore the most basic type of exegesis and interpretation of a text. It is thus a widespread exegetical tool, still common today in many educational systems.²

The use of paraphrase is well attested in the ancient world. Quintilian explicitly says that paraphrases are a fundamental and difficult exercise and that pupils who are able to do it well will be able to learn anything (*Inst.* 1.9.2–3). In ancient Greece, school practice often consisted of rewording Homer in the form of paraphrases and translations into ‘classical Greek’. Abundant evidence for this practice comes from papyri that have preserved *scholia minora* and continuous paraphrases of Homer. In fact, the word-for-word translations provided by the glosses of the *scholia minora* can be seen as a first step toward the rephrasing of an entire sentence into a simpler syntax, as attested in the continuous paraphrases.³ Both operations were part of the educational process, as demonstrated by the grammatical exercises collected by Raffaella Cribiore.⁴ In particular, students at the highest level, after having been trained in the letters of the alphabet, syllabaries, lists of words, and writing exercises of both short and long passages, practiced Homeric rewordings.

Glosses and paraphrases, however, were not limited to school exercises, but were also part of higher levels of literary analysis. Famously, Socrates in Plato’s *Republic* (393d8–394a7) paraphrases *Il.* 1.12–42 word for word in prose style. On the other hand, Aristotle clearly highlights the importance of the correct understanding of diction through paraphrases in order to solve many textual problems, when in *Poetics* 1461a10–31 he claims that many exegetical problems can be solved with the analysis of the λέξις, ‘diction’, in order to clarify *glossai*⁵ and metaphors, and to remove any kind of ambiguity.⁶

1. Jakobson 1959, 233.

2. On paraphrase in the Anglophone education, see Montgomery 1960; Yoder 1973; D’Angelo 1979; Arrington 1988.

3. On the *scholia minora* and Homeric paraphrases, see Henrichs 1971, 99–116; Montanari 1979, 11–13; Montanari 1995a, 79–82.

4. Cribiore 1996, 31 and 50–52. On paraphrases and glossographical analysis in intermediate school training, the one offered by the γραμματικός, see also Cribiore 2001, 142 and 207.

5. Here and everywhere in the book, by the Greek *glossa* (pl. *glossai*) I mean a difficult or rare word used by a poet (the meaning that γλῶσσα had in Greek). By the English ‘gloss’ I mean the explanation given to a *glossa* by an ancient interpreter.

6. For a discussion of this passage, see Janko 1987, 148–150.

In rhetorical terminology, the practice of paraphrasing was called *metalepsis* (μετάληψις) and later on was used both by grammarians and rhetoricians as well by Christian exegetes.⁷ As outlined above, however, paraphrasing was practiced much earlier, in schools as well as in philosophical and intellectual circles primarily to discuss difficult poetic texts. Aristarchus, too, seems to have been very fond of this interpretative tool.

1. Aristarchus' Direct Quotations: Lecturing with Paraphrases

A couple of direct quotations of Aristarchus by Didymus show that Aristarchus' way of dealing with the Homeric text involved paraphrases as the first step toward interpretation.⁸ The first case is a scholium to *Iliad* 2:

Sch. Il. 2.435a¹ (Did.) μηκέτι νῦν δὴθ' αὖθι λεγώμεθα: οὕτως αἱ Ἀριστάρχου. λέξεις ἐκ τοῦ Β τῆς Ἰλιάδος. “δηθά πολὺν χρόνον, αὖθι αὐτοῦ, λεγώμεθα συναθροίζομεθα. ὁ δὲ λόγος τοιοῦτος· ‘μηκέτι νῦν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον αὐτοῦ συνηθροισμένοι μένωμεν’ ” . . .

‘Let us now not remain gathered here anymore (μηκέτι νῦν δὴθ' αὖθι λεγώμεθα)’: the editions of Aristarchus [read] in this way. [Here are] his words from the commentary to *Iliad* 2: “δηθά [is] πολὺν χρόνον [‘for a long time’], αὖθι [is] αὐτοῦ [‘here’], λεγώμεθα [is] συναθροίζομεθα [‘let us gather together’]. This is what is being said: ‘let us not remain here assembled for a long time’ ” . . .

Aristarchus ‘dissects’ Nestor’s words inviting Agamemnon to summon the army with no further delay (‘Let us now not remain gathered here anymore’) and translates the most difficult words into more straightforward ones: δηθά into πολὺν χρόνον, αὖθι into αὐτοῦ, λεγώμεθα into συναθροίζομεθα. After this word-for-word translation, he gives a full paraphrase of the entire sentence introducing it by ὁ δὲ λόγος τοιοῦτος: ‘let us not remain (μηκέτι μένωμεν) here (ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ) assembled (συνηθροισμένοι) for a long time (πολὺν χρόνον)’. The example demonstrates what was suggested above, namely, that the word-for-word translation was a preliminary step toward the full paraphrase. In particular, the former exercise corresponds exactly to the content of the *scholia minora*

7. See Lallot 1997, II 93 n. 51: “*metálēpsis* . . . désigne l’opération de *paraphrase*, qui consiste pour le grammairien à remplacer par un équivalent prosaïque clair un mot qui, dans un texte, notamment poétique, présente une difficulté grammaticale”. On the concept of *metalepsis* and its use and development in later grammarians, see Lehrs 1882, 19–21; Sluiter 1990, 111–124; Lallot 1988, 20–21; Schenkeveld 1994, 273–274; Schironi 2002, 153–154.

8. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 153–154.

on papyrus and thus proves that this basic operation was not only a ‘school’ exercise performed by students; rather, translating Homeric Greek word for word into Koine⁹ was a common practice even at the highest level of teaching as well as of exegesis.¹⁰ Another direct quotation concerns *Il.* 20.471:

Sch. Il. 20.471a¹ (Did.) κόλπον ἐνέπλησεν: ‘ἐνέπρησεν’ Φιλόξενος (fr. 217 Theodoridis) καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος. περὶ δὲ τῆς γραφῆς Ἀρίσταρχος ἐν ὑπομνήματι φησιν οὕτως: “τὸ αἷμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἥπατος ἐκρούνιζε χύδην καὶ τὸν τοῦ χιτῶνος κόλπον ἐνεφύσησεν”.

‘[The dark blood] filled up (ἐνέπλησεν) the fold [of his tunic]’: Philoxenus (fr. 217 Theodoridis) and Aristarchus [read] ἐνέπρησεν (‘inflated’). In his commentary, Aristarchus says thus about this reading: “the blood from the liver was streaming in floods and blew up (ἐνεφύσησεν) the fold of the chiton”.

When Achilles kills Tros, Homer describes Tros’ liver falling out and the dark blood covering the breast. Two readings were attested in *Il.* 20.471: κόλπον ἐνέπλησεν, in the sense of ‘[the dark blood] filled up the fold [of his tunic]’, and κόλπον ἐνέπρησεν (from ἐμπρήθω, ‘to inflate’), in the sense of ‘[the dark blood] inflated the fold [of his tunic]’. Aristarchus prefers the latter, which is certainly a *lectio difficilior*, and explains it by rephrasing the line and using a synonymous, but easier verb (ἐμφυσάω).¹¹

There is also another scholium which may be considered a direct quotation of Aristarchus by Didymus:

Sch. Il. 4.343a (Did.) πρώτῳ γὰρ <καὶ δαιτὸς ἀκούαζέσθον ἐμεῖο>: . . . | οὐ λέγει δὲ ‘τῆς ἐμῆς δαιτὸς πρώτοι ἀκούετε’, ἀλλὰ ‘πρώτοί μου ἀκούετε περὶ δαιτός’. οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος. | . . .

‘For you two are the first to hear me inviting to banquet’: . . . | He does not say ‘you are the first to hear about my banquet’, but ‘you are the first to hear me when it is about a banquet’. So Aristarchus. | . . .

9. By ‘Koine’, here and elsewhere in this book, I mean the modern concept of Koine, i.e., the Greek language as spoken in the Hellenistic period, which was also the variety of Greek spoken by Aristarchus. This modern sense of Koine must be kept distinct from the ancient idea of κοινὴ διάλεκτος, which was considered another language, namely, ‘standard’ Greek, and was counted as another Greek dialect for a total of five Greek dialects: Ionic, Attic, Aeolic, Doric, and ‘common dialect’. The best discussions of the problem are in Morpurgo Davies 1987 and Cassio 1993.

10. Cf. Roemer 1924, 52; Montanari 1995a, 63–64.

11. For van der Valk 1963–1964, II 117–118, Aristarchus’ reading, in its artificiality, is the one more in line with the canons of Alexandrian poetry, which Aristarchus often followed in his emendations. Cf. also Edwards 1991, 341.

If we take the final οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος as evidence that the preceding words are a verbatim quotation by Didymus from Aristarchus' *hypomnema*, Aristarchus is paraphrasing here not to discuss different readings, but simply to explain a passage whose meaning is not clear. In Book 4, Agamemnon is reviewing the soldiers before the battle and rebukes the Athenians and Cephellenians because they are not yet ready (*Il.* 4.327–335). Thus, he ironically scolds their leaders, Menestheus and Odysseus, by remarking how quick they are when they hear about a feast, while they are much slower when called to fight (*Il.* 4.338–348). The phrase πρῶτω γὰρ καὶ δαιτὸς ἀκουάζεσθον ἐμεῖο is ambiguous because of the two genitives δαιτὸς and ἐμεῖο and their relationship to the verb ἀκουάζεσθον ('you two hear').¹² According to Aristarchus, the sentence does not mean 'you are the first to hear about my feast (δαιτὸς ἐμεῖο)', which would be a positive remark and imply that Agamemnon is keen to have them as guests, but 'you are the first to hear me (ἐμεῖο) when I talk about partying ([περὶ] δαιτός)—as opposed to when I talk about fighting', which is indeed a rebuke. Aristarchus thus uses a paraphrase here to make this point clear.

Many Aristonicus scholia contain paraphrases and, on the basis of the direct quotations analyzed above,¹³ we can safely assume that they go back to Aristarchus himself.¹⁴ Longer paraphrases can be introduced in many ways.¹⁵ Shorter paraphrases, that is, those involving one or two words, on the other hand, are usually expressed as X ἀντὶ τοῦ Y, where X is the *glossa* and Y is the translation into more accessible Greek. The phrasing goes back to Aristarchus, as demonstrated by Didymus' direct quotation of Aristarchus' *hypomnema* in *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4 (λέξις Ἀριστάρχου ἐκ τοῦ Α τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὑπομνήματος: "... τὸ δὲ 'κατὰ δαῖτα' (l. 424) ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ δαῖτα ...").

12. The previous part of the scholium (*Sch. Il.* 4.343a), which Erbse attributes to Aristonicus, states that this verb should be used τροπικῶς, 'figuratively', in the sense of ἐπαισθάνεσθαι, so 'to hear' in the sense of 'to perceive'.

13. Another direct quotation of Aristarchus performing a paraphrase is in *Sch. Il.* 1.423–4 (Did.); see Chapter 2.2 § 1 and Chapter 3.2.B § 3.2.

14. In *Sch. Il.* 16.31a, for example, Aristarchus discusses two variants through the use of paraphrase.

15. Sometimes there is no introduction and the paraphrase follows right after the lemma, as in the direct quotation of Aristarchus in *Sch. Il.* 2.435a¹: ὁ δὲ λόγος τοιοῦτος ... Indeed the idea of λόγος (καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος, ὁ γὰρ λόγος, τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενόν ἐστιν ..., etc.) is frequent in other Aristonicus scholia with paraphrases (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.356a¹; 9.116a; 9.133a¹; 12.359a¹; 15.511a; 16.97–100a; 23.97–8). Sometimes the paraphrase is introduced by ἔστι γὰρ ... (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.262b; 10.505a; 14.239; 16.274a^{1,2}; 16.326a¹; 16.522a¹; 17.35). In other cases, a *verbum dicendi* (λέγει, φησί, εἶρηκεν) is used, whose subject can be either Homer or a character in the case of direct speeches (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 11.21a; 11.376a; 11.786a¹; 17.272b; 22.216a¹). In other instances, the scholia speak of τὸ σημαινόμενον (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 6.285a; 15.538a; 20.362a) or of ὁ νοῦς (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 8.524–5). The more abstract expression τὸ ἐξῆς ἐστι in the sense of 'what follows is' is also employed (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.109b; 5.329a). When two possible paraphrases are reported, the disjunctive ἢ is used (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.177a; 15.505a); if paraphrases elucidate two variants, they can be introduced with ἐὰν μὲν γράφηται ..., ἔσται ..., ἐὰν δὲ ..., ἔσται ... (*Sch. Il.* 7.64c).

2. Close and Loose Paraphrases

As a working definition, we can distinguish two types of paraphrases: the ‘close’ paraphrase, where the text is rephrased word for word by substituting common words for the original difficult ones, and the ‘loose’ paraphrase, where the general content is recast in a different (and easier) sentence without word-for-word rephrasing and/or with a focus on the content of the lines rather than on their morphological or syntactic peculiarities. The latter type of paraphrase is closer to a summary, but is not necessarily shorter than the original—in fact, sometimes it needs to add words to make the more condensed phrasing of the poetic expression clear.

Aristarchus employs both kinds of paraphrases. Of the direct quotations analyzed above, for example, the one of *Il.* 2.435 is a close paraphrase, whereas the one of *Il.* 20.471 is loose (and longer than the original). The difference between the two operations is evident in a scholium where Aristarchus uses both of them:

Sch. Il. 9.622a νόστοιο μεδοίατο: ὅτι ‘νόστοιο μεδοίατο’ λέγει ‘νόστου ἐπιμελοῖντο’, ‘πάλιν τῆς ἀφόδου μνείαν λάβοιεν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσεά’.

‘They might think of departing (νόστοιο μεδοίατο) [from Achilles’ hut]’: because he says νόστοιο μεδοίατο, [i.e., in Koine] νόστου ἐπιμελοῖντο, [that is] ‘Odysseus’ party should be reminded again to depart’.

The first rephrasing, νόστου ἐπιμελοῖντο, is a close paraphrase where the original Homeric words νόστοιο and μεδοίατο are replaced with Koine Greek: a genitive in -ου instead of the Homeric genitive in -οιο¹⁶ and the third-person plural of the optative in -οῖντο instead of the Ionic -οίατο. Then, Aristarchus rephrases the content with a loose paraphrase (πάλιν τῆς ἀφόδου μνείαν λάβοιεν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσεά), where he clarifies the meaning of the sentence and explicitly introduces the subject (οἱ περὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσεά).

This example suggests that the two different kinds of paraphrases might also serve different purposes. Close paraphrases, by giving the corresponding Koine forms of obsolete Homeric ones, focus more on linguistic analysis and thus show which poetic words and syntactic constructions are considered typically Homeric. Loose paraphrases, on the other hand, are focused more on the content, since the summary or the rephrasing of a Homeric passage aims at spelling out the general sense of a sentence rather than emphasizing linguistic

16. The ending in -οιο for the genitive in the o-stems is attested in Mycenaean and Thessalian (see Buck 1955, 88; Cassio et al. 2016, 24 and 154). Yet the origin of these genitives in Homer (an Aeolism? An archaism?) is still very much debated; see Cassio et al. 2016, 83.

difficulties of Homeric Greek. Generally I have rendered the difference between the nature and aim of the two paraphrases in my translations of the scholia by using Greek for the close paraphrase (since there the focus is most often the morphology or the syntax) and English for the loose one (since there the focus is the meaning of the sentence).¹⁷ This also works for shorter glosses involving one word: if their purpose is to make a morphological or syntactic peculiarity of Homer clear, I have kept the Greek. When instead the focus is semantic, I have translated the gloss into English. Since morphological and semantic explanations often occur together in scholia, I have tried to convey their different aims in this way. For example:

Sch. Il. 23.880 <ὥκὺς δ' ἐκ μελέων θυμὸς πτάτο:> ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ ὠκέως, ὃ ἔστιν εὐθέως.

‘Swiftly (ὥκὺς) life fled from her limbs’: because [ὥκὺς is used] instead of ὠκέως, which means ‘right away’.

In this case, Aristarchus first replaces the adjective ὥκὺς with the adverb ὠκέως because here ὥκὺς has an adverbial value—hence, I have maintained the Greek ὠκέως. Then he analyzes the meaning of ὥκὺς, and says that it means εὐθέως, a semantic gloss, which I have translated into English.

3. Close Paraphrases: Homer ‘Translated’ into Koine

Aristarchus made use of close paraphrases and word-for-word renderings to explain linguistically difficult passages. A comparative analysis of some of his close paraphrases may thus be useful for isolating some common patterns as well as some of the problems Aristarchus addressed in the text of Homer. In listing these examples, I will give the original Homeric line(s), its rephrasing by Aristarchus (in brackets are the Homeric terms which are omitted in the Aristarchean paraphrase), and a list of changes to highlight better the function of the paraphrase in each example:

17. As I discussed above, the differentiation between close and loose paraphrases is more a working definition to highlight some specific uses of paraphrases in Aristarchus (see below) than a factual reality. The criterion that I have followed is mainly to see whether his paraphrases contain most of the words of the original or not. Insignificant omissions of an adjective, a genitive, or of minor particles are not to be considered significant and, if they happen, the paraphrase is still considered ‘close’ if the rest of the phrasing is maintained. On the other hand, some paraphrases are considered ‘loose’ because Aristarchus’ rephrasing is focused on the content rather than on the Homeric idiolect.

Homer in *Il.* 5.864–865 and Aristarchus in *Sch. Il.* 5.864

Homer in <i>Il.</i> 5.864–865	Οἷη δ' ἐκ νεφέων (ἐρεβεννῇ) φαίνεται ἀήρ καύματος ἐξ ἀνέμοιο δυσσαέος ὀρνυμένοιο ⁱ
Aristarchus in <i>Sch. Il.</i> 5.864	οἷα φαίνεται ἀήρ ἐκ νεφέων δυσσαέος ἀνέμου ὀρνυμένου ἐκ καύματος
Changes	New syntactic order Homer: οἷη (Ionic) Aristarchus: οἷα (Attic/Koine) Homer: καύματος ἐξ (anastrophe) Aristarchus: ἐκ καύματος (preposition + noun in the regular order) Homer: ἀνέμοιο and ὀρνυμένοιο (Homeric genitives) Aristarchus: ἀνέμου and ὀρνυμένου (Attic/Koine genitives)

ⁱ ‘As a black mist appears from the clouds / when a stormy wind is stirred because of the heat.’

Homer in *Il.* 11.376 and Aristarchus in *Sch. Il.* 11.376a

Homer in <i>Il.</i> 11.376	(καὶ βάλεν), οὐδ' ἄρα μιν ἄλιον βέλος ἔκφυγε χειρός ⁱⁱ
Aristarchus in <i>Sch. Il.</i> 11.376a	οὐδὲ ἄλιον αὐτὸν ἐξέφυγε τῆς χειρός
Changes	Homer: μιν (Homeric pronoun) Aristarchus: αὐτόν (Attic/Koine equivalent) Homer: ἔκφυγε (no augment) Aristarchus: ἐξέφυγε (augment) Homer: χειρός (no article) Aristarchus: τῆς χειρός (article)

ⁱⁱ ‘And he hit [him] and the arrow did not escape from his hand in vain.’

Homer in *Il.* 14.125 and Aristarchus in *Sch. Il.* 14.125a

Homer in <i>Il.</i> 14.125	(ἐγχείη· τὰ δὲ) μέλλετ' ἀκούμεν, (εἰ ἐτεόν περ) ⁱⁱⁱ
Aristarchus in <i>Sch. Il.</i> 14.125a	εἰοίκατε ἀκηκοέναι
Changes	Homer: μέλλετε (Homeric semantic peculiarity) Aristarchus: εἰοίκατε (Koine equivalent) Homer: ἀκούμεν (Aeolic infinitive) Aristarchus: ἀκηκοέναι (Koine form of the perfect infinitive)

ⁱⁱⁱ ‘[He surpassed every Achaean] with the spear; you must have heard these things, if they are true.’

Homer in *Il.* 20.29 and Aristarchus in *Sch. Il.* 20.29a¹

Homer in <i>Il.</i> 20.29	(νῦν δ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ) θυμὸν ἑταίρου χόεται (αἰνῶς) ^{iv}
Aristarchus in <i>Sch. Il.</i> 20.29a ¹	κατὰ θυμὸν περὶ ἑταίρου χολοῦται
Changes	Homer: θυμὸν (simple accusative of respect) Aristarchus: κατὰ θυμὸν (preposition added) Homer: ἑταίρου (simple genitive to express the object of verbs indicating feeling) Aristarchus: περὶ ἑταίρου (preposition added) Homer: χόεται (Homeric verb) Aristarchus: χολοῦται (Koine equivalent)

^{iv} 'Now when in his heart he is terribly angry for his friend'.

These examples allow us to draw some conclusions about the way Aristarchean close paraphrases operate. First, they tend to simplify the vocabulary by substituting corresponding Koine words for those that are peculiar to Homer: χολοῦται is substituted for the less common χόεται (*Sch. Il.* 20.29a¹) and μέλλετε is translated into εἰκόατε, as μέλλειν in Homer does not normally have the Koine meaning of 'to be about to', but instead is synonymous with εἰκέναι, 'to seem', 'to be likely' (*Sch. Il.* 14.125a).¹⁸ Attic/Koine forms are also used for corresponding dialectal ones: the Ionic οἷα becomes οἶα (*Sch. Il.* 5.864), while the genitives in -οιο are replaced by those in -ου (*Sch. Il.* 5.864) and the Aeolic infinitive ἀκούμεν by the Koine perfect infinitive ἀκηκοέναι (*Sch. Il.* 14.125a). Paraphrases also clarify morphological peculiarities: forms with an augment replace those without an augment (*Sch. Il.* 11.376a). Articles represent a pervasive syntactic problem: since in Aristarchus' view Homer normally omits them,¹⁹ he reinserts the articles when paraphrasing (*Sch. Il.* 11.376a). The Homeric personal pronoun μιν is replaced by αὐτόν, as is normal in Attic and Koine (*Sch. Il.* 11.376a). Aristarchus also changes the bare cases without preposition used by Homer to more regular prepositional phrases:²⁰ the simple accusative θυμὸν is turned into κατὰ θυμὸν and the simple genitive ἑταίρου into περὶ ἑταίρου (*Sch. Il.* 20.29a¹). Finally, paraphrases are also used to elucidate stylistic features, for instance when the anastrophe κάματος ἐξ is turned into the regular ἐκ κάματος (*Sch. Il.* 5.864).

Close paraphrases thus have the main goal of rephrasing difficult Homeric Greek into more comprehensible Koine Greek. By replacing all the peculiarities of Homeric Greek (such as *glossai*, the lack of article and augment, peculiar

18. See Chapter 3.3.A § 1.2.

19. See Chapter 3.2.B § 2.1.

20. See Chapter 3.2.B § 2.2.

syntactic constructions, or Ionic forms) with Koine analogues, paraphrases call attention to the specifics of Homeric usage. Sometimes the paraphrase alone is enough to explain the difference between the two ‘languages’. In other cases, however, Aristarchus also adds a comment on the semantic, morphological, or syntactic peculiarity in order to better highlight Homer’s typical idiolect. In the scholia, the comment generally precedes the paraphrase, which is placed at the end to clarify the linguistic and more technical remarks at the beginning of the note.²¹

4. Loose Paraphrases: Discussing Homeric Content

Loose paraphrases are generally focused on the content of one or more lines and give a sort of ‘summary’ in order to explain their meaning. For example, a loose (and short) paraphrase is used in *Sch. Il.* 16.97–100a to support an athetesis. In this case, Aristarchus paraphrases the lines spoken by Achilles to Patroclus (‘Father Zeus, Athena, and Apollo, may none of the Trojans, as many as they are, escape death nor any of the Argives, but may the two of us avoid destruction, so that alone we may destroy the sacred bastions of Troy’)²² as ‘may everyone die except us’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.97–100a: τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ‘πάντες ἀπόλιντο πλὴν ἡμῶν’). With this short summary, Aristarchus highlights the real content of Achilles’ wish, which, even though expressed in an elaborate and poetic way, is utterly unacceptable. Such a short paraphrase is thus meant to show how ἀπρεπεῖς, ‘inappropriate’, these words are.²³

When discussing an athetesis, paraphrases can also be employed to show that the text makes sense even without the lines athetized, as in the case of *Il.* 24.128–129, when Thetis, trying to convince Achilles to go back to his life, asks him for how long he will continue to suffer and go without eating.²⁴ Then (*Il.* 130–132) Thetis invites Achilles to enjoy intercourse with a woman, especially since he is not going to live long:²⁵

21. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 8.321a; 11.734a¹; 16.274a¹; 21.126–7a; 24.318a.

22. *Il.* 16.97–100: αἶ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον / μήτέ τις οὖν Τρώων θάνατον φύγοι ὅσσοι ἔασι, / μήτέ τις Ἀργείων, νῶϊν δ’ ἐκδύμεν ὄλεθρον, / ὄφρ’ οἷοι Τροίης ἱερὰ κρήδεμνα λύωμεν.

23. For another case of loose paraphrase to support an athetesis, see *Sch. Il.* 15.231.

24. *Il.* 24.128–129: τέκνον ἐμὸν τέο μέχρις ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων / σὴν ἔδεται κραδίην μεμνημένος οὔτε τι σίτου [my son, for how long crying and sorrowing will you devour your heart, not taking heed of food . . . ?].

25. *Il.* 24.130–132: οὔτ’ εὐνῆς; ἀγαθὸν δὲ γυναικί περ ἐν φιλότῃ / μίσγεσθ’· οὐ γάρ μοι δηρὸν βέη, ἀλλὰ τοι ἤδη / ἄγχι παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή [nor [taking heed] of bed? It is

Sch. Il. 24.130–2a οὐτ' εὐνής; ἀγαθὸν δὲ <γυναικὶ—κραταιή>: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τρεῖς, ὅτι ἀπρεπὲς μητέρα υἱῷ λέγειν 'ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ γυναικὶ μίσγεσθαι' (cf. *Il.* 130–1). ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων ἀσυμφωρώτατόν ἐστι καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εἰς πόλεμον ἐξιοῦσι· χρεῖα γὰρ εὐτονίας καὶ πνεύματος. καὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι 'ὁ θάνατός σου ἐγγύς ἐστιν', ἄκαιρον. διεσκεύακε δὲ τις αὐτούς, οἰηθεὶς ἀποκρέμασθαι <τὸ> 'οὐδέ τι σίτου' (*Il.* 24.129). πλήρες δὲ ἐστὶ, 'σὴν ἔδεται κραδίην, οὐδὲ τὸ τυχὸν σίτου μεμνημένος'.

'Nor [taking heed] of bed? It is good [even to have sexual intercourse] with a woman— [death and] a strong [fate are close to you]': three lines are athetized because it is inappropriate for a mother to say to her son: 'it is good to have intercourse with a woman' (cf. *Il.* 130–131). And it is the most unsuitable of all and in particular for those going to war, for [in this situation] there is necessity of vigor and spirit. And to say 'death is close to you' is out of place. Someone interpolated these [lines] thinking that 'not [taking heed] of food' (*Il.* 24.129) was incomplete, but it is complete: 'you will devour your heart, not remembering any food at all'.

I will discuss this athetesis in more detail in Chapter 3.6.B § 7.2; now I focus only on Aristarchus' use of paraphrase. He athetizes lines 130–132 on two grounds: Thetis' recommendation to have sex and her comment about Achilles' short life. Both objections are due solely to the content and not to linguistic factors; nevertheless, Aristarchus still uses paraphrases to explain why the content does not fit (because the first comment is inappropriate, ἀπρεπὲς, and the second is 'out of place', ἄκαιρον). Just as with *Sch. Il.* 16.97–100a, he does not change the original words in his loose paraphrase here, but eliminates everything which is not strictly essential and 'cuts to the bone', in order to stress the inappropriateness of the content of the lines. Finally, Aristarchus argues that these lines had been added by someone who did not understand the syntax of the original passage. To show that the text can indeed stand and is complete (πλήρες) even without lines 130–132, he avails himself of another paraphrase: 'you will eat your heart, not remembering any food at all'. Thus this scholium serves as valuable evidence for Aristarchus' use of paraphrases both to dismiss suspicious lines (highlighting their content) and to show that the resulting text is sound (showing that Homeric syntax is right, though not straightforward).²⁶

Sometimes, loose paraphrases can be longer than the original, especially

good even to have sexual intercourse with a woman, for you won't live for long, but already death and a strong fate are close to you].

26. Another loose paraphrase showing that some lines must be athetized because they add nothing to the meaning of the passage can be found in *Sch. Il.* 8.524–5.

when Aristarchus wants to explain the meaning of possibly ambiguous lines²⁷ or a simile.²⁸ A loose paraphrase can also help in spelling out very ‘condensed’ expressions, typical of Homer:

Sch. Il. 5.795b ἔλκος <—> τό μιν βάλε Πάνδαρος ἰῶ: οὐ τὸ ἔλκος ἔβαλεν, εἰργάσατο δὲ ἔλκος βαλὼν, ὡς τὸ ‘νεκρὸν ἄγοι προτὶ ἄστυ, τὸν ἔκτανε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς’ (*Il.* 24.151), ὃ ἐστι κτανὼν νεκρὸν εἰργάσατο.

‘The wound—that Pandarus hit on him with his arrow’: ‘he did not hit the wound’, but ‘**by hitting [him], he made a wound**’, like ‘[a herald who] could carry to the city the corpse whom godlike Achilles killed’ (*Il.* 24.151), which is ‘**by killing [him], he made him a corpse**’.²⁹

Here the phrases ‘the wound (ἔλκος) that Pandarus hit on him (τό μιν βάλε)’ (*Il.* 5.795) and ‘the corpse (νεκρὸν) whom godlike Achilles killed (τὸν ἔκτανε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς)’ (*Il.* 24.151) are paraphrased as ‘by hitting [him] (βαλὼν), he made a wound (εἰργάσατο ἔλκος)’ and ‘by killing [him] (κτανὼν), he made him a corpse (νεκρὸν εἰργάσατο)’. By adding the verb εἰργάσατο (‘he made’) Aristarchus clearly establishes the syntactic role of ἔλκος and νεκρός, which, from a logical point of view, cannot be the direct objects of ἔβαλεν (one cannot ‘hit a wound’) and ἔκτανε (one cannot ‘kill a corpse’).

5. Other Uses of Paraphrases

Since the primary aim of both close and loose paraphrases is to clarify the meaning of the text, they can also elucidate passages that can be interpreted in two different ways. In such cases, Aristarchus gives both possible interpretations and specifies the correct one with expressions like οὐ . . . λέγει . . . ἀλλὰ . . .,³⁰ or simply οὐκ . . . , ἀλλὰ . . .³¹ In *Il.* 1.29, for instance, Agamemnon angrily warns Chryses about what will happen to his daughter Chryseis: ‘I will not set her free; sooner will old age come upon her’:

27. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 15.511a; 20.362a; 20.440b.

28. E.g., *Sch. D Il.* 10.351–4.

29. See also *Sch. Il.* 5.795c; 24.151a¹² and discussion in Chapter 3.2.B § 7.2.

30. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.29a; 2.70; 4.343a (*Did.*; see above, § 1); 8.150c; 9.364b; 10.189a; 24.551; cf. also *Sch. Il.* 22.11a.

31. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 12.348a; 23.574a.

Sch. Il. 1.29a <τὴν δ' ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω· πρίν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν:> {καὶ} οὐ τοῦτο {δὲ} λέγει, ὅτι γηράσασαν αὐτὴν τότε ἀποδώσει, ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον γηράσει ἢ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδοθήσεται.

'I will not set her free; sooner (πρίν) will old age come upon her': he [i.e., Agamemnon] is not saying that he will give her back once she is old, but that she will grow old before (πρότερον . . . ἢ) he gives her back to him [i.e., Chryses].

The ambiguity is due to Homeric syntax since here πρίν is not a temporal conjunction as in Attic, but an adverb, and the construction is paratactic.³² Aristarchus rewords it using hypotaxis with πρότερον . . . ἢ, which is the Koine equivalent of the Homeric parataxis of the type 'negative clause A + clause B with πρίν'. Rather than diving into a long and probably complex explanation involving grammatical rules and analysis of the syntax, he uses a simpler method: he presents the two contrasting paraphrases to express the difference in meaning and identifies the correct one.³³ In other, less fortunate cases, Aristarchus cannot do anything but remark on the ambiguity (often with the formulas πρὸς τὸ ἀμφίβολον or ὅτι ἀμφίβολον/ἀμφιβόλως) and give the different possible paraphrases without choosing a single solution.³⁴

Paraphrases also help to explain poetic tropes used by Homer, such as preeminence (*Sch. Il.* 21.203a)³⁵ or hyperbaton (*Sch. Il.* 16.106a).³⁶ In particular, loose and longer paraphrases can serve to disentangle a poetic metaphor, as in the case of *Il.* 13.745–746, where Polydamas confesses to Hector: 'I fear that the Achaeans will pay back yesterday's debt':

Sch. Il. 13.745–6a δαίδω μὴ τὸ χθιζὸν <ἀποστήσωνται Ἀχαιοί / χρεῖος>: ὅτι μεταφορικῶς 'χθιζὸν χρεῖος τῷ ἴσῳ σταθμῷ ἀποκαταστήσωσι', τουτέστι 'μή, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἐλάβομεν χθὲς νικῶντες, σήμερον εἰσπράξωσιν'.

32. Cf. Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 654; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 264; Smyth 1956, § 2438.

33. Cf. Roemer 1924, 57–58. A similar case is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 18.283a¹, which paraphrases οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκπέρσει· πρίν μιν κύνες ἀργοὶ ἔδονται, 'nor will he sack it; sooner will the swift dogs devour him', as 'the dogs will eat him before he sacks [the city] (πρότερον αὐτὸν οἱ κύνες κατέδονται ἢ ἐκπέρσει)', without, however, providing an alternative, incorrect paraphrase. On the other hand, *Sch. Il.* 24.551 explains that οὐδέ μιν ἀνστήσεις· πρίν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο πάθησθα, 'you will not raise him from the dead; sooner will you suffer another ill', does not mean 'you will not raise him from the dead unless you first suffer some ill', but rather 'you will suffer an ill before you raise him from the dead (πρότερον κακὸν πείσῃ ἢ ἀναστήσεις αὐτόν)'.

34. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.177a; 13.115a; 16.633a; 22.110a¹; 22.197a.

35. On this trope, see Chapter 3.2.A § 11.

36. On this trope, see Chapter 3.2.A § 14.

‘I fear that the Achaeans will pay back (ἀποστήσονται) yesterday’s debt (τὸ χθιζὸν χρεῖος)’: because with a metaphor [he says] ‘they will return (ἀποκαταστήσωσι) yesterday’s debt (χθιζὸν χρεῖος) in equal measure (τῷ ἴσῳ σταθμῷ)’, which is: ‘(I fear) that today they will exact what we took yesterday with our victory’.

Aristarchus first gives a close paraphrase of the lines and then explains the entire metaphor with a loose paraphrase. Similarly, he uses a paraphrase to reject other scholars’ *atheteseis* and show that the lines at issue are actually correct, but figurative. For instance, Zenodotus *athetized* *Il.* 21.538–539 (‘and [the gates] once opened made light (τεῦξαν φάος); and Apollo leapt out to avert the ruin from the Trojans’),³⁷ because he found it ‘ridiculous’ (γελοῖον) that the city was illuminated just through the gate, while the whole place was open to the air. Aristarchus dismisses this interpretation by rewording the line: ‘[the gates] made light’ means ‘they provided salvation for the people in rout’ (*Sch. Il.* 21.538–9: λέγει δὲ ‘τεῦξαν φάος’ ἀντὶ τοῦ τὴν σωτηρίαν τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐποίησαν).³⁸ In other words, ‘light’ (φάος) has a metaphorical meaning here, while Zenodotus incorrectly took it in its literal sense.

A paraphrase can also be used to show that a particular reading is wrong since, once the syntax is explained, it is obvious that the text does not make any sense, as often happens with Zenodotus’ readings. For example, in *Il.* 12.348: ‘if there too (καὶ κεῖθι) for them the toil and strife have arisen . . .’,³⁹ Zenodotus had κακεῖσε instead of καὶ κεῖθι. According to Aristarchus, however, the line requires a locative adverb and not an adverb of direction, as his paraphrase makes clear: it is not ‘if the war is *toward* that place’ but rather ‘*in* that place’ (*Sch. Il.* 12.348a: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εἰ εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον πόλεμος ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ).⁴⁰

6. Conclusions

The examples of paraphrases surveyed above help us to understand more fully Aristarchus’ *modus operandi*. Like his predecessors at Alexandria, Aristarchus was also a teacher engaged in what we would now call ‘higher education’, form-

37. *Il.* 21.538–539: αἱ δὲ πετασθεῖσαι τεῦξαν φάος· αὐτὰρ Ἀπόλλων / ἀντίος ἐξέθορε Τρώων ἵνα λοιγὸν ἀλάλκοι.

38. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.538a^{1,2,3} (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 343; Roemer 1924, 26–27.

39. *Il.* 12.348: εἰ δὲ σφιν καὶ κεῖθι πόνος καὶ νεῖκος ὄρωρεν.

40. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 12.359a¹. Other paraphrases used to reject Zenodotus’ readings occur in *Sch. Il.* 7.153a¹; 15.587; 22.216a¹. On Aristarchus and Zenodotus, see Chapter 4 § 1.

ing other *grammatikoi*, that is, philologists and scholars.⁴¹ While lecturing, he probably started from the text itself and rephrased it in order to make it comprehensible to his students. Paraphrases could be focused on language with a word-for-word translation (close paraphrases). Alternatively, they could be focused on the content, often giving a summary of the lines under study (loose paraphrases). The former were conceived as a tool to help students to become familiar with Homeric Greek and to understand Homeric usage in detail. Such rewordings could help in grasping not only the semantic, dialectal, and morphological peculiarities of Homer, but also the syntax of a passage. This was the most important function of paraphrases as applied to the Homeric poems, which were written in an odd and archaic Greek, and which sounded weird and puzzling to Koine speakers, even probably to the learned pupils of Aristarchus. Moreover, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were poetic texts, rich in figurative language. In particularly difficult passages, Aristarchus could provide two different interpretations and choose one of them (οὐ λέγει . . . , ἀλλὰ . . .) or leave both possibilities open, when the case was ambiguous (ἀμφίβολον). Close paraphrase was thus a fundamental tool because, by translating Homer word for word, Aristarchus achieved a one-to-one correspondence between Homeric and Koine forms, allowing him to define Homeric language in all its peculiarities—in vocabulary, morphology, syntax, and tropes. Defining ‘the specifically Homeric’ (τὸ Ὀμηρικόν) was at the basis of Aristarchus’ exegesis, and paraphrase was the tool he used to determine it. Once the Homeric peculiarities were collected and highlighted through paraphrases, Aristarchus could also use his findings to correct the text when it was problematic and to choose the right variant.⁴²

Paraphrases highlighting the content of the text, on the other hand, were used when the aim was more broadly exegetical, namely, when Aristarchus needed his students to focus on the information carried by the lines. This kind of paraphrase was very useful when discussing an athetesis because he could employ it to point out the unsuitability of certain lines within their context. Paraphrases were also convenient in selecting variant readings, as they could underscore the nuances in meaning provided by different variants. Finally, they could also have a polemical function, when they were used to show that the solutions proposed by other scholars either did not make sense or arose from an incorrect interpretation of the text. To sum up, paraphrases were used for many purposes: to understand and explain the Homeric text, to correct and emend it, and to justify Aristarchus’ own readings, as well as to discuss and support atheteseis.

41. The *Suda* entry reported in Chapter 1.1 § 1 says that he was a pupil of Aristophanes of Byzantium and that he himself taught ca. forty pupils.

42. See also Chapter 3.3.A § 5.

Part 3

3.0

The Six Parts of Grammar

There are many of Aristarchus' fragments on the *Iliad* and they are extremely diverse in terms of the content and topics discussed. This wealth of heterogeneous material poses formidable challenges to anyone attempting to present to readers even a fraction of such highly technical and often difficult-to-interpret material. While developing this book, I considered and experimented with different ordering principles; eventually, I decided to adopt an 'archaeological' approach and organize most Aristarchean fragments analyzed herein according to the six parts of grammar outlined by Dionysius Thrax at the beginning of his *Art of Grammar* (Τέχνη Γραμματική):

Dion. Thr. *Ars* § 1: γραμματική ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων. μέρη δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἕξ· πρῶτον ἀνάγνωσις ἐντριβῆς κατὰ προσῳδίαν, δεύτερον ἐξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικοὺς τρόπους, τρίτον γλωσσῶν τε καὶ ἱστοριῶν πρόχειρος ἀπόδοσις, τέταρτον ἐτυμολογίας εὔρεσις, πέμπτον ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός, ἕκτον κρίσις ποιημάτων, ὃ δὴ κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ.

Grammar is experience of what is for the most part said by poets and prose writers. It has six parts. First, practiced reading aloud according to prosody; second, interpretation according to the poetic tropes present [in the text]; third, straightforward explanation of rare words (*glossai*) and matters of fact (*historiai*); fourth, discovery of etymology; fifth, calculation of analogy; sixth, judgment of poems, which is the finest part of all those [contained] in the art [of grammar].

The Τέχνη Γραμματική attributed to Dionysius Thrax (ca. 170–90 BCE) poses great problems of authenticity.¹ This first paragraph, however, is generally con-

1. For a summary of the discussions on the *Techne Grammatike* and the different positions

sidered genuine, as Sextus Empiricus quotes it almost verbatim and attributes it to him (*Adv. Math.* I § 57 and § 250).² Since Dionysius was a direct pupil of Aristarchus, his definition of grammar can be considered as one from around Aristarchus' time and probably also in Aristarchus' circle. In this opening paragraph, Dionysius describes the work of what we would call a philologist rather than a linguist, because he clearly says that grammar deals with the work of poets and prose writers, and that the literary text must be analyzed in all its characteristics: from the prosodic reading to the *glossai*, from the analysis of etymology to the content. This is exactly what Aristarchus was doing with Homer,³ and this is why I chose such an ordering criterion. In fact, scholars since William Rutherford have used the same order for different studies on ancient scholarship and education.⁴ In particular, since the *Techne* by Dionysius Thrax is addressed to intermediate-level students who can read whole works by classical authors, its focus partly corresponds to marginalia in papyri, studied by Kathleen McNamee, who also follows the same order.⁵ Papyrus marginalia, however, generally deal with the basic understanding of the text and do not preserve notes involving the last part of grammar, namely, the 'judgment of poems'.⁶ On the contrary, Aristarchus worked at a higher level than the scholars who usually wrote the papyri studied by McNamee; his audience almost certainly also included advanced students, and thus he could extensively practice the 'judgment of poems'. As a result, Aristarchus' fragments embrace all the six parts outlined by Dionysius, who was describing the full extent of the art of grammar, even though his treatise only addressed intermediate students.

What exactly do these six parts of grammar consist of? The scholia on Dionysius' *Techne* are fairly copious on this 'proem': they discuss at length the definition of *techne* and *empeiria*,⁷ as well as what these six parts entail. The explanations of these scholia are disappointing, however, because they are repetitive without being very explicatory. Moreover, they also reflect a later stage of the 'art of grammar' (mostly one later than and dependent on Apollonius Dyscolus).⁸ Still, these scholia are an unavoidable starting point for the analysis

among scholars, see Pinborg 1975, 103–106; Taylor 1986, 182–185; Kemp 1996, esp. 307–315. For a more detailed account, see Law and Sluiter 1995.

2. For a discussion on the definition reported by Sextus Empiricus and the one in the *Techne*, see Lallot 1998, 20, 69–70; Blank 1998, 124–129, 262–264.

3. Cf. Lallot 1998, 27–28 and 73.

4. Rutherford 1905 on the Aristophanic scholia; Degenhardt 1909 on the '*veterum grammaticorum scholia*'; Cribiore 2001, 185–215, in her analysis of Greek education at a secondary level.

5. McNamee 2007, 63–77.

6. Cf. McNamee 2007, 74.

7. For a survey of this debate, see Lallot 1998, 70–73.

8. See Lallot 1998, 32–36. Some scholia to the *Techne* even refer their analysis to a much later (and completely different) type of teaching: that of late antiquity or of the Byzantine period. For

of the six parts of grammar presented by Dionysius. In addition to the ancient material, Rutherford, McNamee, and especially Lallot in his commentary to the *Techne*⁹ have also tried to explain the content of each of these six parts. These sources, ancient and modern, together help us to sketch a broad outline of the topics pertaining to each component of Alexandrian ‘grammar’:

1. PRACTICED READING ALOUD ACCORDING TO PROSODY: reading a text κατὰ προσῳδίαν means reading the text aloud according to the right vowel and syllable lengths, accentuation, and breathings.¹⁰ This operation is an important first step in textual analysis as it allows the reader to articulate the *scriptio continua* into the single words that compose it. Reading aloud, especially with certain genres and authors, also entails reading κατὰ διαστολήν, namely, in accordance with the punctuation and pauses, as well as reading καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν, that is, with the right delivery according to the characters’ ethos.¹¹ This requires the reader to stress and interpret the words of each character with vocal and facial expressions, as well as to signal changes of speakers and movements on the stage while reading. This latter point is much more important for drama than for epic poems, such as those of Homer; in fact, the annotations about the reading καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν are typical of scholia on dramatic poets. For the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, reading καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν probably implied reading the hexameters with a dignified tone, suitable to the tragic heroes of Homer, though Aristarchus does not seem to have taken an interest in this aspect.¹²
2. INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO THE POETIC TROPES PRESENT IN THE TEXT: tropes (literally: ‘turns’) are expressions involving a figurative and not standard use of language. They are the hallmark of poetic style, which becomes more expressive through them, but also often more difficult to understand. The analysis of tropes is thus a fundamental step toward the exegesis of a text because the grammarian makes it intelligible by clarifying

example, the Byzantine scholia (e.g., *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 567.3–5; 568.15–25) refer the six parts of grammar to the study of the Old and New Testament!

9. Rutherford 1905, *passim*; McNamee 2007, 63–74; Lallot 1998, 75–82.

10. On the meaning of προσῳδία, see also Chapter 3.1, footnote 2.

11. *Dion. Thr. Ars* § 2 . . . ἀναγνώστέον δὲ καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν, κατὰ προσῳδίαν, κατὰ διαστολήν [and one must read according to tone, according to prosody, according to punctuation].

12. Cf. Lallot 1998, 85–86. Rutherford discusses accents (and more generally orthography) and meter in two separate chapters (Rutherford 1905, 74–86 and 87–92), while under the heading ‘Reading aloud’ he strongly emphasizes reading καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν (Rutherford 1905, 97–100 and 101–156), even if he has also a chapter on reading κατὰ προσῳδίαν (Rutherford 1905, 157–167) and one on reading κατὰ διαστολήν (Rutherford 1905, 168–179). The emphasis on reading καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν is of course obvious in the scholia of Aristophanes, as in drama ‘pronunciation’ and ‘delivery’ are paramount; cf. also Nünlist 2009, 349–351.

them. In all likelihood, Dionysius also included ‘figures’ (*schemata*) within tropes.¹³ Figures can be defined as any departure from normal syntax; hence, the explanation of figures involves the analysis of the syntactic structures of a text. The second part of grammar thus deals with poetic style and poetic phrasing at every level.¹⁴

3. STRAIGHTFORWARD EXPLANATION OF *GLOSSAI* AND *HISTORIAI*: *glossai* (γλῶσσαι) are unfamiliar or dialectal words which are typical of poetic language and need an explanation. Unlike the previous part (the explanation of tropes/figures), the focus is not on the phrasing, but on single words and their semantic meaning. The grammarian explains *glossai* with literary quotations or with Koine equivalents (that is, with intralingual translations, as discussed in Chapter 2.3); he can also discriminate between similar words with different meaning (διάφοροι λέξεις or διαφορὰ λέξεων). *Historiai* (ἱστορίαι), on the other hand, are ‘matters of fact’ concerning the content of a text and requiring specific clarification. In practical terms, the explanation of *historiai* includes information about myths, characters, geography, customs and rituals described in the text, as well as historical facts.¹⁵
4. DISCOVERY OF ETYMOLOGY: in antiquity, discovering etymology meant finding out the ‘true’ (ἔτυμος) nature of words; in grammar this method is often used to analyze hapax legomena or difficult words, as well as to decide about the orthography of a debated word (in terms of accent and aspiration). Etymology, then, can serve both to explain *and* to correct a text.
5. CALCULATION OF ANALOGY: analogy is a heuristic method to discover the right form of debated words (in terms of morphology, accents, orthography) by comparing them to other, similar words, whose forms are secure. The practical application of the analogical method in textual criticism allows a scholar to correct a text from a linguistic and, in particular, morphological point of view.¹⁶

13. Cf. Rutherford 1905, 188, and Cribiore 2001, 206. *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 456.17–18 already includes both tropes and figures in the topics discussed in this second part of grammar. On the problems in distinguishing tropes from figures, even in antiquity, see Chapter 3.2.A § 1 and the introduction to Chapter 3.2.B.

14. Rutherford 1905, 336–350, includes ‘exegesis by metaphrases’ (= paraphrases) in this part, as paraphrases are very often used to explain syntactic peculiarities in Homer (i.e., *schemata*) and figurative expressions (i.e., tropes). This is no doubt an important use of paraphrase, but paraphrase is more a ‘tool’ than a ‘part’ of grammar since it is employed for many purposes beyond the analysis of tropes and *schemata*, as shown in Chapter 2.3.

15. Cf. Rutherford 1905, 387; McNamee 2007, 71.

16. Rutherford 1905, 391–395, dismisses both the fourth and fifth parts very quickly. The reason is that etymology and analogy, which are methods to determine the correct orthography of difficult

6. JUDGMENT OF POEMS: in the scholia to the *Techne*, the *krisis* of poems is consistently explained as deciding whether a poem or some lines are authentic or not.¹⁷ In this respect, the ‘judgment of poems’ involves the discussion of *atheteseis* and the criteria for deciding authenticity. To carry out this part of grammar, scholars can also deal with what we could call ‘literary criticism’ in the broadest sense: the analysis of the specific poetic techniques adopted by an author. Indeed the clarification of narrative techniques or, in the case of Homer, of his specific formulaic style is often used by grammarians to prove that certain lines are spurious or, on the contrary, to defend the received text against previous detractors. This final part of grammar probably also included a ‘judgment’ of the ability of the poet;¹⁸ if such a judgment was positive, the author was included in a list of so-called ‘chosen’ authors (οἱ ἐγκριθέντες), who were considered fundamental and compulsory reading to achieve a full-fledged education.¹⁹ The scholia on the *Iliad* derived from Aristarchus do not preserve any trace of this type of analysis, suggesting that in his commentaries the Alexandrian scholar did not engage in such a question—not because he did not judge Homer as a poet, but because he probably never felt the need to prove how and why Homer was the greatest poet.²⁰

The ‘judgment of poems’, the last and most refined part of grammar, recalls the definition of *kritikos*, in opposition to the *grammatikos*, given by Crates of Mallos, as reported by Sextus Empiricus:

Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* I § 79 . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε διαφέρειν τὸν κριτικὸν τοῦ γραμματικοῦ, καὶ τὸν μὲν κριτικὸν πάσης, φησί, δεῖ λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔμπειρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ἀπλῶς γλωσσῶν ἐξηγητικὸν καὶ προσωδίας ἀποδοτικὸν καὶ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων εἰδήμονα· παρὸ καὶ εἰκέναι ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀρχιτέκτονι τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ὑπηρέτῃ.

forms, are not very important in the scholia to Attic comedy since Aristophanes does not present the linguistic problems of Homer.

17. See *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 170.2–5, 304.2–5, 471.34–35, where the point of the judgment (κρίσις) is whether the poems are spurious (νόθα) or genuine (γνήσια); cf. also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 22.379a.

18. Cf. Rutherford 1905, 399–416; McNamee 2007, 74. The grammarian’s judgment of the quality of the poet is included also by *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 304.2. On the other hand, *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 170.2–3, states that the judgment of the ability of the poet is not the job of a grammarian (so also *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 471.34–35), but rather of another poet.

19. Cf. Lallot 1998, 81. The phrase οἱ ἐγκριθέντες is used by *Su.* δ 333 and λ 825 (on the ‘chosen’ ten orators). The most famous list of Greek ‘chosen’ authors is that of Quintilian (*Inst.* 10.1.46–84). On the formation and characteristics of the ‘canons’ of Greek (and Latin) authors, see Pfeiffer 1968, 203–208; Cancik 2003; Vardi 2003; Hägg 2010.

20. See introduction to Chapter 3.6.A and Chapter 3.6.C § 7.

For he [i.e., Crates] also said that the critic was different from the grammarian; the critic—he says—must be an expert in the entire logical science, while the grammarian must simply be an interpreter of *glossai*, an establisher of prosody, and someone with knowledge of matters related to these. Therefore, [he said] that the former is like a master craftsman and the grammarian is like his servant.

In this passage, Crates draws a line between his own activity as a critic and the activity of the grammarians, who limit themselves to the most basic (and pettiest) aspects of understanding of the text, such as the explanations of *glossai* or the placing of accents. We cannot tell whether Crates was referring to someone in particular when he made this statement; certainly, Aristarchus was not interested in the type of ‘philosophical’ criticism that Crates enjoyed, even if the two employed similar tools when they dealt with textual analysis.²¹ Yet, because he was very much concerned with questions regarding the authenticity of lines, Aristarchus did practice the judgment of poems as defined by Dionysius and the scholia to the *Techne*. Thus, I wonder whether the specific mention of judgment (κρίσις) of poems given by Dionysius Thrax was not included to respond to the polemical self-definition of Crates. Dionysius held that ‘the art of grammar’ (τέχνη γραμματική) entailed criticism (τέχνη κριτική), and consequently a *grammatikos* (like Aristarchus) was also a *kritikos* (like Crates)—yet more than that as well.²²

Lallot²³ rightly points out that Dionysius’ list of the parts of grammar does not include the *diorthotikon* (διορθωτικόν): the emendation and correction of a text. He suggests that the *Techne* assumes the existence of a corrected text, so that ‘grammar’ as described here comes after the *diorthotikon*.²⁴ This supposition is plausible because the *Techne*, even if based on the ‘empirical grammar’ of Aristarchus, has an eminently didactic purpose²⁵ and is directed to students who are not expected to prepare editions or commentaries of the texts they read.²⁶ The scholiasts to the *Techne* apparently also noticed the lack of

21. See Chapter 3.4. § 7 and Chapter 6 § 6.

22. For a different interpretation of the opposition between grammarians and critics, see Lallot 1998, 81–82.

23. Lallot 1998, 74–75.

24. Indeed, Rutherford 1905, 61–73, has ‘variant and conjectures’ as a separate chapter, before the six parts of grammar, but suggests that the activity of emendation could also be considered part of the κρίσις ποιημάτων (Rutherford 1905, 400).

25. *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 453.3–4: τὴν τῶν μερῶν οὖν ἀπαρίθμησιν οὐ πεποιήται κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν διδακτικόν [he has counted the parts [of grammar] not according to a natural order, but according to a didactic one].

26. *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 454.1–3: πρῶτον δὲ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν λέγει· ἀμελήσαντες γὰρ τοῦ διορθοῦσθαι τὰ βιβλία εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναγιγνώσκειν τρέπονται [first he mentions reading aloud; for, since they are not concerned with editing the texts, they right away turn themselves to reading them]. See also *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 12.5–13.

textual criticism and offered their own solution. Given that for them grammar had four parts, reading aloud (ἀναγνωστικόν), textual criticism (διορθωτικόν), exegesis (ἐξηγητικόν), and judgment (κριτικόν),²⁷ they claimed that three of the six parts listed by Dionysius, the third (explanation of *glossai* and *historiai*), fourth (discovery of etymology), and fifth (calculation of analogy), were subdivisions of the διορθωτικόν, textual criticism. The remaining three parts of Dionysius' grammar made up the other three parts of the scholiasts' grammar: reading aloud (first part) was the ἀναγνωστικόν, the interpretation according to the poetic tropes (second part) was the ἐξηγητικόν, and the judgment of poems (sixth part) was the κριτικόν.²⁸ While this distinction derives from the many divisions of the 'art of grammar' circulating in antiquity,²⁹ perhaps even reflecting a later stage of this discipline,³⁰ the situation is in part different when applied to Aristarchus. No doubt, his fragments dealing with the first three or even four parts of grammar are geared more toward exegesis and the understanding of the text at a general level. Nevertheless, Aristarchus' goal was to prepare a new and better *ekdosis* of Homer; for that goal, the *diorthosis* of the text, which could be only achieved through choosing readings from variants and/or conjectures, was paramount. In his case, therefore, the *diorthotikon* portion of grammar permeated all six parts, although in different ways: not only did the analysis of *glossai* and etymology help Aristarchus to correct the text and the calculation of analogy lead him to choose the right reading, but reading aloud allowed him to divide the *scriptio continua*, which often involved choosing between different variants. The activity of correcting the text was thus developed by Aristarchus *alongside* the six 'parts of grammar'—even though the first parts primarily aimed at making the text clear, while the last ones (especially the fifth and sixth) more often involved direct interventions into the text, such as emendations, choice among morphological variants, and atheteseis.

Clearly, the specific topics associated with each part of grammar are partly due to personal choices, as the respective analyses of Rutherford and McNamee show. Moreover, the discussion of a certain part of grammar often inevitably involves the other parts to some extent: etymology is used in the explanation of *glossai*, for example, and the study of *historiai* can lead to an athetesis, which

27. *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 115.8–9: μέρη δὲ τῆς γραμματικῆς εἰσι τέσσαρα, ἀναγνωστικόν, διορθωτικόν, ἐξηγητικόν, κριτικόν [there are four parts of grammar, reading aloud, textual criticism, exegesis, judgment]. See also *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 135.6–7; 164.9–10; 170.18–19; 578.13 (apparatus).

28. *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 453.15–17: διὰ τί τεσσάρων ὄντων τῶν μερῶν αὐτός φησι ἕξ; καὶ λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἕξ αὐτῶν, τὸ διορθωτικόν, ἐτμήθη εἰς τρία, εἰς τὸ νῦν τρίτον, τέταρτον, πέμπτον [since there are four parts [of grammar], why does he speak of six [parts]? And we say that one of them, textual criticism, was subdivided into three [parts], into what is here the third, fourth, and fifth [parts]]. See also *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 13.7–10.

29. For a survey, see Blank 2000.

30. So Lallot 1998, 74.

pertains to the ‘judgment of poems’, if some lines present a particular myth unknown to Homer. Even so, ordering the Aristarchean fragments according to the six parts of grammar will give a consistent organization to the material that will be surveyed in Part 3 of the book. Furthermore, this particular partition of the ‘art of grammar’ dates back to Aristarchus’ time and helps to describe many of the activities in which Aristarchus, ὁ γραμματικώτατος, was engaged.

3.1

Reading Aloud

The Interpretative Effort of Reading

1. The Philologist and the Manuscript
2. Reading according to the Right Vowel Quantities
3. A Question of Division: Interpreting the *Scriptio Continua*
4. A Method for Clarifying Things: Adding Accents
 - 4.1. Accents and Analogy
 - 4.2. Accents and Homographs
 - 4.3. Accents, *Scriptio Continua*, and Syntax
5. Between Reading and Semantics: Choosing the Breathing
6. Reading Aloud: Syntax and Punctuation
7. Posidonius, the ‘Reader’ of Aristarchus
8. Conclusions

The first part of grammar is ‘practiced reading aloud according to prosody’ (ἀνάγνωσις ἐντριβὴς κατὰ προσῳδίαν). The details of this activity are very difficult to recover, as reading aloud is an oral operation which cannot be recorded in writing. Even if it is impossible to grasp in full what this process meant in Aristarchus’ philological practice, nevertheless the scholia give evidence of a series of operations that certainly arose from reading Homer aloud.¹ I will review some of them in this chapter to outline briefly what the first part of grammar entailed and why it mattered so much to Aristarchus’ approach to Homer.

1. During the writing of this chapter, I greatly benefited from the generous help of Philomen Probert and Ben Fortson, with whom I discussed accentuation, pitch, vowel quantity, and Greek meter.

1. The Philologist and the Manuscript

In ancient times trying to read a manuscript written in *scriptio continua*, without divisions between words as well as without reading aids such as accents and breathing marks, was already an interpretative effort per se, implying a first level of philological intervention. In order to ‘read’, for example, the first line of the *Iliad*, which in his manuscripts looked like ΜΗΝΙΝΑΕΙΔΕΘΕΑΠΗΛΗΙΔΕΩΛΧΙΛΗΟΣ, Aristarchus had to perform the following operations:

1. To read the line with the right vowel and syllable quantities (and hence with correct meter).
2. To decide where each word ended and the next began.
3. To pronounce each word with the right accent.
4. To pronounce each word with the right aspiration.

These four operations are fundamental for understanding the written text in the first place.² Only when the *scriptio continua* is articulated into its elements is it possible to proceed to higher levels of interpretation, involving linguistic analysis, stylistic issues, judgment of poetry, and questions of authenticity. Yet without this primary step—namely, understanding the chain of continuous sounds while reading aloud in terms of prosody, word division, and correct pronunciation of words—any other interpretative operation is impossible. And this is why in particular these four operations (reading with correct quantities, articulation of the sequence of letters, addition of accents and breathings) precede the other five parts of grammar. The other parts, in turn, help to explain the selected articulation of the *scriptio continua*, or why a word should be given the chosen accent or breathing. In addition, these four operations are often closely connected. In fact, the division of the *scriptio continua* (2) heavily depends on the other three operations, because the right quantities (1), the right accentuation (3), and the right aspiration (4) help to decide what the words in the sequence are and where one word ends and the next begins.

Aristarchus discussed the results of his reading aloud in the *hypomnemata*, as proven by several scholia dealing with vowel quantity, accentuations, breathings, and division of *scriptio continua*. These decisions were probably also marked in the *ekdosis* with some graphical device, as is common in papyri. While some sort of marking system (σημείωσις) to disambiguate the most difficult

2. It is not clear what counted as προσῳδία by Aristarchus’ time. While for Herodian, writing in the second century CE, prosody included vowel quantity, accentuation, and breathings, the evidence is murkier for the previous centuries (see Probert 2015, 924–927). Whether or not the four operations listed above were all part of ‘prosody’ in the Hellenistic period, they certainly were part of the process of ‘reading aloud’, and so they will be treated in this chapter.

cases might already have been in place by the time of Aristotle,³ Aristophanes of Byzantium is considered to be the ‘inventor’ of a system for signaling the quantity of vowels, accents, and breathings. The evidence for this, however, is an interpolated passage in the epitome of Pseudo-Arcadius⁴ which states that Aristophanes used [-] for long vowels, [~] for short vowels, ['] for acute accent, [˘] for grave accent, [˜] for perispomenon accent, [ˊ] for smooth breathing, and [ˋ] for rough breathing.⁵ Whether or not this testimony is trustworthy, there is no evidence from documents before the second century BCE that signs for accents and breathings were used.⁶ Since Aristarchus took an interest in these matters and needed some way to mark his choices in terms of vowel quantities, accents, and breathings in his text, it is possible that he employed the signs supposedly invented by his predecessor Aristophanes. Indeed, starting with the second century BCE, papyri often show these diacritics and thus further suggest that Aristarchus might have adopted those very same signs.⁷

2. Reading according to the Right Vowel Quantities

Reading Homer’s hexameters meant primarily respecting the quantity of each vowel and syllable in the sequence of sounds while pronouncing them. In Greek, it is often easy to determine the value of each syllable: long and short vowels are often clearly marked graphically (η/ε, ω/ο) and prosodic rules (the alternation of open and closed syllables) make it easy to detect whether a syllable is long or short. The quantity of a syllable is more difficult to determine when an open syllable ends with a vowel that is anceps, namely, a vowel that may be either long or short. It is debated whether or not vowel quantities were still perceived

3. See Aristot. *Soph. El.* 177b4–7: ἀλλ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις τὸ αὐτὸ <τὸ> ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ᾖ καὶ ὡσαύτως (κάκει δ’ ἤδη παράσημα ποιοῦνται), τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταῦτά [yet a word is the same in writing whenever it is written with the same letters and in the same way (though now people put additional marks on them), but the words, when pronounced aloud, are not the same].

4. On this issue, see now Probert 2015, 925, and Roussou 2018, 52–57.

5. [Arcad.] 211.8–214.2. On this passage and the use of accents, see Probert 2006, 21–22 (on Aristophanes) and 22–23 (on the epitome attributed to ‘Arcadius’); Prauscello 2006, 33–40.

6. Turner and Parsons 1987, 11–12. Turner and Parsons 1987, 12, do not give any dating for the marks of vowel quantity, but the earliest examples they offer are (Turner and Parsons 1987, 50, no. 21) *P.Lond.Lit.* 44 = *BM Pap.* 1533, a papyrus containing Pindar’s *Partheneia* and dating to the first century BCE, and (Turner and Parsons 1987, 98, no. 58) *P.Oxy.* 1086, the famous commentary to *Il.* 2.751–827, dated to the first half of the first century BCE (see Chapter 2.1 § 3 and § 4). Cf. Nodar 2007, 469 n. 6.

7. See Nodar 2007; Probert 2015, 934. On punctuation marks in ancient texts, see now the contributions collected by Nocchi Macedo and Scappaticcio 2017.

in daily language by the Hellenistic period.⁸ Nonetheless, Aristarchus took an interest in discussing vowel quantities in Homer.⁹ For example, he observes that certain anceps vowels are used by Homer as both long and short according to metrical needs, such as the proper noun Ὑλη, whose first syllable Y can be both long and short.¹⁰ Similarly, Herodian reports that Aristarchus ‘lengthened’ the alpha of Ἀπόλλωνι in *Il.* 1.36 (*Sch. Il.* 1.36b) and of φθάνει in *Il.* 21.262 (*Sch. Il.* 21.262a^{1,2}) for metrical reasons (διὰ τὸ μέτρον); indeed, the alpha is usually short both in Ἀπόλλων¹¹ and in φθάνειν.¹²

Aristarchus also decided on the quantity of a vowel in a controversial position on the basis of other unambiguous attestations. In *Sch. Il.* 2.662a¹, for example, Herodian says that Aristarchus read the aorist κατέκτα with a short vowel just like in *Od.* 11.410. At *Il.* 2.662, the meter is not affected (the verb is at the end of the line), but at *Od.* 11.410,¹³ as well as at *Il.* 15.432,¹⁴ the vowel quantity is important since the alpha in (κατ)έκτα must be short for the meter to work. While no scholium commenting on ἔκτα at *Od.* 11.410 is extant, at *Il.* 15.432 the *Venetus A* reports a scholium which Erbse attributes partly to Aristonicus and partly to Herodian:

Sch. Il. 15.432a (Ariston. | Hrd.) κατέκτα Κυθήροισι: ὅτι ἐλλείπει ἡ ἔν· ἔστιν γὰρ ἐν Κυθήροισι. | καὶ ὅτι ἀπόδειξις τοῦ συνεσταλμένως ἐκφέρειν τὸ ‘κατέκτα’. καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ ‘ἔκτα σὺν οὐλομένη ἀλόχῳ’ (*Od.* 11.410).

‘He slew [a man] in Cythera’: because ἐν is missing, for it is ἐν Κυθήροισι. | And because it is the demonstration that he pronounced κατέκτα with a short α; and in the *Odyssey* [he does the same]: ‘he killed (ἔκτα) [me] with my deadly wife’ (*Od.* 11.410).

The καὶ ὅτι in Herodian’s part of the scholium sounds very much as if it comes from Aristonicus, and so Friedländer’s proposal to attribute the entire note to Aristonicus seems preferable.¹⁵ At any rate, even if this specific note about

8. Cf. Sturtevant 1940, 30–58; Allen 1987, 89–95.

9. Cf. Ribbach 1883, 14–16.

10. *Sch. Il.* 2.500b and 2.500c (ἐξέτεινε τὸ υ διὰ τὸ μέτρον); 5.708a¹ (ἐκτέταται δὲ ἐν τῷ Καταλόγῳ διὰ μέτρον) and 5.708a²; 7.221. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 232. Ancient grammarians did not make a straightforward terminological distinction (and often did not distinguish at all) between quantity of vowels and quantity of syllables.

11. See *LfgrE*, s.v. (pp. 1095–1096). Cf. Montanari 1995b, 277.

12. In fact, φθάνειν has a long alpha in Homer but a short alpha in Attic; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v.; Frisk, *GEW*, s.v.; *LfgrE*, s.v.

13. *Od.* 11.410: ἔκτα σὺν οὐλομένη ἀλόχῳ οἰκόνδε καλέσας.

14. *Il.* 15.432: ναῖ, ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα κατέκτα Κυθήροισι ζαθέοισι.

15. Friedländer 1853, 249; so also van Thiel 2014a, II 583; but see Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 15.432a. On the ‘composite’ scholia and scholia-partition, see Schironi 2015, 622–623.

κατέκτα is not a fragment from Aristarchus' *hypomnema*, the final alphas of κατέκτα in *Il.* 15.432 and ἔκτα in *Od.* 11.410 are certainly short. It would seem, then, that these two cases convinced Aristarchus to read the κατέκτᾱ in *Il.* 2.662 with a short alpha.¹⁶

In other cases, the lengthening and shortening of a vowel did not alter the length of a syllable and so did not affect the metrical pattern. For example, in *Sch. Il.* 6.268b¹ Herodian says that Aristarchus 'shortened' the second alpha of εὐχετάᾱσθαι, in a syllable which is already metrically long. The reason is not specified, but Herodian adds that Aristarchus' choice is correct because the penultimate vowel in all middle infinitives with an acute accent on the third syllable from the end is short: λέγεσθαι, τίθεσθαι, ἴστασθαι, κίχρασθαι, πίμπρασθαι. Indeed, this might also have been Aristarchus' line of reasoning.

3. A Question of Division: Interpreting the *Scriptio Continua*

In theory one could read metrically according to the right vowel quantity without understanding the articulation of the text, that is, the division of the sequence of sounds into words. Yet sometimes it is necessary to know which words the hexameter contains in order to know the quantity of anceps vowels in the line. Furthermore, the division of the *scriptio continua* into meaningful words is the most important step toward understanding a text. Although in many cases this operation was relatively easy to carry out, in some instances the articulation of the sequence was more complex to decide.

Sometimes the choice involved small particles like κε or τε. For example, when the aorist subjunctive of κάμνειν is preceded by a κε, the words could be split, with κε followed by the aorist subjunctive κάμω, or kept together in order to have a reduplicated aorist κεκάμω. According to Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 1.168b), at *Il.* 1.168 Aristarchus wrote ἐπεὶ κε κάμω instead of ἐπὴν κεκάμω to avoid the strange reduplication in the aorist.¹⁷ Some Aristonicus scholia, however, seem to testify to a more open-minded attitude on the part of Aristarchus:

Sch. Il. 1.168a ἔρχομ' ἔχων ἐπὶ νῆας, ἐπὴν κεκάμω: ὅτι δύναται ὑφ' ἐν κεκάμω, δύναται <δὲ> καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ 'κε'.

16. In contrast, Tyrannion (still *Sch. Il.* 2.662a¹ [Hrd.]) read κατέκτᾱ with a long alpha in analogy to the first-person aorist κατέκτᾱν in *Il.* 4.319 (at the end of the line), a reading also accepted by Aristarchus there. Cf. Haas 1977, 112–113 (fr. 12). In particular, Herodian (*Sch. Il.* 4.319c¹) considers κατέκτᾱν a Doric form (then adopted by the Attic dialect) of the Koine κατέκτην; see Chapter 5.1 § 2.4.

17. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.168c (Did. + Hrd.) and 7.5b (Did.); cf. La Roche 1866, 294–296; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 135 (who considers ἐπεὶ a conjecture by Aristarchus).

‘I go to my ships with [a small yet dear prize] when I am weary (ἐπὴν κεκάμω) [of fighting]’: because it is possible [to read] κεκάμω as one word, but it is also possible [to read κάμω] separate from κε.

Sch. Il. 7.5a {οὔρον} ἐπεὶ κε <κάμωσιν>: ὅτι ἔν τισι γράφεται ‘ἐπὴν’. ἐάν δὲ οὕτως ἔχη, προενεκτέον ὕφ’ ἐν ‘κεκάμωσιν’ ὡς ‘λελάχωσιν’ (*Il. 7.80*, al.).

‘When they are weary (ἐπεὶ κε κάμωσιν) [of going over the sea]’: because in some [editions] it is written ἐπὴν. If so, one must pronounce κεκάμωσιν as one word, like λελάχωσιν (*Il. 7.80*, al.).

Sch. Il. 17.658 <κε κάμησι> ὅτι ὁ κέ περισσός. ἢ ὕφ’ ἐν ‘κεκάμησι’

‘[Like a lion . . . when] he is weary (κε κάμησι) [of rousing to fight dogs and men]’: because κέ is superfluous;¹⁸ or [it can be read] as one word: κεκάμησι.

Similarly, Aristarchus accepts both τε τύχησι and τετύχησι as readings of ΤΕΤΥΧΗΣΙ (*Sch. Il. 11.116*: ὅτι δύναται ἑκατέρως ἀναγινώσκεσθαι, καὶ κατὰ διαστολὴν τύχησι καὶ ‘τετύχησι’ ὡς ‘λελάχωσι’).¹⁹

Questions regarding *scriptio continua* could also be linked to Homeric linguistic usage, as happens with ἐθέλειν/θέλειν. According to Aristarchus, Homer always uses the variant starting with ἐ- in the present. Thus, if there is a present form of the verb preceded by an E, the E always goes with the verbal root -θέλ- and not with the preceding word. As a result, Aristarchus reads μηδ’ ἔθελ’(ε) rather than μηδὲ θέλ’(ε) (*Sch. Il. 2.247a*;²⁰ 7.111a), and οἳ μ’ ἐθέλοντα rather than οἳ με θέλοντα (*Sch. Il. 15.722a*^{1,2}). The case of *Il. 1.277*, with the *scriptio continua* ΠΗΛΕΙΔΗΘΕΛ(Ε), is slightly more complex:

Sch. Il. 1.277a (Ariston.) <Πηλείδῃθελ’> ὅτι ἐγκεκλιμένως ἀναγνώστέον, ἵνα διαλύηται εἰς τὸ ἔθελε.

Πηλείδῃθελ’ (‘son of Peleus, wish [not]’): because it must be read with a retracted accent, so that it is resolved into ἔθελε.

18. On ‘superfluous’ particles, see Chapter 3.2.B § 1.2.

19. In fact, not only does Aristarchus admit reduplicated aorists (*Sch. Il. 6.50*; 7.80), but even considers them typical of Homer (*Sch. Il. 1.100b*: εἴωθε δὲ τοὺς δευτέρους ἀορίστους ἀναδιπλασιάζειν; see also *Sch. Il. 10.381*).

20. Cf. also *Sch. Il. 2.247b* (ex. [Ariston.?).

Sch. Il. 1.277c (Hrd.) <Πηλείδ' ἤθελ'> Ἀρίσταρχος ὀξύνει τὸν δη, τὸ πλήρες λέγων ἔθελε· αἰὲ γὰρ τὸ ἐθέλω παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ε ἄρχεται.

Πηλείδ' ἤθελ' ('son of Peleus, wish [not]'): Aristarchus reads an acute accent on δη, saying that the complete form is ἔθελε, for in the poet ἐθέλω always begins with E.²¹

The most obvious division would be Πηλεῖδη θέλ'(ε), meaning 'son of Peleus, wish [not to quarrel with a king]'. Aristarchus, however, objects to this interpretation and reads Πηλεῖδη ἔθελ'(ε) because the Homeric form is not θέλε, but ἔθελε. This reading, however, requires a synalepha between Πηλεῖδη and ἔθελ'(ε) in order for the meter to work; thus, the 'reading aloud' results in a sequence Πηλεῖδήθελ'(ε) with a 'retracted accent' on the syllable δη.²²

A much-discussed question concerned an epithet of 'sleep', occurring eight times in the *Iliad*, for which two variants were attested, ἦδυμος and νήδυμος. The problem arose in some of the lines where the epithet was preceded by forms that could take a movable v:

- *Il.* 2.2: ἔχε νήδυμος or ἔχεν ἦδυμος,
- *Il.* 10.91: ἐπ' ὄμμασι νήδυμος or ἐπ' ὄμμασιν ἦδυμος,
- *Il.* 14.242: προσεφώνεε νήδυμος or προσεφώνεεν ἦδυμος.

These cases suggested to some scholars that the real form was ἦδυμος, an opinion that seemed to be supported by the clear etymology from ἡδύς, in the sense of 'sweet', a very good epithet for 'sleep'. Aristarchus, however, calls attention to the other five occurrences in the *Iliad*, which in his opinion are not ambiguous and so prove that the correct reading is νήδυμος: when νήδυμος is the first word of the line (*Il.* 14.253 and 23.63) or when νήδυμος is preceded by a word that does not accept a movable v: *Il.* 10.187 (τῶν νήδυμος), *Il.* 14.354 (Ἀχαιῶν

21. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.277b (Hrd.); cf. La Roche 1866, 235; Lehrs 1882, 356; Ribbach 1883, 47; van Thiel 2014a, I 105.

22. In *Sch. Il.* 11.217a commenting on ὄρουσ' ἔθελεν, 'rushing he wanted . . .', Aristarchus states: 'because [the verb] begins with E everywhere in the poet. The explanation [is] with reference to μήτε σὺ Πηλεῖδήθελ' (*Il.* 1.277), because it must be read as enclitic in order to be ἔθελε'. Aristarchus' points are clear; still at *Il.* 11.217 ἔθελεν is an imperfect, which could either be from θέλειν, and so augmented, or from ἐθέλειν, and so without an augment. Thus *Il.* 11.217 is not the best example to 'prove' Aristarchus' reading in *Il.* 1.277. In fact, one could easily use the imperfect ἔθελεν to prove that Homer also knew the form θέλειν. On the other hand, Aristarchus seems to have usually avoided augments in Homer (see Chapter 5.1 § 3), which suggests that he would have simply considered ἔθελεν an imperfect without augment from ἐθέλειν, never even taking into consideration the alternative.

νήδυμος), and *Il.* 16.454 (καὶ νήδυμον).²³ Commenting on these ‘unambiguous’ lines, Aristarchus argues that they clearly (σαφῶς) show that the right form is also νήδυμος for the ambiguous cases (ἐπὶ τῶν ἀμφιβόλων in *Sch. Il.* 10.187; 16.454).²⁴ The implications of what at first sight seems only a question of division of *scriptio continua* emerge in the scholium to *Il.* 2.2:

Sch. Il. 2.2b νήδυμος: ὅτι τὸ ‘νήδυμος’ μετὰ τοῦ ν, καὶ οὐχὶ ‘ἥδυμος’ (ὡς ἔνιοι) παρὰ τὸ ἡδύς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ‘νήδυμος ἀμφιχυθείς’ (*Il.* 14.253). οἱ δὲ μεθ’ Ὅμηρον καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ ν λέγουσι· καὶ Ἀντίμαχος (fr. 74 Matthews)· ‘ἐπεὶ ῥὰ οἱ ἥδυμος ἐλθὼν’, καὶ Σιμωνίδης (fr. 599 *PMG*)· ‘οὔτος δέ τοι ἥδυμον ὕπνον ἔχων’. ἴσως οὖν ἐνόμισαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡδύς εἶναι παράγωγον τὸ ἥδυμος, ὡς ἔτυμος ἐτήτυμος. ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνεκδύτου τίθησι τὴν λέξιν.

νήδυμος: because νήδυμος [is written] with ν, and [it is] not ἥδυμος (as some [think]) from ἡδύς, as is clear from νήδυμος ἀμφιχυθείς (*Il.* 14.253). The poets after Homer also use it without ν: both Antimachus, [in] ‘when sweet (ἥδυμος) [sleep] coming upon him . . .’ (fr. 74 Matthews), and Simonides, [in] ‘but having sweet sleep (ἥδυμον ὕπνον) he . . .’ (fr. 599 *PMG*). Perhaps they thought that ἥδυμος was a derivative from ἡδύς, as ἐτήτυμος [comes from] ἔτυμος. But the poet uses the word for what is ‘ineluctable’.²⁵

The ‘philological choice’ of ἔνιοι led some later poets, such as Simonides and Antimachus, to use the variant starting with η-: ἥδυμος. The supposedly easy etymology from ἡδύς was surely one of the reasons for accepting ἥδυμος rather than νήδυμος. But for Aristarchus this is not the right orthography and, hence, these poets used a nonexistent word, which they thought they had found in

23. In fact, Aristarchus is probably wrong in this case, as the original and correct form seems to be ἥδυμος, which is an alternative form of ἡδύς; see Leumann 1950, 44–45; Chantraine, *DELG*, s.vv. ἥδομαι and νήδυμος; Frisk, *GEW*, s.v. νήδυμος. The form νήδυμος, which was then created from an incorrect word division, is however the ‘correct’ one in Homer, and generally adopted by modern editors such as Allen, West, and van Thiel. Cf. also Kirk 1985, 115; Janko 1994, 189–190.

24. *Sch. Il.* 10.187 (ὅτι σαφῶς τὸ νήδυμος σὺν τῷ ν); 16.454 (ὅτι σαφῶς νήδυμον μετὰ τοῦ ν); 23.63a¹ (ὅτι σαφῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ν ἄρχεται τὸ ὄνομα; cf. also *Sch. Il.* 23.63a²); cf. Nünlist 2012a, 118–119. There is no scholium by Aristonius at *Il.* 14.253, while at *Il.* 14.354, the scholium is brief (*Sch. Il.* 14.354: ὅτι σὺν τῷ ν νήδ<υ>μος). In fact, with the exception of *Il.* 16.454, in *Il.* 10.187 and 14.354 as well as when the adjective appears at line beginning (*Il.* 14.253 and 23.63), the line would scan also with ἥδυμος, so they are not really decisive. Yet all these cases require an additional change in the text (that is, the elimination of a Ν), and Aristarchus might have been reluctant to change the transmitted text (both the vulgate and papyri have the form starting with νήδυμος; see West, ad *Il.* 2.2, 10.91, 10.187, 14.242, 14.253, 14.354, 16.454, 23.63).

25. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.2c¹ (ex. | Ariston.). Of the other two ambiguous cases (*Il.* 10.91 and 14.242), only in one do we find an Aristonius scholium mentioning the problem (*Sch. Il.* 14.242: <ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι> ‘νήδυμος’ σὺν τῷ ν).

Homer. Aristarchus not only establishes that νήδυμος is preferable, but also provides an etymology: it means ‘ineluctable’ (ἀνέκδυτος) and derives from the negative prefix νη- and δύειν, ‘enter’, ‘get into’, i.e., ‘which cannot be penetrated’, hence, ‘deep’. Aristarchus’ solution might not convince modern linguists;²⁶ yet, considering the evidence he had at his disposal (that is, the Homeric lines where νήδυμος could not be substituted with ἥδυμος), his *modus operandi* is indeed the most rigorous one possible and his etymology is relatively sophisticated.²⁷

Finally, even when it was not a question of deciding where a word ended and the other began, Aristarchus sometimes had to add clarifications to make a line intelligible. For example in ‘so his head bowed down to one side (ἐτέρωσ’ ἥμυσε), heavy with his helmet’ (*Il.* 8.308), he explains that ἐτέρωσ’ stands for ἐτέρωσε (*Sch. Il.* 8.308a: ὅτι τὸ πλήρες ἐτέρωσε); in fact, the same articulation of the *scriptio continua* might have led someone to think that the word was the adverb ἐτέρως.

4. A Method for Clarifying Things: Adding Accents

Reading aloud according to prosody and meter did not suppress the accent (i.e., the rise and fall in pitch); rather, syllable length and pitch were both modulated in reading aloud. For this reason, reading aloud also allowed readers to discover the accents of words.²⁸

Papyri show various types of systems for marking accents.²⁹ The accented syllables can be marked with an acute accent and the preceding syllable(s) with a grave, for example δυσμénéων in *P.Oxy.* 2508, 11 (first century CE) or [μ]ελιήδέα in *PSI* 1188, 30 (second to third century CE). Otherwise, an accented syllable can also be marked by simply having the grave accent on the preceding syllable(s) rather than by placing an acute on the high-pitched syllable, as with βούσιν for βουσίν in *P.Oxy.* 2508, 9 (first century CE), διηνέκες for διηνεκές in *P.Oxy.* 2079, fr. 1, 3 (second century CE), τροφόν for τρὸφον and θαμῖνα for θαμινά in *P.Oxy.* 841, A, xxiii, 14 and 16 (second century CE). Accents are not marked on every word in papyri, but sporadically and only in some papyri.

26. See footnote 23 above.

27. Cf. La Roche 1866, 315–316; Dimpfl 1911, 15–16; Matthews 1996, 219–221; Schironi 1999, 286–287; Rengakos 2000, 329. For another case of *scriptio continua* clarified by another unambiguous Homeric passage, see *Sch. Il.* 10.335b and 10.458 (ἐπὶ κτιδέην or ἐπ’ ἰκτιδέην at *Il.* 10.335?). The use of unambiguous passages to elucidate unclear ones is at work also with Homeric *glossai*; see Chapter 3.3.A § 1.2.

28. Cf. Allen 1966 and Allen 1987, 131–139.

29. On accents in papyri, see Laum 1928; Moore-Blunt 1978; Mazzucchi 1979; Probert 2006, 45–47.

Grammarians probably marked (and discussed) only those words which could have caused problems in terms of accent while ‘reading aloud.’³⁰ Yet the many scholia which treat questions of accentuation prove that this was an extremely common activity for ancient grammarians.³¹

4.1. Accents and Analogy

Herodian is the main source for questions of accentuation, and there are indeed plenty of scholia derived from him which discuss Aristarchus’ choices in this regard. In general, the fragments where Aristarchus discusses accentuation can be divided into a few distinct categories. In many scholia, Herodian simply reports Aristarchus’ choice for a certain accent without giving Aristarchus’ reasons;³² in other cases, a question of accent is explained with linguistic concepts, although sometimes it is difficult to decide with whom the grammatical discussion originated: Herodian or Aristarchus.³³ Most often, Aristarchus selects an accent on the basis of analogy with another similar word.³⁴ There are also Aristonicus scholia focusing on the accentuation chosen by Aristarchus,³⁵ and

30. As Nodar 2007, 476 and 479–480, has correctly observed, papyri also present accents on words that are discussed in the scholia not in connection with their accentuation but for other reasons. In this case the marking of accent seems to highlight words which are generally interesting from a scholarly point of view. On the other hand, for Nagy 2000 and 2009b the ‘selective marking of accents’ in papyri with poetry and in the *Venetus A* proves that readers were concerned with the correct pronunciation of the meter, not with specific accents on specific words, as this selective marking reflected ‘traditional patterns of intonation’.

31. On accents and Greek grammarians, see Probert 2006, 21–45; Probert 2015, 934–947.

32. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.49b; 1.175d; 1.269a; 2.330a (cf. Schironi 2004, 131–137, fr. 13); 3.344; 4.138a and 16.542a¹ (cf. Schironi 2004, 379–383, fr. 48); 5.511a¹; 11.51b; 13.103a (cf. Schironi 2004, 335–342, fr. 42); 16.185a¹; 18.64b¹; 21.331a; 24.316a¹.

33. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.114a and 3.128a (cf. Schironi 2004, 197–204, fr. 22); 1.364b² (see also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 1.364a); 1.396b^{1,2}; 2.153a; 2.839b¹; 3.20 (cf. Schironi 2004, 153–156, fr. 16); 4.2c; 5.656a.b^{1,2} and 21.162b¹ (cf. Schironi 2004, 216–225, fr. 25); 5.269c¹ (see also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 5.269d); 6.229; 8.240a; 11.270b; 11.503a¹; 16.123c (see also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 16.123a); 18.39–46; 18.352a and 23.254b¹; 21.110a (see also Nicanor in *Sch. Il.* 21.110a).

34. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.52 (cf. Schironi 2004, 315–319, fr. 39); 2.262b; 2.592b; 2.755b; 3.198a.b; 4.235a^{1,2} (cf. Schironi 2004, 190–196, fr. 21); 5.69a¹; 5.609a (Hrd. [Did.]); 6.422a¹; 6.518b¹; 7.289a; 8.355; 9.150a^{1,2}; 11.239c^{1,2} and 11.480d (cf. Schironi 2004, 273–279, fr. 33); 11.454a and 22.67a; 11.495; 11.659c (cf. Schironi 2004, 290–296, fr. 35); 11.677a¹; 12.20b; 12.158 and 19.357a (cf. Schironi 2004, 315–319, fr. 39); 12.201d (cf. Schironi 2004, 320–325, fr. 40); 12.337b¹; 13.191c (see also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 13.191a and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 13.191b); 14.60a; 14.463b; 15.302b^{1,2}; 15.320–1a^{1,2} and 15.320a (ex. [Hrd.]) (cf. Schironi 2004, 353–358, fr. 44); 16.324d; 16.415a; 16.827 and 17.539b; 22.28a; 24.8a (cf. Schironi 2004, 445–450, fr. 58); 24.228a; 24.566d¹ (see also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 24.566b; cf. Schironi 2004, 457–464, fr. 60). See also *Sch. Il.* 6.244 (cf. Schironi 2004, 240–244, fr. 28); 9.164; 16.390e; 16.508a; 17.688 (cf. Schironi 2004, 384–387, fr. 49); yet in this last group of scholia the analogy might go back to Herodian only (see discussion in Chapter 3.5 § 2).

35. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.364a (see also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.364b²); 2.269c; 3.219a; 4.141a; 5.269d (see

in some of them the choice is justified with an analogical proportion.³⁶ Indeed, Aristarchus very often used analogical reasoning to determine the right accentuation of a word; for this reason, I will review cases of accentuation based on analogy in Chapter 3.5. Yet, even if these accentuation problems were solved with more sophisticated tools like analogical proportions or grammatical concepts, they all began with the first and most basic part of the art of grammar, namely, reading aloud.³⁷

4.2. Accents and Homographs

One accentuation problem could be easily dealt with without using any advanced philological tool: the use of accents to distinguish between homographs. Both papyri and grammarians (e.g., Herodian) show that using accents to distinguish words that otherwise looked identical was a very popular method in antiquity. Aristarchus, too, employed such a strategy. For example, he reads οὐρός, which indicates a channel for hauling and launching ships, to differentiate it from the homograph (but properispomenon) οὔρος, ‘fair wind’:

Sch. Il. 2.153a (Hrd.) οὐρούς: . . . ἀνεγνώσθη δὲ κατ’ ὀξεῖαν τάσιν· ὁ γὰρ Ἀρίσταρχος παρήγγελλεν. . . ἴσως οὖν εἰς ἀποφυγὴν τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνέμου· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλων τὸ τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ ὁ ἀνὴρ.

οὐρούς (‘slipway’): . . . [The word] was read with an acute accent: for [so] Aristarchus dictated. . . Then perhaps [Aristarchus read οὐρός] in order to differentiate it from [the homograph denoting] the ‘wind’ [i.e., οὔρος]. For the man does this sort of thing in other cases too.

According to Herodian, it is typical of Aristarchus (called ὁ ἀνὴρ) to use accents to distinguish homographs. Indeed, also in *Il.* 8.240 Aristarchus reads δημός for ‘fat’ in order to differentiate it from the noun for ‘people’, δῆμος (*Sch. Il.* 8.240a [Hrd.]). Herodian also says that Aristarchus behaves in the same way with proper nouns derived from adjectives, in order to ensure that they are not misunderstood (i.e., read) as epithets. Thus, Aristarchus reads the name of the Trojan Amphoterus as oxytone (Ἀμφοτερός) to distinguish it from ἀμφότερος,

also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 5.269c¹); 13.191a (see also Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 13.191b and Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 13.191c); 15.241a; 18.376a; 20.53a (see also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 20.53b^{1,2}).

36. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 4.153a; 14.421a^{1,2}; 23.1a; 24.566b (see also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 24.566d¹; cf. Schironi 2004, 457–464, fr. 60).

37. Several scholia where Aristarchus discusses accents are also surveyed by Lehrs 1882, 247–300, and Ribbach 1883, 19–34.

which means ‘the one and the other’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.415a [Hrd.]).³⁸ Similarly, he reads Γλαύκη, one of the Nereids (*Il.* 18.39), with a retracted accent to avoid confusion with the adjective γλαυκή, ‘gleaming’ (*Sch. Il.* 18.39–46 [Hrd.]). Yet there are exceptions. Herodian observes that, in the same catalog of the Nereids, Aristarchus does not differentiate between proper nouns and adjectives in other ambiguous cases: Νημερτής (like νημερτής, ‘infallible’) and Ἀψευδής (like ἀψευδής, ‘truthful’) at line 46.³⁹ Similarly, he also pronounces two names of cities with the same accent as their homograph adjective counterparts: Ἰρή like the adjective ἱερά/ἱρή (*Sch. Il.* 9.150a^{1,2} [Hrd.]) and Αἰπύ like the neuter adjective from αἰπύς, ‘steep’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.592b [Hrd.]).⁴⁰

Herodian does not give any reason to explain the apparently inconsistent choices of Aristarchus.⁴¹ Two Aristonicus scholia (*Sch. Il.* 2.519a; 2.532a), however, notice cases where Aristarchus keeps the same accent between a proper and a common noun (not an adjective): with reference to the towns named Κυπάρισσος (like κυπάρισσος, ‘cypress’) and Βῆσσα (like βῆσσα, ‘glen’). The reason is that common nouns sometimes become ‘proper nouns’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.532a: ἔστι μέντοι προσηγορικά, ἃ τινων κύρια γίνεται),⁴² and in these cases the accent should not change. Stephanos Matthaios has suggested⁴³ that Aristarchus changed the accent to distinguish adjectives (ἐπίθετα) and (proper) nouns ([κύρια] ὀνόματα), which all belonged to the general category of ‘nominal forms’ (ὀνόματα). This hypothesis certainly explains the cases of Ἀμφοτερός versus ἀμφοτέρος and Γλαύκη versus γλαυκή as opposed to Κυπάρισσος versus κυπάρισσος and Βῆσσα versus βῆσσα. Yet the cases of proper nouns which Aristarchus reads with the same accent as the corresponding adjectives (Ἰρή = ἱρή, Αἰπύ = αἰπύ, Νημερτής = νημερτής, Ἀψευδής = ἀψευδής) complicate the picture.⁴⁴ The data thus do not allow us to

38. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.415b (ex). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 262–263. As van Thiel 2014a, III 64–65, observes, Ἀμφοτερός is the usual accentuation, so Aristarchus did not change the text, but simply respected the tradition. On *Sch. Il.* 16.415a, see also Chapter 3.5 § 9.

39. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 261–262.

40. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 263 and 288; Ribbach 1883, 31–32. Herodian instead chooses a different accentuation: Αἶπυ, because it is more analogical, as neuter nouns ending in Υ are always barytone, for example πῶυ (*Il.* 3.198) and μέθυ (*Il.* 7.471). Yet, according to Herodian, Apollodorus and Ptolemy of Ascalon as well as common usage followed Aristarchus’ choice (. . . Ἀρίσταρχος ὁξύνει τὸ Αἶπυ, καὶ ἐπείσθη αὐτῷ ἢ πλείων χρήσις).

41. In *Sch. Il.* 9.150a¹ Herodian suggests a possible reason but attributes it neither to Aristarchus nor to anyone else: only nouns that aim at praise (ἐπαίνων ὀνόματα)—that is: proper nouns derived from common nouns or adjectives with a positive meaning—keep the same accent, while others change it. But he also notes exceptions to this rule.

42. As Matthaios 1999, 225–232, has shown, the grammatical terminology of the scholium is Aristonicus’, not Aristarchus’. Cf. also Matthaios 1996.

43. Matthaios 1999, 232–233.

44. In other cases, Aristarchus does not differentiate between common nouns and adjectives: for

see a consistent pattern in Aristarchus' choices, something that Herodian already had noticed.⁴⁵ What seems to us an arbitrary choice of accentuation to distinguish homographs might not in fact be a personal decision. Rather, Aristarchus could have simply marked the accent on a word as it was pronounced in his own time, or he could have followed manuscript evidence which preserved an old and traditional accentuation.⁴⁶ Cases like these are most often irrecoverable now, but we should certainly consider them as real possibilities.

4.3. Accents, *Scriptio Continua*, and Syntax

Placing accents on words was useful not only for the orthography of single words, but also to disambiguate the text. Indeed, in papyri accents can be used to distinguish a compound from simple forms: for example, ὀρεῖ|χάλκωι for the compound ὀρειχάλκω (and not ὄρει χαλκῶ) in *P.Oxy.* 1790, 42–43 (second to first century BCE); φιλήσι|στέφανον for the compound φιλησιστέφανον (and not φίλησι στέφανον) in *P.Oxy.* 841, A, i, 8 (second century CE). Vice versa, they can alert readers that words are not compounds, as in *P.Oxy.* 841, A, v, 52–53, with μάλα|καις for μαλακαῖς (i.e., the first part is not the word μάλα, 'very', or μάλα, the Aeolic and Doric for 'apples'). Aristarchus adopted this practice to make the beginnings and endings of words clear. For example, when Herodian (*Sch. Il.* 11.51b) says that Aristarchus makes the *scriptio continua* ΦΘΑΝΔΕ unaccented (ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος βαρύνει [sc. ΦΘΑΝΔΕ]), this means that he read φθάν δέ, i.e., the epic third-person plural of the indicative aorist of φθάνειν followed by the particle δέ, and not φθάνδε or φθᾶνδε.⁴⁷

example, in *Il.* 11.239 Aristarchus reads λις, 'lion', rather than λις, making thus the noun identical to the adjective λις, 'smooth'. In this case, it is probably the analogy with similar nouns, such as κίς and θίς, which played a role. See *Sch. Il.* 11.239c^{1,2} (Hrd.); cf. Lehrs 1882, 254–256 and 263; Schironi 2004, 273–279 (fr. 33).

45. The question of the ancient grammarians' accentuation of proper nouns, and especially proper nouns that were homographs with common nouns or adjectives, is a complex one; see the detailed surveys in Lehrs 1882, 263–293; La Roche 1866, 398–402.

46. There is indeed one case in which Aristarchus' reading is odd but might preserve an ancient accentuation, which he probably found marked in his manuscripts; see Chapter 3.5 § 9 (on *Sch. Il.* 12.158 [Hrd.]).

47. Cf. Erbse, ad loc.; Probert 2015, 937. Yet Martin West suggested a different solution (*per litteras* to Philomen Probert, who kindly shared it with me): "Herodian on A 51, ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος βαρύνει. I think it likely that what Aristarchus was interested in was the quantity of the alpha in φθάν, as at α 300 we hear that he declared the alpha of ἔκτα to be long. In that case his 'barytone' was not opposed to oxytone but to perispomenon. Herodian, however, comments that Ar. was right because of the sandhi, and quotes N 1 Ζεὺς δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν as a parallel. We can accept that for Ar. φθάν was barytone in the sense that it was not acuter than the following syllables. But this need not imply that in an oxytone polysyllable in sandhi the last syllable would not still be acuter than the preceding syllables".

Another question concerns whether a noun or verb preceded by a preposition is to be read as a compound or as two separate words. In turn, this choice impacts the division of words and, often, also the accentuation of the sequence.⁴⁸ This is especially the case when a preposition can be either in anastrophe with a preceding noun or attached as a compound to the following noun or verb. According to Herodian, Aristarchus sometimes chooses the compound, so Τρώεσσιν ἐπίσκοπον, rather than Τρώεσσιν ἐπι σκοπόν, for ‘a spy on the Trojans’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.38d), and Κρήτη ἐπίουρον, rather than Κρήτη ἐπι οὔρον, for ‘a watcher over Crete’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.450a¹).⁴⁹ Sometimes, on the other hand, he chooses anastrophe. For example, he divides the *scriptio continua* ΝΕΚΥΟΣΠΕΡΙΔΕΙΔΙΑ in *Il.* 17.240 as νέκυος πέρι δειδία, with anastrophe for περὶ νέκυος (so with πέρι with retracted accent), to mean ‘I fear for the corpse [of Patroclus]’. In contrast, Ptolemy of Ascalon reads νέκυος περιδείδια, with περι- as a preverb and without an accent (*Sch. Il.* 17.240b¹ [Hrd.]).⁵⁰ In none of these cases is the sense of the line affected by the reading choice; rather, it is mostly a question of deciding which variant best corresponds to the poet’s specific style, and then of using accents to mark the selected solution.

On the other hand, when the preposition is placed between a noun and an epithet or another noun in apposition, the problem is not so much how to divide the *scriptio continua* but how to interpret the syntax in order to place the correct accents. Aristarchus always follows a rule explained by Herodian, namely, that the preposition belongs to the ‘more proper noun’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.839b¹: ὁ μέντοι Ἀρίσταρχος τοῖς κυριωτέροις συνέταττε τὰς προθέσεις).⁵¹ According to this rule, when there is a noun connected with either an adjective or with another noun in apposition, anastrophe only occurs when the head noun, which Aristarchus considers ‘more proper’ than any adjective or appositive, is placed before the preposition. In this case, the accent of the preposition is retracted. Following this rule, Herodian informs us that for Aristarchus there is no anastrophe in πηγῆς ἐπὶ Κηφισοῖο, ‘by the spring Cephisus’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.523b)⁵²

48. For some prepositional compounds discussed by Aristarchus, see Schironi 2004, 252–256 (fr. 30: ἀμβωμοῖσι / ἄμ βωμοῖσι), 280–289 (fr. 34: παλινορμένω / πάλιν ὀρμένω and παλιμπλαγχθέντας / πάλιμ πλαγχθέντας), 353–358 (fr. 44: κατενώπα / κατ’ ἐνώπα). On Aristarchus’ choices concerning whether to read words as compounds or not, see also Ribbach 1883, 10–12.

49. These two cases (and others) are discussed in Lehrs 1882, 107–111 and 309; Matthaios 1999, 612–613 (fr. 225); Schironi 2004, 110–117 (fr. 10).

50. Cf. Monro 1891, § 180 (p. 169). In this case the question also concerns the use of περιδείδια with genitive or dative (the latter construction occurs at *Il.* 17.242); see also *Sch. Il.* 17.240a; 17.242a^{1,2} (Hrd. | Ariston). Cf. Matthaios 1999, 606 n. 123 (fr. 217); van Thiel 2014a, III 124.

51. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.877a (ex. [Hrd. + Ap. Dysc.]); 3.240b (Hrd.). On Aristarchus’ views of κυρίον ὄνομα, see Matthaios 1996; Matthaios 1999, 218–221.

52. Aristarchus reads the genitive πηγῆς, not the dative plural πηγῆς, which is the reading of those who read the sequence with anastrophe: πηγῆς ἐπὶ Κηφισοῖο, ‘by the springs of Cephisus’; cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 2.523b, and Matthaios 1999, 222 n. 91.

and in ποταμοῦ ἀπὸ Σελλήεντος, ‘from the river Selleis’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.839b¹), while there is anastrophe in Ξάνθου ἄπο δινήεντος, ‘from the eddying Xanthus’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.839b¹) and in νέεσσ’ ἐνὶ ποντοπόροισι, ‘in the seafaring ships’ (*Sch. Il.* 3.240b) because the head noun precedes the preposition.⁵³ In this case, then, the recognition of a syntactic relationship required a change, which became noticeable when reading the line aloud (i.e., the accent on the preposition in anastrophe) and was perhaps accompanied by the marking of a specific accent in the text.⁵⁴

Reading aloud with accents to articulate the *scriptio continua* could also serve more literary-oriented aims, namely, to have a phrasing that better fitted the context. For example, at *Il.* 16.31 Patroclus addresses Achilles with an expression which in the *scriptio continua* looked like AINAPETH, and which could be read in two different ways:

Sch. Il. 16.31a αἰναρέτη· τίς σευ ἄλλος <ὀνήσεται>: ὅτι <τινὲς> γράφουσιν ‘αἶν’ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐκφέρουσι κατὰ τὸ περισπώμενον, ἴν’ ἢ πρότερον αἰνέ, εἶτα πρὸς τὰ κάτω <τὸ ἀρετῆς>· ἀρετῆς τί σοι ἄλλος ὀνήσεται; πιθανώτερον δὲ συνθέτως ‘αἰναρέτη’, ἐπὶ κακῷ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχων.

‘O terribly brave one (αἰναρέτη), how will another [yet to be born] benefit from you (σευ)?’: because some write αἶν’ ἀρετῆς and pronounce it with a perispomenon accent, so that it is first αἰνέ, and then ἀρετῆς with reference to what is said after: ‘how will another benefit from your virtue (ἀρετῆς)?’ But it is more convincing [to read it] as a compound, αἰναρέτη, [which means] ‘the one who has virtue to do evil’.⁵⁵

Some scholars split the sequence AINAPETH, added a sigma at the end, and pronounced it with a perispomenon accent on two syllables, so that it became: αἶν’ ἀρετῆς. At that point, they had to link the genitive ἀρετῆς with the rest of the line, resulting in ‘O terrible one (αἶν’), how will another yet to be born benefit from your (σευ) virtue (ἀρετῆς)?’ Aristarchus, however, reads the compound αἰναρέτη, whose meaning (‘one who uses his virtue for evil’) precisely fits Achilles’ attitude in the context of this part of the poem, without depriving the rest of the line of any meaning (as σευ, ‘from you,’ alone can convey the same basic sense as ἀρετῆς . . . σευ, ‘from your virtue,’ in connection with the verb ‘to benefit’).

53. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 221–223 (fr. 223).

54. These and other examples for Aristarchus’ choices regarding anastrophe and accentuation of prepositions are analyzed by Matthaios 1999, 608–613 (frs. 221–225).

55. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.31b (Nic.) and 16.31c (ex.). Cf. Janko 1994, 319; West 2001, 235.

5. Between Reading and Semantics: Choosing the Breathing

Pronouncing words with the right breathing was another problem to be solved while reading aloud. Since certain words in Greek could only be distinguished by the initial breathing, the choice of whether or not to read with aspiration was critical. Indeed, even more than accentuation, breathing was normally linked with semantics and the meaning of a word, as the aspiration derived from the etymology of the word itself. It is not surprising, then, that most of Aristarchus' fragments discussing the type of breathing explain the choice in terms of meaning or etymology.⁵⁶ This is valid for the fragments transmitted by Herodian (the richest of our sources),⁵⁷ by Aristonicus,⁵⁸ and by the exegetical scholia.⁵⁹ The link between aspiration and meaning also helped in distinguishing homographs. In *Sch. Il.* 5.425a^{1,2}, for example, Herodian notes that Aristarchus wrote the feminine adjective ἀραιή with a rough breathing when it meant 'weak', while he read ἀραιή with a smooth breathing when it meant 'disastrous'. The reason is not given. Aristarchus might have linked ἀραιή in the sense of 'disastrous', 'accursed', with the noun ἀρά, 'prayer', but also 'curse'; if so, he probably chose the rough breathing for ἀραιή in the sense of 'weak', 'thin', just to differentiate it from the homograph.⁶⁰ In other cases, the choice of a specific breathing was used to determine word boundaries, as in *Il.* 10.246, where Aristarchus pronounces ΓΕΣΠΙΟΜΕΝΟΙΟ 'with a rough breathing' (δασύνει), namely, he reads γ' ἐσπομένοιο, and not γε σπομένοιο, which is the choice ascribed to Ptolemy of Ascalon (*Sch. Il.* 10.246a^{1,2} [Hrd.]).⁶¹

The Greeks, while reading aloud, also paid attention to the aspiration (or lack thereof) on vowels within a word. This practice (called 'interaspiration') is well attested in papyri, as for example in the Berlin papyrus of Corinna (*P.Berol. inv.* 13284, first to second century CE) with π[ε]ράγεις,⁶² a compound of περί and ἀγής, 'very holy' (iii, 47), or in *P.Oxy.* 2699, 30 (third to fourth century CE)

56. On Aristarchus' choices about breathings, see also Lehrs 1882, 326–327; Ribbach 1883, 7–9.

57. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 9.6b¹; 12.55–6 (see also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 12.56a¹); 12.193a (cf. Schironi 2004, 313–314, fr. 38); 12.295a (see also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 12.296); 13.543a¹; 15.10a and 24.84 (see also *Sch. Il.* 15.10b [ex.]); 15.365a (see also *Sch. Il.* 15.365b [ex.]; cf. Schironi 2004, 359–366, fr. 45, and Chapter 3.4 § 7).

58. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.734–6; 8.209a; 10.1a; 12.296 (see also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 12.295a).

59. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.136a (see also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 16.211a); 1.554c (cf. Schironi 2004, 103–109, fr. 9).

60. Cf. La Roche 1866, 201–202; *Lfgre*, s.v. Modern scholars think of a difference of accents rather than of breathings: ἀραιός for 'weak' (etymology unknown) and ἀραῖος for 'accursed' (from ἀρά): see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.vv. ἀρά and ἀραιός.

61. Similar is the choice between ἐξελόμην and ἐξ ἐλόμην in *Sch. Il.* 9.130a (Hrd.) and *Sch. Il.* 9.130b (ex. [Ariston.?]), analyzed in Chapter 4 § 1.4.

62. So Page in fr. 654 *PMG*. But Wilamowitz and Schubart, *BKT* V.2, 19–55, XIV (Nr. 284), 25, read]ράγεις, and West 1996, 23, reads]περάγεις.

with συνεύαδε for συνεύαδε (Ap. Rh. 3.30), a compound of ἀνδάνειν.⁶³ Indeed, ancient grammarians often discussed whether or not letters within a word had aspiration. For example, Herodian states that Aristarchus read the adjective ἀάπτους (which is always used in Homer with χεῖρας, to mean ‘invincible hands’) without aspiration and that it meant ‘terrible and undaunted’ (*Sch. Il.* 1.567b¹: οὕτως ψιλῶς προενεκτέον. οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος. ἤκουε δὲ τὰς δεινὰς καὶ ἀπτοήτους). Aristarchus’ gloss of ἀάπτους as ἀπτοήτους, ‘undaunted’, implies that he etymologized the word as a compound derived from privative ἀ- and πτοεῖν, ‘to terrify’, to mean ‘that which cannot be terrified’. His reading was opposed to those who read it with aspiration on the second syllable (ἀάπτους), deriving it from privative ἀ- and ἄπτειν, meaning ‘untouchable’.⁶⁴ As is clear, the placing of breathings within a word is closely connected with the meaning of compounds, so it also requires an etymological analysis. For this reason, I will address interaspiration in Chapter 3.4 when discussing etymology.⁶⁵ Still, interaspiration as a concept started with reading aloud.

6. Reading Aloud: Syntax and Punctuation

As this survey has shown, reading the Homeric text aloud implied several decisions: the quantity of vowels and syllables, the right accentuation and aspiration, and the division of the sequence of letters. While identifying the right words in the *scriptio continua* would often have helped in the placement of accents and breathings as well as in the decision of the right vowel quantity, sometimes the scholar had to deal with more difficult cases, which required more in-depth discussion. Often, a single word required the discussion of more than one of these issues, such as breathing and accent,⁶⁶ or breathing and quantity,⁶⁷ or accent and *scriptio continua*.⁶⁸ In particular, the division of the *scriptio continua* was closely linked to—and often dependent on—the other questions

63. Cf. also Turner and Parsons 1987, 88 (no. 49).

64. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.567b²; Ap. Soph. 1.20–23; Phot. α 7 and α 8. Cf. La Roche 1866, 175–176; Lehrs 1882, 141 and 301–302; van Thiel 2014a, I 146.

65. In particular, see Chapter 3.4 § 5, with an analysis of *Sch. Il.* 5.289b^{1,2} (Hrd.); 23.34b (Ariston.); 24.235a (Hrd.). Interaspiration is also discussed in *Sch. Il.* 5.638a (Ariston.), 5.638b (Nic.), 5.638c (Hrd.), 5.638d^{1,2} (ex. | Hrd.?), all analyzed by Haas 1977, 119–121. On Aristarchus and interaspiration, see also *Sch. Il.* 13.381a (Hrd.); 16.558b (Hrd.); 24.247b (Hrd.); 24.110b¹ (Did.).

66. E.g., Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 4.138a (cf. Schironi 2004, 379–383, fr. 48); 20.464a^{1,2}; 24.134a; Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 11.636a (see also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 11.636b and *Sch. Il.* 11.636c¹ [ex.]).

67. E.g., Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 5.203a^{1,2}.

68. E.g., Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 9.236b; 10.242b^{1,2}; 16.207a; 20.357a^{1,2} (cf. Schironi 2004, 62–63); 21.323b¹ (cf. Schironi 2004, 434–438, fr. 56).

connected with reading aloud: the metrical and prosodic reading, or the placing of accents and breathings.⁶⁹

At the moment when a scholar decided how to divide the sequence of letters into distinct words, another question often arose: how did these words relate to each other. This involved punctuation, which was the tool that allowed the visualization of pauses and syntactic articulations in a written text. The scholar who most took an interest in this question is Nicanor, nicknamed ὁ Στιγματίας, ‘the punctuator’, who is credited with having invented or perfected a system of punctuation in the early second century CE. In fact, Aristotle already implies that some system was in use,⁷⁰ and papyri utilize blank spaces, dots, and double dots as punctuation marks to indicate pauses from very early on, such as the middle and high stops in *P.Oxy.* 1790 (second to first century BCE) and *P.Oxy.* 659 (first century BCE).⁷¹ Thus, Aristarchus probably marked pauses in his *ekdosis*, but we cannot recover much of his work in this area. Moreover, even Nicanor, the authority for punctuation, mentions Aristarchus in very few scholia to the *Iliad* (I have counted thirteen cases in total).⁷² Some of them discuss how to articulate the phrasing of the lines and mention Aristarchus’ opinion in this regard;⁷³ others also discuss variant readings in connection with the articulation of the text.⁷⁴ One example from the latter group shows that, even in a case that deals with a variant choice, reading aloud is also involved. In *Il.* 15.741—the closing line of Ajax’s speech (ll. 733–741) to encourage the Greeks when the Trojans bring fire to the camp—Nicanor testifies that Aristarchus’ reading was ‘therefore salvation (φόως) in battle is in our hands (ἐν χερσὶ), not in softness (μειλιχίη)’:

69. Other examples of division of *scriptio continua* discussed by Aristarchus are surveyed by Schironi 2004, 131–137 (fr. 13), 264–272 (fr. 32), 297–304 (fr. 36; see also Chapter 3.4 § 7), 371–378 (fr. 47), 417–425 (fr. 54).

70. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1407b11–18: ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὐφραστον· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό· ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ’ ἂν μὴ ῥάδιον διαστίξαι, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὕστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ ‘τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίνονται’. ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ αἰεὶ, πρὸς ποτέρῳ <δεῖ> διαστίξαι [generally what is written should be easy to read aloud and easy to understand, which is the same thing. But many connective elements or sentences which are not easy to punctuate, such as those of Heraclitus, do not have this [characteristic]. To add punctuation to the sentences of Heraclitus is a difficult task because it is unclear whether [a word] belongs to what precedes or what follows it, as in the very opening of his treatise. For there he says ‘Of this *logos* that is always men are ignorant’ and it is unclear to which of the two clauses the word ‘always’ must be connected].

71. Cf. Rutherford 1905, 171; Turner and Parsons 1987, 8–10, 48 (no. 20) and 50 (no. 21).

72. There are fourteen scholia of Nicanor mentioning Aristarchus, but one (to *Il.* 21.110) is present in both A and bT (the latter labeled by Erbse as ‘ex. [Nic.]’), so it counts as one case.

73. *Sch. Il.* 5.638b; 5.736c; 11.757a; 13.6a; 17.75a (analyzed below); 21.110a and 21.110c^{1,2} (ex. [Nic.]).

74. *Sch. Il.* 14.173–4; 14.400a; 15.187a; 15.741a; 16.105–6b; 16.638–9; 17.214a.

Sch. Il. 15.741a (Nic.) τῷ ἐν χερσὶ φόως, <οὐ μειλιχίῃ πολέμοιο>: Ἀρίσταρχος κατὰ δοτικὴν ἔγραφεν, συνάπτων δηλονότι ὅλον τὸν στίχον· ἔσται δὲ οὕτως τὸ ἐξῆς, τῷ ἐν χερσὶν, οὐ μειλιχίῃ, τέλος πολέμοιο, οἶον ἐν τῷ δόρατι, οὐκ ἐν προσηνεῖα οὐδ' ἐν ἀργίᾳ κεῖται ἢ τοῦ πολέμου σωτηρία. Διονύσιος δὲ ὁ Θρᾶξ (fr. 17 Linke) κατ' εὐθεΐαν πτῶσιν, ᾧ ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι στίζειν ἐπὶ τὸ 'φόως' τελείᾳ στιγμῇ· καὶ ἔσται καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἐκάτερον ἡμιστίχιον. ὁ δὲ λόγος· διόπερ ἐν χερσὶν ἢ σωτηρία, προσηνεῖα δὲ οὐκ ἔστι πολέμου.

'Therefore salvation (φόως) in battle is in our hands (ἐν χερσὶ), not in softness (μειλιχίῃ)': Aristarchus wrote [μειλιχίῃ] in the dative, clearly making a whole of the entire line; this will be the meaning of the sequence: 'the end of battle is in our hands, not in softness', which [means]: salvation in battle lies in the spear, not in gentleness or in idleness. Dionysius Thrax (fr. 17 Linke), instead, [wrote μειλιχίῃ] in the nominative case, and thus it is logical to mark φόως with a full stop; and each hemistich stays on its own, and what is being said is: therefore salvation lies in our hands; gentleness is not part of battle.⁷⁵

According to Aristarchus' reading, the dative μειλιχίῃ is in parallel with ἐν χερσὶ and the line comprises one syntactic unit. Dionysius Thrax, instead, reads the nominative μειλιχίῃ, which is then parallel to the other nominative φόως. In this case, there are two independent clauses: 'therefore salvation (φόως) lies in our hands; there is no softness (μειλιχίῃ) in battle'.⁷⁶ The problem implies a variant (μειλιχίῃ/μειλιχίῃ) which goes back to the same *scriptio continua* ΜΕΙΛΙΧΙΗ, as the *iota mutum* can be omitted in papyri of the late Hellenistic period.⁷⁷ Each choice implies a change of syntax and meaning but it is also closely linked with pronouncing the line aloud since the two solutions imply different pauses in the reading.

7. Posidonius, the 'Reader' of Aristarchus

'Reading aloud' was so important in his philological activity that Aristarchus apparently even appointed a person whose task was to read the Homeric po-

75. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.741c (Did.).

76. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 194–195; Linke 1977, 45; Janko 1994, 307–308.

77. Clarysse 1976, 150, highlights this phenomenon for the documentary texts starting from the second century BCE; for literary papyri he says (Clarysse 1976, 151): "The *iota mutum*, however, is maintained in literary papyri up to the 7th century. It is not found everywhere; moreover, it is quite often written irregularly within one and the same text or it has been added afterwards by a second hand, but the tradition was clearly kept alive by some scholars".

ems aloud to him: Posidonius the ‘reader’ of Aristarchus (Ποσειδώνιος, ὁ ἀναγνώστης Ἀριστάρχου). He is quoted only three times in the *scholia maiora* to the *Iliad*,⁷⁸ and in two cases the mention concerns the same question in *Il.* 6.511. At *Il.* 6.510–511, Homer compares Paris going back to the battlefield to a horse who ‘is confident in his magnificence, / and his knees nimbly bring him (ρίμφα ἐ γούνα φέρει) to the places and pastures of horses’. But line 511 was problematic in terms of *scriptio continua*:

Sch. Il. 6.511a ρίμφα <ἐ γούνα φέρει>: Ζηνόδοτος ‘ρίμφ’ ἐὰ γούνα φέρει. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ ὁ ἀναγνώστης Ἀριστάρχου <ἄνευ> διαιρέσεως τὸ ε ψιλῶς προφέρεται, παρέλκειν αὐτὸ λέγων ὡς ἐν τῷ ‘ἢ ἐ σὺ τόνδε δέδεξο’ (*Il.* 5.228), καὶ λύεται τὸ σολοικοφανές. ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος ὑπὸ τῶν γονάτων καὶ ποδῶν φέρεσθαι λέγει· ‘τὸν μὲν ἄρ’ ὡς εἰπόντα πόδες φέρον’ (*Il.* 15.405).

‘His knees (γούνα) nimbly (ρίμφα) bring him (ἐ)’: Zenodotus [reads]: ‘[he] nimbly (ρίμφ’) brings his knees (ἐὰ γούνα)’. But Posidonius, the reader of Aristarchus, pronounces the E with a smooth breathing without word division and he says that it is redundant as in ‘or (ἢ ἐ) you wait for him’ (*Il.* 5.228), and [in this way] the apparent solecism [i.e., Zenodotus’ reading] is solved. And Homer says ‘to be brought by the knees and the feet’: [e.g.,] ‘his feet bore him after he had spoken in this way’ (*Il.* 15.405).⁷⁹

Probably on the basis of the phrasing of this note, Martin West⁸⁰ has suggested that Posidonius’ task was specifically that of reading Zenodotus’ text to Aristarchus. In fact, it is impossible to say whether this was Posidonius’ specific task. Yet in this case Aristarchus’ target was no doubt Zenodotus, who inverted two letters in the *scriptio continua*, ΠΙΜΦΕΑ instead of ΠΙΜΦΑΕ, so that the line resulted in ρίμφ’ ἐὰ γούνα φέρει. Aristarchus concludes that Zenodotus made the phrase ἐὰ γούνα the object of φέρει, which was easier to understand (i.e., ‘he brings his knees’), but against Homer’s usage of saying ‘his feet/knees bring him’. While reading Zenodotus’ text aloud, however, Posidonius had to make his own decisions in order to divide the *scriptio continua*, probably

78. Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 6.511a; 6.510–1a¹ and Nicanor in *Sch. Il.* 17.75a. This might be the same Posidonius quoted in *Sch. Ap. Rh.* 2.105–06 and *Ep. Hom.* α 329 (cf. Dyck, ad loc.) as dealing with other Homeric problems. We do not know whether these two mentions of Posidonius stem from his autonomous scholarship or still refer to his role as ‘reader’ for Aristarchus. It is also debated whether the Posidonius quoted by Apollonius Dyscolus (*Con.* 214.4–20) as the author of a *Περὶ συνδέσμων* is this Posidonius or Posidonius of Apamea; cf. La Roche 1866, 72–73; Blau 1883, 40–41; Wendel 1953; Pagani 2016.

79. See also *Sch. Il.* 6.510–1a¹: Ποσειδώνιος δὲ ψιλῶς τὸ ε προφέρεται καὶ φησιν αὐτὸ πλεονάζειν ὡς ἐν τῷ ‘ἢ ἐ σὺ’ (*Il.* 5.228).

80. West 2001, 55.

because there were not many reading aids. Thus, he pronounced the E in Zenodotus' ΠΙΜΦΕΑ with a smooth breathing and with no division from the previous word, resulting in ῥίμφεα as one word. This was not Zenodotus' choice, as he read ῥίμφ' ἔα with division and aspiration on E; yet ῥίμφεα could make sense, Posidonius explained, if one considered the E as pleonastic, so as to be equivalent to ῥίμφα, just like ἦέ in *Il.* 5.228, which is equivalent to ἦ.⁸¹ Even if Aristarchus was completely convinced of his reading (ῥίμφά ἐ γοῦνα φέρει) as it was closer to the Homeric usage, he himself might have reported Posidonius' suggestion (ῥίμφεα γοῦνα φέρει) in his commentaries after he listened to him. By reading Zenodotus' sequence AE in a different way, Posidonius made it acceptable, as it now became similar to the construction Aristarchus preferred, since ῥίμφεα corresponded to ῥίμφα, and γοῦνα was subject of φέρει. In Posidonius' reading the object of φέρει (i.e., him) was unexpressed, but this is acceptable in Greek.⁸² It must be added that other modern scholars⁸³ have read the above scholium differently, concluding that Posidonius was reading the same text as Aristarchus (so, ΠΙΜΦΑΕ), but with different articulation: ῥίμφαε rather than ῥίμφα . . . ἐ. Indeed the two Aristonicus scholia at *Il.* 6.510–511 are ambiguous.⁸⁴ Yet the comment about Posidonius' *lysis* of Zenodotus' solecism in *Sch. Il.* 6.511a suggests that West's interpretation is probably correct. In addition, hiring someone to read aloud other editions of Homer (in this case that of Zenodotus, but not necessarily only his) is more fitting with what Aristarchus' daily work might have been.

The other mention of Posidonius concerns *Il.* 17.75–76, when Apollo, disguised as Mentès, warns Hector not to run after unattainable things such as the horses of Achilles (Ἑκτορ νῦν σὺ μὲν ὧδε θέεις ἀκίχῃτα διώκων / ἵππους Αἰακίδαο δαΐφρονος). According to Nicanor in *Sch. Il.* 17.75a, Posidonius links ἀκίχῃτα ('unattainable') with what follows, that is, he reads it in apposition to ἵππους Αἰακίδαο δαΐφρονος, depending on the participle διώκων, 'pursuing'. In other words, Posidonius pauses after θέεις, 'you run': 'you run—pursuing

81. For a similar question on how to read E (whether is pleonastic or the pronoun ἐ) in a *scriptio continua* involving Aristarchus and Chrysippus, see *Sch. Il.* 15.241a (Hrd. | Ariston) and 15.241b (Ariston. | Hrd. | ex.); cf. Janko 1994, 252.

82. In fact, Zenodotus' reading ῥίμφ' ἔα γοῦνα φέρει could also mean 'his knees (ἔα γοῦνα) nimbly (ῥίμφα) bring [him]', with an unexpressed object; yet Aristarchus does not consider this possibility. On Zenodotus' reading, see Chapter 4 § 1.5.1.

83. For example, La Roche 1866, 72; Wendel 1953; Nagy 2009a, 60–63.

84. Eustathius (659.16–17, ad *Il.* 6.510–511) follows this second interpretation: τινὲς δὲ φασὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου ἀναγνώστην Ποσειδώνιον ῥίμφαε λέγειν ἐν ἐνὶ τρισυλλάβῳ μέρει λόγου, πλεονάσαντος, φησὶν, ἐν παρολκῇ τοῦ ε, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἦε σὺ τόνδε δέδεξο' (*Il.* 5.228) [some say that Aristarchus' reader Posidonius pronounced ῥίμφαε as one word of three syllables, in which—he says—the E is redundant, just like in 'or (ἦε) you wait for him' (*Il.* 5.228)].

unattainable things, the horses of . . .’ Aristarchus approves of this solution,⁸⁵ which is also the one favored by modern scholars.⁸⁶ But there is another possibility, to link ἀκίχητα with θέεις and understand it as an adverb meaning ‘in vain’ with a pause after it: ‘you run in vain—pursuing the horses of . . .’ In this example, therefore, the reading of the lines aloud at first is simply a question of where to pause. Yet it has also syntactic implications, since the scholar has to decide what the function of ἀκίχητα is: an object of διώκων or an adverb modifying θέεις.⁸⁷ As in the many examples surveyed above, in this case too reading aloud is no trifling matter, since the voice’s pauses allow one to decode the phrase’s syntax.

8. Conclusions

‘Reading aloud’, the first part of grammar, is partly irrecoverable due to the fact that it was mostly an oral activity, for which Aristarchus had even an official ‘reader’, Posidonius. The scholia preserve a few traces of this process because in some cases reading a continuous sequence of words aloud was problematic and needed to be discussed in the commentaries. Aristarchus discussed vowel lengths and metrical questions, the choice of accents and breathings, as well as the division of the *scriptio continua* into single words. The various issues often were interconnected, since accents and breathings were not only used to disambiguate homographs, but could also help to determine word boundaries. In fact, on top of other systems attested in papyri, such as oblique strokes dividing words⁸⁸ or high and middle stops whose origin (i.e., whether they reflect Alexandrian practice) is still debated,⁸⁹ the correct placing of accents and breathings was one of the main tools through which a grammarian could mark the division of the *scriptio continua* in the manuscript.

As this survey has shown, the operation of reading aloud went beyond prosodic readings. The correct vowel and syllable lengths, accents, breathings, and division of *scriptio continua* into words depended on the correct understanding of the sentence. This is why it was so crucial as a first step in

85. See also Ap. Soph. 20.6.

86. Cf. *Lfgre*, s.v.; Edwards 1991, 70.

87. Cf. Nagy 2009a, 59–60. Eust. 1096.13 (ad *Il.* 17.75–76) gives the exact opposite solution for Aristarchus’ choice here (cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 17.75a: ‘sch. obiter legit et temere transscripsit Eust. 1096.13’). Indeed, Eustathius’ lack of precision might also be at work in the previous case on Posidonius’ reading (see above, footnote 84).

88. Cf. Turner and Parsons 1987, 7–8.

89. Cf. Turner and Parsons 1987, 9–10.

approaching a text. Within a school setting, moreover, a pupil could demonstrate to his teacher (Aristarchus?) that he had at least a basic grasp of the meaning of the text simply by reading it aloud correctly. At a higher level of exegesis, on the other hand, Aristarchus discussed etymology, grammatical rules, and elements of style in order to decide how to read more difficult lines correctly. For this reason, many of the other examples arising from the 'reading aloud' of *scriptio continua* will be treated elsewhere, since they also involve the analysis of other textual aspects, such as morphology, linguistic usage, etymology, and so on. Even though they involved more 'refined' types of analysis, nevertheless these questions arose with reading texts aloud, the first part of grammar, which dealt with the most basic form of interpretation: how to divide a continuous flow of sounds.

3.2.A

Interpretation of Poetic Tropes

Decoding Homer's Style and Figurative Language

1. Tropes and Figures
2. Criteria Adopted in This Chapter
3. Metaphor (μεταφορά)
4. Simile (εἰκὼν, ὁμοίωσις, παραβολή)
5. Allegory (ἀλληγορία)
6. Synecdoche (τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους)
7. Litotes and Irony (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον)
8. Antithesis (ἀντικειμένως)
9. 'Side by Side' Construction (παραλλήλως, ἐκ παραλλήλου)
10. Resumption (ἐπανάληψις)
11. Preeminence (ἐξοχή)
12. Reverse Order (πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον)
13. Parallel Order (πρὸς τὸ πρότερον [πρότερον])
14. Hyperbaton (ὑπερβατόν)
15. Syllepsis (σύλληψις)
16. Hyperbole (ὑπερβολή)
17. Amplification (αὔξησις) and Suggestiveness (ἔμφασις)
18. Conclusions

In his definition of the six parts of grammar, Dionysius Thrax places the 'interpretation according to the poetic tropes there present' as the second step (δεύτερον ἐξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικούς τρόπους). According to the ancients, tropes were deviations from the standard meanings of words, used to embellish a phrase or express an idea more forcefully; since they were typical of poetic language, it was the duty of the grammarians to explain them.¹

1. See Tryph. i 191.12–22: τρόπος δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος κατὰ παρατροπὴν τοῦ κυρίου λεγόμενος κατὰ

The correct analysis of tropes was indispensable for an initial understanding of a literary text since they could often cause ambiguities in the wording. In addition, the analysis of tropes represented a first and fundamental step toward the appreciation of the literary qualities of the text and of the specific style of the poet.

1. Tropes and Figures

When discussing ‘tropes’ (τρόποι), the very similar category of ‘figures’ (σχήματα) must inevitably be taken into account.² Generally tropes are considered transferences from the proper and original meaning of a word to another, while figures concern the collocation of words within the sentence; that is, tropes are more connected with semantics, while figures are connected with syntax.³ Yet the distinction between these two categories is often blurred, especially among the ancients.⁴ For example, sometimes the same feature (e.g., hyperbaton) can be classified as a trope or as a figure in different treatises, in part because in antiquity the analysis of tropes and figures belonged to two different, though often overlapping, fields: the study of grammar (in the sense of Dionysius Thrax, i.e., philology) and the study of rhetoric. Although rhetoricians elaborated a relatively standardized classification of tropes and figures, the distinction between the two categories remained unclear even in rhetoric, as Quintilian himself admits (*Inst.* 9.1.2–3). Grammatical analysis of tropes and

τινα δῆλωσιν κοσμιωτέραν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον . . . τούτους δὲ ποιητικούς καλοῦσιν, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γὰρ τὸ πλεῖστον ἢ τούτων χρήσις παρὰ ποιηταῖς, καὶ ὅτι τούτοις οἱ γραμματικοὶ χρῶνται ἐξηγούμενοι τὰ κυρίως ἢ τροπικῶς τοῖς ποιηταῖς εἰρημένα [a trope is a way of speaking spoken in a manner deviating from standard usage for a more ornate display or out of necessity . . . they call them ‘poetic [tropes]’ because they are mostly used by poets and because the grammarians use them when explaining literal and figurative expressions in the poets]. Cf. Lausberg 1998, § 553.

2. The best introduction to tropes and figures is Martin 1974, 259–315. Lausberg 1998 provides the most complete guide to rhetorical devices, tropes, and figures in ancient rhetoric and grammar.

3. For this definition, see Schenkeveld 1991, 151. The same ideas can be found among the ancients, for example [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 15: ἡ μὲν τῶν λέξεων ἐκτροπή καλεῖται τρόπος, ἡ δὲ τῆς συνθέσεως σχῆμα [alteration in words is called trope, while alteration in composition [is called] figure]; and Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.4: *est igitur tropus sermo a naturali et principali significatione tralatus ad aliam ornandae orationis gratia, vel, ut plerique grammatici finiunt, dictio ab eo loco in quo propria est tralata in eum in quo propria non est; figura, sicut nomine ipso patet, conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerente ratione* [a ‘trope’ is thus a way of speaking transferred from its natural and principal meaning to another to embellish the diction or, as most grammarians define it, an expression transferred from one place where it is proper to another where it is not; a ‘figure’, as is clear from the name itself, is a certain arrangement of diction far from the normal and immediate order].

4. See Martin 1974, 261 and 272–273; Schenkeveld 1991, 149; Lausberg 1998, §§ 557, 601.

figures escaped such attempts at classification to an even greater degree, probably because these categories were elaborated among Hellenistic philologists at an earlier time than among rhetoricians, who wrote their treatises in the Roman era. Aristarchus and his colleagues thus noticed and analyzed specific stylistic phenomena without having in mind a full-fledged classification of tropes and figures.⁵ Dirk Schenkeveld is therefore right when he concludes that the *τρόποι* mentioned by Dionysius Thrax still constitute a very broad category, not necessarily identical with what later rhetoricians would call ‘tropes’; and, moreover, that they include phenomena elsewhere labeled as ‘figures’.⁶ For this reason, I will include both tropes and figures in my analysis of the second part of grammar, which I have divided into two chapters. The first (Chapter 3.2.A) will discuss the cases mainly recognized as tropes (even if some happen to be included in treatises *περὶ σχημάτων*), while figures (or *σχήματα*) will be the topic of the second chapter (Chapter 3.2.B). In particular, the tropes (and figures) discussed in this chapter are mostly concerned with stylistic or semantic nuances rather than syntactic concepts, even when they involve a change in the word order of the sentence. In the next chapter I will instead analyze figures that are more closely connected to syntactic analysis and grammatical ideas.

2. Criteria Adopted in This Chapter

Many of the features of Homeric style noticed by Aristarchus overlap with tropes and figures listed in the various treatises *περὶ τρόπων* and *περὶ σχημάτων*, which not only often use the same names or definitions found in the Aristarchean scholia, but illustrate a trope or figure using the very same Homeric examples which Aristarchus also discussed. In particular, among the many later collections of tropes, the most interesting is the treatise *Περὶ τρόπων* ascribed to Tryphon, an Alexandrian grammarian contemporary of Didymus. As Martin West has observed,⁷ this treatise is preserved in many, partly overlapping, versions: Tryphon i,⁸ Tryphon ii,⁹ the anonymous treatises *Περὶ τρόπων* ed-

5. Cf. Schenkeveld 1991, 152–153.

6. Schenkeveld 1991, 153–156. For a survey of *σχῆμα* and *τρόπος* in the Homeric scholia, see Schrader 1904.

7. West 1965, 230–233.

8. Edited in *Rhetores Graeci* viii, 726–760 Waltz = iii, 189–206 Spengel.

9. Originally attributed to Gregory of Corinth and edited in *Rhetores Graeci* viii, 761–778 Waltz = iii, 215–226 Spengel. The text was reedited by West 1965, whose edition I follow.

ited by Waltz and Spengel,¹⁰ the treatise by Cocondrius,¹¹ the one falsely attributed to Choeroboscus,¹² and the one in the *De Homero* falsely attributed to Plutarch.¹³ There are also similar texts preserved on papyrus¹⁴ and some by Latin grammarians.¹⁵ Whether or not these preserved treatises represent Tryphon's *περὶ τρόπων in toto* (which cannot be proved, in part because there are slight differences among them), they ultimately seem to represent a tradition stemming from Tryphon, who must have written a treatise on tropes, as *Suda* (τ 1115) also reports.¹⁶ Tryphon's collection is particularly important because, unlike the other treatises *περὶ τρόπων* and *περὶ σχημάτων*, it was written by, or at least attributed to, not a rhetorician but a grammarian. Indeed, Tryphon's work is for the most part focused on Homeric examples. It is also the most ancient treatment of the subject extant, since at least one papyrus preserving part of it (*P. Würzburg* 2) dates back to the second century CE.¹⁷ Thus, this treatise is the closest to Aristarchus' time and can help to put his analysis of poetic tropes within its wider cultural and historical context. In fact, if we accept that the core of this collection goes back to Tryphon himself, he lived between the first century BCE and the early first century CE, namely, within 150 years after Aristarchus. In particular, I will give preference to Tryphon i and ii, which are the main versions of this work.¹⁸ Tryphon ii exhibits the closest relationship with Aristarchus; this treatise lists twenty-six tropes,¹⁹ and many of them are also discussed in the Aristarchean scholia. Tryphon i, which distinguishes four-

10. Anon. ii in *Rhetores Graeci* viii, 714–725 Waltz = iii, 207–714 Spengel; and Anon. iii in *Rhetores Graeci* viii, 779–781 Waltz = iii, 227–229 Spengel (partial text), reedited by Fredrich and Wentzel in *NGG* 1896, 337–340.

11. Edited in *Rhetores Graeci* viii, 782–798 Waltz = iii, 230–243 Spengel.

12. Edited in *Rhetores Graeci* viii, 799–820 Waltz = iii, 244–256 Spengel.

13. [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 §§ 15–26.

14. *P. Würzburg* 2 (second century CE), containing the most ancient version of this text, and *P. Vindob. inv.* 29332 (fourth to fifth century CE, edited by Oellacher 1939, 59–61), which is very close to that of Tryphon ii. I am currently working on an Oxyrhynchus papyrus (*inv.* 81_2B85–30(a)), which also dates to the second century CE and contains another version of this treatise (close to [Plutarch], *De Homero* 2, and to Tryphon i).

15. Charisius in *GL* 1, 272.1–277.23; Diomedes in *GL* 1, 456.26–464.24; Donatus in *GL* 4, 399.12–402.34; Sacerdos in *GL* 6, 460.20–470.22.

16. See West 1965, 231; Baumbach 2002, 885. On the other hand, Wendel 1939, 729–730, was more skeptical about the attribution of this treatise to Tryphon. Cf. also Dickey 2007, 82 and 84.

17. To which we can probably add the Oxyrhynchus papyrus on which I am working and which can be provisionally dated to the second century CE as well (see footnote 14 above).

18. See stemma in West 1965, 235.

19. These are ἀλληγορία, μεταφορά, κατάχρησις, μετάληψις, ὑπερβατόν, ἀναστροφή, συνεκδοχή, ὀνοματοποιία, μετωνυμία, περίφρασις, πλεονασμός, παραπλήρωμα, ἔλλειψις, ὑπερβολή, εἰρωνεία, σαρκασμός, ἀστεϊσμός, ἀντίφρασις, ἐναντίωσις, ἀντονομασία, ἀμφιβολία, σύλληψις, αἶνιγμα, ἐπαύξησις, ἐξοχή, ὑστερολογία.

teen tropes of ‘grammar’ (τρόποι τῆς γραμματικῆς)²⁰ and twenty-seven tropes of ‘expression’ (τρόποι τῆς φράσεως),²¹ shows less overlap with Aristarchus. Even so, the Aristarchean scholia notice some tropes which are only listed by Tryphon i and not by Tryphon ii (e.g., ἔμφασις and ἐπανάληψις, as well as the pair ὁμοίωσις and εἰκόν).

While some tropes listed by Tryphon are absent in the Aristonicus scholia (for example μετωνυμία and ἀντονομασία), some other phenomena that Aristarchus noticed in Homer are not described by Tryphon, such as ‘side by side’ construction and ‘reverse order’. This is probably because they are more closely related to the position of the words within the sentence than to their semantic meaning and, consequently, are closer to real figures than tropes. In fact, parallels have been found in the treatises περὶ σχημάτων, like those by Pseudo-Herodian and Lesboux.²² None of these collections of tropes and figures thus shows a complete overlap with Aristarchus’ analysis; they are all useful, nevertheless, for framing his exegesis and for seeing how it compares with these later, more theoretical works.

The Aristonicus scholia generally use the same name employed in later lists of tropes and figures, but sometimes they simply describe the trope/figure with a phrase, but do not give a specific name to it. The names or ‘descriptions’ used by Aristonicus and (perhaps) by Aristarchus are reported in brackets in the titles of the subsections of this chapter devoted to each trope/figure, so to make immediately clear how each stylistic feature is named in the scholia. Since there is no fixed order for these tropes and each treatise lists its own selection in its own order, in this chapter I will start with the very common tropes of metaphor and simile. I will then analyze other tropes involving a change in meaning of a specific word or phrase; subsequently, I will focus on others involving the order and the position of words within a phrase, and conclude with tropes devoted to giving ‘rhetorical’ amplification. I will exclude from this chapter some tropes mentioned by Tryphon i, such as παρασιώπησις (Tryph. i 199.26–200.2), συντομία (Tryph. i 202.7–15), and προαναφώνησις (Tryph. i 203.14–19); moreover, I will not consider here the figure of ἀποστροφή (e.g., [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 7). Although Aristarchus did notice these phenomena in Homer, these tropes and figures belonged to a higher level of analysis than the simple explanation

20. These are (Tryph. i 191.14–198.20) μεταφορά, κατάχρησις, ἀλληγορία, αἶνιγμα, μετάληψις, μετωνυμία, συνεκδοχή, ὀνοματοποιία, περίφρασις, ἀναστροφή, ὑπερβατόν, πλεονασμός, ἔλλειψις, παραπλήρωμα.

21. These are (Tryph. i 198.21–206.22) ὑπερβολή, ἔμφασις, ἐνέργεια, παρασιώπησις, ὁμοίωσις, εἰκόν, παράδειγμα, παραβολή, χαρακτηρισμός, εἰκασμός, συντομία, βραχύτης, σύλληψις, ἐπανάληψις, προαναφώνησις, παρέκβασις, ἀμφιβολία, ἀντίφρασις, μετατύπωσις, ἀντονομασία, εἰρωνεία, σαρκασμός, ἀστεϊσμός, μυκτηρισμός, χαριεντισμός, ἐπικερτόμησις, παροιμία.

22. On Pseudo-Herodian and Lesboux, see the introduction to next chapter.

of the phrasing of the text, which was the scope of the second part of grammar. For this reason, I will discuss these additional tropes and figures when dealing with the last part of grammar, in which Homeric narrative style and techniques will be treated.²³ Similarly, I am not considering κατάχρησις (Tryph. i 192.20–193.7 and Tryph. ii § 3) in this chapter, because when Aristarchus noticed that Homer used a word καταχρηστικῶς, ‘wrongly’, his analysis mostly stemmed from the third part of grammar, the explanation of *glossai*, and so I will treat κατάχρησις in Chapter 3.3.A.²⁴ Finally, I will discuss ὀνοματοποιΐα (Tryph. i 196.12–197.2, and Tryph. ii § 8) when treating the fourth part of grammar, the ‘discovery of etymology’,²⁵ because ὀνοματοποιΐα ultimately depended on the ability of the critic to analyze the constituents of a word from an etymological point of view.

3. Metaphor (μεταφορά)

Homer often employs metaphors, which—as Aristotle teaches (*Poet.* 1459a4–14)—are a distinctive feature of poetic language. Not surprisingly, Aristarchus often notices metaphorical expressions,²⁶ such as φῶς ἐρέουσα/ἐρέων, ‘[Dawn / the morning star] announcing the light’, where, he explains, the verb ἐρεῖν, ‘to say’, is used μεταφορικῶς instead of (προ)σημαίνειν, ‘to indicate’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.49b; 23.226c).²⁷ He also notes adjectives with a metaphorical meaning, for example ἀναιδής, ‘shameless’, for a stone, in the sense of ‘hard’ (*Sch. Il.* 4.521a),²⁸ or κωφόν, ‘mute’, for a dart, in the sense of ‘imperceptible’, hence ‘weak’ (*Sch. Il.* 11.390a).²⁹

A comparison between Pindar and Homer is focused on metaphors: according to Aristarchus, when Pindar says in *O.* 7.34: ‘where [i.e., in Rhodes] once the great king of the gods *showered* (βρέχε) the city with golden snowflakes’,

23. I will treat συντομία when analyzing Aristarchus’ criteria for athetesis (Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4) and προαναφώνησις, ἀποστροφή, and παρασιώπησις when discussing Aristarchus’ view of Homer’s narrative techniques (Chapter 3.6.C § 2.3, § 2.5, and § 3.1 respectively).

24. Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11. Catachresis is also applied to Homer’s formulaic style; see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.1.

25. Chapter 3.4 § 8.2.

26. On Aristarchus’ view of metaphors, cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 11–12; Roemer 1924, 20–32.

27. Cf. Bouchard 2016, 65.

28. Aristotle too (*Rhet.* 1411b33–34) notes the metaphorical meaning of ἀναιδής applied to a stone in *Od.* 11.598; cf. Meijering 1987, 22.

29. See also *Sch. Il.* 14.16a; cf. Lehrs 1882, 117–118. For adjectives interpreted as metaphorical, see also *Sch. Il.* 1.51c; 13.147a; 13.317; for verbs or phrases used metaphorically, see *Sch. Il.* 13.745–6a and 21.538–9 (both analyzed in Chapter 2.3 § 5); 22.356a.

he is speaking literally (so Zeus indeed poured gold on Rhodes), while in *Il.* 2.670: ‘upon them [i.e., the Rhodians] the son of Cronus *poured* (κατέχευε) marvelous wealth’, Homer is using a metaphor to mean the wealth of the island:

Sch. Il. 2.670 καί σφιν θεσπέσιον πλοῦτον <κατέχευε Κρονίων>: ὅτι Πίνδαρος (O. 7.34) κυρίως δέδεκται χρυσὸν ὕσαι τὸν Δία, Ὀμήρου μεταφορᾷ κεχρημένου διὰ τοῦ κατέχευε πρὸς ἔμφασιν τοῦ πλούτου.

‘Upon them the son of Cronus poured (κατέχευε) marvelous wealth’: because Pindar has understood that Zeus rained gold in a literal sense, whereas Homer has used a metaphor through [the use of the verb] ‘he poured’ (κατέχευε) to suggest the abundance of gold.³⁰

The phrasing of the scholium echoes Tryphon, who defines metaphor as a transference of a part of speech from the literal or proper meaning (κύριον) to another meaning because of ‘suggestiveness’ (ἔμφασις)³¹ or similarity (ὁμοίωσις). Tryphon lists five types of metaphor:³²

1. From animate beings to inanimate objects (ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων ἐπὶ ἄψυχα)
2. From inanimate objects to animate beings (ἀπὸ ἀψύχων ἐπὶ ἐμψυχα)
3. From animate beings to animate beings (ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων ἐπὶ ἐμψυχα)
4. From inanimate objects to inanimate objects (ἀπὸ ἀψύχων ἐπὶ ἄψυχα)
5. From action to action (ἀπὸ πράξεως ἐπὶ πράξιν)

Interestingly, the expression ‘metaphor from animate beings’ (μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμψύχων) occurs in the Aristonicus scholia to describe when Homer personifies certain objects:³³ when spears are ‘eager to satiate themselves with

30. See also *Sch. Pind. O.* 7.63a.b; Strabo 14.2.10; cf. Lehrs 1882, 186; Roemer 1924, 105–106; Bouchard 2016, 186–187.

31. On the link between metaphor and ‘suggestiveness’ (ἔμφασις), see also below, § 17.

32. Tryph. ii § 2: μεταφορὰ ἐστὶ λόγου μέρος μεταφερόμενον <ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἐφ’ ἕτερον> ἢ τοι ἐμφάσεως ἢ ὁμοιώσεως ἔνεκα. τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν εἶδη ἐστὶ πέντε· αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰσιν ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων ἐπὶ ἄψυχα, αἱ δὲ τοῦναντίον ἀπὸ ἀψύχων ἐπὶ ἐμψυχα, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων ἐπὶ ἐμψυχα, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἀψύχων ἐπὶ ἄψυχα, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ πράξεως ἐπὶ πράξιν [metaphor is a part of speech transferred from the proper meaning to another or for suggestiveness or similarity. There are five types of metaphor: some of them are from animate beings to inanimate objects; others are the opposite, from inanimate objects to animate beings, others [are] from animate beings to animate beings, others from inanimate objects to inanimate objects, others from action to action]. See also Tryph. i 191.23–192.19.

33. Cf. Roemer 1924, 24–26.

flesh'³⁴ (*Sch. Il.* 11.574a); or when prizes are 'waiting' for the charioteers,³⁵ as if they were people (*Sch. Il.* 23.273a). Since Homer uses φέρειν, 'to carry', for inanimate things (ἐπὶ ἀψύχων) and ἄγειν, 'to lead', for animate beings (ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων),³⁶ Aristarchus considers it a μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμψύχων when ἄγειν is used for a 'cup'³⁷ (*Sch. Il.* 11.632b).³⁸

The 'metaphor from quadrupeds' (μεταφορὰ ἐκ τῶν τετραπόδων) is a more specific type of 'metaphor from animate beings', and is employed in the Aristonicus scholia to label the use of ἀμφιβαίνειν for 'to protect'. The primary meaning of the verb is 'to go about or around' and 'to bestride'; by extension, it means 'to protect' (i.e., to bestride a fallen friend, so as to protect him).³⁹ According to Aristarchus, this is a metaphorical meaning derived from quadrupeds who, to protect their young, 'bestride them'. Homer makes this link explicit through a simile with animals in *Il.* 5.299, where Aeneas 'bestrode' (ἀμφὶ . . . βαῖνε) Lycaon's corpse to defend it 'like a lion', and in *Il.* 17.4–6, where Menelaus 'bestrode' (ἀμφὶ . . . βαῖνε) Patroclus' corpse 'as a mother cow stands over her calf'.⁴⁰ The verb ἀμφιβαίνειν and the similar περιβαίνειν occur without reference to animals to mean to 'protect' a dead or wounded companion in a military context elsewhere in Homer (ἀμφιβαίνειν in *Il.* 14.477 and περιβαίνειν in *Il.* 5.21, 8.331 = 13.420). Aristarchus notices the metaphor ἀπὸ τῶν τετραπόδων and explains that it means 'fight on behalf [of someone]' (ὑπερμαχεῖν) (*Sch. Il.* 5.21b; 5.299a; 13.420); in all these instances, he also refers to the example of *Il.* 1.37 (*Sch. Il.* 5.21b; 5.299a; 8.331b; 13.420; 14.477; 17.4a).⁴¹ At *Il.* 1.37, the meaning of ἀμφιβαίνειν was probably even more problematic, because the word is not used in a military context: Chryses invokes Apollo and says: 'hear me, god of the silver bow, you who have granted protection

34. *Il.* 11.574: [τὰ δὲ δοῦρα; cf. l. 571] ἐν γαίῃ ἴσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἄσαι [[and the spears] stood in the earth, eager to satiate themselves with flesh].

35. *Il.* 23.273: ἱππῆας τὰδ' ἄεθλα δεδεγμένα κεῖτ' ἐν ἀγῶνι [and these prizes lie waiting for the charioteers in the contest].

36. See *Sch. Il.* 23.263–4; 23.512–3a¹²; 24.367a, all discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 2.5.

37. *Il.* 11.632: πὰρ δὲ δέπας περικαλλές, ὃ οἴκοθεν ἦγ' ὁ γεραίος [and beside them there was a beautiful cup, which the old man had led from home].

38. In *Sch. Il.* 11.632c, Didymus mentions two readings by Aristarchus, one with ἄγειν and one with ἔχειν, both with 'cup' as object. If ἔχειν was the latest reading (as it seems, since it is unknown to Aristonicus), Aristarchus perhaps preferred it in order to avoid having ἄγειν, 'to lead', refer to inanimate things, which was against the *usus Homericus* and which could only be accepted as a 'metaphor from living beings'. On *Sch. Il.* 17.163c, which discusses another instance of ἄγειν with an inanimate object (i.e., a corpse!), see van der Valk 1963–1964, I 460 n. 243; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 17.163c.

39. Cf. *LSJ*, s.v. ἀμφιβαίνω; *Lfgre*, s.v. βαίνω II.1.

40. Another example is *Od.* 20.14–15: 'And as a bitch standing over her tender pups (περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα), when she sees a stranger, barks and is eager to fight'. The parallel is quoted in *Sch. Il.* 17.4b (ex.) and *Ap. Soph.* 27.19–27. No scholia to *Od.* 20.14 and 15 are preserved.

41. See also *Sch. Il.* 17.80, discussing another instance of περιβαίνειν. Cf. Roemer 1924, 26–27.

(ἀμφιβέβηκας) to Chryse'. While in the previous cases the metaphorical sense of ἀμφιβαίνειν/περιβαίνειν is more intuitive, as the soldiers are 'bestriding' their dead or wounded companions to defend them from the enemy, it is less obvious what it means for Apollo to 'have bestriden' Chryse. The Aristonicus scholium simply explains it as a metaphor from quadrupeds (*Sch. Il.* 1.37e: ὅτι κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἐκ τῶν τετραπόδων, ὑπερμαχεῖς). Yet the instances where this metaphor occurs and Aristarchus' notes about them suggest that, in his view, ἀμφιβαίνειν/περιβαίνειν is used metaphorically in two steps: first from animals to humans so as to mean to protect a body by 'bestriding' him, and then from a military to a nonmilitary context, where the verb 'to bestride' has to be interpreted in an even more abstract sense, as in *Il.* 1.37.

Sometimes Homer himself expounds on his metaphors by adding a simile, for example with ἀμφιβαίνειν in *Il.* 5.299 and 17.4–6, as we have just seen. Similarly, in *Il.* 8.131, 'and they would have been penned (σῆκασθεν) inside Ilium like lambs (ἥϋτε ἄρνες)', for Aristarchus the poet explains his own metaphorical use of the verb σηκάζειν, 'to shut up in a pen', by adding the comparison 'like lambs' at the end (*Sch. Il.* 8.131a: ὅτι τὸ 'σῆκασθεν' αὐτὸς ἐπεξηγεῖται εἰπὼν 'ἥϋτε ἄρνες').

The partial overlap between Aristarchus' analysis of metaphors and the definitions of Tryphon can be interestingly compared with Aristotle's definition of metaphor:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1457b6–9: μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.

Metaphor is the application of a word that is extraneous [to the context], either from the genus to the species, or from the species to the genus, or from species to species, or according to analogy.⁴²

This definition covers more phenomena than just metaphors. In fact, only the 'metaphor according to analogy' describes what we now define as a metaphor.⁴³ Later discussions of this trope do not include Aristotle's first three types of metaphor, which rely upon the opposition γένος/εἶδος.⁴⁴ Aristarchus and Tryphon, for example, do not refer to species or genera, but are mostly concerned with the pair ἄψυχα/ἔμψυχα, which seems to be a further refinement of the 'meta-

42. Cf. Janko 1987, 129–130. Metaphors are also discussed in Aristot. *Rhet.* 1405a3–b20 and 1411a1–1413b2. On metaphor in Aristotle, see Tamba-Mecz and Veyne 1979.

43. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1411a1–2) in fact considers the metaphor according to analogy the most important type of metaphor.

44. Cf. Lucas 1968, 205. See below, footnote 47.

phor by analogy' of Aristotle.⁴⁵ This difference suggests that between the time of Aristotle and that of Aristarchus the analysis of metaphors underwent significant developments. While the distinction genus/species was not recognized any longer as defining metaphors,⁴⁶ the focus was on metaphors 'by analogy', which were subdivided into different types, mostly related to the types of elements that were part of the relations: whether they were animate or inanimate.⁴⁷

4. Simile (εἰκὼν, ὁμοίωσις, παραβολή)

Aristotle considers the simile a sort of metaphor:

Aristot. *Rhet.* 1406b20–22: ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ μικρόν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ [τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα] 'ὥς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν', εἰκὼν ἔστιν, ὅταν δὲ 'λέων ἐπόρουσε', μεταφορά.

The simile is also a metaphor; for it differs in a small detail: when one says [Achilles] 'sprang like a lion', it is a simile, whereas when [one says] 'a lion sprang', [it is] a metaphor.⁴⁸

The only difference between the two tropes is the presence in the simile of the comparative ὥς; other than that, similes and metaphors are essentially the same device (a metaphor, for Aristotle) and are typical of poetry (*Rhet.* 1406b24–25).⁴⁹ This is of course valid only for short similes or comparisons, not for long similes, which cannot be reduced to metaphors by simply omitting ὥς.

Aristarchus seems to have recognized the close link between metaphors and

45. The opposition of ἄψυχα/ἔμψυχα is in fact already present in Aristotle when in *Rhet.* 1411b31–33 he observes that through (analogical) metaphors Homer speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate. The μεταφορά ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων ἐπὶ ἔμψυχα of Tryphon and μεταφορά ἐκ τῶν τετραπόδων of Aristarchus probably started from this idea and developed it. As Tyler Mayo rightly points out to me, the distinction between animate and inanimate makes sense if one is studying Homer because so many of the metaphors are agricultural/natural in general and deal with animals in particular.

46. On the contrary, Aristarchus extensively uses the dichotomy genus/species in his semantic analysis; see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.9.

47. This reconstruction seems to be confirmed by *P.Hamb.* 2.128, an 'ars poetica' of the second century BCE, which distinguishes between μεταφορά (which is the analogical metaphor, i.e., 'our' metaphor) and μετουσία (which covers Aristotle's metaphors ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος and ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος); cf. Innes 1985, 251–252, and Schenkeveld 1993, esp. 71–79.

48. See also *Rhet.* 1410b17–20; 1412b34–1413a16.

49. This is also the view of Aristarchus; see *Sch. Il.* 11.747a, discussed in Chapter 3.6.C § 2.1.

similes, as he sometimes observes that Homer omits the comparative ὥς,⁵⁰ so that a simile becomes a metaphor. For instance, in the expression ‘well-woven tunics softly gleaming with oil (στίλβοντας ἐλαίῳ)’ Aristarchus observes that ὥς is missing (*Sch. Il.* 18.596b);⁵¹ he thus interprets this phrase as a figurative expression in the sense of ‘gleaming *like* with oil’ rather than taking it literally—although the latter interpretation is probably correct.⁵² Similarly, in a debated passage he understands κώδειαν ἀνασχών as ‘holding [Ilioneus’ head] (like) a poppy head’, with omission of the comparative ὥς (*Sch. Il.* 14.499b; 14.500).⁵³

In later treatises, similes are treated separately from metaphors under the label of ὁμοιώσις. According to Tryphon i (200.4–6), there are three types of ὁμοιώσις: εἰκὼν, παράδειγμα, and παραβολή. The παράδειγμα is the exemplum, either mythical or historical,⁵⁴ while it is more difficult to distinguish between εἰκὼν and παραβολή.⁵⁵ In Pseudo-Herodian, for example, παραβολαί are longer similes, while ὁμοιώσεις are shorter similes or images,⁵⁶ but Tryphon does not seem to make this strict distinction.⁵⁷

50. This is the postpositive ὥς, which means ‘like’ and is used only in Homer; cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. 3 ὥς.

51. See also *Sch. Il.* 18.596a (ex.).

52. Oil was really used on cloths to give them scent and brightness; cf. Edwards 1991, 229–230; Janko 1994, 175; van Thiel 2014a, III 211.

53. Similar comments come back in two scholia that Erbse tentatively attributes to Aristonicus: *Sch. Il.* 5.339b; 5.633–4.

54. Tryph. i 200.21–23: παράδειγμά ἐστι τοῦ προγεγονότος πράγματος παρένθεσις καθ’ ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὑποκειμένων πρὸς παραίνεσιν προτροπῆς ἢ ἀποτροπῆς ἐνεκεν [exemplum is the mention of a past event on the basis of similarity with current events for advice, in order to encourage or dissuade]. To illustrate this trope Tryphon quotes the exempla of Orestes in *Od.* 1.298–300 and of Lycurgus in *Il.* 6.130–140. No Aristarchean scholia deal with these passages as ‘παράδειγματα’.

55. Tryph. i 200.6–9: εἰκὼν ἐστι λόγος ἐναργῶς ἐξομοιοῦν πειρώμενος διὰ τοῦ παραλαμβανομένου, πρὸς δὲ παραλαμβάνεται, οἷον ‘ἥτε βοῦς ἀγέληφι μέγ’ ἔξοχος ἔπλετο πάντων’ (*Il.* 2.480) [image is a way of speaking which, by means of an expression which is used as a substitute, tries to compare with vividness [the thing] in relation to which [the substitute] is used, for example: ‘as a bull in a herd is preeminent among all by far [in the same way Zeus made the son of Atreus on that day]’ (*Il.* 2.480, 482)], and Tryph. i 201.12–16: παραβολή ἐστι λόγος διὰ παραθέσεως ὁμοίου πράγματος τὸ ὑποκείμενον μετ’ ἐνεργείας παριστάνων, οἷον ‘κινήθη δ’ ἀγορή, ὡς κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης πόντου / Ἰκαρίοιο’ (*Il.* 2.144–145) [simile is a way of speaking that presents the topic at hand with vividness through a juxtaposition of something similar, for example: ‘and the assembly was stirred just like the great waves of the Icarian Sea’ (*Il.* 2.144–145)].

56. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 64: ὁμοιώσις δὲ πράγματος ὁμοίου παράθεσις, οἷον ‘ὄρνιθες ὥς’ (*Il.* 3.2). διαφέρει δὲ τῆς παραβολῆς, ὅτι διὰ συντόμων ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον λέγεται καὶ χωρὶς ἀνταποδόσεως φράζεται [comparison is the juxtaposition of something similar, for example, ‘like birds’ (*Il.* 3.2). It differs from simile because in most cases it is expressed concisely and without the second part that correlates the simile to the narrative context]. On ἀνταπόδοσις, see Nünlist 2009, 283–284.

57. Nünlist 2009, 284–285, suggests that, while παραβολή is the marked term designating long similes, the word εἰκὼν is an unmarked term that can both indicate short and long similes. On this figure and the terminological problems in ancient theorists, see also McCall 1969; Lausberg 1998, §§ 422–425, 558, 843–847.

The terminology in the scholia is equally puzzling.⁵⁸ In the Aristonicus scholia, whereas I could not find instances of παράδειγμα meaning exemplum, both εἰκῶν (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 10.5a) and παραβολή (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 6.506–11a¹; 22.31) are used, as well as ὁμοίωσις (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 14.394a¹), and the verbs εἰκάζω (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.87a) and ὁμοιόω (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 12.463a). If Aristonicus preserves the original terminology,⁵⁹ Aristarchus probably did not make such subtle distinctions, but employed all these terms as synonyms to indicate a simile or comparison. In particular, in almost all the places where these words are used they all refer to a long simile, with the sole exception of *Sch. Il.* 12.463a, where the verb ὁμοιόω refers to a short simile. The impression is that, while Aristarchus clearly distinguished between metaphors and long similes, he was more ambiguous about short similes, as the latter were identical to metaphors except for the presence of the introductory ὥς or the postpositive ὥς, which, however, could be omitted. This conclusion is consistent with the fact that Aristarchus seems to have agreed with Aristotle in considering short similes as closely connected with metaphors; this cannot hold for long similes, however, since they can never be reduced to metaphors, making them a different trope. In this section, therefore, I will review Aristarchus' analysis of long similes only.

In many cases where Aristarchus discusses Homeric similes, he limits his analysis to their meaning, often providing a complete or partial paraphrase of them.⁶⁰ He is surprisingly precise (nearing obsession) in explaining the details of similes involving natural phenomena or specific human activities. For example, Book 3 opens with a simile in which the Trojans are compared to cranes crying when they migrate away from χειμῶν toward Africa (*Il.* 3.3–7). Aristarchus observes that by χειμῶν Homer does not mean the 'wintry season', but rather the 'wintry place of Thrace', because cranes do not wait until winter to migrate but do so before, when winter is expected (*Sch. Il.* 3.4a). In fact, here Aristarchus is probably wrong because in the simile χειμῶν can mean 'winter' without necessarily implying that cranes wait until winter to leave for Africa.⁶¹ Yet Herodotus (2.22.4) says that cranes spend winter in Africa; the historian's authoritative testimony might have triggered Aristarchus' comment.

Sometimes Aristarchus explains why a simile makes sense, focusing on the similarities that link the *comparandum* with the *comparatum*. In *Il.* 22.26–31, for example, Achilles running in the plain toward Hector is compared to the

58. On similes in the scholia, see Snipes 1988 and Nünlist 2009, 282–298, to whom one should refer for a more in-depth analysis of the question. I will limit my focus here to some specific cases analyzed by Aristarchus.

59. Yet it is telling that, for example, while *Sch. Il.* 14.394a¹ in the *Venetus A* uses ὁμοίωσις, *Sch. Il.* 14.394a² in T (= *Brit. Mus. Burney* 86) uses παραβολή.

60. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 11.494a; 11.559b; 12.285a; 16.633a. On Aristarchus and Homeric similes, cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 12–15.

61. Cf. Kirk 1985, 264–265.

Dog of Orion, which brings much ‘πυρετός’ to wretched mortals (l. 31). For Aristarchus, πυρετός is used here in the standard meaning (κυρίως) of ‘fever’ and not ‘heat’ (as some believed), because the point of the simile is that Achilles will bring evil to Hector as the Dog of Orion brings evil to humans (*Sch. Il.* 22.31: πρὸς γὰρ τὸ φθοροποιὸν ἢ παραβολή); for the simile to work, πυρετός must have a negative meaning—like ‘fever’—while ‘heat’ is not necessarily something negative.⁶² Likewise, Nestor pondering what to do is compared to the sea when it is shaken by winds and becomes dark (*Il.* 14.16–22) because the soul of those who are worried is similarly shaken and dark (*Sch. Il.* 14.16a).

The main function of long similes is to convey an idea more forcefully by using an analogy with something else that is known and more familiar to readers; as Aristarchus observes, ‘Homer makes his comparisons from what is known to everyone’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.364a: ὁ γὰρ Ὅμηρος ἀπὸ τῶν γινωσκομένων πᾶσι ποιεῖται τὰς ὁμοιώσεις). He recalls this principle to demonstrate that Mt. Olympus, mentioned in a simile, must be a reality known to readers, and thus it is the mountain in Macedonia and not a faraway and mysterious heaven.⁶³ The category of ‘known’ elements includes the reality of the poet and the audience, but not necessarily that of the characters, and Aristarchus often notes that in similes Homer refers to habits or objects unknown to the heroes.⁶⁴ Indeed, the *comparatum* in a simile should be understandable to the readers, not to the characters, and thus it must be taken from the ‘real’ world, not from the fictional one.

Often a simple simile is not able to express all the details that the poet wants to accentuate in the *comparandum*. Thus Homer can use more than one image, such as when he compares Ajax first to a lion for his unyielding courage (*Il.* 11.548–557), and then to a donkey for his endurance (*Il.* 11.558–562). Aristarchus accepts the two similes because they express different ideas, and criticizes Zenodotus’ athetesis of the first simile (*Sch. Il.* 11.548a).⁶⁵ In case of more than one simile, the most ‘intense’ one is often placed at the end in order to achieve a climactic effect. For example, in *Il.* 14.394–401, Homer says that the cries of Greeks and Trojans clashing against each other were stronger than the bellow of the waves of the sea upon the shore (ll. 394–395), than the roar of a fire burning a forest on the mountains (ll. 396–397), and than the shriek of the wind amid the oaks (ll. 398–399). Zenodotus, however, had a different order:

62. Aristarchus recalls this passage to support his reading οὔλιος ἀστήρ, ‘deadly star’ (rather than αὔλιος ἀστήρ, ‘star of the fold’), so to introduce another comparison between a ‘deadly’ hero (Hector this time) and the Dog in *Il.* 11.62–64 (*Sch. Il.* 11.62a¹; on which, see Chapter 5.3 § 1).

63. For this question, see Chapter 3.3.B § 4.4.

64. See *Sch. Il.* 15.679a (horseback riding); 18.219a.b^{1,2} (trumpets); 21.362a.b (boiled meat). All these scholia are discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 6. Cf. also Snipes 1988, 214–215; Nünlist 2009, 296.

65. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 15; Nickau 1977, 112–118. In *Sch. Il.* 11.559b, on the other hand, Aristarchus explains the point of the second simile with a paraphrase, making clear that it is not contradictory (*Sch. Il.* 11.559b: ὅτι δοκεῖ μάχεσθαι . . . ἀλλ’ ἔστι τοιοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον . . .).

Sch. Il. 14.394a¹ οὔτε θαλάσσης κῦμα τόσον: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος τούτων τῶν ὁμοιώσεων τὴν πρώτην (ll. 394–395) τρίτην τέταχεν. ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος τὰ ἐπιτατικώτερα <ὔστερα> λέγει. πάντων δὲ ἐπιτατικώτερον ἀνέμου φορά, ἥτις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κινεῖ, θάλασσαν καὶ πῦρ.

‘Nor so [loud roars] the wave of the sea’: because Zenodotus has put the first (ll. 394–395) of these comparisons [i.e., the sea, the fire, the wind] as third. But Homer [regularly] puts his more intense expressions later. And the rush of wind, which also moves all the rest, [namely,] the sea and the fire, is more intense than all [the rest].⁶⁶

By reading lines 394–395 after line 399, Zenodotus’ solution (first fire, then wind, and eventually sea) is wrong, as it disrupts the order of intensity, almost creating an anticlimax, which is the opposite of Homer’s style.

If similes aim at stressing particular elements or characteristics in a description, then they do not necessarily need to completely match the *comparandum* and *comparatum* in all the details. Aristarchus clearly explains this with reference to the simile that opens Book 10, when the groans of sleepless Agamemnon are compared to the thundering of Zeus (ll. 5–10). As he makes clear, Homer is drawing a parallel only between the sounds produced by Agamemnon and Zeus, not between the two of them: Agamemnon is not comparable to Zeus, but his groaning is, and this is the basis of the simile (*Sch. Il.* 10.5a).⁶⁷

The discussion about the real point of comparison in a simile is linked with the way the simile itself is expressed. Using Hermann Fränkel’s terminology, the first part of the simile (the *comparatum*) is the *Wie-Stück* (‘as’, ‘like’) and the second (the *comparandum*) is the *So-Stück* (‘so’), which the Greeks called ἀνταπόδοσις.⁶⁸ Linguistically, in Homeric Greek the *comparatum* is introduced most often by ὥς and the *comparandum* is introduced by ὡς. When the comparison focuses on quantity rather than quality, on the other hand, the *comparatum* is introduced by the adjective ὅσος and the *comparandum* by τό(σ)σος (or, more rarely, τοσοῦτος). Aristarchus discusses the difference between quality- and quantity-based similes and the question of whether it is possible to ‘mix’ these different introductory set expressions with reference to the long (and famous) simile in *Il.* 8.555–561, where Homer compares the fires in the camp of the Trojans to the stars that shine in the dark sky. Here the *Wie-Stück* is introduced by ὥς (l. 555) but the *So-Stück* is introduced by τόσσα (i.e., πυρά, l. 560). According to Aristarchus, this is incongruous (ἀκαταλλήλως), as ὥς focuses on the quality, highlighting

66. See also *Sch. Il.* 14.394a². Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 15.

67. Cf. Meijering 1987, 153; Nünlist 2009, 289.

68. Fränkel 1977, 4; cf. also Nünlist 2009, 283. On ἀνταπόδοσις, see also footnote 56 above.

the identity of brilliance between the stars and the fires, while τόσσα expresses the quantity, highlighting that there are as many fires as the stars (*Sch. Il.* 8.560a: τὸ μὲν οὖν παραβολικὸν τὸ τῆς ἀντεικασίας ἔχει, τὸ δ' ἀνταποδιδόμενον τὸ τοῦ πλήθους). For this reason, some scholars changed the second part and read ὥς τὰ (πυρά); Aristarchus, however, seems to accept the incongruity and simply tries to explain how to understand the simile.⁶⁹

Similes are thus a great device that poets have to embellish their poetry and give it more force;⁷⁰ they should only be employed when appropriate, though, and not be overused. In particular, similes and metaphors should be avoided when the image they convey does not fit the context, because otherwise the result is frigidity (τὸ ψυχρόν, according to Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1406b5–8 and 24–26). An example is the simile at the end of Book 8 which we have just discussed, in which the fires of the Trojans in the night are compared to shining stars, ‘and all the peaks and the tops of the headlands appear, and the glens; and endless air opens up from the sky’ (*Il.* 8.557–558). The same two lines come back in another simile in Book 16, when Patroclus and the Myrmidons coming out of their camp against the Trojans are compared to when Zeus scatters the clouds, and all the mountains appear and the clear sky suddenly breaks open (*Il.* 16.297–302). According to Aristarchus, this image, which conveys the idea of the force and unexpectedness of the event, is appropriate when applied to Patroclus and the Myrmidons, who suddenly dispel the Trojans like clouds (*Sch. Il.* 16.299–300). On the other hand, it is less fitting in Book 8 when it refers to fires in the night: ‘for there [i.e., in Book 16] he wants to have a sudden shining when Patroclus appears suddenly; here, instead, he wants to have a protracted stillness in the air with fair weather’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.557a). Therefore Aristarchus athetizes lines 557–558 of Book 8.⁷¹

5. Allegory (ἀλληγορία)

With the term ἀλληγορία, Tryphon means a figurative expression close to metaphor.⁷² This meaning has been preserved by modern scholars, who often

69. See also Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 8.560b and Nicanor in *Sch. Il.* 2.469–72. The pair ὅσος/τόσος is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 14.400a (Nic.). Both cases are treated by Nünlist 2009, 286–287; cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 14; Lührs 1992, 221–222 (both on *Sch. Il.* 8.560a).

70. On the ability of metaphors and similes to give αὔξεις and ἔμφασις, see below, § 17.

71. Cf. Roemer 1912, 248–249; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 459–460; Nickau 1977, 120–122; Lührs 1992, 219–222; West 2001, 204–205. For another case of unfitting simile athetized by Aristarchus, see *Sch. Il.* 22.199–201a; 22.199–201b (ex. [Ariston.]); cf. Erbse, ad loc.

72. Tryph. ii § 1: ἀλληγορία ἐστὶ φράσις ἕτερον μὲν τι <κυρίως> δηλοῦσα, ἑτέρου δὲ ἔννοιαν παριστῶσα [allegory is an expression which literally indicates one thing but suggests the idea of another]. See also Tryph. i 193.9–11.

define allegory as ‘a metaphor sustained for the length of a whole sentence.’⁷³ Aristarchus probably used the term in this sense too, as is suggested by the two Aristonicus scholia where the word occurs. One of them comments on *Il.* 8.191–195, when Hector urges his horses to help him to take Nestor’s shield and Diomedes’ breastplate. According to Aristarchus, ‘from the armor he makes reference to the men’ – because here Hector mentions an attribute (the shield and the breastplate) to indicate the person to which this attribute belongs. Perhaps for Aristarchus this was a synecdoche (see below, § 6), but it was certainly not an allegory, as he concisely states (*Sch. Il.* 8.195a: ἀπὸ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀναφέρεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλληγορία).⁷⁴

On the other hand, an allegory occurs in *Il.* 13.358–360, when Homer comments on Zeus and Poseidon, each helping the Trojans and the Greeks respectively: ‘Pulling alternatively the rope (πεῖραρ) of violent Strife and cruel War, they [i.e., Zeus and Poseidon] stretched it over both [armies], [a rope that was] unbreakable and indissoluble and which loosed the knees of many men.’⁷⁵ Aristarchus notes the trope (*Sch. Il.* 13.359a: ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι παραλληγορεῖ)⁷⁶ and explains that Homer is representing the two ends of a rope, one with Strife and the other with War, as attached to both armies.⁷⁷ A similar paraphrase is also offered in the first part of the scholium, attributed to Didymus:

Sch. Il. 13.359a (Did.) πεῖραρ ἐπαλλάξαντες <ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέροισι τάνυσσαν>: διχῶς Ἀρίσταρχος, καὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοισιν. ἐν δὲ δι’ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ λεγόμενον ὅτι ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς τὸν πόλεμον τῇ ἔριδι συνέδησαν, τὸ πέρας τῆς ἔριδος καὶ πάλιν τὸ τοῦ πολέμου λαβόντες καὶ ἐπαλλάξαντες ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέροις, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ἄμματα ποιοῦντες, τόδε ἐπὶ τόδε. οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος.

‘Pulling alternatively the rope (πεῖραρ), they stretched it on both [armies]’: Aristarchus [has] both readings, [ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέροισι] and ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοισιν. And

73. So Lausberg 1998, § 895.

74. Cf. Hahn 1967, 43.

75. *Il.* 13.358–360: τοὶ δ’ ἔριδος κρατερῆς καὶ ὁμοίου πτολέμοιο / πεῖραρ ἐπαλλάξαντες ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέροισι τάνυσσαν / ἄρρηκτόν τ’ ἄλυτόν τε, τὸ πολλῶν γούνατ’ ἔλυσεν.

76. The proposal ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι <οὐ> παραλληγορεῖ by Wachsmuth 1860, 30 n. 3, is wrong (see Erbse, ad loc.).

77. Aristarchus intends πεῖραρ, which means ‘rope’ but also ‘end’, ‘limit’, as meaning ‘end of the rope’: one end has Strife attached to it and the other end has War attached to it. His explanation has been criticized by van der Valk 1963–1964, II 97–99, followed by Michel 1971, 55–56; on van der Valk’s analysis, see Holwerda 1967, 181–182, and Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 13.359; on this difficult passage, see also Heubeck 1949, 251. Crates also interpreted the passage figuratively, but differently from Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 13.358–60b [ex.]). For the problems related to the reconstruction of Crates’ opinion, see Broggiato 2001, 173–175 (fr. 18). According to Porter 1992, 97 n. 80, here Crates “takes a ‘literalist’ stance, while Aristarchus, faced with an overt allegory in Homer’s text, gets himself entangled in evasive maneuvers”.

the meaning with both readings is the same, that Poseidon and Zeus tied together War with Strife, taking the end [of the rope] of Strife and that of War and crossing them over both [armies], like those who make knots, one over the other. So Aristarchus.

While Aristarchus recognized the trope of allegory, that is, figurative language, and accepted it as a legitimate stylistic feature in Homer, he refused to acknowledge allegorical interpretation (*allegoresis*).⁷⁸ For him, when Homer was speaking through images (allegory), the role of the exegete was to interpret those images, and this was a legitimate operation, as it was required by the text itself. It was a different situation altogether when Homer did not speak by ‘riddles’ or images, but was speaking very clearly—and only later interpreters turned this simple phrasing into a ‘hidden truth’ through allegorical interpretations (*allegoresis*).⁷⁹ The *locus classicus* for analyzing Aristarchus’ attitude toward *allegoresis* is a D scholium to *Il.* 5.385:

Sch. D Il. 5.385 τλῇ μὲν Ἄρης: Ἀρίσταρχος ἀξιοῖ τὰ φραζόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ μυθικώτερον ἐκδέχεσθαι κατὰ ποιητικὴν ἐξουσίαν, μηδὲν ἔξω τῶν φραζομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ περιεργαζομένους.

‘And Ares suffered’: Aristarchus thinks that [readers] should take what is said by the poet more as a fiction, according to poetic license, without bothering with anything beyond what is said by the poet.⁸⁰

Poetry should be read literally and as a fictional plot (μῦθος), without making the poet say things that he did not say.⁸¹ Hence, ‘allegory’ (a trope used by

78. On allegorical readings and symbolism in antiquity, see Wehrli 1928; Buffière 1956; Long 1992 (on Stoicism and allegory); Lamberton 1992 (on Neoplatonism and allegory); the contributions collected by Boys-Stones 2003, Part II; Struck 2004; Bouchard 2016, 29–83.

79. Cf. Lausberg 1998, § 900. On Aristarchus’ attitude toward allegory and *allegoresis*, see, most recently, Cucchiarelli 1997; Nünlist 2011 (who discusses *Sch. Il.* 13.359a at pp. 113–114); Bouchard 2016, 86–99 (who discusses *Sch. Il.* 13.359a at pp. 92–95).

80. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 34; Roemer 1924, 153–154; Meijering 1987, 65; van Thiel 2014a, I 443; and especially Struck 2004, 21–22, 69, and Nünlist 2011, 105–109. The latter also discusses Eust. 561.28–30 (ad *Il.* 5.395–400); cf. also Eust. 3.18–29 (*Proemium*). While I agree with Nünlist’s conclusions that Aristarchus’ statement might not necessarily be directed against *allegoresis* only (Nünlist 2011, 109), it certainly includes *allegoresis*, which is my reason for quoting and discussing it here (see also the next footnote). In her recent study, Bouchard 2016, 86–99, who discusses this scholium as well as the same passage of Eustathius, reaches conclusions very similar to mine.

81. If the words are original, it is significant that Aristarchus here highlights the fact that poetry is a μῦθος, ‘fictional plot’; Aristarchus is again following Aristotle’s lead in claiming that poetry is fiction, not reality (see Chapter 3.6.A § 3) or history (see Chapter 3.3.B § 7). The emphasis on the ‘fictionality’ of poetry is closely connected with the rejection of *allegoresis*, which, on the contrary,

poets) is legitimate, but ‘*allegoresis*’ (an interpretative method used by exegetes) is not. This distinction is explained by Eustathius, when commenting on the image of Apollo shooting arrows at the Greek camp (*Il.* 1.44–52):

Eust. 40.25–34 (ad *Il.* 1.46): ὁ δὲ μῦθος οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον περιεργαζόμενος λέγει σωματικώτερον, ὅτι τε φαρέτραν ὁ Ἀπόλλων ἐνάπτεται καὶ τόξον χειρίζεται καὶ οἷστον ἀφίησι καὶ βάλλει καὶ οἱ βαλλόμενοι πίπτουσι καὶ πυκναὶ πυραὶ αὐτῶν καίονται. ἃ δὲ καὶ ἀποδέχεται Ἀρίσταρχος, ὥς φασιν οἱ παλαιοί. ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὥς καὶ προείρηται, οὐδὲν τι τῶν παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ ἀλληγορεῖν ἤθελεν, οἷον τὸν Δία εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀνάγειν ἢ ἥλιον ἢ ἀέρα ἢ νοῦν, Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ εἰς φρόνησιν ἢ γῆν ἢ αἰθέρα, Ἥραν δὲ εἰς ἀέρα ἢ βασιλείαν, Ἄρην δὲ εἰς θυμὸν ἢ πόλεμον καὶ Ἥφαιστον εἰς πῦρ καὶ ἄλλους εἰς ἄλλα· ἀλλὰ πάντα κατὰ τὸ προφερόμενον καὶ προφαινόμενον τοῦ μύθου ἐνόει. εἰ δὲ καὶ τρόπος ποιητικὸς ἢ ἀλληγορία, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνος ἀλληγορίαν ῥητορικὴν ἐνόει, τουτέστι σχῆμά τι ῥητορικὸν ἀλληγορίαν οὕτω καλούμενον, περὶ οὗ ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθήσεται . . . 40.38–40 (ad *Il.* 1.47) ὅτι γὰρ λοιμώδης νόσος ἦν ἢ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοξεία κατὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ὅτι τοῦ τοιοῦτου κακοῦ αὐτὸς αἴτιος, πάντες οἱ παλαιοὶ φασι. καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἢ ἀλληγορία.

The story without making too much of this says in a fairly concrete way that Apollo touches the quiver, handles the bow, shoots an arrow, and strikes, and that those who have been struck fall and many pyres burn for them. And this is what also Aristarchus accepts, as the ancients say. For, as has already been said, he did not want to interpret allegorically anything of what is to be found in Homer, for example, to reduce Zeus to sky, sun, air, or mind; or [to reduce] Athena to wisdom, earth, or aether, or Hera to air or monarchy, or Ares to courage or war, or Hephaestus to fire, and the other [gods] to other [abstract ideas]. But he understood everything according to what has been already shown and said beforehand in the story. And even though allegory is a poetic trope, he [only] considered rhetorical allegory, that is: the rhetorical figure called ‘*allegory*’ which we will discuss below . . . for all the ancients say that Apollo’s use of the bow against the Greeks represented the plague and that the god himself was the reason for such a pestilence. And so this is allegory.

In this scene of Book 1, Apollo has a figurative sense because the poet here means the plague, but uses a ‘mythical image’ to express it. Aristarchus accepts the identification of Apollo with the plague as a poetic trope (or figure, as Eusta-

connects poetry and reality (see Chapter 6 § 6). Cf. also Meijering 1987, 72–73, who, on the other hand, insists on the difference between the Aristotelian meaning of μῦθος, which technically indicates the ‘plot’ of a drama or an epic, and the Hellenistic meaning (i.e., Aristarchus’ meaning) of ‘fabulous story’. But I think that the two uses of the word are closer than they may seem.

thus calls it, defining it ‘rhetorical allegory’).⁸² On the other hand, he rejects the identification of the Homeric gods with physical elements, as this is extratextual *allegoresis*, not justified by the text or by the narrative.⁸³

6. Synecdoche (τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους)

In the Aristonicus scholia, synecdoche is labeled with the formula τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους, ‘the whole from the part’, a phrase also used to describe some specific types of synecdoche by Tryphon i, Tryphon ii, and other similar treatises.⁸⁴ According to Tryphon ii (§ 7), for example, there are four types of synecdoche:

1. The whole from the part (ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ ὅλον): for example, ‘white-armed Hera’ (*Il.* 1.55 al.), to mean that Hera’s entire complexion is white.
2. The part from the whole (ἀπὸ ὅλου τὸ μέρος): for example, ‘dry bulls’ (*Il.* 12.137), to mean shields (because they are made of bull’s hides).
3. What precedes logically from the consequence (ἀπὸ συμβαίνοντος τὸ προηγούμενον): for example, ‘they sat and made the water white with their polished oars of fir wood’ (*Od.* 12.172), to mean that they rowed (and the water became white as a consequence).
4. The proper object from the symbol (ἀπὸ συμβόλου τὸ κύριον): for example, ‘scepter’ (*Il.* 9.38), to mean royal power.

Tryphon i (195.27–196.11) provides almost the same list along with the same examples,⁸⁵ but also adds:

5. The consequence from what precedes logically (ἀπὸ τοῦ προηγούμενου τὸ ἀκόλουθον); for example, to say ‘lives’ (*Il.* 1.3), to mean living men (*Il.* 1.3).⁸⁶
6. The finished product from the material (ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα); for example, ‘gold’ (*Il.* 8.43), to mean the ‘golden armor’.

82. On this passage, see Cucchiarelli 1997, 216–219. The confusion between tropes and figures in ancient scholarship has been addressed above, at § 1.

83. These identifications were dear, for example, to Crates; see Chapter 3.4 § 7 and Chapter 6 § 6.

84. Tryph. i 195.27–196.11; Tryph. ii § 7; Cocond. *Trop.* 236.27–237.25; Anon. *Trop.* 209.24–210.25; [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 22; *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 460.30–461.2.

85. Except for the last one (ἀπὸ συμβόλου τὸ κύριον), which is absent in Tryphon i.

86. This is the opposite of the ἀπὸ συμβαίνοντος τὸ προηγούμενον (no. 3 in the list above), which Tryphon i (196.10) also lists, but calls ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκολουθίου τὸ προηγούμενον.

This last example is also discussed by Aristarchus, who in *Sch. Il.* 8.43a remarks that in ‘he put on the gold (χρυσόν) around his body’, χρυσόν is used ἀντὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ πανοπλίαν. Unlike Tryphon i, however, Aristarchus does not seem to identify it as a specific kind of synecdoche. The only formula common in the Aristonicus scholia for the synecdoche is τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους, used for example to explain that the ζῶμα, a ‘loincloth’ under the ‘corselet’ (θώραξ) can occur alone to indicate the entire corselet ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ ὅλον (*Sch. Il.* 4.187a).⁸⁷ Similarly, Homer can speak of ‘Sidon’ to mean ‘Phoenicia’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.291b: ὅτι ἀπὸ μιᾶς πόλεως τῆς Σιδῶνος τὴν Φοινίκην σημαίνει).

The trope ‘the whole from the part’ is at the center of a discussion concerning *Il.* 1.3 and 11.55. The latter line reads ‘[the son of Cronus was about] to send to Hades many valiant heads (ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς)’, on which Aristarchus remarks as follows:

Sch. Il. 11.55b κεφαλὰς: ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν γράφειν ‘κεφαλὰς’ οὐδὲν κωλύει, περιφραστικῶς ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ὅλων σημεινομένων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἰλιάδος προοίμιον (*Il.* 1.3) οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἐπιφερομένου τοῦ ‘αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐλώρια’ (*Il.* 1.4).

‘Heads’: because nothing prevents writing κεφαλὰς here, since the whole is meant from the part with a periphrasis, but in the proem of the *Iliad* this is not allowed, because ‘[it made] them prey (αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐλώρια)’ follows.⁸⁸

At *Il.* 11.55 ‘heads’ works because it can indicate the heroes’ corpses, with a periphrasis⁸⁹ using the part (‘heads’) to mean the whole (‘bodies’). The same reading is wrong, however, in the proem of the *Iliad*, where the vulgate has

[Achilles’ wrath which] sent to Hades many valiant lives (ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς) / of heroes (ἡρώων); and made them (αὐτοὺς δέ) prey for dogs / and every bird (*Il.* 1.3–5).

From another scholium we know that Apollonius Rhodius did indeed read κεφαλὰς instead of ψυχὰς in *Il.* 1.3 (*Sch. Il.* 1.3b¹ [Did.?).⁹⁰ But this is wrong

87. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 4.135; 4.216. On the different parts of the armor, see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.1.

88. See also Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 11.55a^{1,2}.

89. Aristarchus does not seem to have recognized ‘periphrasis’ as an autonomous trope, as listed by Tryph. ii § 10 and Tryph. i 197.3–8. In fact, while there is no occurrence of the noun περίφρασις in the Aristonicus scholia to the *Iliad*, the only occurrences of the adverb περιφραστικῶς are in *Sch. Il.* 1.3b² and 11.55b, which I discuss here, and in *Sch. Il.* 5.189, which observes that the phrase ‘through the corselet’s hollow’ (διὰ θώρακος γυάλοιο) is used περιφραστικῶς to indicate the concave part of the corselet. Thus, in all these three cases, the word indicates a synecdoche. As Lausberg 1998, §§ 907–908, explains, a synecdoche can become a ‘periphrasis of ideas’ or a ‘thought-periphrasis’.

90. Ap. Rh., fr. 13. *Sch. Il.* 1.3b², which Erbse ascribes to Aristonicus, mentions the variant but

for Aristarchus because, unlike in *Il.* 11.55, synecdoche cannot be applied to *Il.* 1.3–4. The reason is that Homer clearly distinguishes here between the vital spirits (ψυχάς), which go to Hades, and the bodies (indicated by the pronoun αὐτούς), which remain on the battlefield and are the prey of dogs and birds.⁹¹ Because of the contrast between vital spirits and corpses (which is absent in *Il.* 11.55), in *Il.* 1.3 it is wrong to replace ψυχάς with κεφαλάς since ‘heads’ can only mean ‘bodies’ by synecdoche. Apollonius’ reading thus removed the contrast, also resulting in nonsense: ‘(which) sent to Hades many valiant heads (= bodies) of heroes and made them themselves prey for dogs and every bird’. Corpses cannot go to Hades and at the same time be prey of animals.⁹² Tryphon i (196.7–9) lists *Il.* 1.3–4 as an example of συνεκδοχή ἀπὸ τοῦ προηγουμένου τὸ ἀκόλουθον, that is, the trope by which one infers the ‘the consequence from what precedes logically’. By mentioning ‘life’ (the primary meaning of the word ψυχή in Homer), we should understand what follows logically from combining life with the corpse, i.e., the living man. It would be tempting to suppose that this comment, too, stems from Aristarchus, who, while rejecting one synecdoche (κεφαλάς for ‘bodies’) in *Il.* 1.3–4, understood ψυχάς as another: the preceding element (ψυχή, ‘life’) was used to mean the consequence (‘living men’), which was then contrasted with the ‘dead bodies’.

7. Litotes and Irony (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον)

The formula ‘contrary from contrary’ (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον) is frequently used in the Aristonicus scholia. It also occurs in treatises about tropes,

attributes it to anonymous τινές. Cf. van Thiel 2014a, I 43–44.

91. Similar is the comment in *Sch. Il.* 1.4a ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δέ: . . . καὶ πρὸς τὰς ψυχὰς ἀντιδιέσταλκε τὸ ‘αὐτοὺς δέ’ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων [‘of heroes (ἡρώων), and [made] them (αὐτοὺς δέ) [prey for dogs]: . . . and with reference to ‘ψυχάς’, he has distinguished αὐτοὺς δέ, [which indicates] the bodies]. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 24.

92. At *Il.* 7.330, where Homer speaks again of ‘souls going down to Hades’, Aristarchus recalls the question of *Il.* 1.3 to prove that his solution is correct (*Sch. Il.* 7.330b¹²: ὅτι συμφώνως τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ‘πολλὰς δ’ ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς’ οὐκ ἄρα γραπτέον ‘κεφαλὰς’). Cf. Kirk 1985, 53. Zenodotus (still *Sch. Il.* 1.4a) athetized lines 4–5; cf. Duentzer 1848, 178; Pfeiffer 1968, 111–112. We do not know which reading Zenodotus accepted, but if he read κεφαλάς, the athetesis of lines 4–5 might have been a way to avoid the very problem that Aristarchus opposes with his reading. This scenario (i.e., a text with κεφαλάς at l. 3 and without ll. 4–5) is suggested for Apollonius Rhodius by Pfeiffer 1968, 147–148, and Rengakos 1993, 50; cf. West 2001, 173. Even if Zenodotus read ψυχάς, though, he might have had some problems with the distinction between ‘souls’ and ‘bodies’ in lines 3–4 and might have wanted to make the text easier by eliminating one of the two. Aristarchus rejects the athetesis because without these lines the proem would become κόλον, ‘hornless’, i.e., lacking something (*Sch. Il.* 1.4a: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος τοὺς δύο ἀθετεῖ. γίνεται δὲ τὸ προοίμιον κόλον).

where it describes two different phenomena which we distinguish today: litotes, i.e., when one negates an idea to express its opposite,⁹³ and irony, i.e., when one expresses oneself so as to imply the opposite of what is said.⁹⁴ Probably such terminology was associated with both stylistic devices because, though formally different and used with different purposes, they are based on the same idea: that the speaker voices the opposite idea (τὸ ἐναντίον) to convey a certain meaning, either by denying it (litotes) or by leaving to the audience to ‘solve the riddle’ (irony).

Ancient handbooks define these two tropes in very similar ways and often their definitions blend. While they use the term ‘irony’ (εἰρωνεία), they ignore ‘litotes’, but rather call it ἐναντίωσις⁹⁵ or ἀντίφρασις.⁹⁶ In particular, Tryphon i opposes ἀντίφρασις, which is ‘an expression of contrary through contrary without pretension [i.e., without simulating a different attitude]’, to εἰρωνεία, which is ‘an expression of contrary through contrary with some pretension in character.’⁹⁷ The difference between irony and antiphrasis/litotes is that in the former the speaker ‘simulates’ an attitude opposite to the one he or she really has.

The Aristonicus scholia use the formula ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον most often to indicate litotes.⁹⁸ For example, *Il.* 1.330, ‘Achilles was not glad (οὐδ’ . . . γήθησεν) seeing the two of them’, is the *locus classicus* quoted by rhetorical treatises for this trope: an exegetical scholium recognizes it as an antiphrasis (*Sch. Il.* 1.330b: ὁ τρόπος ἀντίφρασις), while Aristarchus simply notes that ‘contrary must be understood from contrary’ (*Sch. Il.* 1.330a: ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον ἀκουστέον). Other examples labeled in this way are the

93. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 586–588.

94. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 582–585.

95. Tryph. ii § 19: ἐναντίωσις ἐστὶ λέξις διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ ἐναντίον κατὰ ἀποβολὴν δηλοῦσα, ὡς τὸ ‘τὼ δ’ οὐκ ἄκοντε πετέσθην’ (*Il.* 5.366), ἀντὶ τοῦ οἱ δὲ ἐκόντες ἐπετάσθησαν [contrariety is an expression that indicates contrary through contrary by denying it, such as ‘and the two [horses] not unwillingly sped up’ (*Il.* 5.366), instead of ‘they eagerly sped up’]. See also *Alex. Fig.* 37.30–38.7; *Zon. Fig.* 169.32–170.2, who both use ἀντενατίωσις.

96. Tryph. i 204.3–18 (partly reported in the next footnote); *Cocond. Trop.* 233.10–20; [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 25. Both Tryphon i and Cocondrius consider ἀντίφρασις both litotes proper and also what we would call ‘euphemism’ (e.g., calling the Erinyes ‘σεμναὶ θεαί’ or ‘Eumenides’). In other treatises, however, ἀντίφρασις seems closer to irony (the examples are calling a poor man ‘rich’, a blind man ‘someone who sees’); see also Tryph. ii § 18; *Anon. Trop.* 212.6–8; [Choerob.] *Trop.* 251.4–7. On the lack of the term ‘litotes’ among Greek grammarians and rhetoricians and the terminology they used, see Donnelly 1930, 137–138; Lausberg 1998, §§ 587 and 904.

97. Tryph. i 204.4–5: ἀντίφρασις ἐστὶ λέξις διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου . . . τὸ ἐναντίον παριστῶσα χωρὶς ὑποκρίσεως [antiphrasis is an expression that presents contrary through contrary . . . without pretension]; and Tryph. i 205.2–3: εἰρωνεία ἐστὶ λόγος διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον μετὰ τινος ἠθικῆς ὑποκρίσεως δηλῶν [irony is a way of speaking which indicates contrary through contrary with some pretension in character]. On ‘irony’, see also Tryph. ii § 15; [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 68; *Cocond. Trop.* 235.19–236.19, as well as *Hsch.* ε 1074.

98. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 16.

expression οὐκ ἄκοντε, ‘not unwilling’, hence ‘eager’ (*Sch. Il.* 11.281), or phrases like ‘so that his shot was not feeble’ (*Sch. Il.* 12.458b) and ‘he was not angered [at seeing them]’ (*Sch. Il.* 15.155a). The same idea underlies another scholium to *Il.* 15.11, where Hector is short of breath and vomits blood after Ajax has struck him with a stone (*Il.* 14.402–437, 15.9–11). Homer comments on the scene by saying ‘not the weakest (οὐ . . . ἀφαιρότατος) of the Achaeans had hit him’:

Sch. Il. 15.11b οὐ μιν ἀφαιρότατος: ὅτι τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπακουστέον, ἀλλ’ ἰσχυρότατος· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πλήρους ἀποδέδωκεν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ‘δός, φίλος, οὐ γὰρ μοι δοκέεις ὁ κάκιστος Ἀχαιῶν / ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ’ ὥριστος’ (*Od.* 17.415–416).

‘Not the weakest [of the Achaeans had hit] him’: because we must understand the contrary, the strongest. For he did not say it in full form like in ‘friend, give me [some food]; for you do not seem to be the basest of the Achaeans, but rather the noblest’ (*Od.* 17.415–416).

Aristarchus’ point is that *Il.* 15.11 is different from *Od.* 17.415–416. In the latter passage, Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, asks Antinous for some food and addresses him by saying that he does not look like the basest man (ὁ κάκιστος) but rather the best (ὥριστος), so that the meaning is straightforward. Had Odysseus stopped before and just said ‘you do not seem the basest man’ (οὐ . . . ὁ κάκιστος), this would have been litotes. In this case, however, the opposite idea is also spelled out. In *Il.* 15.11, instead, Homer just denies the opposite concept, in a true litotes.⁹⁹

Finally, in one case the label ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον is applied to something which is certainly not litotes. In *Il.* 22.41–42, Priam is watching his son Hector outside on the plain and curses Achilles: ‘I wish he were loved by the gods as he is by me!’ This is not litotes as there is no negation of the opposite concept. Rather, the meaning Priam wants to express is exactly the contrary of what he is saying: Achilles is certainly not loved by him, but hated. This is irony. Aristonicus notes that ‘some’ mark the passage as it says contrary from contrary (*Sch. Il.* 22.41a: σημειοῦνται τινες ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον δεδήλωται).¹⁰⁰ As discussed above, Tryphon and other treatises on tropes under the label of ‘contrary through contrary’ (διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον) define both litotes and irony. If Aristarchus is included in the τινές, then he agreed with Tryphon and ancient lists of tropes. If instead τινές does not include Aristarchus,¹⁰¹ one

99. On litotes in Homer, see Donnelly 1930.

100. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.41b (ex. [Ariston.]).

101. On the question of τινές in the scholia by Aristonicus, see Chapter 1.1 § 4.1.

could speculate that he employed the phrase ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον for litotes only, but objected to the use of this formula for irony. Since this is the only case of ‘irony’ defined as ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον in the Aristarchean scholia, the question remains open.

8. Antithesis (ἀντικειμένως)

The case of *Odyssey* 17.415–416 discussed above shows that a poet can express an idea and deny its opposite *at the same time*. This trope, according to which one can say ‘not x, but y’ was accepted by Aristarchus as a fuller form of litotes (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον).¹⁰² One can, however, also say ‘y, not x’. This trope is not listed by Tryphon; however, Pseudo-Herodian (*Fig.* § 46) mentions the use of phrases like ‘wealth, not poverty’ and ‘cowardice, not virtue’ as one type of ἀντίθεσις, which happens ‘when antithetical words are used’ (ὅταν ἀντικείμενα ὀνόματα λαμβάνηται).¹⁰³ Aristarchus does not seem to have used the name ἀντίθεσις, but he recognized this construction and probably labeled it with the adverb ‘antithetically’ (ἀντικειμένως), which recalls Pseudo-Herodian’s definition reported above. In the Aristonicus scholia the term ἀντικειμένως is used at *Il.* 13.343–344, when Homer says: ‘bold of heart would have been the man who, seeing such a toil, would have rejoiced and not grieved (γηθήσειεν . . . οὐδ’ ἀκάχοιτο)’. Aristarchus singles out the antithetical statement and seems to consider it part of the Homeric usage (*Sch. Il.* 13.344: καὶ ὅτι ἀντικειμένως ἀποδέδωκεν ‘οὐδ’ ἀκάχοιτο’, πρὸς τὸ σύνηθες). The other case where this trope/figure is mentioned in the Aristonicus scholia concerns *Il.* 14.416: ‘no courage (οὐ περ . . . θράσος) any longer possesses anyone who looks at it’. This is litotes, not antithesis.¹⁰⁴ Aristarchus, however, notes that ‘no . . . courage’ must be supplemented with ‘but fear’ (*Sch. Il.* 14.416: ὅτι τὸ ἀντικείμενον δεῖ ὑπακοῦειν ‘ἀλλὰ δέος’). The comment then must be understood as stating that Homer, as he typically does, denies the contrary of what he wants to say, without adding a positive part, which we, the readers, must supplement.¹⁰⁵ In other words,

102. In later treatises this is called ἐπιτίμησις or ‘correction’. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 784–785.1.

103. See also *Alex. Fig.* 36.26–37.13; *Anon. Fig.* 186.16–25. Cf. Lausberg 1998, § 791.

104. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 14.416, considers it similar to *Sch. Il.* 1.330a and 11.281, discussed above (§ 7) as examples of litotes.

105. On Nestor’s words at *Il.* 9.76–77 (‘since the enemies near our ships kindle many fires; who could rejoice at that?’) Aristonicus notes (*Sch. Il.* 9.77a): προσυπακουστέον τὸ {ὄρων καὶ βλέπων γελάση} καὶ οὐ μὴ μᾶλλον θρηνήσει καὶ κόπεται [it must be understood ‘and he will not rather wail and mourn’]. Lehrs, who expunged {ὄρων καὶ βλέπων γελάση}, suggested reading προσυπακουστέον τὸ <ἐναντίον> or τὸ <ἀντικείμενον> (cf. Erbse, ad loc.). If this was the original

the addition of the antithetical idea (τὸ ἀντικείμενον) here is used to explain a more concise and elliptical expression: litotes. To conclude, these scholia, and especially *Sch. Il.* 15.11b and *Sch. Il.* 13.344, seem to suggest that Aristarchus *did* differentiate among the following different tropes:

1. ‘Not X’, to mean the opposite Y (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον), which was very common in Homer.
2. ‘Not X, but Y’, which for him was a fuller form (ἐκ πλήρους) of the above, equally used by Homer.
3. ‘Y, not X’, which was also used in Homer, even though Aristarchus seems to have noticed it much more rarely (probably because it was a more standard way of expression, not in need of any explanation).

If the wording of the Aristonicus scholia is original, then we might assume that Aristarchus’ terminology was still fluid, and so he could use τὸ ἀντικείμενον and τὸ ἐναντίον as synonyms, even if the latter seems to be the most common.

9. ‘Side by Side’ Construction (παραλλήλως, ἐκ παραλλήλου)

Homer likes to use synonyms, that is, semantically equivalent words within the same sentence in order to amplify the meaning. Tryphon does not list this phenomenon among tropes, but Pseudo-Herodian calls it the ἐκ παραλλήλου construction, to mean that some equivalent words are used ‘side by side’.¹⁰⁶ Aristarchus, too, noticed pairs of two equivalent words ‘side by side’ in Homer, and the Aristonicus scholia label them παραλλήλως or ἐκ παραλλήλου just like Pseudo-Herodian.¹⁰⁷ For example, since Homer normally uses χόλος,

comment, this note becomes very similar to *Sch. Il.* 14.416. A different solution to the scholium’s sense is now offered by van Thiel 2014a, II 84–85.

106. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 55 ἐκ παραλλήλου δέ, ὅταν δύο λέξεις ἐπάλληλοι τεθῶσι τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνουσαι, <ὥς> ‘δηθά τε καὶ δολιχόν’ (*Il.* 10.52), ταῦτ’ σημαίνουσι . . . [‘side by side’ [construction] is when two words which have the same meaning are placed one after the other, such as ‘for a long time and at length’ (*Il.* 10.52); they mean the same]. On the other hand, Tzetzes (*Ex. Il.* 66.13–14; 87.1–2) distinguishes between grammarians and poets, who call this figure ἐκ παραλλήλου, and rhetoricians, who call it περιγραφή.

107. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 19. The παραλλήλως construction implies not only the use of synonyms but also their close connection as a pair. For example, in *Il.* 17.649, αὐτίκα δ’ ἥερα μὲν σκέδασεν καὶ ἀπῶσεν ὁμίχλην [[Zeus] immediately scattered the haze and drove away the mist], Aristarchus does not define this as a παραλλήλως construction; he simply observes that ἀήρ and ὁμίχλη are synonyms (*Sch. Il.* 17.649), probably because here there are two synonymous clauses and not only two words of similar meaning.

‘gall’, alone to express the idea of μῆνις, ‘wrath’,¹⁰⁸ when χόλος and μῆνις occur together, they are employed ‘side by side’ (*Sch. Il.* 15.122a: ὅτι ἐκ παραλλήλου ὡς ἰσοδυναμοῦντα τὸν χόλον καὶ τὴν μῆνιν).¹⁰⁹ Similarly, in the phrase βάσκ’ ἴθι, a cluster usually translated as ‘go quickly’ to stress the force of these two imperatives both meaning ‘go!’, Aristarchus explains that the two verbs are equivalent and placed ‘side by side’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.8b: ὅτι παραλλήλως ‘βάσκε’ καὶ ‘ἴθι’. ἰσοδυναμοῦσι γὰρ αἱ λέξεις).¹¹⁰

In commenting on *Il.* 5.194, Aristarchus notes that Zenodotus seems to have been unaware of παραλλήλως constructions, so that he sometimes changed lines that he thought contained tautologies:

Sch. Il. 5.194a καλοὶ πρωτοπαγεῖς <νεοτευχέες>: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος μετέθηκεν ὡς ταυτολογοῦντος ‘πρωτοπαγεῖς νεοτευχέες’, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἐνίοτε παραλλήλως τάσσει τὰς ἰσοδυναμούσας λέξεις.

‘Beautiful [chariots], new-made (πρωτοπαγεῖς) and newly wrought (νεοτευχέες)’: because Zenodotus altered [the line] because he thought that ‘πρωτοπαγεῖς νεοτευχέες’ was a tautology, not realizing that [Homer] sometimes puts equivalent words side by side.¹¹¹

Some cases, however, do not exactly consist of synonyms placed ‘side by side’. For example, in *Il.* 16.60–62, when Achilles allows Patroclus to use his armor, he says: ‘it is certainly not possible always to be angry (κεχολῶσθαι) in one’s heart; yet I said I was not going to put an end to my anger (μηνιθμόν) sooner, but only when . . .’ Aristarchus comments that μηνιθμόν in line 62 is used παραλλήλως with χόλος, which presumably points to the verb κεχολῶσθαι in line 61 (*Sch. Il.* 16.62a).¹¹² But this is not a repetition of synonyms, as it involves two different parts of speech with different functions in the sentence, even if they belong to

108. See *Sch. Il.* 4.513a; 9.261b; 16.30b; 19.67b; 24.395a^{1.2}. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 132–133; Nünlist 2012c, 206.

109. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.62a (discussed below).

110. Synonyms placed ‘side by side’ singled out by Aristarchus are ἀπριάτην and ἀνάποινον (*Sch. Il.* 1.99a); τηλόθεν and ἐξ ἀπίνης γαίης (*Sch. Il.* 1.270a); ἤδη and ποτε (*Sch. Il.* 3.205b and also *Sch. Il.* 3.184a); ἐξείνισσα and φίλησα (*Sch. Il.* 3.207); νεώτεροι and ὀπλότεροι (*Sch. Il.* 4.324–5); γοόωσα and μυρομένη (*Sch. Il.* 6.373b); ἄν and κέν in the same clause (*Sch. Il.* 13.127a^{1.2}), δηρόν and χρόνον (*Sch. Il.* 14.206a); ἴδη and νοήση (*Sch. Il.* 24.337). Elsewhere, on the other hand, Aristarchus makes it clear that pairs which seem equivalent actually have different meanings, for example ψάμαθος and κόνις in *Il.* 9.385 (*Sch. Il.* 9.385a¹), λάθετο and οὐκ ἐνόησεν in *Il.* 9.537 (*Sch. Il.* 9.537a), and ταρβεῖ and φοβεῖται in *Il.* 12.46 (*Sch. Il.* 12.46a^{1.2}). In these cases, then, the trope is not present.

111. Zenodotus is also criticized in *Sch. Il.* 5.162a for not realizing that Homer has used a παραλλήλως construction even when the two synonyms indicate in fact genus and species; see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.9.

112. Cf. *Sch. Il.* 16.61b (ex.).

the same semantic field (that of ‘anger’). In one instance the label *παράλληλως* is applied to words that are not synonyms but the same verb with different meanings, in *Il.* 13.275–287: ‘what need do you have to recount (*λέγεσθαι*) these things? For if now all the best of us were chosen (*λεγοίμεθα*) besides the ships for an ambush . . . not even then would one blame your strength and your hands’. According to Aristarchus, *λέγεσθαι* and *λεγοίμεθα* are used *παράλληλως*. The verb is in fact the same,¹¹³ but with different (though etymologically connected) meanings since *λέγεσθαι* at line 275 means ‘to recount’, while *λεγοίμεθα* at line 276 means ‘to be counted among’, as Aristarchus himself recognizes (*Sch. Il.* 13.276–87: *παράλληλως τὸ ‘λεγοίμεθα’, ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοίμεθα, ποτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ διαλεγοίμεθα*).¹¹⁴ In modern terminology, this is a pun or *paronomasia*, stylistic devices which Aristarchus does not seem to have recognized; for him, this was just another ‘side by side’ construction. Similarly, in another case the adverb *παράλληλως* does not describe synonymous words but rather the same word in different cases, when the personal pronoun of the first-person dual is used in the genitive-dative (*νῶϊν*) and in the nominative-accusative (*νῶϊ*) in two consecutive lines (*Il.* 15.437–438). Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 15.437–8) observes that the difference between the two forms (*ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ νῶϊν καὶ νῶϊ*) is set *παράλληλως καὶ διδασκαλικῶς*, ‘side by side’ and ‘in a very didactic manner’. The repetition of the pronoun thus makes its morphology clear.¹¹⁵

If the terminology is original, these last examples suggest that Aristarchus labeled as ‘*παράλληλως*’ not only semantically equivalent words, but also etymologically or even morphologically related ones which were placed ‘side by side’. Both stylistic choices would have caught the attention of readers, at first perhaps struck by the apparent redundancy, until they realized that the repetition was a trope, employed by the poet on purpose.

10. Resumption (*ἐπανάληψις*)

According to Tryphon, *ἐπανάληψις* is the successive repetition of the same word two or more times at a short distance.¹¹⁶ Later rhetorical treatises in an-

113. Cf. *LSJ*, s.v. *λέγω* (B); Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. *λέγω*; *Lfgre*, s.v. *λέγω*.

114. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 218. As Janko 1994, 81, observes, here *λεγοίμεθα* means ‘to be gathered’ rather than ‘to be counted’. The verb, however, is the same; see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.6.

115. The note is probably aimed at Zenodotus’ lack of understanding of Homeric dual personal pronouns. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 466–467 (frs. 113–115); Nünlist 2012a, 115. See also Chapter 4 § 1.2.2.

116. Tryph. i 203.2–9: *ἐπανάληψις ἐστὶ δις ἢ καὶ πολλάκις ἐπαλλήλως τιθεμένη φράσις· δις μὲν ‘ἄλλ’ ὁ μὲν Αἰθίοπας μετεκίαθε τήλοθ’ ἐόντας, / Αἰθίοπας, τοὶ διχθὰ δεδαίαται ἔσχατοι ἀνδρῶν’* (*Od.* 1.22–23). *πλεονάκις δέ, ‘Νιρεὺς αὖ Σὺμηθεν ἄγεν τρεῖς νῆας εἵσας, / Νιρεὺς, Ἀγλαΐης υἱός,*

tiquity distinguished between ἐπανάληψις (the repetition of a word or group of words within the sentence), and ἐπαναφορά (the repetition of the same word at the very beginning of the ‘cola’, i.e., of the clauses).¹¹⁷ The term ἐπαναφορά occurs only once in the Aristarchean scholia (*Sch. Il.* 9.241a) but simply means ‘reference’ just like the more common ἀναφορά.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, all the cases where Aristarchus discusses repetitions of words concern real ἐπανάληψεις and not ἐπαναφοραί.¹¹⁹ It is thus impossible to know whether he distinguished between these two tropes, but the close similarities of Aristarchus’ analysis to Tryphon’s classification suggest that, like Tryphon, Aristarchus might have used ἐπανάληψις for any kind of repetition.

The resumption of the same word or group of words within a sentence is a typical trait of Homer and Aristarchus singles out many instances of it: repetitions of nominal forms in the same case, as in *Il.* 22.127–128, with παρθένος ἥϊθέός τε / παρθένος ἥϊθέός τ’(ε) (*Sch. Il.* 22.128a),¹²⁰ or in a different case, as in *Il.* 6.395–396, with μεγαλήτορος Ἡετίωνος / Ἡετίων ὅς . . . (*Sch. Il.* 6.396a);¹²¹ repetitions of identical verbal forms, as in *Il.* 20.403–404, with ἥρυγεν . . . ἥρυγεν (*Sch. Il.* 20.404a^{1,2}); or even of entire phrases, as in *Il.* 20.371–372, with εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας ἔοικεν, / εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας ἔοικε (*Sch. Il.* 20.372b).¹²² Interestingly, in many of these cases, Aristarchus also observes that, whereas ἐπανάληψις is typical of the *Iliad*, it is used only once in the *Odyssey*.¹²³ For example:

Χαρόποιό τ’ ἄνακτος, / Νιρεύς, ὅς κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε’ (*Il.* 2.671–673) [resumption is an expression placed twice or even many times a short distance apart; twice [as in] ‘he went to visit the Ethiopians who live afar, / the Ethiopians who are split in two, the farthest of men’ (*Od.* 1.22–23). Many times, [as in] ‘Nireus led three well-balanced ships from Syme, / Nireus, the son of Aglaea and of lord Charopus, / Nireus, who was the most handsome man who went to Ilium’ (*Il.* 2.671–673)].

117. E.g., *Alex. Fig.* 19.31–20.28 and [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 32 (ἐπανάληψις with *Od.* 1.22–23 as an example); *Alex. Fig.* 20.29–21.22 and [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 33 (ἐπαναφορά with *Il.* 2.671–673 as an example). The same difference appears in *Anon. Fig.* 181.4–13 (ἐπανάληψις) and 181.14–27 (ἐπαναφορά). Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 616–618 (ἐπανάληψις) and 629–630 (ἐπαναφορά).

118. Especially in the formula ἡ δὲ ἀναφορά πρὸς . . . (‘the reference [is] to . . .’): see, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.320a; 3.339, etc. On this expression, see Nünlist 2012a, 116–118, and Chapter 4, footnote 22.

119. For instance, there are no scholia by Aristarchus at *Il.* 2.671–673, where the name ‘Nireus’ is repeated three times, always at line beginning—the typical example of ἐπαναφορά in *Alex. Fig.* 20.29–21.22 and [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 33. Cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 2.671–3.

120. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.837–8 and 2.838 (ex. [Ariston.]); 5.79; 6.154 (discussed below); 7.138a; 10.490a (which observes that this is typical (ιδίως) of Homer); 12.96; 21.86c^{1,2,3}.

121. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.109 (Ἀντιφόν at l. 101 . . . Ἀντιφός at l. 104, . . . Ἀντιφόν at l. 109).

122. See also *Sch. Il.* 23.642a.

123. *Sch. Il.* 7.138a (ὅτι πυκναὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι αἱ ἐπανάληψεις, ἀπαξ δὲ ἐν Ὀδυσσειᾷ); 12.96 (ὅτι πλεονάζει ἐν Ἰλιάδι τὰς ἐπανάληψεις, ἐν Ὀδυσσειᾷ δὲ ἀπαξ); 20.372b (ὅτι ἐν Ἰλιάδι συνεχῶς, ἐν δὲ Ὀδυσσειᾷ ἀπαξ); 23.642a (ὅτι πυκνῶς μὲν ἐν Ἰλιάδι, ἀπαξ δὲ ἐν Ὀδυσσειᾷ). Elsewhere, Aristarchus limits himself to saying only how often Homer uses this device in the *Iliad*: ὅτι πλεονάζει ἐν Ἰλιάδι (*Sch. Il.* 2.837–8; 6.396a) or ὅτι πυκνῶς ἐν Ἰλιάδι (*Sch. Il.* 22.128a).

Sch. Il. 6.154 Σίσυφος: ἡ διπλὴ πρὸς τὴν ἐπανάληψιν τοῦ ὀνόματος. καὶ ὅτι ἐν Ἰλιάδι συνεχῶς ταῖς ἐπαναλήψεσι κέχρηται, ἐν δὲ Ὀδυσσεΐα ἅπαξ κατ' ἀρχάς, 'Αἰθίοπας τοὶ διχθὰ' (*Od.* 1.23).

'Sisyphus': the *diple* with reference to the resumption of the name. And because in the *Iliad* he has constantly used resumptions whereas in the *Odyssey* [he does so only] once at the beginning: '[he went to visit the Ethiopians who live afar, /] the Ethiopians who [are split] in two' (*Od.* 1.23).¹²⁴

From *Sch. Il.* 12.96 we also know that the discussion about the frequency of this rhetorical trope by Homer was made 'against the Chorizontes', the scholars who maintained that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were not by the same author.¹²⁵ Probably, as Kohl suggests,¹²⁶ the Chorizontes claimed that ἐπανάληψις was never attested in the *Odyssey* while it was common in the *Iliad*, and used this as proof that the two poems originated from different authors. Aristarchus, however, finds at least one instance of resumption in the *Odyssey*, and this counterexample provides enough evidence for him that the trope occurs in both poems and, hence, that the Chorizontes' claim is wrong.¹²⁷ We could even speculate that Tryphon and the treatises *De figuris* mention *Od.* 1.22–23 as a 'typical' example of ἐπανάληψις because of Aristarchus' influence: despite the many instances of resumption in the *Iliad*, later compilers chose the only Odyssean case to exemplify this trope because they knew Aristarchus' polemics and arguments against the Chorizontes.

The Aristonicus scholia use the term ἐπανάληψις also for phenomena which are not strictly 'resumptions', because the repetition is not of the same word but rather of a synonym. This happens, for example, when a hero is called by his proper name and by his patronymic immediately after, as in *Il.* 6.63–64 with Ἀγαμέμνων . . . Ἀτρεΐδης δὲ (*Sch. Il.* 6.64), or in *Il.* 21.169–173 with Ἀχιλεὺς . . . Πηλεΐδης δ' (*Sch. Il.* 21.173a^{1.2}.b). Similarly, there is resumption when the two synonyms for 'shield', ἀσπίς and ῥινός,¹²⁸ occur together in *Il.* 4.447–449 = 8.61–63: 'they clashed together their hide-shields (ῥινούς) . . . and the bossed shields (ἀσπίδες ὀμφαλόεσσαι) came close to each other, and a great din arose' (*Sch. Il.* 4.448a; 8.62a).¹²⁹

124. The Aristonicus scholium to *Od.* 1.23. (*Sch. Od.* 1.23b¹) is very scanty, noticing simply the presence of ἐπανάληψις.

125. On the Chorizontes, see Chapter 5.2 § 2.

126. Kohl 1917, 26–27 (fr. 6).

127. See, however, Chapter 5.2 § 2.3.

128. ῥινός properly means 'hide', i.e., 'oxhide', that is, the material of which a shield is made.

129. Also for *Il.* 16.636: χαλκοῦ τε ῥινοῦ τε βοῶν τ' εὐποιητάων [[a din] of bronze, of hide, and of well-made oxhide shields], Aristarchus suggests considering ῥινοῦ and βοῶν as case of resumption, as they mean the same thing. Otherwise, he gives an alternative solution: considering the third

Finally, resumption can also occur when an anaphoric pronoun refers to a previous noun. For example, in *Il.* 16.466–467 the noun Σαρπηδών is followed in the second line by ὁ δέ:¹³⁰

Sch. Il. 16.467b ὁ δὲ Πήδασον οὔτασεν ἵππον: ὅτι ἐξ ἐπαναλήψεως τὸ ἄρθρον εἴληφε κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσώπου καὶ οὐ περὶ ἑτέρου λέγει, ἀντὶ τοῦ Πήδασον δὲ οὔτασεν. . . .

‘But he struck the horse Pedasus’: because [Homer] has used the article by way of resumption for the same character and does not speak about another [character]; [ὁ δὲ Πήδασον οὔτασεν is used] instead of Πήδασον δὲ οὔτασεν. . . .

The pronoun is unnecessary because the subject is still the same, and the note calls the syntactic redundancy an ἐπανάληψις.¹³¹ In other scholia, this redundant pronominal use is not labeled as ἐπανάληψις, but rather as ὡς περὶ ἑτέρου/ἄλλου, ‘as if [Homer were speaking] of another character’ or, more simply as in the scholium above, οὐ περὶ ἑτέρου/ἄλλου, ‘[Homer] is not speaking of another character.’¹³² Aristarchus thus seems to consider resumption a device to increase poetic expressiveness, even if, especially in the case of pronouns, it could also cause the phrasing to become slightly ambiguous.

11. Preeminence (ἐξοχή)

Tryphon explains that ἐξοχή, ‘preeminence,’ implies the use of two nouns, one of which is part of the group defined by the other, e.g., ‘the Trojans and Hector’ (*Il.* 13.1), where Hector is singled out as preeminent among the Trojans.¹³³

τε as superfluous, so that βοῶν εὐποιητάων becomes a genitive depending from ῥινοῦ [a hide of well-made oxhide shields] (*Sch. Il.* 16.636a^{1,2}). In fact, he seems to prefer this second solution (*Sch. Il.* 16.636c^{1,2} [Did.]). Cf. Janko 1994, 392. On superfluous τε, see Chapter 3.2.B § 1.2.

130. *Il.* 16.466–467: Σαρπηδὼν δ’ αὐτοῦ μὲν ἀπήμβροτε δουρὶ φαεινῷ / δεῦτερον ὀρμηθεὶς, ὁ δὲ Πήδασον οὔτασεν ἵππον [‘Sarpedon missed him with his shining spear when rushing at him in his turn, but he struck the horse Pedasus’].

131. Similar cases are also commented upon in *Sch. Il.* 5.734–6; 15.127a.b; 15.333a; 21.349. In *Sch. Il.* 15.8a (see below, footnote 148), the resumption involves a noun and a personal pronoun referring to it.

132. E.g., Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 3.18a.b^{1,2} (but see Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 3.18a): 8.321a and 8.321b (ex. [Ariston.]); 16.106c; 16.401a; 17.48a. In *Sch. Il.* 22.161a Aristarchus notices a similar but not identical case: in ‘they run for the life of Hector, tamer of horses’ (*Il.* 22.161), Homer has ‘resumed’ the name of Hector, in a sentence which already has Achilles and Hector as subject.

133. Tryph. ii § 25: ἐξοχή ἐστὶν ὀνόματος διαστολή κατὰ διαφορὰν πρὸς τὰ ὅμοια, οἷον ‘Ζεὺς δ’ ἐπεὶ οὖν Τρῳάς τε καὶ Ἑκτορα νηυσὶ πέλασσαν’ (*Il.* 13.1), ὥσπερ τοῦ Ἑκτορος μὴ οὐχὶ ἑνὸς τῶν

Aristarchus, too, notices the line for this reason (*Sch. Il.* 13.1c) and mentions it again as a typical example of ἐξοχή when commenting on the phrase ‘eels and fishes’ (*Il.* 21.203 and 353). In this case, he also adds that we must understand the phrase as meaning ‘the eels and the other fish’ (*Sch. Il.* 21.203a: ὅτι Ὅμηρος διαστέλλει τὰς ἐγγέλους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων . . . ἔστι δὲ πιθανεύσασθαι οὕτως δεχόμενον, ἐγγέλους καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἰχθύες).¹³⁴ The trope is also mentioned to counter Zenodotus’ athetesis of *Il.* 2.641–642, where Homer says that the Aetolians were commanded by Thoas, because ‘the sons of courageous Oeneus were no more, neither did he himself still live, and fair-haired Meleager was dead’. Aristarchus conjectures (*Sch. Il.* 2.641) that Zenodotus athetized these two lines because Meleager was presented as different from the sons of Oeneus; yet, he goes on, this is perfectly in line with Homeric style: Meleager is mentioned κατ’ ἐξοχήν among the other sons of Oeneus, just as Hector is singled out among the Trojans in *Il.* 13.1.¹³⁵ Similarly, ‘the earth and high Olympus’ (*Il.* 15.193) is again an instance of preeminence, since Olympus is a mountain and not heaven, thus belonging to the earth (*Sch. Il.* 15.193b¹).¹³⁶

12. Reverse Order (πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον)

Homer very often arranges a sentence using a chiasmic order, otherwise called ‘reverse order’ construction or inversion of order.¹³⁷ This is a figure rather than a trope, since it deals more with the position of words or phrases in a sentence

Τρώων, ἐπεὶ τοῦτον ἤνεγκε· κατ’ ἐξοχήν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐδήλωσε [preeminence is the distinct use of a noun to distinguish it from similar ones, for example: ‘And Zeus, when he had brought the Trojans and Hector near the ships’ (*Il.* 13.1), as if Hector were not one of the Trojans, since he singled him out; for he mentioned him out of preeminence]. See also Anon. *Trop.* 212.9–12; [Choerob.] *Trop.* 252.17–24; [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 51.

134. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.353a; *P.Oxy.* 221, ix, 27–33, and xvii, 5–7.

135. *Il.* 2.641 is also mentioned as an example of this rhetorical trope by Tryphon ii (in the part omitted from the quotation in footnote 133). Cf. Roemer 1924, 85–86.

136. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.193b² (Ariston. + ex.). In *Sch. Il.* 15.193b¹, Aristarchus also recalls the parallel with *Od.* 9.21–22, where Odysseus mentions Ithaca and then Mt. Neriton on it (see also *Sch. Il.* 15.193a). But this is no ἐξοχή, since Odysseus says: ‘But I dwell in clear Ithaca, and there is a mountain there, / Neriton covered with waving forests and visible from afar’. Perhaps Aristarchus might have mentioned this passage as a parallel to Homer mentioning a land together with a mountain on it, as happens with the earth and Mt. Olympus. On the question of Olympus, see Chapter 3.3.B § 4.4. *Sch. Il.* 2.625a discusses another case of preeminence but without labeling it as ἐξοχή (‘from Dulichium and the Echinae’ is used instead ‘from Dulichium and the *other* Echinae’); cf. Lehrs 1882, 227.

137. For a full treatment of this topic, beyond Aristarchus, see Nünlist 2009, 326–337. On this construction (which he calls ὕστερον πρότερον) in Homer, see Bassett 1920, 39–53, and Bassett 1938, 119–128. In an appendix, Bassett 1920, 54–62, surveys Aristarchean scholia and other ancient sources discussing this construction.

than with their meaning. Hence, not surprisingly, Tryphon does not mention it. Yet, since this figure does not involve any syntactic analysis, I include it in this chapter rather than in the next one. The name ‘chiasmus’ does not occur in ancient rhetorical writings, which use other terms instead.¹³⁸ In particular, προαπάντησις¹³⁹ and προσυναπάντησις¹⁴⁰ recall the formula used by the Aristonicus scholia to ‘name’ such figure: πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπήντηκεν, where the subject is Homer who ‘has come back to the second first’. The phrase must be understood as follows: a pair A and B is stated and then repeated in reverse order (ABBA). In other words, in the second part, one first (πρότερον) finds what in the first part was the second member (τὸ δεύτερον), namely B. In the Aristonicus scholia the label πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον is attached to different types of constructions which show an ‘inversion of order’.

The simplest case is indeed the ‘classical’ chiasmus of the type ABBA. The typical example, quoted also by Alexander in his treatises *On Figures*,¹⁴¹ occurs in the lines which Homer uses twice to describe a battle (*Il.* 4.450–451 = 8.64–65): ‘then there were the groaning and the cry of triumph, of the slayers and the slain’ Aristarchus explains the phrasing as πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρῶτον/πρότερον ἀπήντηκεν (*Sch. Il.* 4.451a; 8.65), because ‘the cry of triumph is of the slayers’ (*Sch. Il.* 4.451a). Another example is in the story of Niobe, whose twelve children were killed by the gods (*Il.* 24.604–606): ‘six daughters (θυγατέρες) and six lusty sons (υἱέες). The sons (τοὺς μὲν) Apollo killed with his silver bow, angry against Niobe, and the daughters (τὰς δ’) the archer Artemis [killed]’ (*Sch. Il.* 24.605a). Similarly, Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 20.68a) observes that in the battle of the gods in Book 20 Homer first opposes a pro-Greek god (Poseidon at l. 67) to a pro-Trojan one (Apollo at l. 68), and then, in a chiasmic construction, a pro-Trojan (Ares at l. 69) to a pro-Greek one (Athena at l. 69).¹⁴²

138. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 723 n. 2, 800–803, 865.

139. Zon. *Fig.* 170.3–4: προαπάντησις γίνεται, ὅταν δύο τινὰ θέντες πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον ἀπαντήσωμεν πρότερον [inversion of order happens when, after setting two elements [in the sentence], we return to the second one first]. See also Anon. *Fig.* 187.15–21.

140. Alex. *Fig.* 40.12–17: προσυναπάντησις ἐστίν, ὅταν δύο ἐξενεγκῶν ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸ τελευταῖον πρότερον τὴν ὑπάντησιν ποιήσῃται, ὥς καὶ τὸ Ὀμηρικόν, ‘ἐνθ’ ἅμα οἰμωγὴ τε καὶ εὐχολὴ πέλεν ἀνδρῶν / ὀλλύντων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων’ (*Il.* 4.450–451 = 8.64–65). τὸ γὰρ ὀλλύντων τὸ εὐχόμενον προσαποδέδοται [inversion of order is when bringing forward two nouns one goes back to the last one first, such as this Homeric [example]: ‘Then there were the groaning and the cry of triumph, of the slayers and the slain’ (*Il.* 4.450–451 = 8.64–65), for ‘of the slayers’ corresponds to the boasting].

141. See previous footnote.

142. Other examples of chiasmus of the type ABBA noted by Aristarchus are in *Sch. Il.* 7.276a (on *Il.* 7.275–276); 14.324a (on *Il.* 14.323–325); 14.391 (on *Il.* 14.390–391); 15.330a.b (on *Il.* 15.329–331). In *Sch. Il.* 14.324a, in particular, he singles it out as something ‘Homeric’ (ὅτι ἔχει τι Ὀμηρικόν) in a group of lines (*Il.* 14.317–327) that he athetizes (*Sch. Il.* 14.317a; see Chapter 3.6.B § 6).

The formula *πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον* also applies to longer passages where the reverse construction is extended over several lines. The order of the elements is the same (ABBA), but they are often less easy to recognize, since one term or both terms are repeated many lines after their first appearance and are not clearly organized in pairs.¹⁴³ For example, in *Il.* 2.761–762, Homer asks the Muse to tell him the best of the heroes and of the horses in the Greek army.¹⁴⁴ At line 763 he begins with the horses and only at line 768 does he say that, as long as Achilles was angry, the best of the Achaeans was Ajax. Thus, Homer inverts the order, starting with the horses and then following with the heroes, *πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον* (*Sch. Il.* 2.763), probably for reasons of emphasis.¹⁴⁵

Although the expression *πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον* clearly indicates two elements whose order is switched once they are repeated, Aristarchus seems to have used this formula even when more than two members were involved. Thus, in *Iliad* 6, when Glaucus tells Diomedes about his ancestry, he describes Bellerophon's offspring, whose wife bore three children, Isander (1), Hippolochus (2), and Laodamia (3) (*Il.* 196–197). Yet he then tells the stories of these three characters in a different order (*Il.* 198–210): Laodamia (3), Isander (1), and Hippolochus (2). The change of order is probably dictated by the need to tell the story of Hippolochus at the end, since he is the father of Glaucus, but Aristarchus only notes that this is a construction *πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον* (*Sch. Il.* 6.198).¹⁴⁶

Lastly, Aristarchus applied the principle of *πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον* when a pair was followed only by the second element rather than by both: ABB. These are normally passages where a pair AB is followed by a relative clause whose antecedent is ambiguous. For instance, at *Il.* 2.627–629, Homer introduces Meges, the commander in chief of the army from Dulichium, as follows: 'These in turn were led by Meges, the peer of Ares, Phyleides, whom

143. This is why it is better to label this figure as 'reverse order' and not simply chiasmus; see also Nünlist 2009, 335 n. 34.

144. *Il.* 2.761–762: τίς τὰρ τῶν ὅχ' ἄριστος ἔην σύ μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα / αὐτῶν ἡδ' ἵππων, οἳ ἅμ' Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν ἔποντο [tell me, Muse, who was far the best among them, among the men and among the horses who followed the sons of Atreus].

145. Cf. also *P.Oxy.* 1086, i, 11–18 (ad *Il.* 2.763), on which see Bassett 1920, 47–48; Lundon 2002a, 78–81, 104–106; Nünlist 2009, 332–333. Other cases of reverse order construction extending over more than three lines are noted in *Sch. Il.* 7.8a (on *Il.* 7.1–11); 7.306–7a (on *Il.* 7.303–307); 9.531 (on *Il.* 9.529–532); 11.834 (on *Il.* 11.833–836); 12.400c (on *Il.* 12.400–404); 13.584a (on *Il.* 13.581–586; cf. Erbse, ad loc.); 13.763 (on *Il.* 13.761–764); 18.595a (on *Il.* 18.593–596). In these cases, the second part of the construction is marked with μέν and δέ (A, B, B μέν, A δέ).

146. The case with Aeneas' genealogy in *Iliad* 20 is identical: first (*Il.* 231–232), Ilus, Assaracus, and Ganymede; then (*Il.* 233–240) Ganymede, Ilus, and Assaracus, where Assaracus is placed at the end because he is the grandfather of Anchises and the great-grandfather of Aeneas. Here, too, Aristarchus simply notes the construction *πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον*, without giving any explanation for it (*Sch. Il.* 20.233a).

the horseman Phyleus, dear to Zeus, begot, who once, angered with his father, moved to Dulichium':¹⁴⁷

Sch. Il. 2.629a ὅς ποτε Δουλίχιον <δ' ἀπενάσσατο πατρὶ χολωθείς>: πρὸς τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, πότερον ὁ Μέγης ἀπώκησεν ἢ ὁ Φυλεύς, ὃ καὶ <Ο>μηρικώτερον. Ὅμηρος γὰρ αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπαντᾷ.

'Who once, angered with his father, moved to Dulichium': with reference to the ambiguity, whether it was Meges or Phyleus who emigrated. The latter [option] is more according to the Homeric usage, for Homer always goes back first to the second.

Aristarchus correctly points out that the sentence does not say clearly whether it was Meges or his father Phyleus who first went to Dulichium and settled there. Yet for him it is better to take it as referring to Phyleus because Homer is fond of inversions of order. Interestingly, Aristarchus calls attention to a typical trait of Homeric style to solve a case of syntactic ambiguity; he could have mentioned grammatical rules, according to which the antecedent of a relative pronoun is normally close to it, or the mythical traditions of Phyleus and Meges (if any). In treating a stylistic choice by Homer as decisive, Aristarchus shows how important tropes and figures are for his work, even though to us a 'stylistic' reason might look weaker or more questionable than other, apparently more 'objective' criteria like a grammatical rule or myth.¹⁴⁸

13. Parallel Order (πρὸς τὸ πρότερον [πρότερον])

The opposite of reverse order is parallel order,¹⁴⁹ described in the Aristarchean scholia with the phrase πρὸς τὸ πρότερον [πρότερον]. This label indicates a

147. *Il. 2.627–629*: τῶν αὖθ' ἡγεμόνευε Μέγης ἀτάλαντος Ἄρηϊ / Φυλεΐδης, ὃν τίκτε Διὶ φίλος ἱππότης Φυλεύς, / ὅς ποτε Δουλίχιον δ' ἀπενάσσατο πατρὶ χολωθείς.

148. A similar case is discussed in *Sch. Il. 23.679a* and *23.679c* (ex. [Ariston.?). In *Sch. Il. 15.8a*, on the other hand, the same idea is applied to a case in which the second B in ABB is not a relative pronoun but the personal pronoun σφι (*Il. 15.7–8*): τοὺς μὲν [i.e., Trojans] ὀρινομένους, τοὺς δὲ κλονέοντας ὀπισθεν / Ἀργείους, μετὰ δὲ σφι Ποσειδάωνα ἄνακτα. [[Zeus saw . . .] the Trojans in rout, and the Argives chasing them behind; and with them lord Poseidon]. Of course, Poseidon is with the Greeks, not with the Trojans. Here Aristarchus also explains that, on top of the chiasmic construction, there is a resumption of 'Argives' in line 8 for the sake of clarity (*Sch. Il. 15.8a*: ἐνεκα δὲ σαφηνείας ἐπανελάβε τοὺς Ἀργείους).

149. For this trope/figure I will employ the terms 'parallel construction' or 'parallel order'. This must be kept separate from the 'παράλληλως construction', which is the use of synonymous words 'side by side', as discussed in § 9.

construction of the type ABAB, in which the poet in the second part comes back first (πρότερον) to the first element of the first part (τὸ πρότερον).¹⁵⁰ Even if parallel order is a more logical and straightforward way of organizing a sentence, Aristarchus notes that Homer uses it very seldom and prefers reverse construction. Nonetheless, he employs parallel constructions a few times, as in *Il.* 2.620–621: ‘Of these some were led by Amphimachus and Thalpius, sons, the one (ὁ μὲν) of Cteatus and the other (ὁ δ’[ἐ]) of Eurytus descendants of Actor’:

Sch. Il. 2.621 νῖες ὁ μὲν Κτεάτου, <ὁ δ’ ἄρ’ Εὐρύτου, Ἀκτορίωνε>: ὅτι παρὰ τὸ ἡθισμένον πρὸς τὸ πρότερον ἀπήντηκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ προκατειρημένος ‘Ἀμφίμαχος’ (l. 620) Κτεάτου υἱός, ὁ δὲ ‘Θάλπιος’ Εὐρύτου . . .

‘Sons, the one of Cteatus and the other of Eurytus, descendants of Actor’: because against his usage he has come back [first] to the first. For Amphimachus, mentioned first (l. 620), is the son of Cteatus, and Thalpius is the son of Eurytus . . .

Even if such a construction is ‘against the Homeric usage,’¹⁵¹ Aristarchus also recognizes it in the fight between Achilles and Hector in Book 22. When, upon meeting Achilles, Hector is seized by fear and runs away, Homer comments on the scene in this way (*Il.* 157–158): ‘There they ran, one fleeing and one chasing behind. In front a brave man fled, but a far mightier one chased him.’ Even with the lack of names, since Achilles is pursuing Hector and is far stronger than him, this is clearly a parallel order, as Aristarchus explains (*Sch. Il.* 22.158b: ὅτι πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ὑπήντησε). Like reverse order, a parallel construction can stretch over multiple lines and can repeat each member of the pair more than once. For example, in Book 11, Agamemnon slays two sons of Priam, Isus and Antiphus, and they are mentioned as follows: Ἰσὸν τε καὶ Ἀντιφόν (l. 101); ὁ μὲν = Isus (l. 103), Ἀντιφός (l. 104), τὸν μὲν = Isus (l. 108), and Ἀντιφόν (l. 109); in this case the parallel construction together with the resumption of the proper names is employed to make clear how each of them is killed (*Sch. Il.* 11.109).¹⁵²

For Aristarchus, however, parallel constructions were not typically Homeric. Hence, their presence was suspicious, especially when the lines containing them presented other difficulties as well. This happens with *Il.* 15.56–77, where, among many other problems, the fact that there is a parallel rather than a

150. I could find no definition of this *schema* in any ancient treatise *De figuris* or *De tropis*. Lausberg 1988, § 864, mentions only Latin sources for this figure.

151. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.333a: ὅτι πρὸς τὸ πρότερον ἀπήντηκε παρὰ τὸ ἔθος [because he has come back [first] to the first against his usage].

152. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.103b (ex. [Ariston.?). Another parallel construction noted by τινές is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 6.219a.

reverse construction (at *Il.* 55–60) is one of the reasons for the athetesis (*Sch. Il.* 15.56a: ὅτι ὡς ἐπίπαν πρὸς τὸ δεῦτερον πρότερον ἀπαντᾷ, νῦν δὲ πρὸς τὸ πρότερον ἀπήντηκεν).¹⁵³

14. Hyperbaton (ὑπερβατόν)

Hyperbaton is defined by Tryphon ii as a phrase whose sequence is interrupted by an insertion. There are two types of hyperbata, those ‘in sentence’ (ἐν λόγῳ) and those ‘in phrase’ (ἐν λέξει).¹⁵⁴ The latter occur when the noun and its epithet are divided (Tryphon’s example is *Il.* 12.177–178) or when a compound verb is divided by tmesis (Tryphon quotes *Od.* 1.8–9). The hyperbaton ἐν λόγῳ, on the other hand, happens when a clause is broken up by an entire parenthetical clause (Tryphon exemplifies it with *Il.* 2.333–335).

In the scholia to the *Iliad*, the word ὑπερβατόν is often employed by Nicanor and by the exegetical scholia, while it is extremely rare in the Aristonicus scholia and is absent from the Didymus scholia altogether. While Aristarchus certainly accepted tmesis as a feature of Homeric style,¹⁵⁵ his attitude toward ‘real’ hyperbata is more difficult to assess. In one case, in fact, he supports his reading (against a much more straightforward one) by saying that it is correct because hyperbaton occurs (*Sch. Il.* 16.106a).¹⁵⁶ He also considers the phrase οὐδ’ Ἑκτορι θυμὸν ἔπειθον (‘but they did not persuade Hector’) hyperbaton, since the correct sequence would be Ἑκτορι δὲ θυμὸν οὐκ ἔπειθον (*Sch. Il.* 22.91b).¹⁵⁷ Even so, it seems that, in general, Aristarchus considered hyperbaton a rare occurrence in Homer’s style. In fact, he rejects a reading by Zenodotus because it created hyperbaton, which is not typical of Homer (*Sch. Il.* 15.587: γίνεται δὲ τὸ ὑπερβατόν οὐ κατ’ Ὅμηρον). Perhaps the presence of hyperbaton also

153. On this athetesis, see Lührs 1992, 129–132; Janko 1994, 234–235; West 2001, 230–231; cf. also Roemer 1912, 296–300; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 426. See also Chapter 3.3.A § 4.4, Chapter 4 § 1.5.1, and Chapter 5.2. § 2.3.

154. Tryph. ii § 5: ὑπερβατόν ἐστι φράσις ἀνὰ μέσον τὰ ἐξῆς ἔχουσα. γίνονται δὲ τὰ ὑπερβατὰ ἐν εἶδεσι δυσί, <εἴτε ἐν λόγῳ> εἴτε ἐν λέξει. . . . [hyperbaton is an expression which interrupts the grammatical sequence. Hyperbata are of two kinds, in sentence or in phrase . . .]. See also Tryph. i 197.19–29. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 716–718.

155. See, for example, Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 16.403b and Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 11.635b.

156. Aristarchus’ reading with hyperbaton is (*Il.* 16.104–106): ‘the shining helmet (φαινή πῆληξ) around [Ajax’s] temples rung while it was hit (βαλλομένη καναχὴν ἔχε), for it was continually being hit (βάλλετο δ’ αἰεὶ), and the well-made cheek-pieces (καὶ φάλαρα)’. The vulgate reading, on the other hand, is straightforward: ‘the shining helmet around [Ajax’s] temples rung while it was hit, for it was continually being hit on the well-made cheek-pieces (καπ φάλαρα)’. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.105–6a (Did.) and 16.105–6b (Nic); cf. Janko 1994, 330.

157. See also *Sch. Il.* 17.1 (Ariston.?).

played a role in the athetesis of *Il.* 12.175–180 (or even *Il.* 12.175–181). In fact, Tryphon ii chooses the passage as an example of hyperbaton ἐν λέξει because the epithet λαῖνον at line 178 is separated from the prepositional phrase where it belongs, περὶ τεῖχος at line 177, to mean ‘around the wall of stone’.¹⁵⁸ After listing many reasons to reject the lines (*Sch. Il.* 12.175a¹), Aristonicus remarks that ‘some add a *diple* to λαῖνον because of the hyperbaton in περὶ τεῖχος λαῖνον’. It is not clear whether Aristarchus is included among these anonymous scholars,¹⁵⁹ nor whether the presence of hyperbaton was one of the reasons for the athetesis. His criticism toward Zenodotus’ hyperbaton at *Il.* 15.587, however, suggests that Aristarchus considered the presence of this trope in *Il.* 12.177–178 an additional reason for the athetesis. Other scholars, on the other hand, had simply marked it with a *diple* without taking any stance against it.¹⁶⁰

Aristarchus’ attitude toward hyperbaton is thus not clear. Yet the ambiguity in the treatment of the trope in the Aristonicus scholia could also be due to the fact that the terminology and definition of specific ‘changes of order’ were not fixed in Aristarchus’ time.¹⁶¹

158. Tryph. ii § 5: . . . <ἐν λέξει,> οἷον ‘πάντη γὰρ περὶ τεῖχος ὀρώρει θεσπιδαὲς πῦρ / λαῖνον’ (*Il.* 12.177–178). τὸ γὰρ ἐξῆς οὕτως ἔχει· πάντη γὰρ περὶ τεῖχος λαῖνον ὀρώρει θεσπιδαὲς πῦρ [. . . [hyperbata] in phrase, for example ‘for everywhere around the wall the prodigious fire rose up / [the wall] of stone’ (*Il.* 12.177–178), for the grammatical sequence is this: ‘for everywhere around the wall of stone the prodigious fire rose up’].

159. On the anonymous τινές sometimes mentioned in the Aristonicus scholia, see Chapter 1.1 § 4.1.

160. For example, Nicanor in *Sch. Il.* 12.177–8c¹: . . . ἔστι γὰρ ‘τεῖχος λαῖνον’ τὸ ἐξῆς· ἄκαιρον γὰρ τὸ ‘λαῖνον πῦρ’, εἴ τις συνάπτει [for the grammatical sequence is ‘wall of stone’; for it would be out of place to have ‘fire of stone’, if one were to connect [these two words in this way]]. See also *Sch. Il.* 12.177–8c² (Nic.).

161. For example, *Il.* 1.11 with τὸν Χρῦσιν ἠτίμασεν ἀρητῆρα [and he dishonored the priest Chryses] is considered hyperbaton by *Sch. Il.* 1.11b (ex.), while for Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 1.11a) it is noticeable διὰ τὴν τάξιν τοῦ ἄρθρου, that is, because the normal position of the article in the phrase is altered (article + noun + adjective/apposition instead of the more regular article + adjective/apposition + noun); see also *Sch. Il.* 1.340a; 21.317a^{1,2}. For Tryph. i 197.10–18, on the other hand, this is ἀναστροφή, a trope in which the logical order of two elements has been altered, and which can involve a noun (e.g., τὸν Χρῦσιν . . . ἀρητῆρα for τὸν ἀρητῆρα Χρῦσιν in *Il.* 1.11), a preposition (e.g., ὃ ἐπὶ for ἐφ’ ὃ in *Il.* 1.162), or the postpositive ὥς (e.g., ὄρνιθας ὥς for ὥς ὄρνιθας in *Il.* 2.764). See also Tryph. ii § 6. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 713–715. Aristarchus certainly recognized these changes in word order although he does not seem to have labeled them as ‘anastrophe’ (ἀναστροφή and the verb ἀναστρέφειν do not occur in the Aristonicus scholia). For example, he points out when the preposition is placed after the noun to which it refers, but does not label it a trope. He simply rephrases the cluster according to the Koine order (*Sch. Il.* 2.109b; 11.44; 18.11). As seen in Chapter 3.1 § 4.3, Herodian also reports that Aristarchus followed specific rules to determine the accent in cases of anastrophe of preposition and noun with adjective or apposition; yet again, the label ‘anastrophe’ in these scholia can only be attributed with certainty to Herodian. To conclude, Aristarchus did recognize syntactic inverted orders, but probably did not consider them a ‘trope’ (either anastrophe or hyperbaton). Cf. Matthaios 1999, 443.

15. Syllepsis (σύλληψις)

According to the treatises *De tropis* and *De figuris*, σύλληψις is an expression which refers to two (or more) characters, even though semantically it only belongs to one of them.¹⁶² Aristarchus often recognized this trope in Homer.¹⁶³ The first case concerned verbs and their relative subjects, especially with duals for two characters ‘onstage’, but when only one of them actually did what the verb expressed. For example, during the expedition of Odysseus and Diomedes to the Trojan camp in Book 10, the two heroes walk silently when they hear Dolon approaching. Odysseus alerts Diomedes that someone is coming toward them; Homer uses the dual ὥς ἄρα φωνήσαντε (*Il.* 10.349) even though only Odysseus speaks, and Aristarchus explains that the dual here is employed συλληπτικῶς (*Sch. Il.* 10.349b).¹⁶⁴ Similarly, in *Il.* 11.328–335 Homer describes Odysseus and Diomedes fighting side by side, and says that they seized (ἐλέτην) the two sons of Merops. Diomedes, however, killed them alone (*Il.* 11.333–334); this, too, is a case of syllepsis (*Sch. Il.* 11.328a and 11.333).¹⁶⁵

Another case occurred when the same feature was applied to two characters, while it actually pertained to only one of them. For example, in *Il.* 17.492–493 Homer describes Hector and Aeneas marching ‘with their shoulders wrapped in oxhide, dry and tough’. According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 17.492a), this detail applies only to Aeneas, as Hector at this point is using Achilles’ armor, which he has taken from Patroclus (in *Il.* 17.125) and which is always described by Homer as shining because it is made of metal (in *Il.* 16.130; 22.322–323). Yet again, this is not a mistake by Homer but rather a τρόπος συλληπτικός.

A peculiar type of syllepsis involved pairs of verbs or adjectives with different meanings. For example, according to Aristarchus βάλλειν means ‘to hit by hurling something’, and οὐτάμεναι¹⁶⁶ or τύπτειν both mean ‘to strike with

162. Tryph. ii § 22: σύλληψις ἐστὶ φράσις δυεῖν ὑποκειμένων προσώπων τὸ τῷ ἑτέρῳ πραχθὲν ἰδίᾳ κοινῶς παραλαμβάνουσα [syllepsis is an expression referring to two characters which associates [to both of them] in common what has been done only by one of them]. See also Tryph. i 202.24–31; [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 50. This is what Lausberg 1998, §§ 705–708, defines as a ‘semantically complicated zeugma’ to be distinguished from the ‘syntactically complicated zeugma’, normally called ζευγμα in the ancient treatises; cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 701–704.

163. On Aristarchus’ analysis of syllepsis, cf. also Roemer 1924, 32–39.

164. According to *Sch. Il.* 10.349a^{1.2} (Did.), Aristophanes and other manuscripts had a different reading (ὥς ἔφατ’, οὐδ’ ἀπίθησε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης), probably in order to avoid the inconsistency of the dual for an action that pertains only to Odysseus. For a different reconstruction of what Aristophanes might have done, see van Thiel 2014a, II 189.

165. Other cases of σύλληψις with a dual for an action that is performed by (or appropriate to) only one of the members of the pair are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 4.343a; 7.8a; 19.49a; 21.298 (ex. [Ariston.?).

166. In this case, I prefer to use the Aeolic infinitive οὐτάμεναι attested in Homer, rather than the contracted infinitive οὐτᾶν.

a weapon in hand'.¹⁶⁷ Thus, he considers the *formula* βεβλημένοι οὐτάμενοί τε, 'hit and struck', syllepsis, because the phrase means that some were hit with darts or objects used as missiles (e.g., a thrown spear) and others were struck with spears in close combat (*Sch. Il.* 11.659b¹; 13.764a^{1,2}; 16.24a: πρὸς τὴν σύλληψιν).¹⁶⁸ Aristarchus labels the opposite case syllepsis as well, when Homer uses only βάλλειν or only οὐτάμεναι/τύπτειν to mean generically 'wounding', either by hitting or striking. For instance, in *Il.* 13.782 Homer refers to both Helenus and Deiphobus as 'struck (τετυμμένω) with long spears', even though only Deiphobus has been struck in close combat with a spear by Meriones (at *Il.* 13.527–529), while Helenus has been hit by Menelaus casting his spear (at *Il.* 13.593–594):

Sch. Il. 13.782a οἷχεσθον μακρῇσι τετυμμένω <ἐγχείησιν>: ὅτι συλληπτικῶς τὸ τῷ ἑτέρῳ συμβεβηκὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων τέταχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀμφοτέροι ἐτύπησαν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἑλένος ἐβλήθη, ὁ δὲ Διίφοβος ἐτύπη.

'[Deiphobus and Helenus] have left, both of them struck (τετυμμένω) with long spears': because with syllepsis he has referred to both what has happened [only] to one of them; for not both of them were struck, but Helenus was hit and Deiphobus was struck.

Aristarchus' comments suggest another goal in his analysis of Homeric tropes, namely, to explain what he perceives as linguistic inconsistencies in the poems as precise stylistic choices. According to him, Homer knows the different verbs to describe different types of wounding in battle (βάλλειν, οὐτάμεναι, τύπτειν) and most of the time employs them properly. Yet sometimes Aristarchus feels that the Homeric use of one of these verbs is incorrect. In these cases, he explains, verbs which strictly speaking indicate only one way of wounding (either by throwing a missile or in close combat) are used συλληπτικῶς and must be understood as covering both senses.¹⁶⁹ This is not a mistake, then, but a precise stylistic choice of the poet.¹⁷⁰

167. On the meaning of βάλλειν vs. οὐτάμεναι/τύπτειν, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.5.

168. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 53; Roemer 1924, 33–34.

169. Similar cases are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 14.28b; 14.63a (for βάλλειν) and *Sch. Il.* 14.128a; 14.379b^{1,2} (for οὐτάμεναι). Finally, Homer can also use the noun ὤτειλαί, which is derived from οὐτάμεναι (see Chapter 3.4 § 1.1 and § 8.1), to mean generically 'wounds' as the result of both βάλλειν and οὐτάμεναι, with syllepsis (*Sch. Il.* 18.351b).

170. Another syllepsis occurs with the pair 'not unharmed' (ἀπήμονας) and 'not free from death' (ἀνολέθρους) in *Sch. Il.* 13.761a: the two terms are closely connected, but cannot refer to the same people, because 'not unharmed' soldiers are still alive, while 'not free from death' soldiers are dead. For another case in which Aristarchus appeals to the trope of syllepsis to free Homer from possible inconsistencies, see *Sch. Il.* 11.699a, discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.8.

16. Hyperbole (ὑπερβολή)

Hyperbole is a rhetorical exaggeration¹⁷¹ and, in Aristarchus' view, Homer was fond of it.¹⁷² For instance, in the proem of the Catalog of the Ships, the poet speaks in the first person and says that he will name only the leaders and the ships, but will not be able to name each of the soldiers who were there, 'even if I had ten tongues, ten mouths, and an unbroken voice, and even if my heart were of bronze' (*Il.* 2.489–490). Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 2.489–90) defends the lines against those who wanted to eliminate them because hyperbole is typical of Homer (ἡ ιδιότης τῆς ὑπερβολῆς Ὀμηρικῆ); he then recalls the parallel in *Od.* 12.78, when Circe tells Odysseus about the rock of Scylla, which no mortal man could climb, 'not even had he twenty hands and feet'.

Hyperbole also occurs in phrases like 'your mother reared you on gall' (*Sch. Il.* 16.203a) or in the comparison between Hera's swiftness and the swiftness of human thought in *Il.* 15.80–83 (*Sch. Il.* 15.80). When Achilles is about to kill Hector, who beseeches him to spare his life and accept the ransom offered by his parents, Achilles replies that nothing will be enough, not even if Priam pays Hector's weight in gold (*Il.* 22.351–354). Aristarchus notes that Homer is using hyperbole (*Sch. Il.* 22.351b: ὅτι ὑπερβολικῶς λέγει), but Aeschylus understood the phrase literally and in the tragedy entitled *Phrygians* or *The Ransom of Hector* had the corpse of Hector being weighed in gold.¹⁷³ Another case of a hyperbole misunderstood by later readers occurs in Book 2, when Agamemnon says that if the Greeks were to be grouped by tens and each group had a Trojan to pour wine, there would still be groups without a wine pourer (*Il.* 2.125–128). This is hyperbole, meaning that the Greeks greatly outnumber the Trojans; for this reason, Aristarchus athetizes line 124, where the king invites the Greeks to 'count' themselves (*Sch. Il.* 2.124a: ἀθετεῖται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀληθείας λέγεται, ἀλλ' ὑπερβολικῶς τὰ τῶν δεκάδων). In Aristarchus' mind, this line had probably been added by someone who took the hyperbole literally and consequently thought that it meant that the Greeks should really count themselves to be divided into groups of ten.¹⁷⁴

171. Tryph. ii § 14: ὑπερβολή ἐστι λόγος ὑπεραίρων ἐμφάσεως ἔνεκα τὸ ἀληθές [hyperbole is a way of speaking that exceeds what is true for the sake of suggestiveness]; Tryph. i 198.31–32: ὑπερβολή ἐστι φράσις ὑπεαίρουσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐξήσεως ἢ μειώσεως χάριν [hyperbole is an expression that exceeds the truth for the sake of amplification or diminution]. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 579 and 909–910.

172. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 16.

173. Aesch. *TrGF* 3, pp. 364–370 (esp. p. 365). See also *Sch. Il.* 22.351c¹ (ex. [Ariston.?.]) and 22.351c² (ex. [Ariston.]) and discussion in Chapter 5.3 § 3.4.1.

174. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 30; Roemer 1912, 218–219.

17. Amplification (αὐξησης) and Suggestiveness (ἔμφασις)

The last two tropes included in this survey are closely connected as they are both used to express more, or more vividly, the content of the text: αὐξησης and ἔμφασις. The function of amplification (αὐξησης or ἐπαύξησης) is to increase the sense of a phrase or an idea.¹⁷⁵ By ἔμφασις, on the other hand, ancient rhetoricians and grammarians meant something different from modern ‘emphasis’; rather than a synonym of ‘stress’ or ‘prominence’, ἔμφασις was more linked with the etymological origin of the word, derived from the verb ἐμφαίνειν, ‘to display’.¹⁷⁶ Thus, ἔμφασις, ‘suggestiveness’, consists in having a phrase that amplifies what is being said through a hidden meaning (δι’ ὑπονοίας)¹⁷⁷ or, in the words of Quintilian, an expression that signifies more than what it says.¹⁷⁸ Even if they can indicate different concepts, both amplification and suggestiveness can thus blend in a generic sense of ‘vividness’, meaning the capacity to leave a strong impression in the readers’ minds.¹⁷⁹

In Aristarchus’ analysis, these two tropes seem to have been closely linked with figurative language, in particular with metaphors and similes. For example, he considers that the metaphor of Zeus ‘pouring gold’ at *Il.* 2.670 (above, at § 3)

175. Tryph. ii § 24: ἐπαύξησης ἐστὶ φράσις κατὰ πρόσθεσιν αὐξάνουσα τὸ σημαινόμενον, ὡς ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα· ‘τῶν νέες ὠκεῖαι ὡς εἰ πτερὸν ἢ νόημα’ (*Od.* 7.36). ὠκύτερον γὰρ τῶν νηῶν παρέστησε τὸ τάχος, ἐπισυνάψας τῷ πτερῷ τὸ νόημα [amplification is an expression that increases the meaning through addition, as happens here: ‘their ships are swift just like a winged bird or a thought’ (*Od.* 7.36), for he represented the speed of the ships as swifter by joining ‘thought’ to ‘bird’]. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 259, 400–409.

176. As Asmis 1992, 402, explains: “There is no good English equivalent; ‘suggestive’ comes close in meaning. Although the term can mean ‘expressive’ and this sense can slide off into ‘forceful’, it is misleading to translate ἔμφατικός as ‘emphatic’ or ‘forceful’, as it is often done”. My translation ‘suggestiveness’ for ἔμφασις should be understood in the light of Asmis’ analysis.

177. Tryph. i 199.15–19: ἔμφασις ἐστὶ λέξις δι’ ὑπονοίας αὐξάνουσα τὸ δηλούμενον, οἷον ‘αὐτὰρ ὅτ’ εἰς ἵππον κατεβαίνομεν’ (*Od.* 11.523)· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ‘κατεβαίνομεν’ δηλοῦται τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ ἵππου [suggestiveness is an expression that increases what is being signified through a hidden meaning, for example: ‘and when we went down into the horse’ (*Od.* 11.523); for the magnitude of the [Trojan] horse is shown in the verb κατεβαίνομεν].

178. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.83–84: . . . *emphasis, altiore praebens intellectum quam quem verba per se ipsa declarant. eius duae sunt species: altera quae plus significat quam dicit, altera quae etiam id quod non dicit. prior est apud Homerum, cum Menelaus Graios in equum ‘descendisse’ ait (Od. 11.523)—nam verbo uno magnitudinem eius ostendit* [. . . emphasis, which offers a deeper meaning than the one which the words in themselves declare. There are two species of emphasis; one which signifies more than what it says, and one which signifies even what it does not say. The first one is in Homer, when Menelaus says that the Greeks ‘went down’ into the horse (*Od.* 11.523)—for with one verb he shows the magnitude of the horse]. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 578, 905–906.

179. In fact, the two tropes seem to be considered as alternative names for the same stylistic device; for example, Tryphon ii has only ἐπαύξησης, while Tryphon i has only ἔμφασις. In the scholia, the two terms are often used in close connection. For example, discussing *Il.* 23.16 (τοῖον . . . μῆστωρ φόβοιο, ‘such a master of rout’), in the bT scholium derived from Aristonicus we read that τοῖον has an amplificatory value which aims at ‘suggestiveness’ (αὐξητικῶς κατὰ ἔμφασιν in *Sch. Il.* 23.16a²); the scholium in A (*Sch. Il.* 23.16a¹), on the other hand, uses only the adverb αὐξητικῶς.

is used by Homer πρὸς ἔμφασιν τοῦ πλούτου, i.e., ‘to suggest’ the abundance of wealth (*Sch. Il.* 2.670). In another instance, Aristarchus changes a simile into a metaphor so that the result is ἐμφατικώτερον (*Sch. Il.* 19.386a [Did.]).¹⁸⁰ Similes have the ability to add vividness to poetry as well.¹⁸¹ Accordingly, Aristarchus accuses Zenodotus of having destroyed the suggestiveness of a long simile (*Sch. Il.* 16.161a: καὶ ἐκλέλυσται ἡ ἔμφασις) with his reading.¹⁸² Zenodotus is also criticized because he eliminated a simile that compares the crying Agamemnon to a fountain of dark water (*Il.* 9.14–16); the simile, however, is necessary for amplification (*Sch. Il.* 9.14b: ἀναγκαῖα δέ ἐστιν εἰς αὖξιν).¹⁸³

Since one of the stylistic features of Homer is to ‘hint’ at something through his phrasing, Aristarchus chooses readings that are more ‘suggestive’, and hence have some sort of figurative sense. For example, between the reading μένον ἔμπεδον, ‘they [i.e., the Greeks] waited for [the Trojans] steadfastly’ and one without ἔμπεδον (and a slightly different text) found ‘in some copies’ (ἐν τισι), he prefers the former; he believes that the latter takes away what prompts the ‘suggestiveness’ of their steadfast position—namely, ἔμπεδον ‘suggests’ that the Greeks were holding their ground ‘like a stone in the plain’ (*Sch. Il.* 15.622: αἶρεται δὲ τὸ κινεῖν τὴν ἔμφασιν τῆς ἐμμόνου στάσεως. ‘μένον’ γὰρ ‘ἔμπεδον’, φησὶν, ὡς πέτρα ἐναρηρυῖα τῷ πεδίῳ).

Aside from the figurative use of language, other devices could be employed to achieve αὖξιν or ἔμφασιν. Simple words could also be ‘suggestive’ if employed in particular contexts. For example, in *Il.* 3.79–82, the Achaeans try to hit (l. 80: ἔβαλλον) Hector with arrows and stones, but Agamemnon orders them to stop (l. 83: μὴ βάλλετε). Since for Aristarchus βάλλειν in Homer means ‘to hit’ by hurling darts or other missiles,¹⁸⁴ the first occurrence is not to be taken literally, because they have not hit Hector yet. With the verb ἔβαλλον, however, Homer ‘suggests’ that had Agamemnon not intervened forbidding the Greeks to hit Hector,¹⁸⁵ the latter, who had come forward to propose a truce and single combat between Paris and Menelaus, would have been wounded (*Sch. Il.* 3.80b: ὅτι Ὅμηρος τὸ βάλλειν ἐπὶ τοῦ τιτρώσκειν τίθησι· νῦν δὲ ἔμφασιν ἔχει).¹⁸⁶

Another way to add αὖξιν or ἔμφασιν to the poem and grab the readers’

180. See also *Sch. Il.* 19.386b^{1,2,3} (Did.); see Chapter 2.2 § 1 and Schironi 2004, 146–152 (fr. 15).

181. See *Sch. Il.* 18.207a.b (Did.); cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 13; Linke 1977, 46; Edwards 1991, 170–171.

182. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 16.161b.

183. These last two examples are discussed by Nickau 1977, 109–110 (with n. 11), and Snipes 1988, 209–211. Cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 15.

184. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.5.

185. See *Sch. Il.* 3.82b.

186. For other Homeric expressions used in a ‘suggestive’ way, see *Sch. Il.* 2.809; 6.169a; 8.108a; 23.16a². Certain Aristarchean variant readings are defined as ‘suggestive’, or ‘more suggestive’ by Aristonicus (*Sch. Il.* 8.209a) and by Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 1.108a; 1.553b; 8.449).

attention is the direct intrusion of the poet into the narrative.¹⁸⁷ Therefore Zenodotus was wrong in athetizing two lines where Homer directly comments on the battle for Patroclus' body with a rhetorical question (*Il.* 17.260–261); in fact, these words beautifully amplify the magnitude of the battle for Patroclus (*Sch. Il.* 17.260a: αὔξουσιν τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ὑπὲρ Πατρόκλου μάχης).¹⁸⁸ Zenodotus was also wrong when choosing readings that actually 'suggested' something which did not fit the context. Thus, when Odysseus intervenes in Book 2 to calm the soldiers down after Thersites' attempt to stir them up, he invites them to endure and wait 'for some time' (ἐπὶ χρόνον). Zenodotus, however, read ἔτι χρόνον, 'still for some time', an unconvincing reading for Aristarchus because ἔτι 'suggests' the idea that it is going to be a 'long time' (*Sch. Il.* 2.299b: ἀπιθάνως· ἔμφασις γὰρ γίνεται πολλοῦ χρόνου διὰ τοῦ ἔτι)—which is exactly what a great orator like Odysseus wants to avoid.¹⁸⁹

The idea that Homeric style was generally 'suggestive' rather than explicit played an important role in the discussion of atheteseis, as Aristarchus often rejected a line because it provided additions that obliterated ἔμφασις.¹⁹⁰ For example, he athetizes lines 6–9 of Book 24,¹⁹¹ when Homer describes Achilles' sleepless night: his longing for Patroclus' valorous might, his recollection of what they did together, and of his own sufferings in wars all made him cry.¹⁹² For Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 24.6–9a¹), these lines are cheap (εὐτελεῖς) and also contain some linguistic oddities. Once lines 6–9 are athetized, the text results in *Il.* 24.3–5 + 10–11: 'but Achilles wept remembering his dear friend; nor did sleep, that masters all, seize him, but he turned hither and thither, lying now upon his side, now upon his back, and now upon his face'.¹⁹³ This shorter text describes Achilles' grief with more suggestiveness (*Sch. Il.* 24.6–9a¹: ἀρθέντων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐμφαντικώτερον δηλοῦται ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως λύπη), as now he turns in his bed, incapable of falling asleep, and his thoughts are not explicitly

187. On Homer's direct intrusions, see Chapter 3.6.C §§ 2.2–5.

188. Cf. Edwards 1991, 88. On this scholium, see also Chapter 3.6.A § 5.

189. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 356. Another reading by Zenodotus which 'suggests' something unfitting for the context is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 15.470a^{1,2} and 15.469–70a¹ (Did.). Cf. Janko 1994, 279.

190. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 22.

191. The line had already been athetized by Aristophanes according to Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 24.6–9a^{1,2}.

192. *Il.* 24.6–9: Πατρόκλου ποθέων ἀνδροτῆτά τε καὶ μένος ἦῤ, / ἥδ' ὅποσα τολύπευσε σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ πάθεν ἄλγεα / ἀνδρῶν τε πτολέμους ἀλεγεινά τε κύματα πείρων· / τῶν μνησκόμενος θαλερὸν κατὰ δάκρυον εἶβεν [longing for Patroclus' manhood and great might, and for all the things he endured with him, and the grief he suffered, going through wars of men and grievous waves; remembering all these things, he shed many tears].

193. *Il.* 24.3–5, 10–11: . . . αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεύς / κλαῖε φίλου ἐτάρου μεμνημένος, οὐδέ μιν ὕπνος / ἦρει πανδαμάτωρ, ἀλλ' ἐστρέφετ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (l. 5) / (l. 10) ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρὰς κατακείμενος, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε / ὕπτιος, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνῆς . . .

revealed but only ‘suggested’ by his restlessness.¹⁹⁴ The examples discussed here prove that, in Aristarchus’ view, amplification and suggestiveness were extremely important elements of Homeric style. Yet they did not operate alone, but were achieved through the use of other poetic ‘instruments’, for instance figurative language and specific words that were rich in semantic nuance.

18. Conclusions

This chapter has mostly consisted of a list of stylistic features that Aristarchus recognized in Homer and has outlined the type of questions with which he was grappling when explaining the epic style. By comparing Aristarchus’ approach to tropes and figures with later discussions among grammarians and rhetoricians, the survey has also tried to place his analysis in this field in a broader context. The closest to Aristarchus in terms of content and terminology is the treatise *Περὶ τρόπων* attributed to Tryphon, and, in particular, the version called Tryphon ii. This is one of the earliest collections of tropes; interestingly enough, it is also attributed to (if it does not indeed originate from) Tryphon, who, like Aristarchus, was a grammarian and not a rhetorician. The analysis and distinctions of different tropes and figures seem to have originated from the necessity of explaining ‘canonical’ authors and their styles; yet this categorization was also adopted by rhetorical schools, which developed the study in a much more systematic way, as we see in the later treatises of the Roman period. The slow development in the recognition and definition of tropes partly explains why distinctions between tropes and figures are sometimes blurred in the Aristonicus scholia, and why it is not always easy to reach firm conclusions about Aristarchus’ recognition of a certain trope/figure. In fact, our analysis has revealed some differences between Aristarchus’ discussion of tropes and that of Tryphon, despite both being grammarians and working within 150 years of each other. Even though the treatise attributed to Tryphon is certainly the closest to Aristarchus in terms of how tropes are discussed and exemplified, its treatment is far more complete than the one attested in the Aristarchean scholia. No doubt, one of the reasons for this is that Tryphon’s *Περὶ τρόπων* was a handbook specifically written for didactic purposes; thus, it needed to be both systematic and complete. On the other hand, Aristarchus’ work was aimed

194. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 445–446. For other atheteseis in which Aristarchus notes that without the rejected lines the passage acquires more *ἔμφασις*, see *Sch. Il.* 9.44a (discussed in Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4 with footnote 103) and 24.205b^{1,2}. In *Sch. Il.* 17.172, on the other hand, Aristonicus notes that Aristarchus is used to athetizing lines that lessen ‘suggestiveness’; cf. Lehrs 1882, 339; Lührs 1992, 72–73.

at commenting on specific elements of the Homeric style and had a scholarly purpose, even when addressed to his advanced students. The different aims of Tryphon and Aristarchus (didactic theory versus philological practice) certainly played a role.¹⁹⁵ Still, the difference between the goals of these two scholars does not explain why, for example, the Aristonicus scholia only describe synecdoche with the phrase τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους, while Tryphon has many more specific labels that allow him to highlight the many nuances of this trope and describe its typology much more precisely. The scholia derived from Aristarchus seem to reflect an earlier stage in the study of poetic style, when all the distinctions elaborated by Tryphon were not yet available. The evidence thus suggests that the analysis of tropes and figures was still ‘work in progress’, but was developing rapidly in the Hellenistic and early Roman period. Aristarchus was indeed able to recognize particular stylistic elements of Homer, but often he did not have specific terms to ‘name’ them, so that the expressions we find in the scholia are merely a description of these stylistic devices. On the contrary, Tryphon could utilize the more precise technical terminology developed after Aristarchus’ time. For example, Aristarchus seems to have used phrases like ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον and τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους for ‘antiphrasis’ (i.e., litotes) and ‘synecdoche’, technical names that Tryphon knew well and employed. This lack of technical terminology in Aristarchus is also a symptom of the lack of a firm definition for many individual tropes and figures. This explains why, in a few cases, such as παραλλήλως construction and hyperbaton, Aristarchus does not seem to have had a consistent approach. This is surprising in a scholar who in many other aspects of his work demonstrated amazing precision and self-consistency, but is indeed explicable if we see the study of tropes and figures as a new discipline *in fieri*, which was still finding its own method and still defining its own objects. Nevertheless, Aristarchus’ analysis already showed a significant evolution compared with that of previous scholars. In his exegesis of literary texts, he was continually testing the definitions and applicability of tropes and probably contributed a great deal to the development of the study of tropes and figures in literary texts and among the ‘grammarians’.¹⁹⁶ An excellent example is the analysis of metaphors and similes made by Aristotle, Aristarchus, and Tryphon. While Aristarchus shared Aristotle’s view that metaphor and (short) simile work in a continuum, he seems to have moved away from the philosopher with his analysis of metaphors, already foreshadowing some of the distinctions that would be fully developed in Tryphon’s analysis of the different types of metaphors. It is also interesting to observe that several of the Homeric

195. A similar point was made also by Schenkeveld 1991, 153.

196. On the interplay between literary criticism and rhetorical theories of tropes, see Porter 2016, 85–87.

examples singled out by Tryphon to illustrate a trope were also discussed by Aristarchus. This is the case, for instance, with *Il.* 8.43 for synecdoche ('gold' to mean the 'golden armor'), with *Il.* 13.1 for preeminence ('the Trojans and Hector'), and with *Il.* 1.330 for litotes ('Achilles was not glad seeing the two of them').¹⁹⁷ Perhaps Aristarchus' comments made these Homeric lines paradigmatic of that trope. If so, the continuity in selecting these 'traditional' Homeric examples further suggests Aristarchus' impact on the analysis of tropes.

Aristarchus' engagement with tropes was aimed at defining 'the typically Homeric' (τὸ Ὀμηρικόν), and resulted in the identification of tropes that were characteristic of Homer (e.g., the use of synonyms placed 'side by side', reverse order, and resumption) and those that were not (e.g., parallel order and hyperbaton). The classification of what was typical of Homeric style and what was not is fundamental to Aristarchus' exegesis of the Homeric text; it also represents one of the main methodological legacies of his activity. In particular, once he defined which tropes were typical of Homer and which were not, he used his findings to support atheteseis or counter his predecessors' readings and interpretations. In this regard, however, Aristarchus seems to have been fairly disingenuous and to have bended his strict criteria toward his own goals rather than always applying them rigorously. For example, he was content to find one case only of ἐπανάληψις in the *Odyssey* to combat the theories of the Chorizontes, who maintained that Homer very often employed resumption in the *Iliad* and never in the *Odyssey* and that this, in turn, proved that the two poems were not by the same poet. If resumption in *Od.* 1.23 is indeed a counterexample for the Chorizontes, it is a unique case in the *Odyssey*: in this regard the poem does seem to follow another style compared with the frequent use of this trope in the *Iliad*—and therefore the Chorizontes had a point. In fact, in other cases Aristarchus seems to have considered that a single occurrence, or very rare occurrences, of a trope was not significant enough to make that trope 'typical' of Homer. For example, he claimed that Zenodotus was wrong in introducing hyperbaton in *Il.* 15.587–588 because Homer did not use the trope, but Aristarchus himself noticed it at least once or twice in the *Iliad*. Similarly, even though he could count at least three cases of parallel constructions, this was still not enough for him to make the construction 'typical' of Homer, giving him justification for athetizing a group of lines (*Il.* 15.56–77) where the trope occurred (*Sch. Il.* 15.56a). Aristarchus, thus, seems to have wanted to have it both ways: on one side, a few cases of parallel order or hyperbaton in the *Iliad* were not enough to make those tropes a typical Homeric feature; on the other,

197. Tryph. i 204.10 quotes the latter example (in the portion omitted in footnote 97). Similarly, *Il.* 4.450–451 = 8.64–65, which Aristarchus singles out for its chiasmic construction (*Sch. Il.* 4.451a; 8.65), is the example chosen by Alexander to illustrate the figure of προσυναπάντησις in his treatise *On Figures* (Alex. Fig. 40.12–17; see above, footnote 140).

one single example of resumption in the *Odyssey* was sufficient to say that this trope was also used in this poem, so that its author was the same as the one who wrote the *Iliad*, where resumption was common.¹⁹⁸ In the end, it may be comforting to discover that even ‘the best of the grammarians’ from time to time bent the rules and ‘selectively’ used the evidence to his own advantage, as in the best academic traditions of modern times.

198. For Nünlist 2015, 400, Aristarchus’ behavior about resumption in the *Odyssey* is proof of his ‘undogmatic practice’. This is certainly true, yet he does not seem to have applied the same ‘undogmatic practice’ when it came to judge his colleagues’ solutions or to decide upon the athetesis of *Il.* 15.56–77 (which, admittedly, was suggested by other reasons as well); this is what I would also like to underscore here.

3.2.B

Interpretation of Poetic Figures

Decoding Homer's Syntax

1. Superfluous Parts of Speech (περισσεύειν, περισσός)
 - 1.1. Superfluous Prepositions
 - 1.2. Superfluous Particles and Conjunctions
 - 1.3. Superfluous Words Are 'Redundant' (παρέλκειν)
2. Ellipsis (ἐλλείπειν, ἔλλειψις)
 - 2.1. Ellipsis of Articles
 - 2.2. Ellipsis of Prepositions
3. Enallage ([έν]αλλάσσειν, [έν]αλλαγή)
 - 3.1. Enallage of Articles
 - 3.2. Enallage of Prepositions
 - 3.3. Enallage of Case
 - 3.4. Enallage of Case and Enallage, or Ellipsis, of Preposition
 - 3.5. Other Enallages in Nominal Forms: Gender and Number
 - 3.6. Enallage of Tense
 - 3.7. Enallage of Mood
 - 3.7.1. Ibycean Figure (Ἰβύκειον σχῆμα)
 - 3.8. Other Enallages in Verbal Forms: Voice and Person
 - 3.9. Enallages Involving Adjectives, Adverbs, Prepositions, and Particles
4. Figures concerning the Agreement of Subject and Predicate
 - 4.1. Pindaric Figure (Πινδαρικὸν σχῆμα)
 - 4.2. Plural Predicates with Neuter Plural Subjects
 - 4.3. Alcmanic Figure (Ἀλκμανικὸν σχῆμα)
5. *Concordantia ad Sensum* (σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ νοητόν/ πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον)
6. *Apo Koinou* Construction (σχῆμα ἀπὸ κοινοῦ or κοινόν)
 - 6.1. *Apo Koinou* Constructions and Atheteseis
7. Syntactic Supplements (ἐξωθεν [προσ]ὑπακούειν/λαμβάνειν)
 - 7.1. Syntactic Supplements (ἐξωθεν ἀκουστέον) and Atheteseis
 - 7.2. Other Figures Requiring Syntactic/Semantic Supplements
8. Conclusions

This chapter, which still deals with the second part of grammar, is dedicated to ‘figures’ or *schemata*. Even if generally associated with a rhetorical analysis of language, ‘figures’ (*schemata*) were employed by Aristarchus essentially to analyze Homeric morphology and syntax.¹ In particular, the word *schema* occurs in Aristarchus’ fragments to indicate two separate phenomena: with reference to morphology, it indicates the ‘figures’ of words; with reference to syntax, it indicates the ‘figures’ of phrases.² The *schemata* related to morphology concern inflectional patterns, the accentuation of declinable forms, and their orthography, such as whether to write two elements as compounds (ἐν συνθέσει) or simple forms (ἐν παραθέσει). The *schemata* of syntax, on the other hand, concern the use of cases, prepositions, or moods, that is, syntactic phenomena. Only the latter category belongs to this section because, like tropes, syntactic *schemata* deal with Homer’s style and with the correct understanding of Homeric phrasing, and especially of its syntax.³

As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the line between tropes and figures/*schemata* is not strictly defined. For example, syntactic *schemata* include phenomena classified as tropes by Tryphon: ellipsis (ἔλλειψις) and redundancy (παραπλήρωμα)—the latter corresponding to the cases in which the scholia label a certain word or grammatical form as περισσός, ‘superfluous’. These two phenomena are ‘grammatical figures’ rather than real tropes because, unlike the tropes analyzed in the previous chapter, they involve the analysis of Homeric syntax and make use of what we now consider grammatical concepts.⁴ For this reason, they will be analyzed in this chapter.

After reviewing the tropes of redundancy and ellipsis, I will focus on the syntactic *schemata* proper. Later rhetorical tradition divided *schemata* into at least two categories: figures of diction (σχήματα λέξεως)⁵ and figures of

1. Lausberg 1998, §§ 507–511 and 605, speaks of grammatical *schemata*. In this perspective the development of the theory of figures is closely connected with the development of the theory of *Hellenismos*, i.e., correct Greek; *schemata* are thus (allowed) deviations from what is considered ‘proper’ Greek; cf. Schenkeveld 1991, 156. I would especially like to thank Albio Cesare Cassio and Philomen Probert, who helped me to navigate many thorny questions about Homeric syntax treated in this chapter.

2. I am following the distinction outlined by Lallot 2004.

3. The morphological *schemata* will be analyzed more closely in Chapter 3.5 because it is through the ‘calculation of analogy’ that morphology and morphological *schemata* are discussed and determined. Yet syntactic *schemata* seem to be the main concern of Aristarchus. Indeed, Friedländer gave the title ‘*Fragmenta Schematologiae Aristarchae*’ to the section where he reviewed the Aristonicus scholia dealing with Homeric syntax (Friedländer 1853, 1–35).

4. In fact, Matthaios 1999 discusses the same phenomena in his book, while he rightly does not consider the other tropes analyzed in Chapter 3.2.A, as they do not involve grammatical and syntactic notions but only the semantic meaning of the phrase or the position of words within the sentence.

5. The expression σχήμα τῆς λέξεως is already used by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (1401a8,

thought (σχήματα διανοίας); sometimes, they added a third, namely, figures of speech (σχήματα λόγου). It is difficult to differentiate among them,⁶ just as it is difficult to differentiate between tropes and *schemata*.⁷ One way to organize the *schemata* is to divide them into subcategories as follows:⁸

1. Σχήματα διανοίας
2. Σχήματα λέξεως
 - 2a. Grammatical figures (i.e., ἀλλοιώσεις, ἐναλλαγαί, ἀλλαγαί)
 - 2b. Rhetorical figures

The *schemata* noticed by Aristarchus in Homer mostly correspond to category 2a, the ‘grammatical figures’, which are also called enallages ([ἐν]αλλαγαί) or interchanges because they often imply a ‘change’ ([ἐν]αλλαγή) in the syntax compared with standard Koine usage. Thus, strictly speaking, grammatical figures are departures from normal syntax and would constitute solecisms unless they are explained as poetic devices.⁹

Syntactic *schemata* are at the core of the most grammatically oriented collections of figures: the treatise by Lesbonax and the one falsely attributed to Herodian, both of which may date around the second century CE.¹⁰ These two

1408b21–29, 1410b28–31), in the *Poetics* (1456b9), and often in the *Sophistic Refutations* (165b27, 166b10, 169a30, etc.). Cf. Ildefonse 2004 and Lallot 2004, 161.

6. See Martin 1974, 275–276; cf. also Lausberg 1998, §§ 602–603.

7. See Chapter 3.2.A § 1. Rhetoricians themselves seem to be aware of the problem: Alex. *Fig.* 9.5–11: ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ἡ τυχοῦσα δυσκολία περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου σχημάτων εἰπεῖν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ τῷ πλήθει δυσπόριστά ἐστι τῶν μὲν καὶ ἄπειρα φασκόντων εἶναι τὰ σχήματα, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ἄπειρα μὲν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπερίληπτα, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ γε οὐ ράδιον διακρίναι τὸ σχῆμα ἀπὸ τοῦ τρόπου, καὶ τὰ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τῆς λέξεως ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων [it is no trifling difficulty to speak about figures of speech. For they are difficult to determine because of their number, since there are some who say that the figures are actually countless, and some who say that they are not countless, but many and impossible to determine; and in addition to this, it is not easy to distinguish a figure from a trope, and [the figures] of thought and those of diction one from the other]. Similarly, Phoebe. *Fig.* 54.30–32: τῶν δὲ τῆς λέξεως κοτ’ σχημάτων τῶν ἡμῖν ἀπριθμημένων ἡ μετάληψις καὶ ἡ μεταφορὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ τρόπου εἰσὶν ἢ τοῦ σχήματος [of the twenty-six figures of diction which we have counted, *metalepsis* and metaphor belong more to trope than figure]. I would like to thank Pierre Chiron, who brought these passages to my attention.

8. I follow the distinctions articulated by Blank 1988, 138; cf. also Martin 1974, 275–308, esp. 295.

9. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 1: σχῆμά ἐστιν ἐξάλλαξις φράσεως ἀπὸ τοῦ καταλλήλου ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον μετὰ τινος ἀναλογίας. διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ σολοικισμοῦ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κατόρθωμα καὶ τὴν ἐξάλλαξιν εὐλογον ἔχει, ὁ δὲ σολοικισμὸς ἀμάρτημα, μηδεμίαν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀκαταλληλίας ποιούμενος [a figure is an alteration in expression from what is correct for the sake of a better [phrasing], with some logical correspondence [to the correct usage]. It is different from solecism because the former is a correct use and offers a suitable alteration, while solecism is a mistake, without any excuse for not following the correct rule].

10. On these treatises, whose dating is debated, see Blank 1988, 138–146, and Hajdú 1998, 15–31.

works have a grammatical focus and comment on several Homeric examples, which are often the same as those analyzed by Aristarchus. Pseudo-Herodian's *De figuris* is a composite treatise and surveys grammatical figures, figures of thought, and other phenomena sometimes labeled as tropes by other authors.¹¹ Lesbonax, on the other hand, focuses only on grammatical figures and often overlaps with Aristarchus' analysis, both in terms of description of each *schema* and in terms of Homeric examples commented upon. For this reason, David Blank suggests that Lesbonax used ancient commentaries on Homer as primary sources.¹² There is, however, an important difference between Aristarchus and Lesbonax: the latter has a 'dialectal' view of these *schemata*, as he ascribes each *schema* to a specific dialect or ethnic group. This attitude contrasts with Aristarchus, who never does so; he simply considers these *schemata* as typical of Homer, whose language is 'ancient Attic'.¹³

Since this chapter deals with the syntactic description of Homeric language, it is unavoidable that there will be a partial overlap with the material treated by Matthaios 1999, the most significant contribution on Aristarchus of the past few decades. My focus, however, will be different. Matthaios' goal was to reconstruct Aristarchus' theoretical views on the parts of speech and put them into the context of their historical development.¹⁴ His excellent volume is thus organized according to the eight different grammatical categories that Aristarchus supposedly recognized: noun, verb, participle, article and pronoun, adverb, conjunction, and preposition. The analysis carried out by Matthaios is thus conceived as a search for Aristarchus' linguistic theory. My focus, on the other hand, is on the 'tools' that Aristarchus used to describe and analyze Homeric syntax, that is, figures and tropes. The aim of the present chapter is to reconstruct *how*, in practical terms, Aristarchus approached this aspect of Homeric scholarship. Therefore, the material treated is the same as in Matthaios' work but the perspective is very different. Nevertheless, to avoid an excessive cluttering of references to Matthaios' study every time I analyze a

11. As Hajdú 1998, 16–17 and 24–29, explains, the treatise is composed of two main parts: the first one is on the so-called σχήματα ἐν λέξει, that is, the grammatical figures (§§ 1–9); the second part analyzes the σχήματα διανοίας, 'figures of thought' (§§ 12–23), the σχήματα λόγου, 'figures of speech' (§§ 25–58), and the κατασκευαί, which other authors consider part of tropes (§§ 59–66). The first part is close to Pseudo-Plutarch, *De Homero*, while the second part shows similarities with Alexander, *De Figuris*, and with treatises titled *On Tropes*, especially the one by Tryphon.

12. Blank 1988, 140–143.

13. See Chapter 5.1 § 4.

14. See Matthaios 1999, 13: "Ihr [i.e., dieser Untersuchung] Ziel ist es zum einen, diejenigen Texte aus der Überlieferung Aristarchs vorzulegen, die sich auf die Wortartenlehre beziehen, zum anderen, anhand dieser Texte Aristarchs sprachtheoretische Ansichten über die Wortarten zu rekonstruieren und in den Kontext ihrer historischen Entwicklung zu stellen".

fragment that he also discusses, I will usually give a comprehensive reference to Matthaios 1999 in a footnote at the beginning of each section without repeating specific references throughout the section. Readers should refer to Matthaios' analysis (and to the bibliography quoted there) for a grammatical discussion of the material in question. My focus will be Aristarchus' methodology and the mindset with which he approached the analysis of Homeric *schemata*. In order to do so, however, I will first give a rather detailed survey of the different tropes, figures, and concepts he used to analyze Homeric syntax with several, specific examples. Without aiming at covering all the syntactic phenomena he discussed, this survey will nevertheless give a rather detailed account of 'Homeric syntax according to Aristarchus'. The minute analysis of so many cases will also be necessary to draw the broad picture of his method in addressing a language, that of Homer, which was so problematic in many respects and so far from the linguistic usages of his own time.

1. Superfluous Parts of Speech (περισσεύειν, περισσός)

In Greek, *περισσός* can have a positive meaning ('uncommon', 'extraordinary') as well as a negative one ('more than sufficient', 'superfluous'). Aristarchus adopted the latter meaning and used it as a pervasive critical criterion in his work, which went far beyond the linguistic analysis of the Homeric text; for example, this concept played an important role in the question of athetesis.¹⁵ When analyzing Homeric phrasing, Aristarchus often noted that certain elements in the syntax were 'superfluous'; the Aristonicus scholia use either the adjective *περισσός* or the derivative verb *περισσεύειν* to express this idea. This phenomenon is listed as a 'real' trope by Tryphon, who calls it *παραπλήρωμα*, 'redundancy'. In particular, Tryphon ii¹⁶ singles out three elements that are redundant in Homer: prepositions used as prefixes, the particle *τε*, and the particle *κε*. Indeed, Aristarchus noticed the same peculiarities, starting with prepositions.

15. See Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4.

16. Tryph. ii § 12: *παραπλήρωμά ἐστι φράσις ἢ λέξις ἐκ περισσοῦ παραλαμβανομένη, οἷον ἄρχονς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆας τε προπάσας* (Il. 2.493). *ἡ γὰρ πρό παρέλκει. καὶ ἄστέρι ὀπωρινῷ ἐναλίγκιος, ὃς τε μάλιστα* (Il. 5.5), *ἀντὶ τοῦ ὃς μάλιστα. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κε· καὶ κέ τις ὥδ' ἐρέει Τρώων ὑπερηγορούντων* (Il. 4.176) [redundancy is a phrase or a word that is used superfluously, for example: 'now I will say the leaders of the ships as well as all (*προπάσας*) the ships' (Il. 2.493). For here *πρό* [in *προπάσας*] is redundant. And 'similar to the star of midsummer, and which (*ὃς τε*) above all' (Il. 5.5) [where *ὃς τε μάλιστα* is used] instead of *ὃς μάλιστα*; and with *κε*: 'and so one of the insolent Trojans will say (*κε . . . ἐρέει*)' (Il. 4.176)]. See also Tryph. i 198.9–14.

1.1. Superfluous Prepositions

For Aristarchus, a preposition could be superfluous when its meaning was already present in the phrase because of another word or suffix. For example, in ἐξ οὐρανόθεν, οὐρανόθεν already means ‘from heaven’ because of the suffix -θεν; so there is no need of the preposition ἐξ, which Aristarchus thus defines as περισσὴ in *Sch. Il.* 8.19 and *Sch. Il.* 17.548. Just like Tryphon, he also considered a prefix superfluous when it did not add anything to the meaning of the compound, as in ἀπομηνίσαντος, which is used ἀντὶ τοῦ μηνίσαντος (*Sch. Il.* 19.62a¹),¹⁷ or the intensive prefix προ- in πρόπας (*Sch. Il.* 2.493).¹⁸

Since Homer generally omits prepositions (see below, § 2.2), Aristarchus, unlike Tryphon, also considered prepositions not used in composition superfluous. For example, ὑπό is superfluous in ‘Aeneas, whom divine Aphrodite bore to Anchises (ὕπ’ Ἀγκίσῃ)’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.820), because Homer often uses the simple dative to mean ‘to bear a son to someone’ (e.g., *Il.* 2.658, 6.22, 20.384). Likewise, in *Sch. Il.* 12.303b Aristonicus says that ‘some’ (and Aristarchus as well?) mark the phrase φυλάσσοντας περὶ μῆλα, ‘keeping watch over the sheep’, because περὶ is superfluous—probably on account of the fact that in Homer φυλάσσειν usually has a direct object when it means ‘to guard’, ‘to watch over’ (e.g., *Il.* 10.417, *Od.* 12.136, 17.593).

1.2. Superfluous Particles and Conjunctions

Not surprisingly, particles and conjunctions were the grammatical category that was most affected by redundancy, according to Aristarchus. A large number of Aristonicus scholia indeed consider this phenomenon, especially for κε(ν)/ἄν, τε/καί, and δέ.

The particle κε(ν) is the Homeric equivalent of the Attic and Koine ἄν. Homer presents some distinct uses of κε(ν), however, which are foreign to Koine, such as κε(ν)/ἄν with a future indicative in main or relative clauses, where the future is nothing but an ancient short-vowel aorist subjunctive reinterpreted as a future.¹⁹ In these cases, Koine Greek would either use the

17. See also *Sch. Il.* 14.54 (Ariston.?).

18. The latter is the same example singled out by Tryphon to discuss the παραπλήρωμα; see above, footnote 16.

19. The ancient forms of the sigmatic aorist subjunctive were not τιμήσῃ, τιμήσητε, τιμήσωσι but rather τιμήσει, τιμήσετε, τιμήσουσι (< *τιμήσοντι) without lengthening, and so they were identical to future indicatives (see Buck 1955, § 150). These short aorist subjunctives remained in the text in the first- and second-person plural for metrical reasons (e.g., the aorist subjunctive δείξετε), while they were transformed into the more regular subjunctive forms with long vowel whenever possible (e.g., δείξη instead of the original δείξει). Once the ‘standard’ aorist subjunctives with long vowels were created, then one could understand οἱ κέ με τιμήσουσι (*Il.* 1.175) as a future with κε

simple future indicative (for a straightforward prediction of the future) or the potential optative plus ἄν (for something that could or might happen). Aristarchus, therefore, offers two different solutions on the basis of the Koine usage.²⁰ In some cases, more clearly indicating the future, he simply states that κε(ν) is 'superfluous'; for example, with reference to *Il.* 14.239–240, 'Hephaestus my son, the ambidextrous, will make (κ' . . . τεύξει) [a throne]', he explains that it means Ἡφαιστος . . . τεύξει, with a superfluous κε according to the Homeric usage (*Sch. Il.* 14.239: ἔστι γὰρ Ἡφαιστος δὲ ἐμὸς παῖς τεύξει, ὥστε περισσὸν νοεῖσθαι τὸν κέ Ὀμηρικῶς).²¹ In other cases, he proposes that either κε(ν) is superfluous (as in the previous case) or that it is a case of change of verb,²² i.e., a future indicative with κε(ν) is used instead of a potential aorist optative with κε(ν).²³

Equally superfluous for Aristarchus is κε(ν) in the protasis of a future conditional with a future indicative (*Sch. Il.* 2.258a¹; 5.212)²⁴ or an optative (*Sch. Il.* 2.123a),²⁵ because Koine Greek does not use ἄν in the protasis but simply εἰ followed by the simple future indicative or the simple optative.²⁶

Sometimes, however, the same concept seems to have been applied with reference not to Koine usage but to Homeric usage. This happens, for example, when Aristarchus concludes that κε is superfluous with a subjunctive in a relative clause (*Sch. Il.* 11.409a) and in a temporal clause introduced by ἐπεὶ (*Sch. Il.* 17.658).²⁷ Since Koine Greek always has ἄν and subjunctive in these cases,²⁸ the 'reference language' cannot be Koine. Homer, on the other hand, tends to use simple subjunctive for generic statements, while he has subjunctive

('who will honor me'), where κε was considered superfluous. Cf. Monro 1891, § 326.1; Smyth 1956, § 1793; Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 351–352; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 225–226.

20. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 370–371 (frs. 76–77), 578–579 (fr. 177).

21. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.523a; 2.229c; 6.260b; 10.282b; 20.311a^{1,2}.

22. On the 'changes' (enallages) of verb, see below, § 3.6–8.

23. *Sch. Il.* 1.175a; 4.176a; 9.262a; 10.44; 22.49b^{1,2,3}.

24. Cf. Monro 1891, § 326.5. In this case, too, some of these forms can be better interpreted as aorist subjunctives than as future indicatives, as Chantraine 1953–1958, II 225 and 284, notes (cf. also Smyth 1956, § 2327c). For example, Chantraine considers κινήσομαι at *Il.* 2.258 an aorist subjunctive (1953–1958, II 225, 280), but νοστήσω καὶ ἐσόψομαι at *Il.* 5.212 future indicatives (1953–1958, II 226).

25. Cf. Monro 1891, § 313; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 277–278; Smyth 1956, § 2334a.

26. Cf. Smyth 1956, §§ 2297, 2328, 2329.

27. *Il.* 11.409: ὃς δὲ κ' ἀριστεύῃσι μάχῃ ἐνὶ τὸν δὲ μάλα χρεὼ [/ ἐστάμεναι κρατερῶς] [whoever is best in battle, he must [hold his ground with force]]; and *Il.* 17.658 : ὃς τ' ἐπεὶ ἄρ κε κάμῃσι κύνας τ' ἄνδρας τ' ἐρεθίζων . . . [[like a lion] who, when he is weary of rousing to fight dogs and men, . . .].

28. See Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904, I 250–252; Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 311, 312 (relative clauses with subjunctive), 658–660 (temporal clauses introduced by ἐπεὶ); Smyth 1956, §§ 2401–2402 (temporal clauses with subjunctive), 2545c (relative clauses with subjunctive).

and κε for nongeneric ones in the future, both with relative clauses²⁹ and with temporal clauses introduced by ἐπεὶ.³⁰ Since in both Homeric examples the clause has a generic sense (*Il.* 11.409 speaks of the duty of any brave warrior and *Il.* 17.658 belongs to a simile), Aristarchus concludes that κε is superfluous in both cases, as Homer usually omits it.³¹

In Aristarchus' opinion, the connective conjunctions τε and καί were also superfluous when they did not have a copulative function.³² The conjunction τε has two meanings in Homer: the 'normal' connective one and a more peculiar one, limited almost to epic and early lyric poetry, which has been called as 'epic τε'. Epic τε expresses a habitual or indefinite action; therefore it is particularly common in similes and gnomic statements.³³ Aristarchus defines the epic τε as περισσός in three situations, namely, after a relative pronoun to indicate a characteristic attribute;³⁴ in a more particular statement but still without connective function;³⁵ and in the clusters γάρ τε in a simile³⁶ and εἴ περ τε in a gnomic statement.³⁷ Aristarchus' definition is in part correct: from the point of view of standard Koine, at least, this use of τε is not connective at all.³⁸ Like τε, καί too sometimes has no proper connective meaning.³⁹ This case includes instances where καί has the sense of 'also' or 'even', as well as cases where καί has a weaker meaning and is often omitted in modern translations. In these cases, Aristarchus considers καί superfluous.⁴⁰

Aristarchus also often describes δέ as 'superfluous',⁴¹ in particular when δέ

29. See *Monro* 1891, § 283; *Chantraine* 1953–1958, II 245–247. With the exception of Homer, the simple subjunctive in relative clauses is used only in poetry and in archaic prose (see *Schwyzler* 1950–1953, II 312). *Chantraine*, however, notes (1953–1958, II 247) that the distinction between simple subjunctive for generic statements and subjunctive with κε for nongeneric statements has many exceptions.

30. See *Monro* 1891, § 296; *Chantraine* 1953–1958, II 256–257.

31. *Monro* 1891, §§ 293 and 296, in fact, agrees with Aristarchus in considering κε unnecessary in both relative and temporal clauses with ἐπεὶ, supposing that κε is here a corruption for the original τε. Other, different cases of superfluous κε(ν) are noted in *Sch. Il.* 3.138a; 7.41a; 22.110a^{1,2}.

32. Cf. *Matthaios* 1999, 568–570 (frs. 168–169).

33. See *Monro* 1891, § 332; *Denniston* 1950, 520–535. The most important study on the epic τε is *Ruijgh* 1971, who also devotes one chapter (*Ruijgh* 1971, 61–75) to the ancient grammarians' theories on it.

34. *Sch. Il.* 5.5a (the same example of Tryphon ii; see above, footnote 16); 22.29a; 22.117–8.

35. *Sch. Il.* 17.368d. Cf. *Denniston* 1950, 523.

36. *Sch. Il.* 3.25b.

37. *Sch. Il.* 10.225a.

38. Another case of superfluous τε is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 16.636a^{1,2}; cf. *Matthaios* 1999, 569–570, and also Chapter 3.2.A, footnote 129.

39. See *Denniston* 1950, 293–323.

40. *Sch. Il.* 2.297; 6.218; 10.120b; 12.301a; 13.306a^{1,2}; 20.234a; 21.48 (ex. [Ariston.]); 24.485 (ex. [Ariston.]).

41. Cf. *Matthaios* 1999, 571–572 (fr. 171).

has an apodotic value, that is, when δέ marks the main clause and has neither a connective nor an adversative meaning.⁴² In such cases, δέ is περισσός because its apodotic value in Classical and Koine Greek disappears and because, compared with the more usual connective or adversative meaning, the apodotic δέ is semantically superfluous.⁴³ When an apodotic δέ follows an article with demonstrative value, such as τὸ δέ, τὸν δέ, τοῖσι δέ, τῶν δέ, and so on, Aristarchus does not understand these forms as the ‘modern’ demonstrative pronouns ὅδε, ἥδε, τόδε. Rather, they are two distinct words: the article, which for Aristarchus Homer uses ‘instead of a pronoun’ (see below, § 3.1) and the ‘superfluous’ δέ,⁴⁴ which is a peculiar characteristic of the poet (συνήθως αὐτῷ in *Sch. Il.* 1.41c; 2.189b^{1,2}).

In one case, γάρ is defined as περισσός, namely when it follows a relative pronoun in Achilles’ speech to the Myrmidons before the funeral games (*Il.* 23.9): ‘let us mourn Patroclus, which is the tribute to the dead (ὃ γὰρ γέρας ἐστὶ θανόντων)’. According to Aristarchus, if this is a relative clause, then γάρ is superfluous; if, on the contrary, the relative pronoun ὃ is used instead of τό, with demonstrative value, then γάρ is not superfluous because the phrase means: ‘for (γάρ) this (ὃ = τό) is the tribute (γέρας) to the dead’ (*Sch. Il.* 23.9).⁴⁵ ‘Being superfluous’ is thus both a syntactic and semantic concept: a particle or a word is superfluous when it does not have any ‘functional’ semantic meaning in the sentence.

1.3. Superfluous Words Are ‘Redundant’ (παρέλκειν)

Connected to the idea of ‘being superfluous’ is that of being redundant (παρέλκειν), which is also present in Tryphon’s entry for the παραπλήρωμα quoted above. The verb παρέλκειν occurs in the Aristonicus scholia for cases that look very similar to those elsewhere described as ‘superfluous’ parts of speech: a redundant preposition⁴⁶ and a redundant κε.⁴⁷

42. On this function of δέ, see Monro 1891, § 334; Denniston 1950, 177–181; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 356–357. This is the case when Homer starts with a temporal or relative clause or a conditional protasis, followed by the main clause with a δέ. This δέ has no connective or adversative function, but just serves to signal and give force to that clause compared with the previous clause (which depends on it, even though it precedes it).

43. *Sch. Il.* 1.137; 1.194; 2.802; 5.261; 6.135c; 7.149; 12.145a (Ariston.); 20.48d; 24.15a.

44. *Sch. Il.* 1.41c; 2.189b^{1,2}; 7.314a; 9.509a; 10.490a; 15.745 (ex. [Ariston.]); 17.733 (Ariston.); 24.17a. Herodian has a different opinion, as is clear from *Sch. Il.* 1.41b (Hrd.). Cf. Matthaios 1999, 571–572, and Schironi 2004, 57–64 (fr. 2).

45. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 575. The particle περ is considered superfluous in *Sch. Il.* 13.317; 21.185a^{1,2}.

46. *Sch. Il.* 1.39a.

47. *Sch. Il.* 15.403–4.

In particular, the verb *παρέλκειν* seems to express the idea of ‘being an (unnecessary) appendage’ to a word or a phrase. In fact, sometimes it indicates a suffix without semantic or syntactic function. For example, Aristarchus labels as redundant *ὑπό* in the compound *ὑφηνίοχος*, ‘charioteer’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.19a), *-δέν* when *οὐδέν* means simply *οὐ* (*Sch. Il.* 1.412; 24.370a),⁴⁸ and the suffix *-θεν* in *Ἰδηθεν μεδέων*, ‘[Zeus] ruling from Ida’, as *Ἰδηθεν* is equivalent to *Ἰδης* (*Sch. Il.* 7.202a: *ὅτι τὸ θεν παρέλκει νῦν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ Ἰδης*).⁴⁹ While these examples recall those surveyed in § 1.1, Aristarchus also applies this label when discussing words from a solely semantic point of view. For example, he uses it for the adjective *πᾶς* together with a numeral (e.g., *ἐννέα πάντες* in *Il.* 7.161, *ἐείκοσι πάντας* in *Il.* 18.373, *δέκα πάντα* in *Il.* 24.232), since in these phrases (e.g., ‘all nine’, ‘all twenty’) ‘all’ is semantically ‘redundant’—yet it is typical of Homer (*παρέλκει συνήθως αὐτῶ/τῶ ποιητῇ* in *Sch. Il.* 7.161a; 18.470c²).⁵⁰ An epithet, on the contrary, is ‘not redundant’ (*οὐ παρέλκει*), when it adds a necessary semantic information to the overall meaning of the sentence.⁵¹

2. Ellipsis (*ἔλλειπεν, ἔλλειψις*)

The opposite phenomenon of redundancy was ellipsis: while with ‘superfluous’ syntactic elements, according to ancient grammarians, Homer used a form that was not necessary compared to Koine usage, in the case of ellipsis Homer ‘omitted’ something that was necessary in Koine. Tryphon lists ellipsis (*ἔλλειψις*) among his tropes and observes that it occurs when one or more words are left out.⁵² This concept is still now commonly used to explain Homeric syntax,

48. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.370b (ex. [Ariston.]): *πλεονάζει τὸ δέν*. Indeed, for the same case of *οὐδέν* meaning *οὐ*, different terms are used: *Sch. Il.* 16.274a¹ reads *δέν παρέλκεται*, while *Sch. Il.* 16.274a² has *περισσεύει*; *Sch. Il.* 1.244c says *πλεονάζει τὸ δέν*, while *Sch. Il.* 1.244d (ex.?) reads *Ἀρίσταρχος παρέλκειν λέγει τὸ ‘δέν’*. In these examples, then, *περισσεύειν*, *παρέλκειν*, *πλεονάζειν* are used as synonyms; cf. Lehrs 1882, 306; Schironi 2004, 116.

49. See also *Sch. Il.* 3.276a.

50. *Sch. Il.* 7.161a; 15.189b; 18.373a; 18.470c^{1,2}; 23.882; 24.232a.

51. *Sch. Il.* 18.416b, discussed in Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.1. The use of *παρέλκειν* and, above all, of the noun *παρολκή* for suffixes or additions without a real meaning is especially common in the Herodian scholia, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.178a^{1,2} and 5.289b¹. Herodian also uses it for a preposition which is in tmesis with a verb but does not add any meaning to it (*Sch. Il.* 9.236b) or to discuss Aristarchus’ preference for *τοσσοὺς δέ*, saying that Aristarchus considered *δέ* as a *παρολκή* (*Sch. Il.* 20.357a^{1,2}). On the other hand, Herodian also employs *περισσός* exactly as the Aristonicus scholia do (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 19.90c).

52. Tryph. ii § 13: *ἔλλειψις ἔστι φράσις οὐ κατὰ τὸ πλήρες ἐκφερομένη, ἀλλὰ μὲν λέξει ἢ πλείοσιν ἔλλείπουσα· οἷον ‘κόπτων ἀμφοτέρησιν’ (Od. 18.28), ἔλλειπει γὰρ ταῖς χερσίν* [ellipsis is an expression which is not delivered in full, but lacks one or more words, for example, ‘beating

which often ‘omits’ elements that seem necessary to us. Aristarchus discussed ellipsis especially to characterize two peculiarities of Homeric language, namely, the omissions of articles and of prepositions.

2.1. Ellipsis of Articles

The ‘omission’ of articles, which is connected to the demonstrative value of *ὁ*, *ἡ*, *τό* still present in the Homeric language, is a phenomenon well known to modern linguists.⁵³ Aristarchus, too, was aware of Homer’s tendency to leave articles out.⁵⁴

Sch. Il. 2.1a¹ ἄλλοι {μέν ῥα}: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘ἄλλοι’. ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς ἀσυνάρθρως ἐκφέρει.

‘The other (ἄλλοι) [gods]’: because Zenodotus writes ἄλλοι, but the poet expresses himself without the article.

Sch. Il. 10.1a <ἄλλοι μέν:> παραιτητέον τοὺς γράφοντας, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ Ζηνόδοτος, ‘ἄλλοι μέν’, ἢ καὶ τοὺς ὅπως οὖν βουλομένους δασύνειν· ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ ποιητὴς παραλειπτικός τῶν ἄρθρων.

‘The other (ἄλλοι) [chiefs]’: we must refute those, including Zenodotus, who write ἄλλοι μέν, or those who want to write it in whatever way with a rough breathing: for the poet tends to omit articles.

Both scholia concern the same issue: the fact that the article should not precede ἄλλος, and Aristarchus thus argues against two variants which have an article in crasis: ἄλλοι, read by some anonymous scholars, and the psilotic ἄλλοι, read by Zenodotus.⁵⁵ As the two notes say, Homer is παραλειπτικός of articles, so his language is ἀσυνάρθρως, ‘without articles’. Aristarchus considered this feature

[him] with both (ἀμφοτέρησιν)’ (*Od.* 18.28), for ‘hands’ (ταῖς χερσίν) is missing]. See also Tryph. i 198.15–20.

53. On the Homeric article, see Monroe 1891, §§ 256–264; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 158–168; Meillet 1965, 187–193. In fact, even though in Homer the article generally is a demonstrative pronoun (see below, § 3.1), it sometimes appears to be used with a function very close to a ‘real’ definite article; see Monroe 1891, § 261; Schwyzler 1950–1953, II 22–23; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 165.

54. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 355–356; Matthaios 1999, 436–437, 508 (fr. 99).

55. See also Ap. Dysc. *Synt.* I § 6 (GG 2.2, 6.1–6); on Zenodotus’ reading, see Duentzer 1848, 75; La Roche 1866, 186.

characteristic of Homer⁵⁶ as well as of Ionic in general.⁵⁷ In fact, in his view ellipsis of articles was so typical of Homer, that when he found what looked like Koine articles in his text, he adopted specific strategies to explain those forms as not ‘real’ articles but as due to other *schemata*, as we will see in § 3.1.

2.2. Ellipsis of Prepositions

Homer often also presents simple cases where Classical or Koine Greek would use the same case preceded by a preposition. We now know that these omissions are an archaic feature typical of a language in which cases are still ‘strong’ enough to have no need of prepositions to express certain meanings.⁵⁸ Without knowledge of modern Indo-European linguistics, Aristarchus explained this phenomenon as a case of ellipsis in which a preposition ἐλλείπει, ‘is missing’, or παρείται, ‘has been omitted’, by Homer.⁵⁹

For example, with verbs denoting affection or anger Homer uses the simple genitive to express the object of the feeling, while in Koine the concern or anger *for someone/something* is normally expressed with περί and the genitive. Aristarchus seems to have been particularly interested in this phenomenon, as in many scholia he explains that Homer has omitted περί with the formula ἐλλείπει ἢ περί πρόθεσις. Thus περί is missing with verbs or nouns indicating grief or sorrow *for* someone (e.g., ἄχνυσθαι, ἀκαχίζεσθαι, ὀλοφύρεσθαι, as well as ἄχος and στοναχαί),⁶⁰ or with verbs indicating anger or blame *because of* someone/something (e.g., κεχολῶσθαι or ἐπιμέμφεσθαι).⁶¹ Περί is also missing with ἀμύνειν in the sense of ‘defending’ someone/something,⁶² or in expressions indicating ‘paying the ransom/penalty’ *for* someone/something.⁶³ Sometimes even two prepositions can be missing in the same phrase, as in *Il.* 20.29, where Aristarchus paraphrases θυμὸν ἑταίρου χόεται, ‘in his heart he is angry for

56. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.408a^{1,2} and 10.408b (Ap. Dysc.?) πῶς δαί {τῶν ἄλλων}: ἡ μὲν σύνταξις ἐπιζητεῖ ‘πῶς δ’ αἰ’, τὸ αἰ ἄρθρον. ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος δύο παρέλαβε χαρακτηριστικὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἔλλειψιν ἄρθρου καὶ τοῦ δαί σύνταξιν μετὰ τὸ πῦσμα . . . [‘and how are [the guards of the other Trojans?]: the syntax requires πῶς δ’ αἰ, that is, the article αἰ; but Aristarchus accepted two characteristics of the poet: the ellipsis of articles and the use of δαί with a question]. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 179; Schironi 2004, 264–272 (fr. 32). The lack of article in Homer is also at the basis of Aristarchus’ reading in *Sch. Il.* 11.636a. An exegetical scholium (*Sch. Il.* 21.252d¹) instead objects to Aristarchus that Homer does not always omit articles; on this point, see below, § 3.1.

57. See *Sch. Od.* 2.206b¹; cf. Matthaios 1999, 432–433 (fr. 100 B); see also Chapter 5.1 § 2.1.2.

58. See Monro 1891, § 178; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 35.

59. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 182–184; Matthaios 1999, 597–602 (frs. 195–204).

60. *Sch. Il.* 2.356a^{1,2}; 8.124a; 8.125b; 8.316a; 8.317; 9.567d^{1,2}; 13.403a^{1,2}; 15.651a; 16.17; 17.459b (ex. [Ariston.]); 20.293; 22.170a; 24.550.

61. *Sch. Il.* 1.65b; 1.93–5; 1.429; 2.689; 13.166b; 13.203a; 16.546; 16.553; 21.146; 23.37a.

62. *Sch. Il.* 9.531; 13.110a; 16.522a^{1,2}; 16.561a^{1,2}.

63. *Sch. Il.* 1.111; 11.142a.

his friend', by reintroducing *κατά* and *περί*: *κατὰ θυμὸν περὶ ἑταίρου χολοῦται* (*Sch. Il.* 20.29a¹). Similarly, he explains the ablative genitive as an ellipsis of prepositions: ellipsis of *παρά* with the verb *δέχεσθαι*, in the sense of 'taking a cup' *from* someone (*Sch. Il.* 1.596b; 24.305), and ellipsis of *ἀπό* or *ἐκ* with the verb *ἀναίσσειν*, 'gush forth', of two springs rising *from* the Scamander (*Sch. Il.* 22.148).⁶⁴

Another extremely frequent case is Homer's use of the simple genitive *πεδίοιο* to indicate a movement *along* a plain. Aristarchus interprets this phenomenon as an ellipsis of the preposition *διὰ* and notices it almost obsessively in many scholia, often with this phrasing (or variations of it): *ἐλλείπει ἡ διὰ, ἵν' ἢ διὰ πεδίου* ('the [preposition] *διὰ* is missing, so that it is *διὰ πεδίου*').⁶⁵ The locative dative works in the same way: for Aristarchus, Homer omits *ἐν*⁶⁶ or *ἐπὶ*.⁶⁷ An *εἰς*, on the other hand, is missing when there is a simple accusative for a movement toward a place.⁶⁸ But if the movement is toward a person, the missing preposition is *πρός*, as in *Πηλείωνα δ' ἰκέσθαι* ('to go to the son of Peleus') for *πρὸς Πηλείωνα* (*Sch. Il.* 24.338a^{1,2}). Moreover, *πρός* can be omitted with *verba dicendi* followed by simple accusative.⁶⁹ In one of these cases, Aristarchus highlights the tendency to omit prepositions as typically Homeric:

Sch. Il. 20.375 Ἑκτορα εἶπε: ὅτι ἐλλείπει ἡ πρὸς πρόθεσις, πρὸς Ἑκτορα. καίτοι παρὴν εἰπεῖν Ἑκτορι εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ συνήθως παρέλιπε τὴν πρόθεσιν. 'καὶ τότε' ἄρ' Αἴας εἶπε βοὴν ἀγαθὸν Μενέλαον' (*Il.* 17.237).

'He spoke to Hector (Ἑκτορα)': because the preposition *πρός* is missing, [i.e., Ἑκτορα is used instead of] *πρὸς Ἑκτορα*. And, still, it was possible to say 'he said (εἶπεν) to Hector (Ἑκτορι)', but [Homer] omitted the preposition as is usual for him: [e.g.,] 'and then Ajax said (εἶπε) to Menelaus (Μενέλαον), good at the war cry' (Il. 17.237).

64. Aristarchus' interpretation was perhaps linked to a famous *zetema* about the springs of Scamander; see *Sch. Il.* 22.147b^{1,2} (ex.); Strabo 13.1.43; Porph. *QH Il.* 256.24–257.10; cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 183; Richardson 1993, 124; van Thiel 2014a, III 386.

65. *Sch. Il.* 4.244b; 5.222b; 6.2c; 6.38a; 6.507b¹; 8.106b; 13.64a; 13.820; 14.147b; 18.7a; 21.247a; 21.602a; 22.23a^{1,2}; 22.26; 23.364; 23.372c; 23.475a; 23.518; 23.521a^{1,2}; cf. also *Sch. Il.* 10.353.

66. *Sch. Il.* 12.211a; 15.432a; 24.306a^{1,2}.

67. *Sch. Il.* 8.3. The preposition *ἐπὶ* is also missing with a dative when indicating the reason for a certain feeling (*Sch. Il.* 10.277a; 13.82d).

68. *Sch. Il.* 10.195; 11.405 (where *φῆβωμαι* means *φύγω*, as *Sch. Il.* 11.404 explains); 18.291a¹; 21.40a; see also *Sch. Il.* 8.47–8a.

69. *Sch. Il.* 12.60b; 12.210; 12.365; 13.725a^{1,2}; 17.334b (Ariston.); 17.651; 20.375; cf. also *Sch. Il.* 17.237 (below, footnote 72).

Homer could have said Ἑκτορι εἶπεν with a dative (as, for example, in *Il.* 17.691–692), but preferred the accusative, which implies an omission of πρὸς, because this is typical of his style.⁷⁰ In addition to other cases where prepositions are missing in a phrase,⁷¹ prepositions can also be omitted in verbs. For example, in a sentence such as αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐχώμεθα δηϊοτῆτος, ‘let us keep away from the battle’, according to Aristarchus, the preverb ἀπο- is missing (*Sch. Il.* 14.129b: ἐλλείπει ἢ ἀπὸ πρόθεσις, ἀπεχώμεθα).⁷²

The omissions of prepositions and of articles are the most important syntactic ellipses in Homer, but they are not the only ones pointed out by Aristarchus: for him, Homer can also omit the negative μή when referring to a subjunctive (e.g., οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι instead of the expected οὐδὲ μὴ ἴδωμαι in *Il.* 1.262);⁷³ or he can omit ἵνα in the case of an independent subjunctive in a paratactic construction with a meaning close to a final clause—which Aristarchus obviously understands as a final clause where the introductory conjunction ‘is missing’.⁷⁴ Other ellipses concern semantics more than syntax: when, for example, Aristarchus observes that Homer has omitted an adverb,⁷⁵ the indefinite pronoun τις,⁷⁶ a noun,⁷⁷ or the comparative ὥς.⁷⁸ Here the aim is not so much to discuss Homeric syntax compared to Koine, but to make the sense of the sentence clear.

70. Similarly, *Sch. Il.* 2.356a¹, which discusses the lack of περί with a verb indicating suffering because of someone (see above, footnote 60), concludes: παραλειπτικός γὰρ προθέσεων ἐστὶν ὁ ποιητής [for the poet tends to omit prepositions]. On this scholium, see Chapter 5.2 § 2.2.

71. E.g., ἐκ/ἐξ in *Sch. Il.* 2.576; 5.6a.b; ἐπὶ in *Sch. Il.* 15.395b (with accusative); κατὰ in *Sch. Il.* 9.160; 14.249b (Hrd.); σύν in *Sch. Il.* 8.24; 9.542a; ὑπέρ in *Sch. Il.* 12.155; ὑπό in *Sch. Il.* 6.331b; 11.667b; 16.81a.

72. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.148a (ἐπαιγίζων: . . . ὅτι χωρὶς προθέσεως εἶρηκεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπικαταιγίζων [ἐπαιγίζων (‘rushing upon’): . . . because he has said it without preposition, instead of ἐπικαταιγίζων]); 17.237 (εἶπε βοὴν ἀγαθὸν Μενέλαον: . . . ὅτι ἢ πρὸς ἐλλείπει, ἢ ἢ προσεῖπε τὸν Μενέλαον [εἶπε βοὴν ἀγαθὸν Μενέλαον (‘he spoke to Menelaus, good at the war cry’): because the [preposition] πρὸς is missing, so that it is προσεῖπε τὸν Μενέλαον]); 24.17a (πανέσκετο: . . . ὅτι παρείται ἢ ἀνά, καὶ ἔστιν ἀναπανέσκετο [πανέσκετο (‘he would rest’): . . . because the [preposition] ἀνά has been left out, and it is ἀναπανέσκετο]).

73. *Sch. Il.* 1.262b (οὐδὲ ἴδωμαι: ὅτι παραλείπεται ἢ μὴ ἀπαγόρευσις· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδὲ μὴ ἴδωμαι). This example is also listed by Lesb. *Fig.* § 20A. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 547 (fr. 166). As Chantraine 1953–1958, II 209, clarifies, the negative οὐ in *Il.* 1.262 means that the subjunctive is used as an emphatic future.

74. *Sch. Il.* 23.71a; 23.75; 23.97–8. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 575–576 (fr. 174). On this use of the subjunctive, see Chantraine 1953–1958, II 207 and 266.

75. *Sch. Il.* 8.16a.

76. *Sch. Il.* 4.307a; 13.287c^{1,2}; 20.223b.

77. *Sch. Il.* 3.126c; 3.263.

78. *Sch. Il.* 5.339b (Ariston.?); 5.633–4 (Ariston.?); 18.596b; see Chapter 3.2.A § 4.

3. Enallage ([ἐν]αλλάσσειν, [ἐν]αλλαγή)

Ancient grammarians and authors of treatises of *schemata* were very much concerned with enallages, or ‘changes’, of a grammatical category into another. For example, in the first part dedicated to the σχήματα ἐν λέξει (§§ 1–9), Pseudo-Herodian lists the following *schemata* involving ‘changes’, which he calls ἐξαλλάξεις: changes of grades in adjectives (§ 2), of gender in nominal forms (§ 3), of cases (§ 4), of number between predicates and their subjects (§ 5), of moods (§ 6), of persons (§ 7),⁷⁹ of tenses (§ 8), and of voices (§ 9). Lesbonax provides a more detailed list of these ‘changes’, which often overlaps with Aristarchus’ analysis. As for the Aristonicus scholia, the technical terms used to indicate these ‘changes’ are (ἐν)αλλαγή (from which the modern term ‘enallage’ derives) or the verb (ἐν)ήλλακται, ‘[the form] has changed’. In particular, these labels indicate the following phenomena: change of preposition (πρόθεσις),⁸⁰ change of case (πτῶσις),⁸¹ change of case and preposition,⁸² change of tense (χρόνος⁸³),⁸⁴ change of verbal form (ῥῆμα),⁸⁵ change of verbal form and tense (ῥῆμα καὶ χρόνος).⁸⁶

Even if the expressions (ἐν)αλλαγή and (ἐν)ήλλακται are used only with reference to three parts of speech, namely, nouns, verbs, and prepositions, and only for specific ‘changes’, there are other syntactic changes that Aristarchus noticed. In fact, the Aristonicus scholia often express enallage by replacing the Homeric form with the Koine one, introducing it with the typical formula for paraphrases: ἀντὶ τοῦ/τῆς. Thus, the change of prepositions can be signaled with the mention of the two prepositions and ἀντί, for example, ἡ ‘πρό’ ἀντὶ

79. Pseudo-Herodian here speaks specifically of ἀποστροφή, when the poet ‘turns away’ (ἀποστρέφειν) from speaking of his characters in the third person to addressing them directly in the second person; this phenomenon will be discussed in Chapter 3.6.C § 2.5. Other changes of persons will be discussed below, at § 3.8.

80. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 7.407a.

81. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.171a; 2.148a; 3.138a; 3.211a¹; 4.331a; 4.334–5a¹; 6.479–80a¹; 9.632b; 10.35a¹; 10.298b; 11.600b; 11.606b; 13.205; 13.217a; 13.275b; 13.474a; 13.477a; 13.502a¹; 13.557; 13.575; 13.649a¹; 14.218; 14.402b; 15.87b; 15.178; 15.376b; 15.449–51a; 15.462; 15.464; 16.326a¹; 17.2a; 17.125a; 17.242a¹.b; 21.37b; 21.541a¹.

82. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 22.153a.

83. A note on terminology: for Aristarchus, χρόνος is ‘tense’, and ῥῆμα is ‘verbal form’ in general, not only ‘mood’, as explained by Matthaios 1999, 329–331, 356–360, 368–371, 413–414, 415–416.

84. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.164; 1.168a; 2.286; 6.87a¹; 9.156a; 13.346b; 14.25; 18.583a; 21.33b; 22.67b; 22.356a. In *Sch. Il.* 5.85a and 13.127a¹ the ‘change of tense’ concerns an aorist indicative and an aorist optative, because, as suggested by Matthaios 1999, 369, Aristarchus probably considered the optative (esp. the potential optative) as a future in meaning.

85. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.137; 4.176a; 10.44; 13.343; 13.344; 14.235a. In these examples, the ‘change of ῥῆμα’ concerns a change of mood but in some cases (*Sch. Il.* 4.176a; 13.343) of tense as well (see footnote 83 above).

86. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 4.539a; 5.311a; 17.70a¹.

τῆς ὑπέρ' (*Sch. Il.* 10.286a), sometimes followed by a further rephrasing of the entire syntagm.⁸⁷ Similarly, a change of case can be indicated by a translation into Koine, e.g., ὑπὸ χειρῶν: . . . ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ χειρῶν' (*Sch. Il.* 19.62a¹), or by explaining the enallage by naming the two cases that are 'exchanged', e.g., τῇ γενικῇ ἀντὶ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς, '[he uses] the genitive instead of the accusative' (*Sch. Il.* 4.357a¹). For verbs, the change of tense or mood follows the same rules: the name of the two tenses or moods with ἀντὶ (τοῦ), as in *Sch. Il.* 5.263a: ὅτι τῷ ἀπαρεμφάτῳ ἀντὶ προστακτικοῦ ἐχρήσατο, 'because he used the infinitive instead of the imperative'; or with the mention of the two specific verbal forms, e.g., τὸ ἄγω ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄγοιμι' (*Sch. Il.* 1.184). In addition, the formula ἀντὶ τοῦ' also introduces many other syntactic changes for which the terms (ἐν)αλλαγὴ and (ἐν)ῆλλακται are never employed, namely, change of voice,⁸⁸ change of number,⁸⁹ change of gender,⁹⁰ change of article (e.g., what looks like a Koine article is used instead of the relative pronoun),⁹¹ and change of an adverb into a preposition.⁹²

3.1. Enallage of Articles

Ancient grammarians divided 'articles' into two categories, the προτακτικὰ ἄρθρα, 'prepositive articles', and the ὑποτακτικὰ ἄρθρα, 'postpositive articles'. The former were the 'real' articles because they were 'put before' the noun to which they referred, while the latter were the relative pronouns because they were 'put after' the noun to which they referred.⁹³ From his reading of the Homeric poems, Aristarchus concluded that, compared with Koine usage, Homer tended to 'omit' prepositive articles, that is, 'real' articles (see above, § 2.1). This was a general rule; yet sometimes the presence of prepositive articles was undeniable in Homer. Aristarchus thus had to give a reason for their presence, and indeed he developed an interesting set of explanations, very clearly surveyed by Stephanos Matthaios.⁹⁴ I would like to analyze only a couple of cases here. Aristarchus sometimes explains the presence of articles as due to the fact that

87. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 6.92a ἐπὶ γούνασιν: ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι ἀντὶ τῆς παρά, ἵν' ἢ 'παρὰ γούνασιν' [ἐπὶ γούνασιν ('by the knees'): the *diple*, because [ἐπὶ is used] instead of παρά, so that it is παρὰ γούνασιν].

88. E.g., 'passive instead of active' (παθητικὸν ἀντὶ ἐνεργητικοῦ) in *Sch. Il.* 3.306–10; 9.297; 10.188a; 'active instead of passive' (ἐνεργητικὸν ἀντὶ παθητικοῦ) in *Sch. Il.* 4.45a.

89. E.g., 'in the plural instead of in the singular' (πληθυντικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνικῶς) in *Sch. Il.* 1.14a.

90. E.g., 'χόλῳ in the masculine instead of χολῇ' (χόλῳ ἀρσενικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ χολῇ) in *Sch. Il.* 16.203a.

91. E.g., 'ὅ instead of ὅς' (τὸ ὅ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅς) in *Sch. Il.* 22.480a¹; see below, § 3.1.

92. E.g., 'εἴσω instead of εἷς' (τὸ εἴσω ἀντὶ τοῦ εἷς) in *Sch. Il.* 1.71a.

93. On the προτακτικὰ ἄρθρα and the ὑποτακτικὰ ἄρθρα, see Matthaios 1999, 433 and 508–509.

94. Matthaios 1999, 432–443 and 515 (frs. 96–102).

Homer uses prepositive articles (προτακτικὰ ἄρθρα) instead of relative pronouns (ὑποτακτικὰ ἄρθρα):

Sch. Il. 22.480a¹ <ὃ μ' ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἐοῦσαν:> . . . καὶ ὅτι τὸ ὃ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅς.

‘[Of Eëtion], who (ὃ) raised me when I was a child’: . . . and because ὃ [is used] instead of ὅς.

Sch. Il. 24.180 <νεκρὸν . . . , τὸν ἔκτανε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς:> ὅτι νεκρὸν, ὃν ἔκτανε.

‘The corpse . . . whom (τὸν) noble Achilles killed’: because [it is used instead of] νεκρὸν, ὃν ἔκτανε.⁹⁵

Of course, this is a ‘functional’ explanation, not a linguistically correct analysis of this feature.⁹⁶ On the other hand, the most common reason provided by Aristarchus for what looks like an article in Homer is that these forms are not ‘real’ articles but are used instead of demonstrative pronouns,⁹⁷ an explanation very close to our modern understanding of the question.⁹⁸ For example, when at *Il.* 10.321 Dolon tells Hector to swear that he will repay him if he volunteers to go and spy on the Greeks, he says ‘τὸ σκῆπτρον ἀνάσχεο’. Aristarchus clarifies that it does not mean ‘lift *the* scepter’, but rather ‘lift *this* scepter *here*’, as if Dolon were pointing to the object which Hector was carrying (*Sch. Il.* 10.321a: ἀντὶ <τοῦ> τοῦτο τὸ σκῆπτρον. ἐφόρει δὲ Ἑκτωρ, ἐπεὶ ἐδημηγόρει).⁹⁹ When the supposed ‘article’ was in the genitive, Aristarchus could also adopt a different solution. For instance, at *Il.* 9.133 Agamemnon states that he never had intercourse with Briseis, since he never went to ‘her bed’ (τῆς εὐνῆς):

95. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.151a^{1,2}. On the odd phrasing ‘the corpse . . . whom (τὸν) noble Achilles killed’ (*Il.* 24.151 = *Il.* 24.180), see below, § 7.2.

96. For the modern view, see Monro 1891, § 262; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 166–168. Given Homer’s habit of using prepositive articles instead of postpositive ones, Aristarchus athetizes *Il.* 8.524–525, because these lines are unnecessary and because the opposite phenomenon occurs, namely, the postpositive ὅς is used instead of the prepositive ὃ (*Sch. Il.* 8.524–5). On the enallages involving prepositive and postpositive articles, see Matthaios 1999, 433–434 (frs. 96–97); Schironi 2002; Schironi 2004, 77–84 (fr. 5).

97. *Sch. Il.* 2.576; 5.268; 9.133a^{1,2}; 10.321a; 10.322; 10.330b; 15.464; 19.105a (ex. [Ariston.?]); 19.176 (Ariston.?). Cf. Friedländer 1853, 30; Matthaios 1999, 437–440 (fr. 100).

98. See bibliography quoted in footnote 53.

99. See also *Sch. Il.* 5.268 (τῆς γενεῆς ἔκλεψεν: ἀντὶ τοῦ ταύτης. . . , ἵν’ ᾗ ‘ταύτης τῆς γενεῆς’) and *Sch. Il.* 10.330b (τοῖς ἵπποισιν: ὅτι καὶ νῦν τοῖς ἀντὶ <τοῦ> τούτοις τοῖς ἵπποις).

Sch. Il. 9.133a¹ μήποτε τῆς εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι: ὅτι ἔξωθεν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ ἄρθρον· τὸ γὰρ ‘τῆς’ νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ ταύτης παρείληπται, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος ‘μήποτε τῆς ταύτης εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι’.

‘[I swear a great oath] that I never mounted her (τῆς) bed’: because we must supply the article from outside; for now τῆς has been used instead of ταύτης and the phrase means: ‘that I never mounted the bed (τῆς . . . εὐνῆς) of her (ταύτης)’.

This line is tricky, as the Homeric usage could seem similar to Koine, since a Hellenistic reader would have easily understood τῆς εὐνῆς as an article followed by a noun (‘of the bed’). Thus, Aristarchus points out that this is a mistake because τῆς looks like an article but, in reality, it is not, as here it means ταύτης, ‘of her’, i.e., ‘of Briseis’. Instead, the real article referring to εὐνῆς is ‘omitted’ by Homer and must be supplied. As a result, the meaning of the line is slightly different, as the paraphrase makes clear (‘of the bed of her’, i.e., Briseis’ bed). In other words, this time the demonstrative τῆς does not refer to the noun in the genitive (εὐνῆς) but rather to another feminine noun (Briseis).¹⁰⁰ In its didactic tone, this note may reflect Aristarchus’ teaching practice. He had to explain to his pupils the peculiar use of articles in Homer: though they seemed to be articles, they were in fact used in place of pronouns (ἐν τάξει ἀντωνυμίας as in *Sch. Il.* 10.322),¹⁰¹ and thus they corresponded to the Koine forms οὗτος, αὗτη, or τοῦτο.¹⁰²

3.2. Enallage of Prepositions

Homer often uses prepositions different from those used in Koine. A direct quotation from his commentary preserved by Didymus provides an excellent starting point from which to analyze Aristarchus’ approach to this problem:¹⁰³

100. Interestingly, this is the same solution suggested for *Il.* 9.133 by Chantraine 1953–1958, II 164 (*Remarques*). Aristarchus also gives the same explanations in *Sch. Il.* 2.576 τῶν ἑκατὸν νηῶν <ἦρχε>: ὅτι τὸ ‘τῶν’ οὐχ ὡς ἄρθρον παρείληπται, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ ἀντωνυμίας τῆς τούτων, καὶ παραλέλειπται ἡ ἐκ πρόθεσις, ἵν’ ᾗ ‘ἐκ τούτων τῶν πόλεων ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχεν’ [‘Of these [Agamemnon] led one hundred ships’: because τῶν has not been used as an article, but instead of the pronoun τούτων, and the preposition ἐκ has been omitted, so that it is: ‘[Agamemnon] led one hundred ships from these cities’].

101. On Aristarchus’ knowledge of the word ἀντωνυμία, see Matthaios 1999, 444–446 (fr. 103).

102. As Matthaios 1999, 440, explains: “Aristarch vertritt nicht die Auffassung, daß die Artikel im homerischen Text für Pronomina eintreten, sondern daß die artikelähnlichen Formen Pronomina seien”. According to Matthaios 1999, 437–440, in claiming that, in Homer, what looks like an article is in fact a pronoun, Aristarchus was arguing against the Stoics, who maintained that Homer mistakenly used ‘real’ articles instead of the correct pronominal forms.

103. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 592–597, who analyzes many of the examples presented here (frs. 185–194).

Sch. Il. 1.423–4 (Did.) <Ζεὺς . . . μετ’ ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας /> χθιζὸς ἔβη <κατὰ δαῖτα, θεοὶ δ’ ἅμα πάντες ἔπονται>: λέξις Ἀριστάρχου ἐκ τοῦ Α τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὑπομνήματος. “τὸ μὲν ‘μετ’ ἀμύμονας’ (l. 423) ἐπ’ ἀμύμονας, ὃ ἐστι πρὸς ἀμώμους, ἀγαθούς, τὸ δὲ ‘κατὰ δαῖτα’ (l. 424) ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ δαῖτα· οὕτως γὰρ νῦν Ὅμηρος τέθεικεν. ἔνιοι δὲ ποιοῦσι ‘μετὰ δαῖτα’, ὅπως ἦ αὐτοῖς αὐτόθεν τὸ μετὰ ἐπὶ. χρῶνται δὲ καὶ πλείονες ἄλλοι τῶν ποιητῶν τῇ κατὰ ἀντὶ τῆς ἐπὶ. Σοφοκλῆς ‘ἐγὼ κατ’ αὐτόν, ὡς ὁρᾷς, ἐξέρχομαι’ (*TrGF* 4, fr. 898)”.

‘Yesterday Zeus went to Oceanus, to the blameless Ethiopians (μετ’ ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας) for a banquet (κατὰ δαῖτα), and the rest of the gods are following’: quotation of Aristarchus from the commentary to *Iliad* 1: “the [expression] μετ’ ἀμύμονας (l. 423) [is used instead of] ἐπ’ ἀμύμονας, which means ‘to the faultless, valorous [Ethiopians]’; the [expression] κατὰ δαῖτα (l. 424) [is used] instead of ἐπὶ δαῖτα, for this is how Homer has used it here. Some, however, write μετὰ δαῖτα, so that for them μετὰ is simply ἐπὶ. But the majority of the other poets also use κατὰ instead of ἐπὶ. Sophocles [has]: ‘as you see, I am going to (κατὰ) him’ (*TrGF* 4, fr. 898)”.¹⁰⁴

In two consecutive lines, Homer has used prepositions that are different from the ones expected in normal Koine usage. Yet this is fine, because poets often change prepositions. In particular, they often use κατὰ instead of ἐπὶ, as Sophocles also demonstrates. Therefore, there is no need to alter κατὰ δαῖτα into μετὰ δαῖτα (as some did), or into the Koine ἐπὶ δαῖτα.¹⁰⁵

Aristarchus often notices enallages of prepositions in Homer: for example, to indicate movement toward a person Homer uses εἰς instead of πρὸς with accusative (which might sound odd, but is correct in Homer);¹⁰⁶ he also uses μετὰ instead of ἐν with dative in μετ’ ἀνθρώποισι, ‘among men’ (*Sch. Il.* 3.460); ἐπὶ instead of παρὰ with dative in ἐπ’ ὄεσσι ‘by the sheep’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.25a), in ἐπὶ γούνασιν, ‘by the knees’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.92a.b; 6.273; 6.303),¹⁰⁷ and in ἐπὶ πλατεῖ

104. The change of prepositions as such is not listed by Pseudo-Herodian or Lesbonax. The latter, however, analyzes the example of *Il.* 1.423–424 (*Fig.* § 7), but for him it is a change of preposition *and* case (a category analyzed below, at § 3.4); this is because Lesbonax ‘translates’ μετ’ ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας with ἐν τοῖς ἀμύμοσιν Αἰθίοσιν, whereby ἐν + dative is a substitute for μετὰ + accusative.

105. Cf. Wecklein 1919, 52; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 130–131.

106. *Sch. Il.* 6.252a; 7.312a; 22.492; 23.36a (σημειῶσαι ὅτι τῇ εἰς ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων· ὥφειλε γὰρ τὴν πρὸς) and 23.36b (ex. [Ariston.]).

107. This specific interpretation of ἐπὶ γούνασιν as παρὰ γούνασιν, to mean ‘by the knees’ and not ‘on the knees’ is given because the phrase in all these passages in Book 6 refers to the Palladium, which depicts a standing, not a seated, Athena, as Aristonicus clarifies (*Sch. Il.* 6.92a): ἐπὶ γούνασιν: ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι ἀντὶ τῆς παρὰ, ἔν’ ἣ ‘παρὰ γούνασιν’. ὀρθὰ γὰρ τὰ Παλλάδια κατεσκευάσται . . . [ἐπὶ γούνασιν (‘by the knees’): the *diple*, because [ἐπὶ is used] instead of παρὰ, so that it is παρὰ γούνασιν (‘at the knees’); for the Palladia are built standing [i.e., they are not seated statues]]. Cf. Roemer 1924, 45–46; van Thiel 2014a, I 490.

Ἑλλησπόντῳ ‘by the wide Hellespont’ (*Sch. Il.* 7.86a); πρό instead of ὑπέρ with genitive in πρὸ Ἀχαιῶν, ‘for the Achaeans’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.286a) or instead of ὑπό with genitive in πρὸ φόβοιο, ‘because of the rout’ (*Sch. Il.* 17.667a). An anastrophe like δαΐδων ὕπο, ‘under torches’, is explained as equivalent to μετὰ δάδων, ‘with torches’ (*Sch. Il.* 18.492b). Changes of preposition also involve preverbs: in *Sch. Il.* 7.407a, Aristarchus analyzes the Homeric ὑποκρίνονται, ‘they answer’, in the following terms: ‘the preposition has changed: [ὑποκρίνονται is used] instead of ἀποκρίνονται’—ἀποκρίνεσθαι is indeed the Koine and Attic form for ‘to answer’, ‘to reply to a question’.¹⁰⁸

3.3. Enallage of Case

According to Aristarchus, cases also ‘changed’ in Homer when the text presented a case that was not the one expected in Koine Greek.¹⁰⁹ For example, the verb ἀνάσσειν, ‘to rule over’, generally takes the genitive, especially in classical authors; Homer, however, often uses it with the locative dative, and when this happens ‘the case has changed’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.217a: ὅτι πτώσις ἥλλακται).

The cases of a double accusative for the whole and the part are particularly problematic.¹¹⁰ Aristarchus interprets the accusative for the whole as used instead of a genitive of possession; for example, the *formula* τὸν δὲ σκότος ὅσσε κάλυψε, ‘darkness covered him [in] his eyes’, is paraphrased as τοῦ δὲ σκότος ὅσσε [κάλυψε], that is, literally, ‘darkness covered the eyes of him’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.575).¹¹¹ Another case of double accusative is the phrase τεύχεα /εὖχος/ θυμὸν ἀπηύρα + the name of the slain hero in the accusative (‘he took the amour/glory/life from . . .’), in which Aristarchus explains that the name of the hero in the accusative, instead of the regular genitive, is due to a change of case.¹¹²

108. See also *Sch. Il.* 12.228a.

109. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 4, mentions this *schema* but only gives a few examples; Lesb. *Fig.* §§ 22A and 27B (dative instead of nominative or accusative); § 8 (dative instead of genitive); § 14B (accusative instead of dative with verbs); §§ 10, 17A, and 20B (genitive instead of dative); § 21A (genitive instead of dative with verbs); § 11 (accusative instead of dative or genitive with verbs); § 12 (accusative instead of genitive with nouns); § 13A (nominative instead of genitive or dative); §§ 19A, 23A, 23B, 24B (nominative instead of accusative and vice versa). On Aristarchus’ concept of case, see Matthaios 1999, 284–289, who briefly touches upon the ἐναλλαγὰι τῶν πτώσεων (Matthaios 1999, 284–286, frs. 39–47). Cf. also Friedländer 1853, 18–24; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 184.

110. On this type of double accusative, see Monro 1891, § 141; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 42.

111. Other double accusatives of the whole and of the part for which Aristarchus ‘translates’ the accusative of the whole as a genitive are *Sch. Il.* 8.124a (Ἑκτορα δ’ αἰνὸν ἄχος πύκασε φρένας, ‘terrible pain covered Hector in his mind’); 11.583b (μὲν βάλε μηρόν, ‘he hit him on the thigh’); 21.166a (μὲν πῆχυν . . . βάλε, ‘he hit him on the forearm’, a construction defined ἀρχαϊκῶς in the scholium; see Chapter 5.1 § 1.2); 24.58c (γυναικὰ τε θήσατο μάζον, ‘and (Hector) suckled the breast of a woman’, a construction defined in the scholium as Ὀμηρικὸν ἔθος). The final example is also discussed by Lesb. *Fig.* § 12.

112. *Sch. Il.* 6.17c¹; 10.495; 15.462; 17.125a; 20.290a^{1.2}. Similar are the cases discussed in *Sch. Il.* 1.275b; 5.156.

Another common instance of change of case is the dative of possession, which for Aristarchus is used ‘instead of the genitive’:¹¹³ for example, he paraphrases οἱ ἔγχος, ‘his spear’, as αὐτοῦ τὸ ἔγχος (*Sch. Il.* 13.557).¹¹⁴ In particular, when commenting on *Il.* 1.24, ‘but [this] did not please (ἦνδανε) the heart of Agamemnon, son of Atreus (Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι . . . θυμῷ)’, he censures Zenodotus, who read Ἀτρεΐδεω Ἀγαμέμνονος in order to have a more regular genitive, instead of the dative; this reading, however, is against the Homeric usage (*Sch. Il.* 1.24a: ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς δοτικὴν ἀντὶ γενικῆς παραλαμβάνει).¹¹⁵

Enallages also involve the nominative and vocative: Homer can use the nominative instead of the vocative¹¹⁶ and vice versa. The latter enallage explains the Homeric forms of masculine nominatives in -α: Θυέστα (*Sch. Il.* 2.107a), αἰχμητά (*Sch. Il.* 5.197), κυανοχαῖτα (*Sch. Il.* 13.563a), and ἀκάκητα (*Sch. Il.* 16.185b). Though still debated today, they are considered archaic formations.¹¹⁷ Aristarchus, however, does not perceive any diachronic development: he defines them as vocatives (*hic et nunc*) used ‘instead of nominatives’, so as a change of case.¹¹⁸

Changes of case could also occur in prepositional phrases where the preposition would normally expect another case.¹¹⁹ For example, Aristarchus explains διὰ τ’ ἔντεα καὶ μέλαν αἷμα, ‘through the arms and the black blood’, as a change of case (*Sch. Il.* 10.298b; 10.469a) because Koine Greek would use διὰ with genitive to express movement through a place, and not διὰ with accusative.¹²⁰ This clarification was perhaps particularly necessary because διὰ with accusative is also common in Koine Greek, but with a causal and not a local meaning, the latter being only an epic and lyric usage.¹²¹ Other Homeric peculiarities noted by Aristarchus are ἐπί + dative or genitive instead of ἐπί + accusative in the sense of motion toward or onto something;¹²² ὑπό + dative rather than ὑπό + genitive for the agent,¹²³ especially in the expression ὑπὸ χερσίν, ‘by the hand (of . . .)’ instead of ὑπὸ χειρῶν (*Sch. Il.* 18.11; 19.62a¹).

113. On this use of the dative, close to the genitive, see Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 189–190; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 71.

114. See also *Sch. Il.* 3.138a; 5.300; 10.559; 14.218; 15.178; 17.7.

115. This example is discussed also by Lesb. *Fig.* § 8. Aristarchus also notices cases of ‘dative instead of genitive’ in *Sch. Il.* 5.298 (‘to drag away from . . .’) and 10.574 (‘to wash away from . . .’).

116. *Sch. Il.* 3.277a^{1,2}; 4.189b.

117. These forms have been variously explained: see Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 560.

118. This detail is of paramount importance to analyzing Aristarchus’ approach to Homeric language and his view of ‘grammar’ (see conclusions, below, at § 8). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 257.

119. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 605–608 (frs. 215–220).

120. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.190a^{1,2}.

121. See Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 452–453.

122. ἐπί + dative in *Sch. Il.* 2.89b; 2.148a; 4.251a (but the bT scholium, *Sch. Il.* 4.251b, recasts it as πρὸς + accusative); 5.14b; ἐπί + genitive in *Sch. Il.* 5.249c; 5.700a (a construction defined as ‘Attic’; see Chapter 5.1 § 2.2).

123. *Sch. Il.* 11.121a; 11.262.

The idea of enallage allowed Aristarchus to accept even the most problematic examples of Homeric syntax. For example, when Homer uses a participle in the nominative in an anacoluthic construction where the accusative would be more natural, Aristarchus simply calls the change of case ‘incongruous’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.353a¹: ὅτι ἀκαταλλήλως εἴρηται), but does not emend or alter the text, as far as we can tell.¹²⁴ Another example is the pending nominative in *Il.* 3.211: ‘when the two of them were sitting (ἄμφω δ’ ἐζομένω), Odysseus was the more majestic’. Aristarchus considers ἄμφω δ’ ἐζομένω a nominative instead of a genitive and rebukes Zenodotus for having tried to ‘normalize’ the text:

Sch. Il. 3.211a¹ ἄμφω δ’ ἐζομένω <γεραρώτερος ἦεν Ὀδυσσεύς>: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος σὺν τῷ ν γράφει ‘ἐζομένων’. τὸ δὲ ἄμφω δύο πτώσεις ἔχει, ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ νῦν λέγει ‘ἀμφοτέροι δὲ καθήμενοι’, κατ’ ἐναλλαγὴν πτώσεως, ἀντὶ τοῦ καθημένων δὲ ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ ἔστι σύνηθες ὡς ἐπ’ ἐκείνου· ‘οἱ δὲ δύο σκόπελοι, ὁ μὲν’ (*Od.* 12.73), ἀντὶ <τοῦ> τῶν δύο σκοπέλων.

‘When the two of them were sitting (ἄμφω δ’ ἐζομένω), Odysseus was the more majestic’: because Zenodotus writes ἐζομένων with ν. Ἄμφω has two cases, ἀμφοτέροι and ἀμφοτέρους [i.e., nominative and accusative]. And now he says ἀμφοτέροι δὲ καθήμενοι, with a change of case, instead of καθημένων δὲ ἀμφοτέρων. And this is usual [for Homer], as in that example: ‘And the two promontories (οἱ δὲ δύο σκόπελοι), one . . .’ (*Od.* 12.73), [οἱ δύο σκόπελοι is used] instead of τῶν δύο σκοπέλων.¹²⁵

3.4. Enallage of Case and Enallage, or Ellipsis, of Preposition

With the figures of enallage and ellipsis Aristarchus could thus explain many Homeric syntactic oddities. In fact, he could even combine the two ideas to account for other, more complex constructions. For example, a change of preposition could occur together with a change of case. In *Il.* 22.153, when Hector flees from Achilles outside Troy, they reach the two springs where the Trojan women washed their clothes: ‘And there near them (ἐπ’ αὐτάων) are broad washing tanks’. Here, according to Aristarchus, Homer has changed the

124. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.353a². Similar cases of anacolutha with a pending nominative are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 5.245a (ἡ διπλὴ πρὸς τὴν ιδιότητα τῆς φράσεως· ἀκόλουθον γὰρ ἦν εἰπεῖν . . .) and 5.245b (ex. [Ariston.]); 6.510a and 6.510–1a² (see Chapter 4 § 1.5.1). All these cases are also listed by Lesb. *Fig.* §§ 23A, 23B, 24B.

125. See also *Sch. Il.* 3.211a². Similar pending nominatives used instead of genitive absolutes or partitive genitives are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 7.306–7a; 10.224a^{1,2}; 16.317a. Lesb. *Fig.* § 13A also lists the examples of *Il.* 3.211 and 16.317, as well as of *Od.* 12.73. On these anacoluthic nominatives, see Chantraine 1953–1958, II 15–16 and 323.

case and preposition and, instead of the Koine *παρ' αὐταῖς*, 'beside them', uses *ἐπ' αὐτάων* (*Sch. Il.* 22.153a: ὅτι πρόθεσις ἥλλακται καὶ πτώσις, ἀντὶ τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς). On the other hand, when the same prepositional phrase, *ἐπί* + genitive, indicates movement toward a place, Aristarchus rephrases it as *εἰς* + accusative and labels it as an Attic peculiarity (*Sch. Il.* 3.5: ἐπ' Ὀκεανοῖο ῥοάων· ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς ῥοάς, Ἀττικῶς).¹²⁶

Homer can also present a simple case in situations where Koine Greek uses another case plus a preposition, so that at the same time there is ellipsis of the preposition and enallage of the case.¹²⁷ Examples discussed by Aristarchus include the dative of agent, used instead of *ὑπό* + genitive;¹²⁸ the dative of cause, used instead of *διὰ* + accusative;¹²⁹ the simple dative with the verb *δέχεσθαι*, 'to take', 'to accept' (from someone), used instead of *παρά* + genitive;¹³⁰ and the simple genitive with verbs meaning 'aiming at' or 'moving closer to', used instead of *ἐπί* + accusative.¹³¹

3.5. Other Enallages in Nominal Forms: Gender and Number

For Aristarchus gender, too, was subject to 'changes'¹³²—for example, when Homer connects feminine nouns with masculine adjectives¹³³ or participles.¹³⁴ For this reason, in *Il.* 15.626 he accepts the feminine noun *ἀήτη* with a masculine epithet, *δεινός*, to mean 'terrible blast':

126. See Chapter 5.1 § 2.2. Other changes of case and of preposition are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 1.593a^{1,2} ([Did.]; ἐν + dative instead of εἰς + accusative) and 13.493a (ἐκ + genitive instead of μετὰ + accusative); cf. Matthaios 1999, 596 (frs. 193–194). In the latter case, in particular, Aristarchus notes that such changes of case and preposition have parallels in 'modern (= Koine) usage': *Sch. Il.* 13.493a πόμεν' ἐκ βοτάνης: ὅτι 'ἐκ βοτάνης' ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν βόσκησιν, ὡς λέγομεν 'ἐξ ἀρίστου παρέσομαι' ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὸ ἄριστον ['from the pasture to drink': because 'from the pasture' (ἐκ βοτάνης) is 'after the pasture' (μετὰ τὴν βόσκησιν), just as we say 'I will be there away from lunch (ἐξ ἀρίστου)' instead of 'after lunch (μετὰ τὸ ἄριστον)'].

127. Pseudo-Herodian does not mention this type of ἐναλλαγή. Lesbos has only the cases of dative instead of *παρά* + genitive (§ 9) and of dative instead of *διὰ* + accusative (§§ 16A, 18B). On Aristarchus' analysis of these types of figures, see Matthaios 1999, 602–604, where other cases are also analyzed (frs. 205–210).

128. *Sch. Il.* 6.398a; 13.16a^{1,2}; 15.376b; 16.326a^{1,2}; 17.2a; 18.103; 18.461; 22.40; 22.55; 22.110a^{1,2}. Aristarchus also understands the simple datives in 'his eyes blaze with fire (*πυρὶ λάμπετον*)' (*Sch. Il.* 13.474a) and 'rough with thirst' (*δίψῃ καρχαλέοι*)' (*Sch. Il.* 21.541a^{1,2}) as equivalent to *ὑπό* + genitive.

129. *Sch. Il.* 5.875a.b. The same example is discussed by Lesb. *Fig.* §§ 16A, 18B.

130. *Sch. Il.* 2.186a (which defines this use as 'fairly archaic'; see Chapter 5.1 § 1.2.) and 15.87b. This *schema* is also analyzed by Lesbos (Fig. § 9), who mentions exactly these two Homeric examples.

131. *Sch. Il.* 4.100b; 4.334–5a¹; 6.3a; 12.36c; 12.118a¹; 12.258a; 13.159; 13.502a¹; 14.402b; 17.608.

132. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 276–277 (fr. 33).

133. *Sch. Il.* 2.742; 10.27; 10.118; 15.626b; 16.589c; 18.222b^{1,2}; 20.229b; 22.480a^{1,2}. Lesbos (Fig. § 2) mentions the example of *Il.* 2.742 (*κλυτὸς Ἴπποδάμεια*), which is among the most famous ones.

134. *Sch. Il.* 4.22 and 8.459 (*ἀκέων*); 8.455a (*πληγέντε*). For an apparent but misleading change of gender, see *Sch. Il.* 16.281a, discussed below (§ 5).

Sch. Il. 15.626b δεινὸς ἀήτη: ὅτι ἀρσενικῶς ‘δεινὸς ἀήτη’, ἀλλ’ οὐ δεινὴ, ὡς ‘κλυτὸς Ἴπποδάμεια’ (*Il.* 2.742). ἔνιοι δὲ ἀγνοοῦντες ποιοῦσι ‘δεινὸς ἀήτης’. ἀλλ’ οὐ δεῖ γράφειν οὕτως.

‘Terrible blast (δεινὸς ἀήτη)’: because it is in the masculine, δεινὸς ἀήτη, and not δεινὴ, like ‘famous (κλυτός) Hippodamia’ (*Il.* 2.742). Some, not being aware [of this Homeric usage], write δεινὸς ἀήτης, but such a reading should not be accepted.

Aristarchus is probably preserving the received text, which he explains as typical of Homer, castigating those who altered it and read a masculine noun, ἀήτης, in agreement with the masculine adjective δεινός.¹³⁵ In fact, we can isolate two different cases of gender enallage. Sometimes, the masculine adjectives in agreement with feminine nouns are two-termination adjectives only in Homer, so the masculine coincides with the feminine;¹³⁶ in this case, Aristarchus presumably labeled it an enallage by comparing the Homeric usage to Koine.¹³⁷ In other instances, instead, the feminine form is also attested in Homer: so with δεινός, Homer uses also the feminine δεινὴ (e.g., *Il.* 1.49, 5.742); similarly ἄλὸς πολιοῖο at *Il.* 20.229 (*Sch. Il.* 20.229b) can be compared to a very similar Homeric phrase with the feminine, ἔφ’ ἄλὸς πολιῆς, at *Il.* 1.350.¹³⁸ In this case, Aristarchus must have considered it an enallage compared to the normal Homeric usage. Since in these cases the choice between the feminine and the masculine is due to metrical reasons, Aristarchus also rebukes Zenodotus for not knowing this Homeric *schema* and trying to correct gender agreement by making lines unmetrical, as in *Il.* 18.222, where Zenodotus wrote ὅπα χαλκῆην instead of ὅπα χάλκεον, ‘brazen voice’ (*Sch. Il.* 18.222b¹).¹³⁹

Enallages can also occur in regard to number, because Homer can use a singular noun instead of a plural one (*Sch. Il.* 12.121b) and (more often) a plural instead of singular one (*Sch. Il.* 1.14a: ὅτι ἔθος αὐτῷ πληθυντικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνικῶς λέγειν).¹⁴⁰

135. Despite Aristarchus’ preference for ἀήτη, the reading with the masculine ἀήτης (i.e., δεινὸς ἀήτης) has prevailed in the vulgate (see West, apparatus ad *Il.* 15.626; West, however, chooses Aristarchus’ reading). Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 176–177; Janko 1994, 297; van Thiel 2014a, II 601 (with a different interpretation of Aristarchus’ comment).

136. Κλυτός at *Il.* 2.742, ἀνεκτός at *Il.* 10.118, τυτθός at *Il.* 22.480; cf. *Lfgre*, s.vv. ἀνεκτός, κλυτός, and τυτθός.

137. For example, the feminine τυτθὴ is used by Apollonius Rhodius in his *Argonautica* (3.93, 4.832).

138. Cf. *Lfgre*, s.vv. δεινός and πολιός.

139. Cf. Wecklein 1919, 47. Aristarchus also censures Zenodotus for reading the feminine compound adjective ἀνίπτῃσιν, ‘unwashed’, in agreement with χερσί, instead of the correct ἀνίπτοισιν; as Aristarchus remarks, the nominative ἀνίπτῃ does not exist (*Sch. Il.* 6.266b); *contra* van der Valk 1963–1964, II 131–132.

140. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 283–284 (fr. 38).

A typical case of *pluralia tantum* can be seen in πύλαι¹⁴¹ and θύραι,¹⁴² which simply mean ‘gate’ and ‘door’ respectively, and not the plural ‘gates’ and ‘doors’.

3.6. Enallage of Tense

Ancient grammarians also noticed that Homeric verbs were often affected by enallage, both in tense and in mood.¹⁴³ As for Aristarchus, Matthaïos singles out three main categories of ‘changes,’ namely, present-future, present-past, and imperfect-aorist.¹⁴⁴

In present-future opposition, Aristarchus notes that Homer uses the ‘present instead of the future’ with νεῦμαι, which is a present with a future meaning (‘I will go’).¹⁴⁵ Yet he also considers ἐρύουσιν¹⁴⁶ and (ἐκ)τελέουσιν¹⁴⁷ presents instead of futures, verbs which are in fact ‘real’ futures which lost their intervocalic sigma¹⁴⁸—but he obviously could not know this. On the other hand, he explains as ‘future instead of present’ forms such as οἴσετε or ἄξετε, which have been variously interpreted as short-vowel aorist subjunctives or, more often, as artificial imperatives from the future-stem of these verbs.¹⁴⁹ For Aristarchus, more simply, these verbs do not have any future meaning but correspond to standard present forms (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.105a: ὅτι τὸ ‘ἄξετε’ οὐ τὸν μέλλοντα σημαίνει, ἀλλ’ ἴσον τῷ ἄγετε).¹⁵⁰

The opposition between present and past includes different cases. For

141. *Sch. Il.* 7.339a; 8.58a¹; 9.354a; 9.383a; 12.120; 12.291; 12.470c; see also *Sch. Il.* 5.397 (Ariston?; cf. van Thiel 2014a, I 443–444). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 124–125.

142. *Sch. Il.* 9.475; 14.167a^{1,2}. Of course, θύραι and πύλαι are plural because—as Richard Janko has remarked to me—ancient doors had two panels, like saloon doors. The question of the singular meaning of the plural πύλαι, however, is not a purely grammatical issue for Aristarchus. In fact, by insisting that Homer uses πύλαι in the plural to indicate a single gate, he can argue that Troy has only one gate, called in the plural Scaean or Dardanian πύλαι; see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.5.

143. See [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 8 (change of tense) and § 6 (change of mood). Lesbonax has only one change of tense (§ 26 B: present and perfect in the same clause), and discusses some changes of mood (on which, see below, § 3.7).

144. Cf. Matthaïos 1999, 331–340 (frs. 62–71). Here my focus is on the description of the Homeric *schemata* as given in scholia by Aristonicus. Aristarchus also adopted readings following these *schemata*; see the scholia by Didymus listed by Matthaïos 1999, 101–105 (frs. 62–71).

145. *Sch. Il.* 18.136a. On νέομαι (contr. νεῦμαι), see *LSJ*, s.v., and *LfgreE*, s.v. (p. 326); Chantraine 1953–1958, I 452 and II 191.

146. *Sch. Il.* 15.351a and 15.351b (ex. [Hrd. + Ariston.]); 22.67b; see also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 11.454b¹. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 296–297.

147. *Sch. Il.* 2.286; 9.156a.b.

148. See Wackernagel 1926–1928, I 159; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 450, 451–452, and II 191.

149. See Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 788; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 417–418; Leumann 1959, 234–241, esp. 239–240; Risch 1974, 250; Cassio, *per litteras* (who also observes that οἴσετε is even more ambiguous, because οἴσω might even be a present used as a future; see *LSJ*, s.v. φέρω, II).

150. See also *Sch. Il.* 3.103a; 8.505a; 15.718a^{1,2}; 24.704 (ex. [Ariston.]); cf. also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.120a.b. These cases are not treated by Matthaïos 1999.

instance, Aristarchus explains iterative presents as a case of a present instead of a past tense.¹⁵¹ He also considers it an enallage between present and past when, within the same sentence or context, pasts are mixed with presents, and probably he expects either a past¹⁵² or a present.¹⁵³ Along the same lines, when (*Il.* 4.32) Zeus asks Hera: ‘how do Priam and the sons of Priam create (ῥέζουσιν) so many evils to you that you are constantly eager to destroy the well-built citadel of Ilium?’, Aristarchus comments (*Sch. Il.* 4.32a) that ῥέζουσιν is used instead of the aorist ἔρεξαν—presumably because Hera’s anger is due to a past action on the Trojans’ part. He also interprets a gnomic aorist as a change of tense: a past instead of a future or of a present (*Sch. Il.* 1.218a).

The opposition between aorist and imperfect seems to center around the aspectual meaning of the two forms. Thus, Aristarchus says that the imperfect is used instead of the aorist when the action has a punctual, not durative meaning, for example with the imperfect ἤγε, ‘he brought’ (*Sch. Il.* 11.632b).¹⁵⁴ He also understands ἐγήρα, ‘he grew old’, as an imperfect used instead of the aorist ἐγήρασε (*Sch. Il.* 7.148: ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐγήρασεν τὸν παρατατικὸν ἔταξεν). This is interesting because ἐγήρα is in fact an aorist of γηράσκω and in this case it is indeed used as such in the sense of ‘when he became old’; yet later on ἐγήρα could be taken as an imperfect of the post-Homeric present γηράω—which is Aristarchus’ understanding of the form.¹⁵⁵

The same opposition between durativity and punctuality can be applied beyond the indicative, for example, when a present participle is used instead of an aorist (*Sch. Il.* 6.87a^{1.2}) or a present infinitive is used instead of an aorist infinitive (*Sch. Il.* 21.33b): in both cases, these presents indicate a punctual action, for which an aorist is expected.¹⁵⁶

151. *Sch. Il.* 1.163a.b; 1.168a.

152. *Sch. Il.* 11.650; 22.356a (present instead of past). On *Sch. Il.* 10.364b; 13.346b; 18.583a, cf. Matthaios 1999, 334, and Janko 1994, 91.

153. *Sch. Il.* 5.729a (past instead of present). Matthaios 1999, 335, suggests that here Aristarchus expected a present because it is a description of divine objects (the chariot of Athena and Hera), for which the present is more suitable. This is certainly possible (as proven by the similar cases of *Sch. Il.* 2.448c [Ariston.?] and 2.485, discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 5.1); however, in the rest of the description (*Il.* 5.724–728) the verbs are all in the present, so he might have also wanted to harmonize the tenses.

154. In this case ἤγε, ‘he brought’, implies a progressive action; see Monroe 1891, § 72.2.

155. Cf. Chantraine 1953–1958, I 380. For a case of aorist instead of imperfect, see *Sch. Il.* 7.465; cf. Matthaios 1999, 335–337, for a more detailed explanation of these and similar cases.

156. Moreover, in *Il.* 6.87, the present participle (ξυνάγουσα) is followed (at l. 89) by a correlated aorist participle (οἷξασα), which suggests the punctuality of the two correlated actions (after gathering the old women and opening the doors of the temple of Athena, Hecuba should make an offer to the goddess).

3.7. Enallage of Mood

Even if it is questionable whether Aristarchus really had a specific concept of verbal moods,¹⁵⁷ he certainly singled out cases where the Homeric verbal moods were in contrast with the Koine use of them. For instance, he very often notices instances when Homer employs the infinitive instead of the imperative.¹⁵⁸ He also argues against Zenodotus, who read the dual imperative ἀποτίνετον (where a dual was also wrong) rather than the infinitive, and openly accuses him of not knowing this Homeric usage (*Sch. Il.* 3.459: καὶ ἡγνόησεν ὅτι συνήθως τῷ ἀπαρεμφάτῳ ἀντὶ τοῦ προστακτικοῦ χρῆται Ὅμηρος).¹⁵⁹

Homer also uses the optative differently than Koine. For example, for unreality or potentiality in the past he sometimes has the optative + κεν¹⁶⁰ rather than historical tenses in the indicative + ἄν.¹⁶¹ Aristarchus notices these peculiarities and singles them out as changes of ῥῆμα—and sometimes of χρόνος, too.¹⁶² Homer also uses the simple optative alone for a wish, and Aristarchus explains it as used ‘instead of ἵνα and subjunctive’ (*Sch. Il.* 18.125a).¹⁶³

The subjunctive in Homer presents some problems.¹⁶⁴ For example, it can express a possible action in the future (anticipatory subjunctive)—a function which Aristarchus recognized.¹⁶⁵ In the scholia, he explains it as an enallage, in that the subjunctive with (or without) ἄν/κεν is used instead of a potential optative with ἄν¹⁶⁶ or instead of a simple future (in which case κε is

157. On the knowledge of verbal moods in Aristarchus, see Matthaios 1999, 351–376 (frs. 72–79), where he also discusses their ἐναλλαγαί. Lesbonax notes the following changes of mood: § 3 (indicative instead of subjunctive); § 4 (subjunctive instead of indicative); §§ 15A and 17B (infinitive instead of imperative); § 18A (optative instead of subjunctive + ἵνα).

158. *Sch. Il.* 1.20a^{1,2}; 2.10b; 3.285; 3.459; 4.64–6; 4.70–1; 5.262a; 5.263a; 5.264; 9.279; 9.709a; 10.65; 10.347b; 14.501 (Ariston.); 16.454; 16.496a (see discussion below, at § 3.8); 20.213c; 21.487b; 21.501b; 22.259. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 360–363 (fr. 72).

159. On Aristarchus’ attitude toward Zenodotus, see Chapter 4 § 1; in particular, on Zenodotus’ errors regarding Homeric syntax, see Chapter 4 § 1.2.2. A totally different interpretation of this scholium, in line with his particular views of the nature of Alexandrian editions, is given by van Thiel 2014a, I 336.

160. See Monro 1891, § 300c; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 220–221; Smyth 1956, § 1829.

161. See Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 346–348; Smyth 1956, § 1784.

162. *Sch. Il.* 1.232; 2.215c; 3.220a; 4.539a; 5.85a; 5.311a.b; 5.388b (ex. [Ariston.]); 13.127a¹; 13.343–4 and 13.343; 13.344; 17.70a^{1,2}. Cf. Matthaios, 368–370 (fr. 74).

163. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 576.

164. On the subjunctive in Homer, see Monro 1891, § 274–298; Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 310–319; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 206–212, 245–247, 279–283.

165. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 371–373 (fr. 78).

166. For example, in main clauses (*Sch. Il.* 1.184; 6.459; 16.129c; 22.505) and relative clauses (*Sch. Il.* 4.191b; 7.171a; 21.126–7a and 21.127; 21.296–7a^{1,2}; 23.345b) indicating a possibility in the future.

superfluous).¹⁶⁷ For example, at *Il.* 14.235, ‘I will be grateful to you (κέ τοι εἰδέω χάριν) for the rest of my days’, for Aristarchus either κε . . . εἰδέω¹⁶⁸ is used instead of εἰδείην ἄν, with a change of verb, or the verb εἰδέω is semantically equivalent to the future εἴσομαι and κε is superfluous (*Sch. Il.* 14.235a). This *schema* also explains the apodosis of a conditional clause in the future where Homer uses a subjunctive with κεν: Aristarchus interprets it as an enallage for the potential optative and ἄν.¹⁶⁹

When dealing with subjunctives, the problem of the so-called short-vowel subjunctive also arises.¹⁷⁰ In many cases, Aristarchus considers that the form with a short vowel is used instead of the regular subjunctive form with a long vowel, as in *Sch. Il.* 9.165a, where we read τὸ ‘ὀτρύνομεν’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀτρύνωμεν.¹⁷¹ In this case, one might wonder whether Aristarchus knew that ὀτρύνομεν was a subjunctive or whether he considered it an indicative used ‘instead of a subjunctive’. In other scholia, however, Aristarchus correctly explains these subjunctives as ‘reduced’ forms, with terms like συνεσταλμένως, ‘with a short vowel’, συνέσταλται, ‘[the form] has been shortened’, or συνέσταλκεν, ‘[Homer] has shortened [the form]’.¹⁷² Therefore, unlike the asigmatic futures, which he considered presents ‘with a change of tense’ (see above, § 3.6), Aristarchus did not understand these forms as changes of mood, but more simply as subjunctives with a change of ‘vowel length’—probably understanding them as due to Homer’s ‘poetic freedom’ to change vowel length for metrical reasons.¹⁷³

3.7.1. Ibycean Figure (Ἰβύκειον σχῆμα)

Among the clauses with subjunctives, a specific case, much discussed by the ancients, was represented by those which had a subjunctive in the third person ending in -ησι (without κε/ἄν). These are archaic forms of subjunctives in -ēti > -ēsī; at a certain point, the first iota was added by analogy with the regular the-

167. *Sch. Il.* 4.164d; 8.373a.

168. On this reading, see Janko 1994, 188–189; cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 205–206.

169. *Sch. Il.* 1.137 and 1.139a; 1.324–5; 11.387. In *Sch. Il.* 1.324 the subjunctive is also understood as used instead of the simple future, which is the other mood used by Koine in the apodosis in the future; see Smyth 1956, §§ 2297 and 2327a–b (for the Homeric construction).

170. On these subjunctives, see Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 790–791; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 454–461.

171. Similar short paraphrases occur also in *Sch. Il.* 2.440; 11.192a^{1.2.3}; 12.42a; 12.328a; 13.465a; 16.60; 17.93; 19.8. These are indeed all short-vowel subjunctives; only στρέφεται in *Il.* 12.42 is debated (see Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 791 n. 6; Hainsworth 1993, 322); yet it occurs in a temporal clause introduced by ὅτ’ ἄν, so for Aristarchus στρέφεται was obviously used instead of a subjunctive with long vowel (*Sch. Il.* 12.42a <στρέφεται> ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ στ<ρ>έφεται).

172. *Sch. Il.* 1.141; 2.72d; 7.39a; 12.216; 23.75; 23.244a. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 373 (fr. 79).

173. *Sch. Il.* 10.361b is the only case where Aristarchus notes that an indicative is used instead of subjunctive; however, both Friedländer 1853, 13–14, 179, and Matthaios 1999, 352, 373, deny that the scholium goes back to Aristarchus.

matic subjunctives.¹⁷⁴ Yet ancient grammarians were puzzled by these forms and gave different explanations to account for these odd subjunctives—sometimes calling this construction ‘Ibycean figure’ (Ἰβύκειον σχῆμα).¹⁷⁵ Lesbos, in particular, who uses this label, explains that it occurs when subjunctives are used instead of indicatives, quoting *Il.* 5.6 as an example.¹⁷⁶ The same line is noticed by Aristarchus, who also recalls Ibycus and paraphrases παμφαίνῃσι as ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ παμφαίνει (*Sch. Il.* 5.6a). He observes the same phenomenon at *Il.* 22.23:

Sch. Il. 22.23a¹ ὅς ῥά τε ῥεῖα <θέῃσι τιταινόμενος πεδίοιο>: ὅτι θέῃσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ θέει. πλεονάζει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ σχήματι Ἰβυκος (*PMG* 303).

‘[As . . . a horse] that easily runs (θέῃσι) hastening along the plain’: because θέῃσι [is used] instead of θέει. Ibycus (*PMG* 303) indulges in this figure.

Even if the explanation is the same, unlike Lesbos, Aristarchus does not call this construction by any specific label and simply remarks that the subjunctives θέῃσι and παμφαίνῃσι¹⁷⁷ are used ‘instead of indicatives’, and that this is typical of Ibycus. The label ‘Ibycean figure’ could have been lost in the course of the tradition of *Sch. Il.* 5.6a and 22.23a¹, since Aristarchus knows, for example, another figure called after a lyric poet: the ‘Alcmanic figure’ (see below, § 4.3). Otherwise, if nothing has been lost in these two scholia, the difference between the Hellenistic philologist and the later grammarian recalls what we have already seen for the terminology concerning tropes: Aristarchus often

174. See Chantraine 1953–1958, I 461.

175. For example, [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 53 defines the σχῆμα Ἰβύκειον as the figure according to which the third-person subjunctive ends in -σι, so that παμφαίνῃσι is used instead of παμφαίνει. According to [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 11, on the contrary, the addition of -σι in the subjunctive is typical of the Ionians (probably because in this way he can explain why it is found in Homer). According to Heraclides of Miletus (fr. 41 Cohn), on the other hand, these were indicatives and were typical of the dialect of Rhegium, where they used to say λέγῃσι instead of λέγει. The latter theory is simply untenable; cf. Ahrens 1839–1843, II 301–303.

176. Lesb. *Fig.* § 4: Ἰβύκειον . . . Ἰβύκειον δὲ σχῆμα τὸ τὰ ἐναντία τῷ Κορινθίῳ ἔχον, ἥγουν ὑποτακτικὰ ἀνθ’ ὀριστικῶν· ὡς τὸ (*Il.* 5.6) ‘λαμπρὸν παμφαίνῃσιν’ ἀντὶ τοῦ παμφαίνει [Ibycean: . . . the Ibycean figure is the opposite of the Corinthian figure, that is, subjunctive instead of indicative; for example, ‘[which] shines bright’ (*Il.* 5.6), [with παμφαίνῃσιν] instead of παμφαίνει].

177. Inconsistently, Erbse writes θέῃσι without iota in *Sch. Il.* 22.23a¹ (while the *Venetus A* has θέῃσι) but restores the lemma in *Sch. Il.* 5.6a as παμφαίνῃσιν (following Villosion?). In his edition, West has the original forms without iota, παμφαίνῃσι in *Il.* 5.6 and θέῃσι in *Il.* 22.23. I have preferred to follow the vulgate (and Allen’s edition), thus leaving the forms with iota, θέῃσι and παμφαίνῃσιν, as they were most probably the forms read by Aristarchus. In fact, that the iotas had already been added to these subjunctives in the Hellenistic period is proved by the Orphic gold leaf from Hipponium (Vibo Valentia), dated to the end of the fifth or the beginning of the fourth century, which has ΜΕΛΛΕΙΣΙ for μέλλῃσι (l. 1); for the text and commentary of the tablet, see Pugliese Carratelli 2001, 39–66.

simply ‘described’ them, while the later Tryphon ‘named’ and ‘defined’ them (Chapter 3.2.A § 18).

3.8. Other Enallages in Verbal Forms: Voice and Person

Aristarchus recognized only two *diatheseis*: active (ἐνεργητικὸν ῥῆμα), for verbs with active or intransitive meaning and active form, and passive (παθητικὸν ῥῆμα), both for verbs with passive meaning and passive forms (i.e., real passives) and also for those with active or intransitive meaning and passive form (i.e., middle forms).¹⁷⁸ With this theoretical background Aristarchus concluded that voices, too, changed in Homer.¹⁷⁹ In particular, he notes that the active is used instead of the passive with verbs like ναιετάω and ναίω, which have an active form with an intransitive meaning, i.e., ‘to lie’, ‘to be situated’, when referring to places (*Sch. Il.* 4.45a ναιετάουσι: ὅτι τῷ ἐνεργητικῷ ἀντὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ κέχρηται, ἀντὶ τοῦ ναιετάονται).¹⁸⁰ The same explanation occurs when Homer uses the active form κτεάτισσα, ‘I gained’, instead of the Koine ἐκτησάμην, which Aristarchus defines as ‘our usage’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.57a: ὅτι ἰδίως καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν συνήθειαν ‘κτεάτισσα’ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργητικὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκτησάμην).¹⁸¹ Conversely, the passive occurs instead of the active (παθητικὸν ἀντὶ ἐνεργητικοῦ) when a middle form governs an object or when its intransitive meaning has a more active sense (e.g., πυρὸς αἶθομένοιο, ‘burning fire’, instead of αἶθοντος in *Sch. Il.* 16.81a).¹⁸²

Homer sometimes can change the person as well. In particular, Aristarchus notices when a character speaks of himself ‘as if speaking of someone else’ (ὥς περὶ ἑτέρου/ἄλλου)—in other words, using the third person rather than the first.¹⁸³ This is typical of the gods: Zeus speaks of himself as ‘Zeus the highest

178. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 320. On Aristarchus’ view of voices, see Matthaios 1999, 302–309, 318–326. On the problematic treatment of the middle voice among Greek and Latin grammarians, see Rijksbaron 1987.

179. Pseudo-Herodian briefly touches upon this change in [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 9.

180. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.626a¹²; 6.370a; 6.415a. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 309–310 (fr. 55). The use of these intransitive forms is obscure (see Chantraine 1953–1958, II 172).

181. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.84a (ἄμυνε instead of ἀμύνου). Cf. Matthaios 1999, 318–320 (frs. 60–61), who also discusses the more difficult case of *Sch. Il.* 11.562a (ἐκορέσσατο instead of ἐκορέσθη); cf. also Meijering 1987, 228 (on the opposition of ἰδίως and συνήθεια); Nünlist 2012b, 158–159.

182. *Sch. Il.* 3.306–10; 4.331a; 6.3a; 9.297; 10.188a; 12.285a; 15.730; 16.81a; 17.136b (Ariston.); 21.363a. In particular, the case of *Il.* 21.363 (μελδόμενος instead of μέλδων) was very much debated in antiquity; see, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 21.363c.d.e (ex.) and *P.Oxy.* 221, xvii, 20–34; cf. Barth 1984, 181–193; Schmidt 1987; Dyck 1988, 247–249 (fr. 13). In *Sch. Il.* 3.163a the use of the second person of the aorist subjunctive middle ἴδῃ instead of the active ἴδῃς is defined as Ὀμηρικώτερον (see also *Sch. Il.* 1.203a and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 4.205b; 13.449a¹²). For a more complete analysis (including the perfect participles πεπληγώς, for ‘striking’, in *Sch. Il.* 2.264a.b; 5.763; 22.497a, and κεκοπώς, for ‘hitting’ in *Sch. Il.* 13.60b), see Schmidt 1987, 67, and Matthaios 1999, 312–318 (frs. 57–59); cf. also Rijksbaron 1987, 343.

183. This use of ὥς περὶ ἑτέρου is different from the one discussed under the trope of ἐπανάληψις

counselor' ὡς περὶ ἄλλου (*Sch. Il.* 8.22a); in two speeches Poseidon refers to 'the immortals' (ἀθάνατοι) and 'the gods' (θεοί) instead of saying 'us' (ἡμεῖς) 'as if he himself were not immortal' (*Sch. Il.* 7.447a: ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ὦν ἀθάνατος λέγει) and 'as if he himself were not a god, too' (*Sch. Il.* 20.299a¹: ὡς οὐκ ὦν καὶ αὐτὸς θεός).¹⁸⁴ Heroes also can refer to themselves in the third person, as Hector does in *Il.* 7.67–91, when, speaking to both the Trojan and the Achaean armies, he refers to himself as 'noble Hector' (Ἑκτορι δῖω), using the third person; Aristarchus considers this a typical stylistic feature of Homer (*Sch. Il.* 7.75a¹: ἰδίως ὡς περὶ ἑτέρου).¹⁸⁵ A similar case, where he proposes two possible solutions, concerns *Il.* 16.495–496, when Sarpedon before dying beseeches Glaucus: 'First, going everywhere, urge (ὄτρυνον) the leaders of the Lycians to fight for Sarpedon (Σαρπηδόνοσ ἀμφιμάχεσθαι)':

Sch. Il. 16.496a πάντῃ ἐποικόμενος <Σαρπηδόνοσ ἀμφιμάχεσθαι>: ὅτι ἦτοι ἀπέστροφε τὸν λόγον ὡς περὶ ἑτέρου λέγων, 'Σαρπηδόνοσ' ἀντὶ <τοῦ> ἐμοῦ. ἢ ἐλλείπει τὸ 'τάδε λέγων', καὶ τὸ ἀπαρέμφατον ἀντὶ προστακτικοῦ κεῖται, ἢ ὄτρυνον Λυκίων ἡγήτορας ἄνδρας τάδε λέγων, Σαρπηδόνοσ ἀμφιμάχεσθαι.

'Going everywhere, [urge the leaders of the Lycians] to fight for Sarpedon': because either he has turned the sentence in a different direction as if he were speaking about someone else, [i.e.,] Σαρπηδόνοσ [is used] instead of ἐμοῦ. Or τάδε λέγων is missing, and the infinitive is used instead of the imperative, so that it is: 'urge the leaders of the Lycians saying this: fight for Sarpedon! (Σαρπηδόνοσ ἀμφιμάχεσθαι)'¹⁸⁶

in Chapter 3.2.A § 10, where it indicates a redundant 'resumption', through an anaphoric pronoun, of a previously used noun. Now the formula refers to characters speaking directly and about themselves, where a first person would be expected. So the 'change of person' in using a third person (with a noun or a third-person verb) rather than the first person implies a change in the syntax. On the other hand, two other specific cases of change of person occur when Homer directly addresses his characters (the so-called ἀποστροφή) and when he transitions from 'narrative to mimetic (mode, i.e., speech)'. I will analyze both phenomena in Chapter 3.6.C § 2.5 and § 3.6, since they involve Homeric narrative techniques rather than Homeric syntax (even if, of course, they also impact the syntax of the sentence). For the so-called 'generic you', used both in the narrative as well as in direct speeches for generic statements, see Chapter 3.6.C § 2.6. On the idea of person in Aristarchus, see Matthaios 1999, 387–395 (frs. 86–89).

184. See also *Sch. Il.* 20.299a². A similar case is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 5.878a.

185. Aristarchus does not see any problem when Hector talks about himself in the third person ('according to the peculiar usage' of Homer—*pace* Meijering 1987, 229, for whom ἰδίως in this scholium has a pejorative sense, which is hardly the case). Similarly, even if he considers that the epithet 'noble' is used 'out of place' by Hector referring to himself (*Sch. Il.* 7.75a¹: ... καὶ ὅτι ἀκαίρως δῖον ἑαυτὸν ὁ Ἑκτωρ), Aristarchus does not reject the line for this reason; see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.2.

186. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.496b (ex. [Ariston.?).

For Aristarchus, the use of the third-person Σαρπηδόνοϛ when Sarpedon himself is speaking can be explained in two ways. Either it is a case of ‘change of person’, so that Σαρπηδόνοϛ is used instead of the first-person ἐμοῦ (ὥς περὶ ἑτέρου). Or one could think of it as an ellipsis of the phrase τάδε λέγων, ‘[urge them] saying this’, followed by Σαρπηδόνοϛ ἀμφιμάχεσθαι, which is to be interpreted not as Sarpedon’s own words but the words pronounced by Glaucus, with an enallage of mood (infinitive instead of imperative); in this way, Glaucus would be correctly using the third person to refer to Sarpedon in a direct command to his fellow Lycians.¹⁸⁷

3.9. Enallages Involving Adjectives, Adverbs, Prepositions, and Particles

Aristarchus also noticed a variety of other ‘changes’ in Homer. For example, Homer has the comparative instead of the positive adjective, like νεώτεροι instead of νέοι,¹⁸⁸ or the superlative instead of the positive, like ἀκρότατος instead of ἄκρος in the expression ‘on the top peak (ἀκροτάτῃ κορυφῇ) of many-ridged Olympus.’¹⁸⁹ He also points out when an adjective is employed as an adverb. This most often happens with neuter adjectives,¹⁹⁰ but can also occur with masculine or feminine ones.¹⁹¹ In particular, Homer uses the feminine adjective ταχεῖα, ‘swift’, to signify ‘swiftly’ in the *formula* βάσκι’ ἴθι Ἴρι ταχεῖα, ‘come on, go swiftly, Iris!’¹⁹² But this happens also in other cases when ταχύς and ὠκύς have a predicative function.¹⁹³ An adverb, on the other hand, can be used instead of a preposition¹⁹⁴

187. For the dual used instead of the plural and vice versa, see Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.1.

188. *Sch. Il.* 4.324–5, where he notes: τὸ δὲ ‘νεώτεροι’ κατ’ ἀμφοτέρων τίθεται παρ’ αὐτῶ, καὶ συγκριτικῶς καὶ ἀπολελυμένως [in the poet νεώτεροι is used according to both [degrees], in the comparative and in the positive]. Similar cases are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 1.32b; 4.277a¹. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 271–272 (fr. 30).

189. *Sch. Il.* 5.754; 8.3; see also *Sch. Il.* 4.139b; 22.172a and 22.172b (ex. [Ariston.]) (on ἀκρότατος referring to another noun); 1.176 (on ἔχθιστος). Cf. Matthaios 1999, 271 (fr. 29). In all probability, Aristarchus also maintained that ἄριστος had not only a superlative meaning (‘the best’) but a positive one too (‘preeminent’); see *Sch. Il.* 13.365a and 17.80 (cf. Erbse, ad loc.), discussed in Chapter 5.2 § 2.2.

190. *Sch. Il.* 1.473a¹; 2.56b; 9.18b; 9.446b and 9.447a (against Zenodotus); 9.527d; 12.336b; 15.538a. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 528–531 (frs. 137–140).

191. *Sch. Il.* 1.99a; 19.276b.

192. *Sch. Il.* 11.186b^{1,2}; 15.158; 24.144; see also *Sch. Il.* 8.399a and discussion in Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.1.

193. *Sch. Il.* 23.287a and 23.287b (ex. [Ariston.]); 23.880 and 23.880–2a^{1,2} (ex. [Ariston.]). To follow this Homeric usage, Aristarchus reads the neuter ὠκὺ in agreement with μένος (rather than the adverb ὠκά of the vulgate) in *Il.* 14.418: ‘so the strength of Hector quickly fell onto the ground in the dust’ (ὥς ἔπεσ’ Ἑκτορος ὠκά χαμαὶ μένος ἐν κονίῃσι); see *Sch. Il.* 14.418a and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 14.418b^{1,2}.

194. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 20.13 (ἐνδον instead of ἐν); 24.544a (ἄνω instead of ἀνά); 1.71a; 11.44; 21.125; 24.145; 24.184 (εἴσω instead of εἰς).

or, conversely, a preposition can be used as an adverb;¹⁹⁵ or different adverbs can be exchanged, such as when μή is used instead of οὐ in main clauses with the indicative.¹⁹⁶ Finally, a fairly frequent ‘change’ in Homer is, according to Aristarchus, when δέ is used instead of γάρ.¹⁹⁷

4. Figures concerning the Agreement of Subject and Predicate

The last categories of figures recognized by Aristarchus (and which will be discussed in §§ 4–6) do not have a distinct name like ellipsis or enallage; in the scholia they are simply called σχήματα with an additional, brief adjective or prepositional phrase that gives an idea of which syntactic phenomenon they describe. They often overlap with the same phenomena treated by Pseudo-Herodian or Lesbos. These figures normally have to do with more complex syntactic analysis involving the subject, the predicate, and their relationship within the rest of the clause. For example, there are some peculiar syntactic constructions in Homer that involve the agreement between subject and predicate.

4.1. Pindaric Figure (Πινδαρικὸν σχῆμα)

The Pindaric *schema* implies the use of masculine or feminine plural subject in agreement with a singular verb.¹⁹⁸ This figure is mentioned only once, in a scholium tentatively attributed to Aristonicus by Erbse, with reference to *Il.* 17.385–387: ‘and the knees and legs and, beneath, the feet of each man, and the hands and eyes were ceaselessly sprinkled (παλάσσετο) with weariness and sweat’, where the subjects of the third-person singular παλάσσετο are all masculine and feminine plural (*Sch. Il.* 17.387 [Ariston.?): αἱ χεῖρες ἐπαλάσσετο, οὐχὶ ἐπαλάσσοντο. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον Πινδαρικὸν σχῆμα).

4.2. Plural Predicates with Neuter Plural Subjects

A variant of the Pindaric figure, and a much more common one, is having a neuter plural subject in agreement with a singular predicate, which is stan-

195. E.g., περί instead of περισσῶς in *Sch. Il.* 9.53. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 589–592 (fr. 179–184) for a full analysis of these and other cases of exchanges between adverbs and prepositions.

196. *Sch. Il.* 15.41a¹². Cf. Matthaios 1999, 546 (fr. 165).

197. *Sch. Il.* 1.200; 6.339 (Ariston.); 6.360b; 7.401b (ex. [Ariston.]); 8.85b; 8.344 (ex. [Ariston.]); 13.429a (ex. [Ariston.]); 16.116a; 16.336a²; 18.248 (ex. [Ariston.]); 18.256 (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Matthaios 1999, 572–573 (fr. 172). On this use of δέ, see Denniston 1950, 169–170.

198. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 52: Πινδαρικὸν δὲ τὰ τοῖς πληθυντικοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνικὰ ῥήματα ἔχοντα ἐπιφορὰν [the Pindaric [figure] is when singular verbs immediately follow plural nouns]. See also Lesb. *Fig.* §§ 14A and 22B, who calls it ‘Theban figure’. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 386 (fr. 84).

dard in Greek. Both Pseudo-Herodian and Lesbonax consider it an example of Pindaric *schema*.¹⁹⁹ Homer, on the other hand, also has neuter plural subjects with plural verbs, a violation of this type of Pindaric figure, as Pseudo-Herodian notes.²⁰⁰ Aristarchus often notices this *schema* in the *Iliad*.²⁰¹ Since he considered it indicative of the Homeric usage (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 12.159a: πρὸς τὴν συνήθειαν τοῦ ποιητοῦ), when there was a choice between the singular and the plural verb, Aristarchus seems to have chosen the latter. Such is the case in *Il.* 2.397, where the neuter plural κύματα is in agreement with the plural γένωνται, as both Aristonicus and Didymus report:

Sch. Il. 2.397a (Ariston.) γένωνται: ὅτι οὐ γραπτέον, ὥς τινες, ‘γένηται’. Ὀμηρικώτερον γὰρ οὕτως λέγειν, γένωνται τὰ κύματα, ὥς ‘σπάρτα λέλυνται’ (*Il.* 2.135).

‘[Waves . . .] are produced (γένωνται)’: because one must not write, as some [do], γένηται; for it is more Homeric to say in this way: ‘the waves (κύματα) are produced (γένωνται)’, like ‘the ropes (σπάρτα) are loose (λέλυνται)’ (*Il.* 2.135).

Sch. Il. 2.397b (Did.) γένωνται: οὕτως γένωνται αἱ Ἀριστάρχου. τούτῳ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων λόγος ὑπόκειται ἔχων τῇδε· “ἐπὶ τῶν κυμάτων λέγει τὸ γένωνται. τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πλεονάκις κέχρηται, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐδετέρων τὰ πληθυντικά παραλαμβάνει”. μεταποιοῦσι δὲ τινες ‘γένηται’, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ταῦτα ὁ Δίδυμος.

‘[Waves . . .] are produced (γένωνται)’: the editions of Aristarchus [have] γένωνται in this way. And, in addition to this, there are also his own words from the commentaries, which are as follows: “[the poet] says γένωνται in reference to the waves (κύματα). He has used this [figure] several times, so that he uses plural [verbs] also in reference to neuter [subjects]”. Some change it into γένηται, not correctly. So Didymus.

199. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 52 (see footnote below) and Lesb. *Fig.*, §§ 14A and 22B.

200. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 52: . . . ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τοῦ ἔθους καὶ τοῖς οὐδετέροις πληθυντικοῖς ἐνικὰ ῥήματα ἐπιφέρειν αἰεὶ παρεδεξάμεθα, ὅπερ οὐ τηροῦσι παντάπασιν οἱ λυρικοί, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ ποιητής· λέγει γοῦν ‘γυῖα λέλυνται’ (*Od.* 8.233) καὶ ἐκ παραλλήλου, ‘καὶ δὴ δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν καὶ σπάρτα λέλυνται’ (*Il.* 2.135) [and from this usage [i.e., the Pindaric figure] we have accepted as correct that singular verbs follow neuter plural [nouns], [a rule] which the lyric poets do not observe at all, nor does the poet even observe it; for he says ‘the limbs are loose (γυῖα λέλυνται)’ (*Od.* 8.233) and, side by side, ‘and the timbers of our ships are rotten (δοῦρα σέσηπε), and the ropes are loose (σπάρτα λέλυνται)’ (*Il.* 2.135)].

201. *Sch. Il.* 1.291b; 2.36c; 2.135a; 2.397a; 5.657a; 7.6c; 7.16b; 7.102a; 8.130b; 10.351b; 11.574a; 12.159a; 13.28b; 13.85; 16.128c^{1,2}; 16.507b (against Zenodotus); 18.130a; 22.266; 23.15–6; 23.431b; 23.504. Cf. Ribbach 1883, 17; Matthaios 1999, 382–384 (fr. 81).

Didymus also reports other cases where Aristarchus reads a plural verb in agreement with a neuter plural subject.²⁰² This does not mean, however, that he was always trying to change the text in order to follow this Homeric *schema*. For example, in *Il.* 2.135, both constructions are attested: ‘the timbers of our ships are rotten (δοῦρα σέσηπε), and the ropes are loose (σπάρτα λέλυνται),’ and Aristarchus simply remarks on their copresence:

Sch. Il. 2.135a <καὶ δὴ δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν καὶ σπάρτα λέλυνται:> ὅτι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν στίχον καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἡμῖν συνήθως ἐξενήνοχε τὸ ‘λέλυνται’ καὶ ‘σέσηπε’.

‘And the timbers of our ships are rotten (δοῦρα σέσηπε), and the ropes are loose (σπάρτα λέλυνται):’ because in the same line he has used both λέλυνται and σέσηπε, according to his own usage and our usage.²⁰³

4.3. Alcmanic Figure (Ἀλκμανικὸν σχῆμα)

The Alcmanic *schema* implies a verb in the plural (or dual) which refers to two subjects in the singular but which is placed after the first subject, so that the syntax seems incongruous (e.g., ‘X are/do and Y’, instead of ‘X and Y are/do’).²⁰⁴ Aristarchus noticed this *schema* in the two places in the *Iliad* where it occurs (*Il.* 5.774 and 20.138).²⁰⁵ In *Il.* 5.774, ἧχι ῥοὰς Σιμόεις συμβάλλετον ἡδὲ Σκάμανδρος (‘where the Simoeis and the Scamander join their streams’), the dual verb συμβάλλετον is placed between its two subjects:

202. *Sch. Il.* 8.137a; 11.128b¹; 13.28c; 16.774b. Some of these scholia have a parallel in the Aristonicus scholia quoted in the footnote above (just as in the case of *Il.* 2.397). Thus also in other scholia which do not mention Aristarchus explicitly but correspond to others by Aristonicus listed above, Didymus is reporting Aristarchus’ readings (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.36d^{1,2}; 12.159c; 16.507a). According to *Sch. Il.* 13.617b¹ (Did.), Aristarchus read a plural predicate with a dual subject (ῥοσσέ); cf. La Roche 1866, 383–384; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 178; Janko 1994, 122; van Thiel 2014a, II 428.

203. Cf. Nünlist 2012b, 158; van Thiel 2014a, I 183. The reference to the ‘modern’ (= Koine) usage is also in *Sch. Il.* 2.36c ἔμελλον: πρὸς τὸ σχῆμα, ὅτι ἔμελλον. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐροῦμεν ‘ἔμελλεν’ ἐνικῶς [‘[things which] were [not] going [to happen]’: with reference to the figure, because [he says] ἔμελλον. But we will say ἔμελλεν, in the singular]. On the opposition between Homer and Aristarchus’ language (labeled in the scholia as ‘our’ language), see Chapter 5.1 § 1.1.

204. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 54: Ἀλκμανικὸν δὲ τὸ μεσάζον τὴν ἐπαλλήλων ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων θέσιν πληθυντικοῖς ἢ δυϊκοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἢ ῥήμασι. τέσσαρα δὲ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ τοιαῦτα [the Alcmanic [figure] is the one which interrupts a sequence of [singular] nouns or verbs with verbs or nouns in the plural or dual. There are four such examples in the poet]. The four examples are *Il.* 5.774, *Od.* 10.513–514, *Il.* 20.138, and *Od.* 14.216. See also Lesb. *Fig.* § 6. Pseudo-Herodian speaks of ‘verbs and nouns’ interrupting the sequence. This is valid for Alcman, but in Homer the interruption only concerns two singular subjects which are interrupted by a plural or dual predicate. On this construction in Homer, see Chantraine 1953–1958, II 18.

205. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 385–386 (fr. 83).

Sch. Il. 5.774 ἤχι ῥοὰς Σιμόεις συμβάλλετον ἡδὲ Σκάμανδρος: ὅτι τὸ κατ' ἀμφοτέρων ῥῆμα μεταξὺ τῶν ὀνομάτων τέταχεν· ἔδει γὰρ ἤχι ῥοὰς Σιμόεις καὶ Σκάμανδρος συμβάλλετον· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ ἔθει πεπλέονακε καὶ Ἀλκμάν· διὸ καὶ καλεῖται Ἀλκμανικόν, οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸς πρῶτος ἐχρήσατο, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ τοιούτῳ ἔθει πεπλέονακε.

'Where the Simoeis and Scamander join their streams': because he has put the verb that refers to both nouns between them; for he should have said ἤχι ῥοὰς Σιμόεις καὶ Σκάμανδρος συμβάλλετον. Alcman, too, has often indulged in this habit; therefore, it is also called Alcmanic [figure], not because he was the first to use it, but because he has indulged in this habit.

The comment about Alcman may have a polemical target: Zenodotus, who in *Il.* 20.138, εἰ δέ κ' Ἄρης ἄρχωσι μάχης ἢ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων ('but if Ares or Phoebus Apollo start the fight') 'corrected' the syntax and wrote the singular ἄρχησι. Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 20.138a) criticizes Zenodotus by emphasizing that this construction is also found in Homer.²⁰⁶ In recalling Alcman in both scholia, Aristarchus' point is probably that Zenodotus, due to his lack of attention, thought that such a *schema* was called Alcmanic because Alcman invented it, and so it was unknown to Homer. Hence he eliminated it when he found it. Rather, Aristarchus remarks that the name is due to the fact that Alcman simply used it particularly often, not because Homer never used it.

5. *Concordantia ad Sensum* (σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ νοητόν/ πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον)

In his syntactic analysis, Aristarchus also dealt with *concordantia ad sensum*, which the Aristonicus scholia label as πρὸς τὸ νοητόν or πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον, to indicate that in his phrasing Homer has followed the semantic rather than the morphological meaning of a word.²⁰⁷ Typically, this occurs when a singular collective noun works as the subject of a plural verb, such as πληθὺς,²⁰⁸ λαός,²⁰⁹ ὄμιλος,²¹⁰ and δῆμος.²¹¹ Aristarchus explains why this construction is correct: because these nouns have a plural meaning, as with 'so spoke (φάσαν)

206. See also *Sch. Il.* 20.138c (Did.); 20.138d (Did.); cf. Roemer 1924, 14; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 213–214.

207. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 5, and Lesb. *Fig.* § 21B, who only consider *concordantia ad sensum* involving number. Matthaios 1999, 251–252 and 384 (fr. 82), too, considers the σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ νοητόν only with reference to number (i.e., plural verb with a singular collective subject). Yet Aristarchus also noticed cases of *concordantia ad sensum* involving gender.

208. *Sch. Il.* 2.278a and 2.278–82; 15.305a and 15.305b^{1,2} (ex. [Ariston.]).

209. *Sch. Il.* 11.717; 23.157a.

210. *Sch. Il.* 18.604.

211. *Sch. Il.* 20.166a.

the crowd (ἡ πληθύς) in *Il.* 2.278 (*Sch. Il.* 2.278a: . . . τῷ γάρ ἔννοιαν ἔχοντι πλήθους ὀνόματι πληθυντικὸν ῥῆμα συνέζευξε τὸ ‘φάσαν’ [he joined φάσαν, a plural verb, to a noun that has the idea of plurality]). In the same way, the noun νέφος with genitive, in the sense of ‘a cloud of’ (‘birds’ in *Il.* 17.755 and ‘soldiers’ in *Il.* 23.133), can be followed by a plural participle (*Sch. Il.* 17.756b [Ariston.?] by or plural adjective (*Sch. Il.* 23.134). Likewise, πᾶς can be linked with the plural ἔχοντες because it means πάντες (*Sch. Il.* 16.265a^{1,2}).

The concordance *ad sensum* (πρὸς τὸ νοητόν) occurs also with gender; for example, when at *Il.* 16.280–281 the feminine φάλαγγες, ‘battalions’, is in agreement with the masculine participle ἐλπόμενοι:

Sch. Il. 16.281a ἐλπόμενοι: ὅτι ἰδίως εἴρηκε ‘φάλαγγες / ἐλπόμενοι’ (*Il.* 16.280–281) πρὸς τὸ νοητόν· σύστημα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν εἰσιν αἱ φάλαγγες. ἢ δεῖ τὴν πτῶσιν μεταλαβεῖν ‘ἐλπομένων’.

‘[The battalions] believing (ἐλπόμενοι) [that . . .]’: because he has said φάλαγγες ἐλπόμενοι in his proper style, with reference to the meaning; for the battalions are a group of men. Or we must change the case [and write] ἐλπομένων.

The *phalanx* is a group of men; hence, a phrase like φάλαγγες ἐλπόμενοι, with a masculine participle, is perfectly acceptable—so it is not a ‘change’ of gender. Otherwise, it would be also good to read φάλαγγες ἐλπομένων, ‘battalions of (men) believing that . . .’. In any case, Zenodotus was wrong when he corrected the text and wrote the feminine ἐλπόμεναι (*Sch. Il.* 16.280–1b, ex. [Did.]).²¹²

6. *Apo Koinou* Construction (σχῆμα ἀπὸ κοινοῦ or κοινόν)

To explain Homeric syntax Aristarchus often emphasized the ἀπὸ κοινοῦ *sche-ma*, that is, when a verb was common to two subjects.²¹³ In this way, he could ‘excuse’ Homer from accusations of producing syntactic anacolutha. For ex-

212. Another case of *concordantia ad sensum* with a feminine noun in agreement with a neuter relative pronoun (βῶν ἀζαλέην, τὸ . . . [oxhide shield, which . . .]) is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 7.239a.

213. *Lesb. Fig.* § 31B: ἀπὸ κοινοῦ ἐστὶ λέξις ἅπαξ μὲν λεγομένη, πολλάκις δὲ νοουμένη καὶ ἔξωθεν λαμβανομένη, . . . καὶ Ὅμηρος (*Il.* 1.15) ‘ἐλίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιοὺς, Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα’. ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐκείνου μὲν τὸ ἦτησα [*sic*; prob. leg. ἦτησε], ἐπὶ τούτου δὲ τὸ ἐλίσσετο [‘in common’ (*apo koinou*)] is an element of the phrase which is expressed once but implied many times and which must be supplied from outside . . . and Homer [has]: ‘he begged all the Achaeans, and especially the sons of Atreus’, for [the predicate] ‘he asked’ in the latter section is *apo koinou*, while in the former there is ‘he begged’. See also [*Hrd.*] *Fig.* § 26. The figure can be connected with zeugma and ellipsis (see Lausberg 1998, §§ 698 and 701) but is not identical with them (the transliterated Greek term *apo koinou* is in fact used in modern linguistics).

ample, *Il.* 11.56–60, ‘and on the opposite side on the rising ground of the plain the Trojans around great Hector, . . . Polydamas and Aeneas . . . and the three sons of Antenor . . .’, seems to lack a main verb. Aristarchus makes clear that the implied verb is ἐθωρήσσοντο, ‘armed themselves’, which Homer has used above at lines 49–50 (θωρηχθέντες / ῥώοντο ‘armed themselves and rushed’) to refer to the Greeks and which is common (κοινόν) to the Trojans at lines 56–60 (*Sch. Il.* 11.56a).²¹⁴

6.1. *Apo Koinou* Constructions and Atheteseis

According to Aristarchus, not everyone was able to recognize this syntactic peculiarity of Homer, so that in the course of time interpolators (διασκευασταί) added lines in order to supplement what in their opinion was missing.²¹⁵ Yet these lines were superfluous (περισσοί) because the syntax worked perfectly well without them; they were only the result of misunderstanding by people inexperienced in Homeric diction and figures. The task of the philologist was thus to explain how the original syntax worked and restore it by athetizing the supposedly interpolated lines. For example, in *Il.* 1.443–444 Odysseus returns Chryseis to her father Chryses and says: παῖδά τε σοὶ ἀγέμεν, Φοῖβω θ’ ἱερὴν ἑκατόμβην / ῥέξαι ὑπὲρ Δαναῶν ὄφρ’ ἱλασόμεσθα ἄνακτα (‘[Agamemnon sent me] to bring you your daughter, and to offer Phoebus a holy hecatomb on the Danaans’ behalf, so that we may appease the lord’). Aristarchus rejects the last line, as line 443 is self-sufficient since the infinitive ἀγέμεν is common to both objects, namely, the daughter and the hecatomb. Some interpolators, however, did not realize this and added line 444 with the other infinitive ῥέξαι to go with ἱερὴν ἑκατόμβην (*Sch. Il.* 1.443a; 1.444a). Aristarchus finds evidence supporting his athetesis of *Il.* 1.444 in *Il.* 21.478–479: ὣς φάτο, τὴν δ’ οὐ τι προσέφη ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων, / ἀλλὰ χολωσαμένη Διὸς αἰδοίη παράκοιτις (‘So [Artemis] spoke, but Apollo, who strikes from afar, did not answer her; / rather, in anger, the revered wife of Zeus [answered]’), followed by Hera’s words:

Sch. Il. 21.479a¹ ἀλλὰ χολωσαμένη <Διὸς αἰδοίη παράκοιτις>: ὅτι κοινὸν δεῖ δέξασθαι τὸ ‘προσέφη’ (*Il.* 21.478). ‘ἀλλὰ χολωσαμένη Διὸς αἰδοίη παράκοιτις προσέφη’. οὕτως οὖν κακεῖ· ‘παῖδά τέ σοι ἀγέμεν Φοῖβω θ’ ἱερὴν ἑκατόμβην’ (*Il.* 1.443). ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γὰρ τὸ ‘ἀγέμεν’, καὶ περιττὸς ὁ ἐξῆς ‘ῥέξαι ὑπὲρ Δαναῶν’ (*Il.* 1.444).

214. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.56b (ex. [Ariston.?). Other cases of *apo koinou* construction are treated in *Sch. Il.* 23.183 and in the scholia discussed in the following section.

215. On the interpolators (διασκευασταί), see Chapter 3.6.B § 7.

‘Rather, in anger, the revered wife of Zeus’: because προσέφη (l. 478) must be taken in common: ‘rather, in anger, the revered wife of Zeus answered (προσέφη)’. In the same way thus also there: ‘to bring (ἀγέμεν) you your daughter and Phoebus a holy hecatomb’ (*Il.* 1.443); for ἀγέμεν is in common, and the following ‘to offer on the Danaans’ behalf’ (l. 444) is superfluous.²¹⁶

Since προσέφη refers to both Apollo in line 478 and Hera in line 479,²¹⁷ ἀγέμεν can refer to both the ‘daughter’ and the ‘hecatomb’; thus, the athetesis of *Il.* 1.444 is justified.²¹⁸

7. Syntactic Supplements (ἔξωθεν [προσ]ὑπακούειν/λαμβάνειν)

According to Aristarchus, then, in an *apo koinou* construction all the necessary syntactic elements were in the text. A different case was the phenomenon of ἔξωθεν (προσ)ὑπακούειν/λαμβάνειν, ‘to understand/take [something omitted] from outside’, i.e., to supplement mentally some missing elements in order to make the syntax work. This kind of exegetical activity again aimed at preserving the Homeric text as it was and to demonstrate that it was correct, provided that one was aware of the peculiarities of Homeric syntax.

As is clear, ‘supplying’ something considered necessary for the syntax is related to the trope of ellipsis in Homer.²¹⁹ This kind of operation thus was the consequence of knowing one of the typical characteristics of Homeric grammar: the omission of elements that were required in Koine. This is clear in cases of the omission of a preposition; in some scholia, the solution is indeed that of ‘supplying from outside’ (ἔξωθεν [προσ]ὑπακούειν/λαμβάνειν)

216. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.479a² and 21.479b.

217. Aristarchus’ comment makes sense only if Aristarchus did not read line 480, which is present in some manuscripts but absent from the vulgate and also from two papyri (nos. 9 and 449 according to West’s numeration): νεῖκεσεν ἰοχέαιραν ὀνειδείοις ἐπέεσσι, where νεῖκεσεν is the predicate referring to Διὸς αἰδοίη παράκοιτις of line 479. With this line, the passage thus reads: ‘So [Artemis] spoke, but Apollo, who strikes from afar, did not answer her; / rather, in anger, the revered wife of Zeus / rebuked the arrow-pourer with words of reproach’. West omits the line in his edition. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 313, and Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 21.479a.

218. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 338; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 25; Roemer 1912, 199–200; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 219; Lührs 1992, 21–23. There are a series of cases where Aristarchus athetizes the second of two consecutive lines because the first is sufficient, once a verb there is understood as *apo koinou*: for example, *Il.* 1.295–296 (*Sch. Il.* 1.295a); *Il.* 9.43–44 (*Sch. Il.* 9.43b; 9.44a); *Il.* 9.415–416 (*Sch. Il.* 9.416a); *Il.* 23.478–479 (*Sch. Il.* 23.478b; 23.479a); see Lührs 1992, 20–42, and discussion in Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4.

219. Indeed, Tryph. ii § 13 notes (in the part omitted in footnote 52) that the trope of ellipsis is also called προσυπακουόμενον (ἐνιοὶ δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προσυπακουόμενον καλοῦσιν).

the omitted preposition. For example, as we saw above (§ 2.2), *πρός* is often omitted with verbs like *εἶπεῖν*: in *Sch. Il.* 23.155b, rather than saying that in the phrase *Ἀγαμέμνονα εἶπε*, '[Achilles] spoke to Agamemnon',²²⁰ the preposition is missing (*ἡ πρόθεσις ἐλλείπει*), Aristarchus remarks that 'the preposition *πρός* must be supplied from outside' (*ἔξωθεν τὴν πρὸς ληπτέον*).²²¹ Another case where both the concepts of 'ellipsis' and 'external syntactic supplements' are employed occurs when the postpositive particle *ὥς*, 'like', is omitted. Sometimes, Aristarchus mentions the ellipsis of *ὥς*;²²² in *Sch. Il.* 14.499b, however, the same problem is solved by stating that *ὥς* must be understood from outside (*ἔξωθεν ἀκουστέον τὸ ὥς*).²²³ Thus, in Aristarchus' practice the trope of 'ellipsis' was closely linked to the idea of 'supplying from outside': the former was the description of the final linguistic result in Homer (i.e., the omission of some important syntactic element), the latter was the procedure that needed to be undertaken in order to fully understand the Homeric syntax by 'transposing' it into Koine Greek (i.e., mentally supplying important syntactic elements in the text).

This concept was extensively used with verbs. For example, Homer often 'omits' the copula;²²⁴ hence, supplying a form of the verb 'to be' can be the solution to a difficult passage where the syntax seems at first puzzling. A case in point, where other possible *schemata* are also invoked to provide a solution, is *Il.* 8.306–308, where Homer compares the head of a dying hero (Gorgythion, a son of Priam) to that of a poppy: 'And he dropped his head (*κάρη βάλεν*) to one side like a poppy (*μήκων*) *which laden* (*ἥ . . . βριθομένη*) with fruit and the moisture of spring in a garden; so his head bowed down to one side, heavy with his helmet'.²²⁵ As is clear, the relative clause *ἥ . . . βριθομένη*, 'which . . . laden', is lacking a main verb. Aristarchus proposes three different solutions:

220. This is the text that Aristarchus read (and the reading accepted by West, *ad loc.*), even if the vulgate has *Ἀγαμέμνονι εἶπε*. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 183.

221. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.405.

222. See above, § 2.2 and footnote 78.

223. See also *Sch. Il.* 14.500 (*δεῖ δὲ ἔξωθεν προσλαμβάνειν τὸ ὥς*). The same principle leads Aristarchus to remove a comparative particle to have a metaphor rather than a simile, in a 'more suggestive' way, as Didymus states in *Sch. Il.* 19.386a (*ἐμφατικώτερον νομίσας εἶναι ὑπακουομένου τοῦ ὥς*); see Chapter 3.2.A § 17.

224. *Sch. Il.* 24.45a (*δεῖ δὲ ἔξωθεν προσυπακοῦσαι τὸ ἐστίν*) and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 4.400b^{1,2}. Apart from these two scholia, I found no other Aristarchean scholia explicitly speaking of 'ellipsis' of the verb 'to be' in Homer; however, there are paraphrases of the type *πάρ τοι = πάρεσί σοι* (*Sch. Il.* 9.43b).

225. *Il.* 8.306–308: *μήκων δ' ὥς ἐτέρωσε κάρη βάλεν, ἥ τ' ἐνὶ κήπῳ / καρπῷ βριθομένη νοτίησί τε εἰαρινῇσιν / ὥς ἐτέρωσ' ἤμυσε κάρη πῆληκι βαρυνθέν*. Some translators take *κάρη βάλεν* as intransitive, meaning 'his head dropped'. This is possible, but Aristarchus certainly understood *κάρη* as the object of *βάλεν*, as is clear from the analysis of *Sch. Il.* 8.307a. My translation, thus, follows Aristarchus' reading. Cf. Kirk 1990, 323–324 (who takes it as transitive).

Sch. Il. 8.307a καρπῷ βριθομένη: ὅτι ἔξωθεν προσληπτέον τὸ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἡ μετοχή ἀντὶ ῥήματος παρείληπται, 'βριθομένη' ἀντὶ τοῦ βρίθεται. ἢ κοινὸν τὸ 'κάρη βάλεν' (*Il.* 8.306).

'Laden (βριθομένη) with fruit': because ἔστιν must be supplemented from outside, unless the participle has not been used instead of a verb, 'laden' (βριθομένη) instead of 'it is laden' (βρίθεται). Or 'he dropped his head' (κάρη βάλεν) is common [to both clauses].²²⁶

The first solution is to supply ἔστιν in order to have ἡ . . . βριθομένη ἐστί: '[like a poppy] which is laden'; the second consists of considering the passage a case of enallage, where the participle is used instead of an indicative βρίθεται: '[like a poppy] which is laden';²²⁷ and the third is to understand κάρη βάλεν, which belongs to the main clause, as also referring *apo koinou* to the relative clause in order to have ἡ κάρη βάλλει . . . βριθομένη: '[like a poppy] which drops its head laden . . .'. For this passage, then, Aristarchus does not choose a solution, but only suggests three possible ways to solve this syntactic riddle and 'save' Homer.²²⁸

Many other verbs could be supplemented beyond εἶναι. For example, in the phrase 'whether we shall give (ὀρέξομεν) glory to another, or another to us',²²⁹ Aristarchus suggests that we understand 'from outside' a second verb ὀρέξει in the second part (*Sch. Il.* 13.327a).²³⁰ Even entire phrases (*Sch. Il.* 16.559a) should sometimes be supplied.²³¹ Finally, regarding *Il.* 10.12–13, 'he marveled (θαύμαζεν) at the many fires that burned in front of Ilium, / and at the sound of *auloi* and pipes, and at the din of men', Aristarchus remarks that in the latter line one must supply ἀκούων (*Sch. Il.* 10.13a: δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀκούων προσυπακούειν ἔξωθεν). In this case, he seems not to understand θαυμάζειν as meaning 'to wonder at', but rather as 'to watch with wonder', since he considers the verb suitable for looking at 'fires', but not for listening to the 'sounds' of *auloi* and pipes, and to the 'din' of men; these acoustic phenomena seem to require the verb ἀκούειν 'from outside'. If so, Aristarchus was also not fond of synesthesia.²³²

226. See also *Sch. Il.* 8.306–8b (Ariston.). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 361; Matthaios 1999, 425 (fr. 95).

227. So also [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 9.

228. See also Nicanor in *Sch. Il.* 8.306–8a and 8.307b (ex. [Nic.]). Aristarchus often suggests different solutions according to different σχήματα; see, for example, *Sch. Il.* 17.2a and 17.178a.

229. *Il.* 12.328 = 13.327: [- ~ ~] ἡέ τω εὖχος ὀρέξομεν, ἡέ τις ἡμῖν.

230. See also *Sch. Il.* 12.328a, in which Aristarchus claims that 'some' (τινές) did not understand the construction correctly and so added an additional line with a verb (δώσει) to go with the second part of line 328 (ἡέ τις ἡμῖν). This additional line is not attested anywhere (see West, ad loc.); cf. Roemer 1912, 186.

231. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.559b^{1,2} (Did.).

232. According to Friedländer 1853, 171, this comment was not by Aristonicus; however, as

7.1. Syntactic Supplements (ἔξωθεν ἀκουστέον) and Atheteseis

In Aristarchus' opinion, some interpolators, not knowing that Homer often omitted the copula, added lines which included forms of εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι or other suitable verbs to solve what they perceived as a problem. These additions, however, were unnecessary because the verb 'to be' was omitted in Homer and had to be supplied; once this mental supplement was made, the interpolated line could be athetized.²³³ For example, in *Il.* 21.569–570, . . . θνητὸν δέ ἔ φασ' ἄνθρωποι / ἔμμεναι· αὐτὰρ οἱ Κρονίδης Ζεὺς κῦδος ὀπάζει ('men say he is mortal / and Zeus son of Cronus gives him glory'), Aristarchus athetizes the second line, as the phrase θνητὸν δέ ἔ φασ' ἄνθρωποι is complete; the verb 'to be' has to be supplemented from outside, without the useless addition of ἔμμεναι in line 570 (*Sch. Il.* 21.570a^{1,2}).²³⁴

7.2. Other Figures Requiring Syntactic/Semantic Supplements

Finally, Aristarchus also recognized other syntactic features as typically Homeric and which involved the operation of ἔξωθεν (προσ)ὑπακούειν/λαμβάνειν, even though this specific formula is never used in the scholia dealing with these cases. In particular, Homer not only 'omitted' elements that one should supply, such as prepositions or the copula, but he was also elliptical in using more specific verbs. These cases consist more of a semantic rather than a syntactic analysis; still, they are treated here because Aristarchus 'solves' them using the same method, namely, 'supplying from outside' other elements which help to clarify the required meaning. For example, in *Il.* 5.795 ἔλκος . . . τό μιν βάλε Πάνδαρος ἰῶ ('the wound that Pandarus hit on him with his arrow'), Aristarchus notes that the meaning cannot be 'he hit the wound', but rather 'he made a wound by hitting [him]' (*Sch. Il.* 5.795b: οὐ τὸ ἔλκος ἔβαλεν, εἰργάσατο δὲ ἔλκος βαλὼν).²³⁵ *Il.* 24.151 provides a similar case with νεκρὸν . . . τὸν ἔκτανε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς. Achilles did not kill a corpse, but, as Aristarchus explains, 'by killing [him], he made him a corpse' (*Sch. Il.* 24.151a^{1,2}: κτείνας νεκρὸν ἐποίησεν).²³⁶

Erbse (ad *Sch. Il.* 10.31a) notes, a very similar instance occurs in *Sch. Il.* 9.77a, where Aristonicus/Aristarchus wants to supply the participle ἰδών.

233. The idea behind Aristarchus' claim concerning the additional line after *Il.* 12.328 (see above, footnote 230) is similar, even if in that case there is no athetesis.

234. Aristarchus athetizes line 570 also because it is contradictory (ἐναντίον) within the context. Cf. Roemer 1912, 114; Lührs 1992, 29; West 2001, 262. See also the athetesis of *Il.* 7.353 (*Sch. Il.* 7.353a) and of *Il.* 24.45 (*Sch. Il.* 24.45a and also *Sch. Il.* 24.44 (ex. [Ariston.])), discussed in Chapter 3.6.B § 7.2); cf. Lehrs 1882, 338–339; Lührs 1992, 27–28 and 33–36. On this type of athetesis, see Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4.

235. See also *Sch. Il.* 5.795c.

236. Both *Sch. Il.* 5.795b and 24.151a^{1,2} recall the other example as a parallel. On these phrases, see Chapter 2.3 § 4.

Aristarchus defines this way of expression as typical of Homer (*Sch. Il.* 5.795c: ὅτι ἰδίως εἴρηκεν). Another peculiarity is the use of a single active verb instead of the causative ποιεῖν + verb in the infinitive; for example, Homer has ἐκλιναν instead of κλιθῆναι ἐποίησαν (*Sch. Il.* 5.37b), οἰδάνει instead of οἰδάνειν ποιεῖ (*Sch. Il.* 9.554), and λελάχωσι instead of λαχεῖν ποιήσουσιν or λαχεῖν ποιήσωσι (*Sch. Il.* 15.350; 22.343).

8. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have surveyed how Aristarchus used grammatical tropes and *schemata* to clarify Homeric syntax. The cases discussed suggest that he analyzed difficult Homeric phrases first by isolating the elements that were different from contemporary usage and then by comparing them with Koine Greek. When compared with Koine, Homeric Greek showed ellipsis of forms or forms that were superfluous, exchanges between similar grammatical categories, and other odd syntactic usages. Sometimes even Homer did not follow his proper usage, for example when he used ‘superfluous’ particles or prepositions (since he normally omitted them) or ‘changed’ gender when he connected a feminine noun with a masculine adjective. It was Aristarchus’ job to notice all these exceptions to make clear that they were not mistakes and so they should not be corrected, but rather respected as stylistic choices.

I have gone into a rather detailed survey of the figures and tropes discussed by Aristarchus, in order to show how comprehensive his analysis was. In fact, mine is not even a full survey of all the syntactic peculiarities described by him, but I have tried to give a detailed account of at least the *tools* he used for such an analysis (i.e., the figures, tropes, and concepts which helped him to make sense of Homeric syntax), also offering many examples to give a sense of the diverse grammatical phenomena that he explained with those tools.

Without any doubt, Aristarchus was working within a sophisticated grammatical conceptual framework, as Matthaios has demonstrated. Yet, at least in his work on Homer, he seems to have used this background only for the purpose of intralingual translations, working ‘by substitution’ and coupling peculiar Homeric usages to Koine ones. In this way, he could make Homeric syntax clear by using fairly simple concepts like those analyzed in this chapter: the idea that certain particles or words were superfluous (redundancy), that some were missing (ellipsis), or that words, cases, and verbal forms could be ‘changed’ (enallage), and that Homer used *concordantia ad sensum* or *apo koinou* constructions. With these *schemata* and the pervasive formula X ἀντὶ τοῦ Y Aristarchus could precisely describe the entire linguistic universe of Homer.

Nevertheless, despite his acute awareness of the main Homeric syntactic features, Aristarchus never seems to have explained *why* Homeric language was different from Koine. The only comments in the scholia are that the tense, the verb, the case ‘has changed’ ([ἐν]ήλλακται), that ‘a preposition has been left out’ (πρόθεσις παρείται), and that ‘the poet tends to omit articles’ (ὁ ποιητὴς παραλειπτικὸς τῶν ἄρθρων). These are not explanations; at best, they are descriptions of a linguistic reality, obtained through a comparison between Homeric Greek and Koine Greek. These two languages are compared and contrasted to better understand the former, but they are not analyzed in a diachronic perspective. Jean Lallot describes such an approach very well:²³⁷

Mais ne lâchons pas si tôt le vers de l’*Iliade*, qui, en plus de l’énallage du cas, présente une ellipse de l’article, trait particulièrement remarquable de l’ ‘usage du Poète’. Parler d’*ellipse* de l’article pour décrire cet usage implique (à nos yeux) un point de vue anachronique sur la langue homérique: c’est seulement par référence à la syntaxe de l’article dans la Koinè qu’on peut dire que l’article ‘manque’ chez Homère. C’est un peu, en moins caricatural, comme si l’on disait que les langues slaves font l’ellipse de l’article. Mais on peut être indulgent pour de telles formulations: il suffit d’y voir une ‘façon de parler’, donnant simplement à entendre qu’il y a moins d’articles dans le texte homérique que dans sa paraphrase en Koinè.

As Lallot remarks, to say that Homer ‘omits’ articles or preposition is an anachronistic explanation. Yet it is a rather practical one, still employed by students of Greek, especially when reading Homer. As we will see in Chapter 5.1, Aristarchus knew that the language of Homer represented an earlier stage of Greek.²³⁸ Even so, when he had to analyze and explain Homeric syntax, he did not need to have a diachronic approach. In fact, to perform correct paraphrases of Homeric Greek into Koine he only needed some technical tools—the grammatical categories and grammatical terminology analyzed by Matthaios—and the ability to apply the figures surveyed in this chapter to give an account of Homer’s odd syntax. Still, these technical tools and his sophisticated knowledge of syntactic figures do not seem to have been used in a more theoretical way in order to give an account of why Homeric language was the way it was. In this

237. Lallot 1997, I 56.

238. The same point is made by Nünlist 2012b. His article came out in 2012, while another article of mine on a very similar topic (which is at the basis of Chapter 5.1) was accepted for publication in 2010 but was published only in 2018 (Schironi 2018a). Since neither of us was aware of the other’s work, I am glad to note that both Nünlist and I independently reached very similar conclusions.

perspective, I agree with Dirk Schenkeveld, who, commenting on Aristarchus' approach to Homeric grammar, concludes:²³⁹

Such annotations do not betray any concern for trying to generalize one's observations, which is a prerequisite of making grammar. We find such remarks everywhere in our scholia, and what they show is an awareness on the side of these scholars that Homer's diction is quite different from that of his readers. Often Aristonicus' scholia offer grammatical terms, which points to a knowledge of such terms and their applicability, not yet necessarily to a wider interest.

Aristarchus' interest in grammar, at least as it emerges from the Homeric scholia, was not a theoretical or a historical one. His goal was not to analyze the Greek language per se; nor did he look for grammatical rules or canons, valid in general 'outside Homer'. Rather, he had a practical, problem-solving approach. He applied grammatical concepts to Homeric philology. Yet grammatical categories interested him only to the extent that they helped him to prepare his edition and explain Homeric idiolect to his readers. Within this aim in mind, the analysis of tropes and figures in Homer through intralingual translations was an excellent methodology. As we have seen in these two chapters, Aristarchus' description of Homeric language is fairly sophisticated and extensive. Most syntactic and stylistic oddities of Homer are noticed and correctly translated into Koine Greek. This was vital for an editor, who otherwise risked changing the text unnecessarily because of ignorance of tropes and figures used by Homer, as Zenodotus often did—at least in Aristarchus' opinion.²⁴⁰

The labels and ideas that Aristarchus employed to 'describe' Homeric diction, namely, tropes and figures, belonged to a stylistic analysis of language, not to a more linguistic-oriented analysis. His focus thus seems mostly to have been on what he apparently understood as specific *stylistic* features of Homer. Even his syntactic analysis of epic diction, supported as it were by the use of grammatical categories, was carried out using concepts which belonged to what we can call a 'rhetorical', style-oriented approach to language, the 'figures of diction' (σχήματα λέξεως). No doubt, the boundaries between a rhetorical and a linguistic analysis of language are thin, as technical concepts about how languages work are needed in both approaches; still, the interest and the perspective are different. Grammarians/philologists and rhetoricians were more interested in an author's style than in abstract technical rules. Aristarchus

239. Schenkeveld 1994, 274.

240. On Aristarchus' criticism of Zenodotus, see Chapter 4 § 1.

did use grammatical concepts but seems to have ‘boxed’ them within what his main analytical tools were: tropes and figures. Without turning Aristarchus’ approach into a rhetorical one,²⁴¹ he seems to have had mainly an interest for a literary and stylistic analysis of Homeric idiolect rather than a technical interest in language per se, as was later developed by the *technikoi* of the Roman era, especially Apollonius Dyscolus and Herodian.²⁴² This ‘stylistic’ approach was different in nature and interest from those of the later technical grammarians, even if his results were linguistically advanced for his time. As Wolfram Ax very aptly put it,²⁴³ Aristarchus had a ‘Grammatik im Kopf’, a ‘*mental* grammar’, which helped him to understand and, if necessary, to correct the Homeric text, figuring out the most correct forms. Yet he did not venture into a full-fledged grammatical description of the Greek language. In fact, Aristarchus’ descriptive and stylistic approach to the language used by Homer was the best way to proceed for a philologist who did not need to find out ‘why’ his poet employed enallages and ellipses, but only that he used them and what they meant in Koine Greek.

241. As Schenkeveld 1991, 153, rightly notes: “At any rate, when using *schema* Aristarchus always looks for morphological and/or phonological aspects to comment upon, never does he point out rhetorical effects”.

242. David Blank confirms that the analysis of the *schemata* as performed by Aristarchus was different from the grammatical analysis of Apollonius Dyscolus and Herodian in his comments on Lesbonax’s collections of *schemata* (Blank 1988, 141): “Lesbonax’s narrow construction of what a σχῆμα is classes him, as I have said, rather with the literary commentators than with technical writers. His habit of labelling certain constructions as schemata and giving examples, without any attempt to explain the origin of these syntactical peculiarities also dissociates Lesbonax from the authors of technical treatises while associating him with Aristarchus and other Homeric commentators. The same is true for Lesbonax’s concentration on Homeric examples”. On later grammarians’ application of *schemata* and ‘pathology’ to explain abnormal morphological and syntactic usages, see Lallot 1995.

243. Ax 1991, esp. 276 and 288; see also Ax 1982.

3.3.A

Explanation of *Glossai*

Diving into the Microcosm of Homeric Vocabulary

1. Analyzing Homeric Vocabulary
 - 1.1. Homer as Exegete of Himself
 - 1.2. *Glossai* Clarified by the Context (σαφῶς ἐκ τῶν συμφραζομένων)
 - 1.3. Clarifying Homer without Homer
2. Homeric Vocabulary as a Self-Sufficient Microcosm
 - 2.1. Homeric Greek versus Koine
 - 2.2. Homeric Greek in Line with Koine
 - 2.3. Standard Meaning (κυρίως) versus Peculiar Meaning (οὐ κυρίως/ἰδίως)
 - 2.4. Homeric Words with a Specific Meaning (οὐ ψιλῶς)
 - 2.5. Sharp Distinctions in Homeric Vocabulary
 - 2.6. Polysemous Words in Homer
 - 2.7. Homeric Words with Both Active and Passive Meaning
 - 2.8. Words with a Meaning Arising 'from the Consequence' (ἐκ [τοῦ] παρεπομένου / παρακολουθοῦντος)
 - 2.9. Genus and Species
 - 2.10. Homeric Hapax Legomena
 - 2.11. Words Used Wrongly or according to Catachresis (καταχρηστικῶς)
3. Against the Glossographers' One-for-One (ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνός) Interpretation
4. Solving Problems through Homeric Vocabulary
 - 4.1. Solving *Zetemata* and Perceived Narrative Inconsistencies
 - 4.2. Solving Perceived Linguistic Inconsistencies
 - 4.3. Choice between Variants
 - 4.4. Atheteseis Due to Words Used οὐχ Ὀμηρικῶς
5. Conclusions

The third part of grammar aims at explaining poetic vocabulary (γλῶσσαι) or the content and *realia* of the poems (ἱστορίαι). The explanation of *glossai*, the topic of this chapter, was probably the most ancient and basic form of exegesis. The famous fragment from Aristophanes' *Banqueters* (PCG 3.2, fr. 233), in which a father asks his son to tell him some 'Homeric *glossai*' (Ὁμήρου γλῶττας), shows that difficult poetic words were analyzed even at the elementary level in schools already in the classical period. The same activity is carried out both in the *scholia minora* preserved on papyri, where Homer's words are translated into Koine, and in the intralingual translations employed by Aristarchus.¹ As discussed in Chapter 2.3, paraphrase was widely used to explain Homeric poetry at different levels. In particular, the translation of poetic *glossai* into current words was one of the most common uses of intralingual translation. 'Exotic' or nonstandard words were a staple of poetic language, and thus they needed to be clarified at every level of analysis, from elementary schools, as shown by the Aristophanes fragment and by the *scholia minora*, to the highest level of textual analysis, as in Aristarchus' scholarship.

Aristotle states that *glossai* are one of the possible 'shapes' a word (ὄνομα)² can take:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1457b1–5: ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑψηλημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ὃ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ὃ ἕτεροι· ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι καὶ γλῶτταν καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατόν τὸ αὐτό, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ.

Every word is standard, a *glossa*, a metaphor, an embellishment, invented, lengthened, truncated, or altered. By 'standard', I mean what each group of people uses; by '*glossa*' [I mean] what others [use]. As a consequence it is clear that the same [word] can be both a *glossa* and a standard [word], but not for the same [people].

According to Aristotle (*Poet.* 1458a18–34), *glossai* give grandiosity to the language, while standard words (κύρια ὀνόματα) give clarity. Poetry needs *glossai*, but an excess of them will result in barbarisms (*Poet.* 1458a25–26); thus, a good poet will use the right mix of standard words and *glossai*. In particular, the latter

1. On *scholia minora* and intralingual translations, see the introduction to Chapter 2.3 with footnote 5 (on the use of the Greek '*glossa*' vs. the English 'gloss' in this study). On ancient glossography, especially on dialectal *glossai*, see Latte 1925 and Montanari 2012.

2. I have translated ὄνομα with 'word' and not 'noun', as in later grammatical theory. Even if Aristotle seems elsewhere to consider an ὄνομα a noun and an adjective (*Poet.* 1457a10–12; cf. Janko 1997, 214), when discussing poetic diction he does not seem to restrict the word to nouns (a verb can be used as a *glossa* or a metaphor); see Matthaios 1996, 66–67; Matthaios 1999, 201 n. 3.

are typical of epic poetry (*Poet.* 1459a9–10).³ Thus, clarifying *glossai* becomes one of the central tasks of the exegete, and this is why Dionysius Thrax places the explanation of difficult words as the third occupation of the grammarian.

Indeed, the first two parts of grammar and this first section of the third part all concern linguistic interpretation. They deal, however, with three different aspects of it, and each of them depends on the successful application of the previous ones. Reading aloud (the first part of grammar) is the first step toward the linguistic understanding of the text because it divides the *scriptio continua* into meaningful elements and adds diacritics, such as accents and breathings, to help to disambiguate homographs. Once the sequence of words is made clear, the interpretation of tropes and figures (the second part of grammar) elucidates the syntax and the general meaning of the phrases. In the third part, instead, the exegete discusses more specific points of linguistic interpretation: individual words which have an unusual meaning or which are employed differently from the standard usage. The interpretation of single words is addressed after the clarification of syntax because with a text written in a nonfamiliar language it is more important first to have a grasp of the general sense of a sentence (through a stylistic and syntactic analysis) than of individual difficult words, as everyone who has experienced reading a book in a foreign language knows—and Homer's dialect was almost a foreign language to Koine speakers! This is why the interpretation of *glossai* is placed at a higher level than the stylistic and syntactic analysis of tropes and figures. It is only after having understood the general sense of a sentence that a grammarian can begin to study the Homeric idiolect in detail by analyzing its unusual and difficult words. In fact, the general sense of the sentence acquired by stylistic and syntactic analysis actually helps a reader to understand the specific meaning of single words.

1. Analyzing Homeric Vocabulary

For Aristarchus, the first step to analyzing Homeric vocabulary was always to read through the Homeric poems and study their language in depth, even when it was not problematic. This in-depth knowledge of the 'standard' Homeric language offered a solid basis for proceeding with the analysis of specific *glossai*. Unusual words in Homer could provide different levels of difficulty, and in the following sections I will review the different strategies developed by Aristarchus to analyze Homeric words.⁴

3. See also Chapter 3.6.A § 6.

4. Lehrs 1882, 36–161, dedicated an entire chapter to the topic (*Dissertatio II. De Aristarchea*

1.1. Homer as Exegete of Himself

Homeric *glossai* included words that were rare or unknown in standard language as well as more common words used with a meaning which was very different from their standard one. In a few fortunate cases Homer himself explained what he meant by adding a gloss in the text. For example, at *Il.* 10.485 Aristarchus points out that the neuter plural μῆλα in Homer indicates only ‘goats and sheep’, not all quadrupeds, as in the Neoteri (Sch. *Il.* 10.485b).⁵ This is the obvious conclusion from this passage, where line 485 (‘just as a lion rushes on flocks (μήλοισιν) without their shepherd’) is followed by line 486 (‘on goats or sheep (αἴγεσιν ἢ ὄϊεσσι), and leaps upon them with evil purpose’), in which Homer explains what he means by μῆλα by adding the apposition ‘goats or sheep’ (Sch. *Il.* 10.486: ὅτι ἐπεξηγεῖται, τίνα τὰ μῆλα). Similarly, in *Il.* 23.627 Homer ‘explains’ what γυῖα means when he has Nestor complaining to Achilles: ‘my limbs (γυῖα), my feet (πόδες), are no longer firm’ (Sch. *Il.* 23.627a: καὶ ὅτι ἐπεξηγήσατο τὴν ‘ἔμπεδα γυῖα’ λέξιν).⁶ Indeed, in Homer γυῖα indicates the ‘extremities’ only, and especially feet and legs,⁷ in contrast to other poets, such as Pindar, who uses γυῖα to mean ‘body’ (N. 7.73).⁸ At *Il.* 21.495, on the other hand, Homer himself explains the *glossa* χηραμός, ‘cleft’, by adding κοίλη πέτρη, ‘hollow rock’, in the preceding line (Sch. *Il.* 21.495b: ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐξηγεῖται, τί ἐστι χηραμός, ὅτι κοίλη πέτρα). An exegetical scholium derived from Aristonicus (Sch. *Il.* 21.495c) also remarks that this is an exception, because usually Homer first introduces the difficult word and then gives the explanation—ἐπεξηγεῖται, ‘explains after’—while here Homer ‘explained first’ (προεξηγήσατο), as the explanation precedes the *glossa*.⁹

Homer’s own clarifications, however, were not always welcome. For example, Aristarchus does not feel the need to spell out what κηρεσσιφορήτους, ‘brought by the Keres’ (*Il.* 8.527), means by keeping the relative clause ‘whom

vocabulorum Homericorum interpretatione); on Aristarchus’ linguistic analysis, see also Dimpfl 1911, Roemer 1924, 1–44 (where he also discusses metaphor and syllepsis, which are treated in Chapter 3.2.A § 3 and § 15); Nünlist 2012c.

5. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 100; Dimpfl 1911, 3–4; Roemer 1924, 42; Severyns 1928, 111. On the Neoteri, see Chapter 5.3.

6. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 112–113.

7. For example, in Homeric phrases like λῦσε δὲ γυῖα (*Il.* 4.469), γυῖα (λέ)λυντο (*Il.* 7.16, 13.85), ὑπὸ τρόμος ἔλλαβε γυῖα (*Il.* 3.34, 14.506), ὅπποτέ κέν μιν γυῖα λάβη κάματος (*Il.* 4.229–230). Cf. Chantraine *DELG*, s.v. *γῦη (4); *LfgreE*, s.v. γυῖα.

8. Aristarchus was certainly aware of Pindar’s use of the word, even if the scholia have not preserved any reference to the lyric poet. The specific Homeric meaning of γυῖα was also one of the reasons for the athetesis of *Il.* 24.514; see below, § 4.4.

9. See also Sch. *Il.* 21.495a; cf. Nünlist 2009, 203. For other cases of self-explanation in Homer, see Sch. *Il.* 6.43; 6.417; for a case in which Homer explains his own metaphors, see Sch. *Il.* 8.131a (discussed in Chapter 3.2.A § 3); cf. Nünlist 2009, 202.

the Keres (κῆρες) bring (φορέουσι) on the dark ships' in the next line, which he in fact athetizes as superfluous (*Sch. Il.* 8.528). Indeed κηρεσσι-φορήτους is very clear etymologically, so it is hardly a *glossa* in need of an explanation.¹⁰

1.2. *Glossai* Clarified by the Context (σαφῶς ἐκ τῶν συμφραζομένων)

Even when Homer simply used *glossai* without explaining their meaning (the majority of cases, in fact), the only source for understanding them was Homer himself. This is the famous principle of 'clarifying Homer from Homer',¹¹ which, when applied to the analysis of vocabulary, suggested that the meaning of a word in Homer had to be sought within his own poems. This principle assumed that Homer used the word consistently throughout his entire work: in this case, the meaning of a *glossa* could be understood by examining all its occurrences in Homer and then deducing it from all the contextual uses. The attention to the context (τὰ συμφραζόμενα) was also the reason why the explanation of the *glossai* was the third step in the art of grammar: the general context could be reconstructed in the previous two steps (the articulation of the *scriptio continua* and the analysis of tropes and figures) and then used to explain the details of individual, difficult words.

An example is the obscure γέντο in the phrase γέντο δ' ἰμάσθλην, 'he grasped the whip' (*Il.* 8.43, 13.25). Γέντο is an isolated past form of a third-person singular that occurs five times in Homer,¹² and can be confused with the homograph γέντο, which is not attested in Homer, but is used by Hesiod as an abbreviated form of ἐγένετο.¹³ Even if the latter might seem a more immediate solution for the *glossa*, γέντο in Homer always has a direct object (a whip, a weapon, or a tool), which suggests a transitive verb with a different meaning than 'he was' or 'he became'. This is exactly Aristarchus' point when he notes that 'from the context' the only meaning that this form can have is 'he took';

10. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 19; Meijering 1987, 173; Lührs 1992, 95; see also Chapter 3.4 § 4 and Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4.

11. On this principle, see Chapter 2.2, footnote 47, and Chapter 6 § 2.2. In fact, Porphyry (*QH I*, 56.3–6 Sodano) combines the idea of 'clarifying Homer from Homer' with the similar (but not identical) one that Homer is sometimes his own exegete (discussed in the previous section): ἀξιῶν δὲ ἐγὼ Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὀμήρου σαφηνίζειν αὐτὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἑαυτὸν ὑπεδείκνυον, ποτὲ μὲν παρακειμένως, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐν ἄλλοις [considering it right to clarify Homer from Homer, I have shown that Homer interprets himself sometimes in passages which are nearby, sometimes in other [more remote] passages].

12. Aside from these two passages, also in *Il.* 13.241 (γέντο δὲ δοῦρε, 'he grasped two spears') and twice in *Il.* 18.476–477 (γέντο δὲ χειρὶ / ῥαιστήρα κρατερήν. ἑτέρηφι δὲ γέντο πυράγην, 'he grasped with one hand a strong hammer, and with the other he grasped a pair of fire-tongs'). Cf. Chantraine *DELG*, s.v.; *Lfgre*, s.v. γέντο I.

13. In *Th.* 200: Κυπρογενέα δ', ὅτι γέντο περικλύστω ἐνὶ Κύπρῳ [Cyprogenea because she was born in surrounded-by-water Cyprus].

therefore, γέντο is a synonym of ἔλαβεν (*Sch. Il.* 8.43a and 13.25b: ὅτι ἐκ τῶν συμφραζομένων τὸ γέντο ‘ἔλαβεν’ σημαίνει).

Other cases were more difficult—for example, when a word was used many times, but in most of its occurrences it was impossible to deduce its specific meaning. In these cases, Aristarchus searched both poems in order to find at least one passage where the context allowed him to deduce the meaning of the word conclusively. These cases are common in the Aristonicus scholia, and in most of them the keyword σαφῶς, ‘clearly’, is used to point out that a specific passage is the one that makes the meaning of the debated *glossa* clear. A typical case involves a famous *zetema* in Homeric criticism: the meaning of οὐρῆας, when in *Iliad* 1 Homer describes Apollo shooting arrows against the Greek camp and spreading the plague: ‘he first attacked the mules (οὐρῆας) and the swift dogs (κύνας), but then, shooting a sharp arrow against the men themselves (αὐτοῖσι), he hit them’ (*Il.* 1.50–52). Ancient scholars wondered whether Homer used οὐρῆας to mean ‘mules’ or ‘sentinels’. The *zetema* was already known to Aristotle, who suggested that οὐρῆας could mean ‘sentinels’:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1461a9–11: τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον γλώττη τὸ ‘οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον’ (*Il.* 1.50). ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας.

Some [problems] must be solved by looking at the diction; for example, ‘οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον’ (*Il.* 1.50) [must be solved] by [assuming] a *glossa*: perhaps [Homer] does not mean ‘mules’, but ‘sentinels’.

This time Aristarchus does not agree with Aristotle:

Sch. Il. 1.50a <οὐρῆας> ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς τινες ‘οὐρῆας’ τοὺς φύλακας· ἀντιδιαστέλλει γὰρ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῖσι (*Il.* 1.51).

οὐρῆας: because some [take] οὐρῆας to mean ‘the sentinels’, not correctly; for [Homer] opposes them [to the men] through αὐτοῖσι (*Il.* 1.51).

According to Aristarchus, οὐρῆας belong to the same group as the κύνας: the group that Apollo shot first. Οὐρῆας and κύνας are then opposed to αὐτοῖσι, who are the ‘men’, whom Apollo shot after the animals; hence, οὐρῆας are animals like κύνας. The definitive proof that οὐρῆας in *Il.* 1.50 means ‘mules’ and not ‘sentinels’ is found in *Il.* 23.111, as Aristarchus points out:

Sch. Il. 23.111a¹ οὐρῆας τ’ ὥτρυνε: ὅτι σαφῶς οὐρῆες οἱ ἡμίονοι, πρὸς τὸ ‘οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον ἐπώχετο’ (*Il.* 1.50).

‘He sent out mules (οὐρῆας) [and men to fetch wood]’: because clearly οὐρῆες are the mules, with reference to ‘he first attacked the mules (οὐρῆας)’ (*Il.* 1.50).

In this passage, οὐρῆες are ‘clearly’ (σαφῶς) the mules, because Agamemnon is sending ‘mules and men’ to the mountains to fetch the wood for Patroclus’ funeral pyre. In this case, too, ‘men’ are opposed to οὐρῆες; in addition, the οὐρῆες have the function of carrying the wood, a job that was typically done by mules (and certainly not by sentinels!). Moreover, the same animals are mentioned shortly after, at line 121, and this time Homer employs the common word ἡμίονοι, which removes any doubt about what the οὐρῆες are.¹⁴

This procedure was also applied to common words that were used by Homer with a meaning very different from the usual one. For example, γνωτός means ‘brother’ in Homer and not simply ‘known person’, ‘acquaintance’, as in Koine Greek. *Il.* 14.485–483 clearly (σαφῶς) shows this, because Acamas kills Promachus to avenge his brother and refers to the latter once (l. 483) as κασίγνητος and once (l. 485) as γνωτός (*Sch. Il.* 14.485a). Similarly, in Homer πρόμος is not ‘king’ or ‘chief’, as in later authors like Aeschylus, Sophocles, or Euripides,¹⁵ but ‘fighter of the first row’, ‘champion’. This is proved by two passages where the word refers to Hector in the phrases πρόμος ἵσταται (‘he stands as a fighter in the front line’, *Il.* 15.293) and μὴ δὲ πρόμος ἵστασο τούτῳ (‘do not stand against him [i.e., Achilles] as a fighter in the front line’, *Il.* 22.85). The military context, in addition to the predicative position of πρόμος, ‘clearly’ (σαφῶς) proves that πρόμος means πρόμαχος (*Sch. Il.* 15.293a; 22.85c).¹⁶

Another case of a common word used with a peculiar meaning in Homer is φόβος, which in Homer means ‘rout’, not ‘fear’; thus, φοβεῖν means ‘to be in rout’, ‘to be put to flight’, and not ‘to fear’, as Aristarchus observes countless times.¹⁷ This peculiar Homeric meaning emerges clearly (φανερῶς/σαφῶς in *Sch. Il.* 11.402; 13.470a; 22.250) from *Il.* 11.402, 13.470–471, and 22.250–251, where the verb φοβεῖν is opposed to (παρα)μένειν, ‘to stay firm’ and ‘to stand fast’:

14. Cf. Nünlist 2012a, 124–125; van Thiel 2014a, I 57. On οὐρῆες, which means ‘mules’ and not ‘sentinels’, see also *Sch. Il.* 10.84a, discussed in Chapter 3.5 § 6.

15. Aesch. *Ag.* 200 and 410, *Eu.* 399; Soph. *OC* 884; Eur. *Tro.* 31.

16. In this case, Aristarchus argued against the Glossographers (see below, § 3), who took πρόμος as meaning ‘chief’ in a passage where it could indeed have that meaning (*Sch. Il.* 3.44b = fr. 28 Dyck). See also *Sch. Il.* 7.75a^{1,2} (ὅτι πρόμον τὸν πρόμαχον κατὰ συγκοπὴν); 7.116b; 7.136a. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 101–102; Dyck 1987, 155.

17. *Sch. Il.* 2.767a; 4.456a (ὅτι τὴν μετὰ δέους φυγὴν φόβον εἶρηκεν; see below, § 4.3); 5.223b^{1,2} (οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν δέους); 5.252a; 5.272a; 6.41a; 6.97c; 6.278; 8.107a; 8.139a; 8.149; 10.10b¹; 11.71; 11.121a; 11.173a; 11.402; 11.404; 12.46a^{1,2}; 12.144a; 13.470a; 13.471a; 15.666a; 17.597b; 17.667a; 18.247; 19.14; 21.575a¹; 21.606c; 22.11a; 22.137c; 22.141a; 22.250. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 75–77. Similarly the verb τρέω (aor. inf. τρέσσαι) for Aristarchus does not mean ‘to fear’ but ‘to flee (with fear)’: see *Sch. Il.* 13.515; 14.522a; 22.143b and 22.143c (ex. [Ariston.]); cf. Lehrs 1882, 78–82.

Sch. Il. 13.471a ἔμενεν: ὅτι ἀντιδιέσταλται τῷ φόβῳ (*Il.* 13.470) τὸ ἔμενε, ἐξ οὗ σαφὲς ὅτι ὁ φόβος τὴν φυγὴν σημαίνει.

‘He stood firm (ἔμενεν)’: because he has opposed ἔμενε, ‘he stood firm’, to φόβος (*Il.* 13.470); from this, it is clear that φόβος means ‘rout’.

Another ‘clarifying’ passage is *Il.* 8.149, where Diomedes imagines Hector boasting about his victory: ‘The son of Tydeus put in rout by me (ὕπ’ ἐμεῖο φοβέμενος) reached the ships’. The movement toward the ships proves that φοβέμενος ‘clearly’ means ‘fleeing’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.149: ὅτι σαφῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ φεύγων). Lastly, also in *Il.* 22.141 the use of the adverb of place ὕπαιθα for a dove that, attacked by a falcon, flees away (ὕπαιθα φοβεῖται) shows that φοβεῖν is a verb of movement (*Sch. Il.* 22.141a: ὅτι καὶ νῦν σαφῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν φεύγει).¹⁸

Similarly, μέλλειν in Homer often does not imply any temporal meaning of ‘to be about to’, as it does in Koine, but rather is a synonym of εἰκέναι, ‘to seem’, ‘to be likely’.¹⁹ This meaning becomes clear from *Il.* 16.46–47, where Homer comments on Patroclus begging Achilles to lend him his armor as follows: ‘so he spoke praying—a great fool: for he was doubtlessly (ἔμελλεν) praying (λιτέσθαι) for his own cruel death and destiny’. For Aristarchus, ἔμελλε ‘clearly’ does not refer to any future event here, since Patroclus has just finished imploring Achilles and is not going to do it again; rather, ἔμελλε means ἐώκει (*Sch. Il.* 16.46c¹: ὅτι καὶ νῦν τὸ ἔμελλε σαφῶς οὐκ ἐπὶ χρόνου . . . ἔστι δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐώκει). Another such instance is provided by εὔχεσθαι, which in Homer often means ‘to boast’, and not ‘to pray’ as in Koine.²⁰ This is shown by *Il.* 19.100, where the verb refers to Zeus, who never ‘prays’, but can certainly ‘boast’ among the other gods (*Sch. Il.* 19.100a: σαφῶς ἔστι καυχώμενος).²¹

18. Aristarchus understands ὕπαιθα as meaning ‘in front of’ rather than ‘from beneath’; see also *Sch. Il.* 21.255a^{1,2}; cf. Lehrs 1882, 117.

19. *Sch. Il.* 1.564b (ὅτι τὸ μέλλει οὐκ ἔστι χρονικόν, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκεν); 2.36c; 2.116–8; 10.326b; 11.54b; 11.817a^{1,2}; 12.34; 12.113; 13.226; 13.777; 14.69; 14.125a; 15.601b; 16.46c^{1,2}; 16.460b (ex. [Ariston.]); 20.451; 21.83a and 21.83b (ex. [Ariston.]); 22.356a; 23.544; 24.46; 24.86. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 120–121; Roemer 1924, 41–42; van Thiel 2014a, II 185.

20. Cf. Nünlist 2012b, 156.

21. Cf. *Sch. Il.* 21.183b; 21.501b; see also below, § 2.2. Identical is the case of βάλλειν, which means ‘to wound by throwing a missile’ (spear or arrow), as some passages ‘clearly’ (σαφῶς) demonstrate (see below, § 2.5). For other cases of words whose meaning is ‘clearly’ shown in one single passage or two, see *Sch. Il.* 3.354c¹; 8.325a¹; 11.49 and 12.77b; 13.439a; 17.649; 21.519a; 22.11a. In many other scholia, on the other hand, Aristarchus follows the same principle (i.e., the attention to the context to explain the meaning of a word) without stating that the meaning emerges ‘clearly’ (σαφῶς) from the context; yet the method behind them is the same; see, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.6b; 2.424; 9.699b; 15.241a.b. Cf. also Nünlist 2012c, 208.

1.3. Clarifying Homer without Homer

Sometimes, however, Homer and the poetic context did not provide any useful information. In these cases Aristarchus had to follow other paths. The most common one was etymology, which I will discuss in Chapter 3.4. Another possibility was to use the evidence provided by later poets, the so-called *Neoteroi*. For example, Aristarchus refers to Hesiod to explain ἵππότης (i.e., ἵππότης in Homer), which is ‘horseman’ (*Sch. Il.* 14.119a), and to Anacreon for ἀστεμφής, ‘unmoved,’ ‘unshaken,’ used only twice in the *Iliad* (*Sch. Il.* 3.219a).²²

Finally, Aristarchus could even refer to other advanced *technai* for more technical terms occurring in Homer:

Sch. Il. 11.424b {δουρὶ κατὰ} πρότμησιν: ὅτι ἅπαξ τὴν πρότμησιν ὠνόμασεν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ ὑπὸ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν τόπος κατὰ τὴν λαγόναν, διὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ τέμνεσθαι τεχθέντα τὰ παιδιά. τοῦτον δὲ λέγουσιν ἰατρῶν παῖδες ἥτρον.

‘[He stabbed Chersidamas under] the umbilical area (πρότμησιν) [with his spear]’: because he mentioned the name πρότμησις only once. It is the place underneath the navel toward the flank, [so called] because newborn babies are cut there first [i.e., πρότμησις is from πρῶτον . . . τέμνεσθαι]. Doctors call it ἥτρον.²³

After discussing the etymology of the hapax, Aristarchus compares Homeric vocabulary with that of doctors, saying that what Homer calls πρότμησις is what doctors (ἰατρῶν παῖδες) call ἥτρον. This comparison testifies to the extraordinary precision of Aristarchus’ analysis when it comes to offering linguistic clarifications.²⁴ His interest and acquaintance with the technical terminology of medicine can be explained by the fact that he had plenty of opportunities at Alexandria (if not in the Museum itself) to meet physicians, to learn about their discipline, and perhaps even to read their writings. Moreover, between the third and first century BCE, medicine was developing its technical vocabulary due to new discoveries, made especially by Herophilus in anatomy, for which new

22. On Aristarchus’ use of the *Neoteroi* to explain Homeric language, see Chapter 5.3 § 1 and § 5.1.

23. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.424c (ex. [Ariston.]) and 11.424d (ex.). Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 11.424a¹) imputes a different reading to Aristarchus (κατὰ πρότμησιν); cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 146 and n. 286.

24. Another case of Aristarchus’ involvement with medical terminology is discussed in Schironi 2004, 495–500 (fr. 65).

terminology was required.²⁵ Finally, lexicography on Hippocrates was already flourishing at Alexandria in the third century BCE;²⁶ thus, even though he was not personally in contact with cutting-edge physicians, Aristarchus could certainly consult these Hippocratic lexica in the Library if he had any doubt about scientific vocabulary.²⁷ It is thus not surprising that Aristarchus referred to one of the most advanced sciences of his time, and one on which there already was an exegetical tradition, to explain Homeric usage. More interestingly, he seems to have assumed the same level of acquaintance with the technical terminology of medicine in his audience.

2. Homeric Vocabulary as a Self-Sufficient Microcosm

Through the analysis of Homeric language ‘within its context’ Aristarchus was able to map out the Homeric idiolect in its specific usages. As is clear, in analyzing Homeric words, he constantly compared them with Koine through intra-lingual translations. Koine Greek was thus the system of reference, but the goal was to find out and respect Homeric ‘otherness’ in terms of vocabulary. Out of this constant effort to find the right meaning in Homer and compare it with Koine, Aristarchus seems to have achieved a fairly precise understanding of the words used by the poet. In this section, I will review the main characteristics which Aristarchus highlighted in the Homeric idiolect.

2.1. Homeric Greek versus Koine

The very first step for analyzing Homeric vocabulary was to realize, acknowledge, and accept that Homeric language was indeed different from the current one. In various scholia, in fact, Aristarchus opposes the usage of Homer to that of Koine Greek. A typical case is offered by the word φόβος, which in Homer does not mean ‘fear’ as in Koine, but ‘rout’, ‘flight’. While in the section above I focused on how Aristarchus is able to find the Homeric meaning of this word, the following scholia show how he opposes the Homeric meaning to the Koine one:

Sch. Il. 11.71 μνώνοντ’ ὀλοοῖο φόβοιο: ὅτι φόβον τὴν φυγὴν. ὃν δὲ ἡμεῖς φόβον, δέος λέγει.

25. See von Staden 1989, 138–241, passim (e.g., 157–158, 160–161).

26. See von Staden 1992; Smith 2002, 202–204; Manetti 2015, 1147–1153.

27. Aristarchus might have even worked on medical writers himself (see the introduction to Chapter 1.2).

‘[And neither of them] thought of ruinous flight’: because φόβος is the flight; and he calls δέος what we call φόβος.

Sch. Il. 12.46a¹ ταρβεῖ οὐδὲ φοβεῖται: ὅτι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει δι’ ἀμφοτέρων, ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τοῦ ‘ταρβεῖ’ δέδιεν, ὃ ἡμεῖς φοβεῖται, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ‘φοβεῖται’ φεύγει. λέγει οὖν, οὔτε δέδιεν οὔτε φεύγει.

‘[His noble heart does not] fear nor flees’: because he does not say the same thing with the two [verbs], but with ταρβεῖ [he means] ‘he fears’, which we [say] φοβεῖται; and with φοβεῖται, [he means] ‘he flees’. Thus, he says: ‘he does not fear nor does he flee’.

In addition to explaining the Homeric meaning of φόβος and φοβεῖν, Aristarchus also provides the Homeric equivalents for what in Koine is meant by φόβος and φοβεῖν: δέος and ταρβεῖν.²⁸ He opposes Homer to ‘us’ (ἡμεῖς), which indicates the ‘current’ usage and is equivalent to the modern idea of ‘Hellenistic Koine.’²⁹ Aristarchus thus referred to the way people used to speak in his own day and compared it with the Homeric usage—a natural consequence of his continuous paraphrasing of Homer in Koine Greek.

The opposition between the Homeric language and later Greek was not limited to Hellenistic spoken Koine. In some scholia, Aristarchus also compares Homer with ‘modern’ literary authors:

Sch. Il. 16.336a¹ ἡμβροτον ἀλλήλων, μέλεον δ’ ἠκόντ<ισαν ἄμφω>: ὅτι μέλεον ἀντὶ τοῦ μελέως, ματαίως, καὶ διὰ παντὸς οὕτως Ὅμηρος χρῆται· οἱ δὲ τραγικοὶ (e.g., Aesch. *Pers.* 733, etc.) ἐπὶ τοῦ οἰκτροῦ καὶ τάλανος, καὶ ἡ συνήθεια· πρὸς ὃ καὶ ἡ σημείωσις.

‘They missed one other, they both had thrown the javelin in vain (μέλεον)’: because μέλεον [is used] instead of μελέως, ‘in vain’. And Homer uses [this word] in this way everywhere: the tragedians (e.g., Aesch. *Pers.* 733, etc.) [use it] for ‘miserable’ and ‘wretched’, and this is also [our] usage; with reference to this [question], the sign [is placed] too.³⁰

28. See also *Sch. Il.* 18.247 and 19.14 (discussed in Chapter 3.4 § 8.1), where Aristarchus argues against Zenodotus, who read φόβος instead of τρόμος in a passage where the context required a word meaning ‘fear’.

29. This is not the same, however, as the κοινὴ διάλεκτος of the ancient grammarians, as clarified by Morpurgo Davies 1987 and Cassio 1993 (see also Chapter 2.3, footnote 9). On the diachronic view that Aristarchus might have had of Homeric dialect, see Chapter 5.1 § 1.

30. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.336a². Cf. Lehrs 1882, 94–95; Dimpfl 1911, 12–13.

Aristarchus' point is undoubtedly correct; as he himself observes elsewhere, μέλεος means 'idle', 'useless', only in Homer, and this is in contrast with the later meaning of the word (*Sch. Il.* 10.480a; 23.795a^{1,2}). In this specific case the comparison with the tragedians is particularly appropriate, since this adjective seems to be especially common in tragedy.³¹ As Aristarchus notes, the tragic meaning of the word was also taken over by the current Koine usage (here called ἡ συνήθεια), in opposition to Homeric Greek.

One of the problems with Homeric *glossai* was that they could be misunderstood according to the modern meaning of the same words. According to Aristarchus, Philoxenus³² and Timotheus³³ committed this exact mistake, when they used the verb θῦσαι as meaning 'to slaughter' for a sacrifice 'according to our usage' (ὁμοίως τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ συνηθείᾳ), rather than 'to burn so as to produce smoke', that is, to put offerings on a fire (*Sch. Il.* 9.219b), which is the Homeric meaning for this technical verb for sacrifices.³⁴ Aristarchus' comment not only aims at stating the correct Homeric meaning, but seems to have an implicit polemical goal as well: if Philoxenus and Timotheus used the verb as an intertextual reference to Homer,³⁵ their μίμησις of Homeric vocabulary was flawed. Indeed, as will be further discussed in Chapter 5.3 § 1 and § 3.4.2, one of the main problems that Aristarchus had with the 'Neoteroi' (for him, *all* poets later than Homer) was that they did not sometimes understand Homeric language well. Thus, they either failed in their Homeric mimesis (as Philoxenus and Timotheus here) or they inadvertently introduced a new meaning for a Homeric word.³⁶

2.2. Homeric Greek in Line with Koine

It was specifically because the Homeric idiolect was different from Koine that the exegete also needed to highlight the (rare) cases when Homer used

31. E.g., Aesch. *Pers.* 733, *Septem* 779, 878, 879; Soph. *Trach.* 972, *Ant.* 1319; Eur. *El.* 1156, etc.; yet also Herodotus uses it with the meaning of 'wretched' (Hdt. 7.140).

32. Fr. 823 PMG.

33. Fr. 783 PMG.

34. See Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. 2 θύω; *Lfgre*, s.v. θύω II; Gow 1912, 215–216; Kadletz 1984, 101–102; Petropoulou 1987, 137–140. The use of θύειν for 'to slaughter' a sacrificial victim is instead later: e.g., Hdt. 1.126.2; Aristoph. *Lys.* 1062–1064. On Aristarchus' analysis, cf. Lehrs 1882, 82–84; Hofmann 1905, 7, 8, 38–39; Dimpfl 1911, 8; Schmidt 1976, 252–256. In particular, Schmidt suggests that Aristarchus was following Theophrastus, who claimed that θῦσαι was a verb used for offering of plants, not of animals (Porph. *Abst.* 2.5). On Aristarchus and *Il.* 9.219, cf. also Montanari 1995c, 58–59; Nünlist 2012b, 156–157.

35. This is certainly possible since Philoxenus (fr. 823 PMG) used it in a scene between the Cyclops and Odysseus and the fragment of Timotheus could come from his *Cyclops* (cf. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1903, 107).

36. For Aristarchus' similar accusations against Antimachus, see Schironi 1999.

a word according to the Koine usage.³⁷ For example, φιλεῖν in Homer sometimes means ‘to receive as a guest’, and not ‘to love’;³⁸ yet in *Il.* 9.480–481 its meaning is not so obvious. Phoenix recounts about his first visit to Peleus, ‘who received (ὑπέδεκτο) me with joy and ἐφίλησ’(ε) me as a father loves (φιλήσῃ) his child’. The context would suggest that ἐφίλησ’(ε) means ‘to welcome as a guest’, since Phoenix is talking about a relationship of *xenia* between Peleus and himself, but Aristarchus rightly points out that in this line φιλεῖν in fact means ‘to love’, as in Koine (*Sch. Il.* 9.481a¹: ὅτι τὸ ‘ἐφίλησε’ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν χρῆσιν). This is correct because here the verb is followed by a comparison with a father’s feeling for (and not *xenia* toward) his son, which uses the same verb (according, again, to Koine usage). Moreover, ὑπέδεκτο in line 480 means ‘he received’, ‘he was hospitable to’; since the idea of hospitality is already conveyed by ὑπέδεκτο, then ἐφίλησ’(ε) can indeed mean something else. A similar case occurs for ἠπειλήσε in *Il.* 9.682, which is employed with the Koine, negative sense of ‘to threaten’ (*Sch. Il.* 9.682: ὅτι τὸ ‘ἠπειλήσε’ νῦν κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν χρῆσιν), and not in the more positive one of ‘to vow’, ‘to promise’, attested in *Il.* 23.863 and 872 and typical of Homer (*Sch. Il.* 23.863b^{1,2}; 23.872). Likewise, Aristarchus remarks that εὐχόμενος, said of Diomedes (*Il.* 5.121) or Odysseus (*Il.* 10.461) addressing Athena, means ‘praying’, as in Koine (*Sch. Il.* 5.121 and 10.461c: ὅτι συνήθως ἡμῖν νῦν κέχρηται τῷ εὐχόμενος), rather than ‘boasting’, which is the usual Homeric meaning of the word.³⁹ In *Il.* 18.614 Homer uses the noun ὅπλα for ‘weapons’ only, as in Koine (*Sch. Il.* 18.614: ὅτι τὰ πολεμιστήρια ‘ὅπλα’ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν εἶπε νῦν), rather than according to his typical usage, where it indicates any kind of instrument.⁴⁰

2.3. Standard Meaning (κυρίως) versus Peculiar Meaning (οὐ κυρίως/ιδίως)

Aristotle clearly states that a poet should employ and mix *glossai* and standard words (κύρια ὀνόματα) in a balanced way, because using too many ‘exotic’ words results in barbarism. Standard words are necessary, moreover, as they give σαφήνεια, ‘clarity’, to the diction. Aristarchus seems to have had Aristotle’s doctrine in mind: while he commented on the cases where Homer uses words with a nonstandard or poetic meaning (οὐ κυρίως or ιδίως), he also highlighted cases when a Homeric word is employed ‘according to the standard mean-

37. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 146; Nünlist 2012b, 156; Nünlist 2012c, 204.

38. See *Sch. Il.* 3.207 (τὸ γὰρ φιλεῖν ἐνίοτε ἀντὶ τοῦ ξενίζειν τίθησι); 3.354c^{1,2} (σαφῶς; see above, § 1.2); 6.15b.

39. See *Sch. Il.* 19.100a; 21.183b; 21.501b.

40. See *Ap. Soph.* 122.1–2 and *Sch. Il.* 19.21a^{1,2} (ex.).

ing' (κυρίως).⁴¹ The opposition κυρίως/ιδίως generally indicates the difference between a word's usual meaning, which most often is the meaning deduced from its etymology (see Chapter 3.4 § 3.1), and the meaning which is peculiar and specifically (ιδίως) Homeric. In fact, Homer can use words both according to the standard meaning⁴² and in a peculiar sense.⁴³ For example, he employs the word ποινή according to the 'standard meaning' (κυρίως) of 'blood money' (that is, compensation in cases of murders) in *Il.* 9.636, and with the 'particular (i.e., derivative) meaning' (ιδίως) of 'recompense' in *Il.* 5.266 (*Sch. Il.* 5.266b).⁴⁴ These cases are thus similar to those surveyed in the previous two sections, but are labeled differently in the scholia. Since the meaning κυρίως is specifically connected with the etymology of a word, οὐ κυρίως or ιδίως can also refer to Homer's figurative use of words as opposed to their 'literal', i.e., etymological, meaning. For example, Aristarchus notes that the adjectives εὐήκης, 'well-pointed', and πανυήκης, 'with long point', are used κυρίως for objects which have a point (ἀκμή), such as a long spear, and κατὰ παραγωγήν, 'by derivation', in *Il.* 16.768, referring to 'long branches' (*Sch. Il.* 22.319a; 16.768a).⁴⁵ A 'literal' meaning is also invoked for *Il.* 4.141, when in a simile Homer speaks of a woman who 'stains ἐλέφαντα with purple'. Here for Aristarchus ἐλέφας must be understood literally (κυρίως) as 'ivory' without introducing the unattested ἐλεφαντὰ in order to create a neuter plural adjective to mean 'ivory things' in the derivative/figurative sense of 'white wool', as some read (*Sch. Il.* 4.141a).⁴⁶ In other instances, however, ιδίως seems to be used to indicate a specific meaning that Homer is seeking to express. This is the case of *Il.* 5.128. Athena has come to Diomedes' rescue and reassures him that she has dissolved the mist from his eyes, so that he will be able to distinguish 'god and man' (ἡμὲν θεὸν ἡδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα) in the battle. Zenodotus replaced ἡδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα with ἡδ' ἄνθρωπον. From a linguistic point of view, this is correct, as standard Greek would require ἄνθρωπος to express the opposition between man and god, not ἀνὴρ. Nevertheless, Aristarchus defends the original reading, pointing out how careful Homer is in his use of the word ἀνὴρ: Athena is speaking of warriors and a warrior

41. I am focusing here on the use of ιδίως and κυρίως referring to single words; however, the keyword ιδίως can also describe syntactic *schemata* 'typical' of Homer, as seen, e.g., in Chapter 3.2.B § 3.8 and § 5. On ιδίως, ιδιάζειν, ἴδιος in scholia, see Meijering 1987, 226–230.

42. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 7.146b (see Chapter 3.4 § 3.1); 7.255a; 10.75b (see Chapter 3.4 § 3.1); 11.523 (see Chapter 3.4 § 3.1); 22.31; 22.489b.

43. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.128b; 5.319b; 8.439a; 10.528b (see Chapter 3.4 § 3.1); 17.272b.

44. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 149–150; Meijering 1987, 162 and 229. See also *Sch. Il.* 3.286a.

45. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 305; Roemer 1924, 78–79.

46. For another case of a word to be understood in a literal sense, see *Sch. Il.* 24.81a. For a nonliteral sense of a Homeric word, on the contrary, see *Sch. Il.* 2.45a (discussed in Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.3) and 2.670 (discussed in Chapter 3.2.A § 3).

in Homer is ἀνὴρ, not simply ἄνθρωπος (*Sch. Il.* 5.128b: ἰδίως δὲ εἶρηκεν ἄνδρα διὰ τὸ καὶ ἄνδρας πολεμεῖν).⁴⁷

The fact that Homer used the same words in a peculiar as well as in a standard (= etymological and/or Koine) meaning introduced a wide degree of uncertainty in using the meaning of a word to support an athetesis. Thus, a lexical oddity (i.e., a word used either οὐχ Ὀμηρικῶς or οὐ κυρίως) was usually only one among other reasons for suspecting a line. For example, one of the reasons for the athetesis of *Il.* 2.252–256 is that the verb ἧσαι, ‘to sit’, at line 255 cannot be understood according to the standard meaning; however, the lines are also ‘fairly prosaic’ (πεζότεροι) in style (*Sch. Il.* 2.252a).⁴⁸

2.4. Homeric Words with a Specific Meaning (οὐ ψιλῶς)

Aristarchus did not limit himself to observing that Homer’s words may have had different meanings from those they had in Koine. He also remarked that in many cases Homer used Koine words, but gave them a more subtle, nuanced meaning, conveying a more complex connotation than later poets. In the scholia the expression employed to label such cases is the formula οὐ ψιλῶς, ‘not merely’, in the sense: ‘the word does not merely mean X but also Y’. For example, the participle ἔρρων does not mean simply ‘coming’ but ‘coming with pain’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.239a; 9.364b; 18.421b),⁴⁹ and when Diomedes calls Paris ‘κέραϊ ἀγλαέ’, ‘famous for your κέρας’, κέρας (litt., ‘horn’) does not mean merely ‘hair’, but alludes to a kind of braiding in the form of a horn (*Sch. Il.* 11.385d).⁵⁰ Similarly, ὄσσα in Homer means specifically ‘divine voice’, hence ‘prophecy’, while the Neoterai⁵¹ used it simply (ψιλῶς) for any kind of ‘voice’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.93b). This observation is closely connected with the interpretation of the phrase κάκ’ ὀσσόμενος applied to Agamemnon:

Sch. Il. 1.105a κάκ’ ὀσσόμενος: ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ὄσων, κακῶς ὑπιδόμενος, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄσσης, τῆς φωνῆς, κακολογήσας· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται Ὅμηρος τῇ ὄσση ψιλῶς ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας κληδόνας.

47. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 24.

48. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 453–454. On atheteseis due to non-Homeric words, see below, § 4.4. On ‘prosaic style’, see Chapter 3.6.A § 6 and Chapter 3.6.B § 5.1.

49. See also *Sch. Il.* 9.364c (ex. [Ariston.?). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 102.

50. Aristarchus is probably arguing against the Glossographers, as an entry in Apollonius Sophista seems to suggest (Ap. Soph. 98.11–16); cf. Dyck 1987, 145–146 (fr. 15). In the same scholium Aristarchus also argues against ‘some’ (ἐνιοί) who understood κέραϊ ἀγλαέ as ‘famous for your bow’; see also Chapter 3.3.B § 2.4.

51. E.g., Hes. *Th.* 701, 832. See Chapter 5.3. § 1.

‘Threatening evil with his look (ὀσσομένοσ): because it is from ὄσσε, [meaning] ‘giving an evil glance’, not from ὄσση, ‘voice’, [meaning] ‘reviling him’. For Homer does not use ὄσση simply for ‘voice’, but rather for ‘divine utterance’.

According to Aristarchus, the participle ὀσσομένοσ derives from ὄσσε, ‘two eyes’, and means ‘giving [Calchas] an evil glance’.⁵² It must not be understood as ‘addressing him harshly’, as if derived from ὄσσα, ‘voice’, because ὄσσα in Homer does not mean simply voice, but is specifically reserved for ‘divine voice’ (ἡ θεία κληδών), which, of course, Agamemnon does not have. This example also shows that the distinction between a specific and a generic meaning of a word can also involve later poets. In this specific case the Neoterioi are the ones who have impoverished the meaning of the Homeric word by applying it to all possible voices. Similarly, the verb ἀμαθύνειν in Homer has the specific meaning of ‘to level with the dust’, as ἄμαθος is ‘dust’,⁵³ but Aeschylus employed it simply (ψιλῶς) in the sense of ‘destroying’⁵⁴ (*Sch. Il.* 9.593a). In both these examples, the specific (and etymological) use of a word by Homer is contrasted with the more generic meaning of the Neoterioi. We could even speculate that for Aristarchus this also proved the superiority of Homer, who used vocabulary more precisely and more expressively than his followers.⁵⁵

2.5. Sharp Distinctions in Homeric Vocabulary

In Aristarchus’ view, another aspect of Homer’s linguistic skill was his ability to make subtle distinctions in his vocabulary: some words were used with a specific meaning and were opposed to others which had a similar, but slightly different sense, and Homer was always very careful in using them.

One of the words that seem to have troubled Aristarchus most in this regard is βάλλειν, as a large number of Aristonicus scholia attest.⁵⁶ In several of them, Aristarchus constantly notes that βάλλειν does not simply mean ‘to throw’ (a weapon, a missile) in Homer, but ‘to hit and wound someone’.⁵⁷ This is proved

52. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.356a; 24.172a. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 88; Dimpfl 1911, 17–18; Nünlist 2012c, 196–198.

53. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 123.

54. In the sense of ‘killing a person’, since he used it to refer to Actaeon, who was ‘killed’ by his dogs (*TrGF* 3, fr. *244: κύνες διημάθουνον ἄνδρα δεσπότην).

55. Other words with a specific, not a plain meaning (οὐ ψιλῶς) in Homer are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 4.117a (see footnote 57 and below, § 4.4); 8.223; 15.56a (see below, § 4.4).

56. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 51–71; Dimpfl 1911, 10; Roemer 1924, 40.

57. *Sch. Il.* 3.80b (ὅτι Ὀμηρος τὸ βάλλειν ἐπὶ τοῦ τιτρώσκειν τίθησι); 3.82b; 3.368a; 4.117a (τὸ γὰρ βάλλειν Ὀμηρος οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιλῶς προέσθαι τίθησι); 5.17; 5.52; 6.9a; 8.299a; 8.313c; 8.322; 10.372a (see below, § 4.1); 11.376a; 11.583b; 11.612a; 16.481a and 16.481b (ex. [Ariston.?). Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 8.301; 11.350. Thus, βέλος is the ‘wound’: see *Sch. Il.* 8.513b and 8.513c^{1,2} (ex. [Aris-

by some passages where it is ‘clear’ (σαφῶς) that the verb implies the idea of ‘hitting’ and not simply ‘throwing a missile’ (*Sch. Il.* 3.368a; 5.52; 16.481a).⁵⁸ In fact, βάλλειν means a very specific way of hitting, that is, ‘to hit with a missile’,⁵⁹ and not in close combat;⁶⁰ for the latter case Homer uses τύπτειν and οὐτάμεναι, which mean ‘to strike with a weapon in hand’ (a sword, a dagger, or even a spear, when it is held in the hands). Aristarchus reached this conclusion by noticing that Homer often uses these verbs in tandem, βάλλειν, on the one hand, and τύπτειν or οὐτάμεναι, on the other.⁶¹ He thus concluded that, while τύπτειν and οὐτάμεναι were synonyms, βάλλειν meant something different. In fact, he points out the difference between these verbs in many of the passages where βάλλειν is used with οὐτάμεναι⁶² or with τύπτειν.⁶³ The definitive proof for such a distinction is found in *Il.* 20.378, when Apollo advises Hector against challenging Achilles ‘lest he hit (βάλῃ) you or strike (τύψῃ) you in close combat with a sword (σχεδὸν ἄορι)’.

ton.]); 14.439a. Needless to say, Aristarchus is discussing the verb βάλλειν in a specifically military context (i.e., in the sense of throwing a missile to hurt an enemy); of course, βάλλειν also means simply ‘to throw’ in other Homeric contexts and Aristarchus was aware of that; for example, at *Il.* 12.458 (where Hector is described throwing stones at the gate of the Achaean wall) he explains that βέλος means ‘everything which is thrown, and now the stone’ (*Sch. Il.* 12.458b: πᾶν τὸ βαλλόμενον ‘βέλος’ λέγει καὶ νῦν τὸν λίθον).

58. Aristarchus also notes a difference between βάλλειν and the cognate βολεῖν: while the former is used for the ‘wounding of the body’, the latter is employed for ‘the wounding of the soul’. Hence, the two verbs cannot be exchanged, as Zenodotus did in *Il.* 9.3 (*Sch. Il.* 9.3c; 9.9b).

59. *Sch. Il.* 4.157a; 4.206; 4.527b (ὅτι τὸ ‘βάλῃ’ ἐκ βολῆς ἔτρωσε); 5.145; 5.208a (βαλὼν: ὅτι τρώσας, καὶ οὐ ρίψας ἀπλῶς τὸ βέλος); 8.270b (βεβλήκοι: ὅτι σαφῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκ βολῆς ἐπιτύχοι); 11.809c; 15.571c.

60. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 20.273–4a^{1,2}; 20.279; 20.283; 20.346a^{1,2}, which all concern a criticism of Aristarchus against Zenodotus (see Chapter 4, footnote 33). On the difference between βάλλειν and other verbs for ‘striking by hand’, see *Sch. Il.* 5.147a and 11.439a¹ (Did.).

61. E.g., ἄβλητος καὶ ἀνούτατος in *Il.* 4.540; δουρὶ τυπεῖς ἢ βλήμενος ἰῶ in *Il.* 11.191, 206; εἴ περ γὰρ κε βλεῖο . . . ἢ τυπείης in *Il.* 13.288; οὐτάσαι οὐδὲ βαλεῖν in *Il.* 14.424; βλήμενος ἢ τυπεῖς in *Il.* 15.495; βεβλημένοι οὐτάμενοί τε in *Il.* 11.659, 826, 13.764, 16.24; ἢ βάλῃ ἢ σχεδὸν ἄορι τύψῃ in *Il.* 20.378; τὸν μὲν δουρὶ βαλὼν, τὸν δὲ σχεδὸν ἄορι τύψας in *Il.* 20.462; ἢ οὐτάσῃ ἢ βάλησιν, in *Il.* 21.576; τύψας ἢ βαλὼν in *Il.* 22.68. I have highlighted the lines for which there are scholia of Aristarchus noticing the differences (with a single underline for the scholia in footnote 62 and with a double underline for the scholia in footnote 63).

62. *Sch. Il.* 4.540; 11.659b^{1,2}; 14.424a; 21.576b^{1,2} (πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τοῦ οὐτάσαι καὶ βαλεῖν). Zenodotus missed this difference and Aristarchus criticizes him in *Sch. Il.* 16.807a; 16.812; 17.15 (discussed in Chapter 4 § 1.2.1). Once Aristarchus observes that Homer seems not to respect this difference: *Sch. Il.* 16.467b (δοκεῖ συγκεχύσθαι τὸ ‘οὐτάσε’· βεβλήκει γὰρ τὸ δόρυ) and *Sch. Il.* 16.467c^{1,2} (Did.); see below, § 4.3; cf. also Chapter 2.2 § 1.

63. *Sch. Il.* 11.191a (πρὸς τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ τύψαι καὶ βαλεῖν); 13.288a; 15.495a^{1,2} (ὅτι διαστέλλει τὸ ‘βαλεῖν’ καὶ ‘τύψαι’); 20.378a^{1,2}; 20.462a¹; 22.68a (πρὸς τὴν διαστολὴν τοῦ βαλεῖν καὶ τύψαι); see also *Sch. Il.* 16.105.

Sch. Il. 20.378a¹ μή πώς <σ> ἢ ἐ βάλῃ <ἢ ἐ σχεδὸν ἄορι τύψῃ>: ὅτι διέσταλκε τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ τὸ τύψαι, διδασκαλικῶς προσθεὶς σχεδόν, οἷον σχέδην ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς.

‘Lest he hit you or strike you in close combat with a sword’: because he has distinguished βαλεῖν and τύψαι, adding σχεδόν, in the sense of ‘closely’, ‘in close proximity’, in a very didactic manner.⁶⁴

The fact that τύψῃ is accompanied here by the phrase σχεδὸν ἄορι is revealing (διδασκαλικῶς⁶⁵) because σχεδόν, ‘in close proximity’, proves that Homer uses τύπτειν for close combat. Moreover, the dative ἄορι, ‘with a sword’, is additional proof that it is a hand-to-hand fight.⁶⁶ Thus, τύπτειν and οὐτάμεναι mean ‘to strike with a sword in close fighting’, whereas βάλλειν, which is used alone, means ‘to hit by throwing something’. Because of the sharp distinction between these two verbs, Aristarchus can single out deviations from it as cases of ‘syllepsis’—for example, in the *formula* βεβλημένοι οὐτάμενοί τε, or when only one of these verbs is employed in a collective way (συλληπτικῶς) to generically mean ‘to wound’, as seen in Chapter 3.2.A § 15.⁶⁷

Another pair of verbs that have slightly different meanings and should be kept separate is ἄγειν, ‘to lead’, and φέρειν, ‘to carry’, as proven by *Il.* 23.512–513. At the end of the chariot race, Sthenelus, who is the winner of the race together with Diomedes, gets his prizes, a woman and a tripod: ‘He gave his brave companions the woman to lead away (ἄγειν) and the tripod with handles to carry away (φέρειν)’. For Aristarchus, this passage clearly illustrates the difference between ἄγειν, ‘to lead’ those who can walk by themselves, and φέρειν, ‘to carry’ those who cannot (*Sch. Il.* 23.512–3a¹: πρὸς τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ ‘ἄγειν’ καὶ ‘φέρειν’).⁶⁸ For this reason, when at the beginning of the race the very same prizes are offered by Achilles to the winner (*Il.* 23.262–264) using only the verb ἄγεσθαι—apparently referring to both the woman and the tripod⁶⁹—Aristarchus points out that the verb φέρεσθαι must be supplemented

64. See also *Sch. Il.* 20.378a². Cf. Sluiter 1999, 178.

65. On the use of διδασκαλικῶς in scholia, see Sluiter 1999 and Nünlist 2012a. Cf. also Roemer 1924, 16–17.

66. *Il.* 20.462 with τὸν μὲν δουρὶ βαλὼν, τὸν δὲ σχεδὸν ἄορι τύψας, ‘hitting one with the spear and striking the other in close combat with the sword’, is equally instructive, but the scholium is scanty (*Sch. Il.* 20.462a¹: ὅτι πάλιν ἀντιδιέστειλεν).

67. *Sch. Il.* 11.659b¹; 13.764a^{1,2}; 16.24a (for the pair βεβλημένοι οὐτάμενοί τε); 13.782a (τύπτειν alone); 14.28b and 14.63a (βάλλειν alone); 14.128a and 14.379b^{1,2} (οὐτάμεναι alone); 18.351b (ὠτειλαί).

68. See also *Sch. Il.* 23.512–3a²: ὅτι διεσάφησε τὸ ‘ἄγειν’ πρὸς τὸ ‘φέρειν’ [because he has clarified the meaning of ‘ἄγειν’ compared with ‘φέρειν’]. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 137; Roemer 1924, 43.

69. *Il.* 23.262–264: ἵππευσιν μὲν πρῶτα ποδώκεσιν ἀγλά’ ἄεθλα / θῆκε γυναῖκα ἄγεσθαι

with reference to the tripod, ‘since the poet is precise about what is led and what is carried’ (*Sch. Il.* 23.263–4: ἀκριβῆς γὰρ ὁ ποιητὴς περὶ τὰ ἀκτὰ καὶ φορητά). Another revealing passage is *Il.* 24.366–367, when Hermes meets Priam and asks him what he will do if someone sees him ‘bringing’ (ἄγοντα) so many gifts. Here, even if the gifts cannot ‘walk’, Homer uses the verb ἄγειν. Aristarchus explains that this lexical choice is correct because Priam is not ‘carrying’ the gifts, but driving the chariot where the gifts have been loaded (*Sch. Il.* 24.367a: ὅτι ἄγοντα εἶρηκεν, οὐ φέροντα· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐβάσταζεν). Thus, the difference between ἄγειν and φέρειν is based on the subject for Aristarchus, not on the object: φέρειν means that the subject physically carries the object and ἄγειν means that the subject ‘leads’ the object, which can move on its own, either because it has legs (like a woman), or because it is placed on something that moves it (like Priam’s gifts on the chariot).⁷⁰

Ἐπιδραμεῖν and διώκειν are also used according to precise rules, even if they both mean ‘to run after’. This conclusion is drawn from *Il.* 10.354–359, when during the night expedition Odysseus and Diomedes take notice of Dolon: ‘the two of them run after (ἐπιδραμέτην) him, and he stopped, hearing a noise’ (l. 354). At first Dolon hopes that these are the Trojans, but then ‘he recognized that they were enemies, and moved his feet quickly to flee; and they suddenly rushed to chase (διώκειν ὁρμήθησαν) him’ (ll. 358–359). Aristarchus comments on the change of verb in both lines:

Sch. Il. 10.354a τὼ μὲν ἐπιδραμέτην: ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιδραμεῖν τίθησιν, ὅτε οὐ γινώσκει ὁ διωκόμενος, ὅτε δὲ γινώσκει, διώκειν καὶ διώκεσθαι.

‘The two of them run after (ἐπιδραμέτην) him’: because he uses [the verb] ἐπιδραμεῖν when the one who is chased does not know [that he is being chased], [and he uses] διώκειν and διώκεσθαι when [the one who is chased] knows it.

Sch. Il. 10.359a φευγέμεναι· τοὶ δ’ αἶψα <διώκειν ὁρμήθησαν>: ὅτι νῦν ὁρθῶς διώκειν λέγει, ὅτε φεύγει ἐπιγνοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους ὄντας.

‘To flee; and they suddenly rushed to chase (διώκειν) him’: now he says rightly διώκειν, when he flees knowing that these are enemies.

ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυῖαν / καὶ τρίποδ’ ὠπώνετα δυωκαεικοσίμετρον [for the swift charioteers he set splendid prizes to lead away, a woman, expert in noble works, and a tripod with handles and which held twenty-two measures].

70. So soldiers can ‘carry’ (ἐνεῖκαν) a wounded companion (*Sch. Il.* 13.213a); on *Sch. Il.* 17.163c, which discusses another instance of ἄγειν for an inanimate object that cannot move on its own (i.e., a corpse!), see van der Valk 1963–1964, I 460 n. 243; Erbse, ad loc. On the metaphorical use of these verbs (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 11.632b), see Chapter 3.2.A § 3.

In this case the difference is based on the object of the verb: Homer uses ἐπιδραμεῖν when the victim is unaware of being chased, and διώκειν when the victim knows that he is being chased.⁷¹

This accuracy extends to descriptions that do not pertain to the military subject of the epos. For example, Homer employs ψύχειν, ‘to dry’, for a wind and τέρσεσθαι, ‘to dry’, for the sun (*Sch. Il.* 11.621a)⁷² and in similes he carefully distinguishes between ὄμβρος, ‘rain’, χάλαζα, ‘hail’, and νιφετός, ‘snow’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.7a; 15.170b); as Aristarchus observes, this is typical of someone who is able to use language well (*Sch. Il.* 10.7a: <οἱ> ὑγιῶς χρώμενοι . . . διὸ νῦν διαστέλλει ἕκαστον).⁷³

2.6. Polysemous Words in Homer

Aristarchus also noticed polysemous words, that is, words that had more than one meaning. A telling case concerns forms like εἶσομαι, εἶσατο, and εἰσάμενος, which may at first seem derived from the same verb, but have different meanings. Aristarchus indeed remarks that each of these forms ‘has many meanings (πολλὰ σημαίνει)’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.532; 12.118a¹; 13.45c¹), and lists them all. The future εἶσομαι in *Il.* 8.532 means γνῶσομαι, ‘I will know’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.532; 12.118a¹), but in *Il.* 21.335 it means πορεύσομαι, ‘I will go’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.532; 21.335c).⁷⁴ The aorist εἶσατο in *Il.* 12.118 stands for ‘he rushed and went’ (*Sch. Il.* 12.118a¹: ὥρμησεν καὶ ἐπορεύθη ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶμι), but the identical εἶσατο in *Il.* 13.191 and in *Od.* 5.281 means ἐφάνη, ‘it appeared’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.532; 12.118a¹; 13.45c¹; 13.191a). The participle εἰσάμενος in *Il.* 13.45 is ὁμοιωθεὶς, ‘appearing in the likeness of’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.45c^{1,2}), but the feminine form in *Il.* 21.424 is ‘rushing’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.45c¹; 21.424a: ἐφορμήσασα, ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶμι). From a modern perspective, there is no polysemy; rather, these are different verbs, though homographs. Forms that Aristarchus glosses as ‘to know’ or ‘to appear’ (*Il.* 8.532; 13.45; 13.191; *Od.* 5.281) are all derived from εἶδω/εἶδομαι.⁷⁵ Those meaning ‘to go’ and ‘to rush’ (*Il.* 12.118; 21.335; 21.424) are all forms of a Homeric verb attested only for the future and aorist and normally connected with ἔμμαι (it shows the presence of a

71. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.158a; a nonstandard meaning of διώκειν is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 8.439a; cf. Lehrs 1882, 126–127; Roemer 1912, 55–56; Nünlist 2012c, 206.

72. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 126.

73. On the difference between κοιμηθῆναι and ὑπνῶσαι, see *Sch. Il.* 7.482a (discussed in Chapter 5.2. § 3.1).

74. Yet, according to Aristarchus, Zenodotus did not understand εἶσομαι in *Il.* 21.335 as ‘I will hasten’, but rather as ‘I will know’, so that he was then forced to change the line, incorrectly (*Sch. Il.* 21.335c).

75. In particular, in *Il.* 8.532 εἶσομαι works as the future of οἶδα, ‘to know’, whereas the aorists εἶσατο in *Il.* 13.191 and *Od.* 5.281 and εἰσάμενος in *Il.* 13.45 are more likely to be real aorists from εἶδομαι in the sense of ‘to look like’, ‘to appear’; cf. Janko 1994, 71 (on *Il.* 13.191).

digamma). Yet the loss of the original digamma led the ancients to link it with εἶμι (hence, the smooth breathing).⁷⁶ This etymology is recalled by Aristarchus in *Sch. Il.* 12.118a¹ and 21.424a,⁷⁷ which proves that he did recognize that these forms ‘with many meanings’ were not in fact the same word. But, at least on the basis of the scholia, he seemed to have described these phenomena in his commentaries focusing on their semantics rather than on their origin; so he could say these forms were polysemous (πολλὰ σημαίνει).

Another similar case occurs with the verb λέγεσθαι and its aorist λέξασθαι. As discussed in Chapter 3.2.A § 9, Aristarchus considers it as a παραλλήλως construction, when, at *Il.* 13.275–276, λέγεσθαι means ‘to say/to recount’ and is followed by λεγοίμεθα, meaning ‘[if] we were to be chosen/counted’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.276–87). In this case, he correctly connects these forms, since indeed λέγεσθαι meaning ‘to say’ or ‘to recount’ is the same verb as λέξεσθαι meaning ‘to be counted.’⁷⁸ The discussion concerning λέξασθαι in *Il.* 2.125 is more problematic: here the verb means ‘to be chosen/counted’, so it has the same meaning of λεγοίμεθα at *Il.* 13.276. Yet, according to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 2.125a), the verb means ‘to be gathered together’ (συλλεγῆναι), and not ‘to lie down’ (κοιμηθῆναι) or ‘to be counted among’ (καταριθμηθῆναι). While specifying that λέξασθαι in this case means ‘to be gathered together’ (συλλεγῆναι), and not ‘to be counted among’, might be a simple explanation of the verb’s peculiar meaning in this passage,⁷⁹ when Aristarchus adds that it does not also mean ‘to lie down’, the verb he is talking about is a different one. Λέξασθαι meaning ‘to lie down’ derives from λέχεσθαι,⁸⁰ which has nothing to do with the verb meaning ‘to be counted among’, ‘to be gathered’, and ‘to recount/to say’, which is λέγεσθαι. In fact, in a scholium to the *Odyssey* Aristarchus correctly derives the future λέξεται in the sense of ‘he will lie down’ from λέχος, ‘bed’ (*Sch. Od.* 4.413a¹: ἀντὶ τοῦ κοιμηθήσεται, ἀπὸ τοῦ λέχους).⁸¹

So Aristarchus seems to have been aware that in these two cases he was dealing with homographs derived from different roots. Yet, when discussing

76. See Chantraine 1953–1958, I 293–294, 412; Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. 3 εἶσομαι.

77. In *Sch. Il.* 15.544b, on the other hand, Aristarchus doubts whether the dual ἐεισάσθην also belongs to the verb which means ‘to go’ and ‘to rush’ (as is correct); cf. Janko 1994, 288.

78. Cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. λέγω; *Lfgre*, s.v. λέγω. The Greek λέγειν has thus the same sense as the English ‘to tell’, which also originally meant ‘to count’ (cf. ‘teller’). I would like to thank Richard Janko for bringing this point to my attention.

79. In fact, also the meaning ‘to be counted’ would work here, since Agamemnon is saying that if both Greeks and Trojans would decide to count themselves, and the Trojans ‘should be gathered/counted together, all of those who live in the city’ (l. 125 Τρῳας μὲν λέξασθαι ἐφέστιοι ὅσσοι ἔασιν), the Greeks would still outnumber the Trojans.

80. Cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. λέχεται; *Lfgre*, s.v. λέχ(ομαι).

81. All the other Aristonicus scholia discussing these homographs, never mention the derivation of these verbs: see *Sch. Il.* 8.519a; *Sch. Od.* 4.451d (where Aristarchus notes another παραλλήλως construction) and 4.452b^{1,2} (V [Ariston.]). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 147; Weckelin 1919, 67.

them, he focused mainly on their different meanings rather than their root derivation, and listed (and analyzed) them together *as if* they were the same verb with different meanings. The reason might be that, beyond the ‘real’ etymology of these words, they appeared identical in the text. So he had to explain to his students that those words had many different meanings and list them all—this was the first and fundamental step to clarify the semantics of the text. He might have then further explained the difference by introducing the correct etymology (as he does in *Sch. Il.* 12.118a¹ and 21.424a), but only as an extra clarification. In addition, Aristarchus’ interest in these homographs might have been stylistic, as they allowed the poet to play with *παραλλήλως* constructions, through which Homer also engaged his readers in wordplay. So his task was to emphasize these multiple meanings and the linguistic puns associated with them, not their ‘true origin’ from an etymological point of view.⁸²

2.7. Homeric Words with Both Active and Passive Meaning

Another peculiarity of the Homeric idiolect was that some nouns could express both an active and a passive meaning—at least according to Aristarchus’ formulation, as it emerges from the scholia discussed below. The clearest example is *κοτύλη*, ‘cup’, which for Aristarchus can indicate both a type of vessel and the beverage contained in it (*Sch. Il.* 22.494a: ὅτι εἶδος ποτηρίου ἢ κοτύλη . . . ὁμωνύμως τῷ ἀγγεῖῳ τὸ ὑγρὸν). The same applies to the synonym *χοῖνιξ*, another container, and *μάσταξ*, ‘mouth’ and ‘morsel’, as explained in the following scholium:

Sch. Il. 9.324a <μάστακ’(α):> ὅτι οἱ Γλωσσογράφοι (fr. 19 Dyck) μάστακα τὴν ἀκρίδα, δέον μάσημα καὶ βρῶμα. ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ στόμα ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ χοῖνικα τὸ μετροῦν καὶ τὸ μετρούμενον. ‘ἀλλ’ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐπὶ μάστακα χερσὶ πίεζεν’ (*Od.* 4.287).

‘Morsel (μάστακα)’: because the Glossographers (fr. 19 Dyck) [say that] μάσταξ is ‘locust’, while it must be a ‘mouthful’ and a ‘morsel’. Sometimes [he calls] the mouth itself this as well, as [he calls] χοῖνιξ what measures and what is measured; [for example in] ‘but Odysseus pressed with his hands on his [i.e., Anticlus’] mouth (ἐπὶ μάστακα)’ (*Od.* 4.287).

In a simile, at *Il.* 9.324, a bird feeds her little ones with a μάσταξ; the word is normally understood as ‘morsel’, but according to the Glossographers (see

82. This is why I prefer to keep the original label of ‘polysemous words’, as in the Aristonicus scholia, rather than talking of ‘homonymy’ as Nünlist 2012c, 210, does, even if our interpretation of the evidence is not very different. On Aristarchus’ use of etymology, see Chapter 3.4.

below, § 3) it was the ‘locust’.⁸³ Aristarchus argues against this interpretation on the basis of *Od.* 4.287, where the meaning ‘locust’ clearly does not make any sense. To reconcile the meaning of the word in *Il.* 9.324 and *Od.* 4.287, he then assumes that μάσταξ is another word with both an active and passive meaning, just like χοῖνιξ, which can be both the ‘cup’ and ‘what is measured by a cup’, namely, a unit of dry measure. Accordingly, μάσταξ in *Od.* 4.287 has an active meaning, ‘mouth’,⁸⁴ while in *Il.* 9.324 it has a passive meaning, ‘morsel’. Aristarchus thus argues against the Glossographers by invoking a specific feature of some Homeric words. The same Homeric feature helps him to solve a linguistic conundrum in *Il.* 21.502–503, where it is said that Latona ‘gathered up the curved bows (τόξα) which had fallen (πεπτεῶτα) here and there’:

Sch. Il. 21.502b καμπύλα τόξα: ὅτι μέμιχε τὸν κατὰ τοῦ τόξου λόγον τῷ κατὰ τῶν βελῶν· καμπύλα μὲν γὰρ τὰ τόξα, ‘πεπτεῶτα’ δ’ ‘ἄλλυδις ἄλλη’ (*Il.* 21.503) τὰ βέλη· ὡς χοῖνιξ τὸ μετροῦν καὶ τὸ μετρούμενον, καὶ κοτύλη, οὕτως καὶ τὰ βάλλοντα καὶ τὰ βαλλόμενα τόξα.

‘Curved bows’: because he has combined the account of the bow with that of the arrows: for the bows are ‘curved’ (καμπύλα), while the arrows are ‘fallen’ (πεπτεῶτα) ‘here and there’ (ἄλλυδις ἄλλη) (*Il.* 21.503). Just as χοῖνιξ is what measures and what is measured (and κοτύλη is the same), so, too, τόξα are what shoot and what are shot.

As with χοῖνιξ and κοτύλη, which can mean both the container and the content, so τόξον can be both what shoots (i.e., the bow) and what is shot (i.e., the arrow), so that now what has ‘fallen here and there’ are the arrows, as is logical.⁸⁵ In these last two examples, Aristarchus solves the problem by applying a Homeric feature, which is obvious and beyond dispute elsewhere, to the passage at issue. Nouns denoting some type of vessels can indeed indicate both the container itself and also the content, as also happens in modern languages. However, cases like μάσταξ and τόξα are less obvious. Aristarchus’ skill in arguing with the Glossographers (in the case of μάσταξ) or in solving a *zetema* (in the case of τόξα) clearly show both his deep knowledge of Homeric idiolect as

83. The Glossographers’ interpretation of μάσταξ as ‘locust’ is shared by Clitarchus, according to whom it is a *glossa* from the Ambraciote dialect; see *EGen.* β 275 L-L: Κλείταρχος δέ φησιν, ὅτι κατὰ Ἀμβρακιώτας μάσταξ καλεῖται ἡ ἀκρίς [Clitarchus says that the locust is called μάσταξ among the Ambraciotes]. The word in this sense is used by Soph. *TrGF* 4, fr. 716, and by Nican. *Ther.* 802, who is quoted by *Sch. Il.* 9.324b (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 12; Dyck 1987, 123, 125, 148–149.

84. See also *Sch. Od.* 4.287c (ex.) and 4.287d^{1,2} (V [Ariston.]).

85. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 60.

well as his subtle ability to find ‘ad hoc’ solutions by adapting the semantic possibilities of certain peculiar words to other, less obvious, cases.⁸⁶ Yet his aim was to solve philological problems without changing the text—an excellent scholarly attitude, which he carried out with rigorous methodology, even if some of his ‘solutions’ might not fully convince us.⁸⁷

2.8. Words with a Meaning Arising ‘from the Consequence’ (ἐκ [τοῦ] παρεπομένου / παρακολουθοῦντος)

Sometimes a word, though clear in its basic sense, did not seem to fit in its context. In this case, the required meaning had to be ἐκ [τοῦ] παρεπομένου / παρακολουθοῦντος, ‘from the consequence’, that is, it expressed an action or a state logically connected to the primary meaning of that word, regardless of whether it occurred before or after. For example, πάλλιν is ‘to brandish’ (a spear), but can also mean ‘to use’ (a spear) ‘from the consequence’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.142a: ἐκ παρεπομένου τὴν χρῆσιν σημαίνει). Κεστός, an adjective referring to the girdle of Aphrodite, means ‘stitched’, ‘embroidered’ (from κεντεῖν, ‘to prick’) and—ἐκ παρεπομένου—‘wrought in various colors’ (ποικίλος), and is not, as ‘some of the ancients’ believed, a proper name (*Sch. Il.* 14.214a).⁸⁸ The idea of ἐκ [τοῦ] παρεπομένου / παρακολουθοῦντος can also be applied to an entire phrase, as when Agamemnon prays to Zeus in *Il.* 2.412–417 to allow him to destroy Priam’s palace and ‘rend Hector’s tunic around his chest’; Aristarchus explains the latter expression as equivalent to ἀνελεῖν, ‘to kill’, ‘from the consequence’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.417a). Similarly, the phrase ‘to place many on the grievous pyre’ is equivalent to ‘to kill’ ἐκ τοῦ παρακολουθοῦντος (*Sch. Il.* 9.546a).⁸⁹

86. Both μάσταξ meaning ‘morsel’ and τόξα meaning ‘arrows’, as Aristarchus suggested, are difficult to accept. Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. μάσταξ, does not even mention the meaning ‘morsel’; in fact, at *Il.* 9.324 (ὥς δ’ ὄρνις ἀπτήσιν νεοσσοῖσι προφέρῃσι μάστακ’ ἐπεὶ κε λάβῃσι, ‘as a bird brings to her unfledged chicks a morsel when she finds it’), μάστακ’ can also be understood as a dative: μάστακι, so to have ‘as a bird brings to her unfledged chicks [something to eat] with her mouth . . .’, as suggested by Hainsworth 1993, 105. As for τόξα, Richardson 1993, 95, comments: “καμπύλα τόξα is a good instance of a formulaic phrase which does not precisely suit its context”.

87. On the other hand, Aristarchus is right when claiming that the adjective ἀμήχανος, too, has both an ‘active’ (‘without means’, so ‘helpless’) and a ‘passive’ (‘allowing no means’, so ‘irresistible’) meaning; see *Sch. Il.* 10.167a; 15.14b; 16.29a. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 145–146.

88. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 191. The target is also Callimachus (*Sch. Il.* 3.371b; see Chapter 5.3 § 1), who, however, could have hardly belonged to ‘some of the ancients’ (ἐνιοὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων). This definition perhaps goes back to Aristonicus, who between the first century BCE and the early first century CE might have indeed considered the Hellenistic poet ‘ancient’; cf. Roemer 1924, 115.

89. The same relationship occurs between δουπεῖν and θνήσκειν; see *Sch. Il.* 13.426a; 16.822a; 20.388; 23.679a, which are discussed below, at § 3.

2.9. Genus and Species

An important distinction that seems to have come into play in the semantic analysis of Aristarchus is the one between ‘genus’ (γένος) and ‘species’ (εἶδος). As Aristotle explains, the εἶδος is a subdivision of a γένος.⁹⁰ In particular, in the *Categories* the philosopher observes that we predicate the genus of a species, but we never can inversely predicate the species of a genus.⁹¹ In the Aristonicus scholia γένος, ‘type’, and εἶδος, ‘species’, and their derivatives are used to define the meaning of certain words. For example, Aristarchus speaks of εἶδος, ‘species’, in a very Aristotelian way when explaining names from the natural world, as for animals in *Sch. Il.* 16.407d (εἶδος ἰχθύος), 16.747a (εἶδος τῶν θαλασσίων ὀστρέων), and 24.316a¹ (Hrd.) (ἀετοῦ εἶδος), or fruits in *Sch. Il.* 9.542a (μήλα . . . ὡς ἡμεῖς <ε>ἰδικῶς). The idea of species is also used to describe objects: a στεφάνη is ‘species of helmet’ (*Sch. Il.* 7.12a; 10.30a; 11.96), a κοτύλη is ‘species of drinking cup’ (*Sch. Il.* 22.494a; 23.34b), and even for more ‘abstract’ definitions like ἀκοή, a ‘species of sensation’ (*Sch. Il.* 4.343a; 11.532).

The most interesting use of ‘genus’ and ‘species’ in Aristarchus occurs when they are employed together and somehow opposed.⁹² A telling example concerns the definition of Calchas in *Il.* 1.62–63, when Achilles suggests consulting a seer: ‘let’s ask some seer (μάντιν), priest (ἱερεῖα), / or a diviner of dreams (ὀνειροπόλον)’:

Sch. Il. 1.62 ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ τινα μάντιν: ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι μάντις γενικῶς, ἱερεὺς δὲ καὶ ὀνειροπόλος εἰδικῶς, εἶδη μάντεων. Ζηνόδοτος δὲ ἠθέτηκεν αὐτόν (*Il.* 1.63). μήποτε δὲ ὀνειροκρίτην ὑπέληφεν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς.

90. Aristot. *Metaph.* 1054b27–31: πᾶν γὰρ τὸ διαφέρον διαφέρει ἢ γένει ἢ εἴδει, γένει μὲν ὧν μὴ ἔστι κοινὴ ἢ ὕλη μὴδὲ γένεσις εἰς ἄλληλα, οἷον ὅσων ἄλλο σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, εἶδει δὲ ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ γένος (λέγεται δὲ γένος ὁ ἅμω τὸ αὐτὸ λέγονται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ διάφορα) [for everything which is different differs either by genus or by species; by genus, [those things] for which there is no common matter, nor generation into each other, for example, [those] whose figure of predication is different; by species, [those] whose genus is the same (genus is defined as the same thing which two different things are considered to be, in respect to their substance)]. Among the many passages on these concepts, see Aristot. *Metaph.* 1057b7–15; *Cat.* 2b7; *Top.* 102a31–102b3, 103a6–14. On γένος and εἶδος in Aristotle, see also below, footnote 100.

91. Aristot. *Cat.* 2b17–21: ὡς δὲ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει—ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τῷ γένει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ εἶδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει [but as the primary substances are with respect to other things, so too the species is with respect to the genus—for the species underlies the genus; for genera are predicated of species but species are not conversely predicable of genera].

92. In *Sch. Il.* 1.62; 1.69a; 5.162a; 8.47–8a; 11.532; 11.612a and 11.612b (ex. [Ariston.]); 15.252b; 21.495a; 24.54c (ex. [Ariston.]).

‘Let’s [ask] some seer (μάντιν)’: the *diple* because μάντις [is said] in a generic way, while ἱερεύς and όνειροπόλος in a specific way, [for they are] species of seers. Zenodotus athetized the line (*Il.* 1.63): perhaps he understood it as ‘interpreter of dreams’, not correctly.

Zenodotus athetized line 63 mentioning the diviner of dreams because—Aristarchus assumes—he did not consider όνειροπόλοι ‘real’ seers, but rather simple interpreters of dreams without any divine inspiration. Aristarchus, however, defends the line and explains that όνειροπόλος is a *species of seer*, and not a simple interpreter of dreams. He repeats the distinction elsewhere, specifying that a όνειροπόλος is someone who divines through dreams and does not simply interpret them (*Sch. Il.* 5.149: ότι όνειροπόλος ό δια τών ιδίων όνείρων μαντευόμενος, ούχ ό όνειροκρίτης).⁹³ In this case, Aristarchus applies the categories genus/species to divination, so that a priest (ἱερεύς) and a diviner of dreams (όνειροπόλος) are ‘species’ of seers (μάντις). In fact, his distinction is correct, because in ancient Greece many methods were used to predict the future or to practice divination: reading dreams or birds’ flight, making a sacrifice and interpreting its signs, or consulting oracles. All these activities were ‘species’ of the ‘genus’ divination (μαντική τέχνη). This distinction comes back again when, after Achilles’ proposal, Calchas rises up and volunteers to speak (*Il.* 1.68–69): ‘Among them rose up / Calchas, son of Thestor (Κάλχας Θεστορίδης), the best of the augurs (οίωνοπόλων όχ’ άριστος)’. Zenodotus read the beginning of line 69 differently, so to have ‘the seer, son of Thestor (μάντις Θεστορίδης), the best of the augurs (οίωνοπόλων όχ’ άριστος)’. Aristarchus, however, rejects this reading as logically impossible, because a genus (μάντις) cannot be ‘the best’ among a species (οίωνοπόλος, a species of μάντις), since genus is the wider category (*Sch. Il.* 1.69a: ού δύναται δέ τώ γένει τώ είδος άμα συγκατατίθεσθαι).⁹⁴

Given that genus is wider than species, a generic name should precede a specific one when used together. Thus, Homer is correct in saying “Ιδην . . . Γάργαρον (*Sch. Il.* 8.47–8a: προτάξας γάρ τώ γενικόν τώ είδικόν έπήνεγκεν) and κοίλη πέτρη . . . χηραμός (*Sch. Il.* 21.495a) because the former is always the genus (‘Ida’ and ‘hollow rock’) and the latter is always the species: ‘Gargarus’ is a peak of the Ida mountain range and a ‘cleft’ (χηραμός) is a species of hollow rock. Yet Homer can sometimes put the species before the genus, when equivalent words are used ‘side by side’ (παραλλήλως).⁹⁵ For example, this occurs in the cluster ‘a heifer or a cow’ (*Il.* 5.162), where the heifer is a species

93. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 44.

94. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 100–101; West 2001, 173; van Thiel 2014a, I 60 and 62.

95. On the use of equivalent words ‘side by side’, see Chapter 3.2.A § 9.

of cow. Zenodotus read ‘a cowherd or a cow’, but for Aristarchus it is much better to keep the original, where Homer has put two (nearly) synonymous words ‘side by side’: the specific (the heifer) before the generic (the cow) (*Sch. Il.* 5.162a: παραλλήλως δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῷ γένει τέταχεν).

In Aristarchus’ view, another important stylistic feature of Homer was the use of the specific in place of the generic. For instance, Homer can say αἶεν, which means ‘to perceive by the ear’, instead of (ἐπ)αισθάνεσθαι, ‘to perceive’, because the former is more specific than the latter (*Sch. Il.* 11.532 and 15.252b). As he observes in *Sch. Il.* 11.532, hearing is a species of perception (ἡ γὰρ ἀκοὴ εἶδος ἐστὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως),⁹⁶ and Homer is expressing the generic through the specific (τῷ εἶδει τὸ γένος δεδήλωκεν).⁹⁷ The same occurs with βάλλειν, which means to ‘hit by hurling’, and thus indicates a ‘species’ of wounding:

Sch. Il. 11.612a βεβλημένον: ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ τετρωμένον· τῷ <ε>ἰδικῷ τὸ γενικὸν ἐσήμανεν.

‘Wounded (βεβλημένον)’: because [βεβλημένον is used] instead of τετρωμένον. He has indicated the generic through the specific.⁹⁸

On the other hand, the Aristarchean scholia never remark that Homer uses the generic instead of the specific. This might be interpreted as a sign of the artistic qualities of Homer, who is always able to use the language in the most expressive way by never using generic words when there are more specific ones that allow him to convey a particular nuance in the meaning.⁹⁹ In this way, then, Aristarchus seems to have adopted the epistemological division between genus and species as defined by Aristotle¹⁰⁰ not only to explain words that might have been difficult, but also, and more interestingly, to comment on Homeric style and prove once more the greatness of Homer.

96. See also *Sch. Il.* 4.343a.

97. On the meaning of αἶεν in *Il.* 15.252, see Janko 1994, 253. A similar case is κωφὴν . . . γαῖαν, ‘the deaf earth’: according to *Sch. Il.* 24.54c (ex. [Ariston.]), κωφὴν is here used instead of ἀναίσθητον, ‘without perception’, to mean ‘the earth who cannot perceive’.

98. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.612b (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Roemer 1924, 24.

99. This idea is closely linked with the notion that Homer uses words with a specific meaning (οὐ ψιλῶς) analyzed above at § 2.4.

100. I am referring here to the definitions of these two categories given by Aristotle in the passages quoted in footnotes 90 and 91. These definitions, and especially the idea that genus is a wider category than species, seem to have been known (not necessarily by direct readings of the *Metaphysics* or the *Categories*) to Aristarchus, who applied them in his exegesis. Aristotle’s definitions are clear, even if his own specific uses of the categories of γένος and εἶδος in the biological works might be inconsistent, as shown by Balme 1962.

2.10. Homeric Hapax Legomena

Aristarchus tried to identify the Homeric lexicon in order to distinguish between words that were typical of Homer and others that were extraneous to him. Yet it was important to differentiate between non-Homeric words and words used only once by Homer. In fact, hapaxes were also a ‘typical’ feature of Homer.¹⁰¹ Many Aristonicus scholia point out that a word is a hapax, i.e., that either it is not used by Homer elsewhere,¹⁰² or it is used once in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey*.¹⁰³ Aristarchus also notes when Homer uses an epithet only once with a specific proper noun.¹⁰⁴ In none of these cases, it should be stressed, does Aristarchus emend the text in order to avoid the unique occurrence of a word. Sometimes, however, a hapax is not the right solution, as shown by *Sch. Il.* 3.54a:

Sch. Il. 3.54a κίθαρις: ὅτι τινὲς μὴ εὐρίσκοντες κατὰ τὴν ποιήσιν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον κιθαρίζοντα μετέγραψαν {οὐκ ἂν τοι χραίσμη} ‘κίδαρις’. τοῦτο δὲ πῖλου γένος εἶναι λέγουσιν. πολλὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἅπαξ λεγόμενα παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ.

‘The cithara (κίθαρις) [would not help you]’: because some changed [the line and wrote] κίδαρις [i.e., a Persian headdress] since they did not find Alexander playing the cithara in the poem. They say that this is a type of felt cap; and there are many hapax legomena in the poet.¹⁰⁵

In *Il.* 3.39–57 Hector harshly rebukes his brother Paris for what he has done

101. Cf. Roemer 1924, 16. On hapaxes in the Homeric scholia and ancient scholarship, see Martinazzoli 1953.

102. *Sch. Il.* 1.106c; 2.217a; 7.433a; 8.250a; 10.226 (see below, § 3); 11.147a; 11.424b and 11.424c (ex. [Ariston.]; see above, § 1.3); 13.564b; 15.412a^{1,2}; 16.34a and 16.34b (ex. [ex. | Ariston.?]); 16.747a; 17.272b; 18.236a; 18.519a; 19.149a (ex. [Ariston.?]); 21.282g (on συφορβός, which is however a hapax only in the *Iliad* but is used several times in the *Odyssey*; cf. Martinazzoli 1953, 36–37 and 82–83. According to van Thiel 2014a, III 331, the note refers to ἐρχθέντα in the same line, which is indeed a hapax); 21.319b^{1,2} (cf. Schironi 2004, 426–433, fr. 55); 21.499 (ex. [Ariston.?]); 22.31; 22.294b.c; 22.496a^{1,2}; 23.91a; 23.311a; 23.481a; 23.531a; 23.604a¹; 23.791; 23.845a and 23.845c (ex. [Ariston.]); 24.304a¹ (see below, § 4.4).

103. *Sch. Il.* 14.509a (cf. Martinazzoli 1953, 34–35, and Erbse, ad loc.); 15.393b (λόγοις is a hapax in the *Iliad*; yet λόγοισι occurs in *Od.* 1.56); 17.599b; 24.124a^{1,2}. On these scholia and other words used twice, once in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey*, see Chapter 5.2 § 3.1.

104. *Sch. Il.* 21.550a, discussed in Chapter 5.2 § 2.3.

105. See also Eust. 381.12–14 (ad *Il.* 3.54): ἰστέον δὲ, ὅτι τινὲς μὴ εὐρόντες Ἀλέξανδρον παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ κιθαρίζοντα μεταγράφουσι κίδαρις ἀντὶ τοῦ κίθαρις· ἔστι δὲ πῖλου γένος ἡ κίδαρις, ἅπαξ, φασι, ῥηθεῖσα ἐνταῦθα τῷ ποιητῇ, λέγοντες καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι ἅπαξ λεγόμενα παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλοις [we must know that since they do not find Alexander [depicted] as playing the cithara in the poet, some [scholars] write κίδαρις instead of κίθαρις. The κίδαρις is a type of felt cap, used—they say—only once, here, by the poet, and they claim that in Homer and in other [poets] there are also other hapax legomena].

to the Trojans and warns him that, if he meets Menelaus in single combat, ‘the cithara would not help you, nor the gifts of Aphrodite’ (l. 54). Paris playing the cithara is a very common image in Greek art;¹⁰⁶ however, since this image occurs nowhere in Homer, some scholars, probably thinking it was iconography introduced by the Neoterioi, decided to change the reading and wrote κίδαρις, which is a Persian headdress. This word is a hapax (probably a variant of τιάρα), but those scholars accepted it because ‘there are many hapax legomena in the poet.’¹⁰⁷ This is Aristarchus’ idea, admittedly, but this time the principle is wrongly applied. The difference lies in the fact that Aristarchus ‘respects’ hapaxes when he finds them in his manuscripts, but he does not insert them in the text, as these critics did in order to correct something that they perceived as odd. On the contrary, for Aristarchus, it is much better to assume that Paris is indeed a cithara player in Homer as well, even though Homer does not say so explicitly (perhaps according to the principle of κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον, ‘tacitly’)¹⁰⁸, than to change the text with a word that is a hapax not only in Homer, but in all Greek literature until Aristarchus’ time.¹⁰⁹ This scholium seems thus to emphasize an important principle in Aristarchus’ practice: while respecting linguistic or stylistic hapaxes present in the received text is fine because there are indeed hapaxes in Homer, introducing hapaxes *into the text* with an emendation (as these scholars did by writing κίδαρις) is incorrect because it would be to go against the poet’s usage.¹¹⁰

106. See, for example, *LIMC*, vol. 1, s.v. Alexandros, 495 and 499 (nos. 9–11).

107. Bouchard 2016, 198, attributes the final comment in the scholium to Aristarchus, who would be referring to the ‘iconographic hapax’ of Paris playing the cithara. The concept of hapax, however, seems to be always applied to linguistic uses and not iconographical ones, especially in the phrase ἅπαξ λεγόμενα, as in this scholium. Aside from words used only once, Aristarchus notices a grammatical hapax, which he rejects (*Sch. Il.* 4.46b² on *Il.* 15.71; see Chapter 4 § 1.5.1 with footnote 116), and a stylistic hapax (i.e., ἐπανάληψις is used extensively in the *Iliad*, but only once in the *Odyssey*: *Sch. Il.* 6.154; 7.138a; 12.96; 20.372b; 23.642a; see Chapter 3.2.A § 10). These cases all concern language. Similarly, even in *Sch. Il.* 23.88b (ὅτι ἅπαξ τῆς διὰ τῶν ἀστραγάλων παιδιᾶς μέμνηται), when Aristarchus points out that Homer mentions the game of dice only on that occasion (as in the other two occurrences, *Il.* 14.466 and *Od.* 10.560, ἀστράγαλος has its primary meaning of neck vertebra) the context is primarily linguistic, not cultural or iconographic (see also Chapter 5.2, footnote 26). Additionally, Eustathius (see above, footnote 105) interprets the phrase as the reasoning of those who wrote κίδαρις, but not of Aristarchus. This reading also seems to be suggested by the wording of the scholium (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς γένος εἶναι λέγουσιν. πολλὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἅπαξ λεγόμενα παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ). Even though the phrasing is indeed ambiguous, both cases of δὲ here are explicatory, while in Bouchard’s translation the second one must be adversative (‘et ils disent que κίδαρις est une sorte de couvre-chef. Mais il y a beaucoup de singularités chez le poète’). Martinazzoli 1953, 54–55 with n. 145, reads the scholium as I do. On this question, see also below, footnote 110.

108. So Bachmann 1902–1904, II 10; Martinazzoli 1953, 54 and n. 143. On the principle of κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον, see Chapter 3.6.C § 3.1.

109. The word κίδαρις is attested in the Septuagint and later Christian and Jewish writers, as well as in lexicographers and prose writers of the Imperial and Byzantine periods.

110. Regardless of whether the last phrase in the scholium (‘And there are many hapax lego-

2.11. Words Used Wrongly or according to Catachresis (καταχρηστικῶς)

A word or phrase in the poems could sometimes be applied to a concept or an object καταχρηστικῶς, ‘wrongly’ or ‘according to catachresis’.¹¹¹ For example, when Pisander and Hippolochus beg Agamemnon to spare them, the phrase ἐκ δίφρου γουναζέσθην (*Il.* 11.130) is incorrect, as the verb means ‘to clasp another’s knee’, and this action obviously cannot be performed ‘from the chariot’ (ἐκ δίφρου); in this case, the verb is used instead of ἰκέτευον (*Sch. Il.* 11.130a).¹¹² In the same way, ἀπολεψέμεν, literally ‘to peel’, is wrong when employed in *Il.* 21.455 to mean ‘to cut off’ (the ear with the sword); rather, the verb is used instead of ἀποκόψειν (*Sch. Il.* 21.455a).¹¹³ Moreover, ἐναίρειν is incorrectly used in ‘it is better to slay (ἐναίρειν) beasts on the mountain’ (*Il.* 21.485), because this verb means ‘to strip the armor’ (from ἔναρα, ‘armor’, ‘spoils’), and animals do not wear combat gear (*Sch. Il.* 21.485a^{1.2}).¹¹⁴ Homer also misuses nouns and applies them to the wrong object: when, for example, he wrongly refers to ‘huts’ as δώματα (*Sch. Il.* 24.512a)¹¹⁵ or calls Diomedes’ helmet κυνέη ταυρεΐη, ‘helmet made of bull skin’. The latter is wrong because κυνέη (sc., δορά) is actually ‘dog’s skin’, which was used to make helmets; thus, it is illogical to say ‘dog’s skin helmet made of bull’s hide’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.258a).¹¹⁶ Yet, aside from these comments, in none of these examples does Aristarchus change or athetize the line.

There is an interesting case of a Homeric misuse, involving the difference between ἕτερος (for two only) and ἄλλος (for more than two). Aristarchus notices when Homer respects this distinction (*Sch. Il.* 24.528a¹) and specifies that it is Ἑλληνικῶς, ‘according to the Greek language’ (*Sch. Il.* 3.104; 14.272). Nevertheless, Homer sometimes confuses the two and uses ἄλλος instead of ἕτερος for two objects—a mistake pointed out by Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 9.313). As in the previous examples, without proposing any emendation, he simply signals the oddity. In other cases, he tries to justify Homer’s confusion between ἕτερος and ἄλλος by giving a specific interpretation of the line (*Sch. Il.* 9.473a¹¹⁷

mena in the poet’) stems from Aristarchus (as Bouchard thinks) or from the scholars who wrote κίδαρις (as Martinazzoli and I think) and so regardless of whether it refers to the iconographic hapax (Paris playing the cithara; but see above, footnote 107) or the linguistic hapax (κίδαρις), Aristarchus’ important methodological point in this note does not change: he respected linguistic hapaxes when he found them but did not introduce them in the text.

111. In addition to the scholia analyzed here (*Sch. Il.* 10.258a; 11.130a; 21.485a¹; 24.512a), see also *Sch. Il.* 17.492a; 20.224a; 21.455a; 24.228a. Catachresis in Aristarchus’ linguistic exegesis is discussed by Lotz 1909, 3–28 (who, however, is strongly influenced by Roemer’s approach; see Preface, footnote 17).

112. Cf. Lotz 1909, 9–10.

113. Cf. Lotz 1909, 16 (with the usual caveats); West 2001, 260 (for a modern perspective).

114. Cf. *Lfgre*, s.v. ἐναίρω. See discussion in Chapter 3.4. § 3.1.

115. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 149.

116. See also Ap. Soph. 105.18–23; cf. Lehrs 1882, 150; Lotz 1909, 13–14.

117. See also *Sch. Il.* 9.472a (ex.) and *Su.* ε 3292.

and 13.64a¹¹⁸). Only in *Il.* 19.94 is the misuse of ἕτερον instead of ἄλλον one of the reasons for the athetesis of the line, which is, however, also superfluous and badly written (*Sch. Il.* 19.94a).¹¹⁹

These examples seem to suggest that Aristarchus did not condemn a word used καταχρηστικῶς as such. Even if a linguistic mistake or a fault against the Homeric usage was enough to suspect a line, nevertheless the evidence shows that Aristarchus athetizes a line for this reason only rarely.¹²⁰ Rather, he usually limits himself to pointing out these misuses and, in line with his conservative attitude toward the text, ‘excuses’ them with some alternative explanations, or simply treats them as typical of Homeric style. In fact, κατάχρησις is a trope listed by Tryphon, according to which a word which has a standard meaning is used also to indicate another object or concept, such as with πυξίς χαλκῇ, ‘*pyxis* of bronze’, because *pyxis* is properly a box of πύξος, ‘boxwood’, and thus cannot be made of bronze.¹²¹ This is exactly Aristarchus’ attitude in cases like κυνὴν ταυρεῖν discussed above. In sum, when he was not able to explain linguistic oddities as otherwise Homeric (i.e., words and phrases used ἰδίως), Aristarchus accepted them as used ‘against the norm’ (καταχρηστικῶς) but yet as a specific stylistic choice, that is, a trope.¹²²

3. Against the Glossographers’ One-for-One (ἐν ἀνθ’ ἐνός) Interpretation

One of Aristarchus’ most important polemical targets was the so-called Glossographers. These scholars are left anonymous in the scholia of Aristonicus, but

118. See also *Sch. Il.* 13.64b (ex.); cf. Janko 1994, 51. Similarly, when Homer uses ἐτέρης instead of δευτέρης while listing the five units of the Myrmidon contingent, Aristarchus explains the apparent ‘mistake’ as due to metrical necessity (*Sch. Il.* 16.179a¹²); see also *Sch. Il.* 12.93b with Eust. 894.4 (ad *Il.* 12.91–93); but cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 12.93b.

119. Cf. Roemer 1912, 137–139; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 449; Lührs 1992, 64–67.

120. See Chapter 3.6.B § 4.5.

121. Tryph. ii § 3: κατάχρησις ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου <ἀπὸ τοῦ> κυρίως καὶ ἐτύμως κατονομασθέν<τος> λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τινος ἑτέρου ἀκατονομάστου κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον, οἷον πυξίς χαλκῇ . . . καὶ ἡ μὲν πυξίς κυρίως καὶ ἐτύμως ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ {ξύλου} πύξου κατεσκευασμένη, <καταχρηστικῶς δὲ> καὶ τὰ μολίβδινα <καὶ τὰ> χαλκ<ᾶ πυξ>ίδας προσαγορεύομεν [misuse is a part of speech used at odds with what is named according to standard usage and etymology, to mean something else which has no particular name, for example ‘*pyxis* of bronze’ . . . And the *pyxis* according to its standard usage and etymology is a box made of boxwood (πύξος), but by misuse we apply this name also to objects of lead and boxes of bronze]. See also Tryph. i 192.20–193.7. Cf. Lausberg 1998, §§ 562 and 577.

122. I have not analyzed this trope in Chapter 3.2.A because its analysis presupposes and is closely connected with the explanation of words and *glossai*.

they seem to have been ancient interpreters of Homer, who read and explained the Homeric poems to (intermediate level?) school pupils.¹²³

Since all the fragments of the Glossographers derive from Aristarchus,¹²⁴ the only evidence we have for them is biased and negative in some way. The available fragments¹²⁵ give the impression that the Glossographers tended to provide interpretations that were consistent only with the context of the very line where the *glossa* was located and that they paid little attention to whether or not their interpretation was applicable to other Homeric passages.

A case in point is the word ἐλώρια of *Il.* 1.4: '[the wrath of Achilles . . .] made [the heroes] prey (ἐλώρια) for dogs and every bird'. The Glossographers understood ἐλώρια as meaning 'food':

Sch. Il. 17.151b ἔλωρ: ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι τὰ 'ἐλώρια' (*Il.* 1.4) οὐκ ἔστι βρώματα, ὡς οἱ Γλωσσογράφοι (fr. 10 Dyck), ἀλλ' ἐλκύσματα.

'Prey (ἔλωρ)': the *diple* because ἐλώρια (*Il.* 1.4) is not what is eaten, as the Glossographers say (fr. 10 Dyck), but what is torn.

Aristarchus recalls the Glossographers' mistake on *Il.* 1.4 when he is commenting on *Il.* 17.151, because this passage proves that ἐλώρια does not mean 'food'. Here the similar ἔλωρ occurs, and it cannot be understood as 'something that is eaten', 'food'. In this passage, Glaucus rebukes Hector because he left Sarpedon to become prey (ἔλωρ) and spoil for the Greeks;¹²⁶ obviously, if the Glossographers were right and ἔλωρ meant 'food', the Greeks would need to have

123. Andrew Dyck has collected and studied the fragments of the Glossographers (Dyck 1987). On the Glossographers, see also Lehrs 1882, 37–39; West 2001, 76. Aristarchus' other polemical targets were obviously the Neoterioi, who misused Homeric words because they misinterpreted them (often on the basis of the Glossographers' interpretations); see Chapter 5.3 § 1, § 3.4.2, and § 5.3.

124. Cf. Dyck 1987, 121–122.

125. These are the Aristonicus scholia to the *Iliad* containing fragments against the Glossographers: *Sch. Il.* 3.44b (fr. 28 Dyck); 4.315a (fr. 24a Dyck); 9.324a (fr. 19 Dyck); 9.404a (fr. 6a Dyck); 9.540b (fr. 9 Dyck); 10.56b (fr. 11a Dyck); 10.226 (fr. 7a Dyck); 13.426a (fr. 8a Dyck); 14.155 (fr. 27 Dyck); 16.822a (fr. 8b Dyck); 17.151b (fr. 10 Dyck); 18.378b (ex. [ex. + Ariston.]) (fr. 32a Dyck); 18.540a (fr. 21 Dyck); 22.322a² (fr. 32b Dyck); 23.16a^{1,2} (fr. 31b^{1,2} Dyck); 23.661a¹ (fr. 14 Dyck); 23.679a (fr. 8c Dyck); 24.164a (fr. 31c Dyck); 24.367a and 24.367b (ex. [Ariston.]) (fr. 23a^{1,2} Dyck). Other Aristonicus scholia do not mention the Glossographers, but the comparison with Apollonius Sophista, Eustathius, or other sources proves that they were the target of Aristarchus' criticism: *Sch. Il.* 3.36b with *Ep. Hom.* α 163 (fr. 1 Dyck); 6.506–11a¹ with Hsch. α 2503 (fr. 4 Dyck); 11.385d with Ap. Soph. 98.11–16 (fr. 15 Dyck); 12.280 with *EGen.* s.v. κῆλον (fr. 17 Dyck); 14.117 with Eust. 305.5–6 (fr. 12 Dyck); 16.41a with Eust. 1861.52–53 (fr. 13 Dyck).

126. *Il.* 17.150–151: σχέτλι', ἐπεὶ Σαρπηδόν' ἄμα ξεῖνον καὶ ἐταῖρον / κάλλιπες Ἀργείοισιν ἔλωρ καὶ κύρμα γενέσθαι [cruel man, since you left Sarpedon, your guest friend and companion, to be prey and spoil for the Greeks].

been cannibals. The same holds for *Il.* 5.684, 17.667, and 18.93, where ἔλωρ is again used so that, if it meant ‘food’, Homer would be describing cannibals rather than soldiers taking the ‘spoils’ from their enemies. Aristarchus singles out all these passages as explicatory of what the word really means (*Sch. Il.* 5.684; 17.667a; 18.93b). Even though these three scholia do not mention the Glossographers (but *Il.* 1.4 is explicitly referred to in *Sch. Il.* 5.684), they are clearly meant to build Aristarchus’ case against them. His point is that their interpretation is reasonable only for *Il.* 1.4, but it is unacceptable for the other occurrences of that word in Homer.¹²⁷

The Glossographers were a constant target of Aristarchus—and most of the time for good reasons.¹²⁸ But there is at least one case where Aristarchus is clearly wrong in criticizing them, when commenting on *Il.* 10.226. Here Diomedes says to Nestor that when a warrior goes alone on a mission rather than with a companion, his mental ability (νόος) is βράσσων:

Sch. Il. 10.226 {ἀλλὰ τέ οἱ} βράσσων: ὅτι οἱ Γλωσσογράφοι (fr. 7a Dyck) βράσσων ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐλάσσων <ἀπὸ τοῦ βραχύς· ἀλλ’> οὐδαμοῦ κέχρηται τούτῳ Ὅμηρος. ἀποδοτέον οὖν βρασσόμενος, ταρασσόμενος διὰ τὸ δέος, οὐχ ἔστηκώς διὰ τὴν ἀγωνίαν. ἅπαξ δὲ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ λέξει.

βράσσων: because the Glossographers (fr. 7a Dyck) [consider] βράσσων [to be used] instead of ‘smaller’, from βραχύς; but Homer has never used this word. Thus, it must be interpreted as βρασσόμενος, ‘shaken by fear’, ‘not firm’ because of the anguish. He has used this word only once.

Though Aristarchus’ interpretation is reasonable per se—the phrase would mean ‘his mental ability is shaken’, i.e., his mind is not firm anymore—the Glossographers were right this time, because βράσσων is in fact a Homeric comparative from βραχύς.¹²⁹ Yet Aristarchus’ mistake is of a different nature from the errors of the Glossographers. The latter tended to limit their interpretation to a single passage, even though a simple analysis of other attestations in Homer would have revealed that the meaning of the word was indeed different, as the case of ἐλώρια/ἔλωρ above has demonstrated. Instead, with *Il.* 10.226

127. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 103; Dyck 1987, 123 and 140. Another case where Aristarchus fights the Glossographers by finding the passage that ‘clearly’ proves the correct meaning of a word is that of πρόμος (*Sch. Il.* 3.44b; 15.293a; 22.85c), discussed above (§ 1.2).

128. The Glossographers’ interpretations, on the other hand, were sometimes accepted by Zenodotus (*Sch. Il.* 9.404a). On the Glossographers’ influence on classical and Hellenistic poets, see Dyck 1987, 125–128.

129. Cf. *LSJ*, s.v.; Cobet 1876, 388; Wecklein 1919, 70; Martinazzoli 1953, 44; Dyck 1987, 124 and 137. *LfggrE*, s.v. prefers a derivation from βραδύς.

Aristarchus is in a more difficult position, as βράσσων is a hapax and, hence, he does not have any other attestation which could help him to assess the real meaning of the *glossa*. In addition, it is fairly natural to connect βράσσων with the verb βράσσειν, used by classical authors in the sense of ‘to winnow’¹³⁰ and by Hellenistic poets in the sense of ‘to shake’, ‘to stir up’.¹³¹ Aristarchus is also right when he points out that βραχύς is not attested in Homer.¹³² Thus, from a methodological point of view, his analysis is correct and far removed from the flaws of the Glossographers. Rather than limiting himself to ‘translating’ Homeric *glossai* into Koine Greek according to the specific context, he uses a full-fledged set of critical tools in order to define them, thus showing a theoretical background completely absent in the Glossographers. The case of the verb δουπεῖν (or, better, the aorist δουπήσαι) can exemplify this last point. The Glossographers thought that the verb meant ‘to die’:

Sch. Il. 13.426a {ἢ αὐτὸς} δουπήσαι: ὅτι ἐκ παρεπομένου τὸ ἀπολέσθαι· οἱ γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ πίπτοντες ψόφον ἀποτελοῦσι τοῖς ὅπλοις. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τοὺς Γλωσσογράφους (fr. 8a Dyck). οὗτοι γὰρ <ἐν> ἀνθ’ ἐνὸς ἐδέξαντο ‘δεδουπότος’ (*Il.* 23.679) ἀντὶ τοῦ τεθνηκότος.

‘To fall (δουπήσαι)’: because [δουπήσαι means] ‘to die’ from the consequence, for those falling in war make noise with their arms. The reference is to the Glossographers (fr. 8a Dyck): for they understood one-for-one, δεδουπότος (*Il.* 23.679) instead of τεθνηκότος.¹³³

Homer uses δουπήσαι for soldiers killed in battle, but according to Aristarchus its meaning is not ‘to die’; rather, the verb means ‘to emit a heavy sound’ and is used for battle casualties because the corpses of the soldiers, falling onto the ground, produce a heavy sound. Thus, δουπήσαι means ‘to die’ ἐκ παρεπομένου.¹³⁴

Yet most of the passages where the verb occurs cannot provide any clear indication about whether its meaning is ‘to die’ or ‘to emit a heavy sound’. In particular, the common *formula* δούπησεν δὲ πεσών used for a dying warrior (*Il.* 4.504, 5.42, 5.540, 5.617, etc.) can be interpreted as both ‘falling he made a heavy sound’ and ‘falling he died’, as the Glossographers suggested. Aristarchus picks up one example of this *formula* and adds some additional explanations:

130. Aristoph. *PCG* 3.2, fr. 282, and Plato, *Soph.* 226b6.

131. Nicand. *Alex.* 137, 359 and Ap. Rh. 2.323.

132. Cf. Nünlist 2012b, 155; Nünlist 2012c, 211.

133. See also *Sch. Il.* 13.426b (ex. [Ariston.?).

134. See also *Sch. Il.* 20.388. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 103–104; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 16; Lotz 1909, 24–25; Dimpfl 1911, 7; Dyck 1987, 139.

Sch. Il. 16.822a δούπησεν δὲ πεσών: ὅτι ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἀπεξεδέξαντο οἱ Γλωσσογράφοι (fr. 8b Dyck) τὸ δουπῆσαι ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν. ἀγνοοῦσι δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ παντὸς θανάτου τάσσει τὴν λέξιν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ πιπτόντων διὰ τὸν παρακολουθοῦντα ψόφον ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων.

‘Falling he made a heavy sound (δούπησεν)’: because from these [lines] the Glossographers (fr. 8b Dyck) understood one-for-one, δουπῆσαι instead of ἀποθανεῖν (‘to die’). But they do not realize that he does not use the word for every death, but [only] for those falling in battle because of the consequent noise of the arms.

On top of the clear connection with the noun δοῦπος, ‘sound’,¹³⁵ which Aristarchus probably recognized even if the scholia do not mention it, the verb’s specific use in Homer provides additional evidence: δουπῆσαι is employed only for warriors dying on the battlefield, because only in that situation can a dying man ‘emit a sound’, as his body falls violently onto the ground.¹³⁶ Aristarchus argues that the Glossographers did not notice this specific use of the verb—or perhaps they did, and thought they had found an exception in *Il.* 23.679, when Mecisteus is said to have come to Thebes for the burial ‘of Oedipus who had died (δεδουπότος Οἰδιπόδαο)’. In this case, the context is ambiguous enough to allow δουπῆσαι to be interpreted as simply ‘to die’. Moreover, in the later tradition, such as in Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus*, Oedipus is not killed in combat. In fact, for Aristarchus, the use of δουπῆσαι in *Il.* 23.679 is evidence that Oedipus’ death in Homer is different from the later tradition, *exactly because* it is described by a verb that implies that he ‘made noise’ when dying. As a king, he could have died in battle fighting to defend Thebes; otherwise, he could have committed suicide by throwing himself off a precipice, thus making noise upon impact with the ground (*Sch. Il.* 23.679a: ἐκ παρεπομένου δὲ νοητέον ὅτι ἦτοι ἐν πολέμῳ τετελεύτηκε· ψοφοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πίπτοντες· . . . ἢ κατεκρήμνισεν ἑαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ θάνατος μετὰ ψόφου). In either case, for Aristarchus the meaning of δουπῆσαι in *Il.* 23.679 is not proof for the Glossographers’ interpretation of the verb, but rather proof that the classical myth of Oedipus’ death in Athens is unknown to Homer.¹³⁷

135. E.g., *Il.* 4.455: τῶν δὲ τε τηλόσε δοῦπον ἐν οὔρεσιν ἔκλυε ποιμήν [the herdsman hears their noise far away in the mountains]; 9.573: καὶ δοῦπος ὀρώρει [and the noise arose]; 10.354: δοῦπον ἀκούσας [hearing a noise].

136. As van Thiel 2014a, III 96, observes, at *Il.* 16.822 the verb refers to Patroclus, who has already been despoiled of his armor by Apollo at *Il.* 16.793–804. So the Glossographers in this case might have had a point; without his armor Patroclus could fall without making noise, and so δουπῆσαι could mean simply ‘to die’. In fact, the problem of whether Patroclus has on armor when he dies was discussed by Aristarchus, who noticed a contradiction in the text of Homer; see Chapter 3.6.C § 6.

137. A different death is indeed suggested by *Od.* 11.275–276, which clearly states that Oedipus

As is clear from the above survey, the key problem of the Glossographers was that they interpreted *glossai* ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνόος, 'one-for-one'. This formula is attested in only four Aristonicus scholia to the *Iliad*,¹³⁸ and in all of them the polemical target is the Glossographers. The formula ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνόος describes (while censuring!) the method followed by the Glossographers, who proceeded by mechanically substituting 'one word for another' (ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνόος). The phrase is derived from the formula X ἀντὶ τοῦ Y used for paraphrases, but its meaning is profoundly different. While X ἀντὶ τοῦ Y refers to a *glossa* and its translation on the basis of *both* the specific context *and* of the other Homeric occurrences of that word, the expression ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνόος implies that *one* meaning is given for *one word*, namely, that the meaning of one word is deduced on the basis of *one attestation only*. The Glossographers, in other words, limited themselves to one occurrence of a word and tailored their interpretation specifically to that occurrence without considering whether such a meaning could fit the other attestations of the same word elsewhere in Homer. In Aristarchus' view, then, their main flaw was neglecting the first step in semantic analysis: a thorough and complete analysis of the Homeric poems. This was a preliminary and necessary step toward a real understanding of Homeric vocabulary, because Homer was a microcosm that the exegete needed to know thoroughly and completely, without limiting himself to single passages. In arguing against the Glossographers, Aristarchus thus to some extent redefined the task of the exegete, who must first carefully study the entire set of evidence (i.e., the entire Homeric poems) rather than limiting his attention to the problematic line only.

4. Solving Problems through Homeric Vocabulary

The explanation of *glossai* allowed Aristarchus to create a 'map' of the Homeric idiolect. Once he had thoroughly analyzed the language of Homer and mapped out Homeric vocabulary, he could then apply his knowledge to the Homeric text in order to correctly interpret obscure passages, discuss readings, solve *zetemata*, and make decisions about questionable lines.

4.1. Solving *Zetemata* and Perceived Narrative Inconsistencies

Correct knowledge of the Homeric idiolect was sometimes useful to solve *zetemata*, 'questions' on specific Homeric passages where the text was perceived as

continued ruling in Thebes. On the differences between the myth of Oedipus in Homer and in later poets (the 'Neoteroi'), see Chapter 5.3 § 3.2.5.

138. *Sch. Il.* 13.426a; 16.822a; 23.679a (all analyzed above with reference to δουπεῖν) and 23.661a¹.

inconsistent or difficult to understand, and which sparked debate among scholars sometimes long before Aristarchus.¹³⁹ Sometimes a *zetema* could be solved simply with a different analysis of a word. A good example is offered by the *zetema* of the Actorione. In *Il.* 23.629–642 Nestor remembers his past sporting exploits at the games for the funeral of king Amarynceus. He won in every single race and combat with one exception: ‘Only in the horse race did the two sons of Actor drive past me, rushing ahead with their number (πλήθει πρόσθε βαλόντες) . . . but they were twin (δίδυμοι); one served constantly as charioteer, constantly drove the chariot, and the other directed [the horses] with the goad’ (*Il.* 23.638–642). Scholars were puzzled about how exactly the Actorione won, what they looked like, and what πλήθει πρόσθε βαλόντες meant. A long Aristonicus scholium (*Sch. Il.* 23.638–42) lists some of the proposed solutions. Antidorus of Cymae (ca. fourth to third century BCE) reported that, for some scholars, it meant that the Actorione entered the race with more than one chariot so as to obstruct the rivals’ chariots and win: ‘rushing ahead with the number (πλήθει) [of their chariots]’. According to others, the organizers of the race favored the Actorione by allowing them to take an earlier start with their chariots; if so, πλήθει πρόσθε βαλόντες meant ‘rushing ahead [of the others because of an earlier start] with the support of the crowd (πλήθει)’. Aristarchus instead solves the question by looking at the word δίδυμοι and explaining it as a word that Homer employs with a different meaning from the Koine one: it does not mean ‘twins’ as in Koine (ὡς ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ), but ‘with a double nature’ (διφυεῖς), having two bodies, that is, they were conjoined twins.¹⁴⁰ He finds evidence that this is the right interpretation of the word in Hesiod, who describes the Actorione as conjoined twins.¹⁴¹ Moreover, with this interpretation the text makes much more sense, as it is now clear what Nestor wants to say: the Actorione won because they unfairly had use of extra body parts, which allowed them to take on multiple roles simultaneously during the race. But the

139. On *zetemata*, see also Chapter 3.6.C § 5.

140. The point is repeated in *Sch. Il.* 11.751 εἰ μὴ σφωε πατήρ <εὐρυκρείων ἐνοσίχθων>: πρὸς τὰ περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν Ἄκτορος παίδων, πότερον μία ἀμφοτέρων συμφυῖα ἢ ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν διφυῆς ἦν [‘if their [i.e., of the Actorione] father, the wide-ruling Earth-Shaker’: with reference to the question about the nature of the children of Actor, whether it was a joint body between the two or each of them had a double nature]. See also *Sch. Il.* 23.641a¹ (ex.).

141. Hes., fr. 18 M-W, which in fact corresponds to *Sch. Il.* 23.638–42 (ἀλλὰ τοὺς διφυεῖς, δύο ἔχοντας σώματα, Ἡσιόδῳ μάρτυρι χρώμενος [but they were of a double nature, having two bodies, using [i.e., Aristarchus] Hesiod as a witness]), and to *Sch. Il.* 11.710 (ex.) (ἢ ὅτι τερατώδεις τινὲς ἦσαν, ὡς Ἡσίοδος, ἄμφω ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι ὄντες [because they were something monstrous, as Hesiod says, being two in one body]). See also Hes., fr. 17a.14–17 M-W: [ἢ δ’ ἄρ’ ἐνὶ μεγάροις διδυμάονε γείνατο τέκνον / Ἄκτορι κυσαμ]ένη καὶ ἐρικτύπῳ ἐννοσιγαί[ωι, / ἀπλήτω, Κτέα]τόν τε καὶ Εὐρυτον, οἷσι πόδες [μ]έν, [/ ἦν τέτορες, κ]εφαλαὶ δὲ δύο ἰδὲ χεῖρες [and in the halls she gave birth to twin sons, having conceived them with Actor and the loud-sounding Earth-Shaker, two monstrous beings, Cteatus and Eurytus, who had four feet, two heads, and hands]. Ibycus, too, depicts them as conjoined twins (fr. 285 PMG).

audience defended the Actorione, claiming that they were only one person and so they could compete in one chariot against Nestor. According to Aristarchus' interpretation, then, πλήθει πρόσθε βαλόντες means 'rushing ahead with the support of the crowd (πλήθει)'—not, however, because of an earlier start but because of the Actorione's nature.¹⁴²

The correct knowledge of Homeric language could also help the exegete to identify 'false' *zetemata*:

Sch. Il. 10.372a ἡ ῥα καὶ ἔγχος ἀφῆκεν, <ἐκὼν δ' ἡμάρτανε φωτός>: ὅτι θέλοντες ζήτημα ποιεῖν μεταγράφουσι τὸ ἡμιστίχιον οὕτως 'καὶ βάλεν οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν, ἐκὼν δ' ἡμάρτανε φωτός'. καὶ λύουσιν ἔξωθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τὸν ἄν συνδεσμον. 'καὶ βάλεν, οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν ἄν, ἐκὼν δ' ἡμάρτανεν'. ἀγνοοῦσι μέντοι ὅτι Ὅμηρος τὸ βαλεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχεῖν τίθησιν.

'He spoke and threw the spear (ἔγχος ἀφῆκεν), but he missed the man on purpose (ἐκὼν δ' ἡμάρτανε φωτός)': because desiring to create a question, they change the hemistich as follows: 'and he threw (βάλεν) [the spear] and did not miss him (οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν), but he missed the man on purpose (ἐκὼν δ' ἡμάρτανε φωτός)'. And they solve it by supplementing the conjunction ἄν from outside: 'and he threw [the spear] and would not have missed him (οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν ἄν), but he missed [the man] on purpose'. But they do not realize that Homer uses βαλεῖν for 'hitting'.

In *Il.* 10.372 Diomedes misses Dolon on purpose in order to capture him alive and extract information. According to Aristarchus, some interpolators changed the first hemistich, substituting ἡ ῥα καὶ ἔγχος ἀφῆκεν, 'he spoke and threw the spear', with καὶ βάλεν οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν, 'and he threw [the spear] and did not miss him'. They thus created a *zetema* because there was now a contradiction between 'he did not miss him (οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν)' and the second hemistich 'but he missed the man on purpose (ἐκὼν δ' ἡμάρτανε φωτός)'. To solve it, they had to assume that the first οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν was actually οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν ἄν, 'he *would* not have missed him'. All this is pointless for Aristarchus because the βάλεν that these interpolators inserted in the line does not make any sense, since βάλλειν, when used to describe combat in Homer, does not simply mean 'to throw' but 'to hit by throwing something'.¹⁴³ Thus, the verb is the exact opposite of ἀμαρτάνειν, 'to miss the target', and cannot fit in the line for that reason.

142. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 175 and 427; Wecklein 1919, 73; Roemer 1924, 131–132, 157–158; Severyns 1928, 208–209; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 253–255; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 23.638–42 (with further bibliography); Richardson 1993, 238–239; Nünlist 2012c, 202.

143. As Aristarchus concluded from his analysis of the Homeric text; see above, § 2.5.

The original text is sound and the disingenuous operation of the interpolators is denounced by their own ignorance.¹⁴⁴

As is clear from these examples, Aristarchus spent a lot of energy trying to show that the text was not contradictory if the right linguistic interpretation was performed. In this way, he put into practice Aristotle's recommendation in *Poetics* 1461a9–16 (see above, § 1.2), where the philosopher maintains that the analysis of poetic *glossai* can solve *zetemata*.

4.2. Solving Perceived Linguistic Inconsistencies

Knowledge of the Homeric idiolect or the ability to decode it in all its nuances also helped Aristarchus to avoid unnecessary emendations or atheteseis in the text. For example, Pandarus is presented as follows in the Catalog of the Trojans (*Il.* 2.827): 'Pandarus to whom Apollo himself gave the bow (τόξον . . . ἔδωκεν)'. The line seems to contradict *Il.* 4.105–111, where Homer describes Pandarus' horn bow and states that an artisan built it, so that Apollo could not possibly have given this bow to Pandarus. Rather than arguing for an athetesis, Aristarchus explains the apparent contradiction by suggesting that τόξον in *Il.* 2.827 does not mean the object, but is to be understood in an 'abstract' way as 'the art of archery', which Pandarus learned from Apollo (*Sch. Il.* 2.827a: ὅτι οὐ τὸ τόξον λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοξικὴν ἐμπειρίαν).¹⁴⁵ With this interpretation, the text is sound and not contradictory anymore.

Another contradiction was perceived in *Il.* 11.51–52: 'the infantry were positioned at the trench much earlier (φθάν . . . μέγ'(α) . . . κοσμηθέντες) than the charioteers, and the charioteers followed shortly (ὀλίγον μετεκίαθον)'. How could the charioteers reach the infantry *in a short time* if the latter had arrived *long before*?

Sch. Il. 11.51a φθάν δὲ <μέγ' ἱππῶν ἐπὶ τάφρῳ κοσμηθέντες>: πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν μάχεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ μεγάλως ἔφθασαν, πῶς οἱ ἱππεῖς 'ὀλίγον μετεκίαθον' (*Il.* 11.52) αὐτούς; λέγει δὲ 'φθάν δὲ μέγα' χρονικῶς, ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλῷ χρόνῳ προέλαβον, 'ὀλίγον' δὲ 'μετεκίαθον' τοπικῶς, οἷον ὀλίγῳ τόπῳ διεστῶτες μετ' αὐτοὺς ἔκινον.

144. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 205. On Aristarchus' attitude toward these supposed 'interpolators', see Chapter 3.6.B § 7.

145. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.827b (ex.). The same interpretation for a very similar line (τόξον, ὃ τοι πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, said by Ajax to Teucer) is given in *Sch. Il.* 15.441a (ὅτι 'τόξον' λέγει οὐ τὸ σκεῦος τὸ πολεμικόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοξικὴν τέχνην); cf. Janko 1994, 277. On the other hand, van der Valk 1963–1964, II 96, sees Aristarchus' exegesis of *Il.* 2.827 as a 'modernisation by which concrete words or ideas are explained as abstract ones' and considers it typical of Alexandrian criticism.

‘[The infantry] were positioned at the trench much earlier (φθάν . . . μέγ’(α) . . . κοσμηθέντες) than the charioteers’: with reference to what seems to be in contradiction. For, if they were far in advance, how could the charioteers ‘follow shortly [after]’ (*Il.* 11.52)? But he says φθάν δὲ μέγα in temporal sense, instead of ‘they preceded them by a long time (πολλῷ χρόνῳ)’, whereas ὀλίγον and μετεκίαθον (*Il.* 52) [are said] in a locational sense, namely, ‘they went after them and stood at a short distance (ὀλίγῳ τόπῳ)’.

Aristarchus’ solution is a linguistic tour de force. He assumes that, while φθάν δὲ μέγα is indeed to be understood in a temporal sense, ὀλίγον and μετεκίαθον must have a spatial sense.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, the meaning is that the infantry took their position at the trench *much earlier* than the charioteers, but when the charioteers followed (much later), they placed themselves *a short distance away* from the infantry. Homer is not contradicting himself, then, but rather focusing on two different aspects of the scene before the battle.¹⁴⁷

Sometimes scholars proposed variants because they perceived some linguistic inconsistency in the phrasing, but Aristarchus argued against those unnecessary changes to the text, demonstrating that the original text was sound and not contradictory. The case of *Il.* 7.127 is worth examining because it shows his ability in handling linguistic issues as well as how the different parts of grammar were connected in his practice. Aristarchus notes that in Homer μείρεσθαι is equivalent to μερίζεσθαι, ‘to be allotted, ‘to receive one’s portion’, and never means ‘to be deprived’ (*Sch. Il.* 9.616b: οὐ τίθησι δὲ τὸ μείρεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ στερίσκεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ μερίζεσθαι); this is clear from *Il.* 9.616, where Achilles invites Phoenix to stay and ‘partake’ (and not ‘to be deprived of!’) half of his honor (καὶ ἡμῖσιν μείρεο τιμῆς). In the same scholium, Aristarchus accuses Zenodotus of unnecessarily changing the text at *Il.* 7.127 because he did not know the real meaning of this verb. Here Nestor remembers when, to recruit Achilles for the Trojan expedition, he went to Peleus, ‘who, questioning me (μ’ εἰρόμενος) then in his palace, rejoiced greatly (μέγ’ ἐγήθεεν), as he inquired about the lineage and offspring of all the Argives’ (*Il.* 7.127–128):

Sch. Il. 7.127a¹ ὅς ποτέ μ’ εἰρόμενος <μέγ’ ἐγήθεεν>: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘μέγα δ’ ἔστενεν’, ἐξ οὗ φανερός ἐστιν ἀνεγνωκῶς ‘μειρόμενος’, οἷον στερόμενος. ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος τὸ μείρεσθαι οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ στέρεσθαι τίθησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ μερίζεσθαι· ‘καὶ ἡμῖσιν μείρεο τιμῆς’ (*Il.* 9.616). δέον οὖν εἰρόμενος, ἐρωτῶν.

146. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.52.

147. Another example in which the detailed analysis of a word’s meaning is useful to the overall understanding of a scene is in *Sch. Il.* 15.241a.b.

‘Who, questioning me (μ’ εἰρόμενος) then [in his palace], rejoiced greatly (μέγ’ ἐγήθεεν)’: because Zenodotus writes ‘he sighed greatly’ (μέγα δ’ ἔστενεν), from which it is clear that he read μειρόμενος in the sense of ‘deprived’. Homer, however, does not use μείρεσθαι to mean ‘to be deprived’, but to mean ‘to take part in’ [as in]: ‘and partake (μείρεο) half of my honor’ (*Il.* 9.616). Therefore, it is necessary [to read] εἰρόμενος, ‘asking’.¹⁴⁸

In Aristarchus’ view, faced with the *scriptio continua* ΠΟΤΕΜΕΙΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ, Zenodotus incorrectly divided it as ποτὲ μειρόμενος; he also understood μειρόμενος in the passive sense of ‘to be deprived of’. Because of this reading, Zenodotus was forced to change the text, as in his version Peleus was ‘deprived’, ‘excluded’ from the expedition, so he could not possibly ‘rejoice’. Thus, he wrote μέγα δ’ ἔστενεν, ‘he sighed greatly’.¹⁴⁹ Yet for Aristarchus these problems and the subsequent emendation are an unnecessary result of his predecessor’s ignorance of Homeric vocabulary. Since in Homer μείρεσθαι never has the passive meaning of ‘being deprived’, but rather the intransitive one of ‘taking part in’,¹⁵⁰ Zenodotus’ reading does not make any sense at *Il.* 7.127; the logical conclusion is that μειρόμενος should not be read in the line, and a different division of the *scriptio continua* is necessary. Indeed, ΠΟΤΕΜΕΙΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ can also be divided as ποτέ μ’ εἰρόμενος, a reading that solves the problem since the following μέγ’ ἐγήθεεν, ‘he rejoiced greatly (while asking me)’, now fits the context perfectly. For Aristarchus, thus, there is no need to change the text; it is just a question of knowing Homeric language and then dividing the sequence of *scriptio continua* in the right way.¹⁵¹

Finally, even without changing the text, some scholars gave ‘ad hoc’ interpretations to a word in order to avoid what was perceived as unfitting:

Sch. Il. 14.84a οὐλόμενε {αἴθ’ ὠφελος}: ὅτι τινὲς ἀποδεδώκασιν ‘οὐλόμενε’ δεινέ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν λέγοι τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὀλέθρου ἄξιε. οὐ δυσωπητέον μέντοι γε, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν περίστασιν ἀτενιστέον· ἐπ’ ὠφελεία γὰρ λέγει τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων· διὸ καὶ ἐπιφέρει ὃ Ὀδυσσεῦ, μάλα πῶς με καθίκεο θυμὸν ἐνιπῇ / ἀργαλήν’ (*Il.* 14.104–105).

‘You wretch (οὐλόμενε)’: because some have interpreted οὐλόμενε as ‘mighty’; for Odysseus could not say to Agamemnon ‘you, worthy of death’. But one must

148. See also *Sch. Il.* 7.127a².

149. On Zenodotus’ alleged ‘changes’ in the Homeric text, see Chapter 4 § 1.6.

150. In fact, μείρεσθαι never means ‘to be deprived of’, ‘to be parted from’. This sense had been suggested for Arat. 657; see however Kidd 1997, 404–405.

151. A similar (but easier) case of a line changed by some scholars who had perceived a (false) inconsistency is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 9.16a.

not be shy and look at the present circumstance. For he speaks in the interest of Agamemnon and the other allies: therefore, [Agamemnon] also adds: ‘Odysseus, you have certainly touched my heart with your harsh reproach’ (*Il.* 14.104–105).

Some scholars were shocked by Odysseus calling his commander in chief Agamemnon ‘wretch’, and thus they tried to restore the appropriateness of the scene by giving a different interpretation to the word. They suggested that in this specific instance οὐλόμενε meant ‘mighty’ (δεινέ). Aristarchus, however, rejects this ‘softer’ interpretation on the basis that the context requires a strong word; this is also demonstrated by Agamemnon’s reply, where he recognizes that Odysseus has rebuked him strongly. In this case, the attention to the context is of paramount importance: what seems too strong under normal circumstances may be fitting in peculiar cases.¹⁵² As the good exegete should not change the text simply because he does not know Homeric idiolect well enough, he should also not force the meaning of a word simply because it does not fit his own presumptions about what is proper *in general*. This is certainly a golden rule. However, some of the examples surveyed in the sections above,¹⁵³ in which Aristarchus forces a certain interpretation on the text in order to ‘save’ Homer from the accusation of misusing language, suggest that Aristarchus himself was not immune from this risky behavior (even though his aim was no doubt ‘noble’ from a philological point of view).

4.3. Choice between Variants

Deep knowledge of the Homeric vocabulary as well as constant attention to the context helped Aristarchus to choose among concurrent readings. Sometimes his skill in noticing the subtlest semantic nuances is remarkable:

Sch. Il. 2.314b τετριγῶτας: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘τιτίζοντας’. εὐτελής δὲ ἡ λέξις· κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ φθεγγόμενοι οἱ νεοσσοὶ τιτίζουσιν, οἱ δὲ κατεσθιόμενοι τρίζουσιν.

‘Uttering a shrill cry (τετριγῶτας)’: because Zenodotus writes ‘chirping’ (τιτίζοντας), but the word is cheap. When young birds sing according to their nature they ‘chirp’ (τιτίζουσιν), but those who are being devoured ‘utter a shrill cry’ (τρίζουσιν).

152. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 5; Roemer 1912, 423.

153. For example, the analysis of μάσταξ and τόξα at § 2.7.

In Book 2 Odysseus reminds the Achaeans of the omen which appeared to them when they were gathered in Aulis: a snake ate eight little sparrows and their mother, and was then turned into a stone by Zeus. Homer describes the snake devouring the little sparrows while they were crying pitifully (τοὺς ἐλεεῖνὰ . . . τετριγῶτας). Aristarchus argues against Zenodotus' variant τιτίζοντας, 'chirping'. Even if both verbs are appropriate for birds, they have a different meaning: τιτίζειν, 'to chirp', is the sound they emit when singing, in a moment of joy, whereas τρίζειν, 'to utter a shrill cry', is a sound of despair. Both the context (the little birds are devoured by the snake) and other linguistic indicators like the neuter plural with adverbial meaning ἐλεεῖνὰ, 'pitifully', indicate that the required verb is the stronger τετριγῶτας.¹⁵⁴

As seen with the words used καταχρηστικῶς, Aristarchus did not change the text just because of vocabulary misuses. For example, in *Il.* 16.467, the horse Pedasus has been hit with a spear, but the verb used is οὐτάσαι instead of the correct βαλεῖν. As already discussed in Chapter 2.2 § 1, both Aristonicus (*Sch. Il.* 16.467b) and Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 16.467c¹)¹⁵⁵ observe that the Homeric difference between βαλεῖν and οὐτάσαι is confused in this passage. Didymus also conjectures that Aristarchus probably had another reading in his text (with βαλεῖν?) as he would not have allowed a line to stand with such a mistake.¹⁵⁶ Given the insistence with which Aristarchus continually underscores the semantic distinction between βαλεῖν and οὐτάσαι in Homer, Didymus' doubts are justified. Even so, Aristarchus might have just limited himself to noting that in *Il.* 16.647 οὐτάσαι was wrongly employed, as in other cases of words used καταχρηστικῶς.

Nevertheless, Aristarchus also could and did reject a specific reading on the grounds that the language was contrary to the Homeric idiolect. For example, at *Il.* 4.456 the clash of warriors results in ἰαχὴ τε πόνος τε, 'shouting and toil', according to Aristarchus, who rejects the reading ἰαχὴ τε φόβος τε, 'shouting and rout' because at this point of the battle the 'rout' (the meaning of φόβος in Homer) has not happened yet, the fighting having just commenced (*Sch. Il.* 4.456b [Did.]: Ἀρίσταρχος ἰαχὴ τε πόνος τε. οὐ γὰρ γέγονέ πω φυγή).¹⁵⁷ On the other hand, Aristonicus seems only to know the reading φόβος, when he comments that the word means 'flight' (*Sch. Il.* 4.456a). This discrepancy

154. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 356–357; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 24; Roemer 1912, 424.

155. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.467c². Cf. Lehrs 1882, 53–55; Ludwich 1884–1885, I 409–410; Bolling 1925, 169–170; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 16.467–8 (with further bibliography), all of whom mostly discuss the testimony of *Sch. Il.* 16.467–8 (ex.).

156. Didymus could perhaps assume this because he had found a variant in the edition of Philemon with ἤλασεν. The verb ἐλαύνειν, 'to strike', could work since it was used for a blow (e.g., in *Il.* 17.517–519); cf. Lehrs 1882, 55, 65–66; West 2001, 58–59.

157. See also *Sch. Il.* 4.456c (Did. | ex.?).

between Aristonicus and Didymus might indicate that the reading *ἰαχὴ τε πόνος τε* was in Aristarchus' second *ekdosis* only.¹⁵⁸ He might initially have had *ἰαχὴ τε φόβος τε*, which is the vulgate reading; if so, he must have had explained the *κατάχρησις* or at least accepted it, as seems suggested by Aristonicus. We cannot know whether the later *πόνος* was Aristarchus' own emendation or a reading that he found attested in certain manuscripts. In any case, the change is minimal and is made according to the Homeric idiolect rather than in ignorance of it (as for example, with Zenodotus' emendations surveyed above).

In conclusion, it seems that, when facing a choice between variant readings attested in the manuscripts, Aristarchus selected the one more in line with Homeric idiolect. However, if the text did not seem to respect the Homeric usage, he was more cautious than his predecessors: rather than emending right away, he tried to find possible exegetical solutions to defend the original text. Thus, he could assume that in a given passage the word at issue was used *ἰδίως*, namely, that it was employed with a very peculiar but still Homeric meaning, or even *καταχρηστικῶς*, that is, incorrectly, but as a conscious choice.

4.4. Atheteseis Due to Words Used οὐχ Ὀμηρικῶς

The discovery of mistakes in vocabulary could sometimes be a reason for an athetesis. An example concerns the opposition *βαλεῖν/οὐτάσαι*: *Il.* 4.140 and 149 are athetized because the wound of Menelaus, who has been hit by an arrow (*Il.* 4.116–139), is called *ῶτειλή* (*Sch. Il.* 4.140a; 4.149a). Aristarchus connects this noun with the verb *οὐτάσαι* (*Sch. Il.* 11.266; 14.518a; 17.86a),¹⁵⁹ concluding that it cannot be used for wounds from arrows which are 'shot' (*Sch. Il.* 4.140a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν λέγοι Ὀμηρος ῶτειλήν τὸ ἐκ βολῆς τραῦμα).¹⁶⁰ The use of a word according to the Koine meaning rather than the Homeric one is at the basis of athetesis of *Il.* 24.304, where the hapax *χέρνιβον* means 'vessel', as it does 'for us' (i.e., Aristarchus' contemporaries), against Homer's usage (*Sch. Il.* 24.304a¹: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι παρὰ τὸ σύνηθες αὐτῷ χέρνιβον τὸ ἀγγεῖον

158. On the discrepancies between Aristonicus and Didymus in reporting Aristarchus' readings, see Schironi 2015. On the other hand, both Lehrs 1882, 76–77, and van der Valk 1963–1964, I 571, consider Aristonicus' note untrustworthy (though for different reasons).

159. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 59; Roemer 1912, 155. In *Sch. Il.* 14.518a and 17.86a Aristarchus even detects a case of etymological wordplay in *κατ' οὐταμένην ῶτειλήν*, 'the struck wound' (see Chapter 3.4 § 8.1). This derivation is, however, not convincing; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.vv. *οὐτάω* and *ῶτειλή*.

160. At *Il.* 4.204–207 Talthybius goes and calls Machaon to help with the wounded Menelaus 'whom someone has hit with an arrow (*ὃν τις οἴστεύσας ἔβαλεν*)'. In these lines Aristarchus finds confirmation of his athetesis of *Il.* 4.140, which he specifically recalls in the scholium (*Sch. Il.* 4.206: ἡ διπλή, ὅτι ἐκ βολῆς ἔτρωσεν, πρὸς τὸ 'αὐτίκα δ' ἔρρεεν αἷμα κελαινεφές ἐξ ῶτειλῆς' (*Il.* 4.140)). In this case, since the only verb to occur is *βαλεῖν* (not *οὐτάσαι*), *ῶτειλή* cannot be considered as used in syllepsis, as elsewhere (see Chapter 3.2.A, footnote 169); hence Aristarchus' athetesis.

τὸ ὑποδεχόμενον τὸ ὕδωρ, ὡς ἡμεῖς).¹⁶¹ However, a vast majority of the time a linguistic misuse is only *one among other reasons* for an athetesis, as in *Sch. Il.* 4.117a, where the incorrect use of a form connected with βάλλειν (the verbal adjective ἄβλητον) may be¹⁶² one of the two reasons for rejecting the line, or in *Sch. Il.* 15.56a, where Aristarchus supports the athetesis of twenty-two lines (*Il.* 15.56–77) with different arguments, among which is the non-Homeric use of the verb πέσωσιν in line 63 and of the noun παλιώξις in line 69.¹⁶³ Similarly, the athetesis of *Il.* 24.6–9 is due to stylistic reasons and to the wrong use (κατάχρησις) of the words ἀνδροτής and μένος in line 6 (*Sch. Il.* 24.6–9a¹).¹⁶⁴ *Il.* 24.514 is rejected because the line does not add anything to what is said in the previous one and also because γυῖα here cannot possibly mean ‘feet’ or ‘hands’, as is the case in Homer, but only ‘body’, improperly (ἀκύρως) (*Sch. Il.* 24.514a).¹⁶⁵

The Homeric idiolect is much more often recalled to justify an athetesis when Aristarchus claims that some people (the διασκευασταί), who did not understand Homeric language properly, added lines to the poems in order to make sense of the text. Aristarchus’ atheteseis are then justified on the basis of other people’s ignorance of Homeric vocabulary. Some specific examples will be analyzed when discussing Aristarchus’ atheteseis.¹⁶⁶ This is the exact same principle used against Zenodotus in the case of *Il.* 7.127 (see above, § 4.2): the original Homeric text was not wrong, but the ignorance of other people meddled with and corrupted it, and it is now Aristarchus’ task to restore it to the original form.

161. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.304a² (τινὲς ἀθετοῦσιν, ὅτι . . .); cf. Hofmann 1905, 32–33; Roemer 1912, 13–14; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 449. In *Sch. Il.* 24.304a¹ Aristarchus also observes that Homer uses the similar χέρνιψ (always in the accusative χέρνιβα) to mean ‘water given for the hands’, while he uses λέβης to mean ‘vessel’. The difference between the two terms is clear in *Od.* 3.440 and *Od.* 1.136–137 = 4.52–53, etc., when they are employed together. See also Chapter 3.6.B § 4.5.

162. The testimony of this scholium concerning the misuse of βάλλειν was called into question by Lehrs 1882, 64–65.

163. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.69. On (ἐμ)πεσεῖν, see *Sch. Il.* 9.235a; 11.824; 12.107a; 12.126; 17.639 (cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 227–229). On παλιώξις, see *Sch. Il.* 12.71; 15.601b. On this athetesis, see Lührs 1992, 129–132; Janko 1994, 234–235; West 2001, 230–231; and also Chapter 3.2.A § 13, Chapter 4 § 1.5.1, and Chapter 5.2 § 2.3 (with further bibliography).

164. Cf. Erbse, ad loc.; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 445–446; see also Chapter 3.2.A § 17.

165. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 112; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 445; Lührs 1992, 71 and 115–117. On the meaning of γυῖα, see above, § 1.1.

166. In particular the cases of *Sch. Il.* 2.791 and 2.807, analyzed in Chapter 3.6.B § 7.2.

5. Conclusions

This chapter on Homeric vocabulary together with the previous one on Homeric syntactic *schemata* make it possible to draw some general conclusions about Aristarchus' attitude toward Homeric language. His approach rested upon two main premises. First, Homer used a language which was different both from Classical Greek and from the Koine Greek spoken during Aristarchus' own time. For this reason, it was a mistake to apply the rules and categories of later versions of Greek to Homer's text. As a consequence, any attempt to explain difficult passages or understand the meaning of uncommon words or syntactic peculiarities in the Homeric poems needed to be carried out on the basis of the Homeric language itself. This is why Aristarchus, throughout his work, always insisted on the idea that words and constructions (like the *schemata* analyzed in the previous chapter), which seemed wrong at first sight because they went against the Koine usage, were, on the contrary, correct. Simply put, Homer's language was different from Koine Greek. The second principle was that the Homeric language was self-consistent, which meant that it was possible to identify its rules (in its vocabulary, grammar, and style), as well as exceptions to those rules. In other words, Aristarchus granted the Homeric idiolect the status of a full-fledged language, and in doing so he implicitly supported the idea that this language could indeed be reconstructed—and respected. This made it possible to apply the principle Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν, which, though valid also in other realms of exegesis (e.g., *realia*, myths, and poetic technique), was particularly appropriate when dealing with language.

Following these principles, the first and preliminary task of the exegete was to analyze Homeric language *throughout the entire corpus*, in order to find out its characteristic features: *glossai*, peculiar meanings of common words, and odd syntactic constructions. Once the exegete had cataloged all the peculiarities of Homeric usage, he could use his findings to explain and correct the text when necessary. We can thus envisage two steps in Aristarchus' work. First, he read the entire body of Homeric works and 'mapped out' the Homeric language as completely as possible. For example, in the case of Homeric vocabulary, without using any additional aid 'from outside', nor assuming a meaning a priori on the basis of the Koine usage, Aristarchus found the meaning of a doubtful word only by looking at passages where the context made the required meaning clear. As a second step, he used his acquired knowledge of the Homeric language to further analyze problematic points, namely, words, linguistic usages, and syntactic constructions which were not immediately understandable and presented more specific problems. By comparing the forms at issue with what he had established about Homeric usage, Aristarchus could either explain and keep them, or conclude that they did not belong to the original text and,

hence, athetize or emend the line where they occurred. The same knowledge of Homeric language also helped him to identify later additions and interpolations made by scholars who, in his opinion, did not realize the peculiarity of the Homeric language, misunderstood the text, and added ‘corrective’ lines for that reason. Using his knowledge of Homeric language, Aristarchus could thus solve real problems in the Homeric text, restore original readings against the wrong solutions provided by his predecessors, and show that many of the problems in Homer actually were false problems, perceived as such only by scholars ignorant of the rules and characteristics of Homeric idiolect.

The mapping out of the Homeric language was thus a fundamental step in Aristarchus’ exegesis and *diorthosis*. Still, there is no evidence that Aristarchus worked on a compendium of Homeric language. He probably never wrote one; instead, he must have relied entirely on his own memory and on his own lifelong experience with Homer. This ‘atlas’ of Homeric Greek—a ‘mental atlas’, so to speak—was built only for the analysis of the Homeric poems. Aristarchus does not seem to have ever tried to apply his extraordinarily vast and detailed knowledge of Homeric language to a systematic lexicographical work, as, for example, Zenodotus or Aristophanes did before him.¹⁶⁷ His scholarly energy was uniquely focused on editing and commenting on Homer. Even if his sensitivity for linguistic problems was fairly advanced and sophisticated, for him language analysis was only a tool for his Homeric studies, not a separate object of study.

This survey has also shown how conservative Aristarchus’ approach to the text normally was. In his analysis of Homeric vocabulary and syntax, he preferred to respect the ‘odd’ usages of the poet, explaining them as due to his specific style. This method and approach to Homeric language recalls Aristotle’s advice in the *Poetics* (1461a9–b9), where the philosopher points out how many problems in understanding a passage can be solved simply by analyzing the diction (λέξις), which can use *glossai* and metaphors, and which can be full of lexical and syntactic ambiguities. Those peculiarities are not errors, but actually in part even are a measure of the ability of the poet himself. As a consequence, the task of the commentator is to try to explain these difficult passages through a rigorous analysis of the style and language of the poet. This is exactly what Aristarchus did in his work.

Aristotle’s and Aristarchus’ view of poetic language has been revived by the concept of the ‘defamiliarization’ or ‘estrangement’, as defined by Viktor

167. See Pfeiffer 1968, 115 (Zenodotus), 197–202 (Aristophanes), 220 (Aristarchus). Recently, on the other hand, Nünlist 2012c, 211–212, has suggested that Aristarchus might have in fact prepared at least an ‘index verborum’ collecting Homeric *glossai*. This is possible, even though the scholia never mention any such work.

Shklovsky in his essay 'Art as Technique' (1917).¹⁶⁸ Shklovsky himself recalls Aristotle when discussing 'estrangement': "according to Aristotle, poetic language must appear strange and wonderful; and, in fact, it is often actually foreign".¹⁶⁹ While Aristotle was the first to say that a poet's language is different from the standard language and such 'otherness' is actually a good thing, and while Shklovsky contributed to the theorization of this idea in modern criticism, Aristarchus was the first to apply it in a self-consistent manner. In fact, his principle that an exegete should first know the text, understand it, and then try to clarify debated passages with a deep and author-based linguistic analysis, rather than normalizing or changing them, represents a great contribution from a theoretical point of view as well.

168. Shklovsky 1917/1965 (esp. 21–24, for defamiliarization and 'roughening' in poetic language). On Shklovsky and his notion of 'estrangement', see Sheldon 1972, esp. 358–360 (on linguistic 'estrangement').

169. Shklovsky 1917/1965, 22.

3.3.B

Explanation of *Historiai*

Characters, Customs, and Places of the Heroic World

1. 'Who Is Who' in the *Iliad*
 - 1.1. Homonymy: Same Name for Different Heroes
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 - 2.9.4. Helmets, Swords, and Other Weapons
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3. Homeric Geography and Ethnography
 - 3.1. Homonymy: Same Name for Different Places
 - 3.2. Double Names: Same Place with Different Names
 - 3.3. Hellas and Hellenes
 - 3.4. Troy and Troad
 - 3.5. Mapping the Theater of War: The Monograph *On the Camp*
 - 3.5.1. The Ships in the Achaean Camp
 - 3.5.2. The Order of the Greek Contingents in the Camp
 - 3.5.3. The Battle at the Achaean Wall
 - 3.5.4. The Battlefield in the Trojan Plain
 - 3.5.5. The Gates of Troy

- 3.6. The Catalog of the Ships
- 4. Homeric Cosmology
 - 4.1. Oceanus
 - 4.2. The Stars, the Sun, East, and West
 - 4.3. North, South, and the *Oikoumene*
 - 4.4. Air, Aether, Heaven, and Olympus
- 5. Homeric Gods
 - 5.1. The Gods' Nature, Dwellings, and Powers
 - 5.2. The Gods' Epithets
- 6. The World of the Heroes and the World of Homer
- 7. Conclusions

Since readers may not know details related to the content of the story being narrated which are essential for their appreciation of it, an important task of the exegete is to explain them. The term used in antiquity to label this type of factual detail was *historiai* (ἱστορίαι), which covered a wide range of topics related to the 'content' of the poems. Notes in the scholia dealing with *historiai* explain, for example, the myths narrated or alluded to in the story, or questions of homonymy involving both characters and places which could create confusion in the reader. Geographic explanations—and, in particular, those about the places where the action takes place—represent another important aspect of this part of grammar. When dealing with an archaic poet like Homer, who is telling an even more ancient story, the exegete also has to explain many customs and societal institutions described in the poem because they are most often unfamiliar to a modern reader. The discussion of Homeric society, as well as of Homeric cosmology, is thus paramount for a full understanding of the poem. In this chapter, I will review these topics, with the only exception being the analysis of the mythological universe of Homer. This latter aspect, which is part of the exegesis of *historiai*,¹ will be treated in a separate chapter, Chapter 5.3 on the Neoteroi, because the discussion of the myths mentioned or assumed by Homer inevitably involves comparison with later poets and with their use of the mythical tradition inaugurated by 'the poet' par excellence.

1. Cf. McNamee 2007, 71.

1. ‘Who Is Who’ in the *Iliad*

One important point for an exegete to clarify is who each character is. This is especially crucial in a complex poem like the *Iliad*, where, together with the main characters (e.g., Achilles, Patroclus, Agamemnon, Hector), the poet mentions many minor characters. These are mostly names with little personality: soldiers, squires, heralds, who are mentioned only once or twice in the poem.

1.1. Homonymy: Same Name for Different Heroes

When dealing with Homeric characters, there are many cases of homonymy, that is, heroes with the same name who should not be confused. The list is long, and Aristarchus seems to have been very attentive in pointing out these cases.² Almost all of them are straightforward cases,³ as the homonymous heroes can be easily identified either because of the context (for example, they fight with the Trojans or with the Greeks) or by other specifications, such as the addition of an epithet⁴ or patronymic. Therefore, it sounds at first a bit surprising that Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 10.266c) considers the Amyntor defined as ‘Amyntor, son of Ormenus’ in *Il.* 9.448 and in *Il.* 10.266 a case of homonymy, not only because the name is identical, but so too is the patronymic, so they really seem to be the same person. In fact, on a closer look, we should give credit to Aristarchus. In *Il.* 9.447–448 Phoenix says that he left Hellas to escape the fight with his father ‘Amyntor, son of Ormenus’. In *Il.* 10.266, in the description of the famous helmet of Odysseus, Homer explains that Autolycus stole it from ‘Amyntor, son of Ormenus’ in Eleon, a place in Boeotia. The problem had occupied many scholars in antiquity, who gave different solutions;⁵ for Aristarchus, the easiest one

2. For example: Amphius (*Sch. Il.* 2.830a); Areithous (*Sch. Il.* 7.10a¹; 7.138a); Asius (*Sch. Il.* 2.837–8); Dryas and Lycurgus (*Sch. Il.* 6.130–2); Dolops (*Sch. Il.* 11.302a and 11.302b (ex. [Ariston.?])); 15.525a); Eëtion (*Sch. Il.* 21.43a); Ennomus (*Sch. Il.* 11.422b; 17.218c); Epistrophus (*Sch. Il.* 2.856b); Eurymedon (*Sch. Il.* 4.228a; 8.114b; 11.620b); Hippothous (*Sch. Il.* 24.251a); Hypsenor (*Sch. Il.* 5.76b); Odius (*Sch. Il.* 2.856b; 5.39c¹); Oenomaus (*Sch. Il.* 12.140); Orestes (*Sch. Il.* 5.705; 12.139; 12.193b); Polyidus (*Sch. Il.* 5.148); Thoas (*Sch. Il.* 16.311a^{1,2}). There are also cases of homonymy between a character in the *Iliad* and one in the *Odyssey*: Agelaus (*Sch. Il.* 11.302a), Laerces (*Sch. Il.* 16.197, ex. [Ariston.]), Mentès (*Sch. Il.* 17.73a). On homonymy in Aristarchus’ exegesis, see Schimberg 1878; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 255–257; Nünlist 2009, 240–242.

3. But for Peiroös in *Il.* 20.484 Aristarchus is unclear about whether he is the same Thracian leader Peiroös of *Il.* 2.844, 4.520, 525 (*Sch. Il.* 20.484a¹: ἀδελφὸν δέ, εἰ τοῦ Θρακῶν ἡγουμένου ἢ ἑτέρου τινὸς ὁμωνύμου).

4. The most famous case is represented by the two Ajaxes, one called ‘the Great’ and the other called ‘the Lesser’; see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.1.

5. See *Sch. Il.* 10.266a (ex.) and Strabo 9.5.18, who mentions, for example, the solutions proposed by Crates and Demetrius of Scepsis; cf. Hainsworth 1993, 121–122; Broggiato 2001, 153–154 (fr. 10).

is to assume that the Amyntor ‘of Boeotia’ cannot be the same as the Amyntor father of Phoenix, who is ‘from Hellas’, a region that corresponds to southern Thessaly in Homeric geography.⁶ So this time the question was solved through geographic details attached to each character.

An interesting case concerns the herald Eurybates, who is mentioned three times, in *Il.* 1.320, 2.184, and 9.170. As Aristarchus observes, the one mentioned at *Il.* 1.320 is surely the herald of Agamemnon (*Sch. Il.* 1.320a)⁷ and the one at *Il.* 2.184 is the herald of Odysseus (*Sch. Il.* 2.184a), since these identifications are straightforward. The former takes orders from Agamemnon and the latter is defined as ‘Ithacan’. The identity of the Eurybates mentioned at *Il.* 9.170 is more difficult to determine: he accompanies the embassy to Achilles, and even modern scholars debate whether this Eurybates is the herald of Agamemnon, who sends the embassy, or the herald of Odysseus, who is one of the ambassadors.⁸ Aristarchus resolves the question with a subtle psychological analysis:

Sch. Il. 9.170b {κηρύκων Ὀδῖος τε καὶ} Εὐρυβάτης: ὅτι οὐ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνωνος (cf. *Il.* 1.320) ὑποληπτέον νῦν λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν Ὀδυσσεύος (cf. *Il.* 2.184), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐξωργίσθη τῆς δι’ αὐτοῦ γενομένης ἀφαιρέσεως ὑπομνησθεῖς.

Eurybates: because now we must assume that he is not speaking of the [herald] of Agamemnon (cf. *Il.* 1.320), but of the one of Odysseus (cf. *Il.* 2.184) because [Achilles] would get angry if he were reminded of [Briseis’] abduction by his hand.

Since the main goal of the embassy is to appease Achilles, it is better to send people that Achilles likes rather than someone who will remind him about the abduction of Briseis, the cause of his wrath. As a consequence, this Eurybates is the herald of Odysseus, since the herald of Agamemnon with the same name was the very man sent to Achilles to carry Briseis away (at *Il.* 1.320–347).

Sometimes, the source of the confusion was the patronymic. For example, there are two characters in the *Iliad* that are defined as ‘son of Thestor’: the seer Calchas in *Il.* 1.69 and the Greek soldier Alcmaon in *Il.* 12.394. Aristarchus denies that Alcmaon is the brother of Calchas because otherwise Homer would have added some other specification in addition to the patronymic (*Sch.*

6. On Hellas, see below, § 3.3. Whether these two characters called Amyntor should be identified as the same person is still an open question; cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 256–258; Hainsworth 1993, 180–181.

7. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.320b (ex. [Ariston.?).

8. Cf. Hainsworth 1993, 82–83. On the embassy to Achilles and its envoys, see Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.2.

Il. 12.394a).⁹ The same problem arises when Homer mentions Polydora, the daughter of Peleus:

Sch. Il. 16.175b ὃν τέκε Πηλῆος θυγάτηρ: ὅτι Φερεκύδης (*FGrHist* 3 F 61a) τὴν Πολυδώραν φησὶν ἀδελφὴν Ἀχιλλέως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ καθ' Ὅμηρον διαβεβαιώσασθαι. πιθανώτερον οὖν ὁμωνυμίαν εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων, ἐπεὶ προσέθηκεν ἂν τεκμήριον τῆς πρὸς Ἀχιλλέα συγγενείας.

‘[Menesthius], whom [fair Polydora], Peleus’ daughter, bore’: because Pherecydes (*FGrHist* 3 F 61a) says that Polydora is the sister of Achilles. But it is not possible to confirm this in Homer. It is thus more believable that it is homonymy, as also happens with other [characters], since he would have added proof of the family ties with Achilles.

Against Pherecydes of Athens, who thought that Polydora was the sister of Achilles, Aristarchus is more cautious. If Polydora was indeed the daughter of Peleus, father of Achilles, Homer would have added some more specification and/or openly said that she was related to Achilles given the central role of this character within the poem. This is more probably another case of homonymy, namely, that there were two characters called Peleus.¹⁰

1.2. Homonymy to ‘Save’ Homer’s Consistency

Aristarchus’ interest in homonymy was not limited to merely identifying characters; sometimes, in fact, homonymy was crucial for ‘saving’ Homer. It is well known that some (minor) characters in the *Iliad* who are killed at an earlier stage of the story are mentioned again as alive later on. These ‘resurrections’ are clearly a result of an oral poet, who sometimes forgot minor details while composing in performance. Since Aristarchus obviously could not invoke oral poetry as a reason for such mistakes, he tried to explain the presence of already-dead heroes as cases of homonymy rather than admitting that Homer had made a mistake.

For example, the Phocian leader Schedius, ‘son of Iphitus’ (*Il.* 2.517–518), is killed by Hector in *Il.* 17.306; however, a Schedius, leader of the Phocians, was already slain by Hector in *Il.* 15.515–516. It seems as if the same hero is killed twice, though the latter is said to be ‘son of Perimedes’. The question is complicated because—with the exception of the two patronymics—all

9. See also *Sch. Il.* 12.394b (ex. [Ariston.]).

10. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 174; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 255–256. For a modern perspective, see Janko 1994, 340–341.

the details are too similar not to think that this is the same person, namely, Schedius, leader of the Phocians.¹¹ Aristarchus, however, insists on the difference of patronymics to show that this is not a Homeric mistake, but a case of homonymy: the Schedius of *Il.* 2.517 and 17.306 is son of Iphitus, and the Schedius of *Il.* 15.515 is son of Perimedes (*Sch. Il.* 15.515a). He further explains that both Schedius, son of Iphitus, and Schedius, son of Perimedes, are defined as ‘leaders of the Phocians’,¹² because the former is the real commander in chief and the latter is only the commander of part of the Phocian army (*Sch. Il.* 2.517c: ὅτι καὶ ἕτερος Σχεδῖος ἐστὶ Φωκεύς, τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἡγεμῶν).

More problems are offered by Pylaemenes, the leader of the Paphlagonians (*Il.* 2.851). He is killed by Menelaus at *Il.* 5.576–579, but we find him again in Book 13, crying after the chariot that brings Harpalion, ‘son of king Pylaemenes’ (*Il.* 13.643) back to Ilium, after he has just been killed by Meriones: ‘and with them went his father, shedding tears; but there was no blood-price for his dead son’ (*Il.* 13.658–659). Aristarchus recognizes that this problem troubled many (*Sch. Il.* 2.851b: ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι Πυλαιμένης, περὶ οὗ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐζητήκασιν, and *Sch. Il.* 13.643b), and gives a radical solution to the *zetema*:¹³

Sch. Il. 13.658–9a ἀχνύμενοι· μετὰ δέ σφι <πατὴρ κίε δάκρυα λείβων, /> ποινὴ δ’ οὗ τις παιδὸς <ἐγένετο τεθνηῶτος>: ἀθετοῦνται ἀμφοτέρω, ὅτι πλανηθεὶς τις ἐκ τοῦ ‘ὅ ῥα πατρί φίλῳ ἔπετο’ (*Il.* 13.644) ἔταξεν αὐτοῦς, ἵνα καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱὸν ὀδύρηται. οὐ λέγει δὲ ‘νῦν ἔπετο’, ἀλλ’ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος παρεγένετο· διὸ καὶ πρόσκειται τὸ ‘ἐς Τροίην, οὐδ’ αὖτις ἀφίκετο’ (*Il.* 13.645). εἰ δὲ μένοιεν οἱ στίχοι οὗτοι, νοητέον ὁμωνυμίαν εἶναι.

‘Grieving; and with them went his father, shedding tears; but there was no blood-price for his dead son’: both lines are athetized because someone misled by ‘[Harpalion,] who followed his dear father’ (*Il.* 13.644) added them, so that the father, too, could mourn the son. But [the poet] does not say: ‘[who] *then* followed’, but when first he came from his country: therefore, the line ‘to Troy, but he did not come back’ (*Il.* 13.645) is also added. But if these two lines remain, we must consider it a case of homonymy.

Aristarchus athetizes the two lines because in his view they were added by someone who misunderstood lines 643–644, when Homer introduces Harpalion: ‘Harpalion, the son of king Pylaemenes, who followed his dear father to

11. On this question, see Kirk 1985, 199; Janko 1994, 284; Edwards 1991, 92.

12. Φωκῆων Σχεδῖος καὶ Ἐπίστροφος ἥρχον / υἱὲς Ἰφίτου μεγαθύμου Ναυβολίδαο in *Il.* 2.517–518 and Σχεδῖον Περιμήδεος υἱόν, / ἀρχὸν Φωκῆων in *Il.* 15.515–516.

13. The ‘Pylaemenes problem’ is still the object of modern debates; cf. Bolling 1944, 134–135; Tsagarakis 1976; Janko 1994, 126; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 13.658–9a (with bibliography).

fight.¹⁴ The interpolator took the phrase literally, as if Harpalion had followed his father on that particular war action. According to this interpretation, then, the father of Harpalion had to be present while his son was slain; hence, it was natural to add two lines in which the poet described the desperate father following the chariot carrying the corpse of his son. Yet—Aristarchus points out—at line 644 Homer does not say νῦν ἔπετο, but just ἔπετο, meaning that Harpalion followed his father ‘to Troy’ (a detail that is further specified at line 645, as Aristarchus also notes) when the latter left the country to go to the war. In other words, lines 643–644 do not mean that Pylaemenes is present, and thus there is no need to add lines 658–659. Homer does not contradict himself: Pylaemenes is already dead, and now his son Harpalion is following the same destiny. Aristarchus, however, also suggests a second possible solution: the lines can be preserved if this is a case of homonymy, namely, if this Pylaemenes is not the same Paphlagonian leader killed by Menelaus at *Il.* 5.576–579.¹⁵ This is probably the meaning of the many scholia where Aristarchus refers to the case of Pylaemenes when discussing the other cases of homonymous heroes.¹⁶

The other problematic character is Chromius. In the *Iliad*, there are several characters with this name: a son of Priam killed by Diomedes (*Il.* 5.160), a Lycian warrior killed by Odysseus (*Il.* 5.677), a Trojan killed by Teucer (*Il.* 8.275), an ally of the Trojans (*Il.* 17.218, 494, 534), and, on the Greek side, a Chromius from Pylos (*Il.* 4.295). With the exception of the Greek Chromius, the characters on the Trojan side pose two main problems: (1) whether the son of Priam killed by Diomedes in *Il.* 5.160 is the same Trojan Chromius killed by Teucer in *Il.* 8.275; (2) whether the Lycian Chromius killed by Odysseus in *Il.* 5.677 is the same Chromius who is an ally of the Trojans in *Il.* 17.218,

14. *Il.* 13.643–644: . . . υἱὸς . . . Πυλαιμένεος βασιλῆος / Ἀρπαλίῳ, ὃ ῥα πατρὶ φίλῳ ἔπετο πτολεμίων.

15. Homonymy is the solution offered also by *Sch. Il.* 5.576 (ex.) and 13.643a (ex.), while Aristophanes athetized lines 658–659 (*Sch. Il.* 13.658–9b [Did.]). Zenodotus, on the other hand, solved the problem differently: at in *Il.* 13.643 he read Κυλαιμένεος instead of Πυλαιμένεος, so that Harpalion was a son of a Cylaemenes (not of Pylaemenes!), and this Cylaemenes was mourning Harpalion at lines 658–659; see Eust. 953.4 (ad *Il.* 13.658s) and *Sch. Il.* 13.643c (Did.), which is however corrupted. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 102–103; Ludwich 1884–1885, I 364.1–13; Roemer 1912, 42–43 (but see below, footnote 20); van der Valk 1963–1964, II 421; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 13.643c; Nickau 1977, 165.

16. *Sch. Il.* 1.320a, on Eurybates (ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τὸν Πυλαιμένεα); *Sch. Il.* 2.517c and 15.515a, on Schedius (ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τὰ περὶ Πυλαιμένους); *Sch. Il.* 2.837–8, on Asius (ἐσημειοῦτο δὲ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος τὰς ὁμωνυμίας πρὸς τὰ <περὶ> Πυλαιμένους); *Sch. Il.* 4.295, on Chromius (πρὸς τὰ Πυλαιμένους). According to Schimberg 1878, 23–29, the scholia discussing these cases of homonymy derive from Aristarchus’ lost monograph *On Pylaemenes*, which he even attempts to reconstruct by pasting together different scholia (Schimberg 1878, 29–35); cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, I 21; Nünlist 2009, 241–242.

494, 534.¹⁷ Unfortunately, only a handful of scholia by Aristonicus are available to elucidate Aristarchus' opinion. In *Sch. Il.* 4.295 (ὅτι τρίτος οὗτος Χρομῖος Πύλιος), he observes that the Chromius from Pylos is the 'third' Chromius, but he does not mention the other two Chromiuses. He also identifies the Chromius of Book 17 with Chromis, the Mysian leader, mentioned at *Il.* 2.858 (*Sch. Il.* 2.858 and 17.218b^{1,2}): Homer would use two variants of this proper name for metrical reasons (*Sch. Il.* 17.218b¹: διὰ τὸ μέτρον).¹⁸ Thus, for Aristarchus, the Chromius allied to the Trojans in *Iliad* 17 is not the Lycian Chromius killed by Odysseus in *Il.* 5.677, but a Mysian warrior, also called Chromis; Homer is not contradicting himself—so problem 2 above is solved. On the other hand, since there are no scholia left at *Il.* 5.160 and 8.275, we do not know how he solved problem 1. Perhaps he considered it another case of homonymy, but this must remain only a hypothesis because of our lack of evidence.

Another case, in which Aristarchus adopts a solution similar to what he suggested for Pylaemenes, involves Aethra, the maid of Helen and daughter of Pittheus (*Il.* 3.144). If this is the same as Aethra, mother of Theseus (who did take care of Helen after Theseus abducted her), the line must be athetized, according to Aristarchus, since 'it is unbelievable that such an old woman is the maid of Helen. He cannot make her live for such a length of time'.¹⁹ Otherwise, this is another case of homonymy similar to many others in the *Iliad*, and the line can thus be retained (*Sch. Il.* 3.144a).²⁰

1.3. Double Names: Same Hero with Different Names

The opposite phenomenon also occurs in Homer: sometimes two characters with a different name must be the same person. To 'save' Homer from contradictions, Aristarchus suggested that in these cases the character had two different names. We have seen this in the case of Chromis/Chromius; another case is offered by Alcimedon, son of Laerces. He is introduced at *Il.* 16.197 as part of the contingent

17. On the various Chromii, see Kirk 1985, 360; Kirk 1990, 74–75; Edwards 1991, 83.

18. On this identification, see also below, § 1.3. Kirk 1985, 360, and Edwards 1991, 83, also identify the Chromius of Book 17 with the Mysian Chromis of *Il.* 2.858. Cf. also von Kamptz 1982, 113 (§ 38.a.1), 114 (§ 39.a.2), 254 (§ 70.a).

19. In fact, according to Aristarchus, Homer does not know of the story of the abduction of Helen by Theseus (*Sch. Il.* 13.626a; see Chapter 5.3 § 3.2.2); this might have been an additional reason for the athetesis of *Il.* 3.144.

20. *Sch. Il.* 5.148, which discussed another homonymous hero (Polyidus), recalls the case of Aethra 'with reference to the homonymy' (πρὸς τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν). Aristarchus' views on *Il.* 3.144 are also discussed below, at § 5.2, and in Chapter 3.6.A § 3; cf. also Lehrs 1882, 341; Roemer 1912, 40–42 (who denies Aristarchus' use of the principle of homonymy; but see Nünlist 2009, 241 n. 6); van der Valk 1963–1964, II 436; Kirk 1985, 282; Jenkins 1999; West 2001, 185–186; van Thiel 2014a, I 301–302.

of Myrmidons, and then mentioned again in Book 17, while he is fighting for Patroclus' body with his companion Automedon.²¹ He never again appears in the *Il-iad*; however, at *Il.* 19.392 and 24.474, 574 another companion of Achilles is introduced, whose name is Alcimus. According to Aristarchus, this is the same hero for whom Homer has used an abbreviated form of the name (*Sch. Il.* 19.392a^{1,2}; 24.574: ὅτι συγκέκοφε τὸν Ἀλκιμέδοντα Ἀλκιμον εἰπών).²² The reason why Aristarchus considered Alcimus identical with Alcimedon is probably the fact that in the three passages where Alcimus is mentioned, he is always in company of Automedon, who was with Alcimedon in Book 17. This reasoning seems to be exactly the same as that behind Aristarchus' identification of Chromis with Chromius, discussed above. Even if here, too, we do not have scholia giving specific reasons for the identification, in *Il.* 17.218 Chromius is mentioned together with 'the augur Ennomus', who is listed next to Chromis in *Il.* 2.858 as the leader (and augur) of the Mysians.²³ Aristarchus thus concluded that Chromis was Chromius and Alcimedon was Alcimus because their companions were always the same.²⁴

2. The Heroic World

Aristarchus was also interested in the society and habits of the Homeric heroes,²⁵ and he often stressed the differences between 'modern' practices and Homeric ones. For example, considering the prizes that Achilles establishes for the chariot race—a woman and a tripod for the first, a mare for the second, a cauldron for the third, two talents of gold for the fourth, and a two-handled urn for the fifth (*Il.* 23.262–270)—Aristarchus concludes that 'among the ancients' (παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις) the talent did not have the same value as during his own time (καθ' ἡμᾶς), since it is less valuable than a tripod, a horse, and a cauldron (*Sch. Il.* 23.269b).²⁶

21. *Il.* 17.467, 475, 481, 500, 501. *Sch. Il.* 16.146a observes that Automedon is Patroclus' squire.

22. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.474 (ex. [Ariston.]).

23. This Mysian Ennomus, on the other hand, is himself homonymous with the Ennomus killed by Odysseus at *Il.* 11.422 (*Sch. Il.* 11.422b; 17.218c); cf. Edwards 1991, 83.

24. Modern scholars, too, identify Alcimedon and Alcimus; cf. Janko 1994, 317 and 344; Edwards 1991, 110 and 280–281; Richardson 1993, 322; von Kamptz 1982, 11 (§§ 3.a, 3.b.1) and 180 (§ 66).

25. A detailed examination of Homeric society as analyzed by Aristarchus (and by the exegetical scholia) is carried out by Schmidt 1976, to whom one should refer for a more complete discussion, as he also includes other ancient views and further bibliography. On the topic, the much earlier monograph of Hofmann 1905 is also useful. Cf. also Lehrs 1882, 191–196 ('De cultu at victu heroum'); Roemer 1924, 171–206 ('kulturelle Exegese').

26. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 19–20; Schmidt 1976, 247. For other cases of different habits between Homeric and contemporary society, see *Sch. Il.* 7.182a (below, footnote 71); 14.180b (below, § 2.4); 23.683a (below, § 2.7); 23.725b (below, § 2.7); 24.81a.

The opposition between ‘modern’ and ‘ancient’ habits brought Aristarchus to define a ‘heroic society’, which was the one described in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey*. As with his analysis of Homeric language, Aristarchus was not aware of the different chronological layers which modern scholars have identified in the Homeric poems.²⁷ Quite obviously, and justifiably so, for him the Greek heroes who were encamped outside Ilium, the Trojans living at Ilium, the people at Ithaca in the *Odyssey*, and the city and courtly life portrayed on the shield of Achilles were all part of the same, homogeneous world.²⁸ Indeed, Aristarchus often connected the two poems and the *ekphrasis* in Book 18 of the *Iliad* in order to describe what he considered the ‘Homeric’ society. Thus, in *Sch. Il.* 18.505a, commenting on the trial scene of the city at peace, he recalls an example from *Od.* 2.37, when Telemachus addresses the assembly of Ithaca, and explains that those who wanted to speak in the assembly and administer justice carried a staff. The same use is recalled again when a staff is in the hand of Hector addressing his soldiers (*Sch. Il.* 10.321a) and of Menelaus speaking in front of the Greeks (*Sch. Il.* 23.568a). Finally, commenting on the *Odyssey* passage, Aristarchus highlights how this Homeric custom is observed in both poems (*Sch. Od.* 2.37b: ὅτι δι’ ἐκατέρας τῆς ποιήσεως Ὀμηρικὸν ὄν τὸ ἔθος τετήρηται).²⁹ This last statement suggests an argument against the Chorizontes, who famously denied that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were by the same poet.³⁰ In fact, because in his view there was no difference between the society depicted in both poems (as well as the one depicted in the shield of Achilles), Aristarchus could also use ‘common’ Homeric societal customs in arguing against the Separatists’ views.

2.1. The Society of the *Iliad*: Heroes, Kings, and Soldiers

Who are the heroes? For Aristarchus, all the warriors at Troy are ‘heroes’, as is proved by *Il.* 2.110 when Agamemnon speaks to the whole army and uses this word as a form of address (ὦ φίλοι ἥρωες Δαναοί) (*Sch. Il.* 2.110a); this remark is made against Istrus, a pupil of Callimachus, who thought ‘heroes’ were just the kings (*FGrHist* 334 F 69).³¹ To make his point, Aristarchus repeatedly singles out when other characters talk about the Achaeans in general and call them

27. On the different layers of ‘Homeric’ society and on the scholarly debate about it, see Snodgrass 1974; Morris 1986; Sherratt 1990.

28. An archaeological analysis of the iconography on Achilles’ shield is in Fittschen 1973, 10–17.

29. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 49; Roemer 1924, 204; Schmidt 1976, 250.

30. On the Chorizontes, see Chapter 5.2 § 2.

31. On Istrus ‘the Callimachean’ (middle of the third century BCE), who wrote historical, antiquarian, and grammatical works, see Jacoby 1954, I 618–627, and Jackson 2000. Istrus’ opinion about heroes may come from his *Hypomnemata*, which probably dealt with epic poetry and Homer (see Jacoby 1954, I 626; Jackson 2000, 10).

ἥρωες Ἀχαιοί, 'Achaean heroes' (*Sch. Il.* 12.165; 13.629a^{1,2}; 15.230a; 19.34).³² In fact, Homer also uses this word for a wounded Trojan who is not a king at all (*Sch. Il.* 11.339a). On the other hand, when Agamemnon addresses the leaders, he calls them ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες, 'leaders and rulers' (*Sch. Il.* 9.17a: ὅτι ἐνθάδε <οὕτως> γραπτέον· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἀρίστους, οὐ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ὁ λόγος).³³

Homeric lords, on the other hand, are very different from Hellenistic kings: in fact, with reference to Priam, who holds the reins of the chariot in *Il.* 3.261–262, Aristarchus remarks that the heroes can do many other things and work for themselves without the help of slaves (*Sch. Il.* 3.261–2a: ὅτι οἱ ἥρωες πάντες ἔμπειροι καὶ αὐτουργοί). In the same note, he states that the typical example of a Homeric hero/king is Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, where we see him building a ship (*Od.* 5.234–261) and becoming a helmsman (*Od.* 5.270–277).³⁴ If *Sch. Il.* 1.54 (ex. [Ariston.]) goes back to Aristarchus, he also stressed that the society of the *Iliad* is formed by a group of independent kings, among whom Agamemnon has a certain preeminence, as a *primus inter pares*; yet Achilles is an independent commander (αὐτοκράτωρ) and can summon an assembly (*Il.* 1.54 and 19.40–46),³⁵ just as Odysseus can (*Il.* 2.185–211). Moreover—we continue to read in *Sch. Il.* 1.54—the 'free' speeches uttered in Book 9 during the embassy to Achilles prove that the Greek army is not under the 'tyranny' of Agamemnon (οὐ τυραννὶς τοῦτο ἦν).

2.2. Social and Religious Rituals

Aristarchus also took some interest in the social and religious conventions of the heroes. Yet his comments most often arose from the need either to clarify

32. See also *Sch. Il.* 19.41b (ex. [Ariston.]), which observes that 'some' (which probably stands for Istrus) consider 'heroes' to be only the kings. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 46 and 101.

33. In the following part of the scholium, in fact, *Il.* 2.110 is also recalled as the example of when Agamemnon addresses the entire army, using ἥρωες. For Jacoby 1954, I 658, Istrus' idea was common before Aristarchus and is correct, at least in the *Iliad*; see Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1931–1932, II 8–9. On the other hand, the very fact that in the *Odyssey* 'heroes' are also more humble characters, such as Demodocus (*Od.* 8.843) or even Muliis, who is defined a κῆρυξ and a θεράπων (*Od.* 18.423–424), was probably the reason for Aristarchus to conclude that in Homer kings are not the only 'heroes'.

34. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 10; Roemer 1912, 324–325; Roemer 1924, 194–195; Schmidt 1976, 159–164, 165–166. As Schmidt 1976, 162–164, notes, the idea of αὐτουργία was current among ethnographers and historians (e.g., Polyb. 4.21.1) to describe foreign and ancient peoples, as well as among philosophers, who applied it to the Homeric heroes (e.g., Chrysipp. *SVF* 3, fr. 708). Aristarchus probably echoed these contemporary debates and 'social theories', yet he did not have any moralistic agenda, as, for example, the Stoics' parading of the self-sufficient life of the ancients.

35. In fact, *Sch. Il.* 19.45, which derives from Aristonicus and notes that Achilles' leadership is now reestablished as he gathers the assembly, may indeed confirm that *Sch. Il.* 1.54 (ex. [Ariston.]) preserves Aristarchus' ideas; cf. Lehrs 1882, 175; van Thiel 2014a, I 58.

the text or discuss variant readings. So when Homer briefly introduces Pedaeus, Antenor's bastard son (νόθος), whom Theano, Antenor's wife, 'raised like her own children to do a favor to her husband' (*Il.* 5.70–71), Aristarchus explains that it is a 'barbaric custom' to have children from more than one woman (*Sch. Il.* 5.70a: ὅτι βαρβαρικὸν ἔθος τὸ ἐκ πλειόνων γυναικῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι).³⁶ On the other hand, to argue against Zenodotus, who had Ajax say about the dead son of Mastor: 'in our halls we [i.e., Ajax and Teucer] honored [him] just like *our sons*' (*Il.* 15.439) rather than 'just like *our parents*', Aristarchus observes that heroes serve as soldiers when they are young, before begetting children (*Sch. Il.* 15.439a)—so Ajax and Teucer could not honor any son of theirs and Zenodotus' reading is wrong. Aristarchus also took a special interest in marriage conventions because, despite its martial content, the *Iliad* often mentions marriage gifts and dowries. So he had to explain how marriages were arranged in the Homeric society: the grooms give gifts, called ἔδνα, to the father of their future wives,³⁷ and those gifts normally consist of livestock (*Sch. Il.* 11.244a^{1.2});³⁸ in turn, the father gives a dowry, called ἐπιμείλια, to their daughters when they get married (*Sch. Il.* 9.147b; 22.51a^{1.2}).³⁹ As Martin Schmidt has observed,⁴⁰ this view of women 'bought out' by gift exchanges seems to be derived from Aristotle's idea that ancient Greeks used to buy their brides (*Pol.* 1268b41). Yet it was also a very natural conclusion to draw simply from how the Homeric heroes speak of brides or brides-to-be. Another text-inspired comment concerns the *ekphrasis* of Achilles' shield. Aristarchus singles out the scene portraying the brides being led to their new house with torches as an 'ancient custom' (*Sch. Il.* 18.492b: πρὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἔθος).⁴¹ Similarly, attention to the text matched with a contemporary sense of what is proper seems to inspire his praise for Homer's careful representation of women's quarters: they live on the second floor, so that their privacy is defended (*Sch. Il.* 6.248b; 16.184a).⁴²

Aristarchus also recognized the importance of hospitality in Homeric

36. See also *Sch. Il.* 5.70b (Ariston.?). Cf. Hofmann 1905, 17–18; Schmidt 1976, 248.

37. *Sch. Il.* 9.146b; 13.366a; 13.382a^{1.2}; 16.178c. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 8, 13–17; Lotz 1909, 25–27; Roemer 1924, 203; Schmidt 1976, 240–247. On *Sch. Il.* 22.88a, which speaks of ἔδνα as the 'gifts given to the daughters', not to the father-in-law, and thus contradicts the other notes of Aristarchus, see Hofmann 1905, 15 n. 2, and Schmidt 1976, 243.

38. Cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 18.593.

39. On marriage gifts in Homer, see Snodgrass 1974, 115–118.

40. Schmidt 1976, 244.

41. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 17. *Sch. Il.* 18.492c (ex. [Ariston.?]) compares the same custom at Athens. Schmidt 1976, 248, suggests that this was additional proof of the Athenian origin of Homer, on which see Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.1 and § 4.

42. *Sch. Il.* 6.248b also notes that Homer shows the same care in the *Odyssey*, so this is further proof that the two poems are by the same author; see Chapter 5.2 § 1. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 23.

society: when a guest arrives in the house of someone, he is first entertained and only after a while (ten days in the cases of Bellerophon, guest of Proetus' father-in-law in *Il.* 6.175–177) can he be asked why he has come (*Sch. Il.* 6.176a: ἔθος ἦν παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ξενίζειν πρότερον, εἶτα πυνθάνεσθαι);⁴³ on the other hand, a guest always drinks a toast to his host with full cups, as Odysseus does to Achilles (*Sch. Il.* 9.224).⁴⁴

The ἄκρητοι σπονδαί, 'pure libations'—that is, without mixing water with the wine⁴⁵—in *Il.* 2.341 and *Il.* 4.159 are singled out by Aristarchus to interpret *Il.* 3.269–270, where the Trojans and the Greeks meet to take oaths and 'mix' the wine in a bowl. The 'mixing' here means that they mix their respective wines, rather than mixing wine with water, because their libations are always 'pure' (*Sch. Il.* 2.341; 3.270a; 4.159a).⁴⁶ Since neither the Suitors nor the Phaeacians are ever represented as crowned during banquets, nor are those in charge of sacrifices ever crowned, Aristarchus concludes that the heroes never use to wear garlands on any of those occasions (*Sch. Il.* 13.736b).⁴⁷ Hence when Polydamas says to Hector that a στέφανος πολέμοιο is around them (*Il.* 13.736), it cannot mean, metaphorically, 'a garland of war'. This is how a Hellenistic reader would right away understand the phrase, but since Homeric characters do not know of 'garlands', Polydamas cannot use this metaphor.⁴⁸ Rather, Aristarchus connects στέφανος here with στεφάνη, a word used by Homer for anything that 'surrounds' something, especially the head;⁴⁹ so the phrase means 'circle of war' (*Sch. Il.* 13.736b).⁵⁰

43. See also *Sch. Od.* 3.69a. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 35–36; Roemer 1924, 202; Schmidt 1976, 180.

44. The same observation is made for the *Odyssey*: *Sch. H Od.* 13.25 (ὅτι οἱ ἐστιώμενοι τοῖς ἐστιῶσι προπίνουσι παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ [because in the poet the guests drink first as a toast to the hosts]) and *Sch. H Od.* 13.57; see also *Athen.* 5.193a; 11.498c–d. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 160; Hofmann 1905, 27–28; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 9.224; Schmidt 1976, 180.

45. On libations, see Graf 1980 and Henrichs 1983.

46. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 42; Roemer 1924, 206; Schmidt 1976, 261.

47. *Sch. Il.* 11.700b (ex.) also notes that Homeric heroes do not know the use of wreaths as prizes for the athletic games, in sacrifices, or at symposia.

48. *Athen.* 1.18f observes that heroes do not wear garlands but Homer uses garlands in his metaphors, as in *Il.* 13.736. Aristarchus' point, however, is that, while Homer does know things unknown to his heroes and shows his knowledge of them in metaphors and similes in the narrative (see below, § 6), *Il.* 13.736 occurs in a speech by a character, who cannot mention, not even in a metaphor, an object which he does not know.

49. Στεφάνη indicates the brim of a cliff (*Il.* 13.138), the diadem worn by women (*Il.* 18.597), and the brim of the helmet (*Il.* 7.12, 10.30, 11.96; hence, as Aristarchus explains, στεφάνη is a 'species' of helmet: see *Sch. Il.* 7.12a; 10.30a; 11.96).

50. The scholium is corrupt, even though this is probably the meaning. Aristarchus' solution had already been suggested before by Comanus (Ap. Soph. 144.29–32); cf. Dyck 1988, 246–247 (fr. 12); Janko 1994, 139. On this question, cf. Friedländer 1853, 225; Roemer 1924, 42–43, 44; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 249–250 n. 738, and, especially, Schmidt 1976, 215–218.

2.3. Meals, Food, and Dining Habits

In Greece there were three main meals: breakfast (ἄριστον), lunch (δεῖπνον), and supper (δόρπον). Aristarchus notes (*Sch. Il.* 24.124a^{1,2}) that the term ἄριστον, the early meal, occurs only once in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 24.124) and once in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 16.2); normally, on the other hand, Homer uses δεῖπνον and δόρπον. The δεῖπνον, in particular, is taken at breakfast time (*Sch. Il.* 10.578a; 18.560a).⁵¹ Because Homer is so precise in using these terms, Zenodotus was wrong in reading δόρπον instead of δεῖπνον at *Il.* 11.86, when in a simile Homer describes a woodcutter that prepares his morning meal (cf. *Il.* 11.84)—that is, his δεῖπνον (*Sch. Il.* 11.86a). He was also wrong when he read δεῖπνον (instead of δόρπον) at *Il.* 11.730, where Nestor, retelling the deeds from his youth, remembers when he and his companions had their meal and fell asleep (*Il.* 730–731): this is clearly a δόρπον, since they go to bed straightaway (*Sch. Il.* 11.730a: λέγει τὴν ἐσπερινὴν τροφήν· εὐθέως γὰρ κατακοιμῶνται).⁵² More importantly, as a consequence of identifying breakfast (ἄριστον) with lunch (δεῖπνον), Aristarchus observes that Homeric heroes never take three meals (*Sch. Il.* 24.124a¹);⁵³ yet this habit is not solely due to the necessity of warfare, but it seems to be the norm in the Homeric world, since the Suitors and the Cyclops in the *Odyssey* also have only two meals per day (*Sch. Il.* 2.381a [Ariston.?).⁵⁴

The diet of the heroes consists mainly, if not exclusively, of roasted meat.⁵⁵ In the *Iliad* they do not eat fish, while in the *Odyssey* they do, but only when they do not have anything better to eat.⁵⁶ Still, Aristarchus claims that the Iliadic heroes too know of fish as food because Patroclus mentions men searching for oysters in *Il.* 16.747. Homer simply does not portray the heroes of the *Iliad* eating fish, as this is considered petty (μικροπρεπές) for warriors (*Sch. Il.* 16.747a).⁵⁷

51. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 127–130; Roemer 1924, 41 and 201–202; Schmidt 1976, 191–197.

52. Wecklein 1919, 68, however, defends Zenodotus' text.

53. The wording of the scholium has been restored by Martin Schmidt as τρεῖς γὰρ τροφὰς <οὐδέποτε> ἐλάμβανον οἱ ἥρωες (see Erbse, ad loc.). Lehrs 1882, 128, read it without the negation οὐδέποτε, which of course impacted his reading of the note.

54. For this reason, the scholium criticizes Aeschylus, who in the *Palamedes* described the Trojan heroes having three meals (*TrGF* 3, fr. 182.3). *Sch. Il.* 2.381a is doubtfully attributed to Ariston-icus by Erbse; yet, as Schmidt 1976, 191–193, has noted, the content of the scholium is in line with Aristarchus' ideas. In addition, line 381 of *Iliad* 2 is marked with a *diple* in the *Venetus A*.

55. And not of boiled meat, as *Sch. Il.* 21.362a.b observes (see below, § 6). Plato had already noticed that the heroes do not eat boiled meat (*Resp.* 404b10–c4). Crates maintained the opposite view: for him, the Homeric heroes eat boiled meat as well, because in *Od.* 20.296–299 Ctesippus throws an ox's foot at Odysseus and, since no one roasts ox's feet, this foot must have been boiled (Eust. 1893.1–2, ad *Od.* 20.299). Cf. Mette 1952, 175 (fr. 85a); Schmidt 1976, 188–190; Broggiato 2001, 232–233 (fr. 68).

56. For example in *Od.* 4.368–369 and 12.331–332.

57. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 7 and 33–34; Schmidt 1976, 182–187; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 110.

The dining habits of the Homeric heroes as they emerge from the *Odyssey* are the reason for the athetesis of *Il.* 24.476: at Priam's arrival, Achilles has just finished 'eating and drinking, and the table still stood by his side'. This line assumes that tables were usually removed just after the meal, but in fact this is not the case in Homer: tables remained in place until the diners had left the room, as is clear from *Od.* 19.61, when the maids remove the tables from the hall once the Suitors have left Odysseus' palace earlier at *Od.* 18.427–428; thus the line in the *Iliad* should be athetized (*Sch. Il.* 24.476a, ex. [Ariston.]). In the scholium, however, we also read a possible justification for *Il.* 24.476: Achilles and his companions are not really enjoying a meal, as this is a sad moment, so perhaps they have eaten very quickly, without respecting the usual practices.⁵⁸

2.4. Clothes and Fashion

It might surprise us that a serious philologist like Aristarchus paid attention to fashion.⁵⁹ Yet his interest becomes more acceptable if we see it as due to the need of clarifying the meaning of specific words rather than to a fancy for clothes and outfits. In this light, he remarks that Homer distinguishes the peplos (πέπλος) from the mantle (χλαῖνα) and the cloak (φᾶρος), which are all mentioned at *Il.* 24.229–231 (*Sch. Il.* 24.229a),⁶⁰ and also that ἐάνος and πέπλος are synonyms and indicate the same kind of garment for a woman (*Sch. Il.*

The debate involved the Chorizontes, who took the different diet as proof that the poet of the *Iliad* was different from the one in the *Odyssey*; cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 25; Kohl 1917, 27–31 (fr. 7); Montanari 1995a, 13–16; see also Chapter 5.2 § 2.2. On the other hand, Homer mentions fishing as a source of food in two similes (*Il.* 16.406–408 and 24.80–82); Aristarchus discusses these two passages, explaining the fishing technique and noting its differences from his own time (*Sch. Il.* 16.408b and 24.81a). On the world of the narrator Homer as opposed to the world of his fictional heroes, see below, § 6.

58. The same explanation is given by Athen. 1.12a–b. Aristarchus also athetized a line in the *Odyssey* for the same reason, when in Alcinous' palace a maid draws a table next to the already seated Odysseus: *Sch. HPQT Od.* 7.174: ἀθετεῖται τὸ ἔπος ὡς ἀσύμφωνον τῇ τοῦ Ὀμήρου συνηθείᾳ. οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὰς τραπέζας ἀφαιρουμένας παρόντων τῶν δαιτυμόνων, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν [the line is athetized because it is in contradiction with the Homeric usage; for he never shows the tables as being removed while the guests are still present but after their departure]. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 25–27; Roemer 1912, 239–240; Schmidt 1976, 180–181.

59. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 191; Hofmann 1905, 50; Roemer 1924, 199.

60. All these robes are given to Achilles as a ransom, with the exception of one tunic (χιτῶν) and two cloaks (φάρεα) to wrap Hector's body (*Il.* 24.580); however, when Homer describes the maids taking care of Hector, only one cloak is mentioned, and after it the chiton is used (*Il.* 24.588); cf. Andronikos 1968, 8; Richardson 1993, 338. In *Sch. Il.* 24.588 (ὅτι ἔδει χιτῶνα, εἶτα φᾶρος) Aristarchus only observes that the right order is in fact the tunic first and then the cloak. On these clothing items, see Lorimer 1950, 372–375, 377; Marinatos 1967, A 7–11, 38–41. On the χλαῖνα, see also *Sch. Il.* 3.126c.

14.178a; 16.9b).⁶¹ Thus, when Hera prepares herself to seduce Zeus, she wears a *ἐάνος* and pins it upon her breast, in a fashion that Aristarchus singles out as different from the contemporary one, since ‘now’ people pin it upon the clavicle on the shoulder (*Sch. Il.* 14.180b).⁶²

Odd hairstyles also grabbed Aristarchus’ attention. When Diomedes insults Paris and calls him ‘famous for your *κέρας*’, he (*Sch. Il.* 11.385d) explains that this does not mean ‘famous for your bow’,⁶³ as some scholars thought, but rather ‘famous for your tresses of hair’. In fact—Aristarchus goes on—Diomedes has already called Paris ‘archer’ in the same line;⁶⁴ now, instead, he mocks his way of dressing his hair, a sort of tress in the shape of a horn (*κέρας*). Aristarchus also recalls some parallels for such a hairstyle: *Il.* 17.52, where the poet mentions tresses ‘tightly bound with gold and silver’; the Athenians twisting their hair and embellishing them with golden cicadas;⁶⁵ and, finally, a fragment of Sophron describing a similar use (*PCG* 1, fr. 162).⁶⁶

Another difference between the heroic and contemporary worlds involves perfumes: Homer knows the use of perfume but does not call it *μύρον*, ‘sweet oil’; rather he calls it *ἔλαιον*, which properly indicates ‘olive oil’. But he clearly knows how to prepare perfumes, i.e., by mixing oil with aromatic plants and resins. This is proved by *Il.* 23.186, where the poet specifies that the oil is ‘of roses’, and by *Il.* 14.171–172, where he states that it must be burned in order to produce the scent (*Sch. Il.* 14.172c^{1,2}; 23.186a).⁶⁷

As is clear from the survey in §§ 2.2–4, Aristarchus looked at the ‘daily’ life of the heroic age mostly because the text needed some clarification and he especially focused on the similarities to and differences from current or classical usages. In addition, his explanations about the life habits of ancient heroes were all deduced from what he read in Homer himself. Even if his observations were acute, he seems never to have attempted to match the evidence from the text with external sources which could have given clues about how the ‘ancients’ lived. No doubt, it would be anachronistic to expect an interest in material

61. For Lorimer 1950, 377, this is the same kind of dress, a one-piece feminine garment called *ἐάνος*, *πέπλος*, or *φᾶρος*. The latter name, for a woman’s dress, is confined to the *Odyssey* (hence, the *φᾶρος* in the *Iliad* is a different garment), while *ἐάνος* is used only in the *Iliad*; *πέπλος* is the most common and found in both poems. Cf. also Marinatos 1976, A 11 and 41–50. According to Dimpfl 1911, 24, who also attributes *Sch. Il.* 2.42c (D) to Aristarchus, the discussion on the meaning of *ἐάνος* and *πέπλος* was directed against the tragedians, who used *πέπλος* for men as well.

62. Cf. Lorimer 1950, 378–380.

63. Because *κέρας* literally means ‘horn’, and bows were made of horn.

64. *Il.* 11.385: *τοξότα λωβητὴρ κέραϊ ἀγλαὲ παρθενοπίπα* [archer, able only to offend, famous for your tresses, seducer of girls].

65. The habit is also mentioned by Thuc. 1.6.3 and Athen. 12.512c.

66. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 50–51; Marinatos 1967, B 3. See also Chapter 3.3.A § 2.4.

67. Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 32–33; Severyns 1928, 132–134; Schmidt 1976, 214–215; Nünlist 2012c, 212.

culture from a Hellenistic philologist. Furthermore, ‘Homeric society’ is a very problematic concept from a historical point of view—finding ‘outside’ sources would have been challenging. Yet, had he been interested in analyzing Homeric society from a more historical perspective, Aristarchus could have perhaps used some antiquarian research, which he could certainly find among the books in the Library. But—and this is important to understand Aristarchus’ methodology beyond the specific cases discussed here—since his focus was on commenting on the text, his explanations of *realia* were also mostly *text-derived* and *text-driven*, in line with the principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’.

2.5. Money and Writing

Since in *Il.* 7.472–473 Homer says that the Achaeans bought wine in exchange for bronze, iron, cattle, hides, and slaves, Aristarchus concludes that the ancients (οἱ παλαιοί) did not use money, but only exchange (*Sch. Il.* 7.473).⁶⁸

The Homeric heroes also did not use writing.⁶⁹ The *locus classicus* is *Il.* 6.168–169 with the mention of the deadly signs (σήματα λυγρὰ), that Proetus wrote (γράψας) on a folded tablet (ἐν πίνακι πτυκτῷ). Aristarchus explains that γράψαι does not mean ‘to write’, but ‘to carve’, as though on the tablet there were no letters, but rather only ‘shapes’ (εἰδωλα) through which Proetus’ father-in-law would have understood what he should do (*Sch. Il.* 6.169a). Moreover, when referring to the same tablet Homer always speaks of σήματα (*Il.* 6.168, 176, 178) rather than γράμματα, so Aristarchus concludes that these are not letters but just signs (*Sch. Il.* 6.178: ὅτι σημεία λέγει, οὐ γράμματα. εἰδωλα ἄρα ἐνέγραψεν).⁷⁰

That, in Homeric society, γράφειν does not mean ‘to write’ is conclusively proved by *Il.* 7.175–189, when Homer describes the procedure of casting lots to choose who is going to fight against Hector: each warrior marked (ἐσημήναντο) his lot and cast it in the helmet of Agamemnon; then Nestor shook the helmet, and a lot came out;⁷¹ the herald bringing it around showed the lot to everyone, but none of them recognized it, except Ajax, since he had

68. This is why when talking of marriage gifts (§ 2.2), Aristarchus, like Aristotle, remarks that women were ‘bought’. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 19; Roemer 1924, 203–204; Schmidt 1976, 247.

69. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 95 and 328; Hofmann 1905, 20–22; Lorimer 1950, 127; Schmidt 1976, 213–214; Bouchard 2016, 244.

70. Modern scholars, on the other hand, do not exclude the possibility that the Homeric ‘signs’ may refer to some form of writing; see Kirk 1990, 181–182, and especially Heubeck 1979, 126–146 (with bibliography).

71. Aristarchus also notes the difference in this procedure compared with his own times: Homeric heroes cast lots by putting them in a helmet and shaking it until one lot pops out of it, while ‘now’ (ὥς ἡμεῖς νῦν) people simply pick up one lot among the others (*Sch. Il.* 7.182a); cf. Hofmann 1905, 23.

marked it (ἐπιγράψας). For Aristarchus, this is a key passage for proving that Homeric heroes did not know writing. First of all, at line 175 Homer uses ἐσημήναντο, a verb indicating the use of signs, not of letters (*Sch. Il.* 7.175a: ὅτι σημείοις χρώνται, οὐ γράμμασιν). But the key point is the recognition of the lot:

Sch. Il. 7.187 ὅς μιν ἐπιγράψας: ὅτι οὐ γράμμασι τῆς λέξεως, ἀλλ' ἐγχαράξας σημεία· εἰ γὰρ κοινῶς ᾔδεσαν γράμματα, ἔδει τὸν κήρυκα ἀναγνῶναι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἷς ἐπεδείκνυτο ὁ κλῆρος.

‘[To the one] who had marked it [and cast it into the helmet]’: because [he marked it] not with letters [to express] a phrase, but by engraving signs: for, if they generally knew writing, the herald and the others to whom the lot was shown necessarily should have read [what was written on it].

If indeed ἐπιγράφειν meant ‘to write’, every Greek leader should have been able to read what Ajax had written on his lot (possibly, his name?). The fact that none of them was able to recognize the chosen lot except Ajax means that only signs (σημεῖα) were engraved on it—ones which could be recognized only by the one who had engraved them because they were not part of a common system of signs such as writing.

With this view, founded on Homer, Aristarchus went against the common opinion of previous historians (Hdt. 5.58; Ephor. *FGrHist* 70 F 105) and even against that of Aristotle (fr. 501 Rose). These scholars all supported a Phoenician origin of Greek letters, which had been then brought to Greece by Cadmus, who lived generations before the Homeric heroes; consequently, the latter must have known writing. Another theory was that the alphabet had been invented in Egypt and brought to Greece by Danaus, even before Cadmus (Hecat. *FGrHist* 1 F 20). Others credited Palamedes, the hero of the Trojan War, with the discovery (Stesich., fr. 213 *PMG*; Eur. *TrGF* 5, fr. 578).⁷² Even if Aristarchus’ ideas about writing in Homeric society did not enjoy much success,⁷³ his arguments against rival theories are fairly sophisticated and also very typical of his principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’—he looked at the text itself and found that, contrary to other (external) mythological tales, it simply did not support the idea that writing was already available at the time of the Trojan War.⁷⁴

72. See *Sch. Dion. Thr.* 183.1–15 for these and other theories. On ancient Greek views on the origin of the alphabet, see Jeffery 1967; Heubeck 1979, 105–109; Montanari 1995a, 41–58; Willi 2013.

73. Later authors (e.g., Plin. *NH* 7.192; Tac. *Ann.* 11.14) all follow the other theories and also state (e.g., Plin. *NH* 13.69 and 88) that Homer’s heroes knew writing.

74. See also *Sch. EQ Od.* 8.163 (cf. Carnuth 1869, 80). On the other hand, for Aristarchus Homer did know writing, as he certainly *wrote* his poems; see Chapter 3.6.B § 8.

2.6. The Dead and Their Rituals

The Homeric rituals for the dead needed some explanation, as they were different from those of Aristarchus' time and sometimes even presented problems that he needed to discuss.⁷⁵ The appearance of Patroclus' ghost to Achilles at *Il.* 23.65–107, for example, is proof that the dead who do not receive burial honors are prevented from crossing the Styx (*Sch. Il.* 23.73).⁷⁶ The Homeric heroes, in particular, are cremated, as Aristarchus notes many times.⁷⁷ This custom is valid not only for warriors who die far from their country, but also for those who die in their homeland, such as Hector (*Sch. Il.* 22.342; 24.38a^{1,2}), who is first mourned for nine days before he is cremated and then celebrated with a feast for another two days (*Sch. Il.* 24.665–6).⁷⁸

Aristarchus also observes that the bones of the cremated dead are not collected by the Greeks to be brought back home, because when picturing their own death in war, the Greeks imagine that their remains are held by the earth in the Trojan land (*Sch. Il.* 4.174; 18.332a¹) and because Homer speaks of a barrow (σῆμα or τύμβος) heaped up for dead heroes (*Sch. Il.* 7.86a; 7.436a). This clearly attested practice⁷⁹ then is the reason for an athetesis in Book 7, when Nestor speaks among the Greeks and suggests stopping the battle at dawn, collecting all the dead, and burning them 'a little away from the ships, so that each man may bring their bones home to the children, when we return again to our native land' (*Il.* 334–335). Not only is this not the heroic custom, but in the following lines (*Il.* 336–337) Nestor adds that next to the pyre they should heap up a common and undistinguished mound (ἄκριτος τύμβος). This means that the corpses are to be burned together, which is inconsistent with the idea that they can recognize the bones of each hero to be brought back home.⁸⁰ Nestor therefore suggests burning the corpses not because they want to collect the bones to bring them home, but just because it is their custom, and so lines 334–335 must be rejected (*Sch. Il.* 7.334–5: ἀθετοῦνται, ὅτι οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκαίοντο, ὅπως

75. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 194–195; Hofmann 1905, 45–47; Roemer 1924, 201; Schmidt 1976, 238–240.

76. Aristarchus uses this passage as support for athetizing the second *Nekyia* in *Od.* 24.1–204; see *Sch. MV Od.* 24.1; cf. Lehrs 1882, 173.

77. *Sch. Il.* 7.79b; 7.333 (ὅτι οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἔκαιον τὰ σώματα); 7.410; 7.429; 9.546a.

78. See also *Sch. Il.* 23.29a. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 31 and 46; Andronikos 1968, 16.

79. See Lorimer 1950, 109–110; Andronikos 1968, 32–34.

80. This contradiction (with a specific mention of *Il.* 7.334–335) is also highlighted in *Sch. Il.* 7.436a, commenting on *Il.* 7.435–436, which describes the actual elevation of the mound by the Greeks. Similarly, *Sch. Il.* 4.174 and 18.332a¹ also refer to *Il.* 7.334–335. In particular *Sch. Il.* 4.174 concludes: οὐκ ἄρα Ὀμήρου ἐστὶ ταῦτα· ὥς κ' ὅστέα παισὶν ἕκαστος / οἴκαδ' ἄγῃ, ὅτ' ἂν αὐτε νεώμεθα' (*Il.* 7.334–335) [so these lines 'so that each man may bring their bones home to the children, when we return again to our native land' (*Il.* 7. 334–335) are not by Homer].

τὰ ὅστ' αὖ κομίσωνται ἀλλὰ συνηθεία . . . ἐναντιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς [i.e., *Il.* 336–337]).⁸¹

Furthermore, the νεκρῶν ἀναίρεσις, namely, the recovery of corpses of those warriors who had fallen on the battlefield, happens only once in the *Iliad*, in Book 7,⁸² contrary to the opinion of Istrus (*FGrHist* 334 F 70), who claimed that the dead were collected after each battle (*Sch. Il.* 10.298b). But Istrus' view is contradicted by the narrative; twice, at *Il.* 8.491 and 10.199, Homer says that the two armies (the Trojans in Book 8 and the Greeks in Book 10) gathered in assembly 'in an open space where the ground appeared clear of dead bodies'. Moreover, at the end of the assembly in Book 10, Diomedes and Odysseus leave for their mission 'among the slaughter, the corpses, the arms, and the black blood' (*Il.* 10.298). Aristarchus points out all three of these passages 'πρὸς Ἴστρου', because they clearly show that the two armies have not collected their dead (*Sch. Il.* 8.491a; 10.199a; 10.298b).⁸³ Why did Istrus claim that the corpses were collected after each battle? According to Philipp Hofmann,⁸⁴ Istrus' idea is preserved in an exegetical scholium to *Il.* 7.328, which maintains that, since it would have been shameful to leave the corpses abandoned, the Greeks and Trojans collected them after each battle (*Sch. Il.* 7.328a [ex.]: αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἐδόκει τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦσθαι ταφῆς. . . . δῆλον δὲ ὡς ἐκάστοτε τὰς ἀναιρέσεις ἐποιοῦντο τῶν νεκρῶν). Uninterested in 'ethical' issues in Homer, and in spite of what would have been an 'appropriate' handling of the dead, Aristarchus again relies only on the 'hard' textual evidence: the text clearly shows that the battlefield is covered with bodies and that the Greeks and the Trojans do not have any chance to collect the dead and give them proper burial because of the uninterrupted series of battles.⁸⁵

2.7. Sports and Funeral Games

Aristarchus points out that at the time of Homer and his heroes there were no Olympic or other Panhellenic games but only games performed in honor

81. According to Jacoby 1944, 44 n. 30, the practice of bringing back home the bodies of the fallen warriors was peculiar to Athens and started in 464 BCE, and so these lines are a later Athenian interpolation; cf. also Page 1959, 323. On this athetesis, cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 421–423.

82. See especially *Il.* 7.331–333, 395–396, 408–410, 417–432.

83. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.469a.

84. Hofmann 1905, 45. Jackson 2000, which is the most recent study on Istrus, does not discuss this fragment (nor does he discuss the other fragment, about the identity of the Homeric 'heroes', analyzed above, at § 2.1).

85. Jacoby 1944, 42 n. 19, shares Aristarchus' view against Istrus, but on a historical basis. For a similar explanation of why the burial of the dead is sometimes impossible to carry out, see *Sch. Il.* 1.4d (ex.), which might contain Aristarchean material.

of a dead man (*Sch. Il.* 22.164a; 23.630a).⁸⁶ There are several Aristarchean scholia on the funeral games of *Il.* 23.257–897. Some of them simply draw attention to the differences between those games and contemporary ones. For example, the Homeric heroes participate in the games dressed in the *perizoma* instead of being naked (*Sch. Il.* 23.683a: πρὸς τὸ παλαιὸν ἔθος).⁸⁷ He also notes that they do not yet know the rules in wrestling—perhaps in part to ‘excuse’ Odysseus’ trick during his match with Ajax (*Sch. Il.* 23.725b: ὅτι οὐδέπω τέχνην ἤδεσαν ἐν τῷ παλαίειν).⁸⁸ Indeed—and by now it should not come as a surprise—most of Aristarchus’ comments on the games are more focused on explaining what happens in this complex episode than driven by an interest in sport history. For example, he points out that Achilles offers prizes for all the athletes competing in the games (*Sch. Il.* 23.659a; 23.707a). This is true for all the contests,⁸⁹ with the exception only of the weight-throwing in *Il.* 23.826–849, where there is only one prize, the weight itself, and four contenders. Perhaps Aristarchus did not count this game because the prize is different: in fact, it is not a ‘real’ prize but the tool for the contest and is indivisible.⁹⁰ An explanation to ‘save the text’ concerns the archery contest, when Homer says that, just after Teucer had shot, ‘quickly Meriones took the bow from Teucer’s hand; he had been holding an arrow for a long time while [Teucer] aimed’ (*Il.* 23.870–871). Didymus preserves a fragment from Aristarchus’ commentary:

86. On Aristarchus’ analysis of athletic games, cf. Hofmann 1905, 48–49; Roemer 1924, 204; Schmidt 1976, 219–228 (who has an in-depth discussion on the question).

87. If the exegetical scholium to the line (*Sch. Il.* 23.683b¹: νεώτερος οὖν Ἡσίοδος γυμνὸν εἰσάγων Ἴππομένη ἀγωνιζόμενον Ἀταλάντῃ ≡ *Sch. Il.* 23.683b²) contains material that goes back to Aristarchus, then this observation was also used to demonstrate that Hesiod was younger than Homer, since he had Hippomenes competing naked with Atalanta (Hes., fr. 74 M-W); cf. Schmidt 1976, 227–228. On the question of Hesiod’s dating, see Chapter 5.3 § 5.4.

88. Yet in the same note Aristarchus also brings attention to the deceitful nature of Odysseus (*Sch. Il.* 23.725b: ὅτι τὸ δόλιον τοῦ ἥρωος καὶ διὰ τούτων δέικνυται); see Chapter 5.4 § 4. Cf. Roemer 1912, 334–335.

89. Chariot race (*Il.* 23.262–652), boxing (*Il.* 23.653–699), wrestling (*Il.* 23.700–739), running (*Il.* 23.740–797), armed combat (*Il.* 23.798–825), archery (*Il.* 23.850–883), and spear-throwing (*Il.* 23.884–897). So, in Aristarchus’ view, Zenodotus is wrong in using a dual instead of the plural when Achilles invites possible competitors to the running race, as there are three prizes, not two, and so there must be three competitors (*Sch. Il.* 23.753). On Zenodotus’ mistakes with the dual, see Chapter 4 § 1.2.2. Aristarchus finally notes that Achilles also gives an additional prize to Nestor, who does not compete, out of respect for his authority (*Sch. Il.* 23.616a; see Chapter 5.4 § 1).

90. This is one of the reasons suggested by *Sch. Il.* 23.826a¹ (ex.); the other is that the contest is not an honorable one, and therefore there is no need to ‘honor’ the competitors who do not win. It is impossible to determine whether the note preserves Aristarchus’ views. Van Thiel 2014a, III 478, suggests that, because of this discrepancy, lines 826–835 (where Achilles mentions the prize) were perhaps athetized by Aristarchus, but there is no evidence for this.

Sch. Il. 23.870–1a¹ (Did.) σπερχόμενος δ' ἄρα <Μηριόνης ἐξείρυσσε χειρὸς / τόξον· ἀτὰρ δὴ οἷστον ἔχεν πάλαι, ὡς ἴθυνεν>: . . . ὁ μέντοι Ἀρίσταρχος διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ἐπειγόμενον βούλεται τὸν Μηριόνην ἐκσπάσαι τῆς τοῦ Τεύκρου χειρὸς τὸ τόξον· καὶ γὰρ κοινὸν τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων αὐτὸ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸν δίσκον. τὸ δὲ 'ἀτὰρ <δὴ> οἷστον ἔχεν πάλαι' (l. 871) ἐπὶ τοῦ Μηριόνου ἀκουστέον.

'Quickly Meriones took the bow from his hand; he had been holding an arrow for a long time while [Teucer] aimed': . . . But in his commentaries Aristarchus wants Meriones hastily to take the bow from the hands of Teucer: for, he says, [the bow] was shared by the athletes like the discus. And 'he had been holding an arrow for a long time' (l. 871) must be understood as referring to Meriones.⁹¹

The Homeric phrasing had created problems, and variant readings were attested (in the omitted section of the scholium Didymus mentions the editions of Marseilles and of Antimachus).⁹² Aristarchus, however, does not change the text, but rather explains why it is sound: having only one bow in archery contests was an ancient custom in order to have all the contenders on the same footing. For this same reason, they used to share the discus. Therefore, it is reasonable that Meriones, while using his own arrow, takes and uses the bow of Teucer.

On the contrary, Aristarchus tried to enforce consistency elsewhere. At the beginning of the chariot race, the charioteers cast lots to determine their starting position and then stand *μεταστοιχί* (*Il.* 23.358); since Aristarchus (wrongly) understands this adverb as meaning 'in a line', one behind another, as established by the casting of the lots (*Sch. Il.* 23.358a),⁹³ he athetizes the identical line when it is repeated for the runners in *Il.* 23.757, because in that case there is no casting of lots and the competitors can run side by side in one row (*Sch. Il.* 23.757a^{1.2}).⁹⁴ Even if these notes might tell us something of how Aristarchus envisaged the funeral games, they hardly derived from an antiquarian interest in them; rather it was a question of 'explaining' the text or 'saving' Homer, as we have seen in other sections of this chapter.⁹⁵

91. See also *Sch. Il.* 23.870–1a² and Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 23.870.

92. This was an ancient *zetema*, discussed also by Porph. *QH Il.* 266.8–30. Cf. Richardson 1993, 268–269.

93. The meaning of *μεταστοιχί* is probably 'in a row beside one other', with or without the casting of lots. Cf. Wecklein 1919, 74–75; Cuillandre 1944, 256–257; Richardson 1993, 213 and 252; *Lfgre*, s.v.; cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 140.

94. Cf. Lührs 1992, 167–170.

95. This is also the case with *Sch. Il.* 23.621; 23.634–5; 23.851a, which compare the funeral games to the other games in the *Odyssey* in order to show that the poet is the same; see Chapter 5.2 § 1.

2.8. Horses and Chariots

Aristarchus put a lot of effort in emphasizing that the Homeric chariots are pulled by two and not four horses.⁹⁶ He points this out when the horses are called διζυγες, ‘double-yoked’ (*Sch. Il.* 5.195b; 10.473c), when Homer uses the dual to speak of horses yoked to a chariot (*Sch. Il.* 5.224a; 5.230; 5.272a; 6.38a; 8.109a), and during the chariot race in Book 23 (*Sch. Il.* 23.276; 23.295a).⁹⁷ He finds further evidence that chariots in Homer have two horses in *Il.* 8.290, when Agamemnon promises Teucer that, if he conquers Troy, he will give him ‘two horses (δύω ἵππους) together with their chariot’, and in *Il.* 19.400, when Achilles directly addresses his two horses yoked to his chariot (*Sch. Il.* 8.290b; 19.400).

Aristarchus obsessively insisted on the two-horse chariot because he used it to support an athetesis. In *Il.* 8.185 Hector addresses his four horses, Xanthus, Podargus, Aethon, and Lampus, urging them to go after Nestor and Diomedes. Since a four-horse chariot is unknown to Homeric heroes, Aristarchus athetizes the line with the four vocatives, leaving only Hector’s words to his horses (*Il.* 186–197); furthermore, the verbs in his speech referring to the horses are in the dual,⁹⁸ so Hector is talking to two, not four, horses; finally, such a direct address is silly (*Sch. Il.* 8.185a: <ἀθετεῖται,> ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ Ὅμηρος τεθρίππου χρήσιν παρεισάγει. μάχεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπαγόμενα δυϊκά, καὶ ἡ προσφώνησις εὐήθης). In fact, the energy that Aristarchus put into supporting this athetesis suggests that he also had a more important agenda than simply deleting a silly address. The crucial point seems to be the dual. As we will discuss in Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.1, Aristarchus believed that Homer knew how to use the dual correctly, that is, he never used the dual for more than two subjects. This premise was at the basis of his strenuous defense of the debated duals in Book 9 (supposedly referring to three ambassadors)⁹⁹ and of his harsh criticism against Zenodotus, who ‘confused’ the dual in Homer.¹⁰⁰ So he *had* to prove that even in the case of Hector’s speech to his horses, which was full of duals, Homer got it right. This explains his obsession with the two-horse chariots, as it was the proof that he

96. Cf. Lehrs 1883, 193–194; Hofmann 1905, 60–61; Schmidt 1976, 231–238. On Homeric chariots, see Lorimer 1950, 307–328.

97. *Sch. Il.* 23.276 comments on a dual referring to Achilles’ horses; *Sch. Il.* 23.295a, on the other hand, states that Homer never introduces his characters using four horses when Menelaus yokes two horses, Aethon and Podargus, just before the race.

98. Εἰάνθέ τε καὶ σὺ Πόδαργε καὶ Αἴθων Λάμπέ τε διέ / νῦν μοι τὴν κομιδὴν ἀποτίνετον (*Il.* 185–186), . . . (l. 191) ἀλλ’ ἐφομαρτεῖτον καὶ σπεύδετον ὄφρα λάβωμεν [Xanthus, and you Podargus, Aethon, and noble Lampus, now repay me for the care . . . but come and hurry, so that we may take . . .]. See also *Sch. Il.* 8.186; 8.191a.

99. See Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.2.

100. See Chapter 4 § 1.2.2.

could reject the mention of four horses in that speech, and so could ‘save’ Homer from the accusation of ‘confusing the duals.’¹⁰¹ Aristarchus finds definitive proof that the four names in line 185 had been added by an interpolator when he notes that three of them, Xanthus, Podargus, and Aethon, were ‘inspired’ by the full name of Achilles’ horse, ‘Xanthus, son of Podarge’ (*Il.* 19.400), and those of the horses of the Atridae, ‘Aethe’ and ‘Podargus’ (*Il.* 23.295) (*Sch. Il.* 19.400; 23.295a). So the four names are fake: they have been invented on the basis of other horse names and interpolated by someone who did not know that Homeric heroes do not use four-horse chariots and was also incapable of using the dual correctly.¹⁰²

The other problematic passage is *Il.* 11.699, where Nestor mentions ‘four horses, winners of prizes, with their chariot.’¹⁰³ Aristarchus comments that the passage can give the impression that there was a four-horse chariot, because Nestor mentions only one driver at line 702; however, the correct solution is to think of two chariots, with two horses each: the singular ἐλατήρ, ‘charioteer’, at line 702 can in fact be understood as syllepsis (συλληπτικῶς) to indicate each of the two drivers (*Sch. Il.* 11.699a).¹⁰⁴ In this case, therefore, it is Homer’s style that helps to solve the apparent problem. The chariots themselves, on the other hand, can carry two people: the driver, who holds the reins and steers the chariot, and another passenger, who stands beside him (*Sch. Il.* 3.261–2a).

2.9. Weaponry

Not surprisingly given the subject matter of the *Iliad*, Aristarchus extensively discussed the armor and weapons used by the heroes and tried to clarify many passages which even now remain problematic.

2.9.1. The Armor

The most discussed element of ancient weaponry is the armor and how its different parts are organized.¹⁰⁵ The best description of a Homeric set of armor

101. With reference to another passage where the dual is used referring to the two horses yoked to a chariot Aristarchus indeed remarks on Homer’s precise use of duals (*Sch. Il.* 8.109a): ὅτι τετήρηται παρ’ αὐτῷ καθαρῶς τὰ δυϊκά, καὶ νῦν ὡς ἐπὶ δύο ἵππων διαλέγεται [because the duals are very precisely observed by him and now he speaks of two horses].

102. Cf. West 2001, 202. A defense of these lines against Aristarchus’ athetesis can be found in van der Valk 1963–1964, II 426–427. On Aristarchus’ view of Homeric ‘interpolators’, see Chapter 3.6.B § 7.

103. *Il.* 11.699: τέσσαρες ἀθλοφόροι ἵπποι αὐτοῖσιν ὄχεσθιν.

104. On the last part of this scholium, which offers a different solution, see Friedländer 1853, 201; Lehrs 1882, 194; Schmidt 1976, 233–234. On syllepsis, see Chapter 3.2.A § 15.

105. The question of Homeric armor and its parts has been discussed by many modern scholars without reaching a definitive solution: see, e.g., Leaf 1900–1902, I 576–581; Lorimer 1950, 196–211

can be found in Book 4, when Menelaus is wounded by Pandarus (ll. 104–219). Athena deflects the arrow (ll. 127–131), which pierces where there are the golden fastenings of the belt (ll. 132–133: ζωστήρος ὀχῆες / χρύσειοι) and the double corselet (l. 133: διπλόος . . . θώρηξ). The arrow passes through the belt (ll. 134 and 135: ζωστήρ) and enters the corselet (l. 136: θώρηξ) and the metal guard around the waist (l. 137: μίτρη), wounding Menelaus (ll. 139–147). The wound, however, is not fatal since—as Menelaus explains to Agamemnon, who fears the worst—the arrow has been deflected first by the belt (l. 186: ζωστήρ) and, underneath (ὑπένερθε), by the loincloth and the guard (l. 187: ζῶμα and μίτρη). The physician Machaon takes care of the wound (ll. 198–212): he pulls out the arrow from the belt (l. 213: ζωστήρ); then he loosens the belt (l. 215: ζωστήρ), and, underneath (ὑπένερθε), the loincloth and the guard (l. 216: ζῶμα and μίτρη), so that he can finally clean the wound and treat it with medical herbs (ll. 217–219). From the description of the trajectory of the arrow and from the layers that Machaon has to remove, we can isolate the following parts of the armor:

1. The ζωστήρ: a belt around the waist, probably of leather covered with metal plates. It is the outermost element.
2. The θώραξ (Ionic θώρηξ), the corselet.
3. The ζῶμα, a loincloth under the corselet.
4. The μίτρα (Ionic μίτρη), apparently a metal guard to protect the lower body.

This was also the opinion of Aristarchus,¹⁰⁶ on the basis of the same passage:

Sch. Il. 4.135 διὰ μὲν ἄρ ζωστήρος <ἐλήλατο>: πρὸς τὸν ὀπλισμόν· πρῶτος γάρ ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ὁ ζωστήρ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ στατοῦ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ζώματος. ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ταῦτα θώρακα καλεῖ· διόπερ ὅταν τοῦ ἑτέρου μνησθῇ, τὸ ἕτερον παραλείπει. ἔνδοθεν δὲ τούτων πρὸς τῷ χρωτὶ κατὰ τὰ κοῖλα καὶ τὰς λαγόνας ἡ μίτρα.

‘And it was driven through the belt’: with reference to the armor. First, there is the belt (ζωστήρ) in full view, upon the fixed corselet (στατὸς θώραξ) and the loincloth (ζῶμα). He calls both of them [i.e., the στατὸς θώραξ and the ζῶμα] θώραξ. Therefore, when he mentions one, he leaves out the other. Underneath them, next to the skin, at the level of the abdominal cavity and the flanks, [there is] the metal guard (μίτρα).

(θώρηξ), 245–250 (ζωστήρ and μίτρη); van der Valk 1963–1964, II 424–425; Catling 1977; Brandenburg 1977.

106. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 121–123; Hofmann 1905, 56–60; Roemer 1924, 200–201; Schironi 2004, 180–189 (fr. 20).

Aristarchus adds that Homer calls both (or the union of?) the στατὸς θώραξ and the ζῶμα—so, the fixed corselet and the loincloth underneath—θώραξ. Because these two elements could be considered part of the same piece of armor, when Homer lists ζωστήρ, ζῶμα, and μίτρη in *Il.* 4.186–187 and 215–216, even though only the loincloth (ζῶμα) is mentioned, the corselet (θώραξ) is implied as well through synecdoche (*Sch. Il.* 4.187a; 4.216).¹⁰⁷ In fact, he also explains that the ‘double corselet’ (διπλοῦς θώραξ) mentioned at line 133 is so called insofar as the loincloth (ζῶμα), which stretches from the thighs to the knees, is placed under the fixed corselet (στατὸς θώραξ), so that there are two layers (*Sch. Il.* 4.133a).¹⁰⁸

In particular, Aristarchus argues against ‘some’—their identity cannot be determined—who identified the ζῶμα with the ζωστήρ. But this is incorrect, because they are two distinct elements: while the loincloth (ζῶμα) is under the fixed corselet (στατὸς θώραξ), so it is hidden, the ζωστήρ is a metal belt that binds everything together; this is why at *Il.* 10.77 it can be defined as παναίολος, ‘shining’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.77a).¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, *Il.* 5.857, where Athena helps Diomedes to strike Ares with a spear ‘in the lower belly, where he was girded by the metal guard (μίτρη)’, is for Aristarchus a very ‘instructive’ passage (*Sch. Il.* 5.857b: καὶ ἔστιν διδασκαλικὸς ὁ τόπος), as it makes it clear that the μίτρα serves to protect the area around the lower belly (τὰ κοῖλα μέρη).¹¹⁰

Another part often mentioned in connection with the θώραξ is the γύαλον. As Aristarchus often points out,¹¹¹ the γύαλον is not a separate piece of armor but is part of the corselet, as it indicates any hollow part in it.¹¹² Hence corselets (θώρηκες) can be called κραταιγύαλοι, i.e., ‘with strong hollows (γύαλα)’ (*Sch. Il.* 19.361a). Similarly, the θώρηκος γύαλον, ‘the corselet’s hollow’ (*Il.* 5.99,

107. For synecdoche, see Chapter 3.2.A § 6.

108. The same phrase (‘where the golden buckles of the belt were fastened and the double corselet held up (διπλόος ἦντετο θώρηξ) [to the blows]’) is repeated at *Il.* 20.414–415 (= *Il.* 4.132–133) and in that passage, too, Aristarchus gives the same explanation for the διπλόος θώρηξ (*Sch. Il.* 20.415a); see also *Sch. Il.* 20.415b (ex. [Ariston.]). The meaning of the expression διπλόος θώρηξ is debated; cf. Catling 1977, 100–101.

109. The ζωστήρ, on the other hand, can also be called ζώνη (*Il.* 11.234–236); see *Sch. Il.* 11.234a and 11.234b (ex. [Ariston.]). The problem was further debated in antiquity. In the second century CE, the grammarian Telephus agreed with Aristarchus’ reconstruction (*Sch. Il.* 4.133b [ex.]), while Autochthon, a grammarian of unknown date, gave a different interpretation of the *thorax* and its parts (*Sch. Il.* 4.132a; 4.133c, both ex.); cf. Schironi 2004, 187–188.

110. Cf. Nünlist 2012a, 113–114.

111. *Sch. Il.* 5.99a; 13.507a; 15.530a; 19.361a. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 106–107; Roemer 1924, 40–41.

112. These cavities are necessary to adapt the corselet to the body. As Catling 1977, 77–78 and 100, notes, the γύαλα often seem to cover the shoulders of the warriors (hence they must be concave) but sometimes they also appear to be below the shoulders; an example of armor formed by different, concave pieces is the famous armor from Dendra (cf. Tafel E VII in Buchholz and Wiesner 1977).

5.189, 13.507), is not a different piece of armor, but just a periphrasis to mean the concave part of the corselet (*Sch. Il.* 5.189).

The θώραξ is made of bronze (*Sch. Il.* 13.372), which is why it can also be called ‘bronze coat’, as shown in *Il.* 13.439–440, when Idomeneus ‘split the bronze coat (χιτῶνα χάλκεον) around him [i.e., Alcathous], which until then had warded death from his body’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.439a: ὅτι σαφῶς τὸν θώρακα χιτῶνα χαλκοῦν).¹¹³ Because the Greeks do not use linen corselets and Homer always calls them ‘bronze-coated’ (χαλκοχίτωνες), Aristarchus athetizes *Il.* 2.529–530, the only place where Homer uses the epithet λινοθώρηξ, ‘with a linen corselet’, for a Greek, the Oilean Ajax (*Sch. Il.* 2.529–30: οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες οὐκ ἐχρῶντο λινοῖς θώραξι· διὰ παντὸς γὰρ χαλκοχίτωνας αὐτοὺς λέγει).¹¹⁴ On the other hand, he seems to accept that other populations had different types of armor, since he leaves the epithet λινοθώρηξ in the only other place where it occurs, namely *Il.* 2.830, referring to Amphius, an ally of the Trojans.¹¹⁵

2.9.2. The Shield

The weapons used by the heroes also caught Aristarchus’ attention, starting with the shields.¹¹⁶ The Homeric ἀσπίδες—explains Aristarchus—are rounded, the size of a man (*Sch. Il.* 2.389a; 11.32; 15.646), and cover the body from the ankles to the neck (*Sch. Il.* 6.117a); they are carried, moreover, with a leather strap called τελαμών (*Sch. Il.* 2.388a; 5.796; 11.38a; 12.401), so that when walking the heroes can throw the shield on their back (*Sch. Il.* 11.545). For the same reason, the warriors also have another strap to which the sword is attached (*Sch. Il.* 14.405a).¹¹⁷

The ἀσπίδες are made of oxhide, and thus can also be called βόες (*Sch. Il.* 7.239a; 12.105b; 12.137a).¹¹⁸ In *Il.* 5.452–453 (= 12.425–426) Homer mentions ‘the round oxhide shields (βοείας ἀσπίδας εὐκύκλους) and the fluttering skins (λαιοσήϊα τε περόεντα)’. Literally, the λαιοσήϊον is an animal’s skin with the hair left on, which was used as a shield,¹¹⁹ so that λαιοσήϊον can be a synonym of

113. Instead, the στρεπτός χιτών (*Il.* 5.113, 21.31) is for Aristarchus a ‘spun’ tunic used as a garment underneath the fixed corselet (στατός θώραξ) for padding (*Sch. Il.* 21.31b).

114. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 192. This is not the only reason for the athetesis of *Il.* 2.529–530; another one is discussed below, at § 3.3, with footnote 160.

115. Or, at least, we do not have any evidence that Aristarchus wanted to athetize (or emend) *Il.* 2.830.

116. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 191–192; Hofmann 1905, 51–56; Roemer 1924, 200 (on shields, but also on helmets and spears, which will be discussed at § 2.9.4).

117. In *Il.* 11.545 and *Il.* 14.405 Homer speaks of σάκος rather than ἀσπίς (it is the shield of Ajax). Aristarchus, however, does not seem to make any distinction between the two, as in both scholia (*Sch. Il.* 11.545; 14.405a), even if the lemma is σάκος, the explanations speak of ἀσπίδες. On the Homeric shields, see Lorimer 1950, 132–192, and H. Borchhardt 1977, 1–52.

118. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.636a¹², discussed in Chapter 3.2.A, footnote 129.

119. See *LfgrE*, s.v. Herodotus mentions it as a shield made of raw oxhide and used by the Cili-

βόεια ἄσπις. Aristarchus points out (*Sch. Il.* 12.426a) that for other interpreters, however, λαισήϊα were another type of shield. For some, λαισήϊα were long shields (παραμήκεις) as opposed to the rounded ἄσπιδες; for others, they were light shields (ἐλαφρά); for still others, they were hairy shields made of untanned hides (δασέα ἐξ ἀδεψήτων βυρσῶν). Aristarchus does not take a position, and indeed it is still debated which type of shield the λαισήϊον was.¹²⁰

Shields have many layers, made of bull's hide and/or metal. For this reason, Aristarchus changes the text in the description of Sarpedon's shield at *Il.* 12.295–297: 'a beautiful [shield] beaten out (ἐξήλατον) of bronze, which the smith had hammered out, and he had stitched many bull's hides (βοείας . . . θαμειάς) inside with golden continuous stitches around the circumference'. Ἐξήλατον, from ἐξελαύνειν, 'to beat out', is the reading of the vulgate and of Zenodotus. Aristarchus, instead, reads ἐξήλατον, with a rough breathing, as a compound from ἕξ + a form derived from ἔλασμα, 'metal-plate', to mean 'of six metal plates'. In this way, Sarpedon's shield resembles other Homeric shields which are described as being 'of seven bull's hides' (e.g., *Il.* 7.220) or (Achilles' shield at *Il.* 18.481, 20.270) as having 'five layers' (*Sch. Il.* 12.295a [Hrd.]; 12.296).

2.9.3. *The Zetema of the Shield of Achilles*

In fact, the layers of Achilles' shield were problematic too. During his fight with Aeneas, Homer says that Aeneas' spear reaches the golden plate of Achilles' shield (*Il.* 20.267–272):

οὐδὲ τότε Αἰνείας δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος
 ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο·
 ἀλλὰ δύο μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ' ἄρ' ἔτι τρεῖς
 ἦσαν, ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε κυλλοποδίων,
 τὰς δύο χαλκείας, δύο δ' ἐνδοθι κασσιτέροιο,
 τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσεῖν, τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο μείλινον ἔγχος.

Nor did the mighty spear of wise-hearted Aeneas then
 break through the shield, because the gold stopped it, the gift of the god.
 He drove it through two folds, but there were still three,
 since the lame [god] had laid five layers,
 two of bronze, two inside of tin,
 and one of gold, in which the spear of ash was stayed.

cians (Hdt. 7.91: λαισήϊα δὲ εἶχον ἄντ' ἄσπιδων ὠμοβοέης πεποιημένα).

120. Cf. Lorimer 1950, 194–196; H. Borchhardt 1977, 52–53. According to Hofmann 1905, 53, Aristarchus chose the third option, since he maintained that shields are made of oxhide.

This description implies that the shield has the golden layer underneath, hidden by the other two of bronze and tin. Aristotle already had noticed the inconsistency (*Poet.* 1461a31–35), and this was a famous *zetema* in antiquity.¹²¹ Aristarchus' solution is the athetesis of the last four lines (Il. 269–272); in this way, the spear is stopped immediately by the first, golden layer. According to Aristarchus, lines 269–272 were added by someone who wanted to 'create a problem' (*Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τέσσαρες, ὅτι διεσκευασμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ τινος τῶν βουλομένων πρόβλημα ποιεῖν).¹²² Not only are these lines odd in terms of content (why is the gold hidden by bronze and tin?), but they are in clear contradiction with the other genuine lines, in which the weapons made by Hephaestus are said to be invulnerable, so it is impossible that a spear can pierce even through the first layer (*Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a: μάχεται δὲ σαφῶς τοῖς γνησίοις· ἄτρωτα γὰρ τὰ Ἡφαιστότευκτα συνίσταται). In fact, at line 266 Homer clearly says that the gifts of the gods are impossible to break (*Sch. Il.* 20.266a); then at line 268 the golden layer is said to have stayed the spear (χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο). Thus, when the same line is again used with reference to Achilles' shield in *Il.* 21.165, Aristarchus singles it out to stress again that the weapons of Hephaestus are invulnerable and, hence, that his athetesis of *Il.* 20.269–272 is correct (*Sch. Il.* 21.165a).¹²³

Even if the athetesis is probably his preferred solution, Aristarchus also tries to explain the text as transmitted, in order to avoid being accused of choosing the 'quick fix' (i.e., the athetesis), because he is at loss for a better solution (*Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a: ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῇ λύσεως ἡπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡθετηκέναι, φησὶν ὅτι . . .). If the original text is kept, then it must be understood in the sense that the first layer of gold has stopped the force of the spear, but also that the shield has been pierced until the third layer, as happens in the wounding

121. In fact, this passage is problematic even now; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a, and Edwards 1991, 323, survey the different ancient and modern solutions to it. An archaeological study on the shield of Achilles is offered by Fittschen 1973.

122. On Homeric 'interpolators' (διασκευασταί), see Chapter 3.6.B § 7. According to a scholium tentatively attributed to Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 20.269–72b), these lines had been already athetized by some 'learned' men (Aristophanes?) and were absent in some copies (οὗτοι καὶ προηθετοῦντο παρ' ἐνίοις τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἐν ἐνίοις δὲ οὐδὲ ἐφέροντο).

123. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.165b and 21.594 (on a similar line). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 174 and 183; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 423–424. Among other 'genuine' passages that Aristarchus had in mind, perhaps there was also the description of Achilles' shield in Book 18, where its surface is said to be made of gold (at *Il.* 18.517, 549, 562, 577). There are no Aristonicus scholia discussing this point in Book 18, but elsewhere Aristarchus notes that Achilles' armor is entirely golden (*Sch. Il.* 11.44): καὶ ὅτι, ὅταν ἐπ' Ἀχιλλέως λέγῃ 'ὥς τοῦ χαλκὸς ἔλαμπε' (*Il.* 22.32), νοητέον ἀπὸ τοῦ δόρατος τὴν λαμπηδόνα ἀνταυγεῖν· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα χρυσᾷ εἶχεν [and because, when he says about Achilles 'and so the bronze gleamed [on] his [breast]' (*Il.* 22.32) we must understand that the gleam [of the bronze] reflects from the spear, for he had all the rest of gold']. Cf. Roemer 1912, 123–124; Roemer 1924, 46–47.

of Menelaus in Book 4,¹²⁴ where the metal guard, although pierced, protects Menelaus from a major wound (*Il.* 4.137–138). Aristarchus in fact recalls the *zetema* of Achilles' shield in *Sch. Il.* 4.138a (ἡ διπλῇ πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλέως ἀσπίδος) exactly because the wounding of Menelaus explains it.

2.9.4. Helmets, Swords, and Other Weapons

Among the various names used by Homer to indicate the helmet, Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 15.480b) distinguishes the κόρυς, the bronze helmet, from the κυνέη, the leather helmet: the κυνέη is typical of archers, since the archer Teucer uses it; the Locrians also use the κυνέη, because in *Il.* 13.714 Homer clearly says that they did not have bronze helmets (κόρυθας χαλκήρεας). Aristarchus explains the στεφάνη more vaguely as being a 'species of helmet' (περικεφαλαίας εἶδος, in *Sch. Il.* 7.12a; 10.30a; 11.96).¹²⁵

The hapax καταῖτυξ is only used for the helmet of Diomedes (*Il.* 10.257–259): 'and about his head he put a helmet of bull's hide (κυνέην ταυρείην) without bosses and crest (ἄφαλόν τε καὶ ἄλλοφον), a helmet that is called *kataityx*'. Aristarchus singles out the linguistic misuse, as κυνέη indicates a helmet made of dog's skin, while the καταῖτυξ is said to be made of bull's hide (*Sch. Il.* 10.258a: κυνέην μὲν καταχρηστικῶς τὴν ἐκ ταυρείου δέρματος).¹²⁶ In the same scholium, he also explains that this helmet has no bosses or crests to allow the soldiers to hide themselves more easily, which is exactly what Diomedes needs, since he is setting out for a night expedition. For the same reason, namely, hiding during the night expedition, the famous boar's tusk helmet of Odysseus (*Il.* 10.261–271) is made of hide (*Il.* 261–262: κυνέην . . . ῥινοῦ ποιητήν), and not of metal (*Sch. Il.* 10.262).¹²⁷

The main weapons of the Homeric heroes are spears and swords. While Aristarchus does not seem to have had any problem with the former,¹²⁸ he addressed a question of terminology for swords. He rightly points out that, while ἄορ, ξίφος, and φάσγανον are all synonyms for 'sword', μάχαιρα indicates a knife which is carried beside the sword and is used for cutting rather than as a weapon, for example in sacrifices or for surgery (*Sch. Il.* 3.271b; 11.844c).¹²⁹ For

124. See above, § 2.9.1.

125. Homer uses various names to indicate the helmet: κυνέη, κόρυς, στεφάνη, τρυφάλεια, πῆληξ, and, once, καταῖτυξ. It is impossible now to distinguish precisely one from the other. The fundamental difference is between a leather helmet (the κυνέη, which literally means 'dog's skin') and the metal helmet (the κόρυς); see Lorimer 1950, 211–245, esp. 237–245; J. Borchhardt 1977.

126. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11.

127. On Odysseus' helmet, see also *Sch. Il.* 10.265a, discussed in Chapter 5.3 § 3.4.2.

128. He simply notes that when the heroes have been hit on the shield by many spears they first retreat and then shake their shields to make the spears fall off (*Sch. Il.* 4.535b; 11.572; 13.148a, the latter against Zenodotus' reading); cf. Janko 1994, 64.

129. On Homeric swords, daggers, and knives, see Lorimer 1950, 261–276, and Foltiny 1980.

this reason, he reproaches Zenodotus, because he attributed a μάχαιρα rather than a ξίφος to Menelaus in the fight against Pisander, not knowing that in Homer heroes fight with a ξίφος, not with μάχαιραι (*Sch. Il.* 13.610). For the same reason, he also athetizes the two lines in the description of the shield of Achilles where the dancers are depicted as having a μάχαιρα: Homer never calls a 'sword' μάχαιρα and it is not fitting (οὐ πρέπον) to have dancers with a 'dagger' (*Sch. Il.* 18.597–8).¹³⁰

Another weapon is the battle-ax, mentioned in *Il.* 15.711: 'they fought with sharp axes and hatchets (πελέκεσσι καὶ ἀξίνησι)'. Aristarchus athetizes the following line, where Homer adds 'and with great swords and double-edged spears', because it is 'cheap' (εὐτελής) and destroys the peculiarity of the battle, namely, the unusual fight with axes (*Sch. Il.* 15.712a). In the same scholium, Aristonicus mentions the valid objection of Dionysius (probably Dionysius Thrax) to the athetesis: the mention of swords is necessary to introduce lines 713–714, which describe many blades falling from the warriors' hands.¹³¹ Others also defended the line, saying that the swords and spears here enhance the battle's effect on the audience (*Sch. Il.* 15.712b, ex. [Ariston. + ex.]).¹³²

2.9.5. Arming Scenes

The description of a warrior arming himself is one of the most important type scenes in the *Iliad*. There are four main arming scenes in the *Iliad*: Paris in *Il.* 3.328–338, Agamemnon in *Il.* 11.15–46, Patroclus in *Il.* 16.130–144, and Achilles in *Il.* 19.364–391. As scholars have noted,¹³³ there is a ritualized order in the arming scene, as heroes always follow the same sequence:

1. Greaves
2. Corselet
3. Sword
4. Shield
5. Helmet
6. Spear

Aristarchus is right about the synonymy of ἄορ, ξίφος, and φάσγανον (cf. Lorimer 1950, 272; Foltiny 1980, 232), as well as about the use of the μάχαιρα (cf. Foltiny 1980, 240–242).

130. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 89–90; Hofmann 1905, 6 and 54; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 445.

131. Cf. Linke 1977, 61–62 (fr. *39); Janko 1994, 305. Aristarchus seems to have answered to Dionysius' objection in *Sch. Il.* 15.713a; the scholium, however, is corrupted and very difficult to understand (cf. Friedländer 1853, 255; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 15.713a). On this athetesis, cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 23; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 452–453.

132. This battle with axes is indeed peculiar; see Lorimer 1950, 305–306.

133. See Arend 1933, 92–97 with Tafel 6; Armstrong 1958; Fenik 1968, 78–79, 191; Kirk 1985, 313.

Aristarchus, too, observed that the order of these arming scenes was identical, and his remarks had one single target: Zenodotus and his choices in the arming of Paris at *Il.* 3.328–338. In the vulgate, Paris first puts on the greaves (*Il.* 330–331) and the corselet (*Il.* 332–333), then he takes the sword (*Il.* 334–335), the shield (*Il.* 335), dons the helmet (*Il.* 336–337), and, finally, takes the spear (*Il.* 338). Zenodotus, however, had a different text: he athetized lines 334–335, so to have line 333 (corselet) followed by lines 336–337 (helmet), by line 338 (spear), and then another line 338a (ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ὤμοισιν βάλετ' ἀσπίδα τερσανόεσσαν¹³⁴), so that Paris takes his shield last of all. Aristarchus objects to such a reading for two reasons: (1) Paris takes the shield last, after the helmet and the spear; and (2) he does not have a sword. Both details are against the fashion of Homeric arming scenes (*Sch. Il.* 3.334–5a: ὥστε ἐναντίως τῷ Ὀμηρικῷ ὅπλισμῳ ἔχειν).¹³⁵

We do not know whether Zenodotus found this text in his own copies or whether he changed the order on purpose.¹³⁶ Yet Aristarchus seems to have no doubts that he is responsible for the new text.¹³⁷ This is clear not only from the phrasing of *Sch. Il.* 3.334–5a but also from a series of other scholia in which Aristarchus seems to respond to what he might have thought Zenodotus' rationale for placing the shield at the end of the arming: that Zenodotus found it difficult to imagine how one could put on a helmet and grab a spear with a shield in his hands. To this plausible objection, Aristarchus responds that it is indeed possible, as the arming of Agamemnon shows: Agamemnon takes the shield at *Il.* 11.32 and dons his helmet at *Il.* 11.41; he can do that, because—as Aristarchus explains—the straps are holding the shield, so that Agamemnon's hands are free to handle the helmet (*Sch. Il.* 11.32; 11.38a; 11.41).¹³⁸ Achilles does the same: at *Il.* 19.373 he takes the shield before putting on his helmet at *Il.* 19.380–381 (*Sch. Il.* 19.380). The same order is followed also in shorter arming scenes, such as that of Teucer at *Il.* 15.479–482 (*Sch. Il.* 15.480a: ὅτι πρότερον

134. This epithet is not attested elsewhere. C. Robert suggested *τερμιόεσσαν*, and Villoison *θυσανόεσσαν*, both meaning 'fringed' (see Erbse, app. ad *Sch. Il.* 3.334–5a).

135. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 192–193; Hofmann 1905, 54–55; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 20; Kirk 1985, 314.

136. But *P.Hibeh* 19 (ca. 285–250 BCE) has a similar odd order: the spear (*Il.* 338), followed by the shield (*Il.* 339a), the greaves (*Il.* 339b), and the sword (*Il.* 339c); cf. Bolling 1925, 81–84; West 1967, 44 and 54–55.

137. On Aristarchus' attitude toward Zenodotus' Homeric text, see Chapter 4 § 1.6 and § 1.7.

138. In *Sch. Il.* 11.43 (εἶλετο δ' ἄλκιμα δοῦρε: ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου μονομαχίας τὸ ὅμοιον ['and he took two strong spears': because it is the same also in the single combat of [Paris] Alexander]) Aristarchus points out either that the spears are the last things to be taken in the arming or that both Paris and Agamemnon have two spears; the latter is not valid in Paris' arming scene (since at *Il.* 3.338 he clearly takes one spear) but rather is the case at *Il.* 3.18 (where, at the opening of Book 3, he is described as having two spears); cf. Lehrs 1882, 192; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 3.18 and 11.43; Kirk 1985, 268.

τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴληφεν, εἶτα τὴν περικεφαλαίαν. ὁ δὲ Ζηνόδοτος ἐνήλλαχεν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου μονομαχίας).¹³⁹

The lack of a sword in Paris' arming according to Zenodotus' reading was more difficult to handle. In fact, in the duel, while Menelaus uses a sword, which breaks (ll. 361–363), Paris does not use a sword at all. This could have led Zenodotus to believe that Paris did not have any sword to begin with. Yet Aristarchus remarks that at line 339, just after the arming of Paris, Homer mentions Menelaus' arming in one line: 'and in the same manner warlike Menelaus put on his battle-gear':

Sch. Il. 3.339 ὥς δ' αὐτως Μενέλαος: ὅτι οὗτος ξίφος ἔχει. εἰ δὲ ὡσαύτως τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καθόπλισται, πάντως κάκεῖνος εἶχε ξίφος. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον.

'And in the same manner warlike Menelaus [put on his battle-gear]': because he has a sword. If he has armed himself in the same way as Alexander, by all means Alexander, too, had a sword. The reference is to Zenodotus.

If the battle gear is the same, and given that Menelaus clearly has a sword at line 361 (*Sch. Il.* 3.361), Paris also must have a sword; hence, Zenodotus' reading, which eliminates that sword, is wrong.¹⁴⁰

3. Homeric Geography and Ethnography

One of the most difficult problems in dealing with the Homeric world is its geography. Many names of places both in mainland Greece and in Asia Minor are mentioned in the poem, especially in the Catalogs of the Greeks and of the Trojans. In particular, these two passages in Book 2 became the focus of the works by Apollodorus of Athens and Demetrius of Scepsis, who tried to explain Homeric geography and connect it with the real geography of those regions.¹⁴¹

139. Zenodotus' change in the arming of Paris is also specifically recalled in *Sch. Il.* 11.32 (mentioned above). No Aristonicus scholia are preserved for the arming of Patroclus, which follows the same order: he takes the shield at *Il.* 16.136 and dons his helmet at *Il.* 16.137.

140. Zenodotus in fact might have found this line ordering in his own text or might have had other reasons for changing the text, as Nickau 1997, 173–176, shows; cf. also van Thiel 2014a, I 322. Here I have limited myself to reconstructing how Aristarchus may have understood Zenodotus' choice, without discussing whether or not it was correct. For Aristarchus' sometimes faulty understanding of Zenodotus' readings, see Chapter 4 § 1.7.

141. Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 249–251 (on Demetrius), 258–261 (on Apollodorus).

Aristarchus also took an interest in Homeric geography, but his attitude was different from those of Apollodorus and Demetrius.

3.1. Homonymy: Same Name for Different Places

As with the names of heroes, the names of places provide several cases of homonymy which Aristarchus sought to solve.¹⁴² One famous *zetema* in antiquity involved the many cities called Ephyra: Aristarchus explains that in the *Iliad* one Ephyra (*Il.* 6.152, 210) is a byname for Corinth and the other (*Il.* 2.659, 15.531) is the Ephyra in Thesprotia along the river Selleis (*Sch. Il.* 2.659; 6.152b; 15.531a).¹⁴³ Homer himself makes the difference between the two Ephyras clear, as he always mentions the river Selleis when speaking of the Ephyra in Thesprotia (*Il.* 2.659, 15.531), while the other Ephyra, without any specification, is the name that the Homeric characters (Glaucus in this case) give to Corinth.¹⁴⁴ Thus, when in *Il.* 13.301 Homer brings up the ‘Ephyreans’ in a simile, this is the city in Thesprotia, even though the river Selleis is not mentioned, because Ephyra is Corinth only when the characters are speaking directly; in passages where Homer speaks as the narrator (as in this case) Ephyra is always the Thesprotian city (*Sch. Il.* 13.301b). On the other hand, the river Selleis in Thesprotia (*Il.* 2.659, 15.531) is itself homonymous with another river Selleis in Asia, near Arisbe (*Il.* 2.839, 12.97), mentioned in connection with the hero Asius (*Sch. Il.* 2.839a; 12.97; 15.531a: καὶ ὅτι ἐπ’ Ἀσίῳ ἕτερός ἐστι Σελλήεις ποταμός).¹⁴⁵ Another similar case of homonymy solved by the addition of a further geographic specification concerns Lycia: the kingdom of Sarpedon and Glaucus in Asia Minor must be distinguished from the ‘Trojan’ Lycia, a region in the Troad at the foot of Mt. Ida and ruled by Pandarus. Homer calls the latter one simply Lycia (*Sch. Il.* 4.101a; 5.105; 5.173), while he adds the specification ‘Lycia on the eddying Xanthus,’ for Sarpedon’s kingdom (*Sch. Il.* 5.479b [Ariston.?).¹⁴⁶

Another way to solve the problem of homonymy in geographic names is to use different epithets to distinguish them. As Aristarchus points out, Orchomenus in Boeotia is called ‘Minyan’ (Μινύειος), whereas Orchomenus in Arcadia is called ‘rich in sheep’ (πολύμηλος), so that the homonymy is resolved through the epithets (*Sch. Il.* 2.511a: καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις διαστέλλεται

142. The topic was first treated by Schimberg 1878, 3–23, mostly with a focus on *Quellenforschung*.

143. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 228; Schironi 2004, 231–233 and 235–239 (fr. 27), with bibliography. Crates also took an interest in the different cities called Ephyra; cf. Broggiato 2001, 166–169 (fr. 14) and 172–173 (fr. 17*).

144. On this question, see also Chapter 3.6.C § 2.1.

145. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 230.

146. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 229.

ἡ ὁμώνυμία; *Sch. Il.* 2.605). Similarly, Argos can indicate two regions, Thessaly and the Peloponnese,¹⁴⁷ and different epithets characterize them. Thessaly is called ‘Pelasgian Argos’,¹⁴⁸ while the Peloponnese has several epithets: ‘Argos, rich in pasture for horses’, ‘Achaean Argos’, or ‘Iasian Argos’¹⁴⁹ (*Sch. Il.* 6.152b; 9.141a; 19.115a).¹⁵⁰

Homer also knows two islands called Samos. One is in Odysseus’ kingdom, and is also called Same (*Sch. Il.* 2.634). The other is Samothrace, which Homer calls ‘Thracian Samos’ (*Il.* 13.12–13) or, simply, ‘Samos’, specifying that it is near Imbros (*Il.* 24.78), but never ‘Samothrace’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.12d; 24.78a). This case might have attracted Aristarchus’ attention as he was from there. Because of his knowledge of the island, he also pointed out that Samos was also the mountain on the island—hence its name (*Sch. Il.* 13.12c [ex.]: Σάμου· Ἀρίσταρχος ὄρος ὁμώνυμον τῇ νήσῳ).¹⁵¹

3.2. Double Names: Same Place with Different Names

In several instances, the opposite phenomenon also occurs: the same place is called by different names in Homer. Two cases arise. The first case is when a place is known through two different, yet linguistically related names, such as Thryum in *Il.* 2.592 and Thryoessa in *Il.* 11.711, which Aristarchus claims to be the same city (*Sch. Il.* 2.592a; 11.711a.b), probably because in both passages Homer says that the city is in the region of Pylos along the river Alpheiuss. Similarly, Homer calls the city in Laconia Messene in *Od.* 21.15, but Messe in *Il.* 2.582, ‘cutting the name’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.582a: συγκόψας τοῦνομα). Therefore, since Messe is another name for Messene in Laconia, Zenodotus is wrong in reading ‘Messe’ instead of ‘Thisbe’ in a list of Boeotian cities (*Sch. Il.* 2.502).¹⁵²

The second possibility occurs when a place has two different names, unrelated to each other. This is the case with Corinth/Ephyra analyzed above (§ 3.1). The river of the Troad, which has the double name Xanthus/Scamander, is another very famous case. As Homer explains, ‘gods call [it] Xanthus and men

147. Argos indicates the Peloponnese, but not the kingdom of Agamemnon, as it does with the Neoterai (*Sch. Il.* 4.171d; 11.46; see Chapter 5.3 § 2). But Argos is also the city of Diomedes (in *Il.* 2.559 and 4.52). On the different Argos in Homer, see Strabo 8.6.5. The identity of Argos in Homer is still debated; cf. Drews 1979 and Visser 1997, 455–458, 645 (nn. 9 and 11), 647–661.

148. Ἄργος Πελασγικόν in *Il.* 2.681. On Pelasgian Argos, see Strabo 5.2.4 and 9.5.5.

149. Ἄργος ἱππόβοτον in *Il.* 2.287, 3.75 = 3.258, 6.152, 15.30, etc.; Ἀχαιϊκόν Ἄργος in *Il.* 9.141, 9.283, 19.115, etc.; Ἰασόν Ἄργος in *Od.* 18.246.

150. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 224.

151. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 230; Janko 1994, 44. Aristarchus seems to ignore the other, more famous Ionian Samos, since Homer does not mention it. Strabo, on the other hand, considers ‘Thracian Samos’ and ‘Samos near Imbros’ a way for Homer to distinguish Samothrace from the Ionian Samos; see Strabo 10.2.17 and especially 8.3.6 (where he attributes this theory as well as the one regarding the two Orchomeni and Ephyras discussed above to Apollodorus).

152. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 232–233.

Scamander' (*Il.* 20.74), a line that Aristarchus comments upon by saying that Homer has now clarified the difference between the two names (*Sch. Il.* 20.74a). The meaning of this comment becomes clear in the light of other scholia at *Il.* 14.434 and 20.40, where Homer mentions the Xanthus:¹⁵³

Sch. Il. 14.434a Ξάνθου {δινήεντος}: ὅτι μὴ προσυστήσας, εἰ ὁ Σκάμανδρος Ξάνθος καλεῖται, ὡς πρὸς εἰδότας κέχρηται τῷ ὀνόματι.

'Of Xanthus': because without saying first whether the Scamander is called Xanthus, [Homer] has used that name as if the audience knew it.

Sch. Il. 20.40b¹ {λητῷ τε} Ξάνθος {τε}: ὅτι οὐ προδιασυστήσας τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν Ξάνθον καὶ Σκάμανδρον ὄντα (cf. *Il.* 20.74) προκατακέχρηται τῇ τοῦ Ξάνθου ὀνομασίᾳ, ὡς παραδεδομένοις δηλονότι χρώμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς πλάσσων τὰ ὀνόματα.

Xanthus: because without saying first that that the Xanthus is the same river as the Scamander (cf. *Il.* 20.74), [Homer] has used the name Xanthus before, as if he was clearly using traditional names and was not inventing them.¹⁵⁴

This is not a question of double names, as with Messe/Messene or Thryum/Thryoessa and, for characters, Alcimedon/Alcimus, where Homer simply 'cuts' or changes the name of the hero or of the place.¹⁵⁵ In the case of Corinth/Ephyra and Xanthus/Scamander, Homer uses two different names that already exist, and the choice depends on the characters speaking: Homer calls the city Corinth, while his characters call it Ephyra; similarly, the double name (*Sch. Il.* 20.40b²: διωνυμία¹⁵⁶) Xanthus/Scamander is also due to the 'characters' who use them, since men call the river Scamander and gods call it Xanthus, as Homer

153. In fact, there are two rivers Xanthus in the *Iliad*, the Xanthus/Scamander in the Troad and the Xanthus of Lycia in Asia Minor. There are no Aristarchean scholia about this homonymy; rather, as discussed above (§ 3.1), if *Sch. Il.* 5.479b (Ariston.?) preserves Aristarchus' ideas, the mention of the Lycian Xanthus in *Il.* 5.479 was for him a way to avoid problems of confusion between the Lycia 'on the Xanthus' and the Lycia under Ida. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 5.479b, quotes *Sch. h Il.* 5.479, which notes the homonymy between the two rivers called Xanthus, but the origin of this scholium is uncertain.

154. See also *Sch. Il.* 20.40b².

155. The 'arbitrary' nature of Homer's choice in these cases is highlighted by the wording of the relevant Aristonicus scholia: ὅτι (νῦν) . . . εἶπεν/λέγει/καλεῖ, . . . ἐν ἄλλοις/ἐν τῷ Καταλόγῳ . . . εἶπεν/λέγει/καλεῖ. In fact, some of these double names are affected by metaplasm or syncope (cf. κατὰ μεταπλάσμον in *Sch. Il.* 24.474 (ex. [Ariston.]) and συγκόψας/συγκέκοφε in *Sch. Il.* 2.582a; 24.574); on the other hand, some names change because of the meter, as in Chromis/Chromius (cf. εἴρηκε διὰ τὸ μέτρον in *Sch. Il.* 17.218b¹).

156. [Hrd.] *Fig.* (§§ 60 and *60) uses the same term διωνυμία with reference to the Scamander.

himself says at *Il.* 20.74. Thus, when Homer uses Xanthus, he is simply adopting the divine name (*Sch. Il.* 8.560a). Yet such a denomination must be traditional and also known to the audience, who do not need to wait for the explanation at *Il.* 20.74 in order to understand to which river/god Homer is referring when he speaks of Xanthus at *Il.* 14.434 and 20.40.¹⁵⁷

3.3. Hellas and Hellenes

A significant difference between Homer and later geographic denominations concerns the meaning of Hellas/Hellenes. Unlike in historical times, Hellas/Hellenes in Homer do not mean Greece/Greeks, but rather indicate only one region of Greece, the Phthiotis in Thessaly, part of Achilles' kingdom, as already recognized by Thucydides (1.3.1–3).¹⁵⁸ Aristarchus points out the same issue: Hellas is a city of Phthia (*Sch. Il.* 9.447a; 9.478a; 16.595a) and, by extension, the part of Thessaly under Peleus.¹⁵⁹ This is demonstrated by *Il.* 2.684, when the contingent under Achilles is described as 'Myrmidons, Hellenes, and Achaeans' (*Sch. Il.* 2.684: ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ὑπ' Ἀχιλλεῖ τεταγμένους Ἑλλήνας καλεῖ), and again by *Il.* 9.395, when in response to Odysseus, Achilles proclaims that he will go back home and find a wife there, since 'there are many Achaean maidens in Hellas and Phthia' (*Sch. Il.* 9.395a: ὅτι τὴν Θετταλικὴν οὕτως λέγει μόνην, τὴν δὲ ὅλην ἥπειρον οὐκ οἶδεν οὕτως καλουμένην).

The Homeric meaning of Hellas/Hellenes leads Aristarchus to athetize *Il.* 2.530 and *Od.* 4.726, two passages where the noun Hellas/Hellenes is used with a Panhellenic meaning which does not belong to Homer (*Sch. Il.* 2.529–30; 9.395a; *Sch. Od.* 4.726a^{1.2}).¹⁶⁰ In particular, in *Sch. Il.* 2.529–30 Aristarchus comments that the Greeks are never called 'Hellenes' by Homer, but only 'Argives' or 'Danai'. Therefore, the hapax Πανέλληνες to mean 'all the Hellenes', i.e., all the Greeks, is wrong.¹⁶¹

157. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 13; Roemer 1924, 135; Meijering 1987, 158–159.

158. Cf. Bury 1895 and Visser 1997, 650–651, 653–659.

159. See also *Sch. Il.* 9.478b (ex. [Ariston.]): Ἑλλάς πόλις ὁμώνυμος τῇ χώρᾳ. Μυρμιδόνες δὲ καλεῦντο καὶ Ἑλλήνες (*Il.* 2.684) [the city called Hellas is homonymous with the region; 'they were called Myrmidons and Hellenes' (*Il.* 2.684)] and *Sch. D Il.* 9.395: Ἀρίσταρχος παρ' Ὀμήρῳ Θεσσαλίαν μόνην τὴν Ἑλλάδα φησὶν εἶναι, καὶ Ἑλλήνας τοὺς Θετταλοὺς, παρακολουθῶν Θουκυδίδῃ . . . [following Thucydides, Aristarchus says that in Homer Hellas is only Thessaly and Hellenes are the Thessalians]. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 225; Nünlist 2012b, 154.

160. The athetesis of *Il.* 2.529–530 has also other reasons, for example that the lines contain useless repetitions; see discussion in Lührs 1992, 49–52 (for another reason, see above, § 2.9.1). For Roemer 1912, 110, 187–189, 483–484, on the other hand, Aristarchus athetized only line 530 because of 'Hellenes', but not line 529.

161. Aristarchus also notes that Eleans can be called Epeians as well (*Sch. Il.* 11.688b; 15.518a). This is plausible as Epeians are listed among those from Elis in the Peloponnese (*Il.* 2.615–619); cf. Visser 1997, 195, 555–556, 562–563. On the other hand, for Aristarchus it is wrong to call the

3.4. Troy and Troad

Aristarchus correctly observes that in Homer, the city of Troy is properly called Ilium (Ἴλιος),¹⁶² while Τροίη indicates the region of Troy, i.e., the Troad.¹⁶³ Sometimes, however, Τροίη does specifically indicate the city of Troy. In this case, Homer is using the name of the region to indicate a city located in it (*Sch. Il.* 21.544a: ὅτι ὁμωνύμως τῇ χώρᾳ τὴν Ἴλιον Τροίην εἴρηκεν).¹⁶⁴

Since Trojans are all people living in the Troad and not only those living in Troy, Pandarus, the leader of the Lycians in the Troad, can indeed be leader ‘of the Trojans’,¹⁶⁵ because they are ‘the Trojans living under Mt. Ida’ (*Sch. Il.* 5.200; 5.211a¹). In particular, the problem concerns *Il.* 5.211, when Pandarus complains that he ‘led the Trojans [to lovely Ilium] as a favor to noble Hector (ἡγεόμενῃ Τρώεσσι, φέρων χάριν Ἑκτορι δίδω)’. According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 5.211a^{1,2}), ‘some’ scholars changed the line and instead wrote ‘I led [my army] [to lovely Ilium] as a favor to the horse-taming Trojans (ἡγεόμενῃ, Τρώεσσι φέρων χάριν ἵπποδάμοισιν)’ because in their ignorance they believed that the Trojans were only the inhabitants of Troy/Ilium. Moreover, their reading avoided the strange construction of ἡγεόμαι with dative, instead of the regular genitive. Aristarchus keeps the received text, however. He explains what ‘Trojans’ really means in Homer, adds that Τρώεσσι is used instead of Τρώων,¹⁶⁶ and paraphrases the line into [ἡγεόμενῃ] τῶν Τρώων ὑπὸ τὴν Ἰδην, χαριζόμενος δὲ τῷ Ἑκτορι (*Sch. Il.* 5.211a¹), showing that, if one knows Homeric geography and Homeric *schemata*, the original text is flawless.¹⁶⁷

Eleans ‘Achaeans’, as some manuscripts had (*Sch. Il.* 11.694; 11.737a¹); the Pylans, on the other hand, can be called Achaeans (*Sch. Il.* 11.759a^{1,2}). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 228; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 242 n. 710; Hainsworth 1993, 298–299, 300, 305; van Thiel 2014a, II 289 and 294 (with a different interpretation of some of these scholia).

162. On the morphology of the noun Ἴλιος, see Chapter 4 § 1.5.1.

163. Since Troy means ‘Troad’, then ‘Phrygia’, which later poets use to mean the Troad, is a distinct region in Homer; see Chapter 5.3 § 2.

164. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.544c (ex. [Ariston.]); cf. Goedhart 1879, 78; Lehrs 1882, 231–232. The same happens with Hellas (see above, footnote 159).

165. See *Il.* 2.824–827, 5.200, 210–211.

166. For this construction, see *Sch. Il.* 1.71a. On change (enallage) of case, see Chapter 3.2.B § 3.3.

167. Related to this issue is the question of the orthography of Τροίη. Aristarchus and Herodian write it as disyllabic when it is a noun meaning either ‘Troad’ or ‘Troy’, but as trisyllabic (so Τροίην) when it is an adjective to mean a ‘Trojan’ city, that is, ‘of the Troad’ (Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.129c). For this reason, Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 1.129a¹) chastises Zenodotus for writing πόλιν Τροίην in *Il.* 1.129 and taking it to mean ‘the city of Troy’; rather, the reference is to a city in the Troad and thus must be written as trisyllabic: πόλιν Τροίην. Zenodotus, however, was probably right; cf. Kirk 1985, 67; van Thiel 2014a, I 77; West, ad *Il.* 1.129.

3.5. Mapping the Theater of War: The Monograph *On the Camp*

The Aristonicus scholia often discuss how the Greek heroes were encamped, how their ships were disposed along the harbor, and how the battle at the Achaean Wall took place. Aristarchus treated many of these questions not only in the *hypomnemata*, but also in a monograph entitled *On the Camp* (Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου). Since the scholia collect fragments coming from both the *hypomnemata* and this monograph, it is often impossible to decide which of the two works is their source. Aristonicus expressly quotes the work *On the Camp* in *Sch. Il.* 12.258a (ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι . . . ἐν δὲ τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου) and *Sch. Il.* 15.449–51a (ὕστερον δὲ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου ἀπολογεῖται).¹⁶⁸ Four other scholia of Aristonicus offer far more ambiguous evidence since they simply have πρὸς τὰ περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου, ‘with reference to the question of the camp’.¹⁶⁹ This is not a direct quotation of the monograph entitled *On the Camp*, but simply an indication of the ‘topic’ of the note, which could come either from *On the Camp* itself or from the *hypomnemata*. The same happens in *Sch. Il.* 10.53b, when Aristonicus says that Aristarchus extensively treated ‘τὰ περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου’, a remark that could refer either to the monograph, to the commentaries, or to both.

Lastly, there is a reference to a διάγραμμα περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου in *Sch. Il.* 11.166a (πρὸς τὸ περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου διάγραμμα) and in *Sch. Il.* 11.807a (πρὸς τὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου διάγραμμα). Karl Lehrs¹⁷⁰ thought that this was evidence that Aristarchus also drew a map to clarify the position of the Greeks in the plain. Indeed διάγραμμα means ‘figure’, and is especially used for geometrical figures in mathematical treatises; in this specific case, however, διάγραμμα might indicate not a real ‘physical’ map, but rather a ‘mental’ map, which consisted only of Aristarchus’ explanations (in the *hypomnema* or in the monograph *On the Camp*) to reconstruct the Achaean Camp. We must also observe that while the word ναύσταθμον properly means only ‘harbor’ or ‘anchorage’, under this topic Aristarchus would probably have discussed not only the disposition of the Greek ships dragged ashore, but also the geography of the battlefield where Trojans and Greeks fought.¹⁷¹

In conclusion, the evidence does not allow one to determine whether

168. Didymus does not seem to know this work, while Nicanor might have used it, since he quotes an anonymous work Περὶ ναυστάθμου in *Sch. Il.* 12.258b and 18.68–9 (see Chapter 1.2 § 1 with footnote 21, and below, footnote 175).

169. *Sch. Il.* 10.110; 10.112; 11.6; 13.681a.

170. Lehrs 1882, 221 and 224.

171. For example *Sch. Il.* 6.4a and 11.166a discuss the Trojan plain (and *Sch. Il.* 11.166a specifically says πρὸς τὸ περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου διάγραμμα); see below, § 3.5.4.

Aristarchus ever produced a real map of the camp or to say whether the fragments ‘on the camp’ come from the *hypomnemata* or from the monograph *On the Camp*.¹⁷² Nevertheless, such a lack of certainty about the origin of these fragments does not prevent us from reconstructing (at least partially) Aristarchus’ ideas on the topic.

3.5.1. *The Ships in the Achaean Camp*

From the fact that outside Nestor’s hut one can ‘dry the sweat . . . standing in the breeze by the seashore’ (*Il.* 11.621–622) Aristarchus concludes that the huts in the camp are very close to the sea (*Sch. Il.* 11.622b). This is also a consequence of the fact that the Greeks came with a fleet, so they needed to camp on the sea-shore or very close to it. Indeed one of the problems concerned the disposition of the ships on the bay.¹⁷³ The key passage is *Il.* 14.30–36, where Homer says that the Greeks had pulled the ships onto the shore but the beach could not contain them all, so they had dragged them προκρόσσας. According to Aristarchus, since κρόσσαι means ladders,¹⁷⁴ the ships were ‘hailed in the shape of a ladder, one next to the other, so that the dock looked like a theater’ (*Sch. Il.* 14.35a: ὅτι προκρόσσας τὰς κλιμακηδὸν νενεωλκημένας ἐτέρας πρὸς ἐτέρων ὥστε θεατροειδὲς φαίνεσθαι τὸ νεώλκιον· κρόσσαι γὰρ αἱ κλίμακες).¹⁷⁵ From the analogy of a theater, he probably thought that the ships were ordered in multiple rows rather than a single one,¹⁷⁶ because the shore was not long enough to contain them all. Thus, the ships occupied the beach in depth, perhaps in echelon formation.¹⁷⁷ Aristarchus’ idea of a ‘deep’, rather than long, Greek camp,

172. Goedhart 1879, 13–14, gives a brief list of topics touched upon in the monograph. The relative chronology of the monograph and the commentary is discussed in Schironi 2015, 616–617.

173. Cf. Wachsmuth 1860, 28–29; Goedhart 1879, 20–38; Lehrs 1882, 222; Helck 1905, 21–28 (fr. IV); Porter 1992, 107–111; Janko 1994, 154; Broggiato 2001, 175–178 (fr. 19); Schironi 2004, 333–334.

174. Κρόσσαι are mentioned at *Il.* 12.258, 444. They are part of the wall, but their real meaning was debated. In his commentaries, Aristarchus explained that they were copings of the wall (κεφαλίδες), but then in the monograph *On the Camp* he changed his opinion and decided they were ladders on the wall (κλίμακες). See *Sch. Il.* 12.258a; 12.375 and also *Sch. Il.* 12.258b (Nic.) and 12.258c (ex. | Porph.); cf. Schironi 2004, 326–334 (fr. 41).

175. See also *Sch. Il.* 14.35b (ex. [Ariston.?). Nicanor, too, states that the ships were ordered one after another in *Sch. Il.* 18.68–9: καὶ τὰς ναῦς εἰκὸς ἐφεξῆς τετάχθαι, ὡς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ναυστάθμου λέγεται [it is likely that the ships were set in succession, as is stated in *On the Camp*]. See Chapter 1.2, footnote 21.

176. As was suggested by Lehrs 1882, 222 (*uno semicirculari ordine*); cf. Porter 1992, 109 n.105.

177. Aristarchus’ reasoning seems also to be reflected by an exegetical scholium which discusses why the seashore in the Greek camp is called ‘deep’ (ἡϊόνος . . . βαθείης in *Il.* 2.92): for some it meant that it appeared deep from land, and this is Aristarchus’ reason why more rows of ships could be accommodated there (*Sch. Il.* 2.92a¹: ἢ τοῖς μὲν ἀπὸ γῆς δοκεῖ βαθεῖα, τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ὑψηλή· διὸ φησι ‘προκρόσσας’ (*Il.* 14.35). Ἀρίσταρχος). Aristarchus thought that the entire camp had a ‘theater-like’ shape as well (*Sch. Il.* 11.807a, see below, § 3.5.2).

also seems to be confirmed by his conviction that the games for Patroclus took place inside the Greek camp, within an interval of five stadia from the wall to the sea (*Sch. Il.* 23.365 [ex.]).¹⁷⁸ Even though this conclusion was probably due to the fact that the Greeks would only have been safe in this way, it also served to confirm his view of a deep camp, with multiple rows of ships.¹⁷⁹

Crates joined in the discussion, even though the sources are extremely difficult to interpret.¹⁸⁰ In *Sch. Il.* 14.31–2 (ex.), in fact, the phrase ὅτι οὐκ ἐν διστιχίᾳ ἦσαν, ὥς φησι Κράτης, ‘because they were not disposed in two rows as Crates says,’ can equally mean two opposite things: either that Crates thought that the ships were in two rows, or that he said that they were not disposed in two rows and, thus, they were placed either in one or in many rows.¹⁸¹ In conclusion, Aristarchus’ opinion probably was that the ships were disposed in many rows; Crates, on the other hand, was either in agreement with him¹⁸² or opposed to him as he believed that the ships were disposed in one¹⁸³ or two rows.¹⁸⁴

3.5.2. *The Order of the Greek Contingents in the Camp*

Aristarchus also tried to understand how the Greek heroes were encamped and who was next to whom.¹⁸⁵ In this regard, he singles out a set of repeated lines (*Il.* 8.222–226 = 11.5–9) because they provide the first explicit description of part of the camp (*Sch. Il.* 8.223; 11.6): Agamemnon (in Book 8) and the personified

178. Five stadia (less than a kilometer and less than six-tenths of a mile) would not be very much for a chariot race. This is one of the points that Cuillandre 1944, 250–256, makes to argue that the race in fact happened outside the camp in the Trojan plain. No doubt, a distance of five stadia is not much room for a race, but is certainly enough to contain more than one row of ships and to keep the Greeks safe during the race. For Aristarchus these were probably the main considerations here.

179. In addition, at *Il.* 23.374, when Homer says that the horses were completing the last part of the race, Aristarchus reads ἐφ’ ἄλός, ‘toward the sea,’ unlike the majority of copies, which had ἀφ’ ἄλός, ‘away from the sea’ (Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 23.374a¹); with Aristarchus’ reading the race finishes at the sea, within the Achaean camp. Cf. Leaf 1900–1902, ad *Il.* 23.373 (who understands Aristarchus’ reading to mean ‘by the side of the sea’) and Richardson 1993, 215. Despite what Didymus says about the majority of manuscripts, the vulgate has Aristarchus’ reading (cf. West, ad loc.).

180. Especially *Sch. Il.* 14.31–2 (ex.); 14.32a (Hrd.); Eust. 965.36 (ad *Il.* 14.29–31). Crates discusses the accentuation and meaning of ἐπὶ πρύμνῃσι at line 32 as well, a point examined also by the grammarians Heracleon and Autochthon (*Sch. Il.* 14.31–2 [ex.]). Cf. Helck 1905, 21–28 (fr. IV), and Broggiato 2001, 175–178 (fr. 19).

181. Eust. 965.36 (ad *Il.* 14.29–31) supports this latter option: ὁ μὲντοι Κράτης οὐκ ἐν διστίχῳ φησὶν εἶναι τὰς ναῦς. But, as Broggiato 2001, 177, notes, Eustathius’ testimony may not be decisive.

182. So Janko 1994, 300.

183. So Porter 1992, 109–110.

184. So Wachsmuth 1860, 28–29; Lehrs 1882, 222 (who thought that, for Aristarchus, the ships were disposed in one line only), and Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 15.656c.

185. Lehrs 1882, 221–224 (‘Chorographica et geographica’), only gathered the scholia on the Achaean camp and the geography of the Trojan plain without really explaining the single questions discussed by Aristarchus (and examined here in the entire section § 3.5). More complete (but also fairly convoluted) is Goedhart 1879, 38–55.

Strife sent by Zeus (in Book 11) are said to be in the middle of the Achaean camp next to Odysseus' ship and so able to reach both Achilles and Telamonian Ajax at its two opposite ends.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, from *Il.* 11.806–808, when Patroclus, running through the camp, reaches Odysseus' hut, where there was an assembly place (ἀγορή) and the altars of the gods (θεῶν βωμοί), Aristarchus surmises that in the middle of the camp there is an open space for gathering the army, in the shape of a theater (*Sch. Il.* 11.807a: πρὸς τὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου διάγραμμα ὅτι ὑποτίθεται κατὰ μέσον τοῦ ναυστάθμου θεατροειδῆ τόπον εἰς ὄχλου συναγωγὴν).¹⁸⁷

While these descriptions clearly state that Ajax and Achilles are at the edges of the camp and Odysseus at the center of it, the key passage for the position of the other heroes is the beginning of Book 10, where Agamemnon summons the leaders for a night assembly.¹⁸⁸ Since Agamemnon tells Menelaus to go and call Ajax and Idomeneus (l. 53), Aristarchus concludes that the two heroes are encamped near each other (*Sch. Il.* 10.53b: ῥητῶς γὰρ λέγεται πλησίον τοῦ Αἴαντος ὁ Ἰδομενεὺς νενεωλκηκέναι).¹⁸⁹ Agamemnon himself goes to Nestor (l. 73) and finds him already awake. Nestor then suggests going and rousing the other leaders (ll. 108–113): 'Let's also awaken the others, / both the son of Tydeus famous for his spear and Odysseus, / and swift Ajax and Phyleus' strong son [= Meges]. / But it would be good if someone would also go and call these as well: / godlike Ajax and lord Idomeneus, / for their ships are farthest away and not close at all'. From this evidence, Aristarchus concludes that Meges is camped near Oilean Ajax (*Sch. Il.* 10.110), and reconfirms that Telamonian Ajax is camped near (πλησίον) Idomeneus at the extremity of the camp (*Sch. Il.* 10.112). There is no Aristonicus scholium about Diomedes' position. On the basis of Aristarchus' reasoning about the other two pairs of heroes mentioned here, however, the fact that Odysseus and Diomedes are named together at line 109 probably led Aristarchus to conclude that they were close to each other, in the center of the camp, where Odysseus' ship was moored.

The other key passage is the review of the troops in Book 4. When Agamemnon reviews the army, he meets the contingents in this order (from left

186. *Il.* 8.222–226 = 11.5–9: 'and he/she stood by Odysseus' huge black ship, which was in the middle, so to reach with a shout either end, both toward the huts of Ajax, son of Telamon, and toward those of Achilles; for they had hauled their well-balanced ships at the extreme limits [of the camp], trusting in their vigor and the strength of their hands'.

187. Cf. Meijering 1987, 122.

188. Cuillandre 1944, 27–30, too, considers this passage fundamental for mapping the Greek camp.

189. On *Il.* 10.53, see also below.

to center right):¹⁹⁰ Idomeneus and the Cretans (*Il.* 4.251–271), the two Ajaxes¹⁹¹ (*Il.* 4.272–291), Nestor and the Pylians (*Il.* 4.292–326), Menestheus and the Athenians (*Il.* 4.327–328), Odysseus and the Cephallenians (*Il.* 4.329–363), and Diomedes (*Il.* 4.364–421). Aristarchus again observes that Telamonian Ajax is close to Idomeneus ‘against those who place him close to the Athenians’ (*Sch. Il.* 4.273a). This remark becomes clear in another note on *Il.* 3.230, when Helen, showing the Greek heroes to the Trojan elders, points to Telamonian Ajax and ‘on the other side’ Idomeneus (*Il.* 3.229–231):

Sch. Il. 3.230a Ἰδομενεὺς δ’ ἐτέρωθεν: ὅτι πλησίον ὁ Ἰδομενεὺς Αἴαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου ἐτάσσετο κατὰ τὴν ἐπιπώλησιν (cf. *Il.* 4.251–274) συμφώνως. παραιτητέον ἄρα ἐκεῖνον τὸν στίχον τὸν ἐν τῷ Καταλόγῳ (*Il.* 2.558) ὑπὸ τινων γραφόμενον ‘στῆσε δ’ ἄγων ἴν’ Ἀθηναίων ἴσταντο φάλαγγες’. οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν πλησίον Αἴαντος Ἀθηναῖοι (cf. *Il.* 4.326–327).

‘On the other side Idomeneus [stands]’: because, in agreement [with this passage], Idomeneus was lined up next to Telamonian Ajax in the review of the army (cf. *Il.* 4.251–274). Thus, we must reject that line in the Catalog (*Il.* 2.558), which was written by some [interpolators]: ‘[Ajax] set [his ships] where the battalions of the Athenians were stationed’. For the Athenians were not close to Ajax (cf. *Il.* 4.326–327).

On the basis of all the other evidence, which makes clear that Ajax son of Telamon is always close to Idomeneus and the Cretans, and not to the Athenians, line 558 in the Catalog of the Ships must be rejected.¹⁹²

Aristarchus’ comment in *Sch. Il.* 4.273a also suggests that in his view

190. ‘Left’ and ‘right’ for Homer (and for Aristarchus) are imagined from the Greek point of view, facing the Trojan plain (i.e., facing south). Thus, from such a perspective left is east and right is west. Cf. Cuillandre 1944, 15–18, 37–41; Janko 1994, 130–131; Clay 2011, 45. However, West 2011a, 159, argues that Homer has the opposite perspective in some battle scenes (i.e., left is west and right is east, according to the Trojan point of view).

191. On the dual for the two Ajaxes, see below, § 3.5.3.

192. *Il.* 2.558 is not marked by an *obelos* in the *Venetus A*, and no scholium ad *Il.* 2.558 is preserved; see Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 2.558. The expression παραιτητέον in *Sch. Il.* 3.230a, in fact, points more toward a complete deletion of the line than toward an athetesis. It is important to note that the rejection of *Il.* 2.558 is due to a purely ‘internal’ reason (i.e., that Ajax is close to the Cretans and not the Athenians) and has nothing to do with the fact that line 558, mentioning the Athenians together with the troops of Salamis, could be considered an interpolation by the Athenians to lay claim to Salamis. Aristotle alludes to this issue (*Rhet.* 1375b29–30), but Aristarchus seems to ignore it. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 221 and 442–443; Ludwich 1884–1885, I 223.3–20; Davison 1955, 16–18 (esp. n. 27); van der Valk 1963–1964, II 487 n. 43 and 520–521; Kirk 1985, 207–209.

Agamemnon's review of the troops followed the order of the camp.¹⁹³ If this is the case, then he could conclude also that the two Ajaxes were close to each other (Il. 272–291) and the Athenians were placed after Nestor and very close to Odysseus (πλησίον at l. 329), thus in the center (Il. 326–329). As will become clear in the analysis of the battle at the wall (below, § 3.5.3), this was indeed the conclusion that Aristarchus drew from the lists of Book 4 and Book 10.

The cases of Helen's review in Book 3 and of the Catalog of the Ships in Book 2, on the other hand, were different for Aristarchus. The latter does not represent the relative order of the Greek heroes, but is a geographic list of no use in reconstructing the order of the camp;¹⁹⁴ the only 'spatial' reference, in fact, is Il. 2.558, where Homer explicitly says that Ajax placed his troops 'where' (ἵνα) the Athenians were. Aristarchus comments on this passage because this geographic detail is wrong but, as far as our evidence goes, he does not discuss the sequence of the contingents in the Catalog, which still does not correspond to the order of the camp. Similarly, when in Book 3 Helen points out Agamemnon (Il. 3.178–180), Odysseus (Il. 3.200–202), Telamonian Ajax (Il. 3.229), and Idomeneus (Il. 3.230–233) to the Trojan elders, the only spatial information concerns the proximity of Ajax and Idomeneus, which agrees with Book 10—this is indeed the only point that Aristarchus singles out, because it also confirms his ideas about the disposition of the contingents.

To conclude, the only lists of heroes in the *Iliad* that Aristarchus used to map the Greek camp were those in Book 10 and Book 4, where characters walking in the camp provided indications about the relative positions of the contingents. The review of Helen from the tower and the Catalog of the Ships were for him only 'lists' with no value for the ordering of the troops, except in the cases where there was a 'spatial' specification, such as Il. 3.230, which for Aristarchus proved his reconstruction, and Il. 2.558, which contradicted it and which he therefore rejected.

3.5.3. *The Battle at the Achaean Wall*

If the lists of Books 4 and 10 gave some clues about the relative vicinity of certain contingents, the battle fought in Books 12 and 13 offered Aristarchus the

193. The similarities between the ordering in Book 10 and the ordering in the review of Book 4 are also noticed by Cuillandre 1944, 76–77, and Clay 2011, 48–49.

194. Aristarchus himself recognizes the arbitrary nature of the list in the Catalog of the Ships when discussing why the poet begins it with the Boeotians (see below, § 3.6). The lack of value of the Catalog of the Ships as a source for the ordering of the Greek contingents is also noted by Cuillandre 1944, 25–27, and Clay 2011, 51. The latter also rightly warns against assuming that the positions of the various heroes in the camp correspond to their position in the battlefield, an assumption adopted by Cuillandre and to some extent also by Aristarchus when he uses the review in Book 4 and the Battle of the Wall in Books 12 and 13 (discussed in the next section) to prove his ideas about the heroes' placement in the Greek camp.

most complete description of the Greek army in the camp, and so was central to understanding the order of the Greeks.¹⁹⁵

First Aristarchus insists that the wall itself that protects the Greek camp has only one gate, even if Homer speaks of πύλαι, because πύλαι is a plural with singular meaning.¹⁹⁶ For this reason, line 175 of Book 12 (ἄλλοι δ' ἀμφ' ἄλλησι μάχην ἐμάχοντο πύλῃσιν, 'but some were fighting in battle around one gate, some around others') must be athetized, as it is the only evidence against the presence of only one gate in the wall (*Sch. Il.* 12.175–81a, ex. [Did.?).¹⁹⁷ This single gate is placed on the left-hand side, as indicated by *Il.* 12.118, where Asius is the first to attack 'toward the left side of the ships', finding the gate open (*Il.* 12.120–121)—an important clue which does not escape Aristarchus' notice (*Sch. Il.* 12.118a¹: καὶ ὅτι κατὰ ἀριστερὰ τοῦ ναυστάθμου ἡ πύλη. καὶ ὅτι μία). The rest of the Trojans, under Hector's lead, attack the same gate at *Il.* 12.290–291 (*Sch. Il.* 12.291) and finally Hector breaks in at *Il.* 12.459–471, while the Greeks flee back onto their ships (*Sch. Il.* 12.470c).

Aristarchus then focuses on 'who' meets 'whom' in the ensuing battle. Since, as soon as he enters the camp, Asius faces the Lapith Polypoetes and Leonteus (*Il.* 12.127–130) before being killed by Idomeneus (*Il.* 13.384–392),¹⁹⁸ he concludes that Lapiths are camped near Idomeneus (*Sch. Il.* 12.128 [ex.]).

While first Asius and then Hector are attacking the gate on the left side, Sarpedon and the Lycians assault the wall from another direction, near the

195. The description of the battle, as well as the number of the gates in the Greek wall, was (and still is) an open question. For a brief summary of the modern debate on these books, see Hainsworth 1993, 313–316; Janko 1994, 39–41. An in-depth study of *Iliad* 13 is Michel 1971. For a recent study on Homer's narrative in these two books, see Clay 2011, 56–76.

196. *Sch. Il.* 7.339a; 12.291; 12.340a¹; 12.470c; cf. Goedhart 1879, 55–65; Lehrs 1882, 125. The point about the one gate in the Greek wall recalls Aristarchus' discussion of the gate of Troy (see below, § 3.5.5). With the Greek wall there is also the problem of how many bars (ὀχῆες) the gate has: one (*Il.* 12.121, 291) or two (*Il.* 12.455)? Aristarchus believes there are two, one crossed over the other (*Sch. Il.* 12.121b; 12.291; 12.455–6); cf. Lehrs 1882, 126.

197. See also *Sch. Il.* 12.175a¹. In fact, for Aristarchus line 175 had been inserted by interpolators who took it from the similar (and correct!) *Il.* 15.414: ἄλλοι δ' ἀμφ' ἄλλησι μάχην ἐμάχοντο νῆεσσιν, 'but some were fighting in battle around one ship, some around others' (*Sch. Il.* 15.414a^{1,2}). The grammarian Pius objected to Aristarchus' athetesis, as we read in *Sch. Il.* 12.175–81b (ex.): . . . Πῖος (fr. 5 Hiller) ἀπολογούμενος πρὸς τὰς ἀθετήσεις Ἀριστάρχου ταῦτά φησιν ὅτι Ἄσιος μὲν περὶ τὴν μίαν πύλην τὴν ἱππήλατον ἐμάχετο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄσιον περὶ τὰς μικρὰς πύλας· τῷ γὰρ ἄλλας μικρὰς εἶναι πύλας οὐδ' αὐτὸς Ἀρίσταρχος ἀντιλέγει· πῶς γὰρ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος ἐν τῷ φεύγειν διὰ μίας εἰσῆει; [Pius defending [the lines] against Aristarchus' athetesis says that Asius was fighting near the one gate used for the chariots, but those around him near the small gates. And that there were other small gates not even Aristarchus denies. How could such a multitude have gone in through only one [gate] in the rout [i.e., the rout of Book 15]?]. Aristarchus, however, had several reasons to suspect these lines; cf. Hiller 1869, 91–93; Roemer 1912, 83; Hainsworth 1993, 336–337; West 2001, 218–219. On Pius, see Chapter 3.6.B § 9.

198. Cf. also *Il.* 12.116–117.

center of the camp (*Il.* 12.290–293, 307–308). So, when Menestheus (who is stationed near Odysseus, so toward the center) sees Sarpedon and his Lycians approaching his part of the wall (*Il.* 12.331–332), he sends the herald Thoötes to call the two Ajaxes and Teucer, who are fighting on the left-hand side next to the only gate (*Il.* 12.340–341). Here Thoötes finds them; Ajax son of Telamon follows him with Teucer (so toward the center), while Ajax son of Oileus remains to fight at the gate (*Il.* 12.351–371). Aristarchus comments upon this episode as follows:

Sch. Il. 12.335 ἐς δ' ἐνόησ' Αἴαντε δύω: ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀριστεροῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ναυστάθμου γέγονεν ἡ μάχη, ὅπου καὶ οἱ Αἴαντες ἐσκήνουν.

‘He saw the two Ajaxes’: because the battle happened on the left-hand side of the camp, where the Ajaxes were encamped as well.

Since thanks to Ajax’s intervention the Lycians are prevented from advancing further (*Il.* 12.378–418), Aristarchus probably concluded that the Trojans entered the Greek camp only from the left side, and this is where the entire battle was fought.

At the end of Book 12 Hector is able to enter the wall through the gate with the help of Zeus (*Il.* 12.442–471). In Book 13 the narrative of the battle at the wall is split into two scenes: the left side, where the Trojans have broken into the camp, and the center, where Hector has moved (cf. *Il.* 13.136–146). Homer first focuses on the left side: Poseidon comes to encourage the Greeks and especially the two Ajaxes (*Il.* 13.1–135), Idomeneus has his *aristeia* (*Il.* 13.206–515), and Menelaus fights with courage (*Il.* 13.581–642). Then, Homer returns to Hector, who ‘had not heard and did not know that on the left of the ships his men were being slain by the Argives’ (*Il.* 13.674–676). Hector—Homer goes on—‘drove where he first had leapt onto the gate and the wall, breaking the thick ranks of the Danaan warriors, where the ships of Ajax and Protesilaus were . . . and there the wall had been built the lowest’ (*Il.* 13.679–683). Aristarchus explains that this Ajax is the son of Oileus, not of Telamon, and that he is camped next to Protesilaus’ ship (*Sch. Il.* 13.681a). For him, therefore, Hector is still fighting on the left of the camp (because this is where he entered, through the only gate on the left: *Sch. Il.* 12.470c). Indeed, when Hector later on goes back to see how the situation is and finds Paris ‘on the left of the battle’, Aristarchus again picks this positional reference to restate that this is the left of the camp because the point of view is that of the Greeks, not that of the Trojans, who are attacking from inland (*Sch. Il.* 13.765a).¹⁹⁹ Simply put, to explain the second part of *Iliad*

199. See above, footnote 190; cf. Goedhart 1879, 69–71; Cuillandre 1944, 41.

13, from line 674 onward, Aristarchus seems to have concluded that Hector has broken into the camp and moved closer to the center, near Protesilaus' ship,²⁰⁰ which he wants to set on fire, and the hut of Oilean Ajax, while Idomeneus and Menelaus are fighting on the far left, which is why Hector does not know what is happening there.²⁰¹

Thus, Aristarchus looks closely at the narrative in his reconstruction and often assumes that heroes fight right where they are camped. In fact, he was aware that the order of the contingents could change, as is shown by the *zetema* in *Il.* 4.491, where a spear thrown against Telamonian Ajax by mistake wounds a companion of Odysseus; ancient scholars wondered how this could happen since Odysseus' Cephallenians are not encamped close to Ajax's Salaminians, but Aristarchus explains that the order of the heroes is changed due to the confusion of the battle (*Sch. Il.* 4.491a) or, if we trust an exegetical scholium, he considered it a case of poetic license (*Sch. Il.* 4.491b [ex.]).²⁰² Yet the case of Books 12 and 13 was different. While in Book 4 the battle was outside the Greek camp in the Trojan plain, a larger space allowing for a melee, in Books 12 and 13 the battle happened *within* the Greek area. So Aristarchus probably felt that he could use this battle description to determine the order of the contingents in the Greek camp. Figure 2a (on the next page) shows Aristarchus' map of the relative position of the Greeks, of the gate, and of the Trojans as discussed in §3.5.2 and §3.5.3.

If this reconstruction is correct, on the right side Aristarchus might have placed all the other lesser-known contingents, of which there is no mention in Books 10, 12, and 13, but which are all listed in the Catalog, like the Arcadians, the Aetolians, the Rhodians, and so on.²⁰³

The order outlined by Aristarchus in part corresponds to modern reconstructions. I report the one by Richard Janko (Fig. 2b).²⁰⁴

200. The ship of Protesilaus, who was the first to disembark and was killed right away, was on the most interior part of the camp. Cf. Cuillandre 1944, 50.

201. *Il.* 13.673–837 has been the object of many doubts because several scholars have felt that the description of the battle in the center of the camp is inconsistent with the rest of the book; cf. Janko 1994, 129–130, for a brief summary of the question. A thorough defense of the passage is in Michel 1971, 116–137. Yet modern scholars place Protesilaus' ship either in the center (Clay) or on the center-right (Cuillandre and Janko); here Hector is fighting against the two Ajaxes: Telamonian Ajax, because he has come to help (since there is more need at the center than at the left), and Oilean Ajax, because his hut is in the center-right of the camp (on this point, see below footnote 205). Cf. Cuillandre 1944, 32–33, 40.

202. Cf. Goedhart 1879, 50–54; Lehrs 1882, 206–207; Lotz 1909, 38–39; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 33; Roemer 1924, 228.

203. Indeed Cuillandre 1944, 51–52, notes that nothing happens on the right side of the camp; the reason is that this part is occupied by Achilles' troops and the Trojans do not dare to attack him.

204. Janko 1994, 131. The other reconstructions I consulted are Cuillandre 1944, 18–34, esp. 33–34 (cf. also the diagrams in Willcock 1976, 116–117, who follows Cuillandre), and Clay 2011,




Fig. 2a. The Achaean Camp during the Battle at the Wall (*Iliad* 12 and 13) according to Aristarchus’ reconstruction

LEFT	CENTER					RIGHT
	Menelaus	Nestor	Diomedes	<u>Podarces</u>	Boeotians	
Telamonian Ajax	Idomeneus	Agamemnon	Odysseus	<u>Oilean Ajax</u>	<u>Meges</u>	Menestheus Achilles
			SEA			

Fig. 2b. The Achaean Camp during the Battle at the Wall as reconstructed by Richard Janko.

As is clear, the major difference (in bold) is the relative position of Ajax son of Oileus, Meges, and Protesilaus’ ship (with Podarces and Northern Greeks), since for Aristarchus they are not on the right, but on the left side of the camp.

Aristarchus placed the two Ajaxes on the same side (and as a consequence also Meges, who is listed next to Oilean Ajax at *Il.* 10.110, and Protesilaus’ ship, which is said to be close to Oilean Ajax at *Il.* 13.681) because the two Ajaxes are often seen fighting together in the battle at the wall. Since Telamonian Ajax is definitely camped on the extreme left, then these other three contingents must also be placed on the same side. In addition, this ordering matches the lists in Book 4 (where the two Ajaxes are met at a close distance by Agamemnon, after

48–49 and 50 (map). Cuillandre’s reconstruction is very similar to Janko’s, but he adds Eurypylus between Odysseus and Diomedes and does not mention the Boeotians. Clay, on the other hand, follows Cuillandre and Janko on the left-hand side, but places Protesilaus’ ship in the middle of the camp on the basis of *Il.* 16.285–286 (Clay 2011, 87); thus, after Odysseus she has [Protesilaus]/Podarces, Menestheus, Diomedes, Oilean Ajax, Meges, Achilles. However, as Cuillandre 1944, 33, observes, at *Il.* 16.285–286 Patroclus is said to be rushing forward toward the middle near the ship of Protesilaus, but this only means that Protesilaus’ ship is toward the middle with respect to Achilles’ position, not in absolute terms. Protesilaus’ ship, together with Oilean Ajax and Meges, is more on the right-hand side of the camp (see next footnote).

Idomeneus and before Nestor) as well as Nestor's list of heroes at *Il.* 10.108–113, which then could be interpreted as indicating a one-way trip starting from the center-right to the far left (Diomedes, Odysseus, Oilean Ajax, Meges, Telamonian Ajax, and Idomeneus).²⁰⁵ Aristarchus could not hope for anything more to prove that Homer was self-consistent even in the mapping of the camp.

Probably, an incorrectly understood linguistic archaism was an additional factor in convincing Aristarchus to place the two Ajaxes on the same side. Homer often uses the dual Αἶαντε during the battle at the wall and, as Jacob Wackernagel showed,²⁰⁶ there are reasons to believe that this dual did not originally mean 'the two Ajaxes', i.e., Ajax son of Telamon and Ajax son of Oileus, but rather 'Ajax son of Telamon and his half-brother Teucer'. Hence, it is understandable why there are so many instances (22) of this dual in the *Iliad*: Ajax and his half brother Teucer are often seen together, as they are part of the same contingent, that of Salamis. The use of the dual to indicate real 'pairs' (and not simply two unrelated things or individuals), and the possibility that one member of the pair indicates both when used in the dual was lost in classical Greek. Therefore, for any Hellenistic reader, Αἶαντε could only mean 'the two Ajaxes', i.e., Ajax the son of Telamon and Ajax the son of Oileus. In addition, on the basis of this dual, which he himself understood as meaning 'the two Ajaxes', the poet of the *Iliad* created a plural Αἶαντες, which was a further source of confusion,²⁰⁷ especially in lines such as Αἶαντές τε δῶν Τεῦκρός θ', ὃς ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν, 'the two Ajaxes and Teucer, who was the best of the Achaeans [in

205. For this reason, I think that Aristarchus placed Idomeneus at the very far end of the camp, next to Telamonian Ajax, but in the interior of the camp, closer to the gate (where in fact he kills Asius). In this way, Aristarchus could also explain why in the review of Book 4 Agamemnon starts with Idomeneus and then meets the two Ajaxes—presumably in his reconstruction Agamemnon started from the interior part of the camp, next to the gate and then preceded toward the shore (where he met Telamonian Ajax) and moved toward the right of the camp, meeting Oilean Ajax and then Nestor. Modern critics, on the other hand, place Oilean Ajax and Meges on the center-right, after Diomedes, because at *Il.* 10.175–176, arriving from the left, Nestor wakes up Diomedes and tells him to continue in his place and alert Oilean Ajax and Meges. This means that the two heroes are camped further to the right. Cf. Cuillandre 1944, 28, and Clay 2011, 49. However, since Homer is very vague and simply says that Diomedes went and roused them (*Il.* 10.177–179) with no spatial indication, Aristarchus might well have thought that he went in the other direction, toward the left; the fact that Nestor tells Diomedes to go on in his place as he is younger and should pity him (at l. 176), might have even suggested to Aristarchus that it was indeed a long distance to cover (and in the opposite direction), and not simply a question of reaching the next hut.

206. Wackernagel 1955, I 538–546. Cf. also Vürtheim 1913, 35–36; Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 50–51; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 29; Page 1959, 235–238; Kirk 1985, 158, 201; Janko 1994, 48; Ebbott 2003, 41–44; West 2011a, 144, 270.

207. For example at *Il.* 4.272–291 (one of the key passages used by Aristarchus to determine the order of the contingents) the Ajaxes are introduced with the plural ἐπ' Αἰάντεσσι (l. 273) but then Agamemnon addresses them (l. 285) with the dual: Αἶαντ' Ἀργείων ἡγήτορε χαλκοχιτώνων. Again, these were originally Telamonian Ajax and Teucer (see Page 1959, 236–237; Kirk 1985, 359); yet for Aristarchus they were Telamonian Ajax and Oilean Ajax.

archery]' (*Il.* 13.313). This line must have further convinced Aristarchus that in Book 13 Telamonian Ajax with his half brother Teucer was fighting together with Oilean Ajax. At this point, for him the question arose of why these two characters called 'Ajaxes', who are unrelated and from different contingents, are so often mentioned together. Aristarchus' solution was to have them encamped close to each other, on the same side of the camp.

In order to match his reconstruction, Aristarchus may have even altered some passages, for example the episode in Book 10 mentioned above. When he wakes up, Agamemnon goes to his brother Menelaus and tells him to go and call Telamonian Ajax and Idomeneus (*Il.* 10.53); instead of the vulgate 'but now go and call Ajax (Αἴαντα) and Idomeneus', Aristarchus reads the dual Αἴαντε (Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 10.53a^{1,2}), so that, with this reading, the two Ajaxes are once again on the same side and Menelaus is sent to alert them both.²⁰⁸

3.5.4. *The Battlefield in the Trojan Plain*

Aristarchus also took an interest in the geography of the plain between the Greek camp and Ilium, where most of the battles take place.²⁰⁹ In the middle of it, at the same distance from the Greek ships and Troy, there is Ilus' tomb, as Homer specifies in *Il.* 11.166–167 (*Sch. Il.* 11.166a: πρὸς τὸ περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου διάγραμμα).²¹⁰ In the battle of the gods, the Simoeis is mentioned as the place of the fighting (*Il.* 20.53), and in Book 21 the Scamander is depicted as occupying the plain of Troy and asking the Simoeis for help to fight against Achilles (*Il.* 21.298–323). This evidence probably led Aristarchus to change the reading at *Il.* 6.4, where Homer describes the Trojans and the Achaeans fighting. According to *Sch. Il.* 6.4a, the old manuscripts (ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις) had 'between the river Scamander and the lagoon' (μεσσηγὺς ποταμοῖο Σκαμάνδρου καὶ στομαλίμνης), a reading which Aristarchus accepted in his *hypomnemata*. Later on, however, he changed his mind and wrote 'between the Simoeis and the streams of Xanthus' (μεσσηγὺς Σιμόεντος ἰδὲ Ξάνθοιο ῥοάων), because this

208. Telephus (second century CE) argued that Didymus was wrong and that Aristarchus did not read the dual (*Sch. Il.* 10.53a¹ [ex.]), a position shared by Ludwich 1884–1885, I 312.8–19. As Ludwich observes, Aristonicus (*Sch. Il.* 10.53b) knows the reading Αἴαντα; yet Aristonicus does not seem to know the latest stage of Aristarchus' *diorthosis* (see Schironi 2015), so this does not disprove Didymus' testimony. In fact, the dual Αἴαντε fits perfectly with Aristarchus' reconstruction of the camp, which he perfected in the later monograph *On the Camp*; so the dual might have been present only in the second edition of Aristarchus and this is why it is known to Didymus but not to Aristonicus. Cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, I 112 and 566–567. The dual Αἴαντε meaning 'the two Ajaxes' instead of the transmitted accusative singular Αἴαντα was also adopted in *Il.* 12.342–343 and 15.301 (Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 12.342a^{1,2} and 15.301a^{1,2}) by Zenodotus and Aristophanes (the latter is only mentioned at *Il.* 15.301). Cf. Duentzer 1848, 89–90; Hainsworth 1993, 356; Janko 1994, 24 n. 23, 260; West 2001, 219.

209. Cf. Goedhart 1879, 84–94.

210. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.415b (ex. vel Ariston.). Cf. Roemer 1924, 211–212.

reading, with Simoeis and Xanthus/Scamander delimiting the battlefield, better fitted the geography of the camp (*Sch. Il.* 6.4a: τοῖς γὰρ τοῦ ναυστάθμου τόποις ἡ γραφή συμφέρει).²¹¹

3.5.5. *The Gates of Troy*

Another question connected with the plain in front of Troy concerned the number of gates of the city and their names.²¹² As already pointed out concerning the gate in the Greek camp, for Aristarchus the noun πύλαι in Homer is a plural with a singular meaning: ‘gate’.²¹³ In two places where he makes this observation (*Sch. Il.* 8.58a^{1,2}; 9.354a), the πύλαι in question are those of Troy, implying that Troy has only one gate. So, at *Il.* 2.809 = 8.58, when the Trojans rush out ready to fight and ‘all the gates were opened’ (πᾶσαι δ’ ὤϊνυντο πύλαι), Aristarchus comments that the plural there ‘suggests’²¹⁴ the idea of many gates but in fact Troy has only one gate, and so πᾶσαι here is equivalent to ὅλαι, meaning ‘the gate was entirely opened’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.809: ὅτι ἔμφασιν ἔχει πολλῶν πυλῶν, μία δὲ ἔστι, καὶ ἔστι τὸ ‘πᾶσαι’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅλαι).²¹⁵

If this is the case, why then does Homer speak of the ‘Scaean’ Gate and of the ‘Dardanian’ Gate? According to Aristarchus, these are two names used for the same (and only) gate of Troy (*Sch. Il.* 9.354a). This is evident from various instances in the *Iliad*. First, in *Il.* 5.784–791 Hera in the likeness of Stentor comes to the Achaeans to urge them to fight. She shouts and says that they should be ashamed because, when Achilles was fighting, the Trojans never went beyond the Dardanian Gate (*Il.* 789–790), while now they are all over the plain. A very similar statement is made by Achilles in his reply to Odysseus’ embassy: he refuses to return to the fighting and ironically suggests that Agamemnon

211. For Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 6.4b), Aristarchus ‘found’ this later reading (i.e., he did not invent it). Cf. Goedhart 1879, 88–90; Ludwich 1884–1885, I 262.17–265.5 (on the ἀρχαία ἀντίγραφα quoted by Aristonicus); Bachmann 1902–1904, I 13; Wecklein 1919, 29–30; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 88; Rengakos 2001, 214–215; Rengakos 2002b, 150–151; Schironi 2015, 616–617. Scamander and Simoeis as battlefields are also mentioned in *Il.* 12.21–23, when the poet lists the rivers that flow from Mt. Ida to the sea, including ‘godlike Scamander and Simoeis, where many shields of bull’s hide and helmets fell in the dust, and the race of demigods’. Aristarchus points out that it is ambiguous to which river the relative clause refers but suggests the Simoeis, since this river flows in the middle of the plain (*Sch. Il.* 12.22a).

212. Cf. Goedhart 1879, 78–84; Lehrs 1882, 223; Cuillandre 1944, 267–268; Kirk 1985, 282–283; Hainsworth 1993, 109.

213. See also Chapter 3.2.B § 3.5.

214. On ‘suggestiveness’ (ἔμφασις) as a trope, see Chapter 3.2.A § 17.

215. So also *Sch. Il.* 8.58a^{1,2}. In many scholia Aristarchus obsessively notes that Homer uses πᾶς instead of ὅλος, and in many of these he refers to the question of Troy’s gate at *Il.* 2.809 (= *Il.* 8.58); see *Sch. Il.* 8.193; 11.65; 13.191f (Ariston.); 13.408a; 13.548a; 16.801c; 20.387; 21.345; 22.286; 22.354b; 23.135b. The same reasoning applies to the only gate of the camp (see above, § 3.5.3) when Homer says πᾶσαι γὰρ ἐπώχματο, which Aristarchus understands as ‘the [gate] was entirely closed’ (*Sch. Il.* 12.340a¹). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 125–126; Schironi 2004, 138–145 (fr. 14).

should think about a new strategy, since the Trojans have become aggressive, while when he himself was in the battle ‘Hector did not want to stir battle far from the wall, but reached only as far as the Scaean Gate and the oak tree’ (*Il.* 9.353–354). Since the situation described is the same, Aristarchus concludes that Hera and Achilles must mean the same gate (*Sch. Il.* 5.789; 9.354a), in front of which there is an oak tree (*Sch. Il.* 7.22a; 9.354a).²¹⁶ The events in Book 22 also prove for Aristarchus that the Dardanian Gate is to be identified with the Scaean Gate. At the opening of the book, Homer says that Hector has remained outside, in front of Ilium and the Scaean Gate (l. 6), where his parents beseech him to get inside the walls. Later on, when chased by Achilles, Hector tries to rush toward the Dardanian Gate (l. 194) in search of help from his people. According to Aristarchus, this description again shows that there is only one gate, called Scaean at line 6 and Dardanian at line 194 (*Sch. Il.* 22.6a and 22.194b: ὅτι ἄς ἄνω Σκαιάς, νῦν Δαρδανίας).

To explain the double name, Aristarchus considers Δαρδάνιαι to be the real name, ‘The Gate of Dardanus’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.237b: ὀνοματικῶς Δαρδανίας λέγει), while Σκαιαί is merely an adjective, meaning ‘on the left’ (*Sch. Il.* 22.6b, ex. [Ariston.]): ἐν ἀριστερᾷ κεῖνται τοῦ τείχους αἱ πύλαι). Therefore, Dardanian and Scaean are not two different proper names, but two different ways of indicating the same gate: a name indicating the ‘historical origin’ (Δαρδάνιαι πύλαι) and adjective indicating the ‘position’, namely, the gate ‘on the left’ (Σκαιαὶ πύλαι).²¹⁷

3.6. The Catalog of the Ships

As has become clear from the preceding survey, Aristarchus’ comments on Homeric geography are disappointing in terms of ancient geography per se, since he does not seem to have been interested in mapping the Homeric world ‘outside Homer’, that is, in trying to match the geographic details as recounted in the *Iliad* with the reality outside it. We have already seen how he correctly dismissed the evidence from the Catalog of the Ships in mapping the Achaean camp. Yet both the Greek and Trojan Catalogs in Book 2 were an invaluable source of geographic details, which soon attracted the attention of scholars such as Demetrius of Scepsis or Apollodorus.²¹⁸ In this respect, it is very telling to see how Aristarchus addressed one famous *zetema* on why the poet starts the

216. Cf. Meijering 1987, 122.

217. In *Sch. Il.* 3.263 Aristarchus states that Homer usually calls them Scaean; the note is probably to be understood as meaning that though their real name is ‘Dardanian’, Homer prefers the ‘positional’ name.

218. For a study on the Greek Catalog vis-à-vis the archaeological evidence of Mycenaean Greece, see Simpson and Lazenby 1970.

Catalog of the Ships with the Boeotian contingent.²¹⁹ Some thought the reason for this was because Boeotia was at the center of Greece; others, because it was the most ancient area, as proven by the myth of Deucalion and Pyrrha; still others suggested that it was because Boeotia had the largest fleet, or because the entire Greek fleet met together in Aulis, on the coast of Boeotia; finally, for some it was a way for Homer to please the Muses, who dwell on the Boeotian Helicon. For Aristarchus, however, it is a much more trivial question:

Sch. Il. 2.494–877 (ex.) . . . ἤρκται δὲ ἀπὸ Βοιωτῶν κατὰ μὲν Ἀρίσταρχον οὐκ ἔκ τινος παρατηρήσεως.

. . . According to Aristarchus, [the poet] has started from the Boeotians not because of any [specific] observation.

Sch. D Il. 2.494a . . . ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος φησιν κατὰ ἐπιφορὰν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ Βοιωτῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν πεποιῆσθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλου ἔθνους ἤρξατο, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀρχῆς.

. . . Aristarchus says that the poet has started from the Boeotians in accordance with a [poetic] impulse; for, if he had started from another people, we would investigate the reason of that beginning.²²⁰

Boeotia is the result of a random selection: this 'explanation' is significant for understanding Aristarchus' point of view, since he seems to see the Catalog essentially as a poetic product, and not as a geographic description of Greece, contrary to his pupil Apollodorus.²²¹ For this reason, he dismisses all the possible historical, geographic, or mythical interpretations that other scholars sug-

219. The different solutions suggested for this *zetema* are listed in *Sch. Il.* 2.494–877 (ex.); *Sch. D Il.* 2.494a; Eust. 262.26–41 (ad *Il.* 2.494). The reason behind the Boeotian incipit is still a problem: see Page 1959, 125; Simpson and Lazenby 1970, 168–169; Kirk 1985, 178–179, 190–195. On the odd geographic order followed in the Catalog, see West 2011a, 113.

220. In his edition of the D scholia (van Thiel 2014b, 121), van Thiel considers these words a verbatim quotation from Aristarchus. See also Eust. 262.37–41 (ad *Il.* 2.494): Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ φησιν ἀπὸ Βοιωτῶν ἄρξασθαι τὸν ποιητὴν οὐκ ἔκ τινος παρατηρήσεως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἐπιφορὰν, ἥτοι κατὰ τινα φορὰν καὶ τύχην καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἐπιτυχόν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἄλλου ἔθνους ἤρξατο, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν, φησί, τὴν αἰτίαν [Aristarchus says that the poet starts from the Boeotians not because of any observation, but in accordance with a [poetic] impulse, or according to some urge, or by chance, or simply because [the Boeotians were those] who came first to his mind. And, furthermore, if he had started from another people, he says, we would investigate the reason [for it]]. Cf. Goedhart 1879, 54–55; Lehrs 1882, 206; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 33; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 229–230; Meijering 1987, 66; van Thiel 2014a, I 230; Bouchard 2016, 200–201. On 'poetic impulse' and poetic license, see also Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.3.

221. Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 258.

gested in order to explain why Homer starts his Catalog with the Boeotians. For him, there is no reason except poetic convenience. This attitude recalls Aristarchus' reproach against those, such as Crates, who interpreted the voyages of Odysseus as a true geographic description of the *oikoumene*.²²² This was a meaningless intellectual enterprise for him, since Homer should not be expected to provide correct geographic data, but rather sublime poetry.²²³ Aristarchus' lack of genuine geographic or antiquarian interests also emerges when he considers why Homer mentions a place or people that he has omitted in the Catalog: the Leleges and the Caucones are omitted from the Trojan Catalog 'because they arrived late'—a reason which is surmised from what Dolon tells about Rhesus' contingent a few lines below, at *Il.* 10.434–435 (*Sch. Il.* 10.429a);²²⁴ the Dolopes are omitted from the Greek Catalog 'because they are part of Phthiotis' (*Sch. Il.* 9.484, ex. [Ariston. ?]).²²⁵ These omissions might well have sparked geographic or antiquarian discussions, but he dismisses them quickly and has only one goal: to save Homer from the accusation of being inconsistent or careless in his narrative.²²⁶ Aristarchus was not an antiquarian and was not interested in the historical or geographic evidence for the Trojan War. He did not question the story as told by the poet; the reality outside the poem—whatever it may have been—was simply not his concern.

4. Homeric Cosmology

While he avoided a 'comparative approach' between Homeric and 'modern' geography, Aristarchus addressed Homeric cosmology with a different attitude. Since Homeric cosmology had given rise to some famous *zetemata*, when discussing these questions, he appears to have been receptive to contemporary philosophical debates, even if his focus was (as always) to 'clarify Homer from Homer'.

222. See Strabo 3.4.4. Cf. Broggiato 2001, 237 (fr. 75).

223. *Sch. Od.* 5.55a ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τὴν νῆσον: πρὸς τὰ περὶ τῆς πλάνης, ὅτι πόρρω που καὶ ἐν ἐκτετοπισμένοις τόποις ἀορίστοις ['but when [he reached] the island': with reference to the question of [Odysseus'] wandering, because [it is] somewhere faraway and in remote regions which are not defined]; see also *Sch. BQT Od.* 10.189. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 241–246; Buonajuto 1996.

224. Cf. *Sch. Il.* 21.86c¹ and 20.329 (ex.). See Kirk 1985, 258–259; Hainsworth 1993, 195–196.

225. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 227; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 21–22. *Sch. Il.* 21.155a, on the other hand, notes the omission of a leader of the Paeonians from the Catalog (*Il.* 2.848–850).

226. In fact, many of Aristarchus' remarks on both catalogs of Book 2 are very generic and show an interest in choice of readings, simple clarification of the text, etymological analysis, or basic 'geographic' exegesis: see, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.571; 2.625a; 2.696a; 2.835a; 2.854.

4.1. Oceanus

The nature of Oceanus in Homeric cosmology was at the center of one of the most famous debates of antiquity concerning Achilles' words in *Il.* 21.194–197: 'with him [i.e., Zeus] not even powerful Achelous competes, / nor the great strength of deep-flowing Oceanus, / from whom all the rivers and the entire sea, / and all the springs and deep wells flow'. These lines raised an intense debate in antiquity; aside from the scholia to the *Iliad*, a discussion of it is preserved in *P.Oxy.* 221, ix, 1–25 (a papyrus commentary written or copied by an Ammonius) as well as in *P.Derveni*, xxiii, 11–12.²²⁷

Aristarchus accuses Zenodotus of omitting line 195 (*Sch. Il.* 21.195a¹),²²⁸ where Oceanus is mentioned, so that Achelous becomes the river from which all the waters spring. Since Megacledes, a fourth-century Peripatetic scholar, already read the passage in *Iliad* 21 without line 195,²²⁹ there is the legitimate suspicion that Zenodotus simply did not have the line in his copies and that his might be the original text.²³⁰ No matter what the origin of Zenodotus' text was, for Aristarchus keeping line 195 is a question of internal consistency: it is Oceanus, and not Achelous, who gives water to the sea and the rest of the rivers (*Sch. Il.* 21.195a¹). Even if the note does not say it, Aristarchus probably deduced this from *Il.* 14.246, where Oceanus is said to be the father of all gods. Since rivers and waters are divine entities, Oceanus (and not Achelous) is the origin of all waters, as line 195 states.²³¹ Aristarchus also notes that at *Il.* 20.7 Homer says that all rivers except Oceanus went to an assembly summoned by Zeus—and this proves that Oceanus has a special status (*Sch. Il.* 21.195a¹: ἔστι δὲ καθ' Ὅμηρον ὁ Ὠκεανὸς ὁ ἐπιδιδούς πασι τὰ ρεύματα· διὸ καὶ κατὰ τιμὴν φησιν· οὔτε τις οὐν ποταμῶν ἀπὲν νόσφ' Ὠκεανοῖο' (*Il.* 20.7)).

Crates, too, preserved line 195, but his agenda was profoundly different from Aristarchus'. In his view, Oceanus must be mentioned as the origin of

227. Cf. Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou 2006, 258–259. For a thorough analysis of this question at in *Il.* 21.195, see Schmidt 1976, 111–122, and D'Alessio 2004.

228. *Sch. Il.* 21.195a² says that Zenodotus 'athetized' the line but this is probably not correct; cf. Nickau 1977, 56; West 2001, 41 n. 36; D'Alessio 2004, 17.

229. See *P.Oxy.* 221, ix, 3–5, and *Sch. Il.* 21.195b (ex.). Cf. Janko 2000a, 141 (fr. 4), and Janko 1994, 23, 28. Seleucus, a grammarian of the first century CE, on the other hand, quoted Pindar and Panyassis to show that Achelous was identical with Oceanus; see *P.Oxy.* 221, ix, 8–20, and also *Sch. Il.* 21.195c (ex. [Did.]); this probably suggests that Seleucus, too, was in favor of omitting line 195 as unnecessary. Cf. Schmidt 1976, 113–114; D'Alessio 2004, 30–33.

230. As D'Alessio 2004 convincingly shows. Cf. also Bolling 1925, 188–189; Pasquali 1962, 225–227; Nickau 1977, 55–56. On Aristarchus' misrepresentations about Zenodotus' text, see Chapter 4 § 1.6 and § 1.7.

231. There are no scholia derived from Aristarchus at *Il.* 14.246.

all waters because Oceanus is the ‘Great Sea’, i.e., the Atlantic Ocean, which surrounds the entire world (*Sch. Il.* 21.195b [ex.]). The Great Sea or Oceanus covering a spherical earth was a common idea among Hellenistic geographers²³² and was very important for the Stoics.²³³ For Crates, *Il.* 21.195 is thus proof for his theory of the *sphairopoia*, according to which Homer knew that the earth was spherical and depicted it as such in his poems.²³⁴ To support his view and explain the Homeric passage, Crates even quotes Hippon (38 B 1 D-K), a natural philosopher of the fifth century BCE.²³⁵

In fact, Aristarchus does point out that Oceanus is a river, and not a sea, as is clear from *Il.* 20.7, the line already singled out against Zenodotus, where Homer states that no river missed Zeus’ assembly except Oceanus (*Sch. Il.* 20.7a: ὅτι ποταμόν, οὐ θάλασσαν τὸν Ὠκεανὸν παραδίδωσι).²³⁶ It is impossible to ascertain whether Aristarchus was expressly criticizing Crates’ *sphairopoia* here, as the Aristonicus scholium does not quote Crates. Without a doubt, however, Aristarchus is distinguishing the Homeric view of Oceanus as a river from the later view of Oceanus as a sea, which was embraced by Crates and contemporary scientific analysis.

4.2. The Stars, the Sun, East, and West

Aristarchus needed to discuss astronomical details in the Homeric poems, and not only because stars were paramount in ancient poetry. More crucially, the astronomical knowledge of Homer was very different from the scientific results developed by the Hellenistic astronomers. It was important to recognize this difference in order to defend Homer from possible detractors who accused him

232. For example, Aristotle (*Mete.* 354a2–3) speaks of ἡ ἔξω στηλῶν θάλαττα, ‘the sea beyond [Heracles’] Pillars’, and Eratosthenes calls it ἡ ἐκτὸς θάλαττα (Strabo 1.3.13 = Eratosth., fr. II A 8 Berger); cf. Mette 1936, xix; Geus 2002, 123, 269, 282. It is uncertain whether Eratosthenes also called it Oceanus (but see Roller 2010, 156–157, on Strabo 1.1.8).

233. See, e.g., Cleanth. *SVF* 1, frs. 501 and 505; Chrysipp. *SVF* 2, fr. 527. Cf. Mette 1936, xviii, 60, 236; Schmidt 1976, 115; Broggiato 2001, lii.

234. On Crates’ *sphairopoia*, see Mette 1936; Porter 1992 (esp. 85–111); Broggiato 2001, li–lv; and also Chapter 6 § 6. On allegorical readings (especially by Crates and Heraclitus) connected with the idea of a spherical earth (and cosmos), see Buffière 1956, 212–221.

235. Perhaps Crates also quoted Xenophanes (21 B 30 D-K) mentioned in *Sch. Il.* 21.196–7 (ex.). Cf. Wachsmuth 1891, 552–554; Schrader 1908; Mette 1936, 61–65 and 226–228 (fr. 32a); Buffière 1956, 215–216; Broggiato 2001, 192–193 (fr. 29). Another fragment of Crates deals with Oceanus as the Great Sea; cf. Broggiato 2001, 178–180 (fr. 20). Crates’ pupil Artemon seems to have held the same view, applying it to the interpretation of Pindar; cf. Broggiato 2011, 548–549. A survey of ancient views on the Homeric Oceanus is offered by Romm 1992, 176–183.

236. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 173. This view is criticized by the author of *P.Derveni* (xxiii, 5–7), who deems those who believed that Oceanus is a river ‘ignorant’. In his view, Oceanus is the air, and the air is Zeus (xxiii, 3); cf. Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou 2006, 256–257.

of ignorance or tried to change his text to bring it in line with contemporary astronomical views. For example, Homer mentions two different stars: Hesperus, which brings evening and is called κάλλιστος, 'most beautiful', in *Il.* 22.318, and Heosphorus, which brings dawn in *Il.* 23.226 and is called φαάντατος, 'brightest', in *Od.* 13.93–94.²³⁷ Ibycus,²³⁸ Pythagoras,²³⁹ or Parmenides²⁴⁰ had discovered that the planet Venus, the morning star (Heosphorus or Phosphorus), was identical with the evening star (Hesperus). Aristarchus therefore explains that the use of different epithets for Hesperus and Heosphorus is due to the fact that Homer, who was 'ancient', thought that the morning star (Heosphorus) and the evening star (Hesperus) were indeed two different stars (*Sch. Il.* 22.318a: καὶ οὐδεῖς ὡς μαχόμενον λαμβάνειν. ἕτερον δὲ τὸν ἑσπερον ὡς ἂν παλαιὸς οἶδε τοῦ ἑωσφόρου). In this case, Aristarchus is probably arguing against the objections of the Chozizontes, who claimed that the two different epithets for the same star (in the *Iliad* called 'the most beautiful' and in the *Odyssey* called 'the brightest') proved that the poems were by different authors.²⁴¹ This fragment also illustrates Aristarchus' approach to Homeric poetry: in opposition to Crates, he did not seek 'scientific' truth in Homer. Here Homer makes a bona fide mistake because it was not known at his time that the two stars were actually the same; thus, he should not be censured for this error, as in a poem one should look for poetry, which gives pleasure, and not for a lecture in astronomy.²⁴²

Aristarchus observes (*Sch. Il.* 21.111a) that Homer divides the day into three parts, dawn (ἠώς) in the early morning, midday (μεσημβρία) in the middle of the day, and afternoon (δείλη) when the sun has set; the night, too, is divided into three parts: the evening (ἑσπέρα), the darkness (ἄμολγός), and the last part before the dawn (ἑώα).²⁴³ More interestingly, Homer knows that the sun rises from and sets into Oceanus (*Il.* 7.421–423 and 8.485–486), but his characters instead speak of the sun as rising from and setting into the earth, as Nestor does at *Il.* 11.735 (*Sch. Il.* 7.422; 8.485a; 11.735b^{1,2}).²⁴⁴ These two directions are also called 'right' (the one toward the rising) and 'left' (the one toward the setting),

237. See also *Su.* ε 3188.

238. Fr. 331 *PMG*.

239. Diog. Laert. 9.23 (14 A 20 D-K); *Su.* ε 3187; Plin. *NH* 2.36–37.

240. Diog. Laert. 9.23 (28 A 1 D-K); *Su.* ε 3187. Hesiod also refers to this star, when in *Th.* 378–381 he mentions Heosphorus, offspring of Eos and Astreus. On the question of the evening and of the morning star, see Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1883, 417–420; West 1966, 81–82 and 272; Dicks 1970, 32.

241. As rightly suggested by Schmidt 1976, 145–147. Kohl 1917 does not have the fragment in his collection of the Chozizontes.

242. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 35. Aristarchus' attitude toward Homer is very close to that of Eratosthenes, as reported by Strabo 1.1.10 and 1.2.3; see below, § 7, and Chapter 6 § 6.

243. Cf. Roemer 1924, 204–205; Schmidt 1976, 198–202.

244. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 173–174; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 19; Schmidt 1976, 111–112; Dicks 1970, 31–32. See also Chapter 3.6.C § 2.1.

as shown by *Il.* 12.239–240: Hector replies to Polydamas, who has advised him to stop the attack because the birds are not favorable, that he does not care about birds ‘whether they go to the right toward the dawn and the sun or to the left toward the obscure zone of darkness’. Aristarchus thus concludes that ‘left’ in Homer is west, and ‘right’ is east (*Sch. Il.* 12.239).²⁴⁵

4.3. North, South, and the *Oikoumene*

What about the other two directions, north and south?²⁴⁶ Aristarchus certainly knew that the earth was spherical, since Aristotle, Eratosthenes, and others had already established that fact.²⁴⁷ Yet, unlike Crates with his doctrine of *sphairopoiia* (see above, § 4.1), he did not apply his own beliefs to Homer’s poetry, as Homer’s earth was clearly flat. With a flat earth, it can sound odd that Aristarchus explains that the region of Troy is north of Greece, and therefore that the right verb to indicate the sailing from Greece to Troy is ἀνάγειν, ‘to lead up’, because the northern regions are higher (*Sch. Il.* 3.48; 9.338: ὅτι οὕτως εἶωθε λέγειν ἀναγωγὴν καὶ ἀνάπλουν τὸν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν πλοῦν, διὰ τὸ τὰ πρὸς ἄρκτους ὑψηλότερα εἶναι).²⁴⁸ Even though this explanation seems to suggest a spherical earth,²⁴⁹ it could also work with a flat earth, as envisaged by Homer and the Presocratics. In fact, the Presocratics (in particular, Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles) thought that the earth was inclined toward the south, so that even on a flat earth there could be ‘lower’

245. See also *Sch. Od.* 2.154a¹; cf. Lehrs 1882, 173. This orientation is generally explained by the fact that Greek augurs would face north; see Hainsworth 1993, 343. A different explanation is offered by Cuillandre 1944, 215–219, who suggests that ‘toward the dawn and the sun’ means ‘toward the south’ and ‘toward darkness’ means ‘toward the north’, so augurs faced east. This system of reference (whichever solution we prefer) is different from Homer, who speaks of ‘left’ and ‘right’ in the Achaean camp from the point of view of the Greeks, who face south: hence, ‘left’ is east and ‘right’ is west (see footnote 190 above).

246. Cf. Schmidt 1976, 143–145.

247. The idea that the cosmos was spherical and that a spherical earth was located in its center is attested for the first time in Plato (*Phd.* 108e4–109a7) and was then adopted by Aristotle, the Stoics (e.g., Chrysipp. *SVF* 2, fr. 555), and the scientists of the Hellenistic period, such as Eratosthenes. Cf. Mette 1936, viii–xx; Dicks 1970, 72, 97–98, 197–198.

248. See also *Sch. Il.* 6.292a; 11.22; cf. Lehrs 1882, 111; Schmidt 1976, 143–145.

249. This view is maintained by Heraclitus (*QH* 47): without discussing the question of the sailing from Greece to Troy, he uses an analysis of winds’ direction, north and south, to ‘prove’ that the earth for Homer is spherical. It is more difficult to judge whether an *Odyssey* scholium derived from Porphyry, *Sch. Od.* 3.295a (= *QH Od.* 36.14–37.9), which discusses both the winds’ direction and the names of the sailing to Troy (ἀνάπλους and ἀναγωγή), presupposes a spherical earth or not; cf. Buffière 1956, 219–221; Schmidt 1976, 143; Hillgruber 1994–1999, II 245; Pontani 2005b, 215–216 (n. 146).

and ‘higher’ places.²⁵⁰ This would appear to be the idea behind Aristarchus’ claim that Troy is located ‘higher’ than Greece because it is to its north. Hence Zenodotus was wrong in reading ἄγοντες instead of ἀνάγοντες, which would refer to the Trojans ‘bringing’ Helen from Sparta to Troy, as if on a horizontal, but not titled, surface (*Sch. Il.* 13.627a: καὶ ἠγνόηκεν ὅτι ἀναγωγὴν καλεῖ τὸν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου εἰς Τροίαν πλοῦν). It must be noted that in this case Aristarchus is not imposing a modern view of the cosmos (i.e., the pre-Socratic one) onto Homer, as Crates did with Stoic cosmology. In fact, here Aristarchus is simply ‘explaining the text’, which, oddly, has the verb ἀνάγειν describing the same trip from Greece to Troy (*Il.* 3.48, 9.338, 13.627). This choice sounded odd to a Hellenistic speaker for whom ἀνάγειν meant ‘to lead up’ or ‘to lift up’ from a lower to higher place (e.g., a mountain). So he had to make clear that the Homeric use was correct, even on the Homeric flat earth, once the world was imagined according to certain ideas—ideas that were not so odd, as he also found them attested in archaic thinkers.²⁵¹

4.4. Air, Aether, Heaven, and Olympus

For Aristarchus, the Homeric cosmos is structured in different layers from the earth up to heaven.²⁵² There are several references to such a structure in the *Iliad*: from the earth, gleaming light and sounds reach ‘heaven’ (οὐρανός) through the ‘aether’ (αἰθήρ) (*Il.* 2.457–458, 17.424–425); a very tall fir on Ida passes through the ‘air’ (ἀήρ) before reaching the ‘aether’ (αἰθήρ) (*Il.* 14.287–288); Athena passes through the ‘aether’ (αἰθήρ) when going down from ‘heav-

250. See Aëtius 337.26–338.10: Διογένης καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας (59 A 67 D-K) ἔφησαν μετὰ τὸ συστήναι τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐγκλιθῆναι πῶς τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου εἰς τὸ μεσημβρινὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος, ἴσως ὑπὸ προνοίας, ἵν’ ἃ μὲν ἀοίκητα γένηται ἃ δὲ οἰκητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ ψῦξιν καὶ ἐκπύρῳσιν καὶ εὐκρασίαν. <Εμπεδοκλῆς> (31 A 58 D-K) τοῦ [δὲ] ἀέρος εἷξαντος τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου ὀρμῇ ἐπικλιθῆναι τὰς ἄρκτους, καὶ τὰ μὲν βόρεια ὑψωθῆναι τὰ δὲ νότια ταπεινωθῆναι, καθ’ ὃ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον [Diogenes and Anaxagoras (59 A 67 D-K) said that after the cosmos was formed and living beings came out from the earth, the cosmos somehow on its own inclined toward its own southern part, perhaps by some divine providence, so that some parts of the cosmos became uninhabited and others inhabited because of the excessive cold or heat or because of a temperate climate. Empedocles (31 A 58 D-K) [says] that because the air yielded to the strong impulse of the sun, the north tilted and the northern regions were lifted up and the southern ones were lowered and accordingly the entire cosmos [was tilted]]. Leucippus (67 A 27 D-K) and Democritus (68 A 96 D-K) also maintained this theory but explained it in a different way; cf. Buffière 1956, 220; Dicks 1970, 59, 78, 80, 83.

251. Perhaps the same ‘geographic’ reason is at the basis of the variants readings discussed in *Sch. Il.* 13.367a^{1,2} (Did.), the correct interpretation of which, however, is debated; cf. Duentzer 1848, 38; Lehrs 1882, 111 n. 60; Ludwich 1884–1885, I 357.16–358.6; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 120 n. 164; Schmidt 1976, 143–144.

252. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 163–164, 168–170; Schmidt 1976, 75–81, 87–101.

en' (οὐρανός) (*Il.* 19.350–351). All these references show that beyond the earth (γῆ), there is first the 'air' (ἀήρ),²⁵³ then the 'aether' (αἰθήρ), which can also be called 'heaven' (οὐρανός), using the same name used for the layer above, the 'heaven with fixed stars' (στερέμνιος οὐρανός) (*Sch. Il.* 2.458; 14.288: ὅτι καθ' Ὅμηρον ἀήρ ὁ ἀπὸ γῆς μέχρι νεφῶν τόπος. ὁ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὰ νέφη τόπος αἰθήρ, καὶ ὁμωνύμως τῷ στερεμνίῳ οὐρανός). Because 'aether' (αἰθήρ) can also be called 'heaven' (οὐρανός), the clouds, which are in the 'air' (ἀήρ), are called 'gates of heaven' (πύλαι οὐρανοῦ) as they lead into the 'aether' (*Sch. Il.* 5.749a.b; 8.393a; 14.288), and the space below them is called '[the place] before heaven' (οὐρανόθι πρό) (*Sch. Il.* 3.3b).²⁵⁴

As Martin Schmidt has explained,²⁵⁵ even if Aristarchus availed himself of some Hellenistic ideas about the layers of the universe (especially Peripatetic and Stoic ones),²⁵⁶ his goal was by no means to read Homer's cosmos as reflecting a Stoic or even an Aristotelian view of the cosmos. His agenda was completely different and had to do with one of the most famous *zetemata* of antiquity: what Olympus, the dwelling of the gods, really was—a mountain or a place in heaven. The question arose because in classical poets Olympus is heaven (οὐρανός), while in Homer the situation seems more complex. To judge from the high number of scholia dealing with the question, Aristarchus took a deep interest in this *zetema*.²⁵⁷

For him, things are clear: in Homer Olympus is a mountain, and not heaven. Some Homeric passages, however, are problematic for his view: at *Il.* 1.497, for example, Thetis is said to have gone up *to Olympus* and *heaven* (μέγαν οὐρανὸν Οὐλύμπόν τε) to meet Zeus; similarly, in Book 24 Thetis rushes *to heaven* (l. 97: ἐς οὐρανόν) to meet Zeus, who greets her commenting that she has come *to Olympus* (l. 104: Οὐλύμπον); when she leaves she darts from the peaks of *Olympus* (l. 121: κατ' Οὐλύμποιο καρῆνων). The solution is clear for Aristarchus: Olympus, where the gods live, is not in heaven but, being a very tall mountain, reaches above the clouds; this region is the 'aether' (αἰθήρ), which is also called 'heaven' (οὐρανός); hence Olympus' peaks are 'heavenly' (ἐπουράνιοι) and one goes through 'heaven' to reach them (*Sch. Il.* 1.497b^{1,2}; 24.97c; 24.104; 24.121).²⁵⁸ As is clear, here (just like in *Sch. Il.* 2.458; 14.288 mentioned above) Aristarchus is obliged to say that in Homer the aether (αἰθήρ) is also called 'heaven' (οὐρανός)

253. In Homer, however, ἀήρ can also mean 'mist', as Aristarchus notes in *Sch. Il.* 5.776a; 17.644a; 17.649; cf. Lehrs 1882, 102; Schmidt 1976, 78–80.

254. On this scholium, which is corrupted, see Schmidt 1976, 76.

255. Schmidt 1976, 77–81.

256. Cf. Dicks 1970, 30, 199.

257. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 164–168; Schmidt 1976, 81–87, 101–105.

258. See also *Sch. Il.* 3.3b.

in order to ‘save’ Homer and ‘prove’ that Olympus is always a mountain and never heaven—a ‘fact’ which actually is far from clear in Homer.²⁵⁹

To conclude, figure 3 shows how Aristarchus envisages the Homeric cosmos and Mt. Olympus’ position in it.




Fig. 3. The Homeric cosmos and Mt. Olympus according to Aristarchus

For Aristarchus, other passages, too, prove that Olympus is a very high mountain, reaching above the clouds. For example, the scent of Hera, who is on Olympus, reaches both earth and heaven, because Olympus stretches between these two regions (*Sch. Il.* 14.174a^{1,2}). In fact, Olympus is very high, but not higher than Mt. Ida, since Iris’ flight from Ida to Olympus in *Il.* 8.410 seems to follow a horizontal trajectory (*Sch. Il.* 11.196). The identification of Olympus with the mountain in Macedonia²⁶⁰ also agrees with other geographic details in the poem. For example, when in Book 1 Hephaestus tells the sad story of Zeus throwing him off Olympus (*Il.* 1.591), he says that he landed on Lemnos (l. 593), which is reasonable, as Aristarchus explains, since Lemnos is close to

259. On the question of the Homeric Olympus and whether it is to be identified with the οὐρανός, see Cook 1914–1940, I 113–117; Luch 1925; Nilsson 1932, 228–238; Schmidt 1939, 277–279; Merritt Sale 1984.

260. For Aristarchus Olympus was in Macedonia (just as in Strabo 10.3.17), not in Thessaly (as in Hdt. 7.128); see also *Sch. Il.* 8.19 (below).

Thrace and hence to Olympus (*Sch. Il.* 1.593a¹). Similar is the path followed by Hera when in Book 14 she leaves Olympus to find Sleep (*Il.* 14.225–230): Olympus, Pieria (which is a mountain ridge belonging to the same region), Emathia (the ancient name for Macedonia), Thrace, Mt. Athos, and, finally, Lemnos (*Sch. Il.* 14.226a).

In addition, Aristarchus observes that Homer describes Olympus as a mountain, with peaks (κάρηνα)²⁶¹ and crests (ρία).²⁶² He also applies to Olympus epithets that are proper for a mountain, but not for heaven: ‘with many ridges’ (πολυδειράς),²⁶³ ‘with many valleys’ (πολύπτυχος),²⁶⁴ ‘snowcapped’ (ἀγάννιφος),²⁶⁵ and ‘snowy’ (νιφόεις).²⁶⁶ Most importantly, Olympus is called μακρός, ‘high’, a most natural epithet for a mountain.²⁶⁷ This epithet is never used for heaven, which on the contrary Homer calls ‘vast’ (εὐρύς)²⁶⁸ and ‘brazen’ (χάλκεος),²⁶⁹ indicating that the two entities are different because they have different epithets. The use of two different epithets to characterize Olympus and heaven is also a point of contrast with Zenodotus, who in *Il.* 3.364 and 15.192 read οὐρανὸν αἰπὺν instead of οὐρανὸν εὐρύν. Aristarchus argues against this reading (*Sch. Il.* 3.364; 15.192), because αἰπύς means ‘high’, ‘steep’, and thus it is an epithet suitable for a mountain (like Olympus), but not for heaven, which instead is ‘vast’, since it stretches over earth (*Sch. Il.* 3.364: αἰπὺ δὲ ὄρος ἄν λέγοιτο· ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς εὐρύς· παρήκει γὰρ τῇ γῇ).²⁷⁰

Furthermore, Aristarchus states that while Homer uses phrases like ‘between earth and starry heaven’, he never says ‘between earth and snowy Olympus’, nor does he call Olympus ‘starry’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.46a). He also observes that the sun is always placed in heaven and never in Olympus (*Sch. Il.* 8.68a).²⁷¹

261. *Sch. Il.* 1.44a (τὰ γὰρ κάρηνα ἐπὶ ὄρους); 2.167a; 4.74.

262. *Sch. Il.* 14.154a (ὅτι ὄρος ὁ Ὀλυμπος, καὶ ρία ἔχει); 14.225a (τὸ γὰρ ρίον ἰδίως ἐπ’ ὄρους τάσσεται).

263. *Sch. Il.* 5.754; 8.3 (ὅτι τὰ ἐπίθετα ὡς ἐπὶ ὄρους).

264. *Sch. Il.* 20.5a (ἡ διπλή δέ, ὅτι Ὀλυμπος ὄρος· διὸ πολύπτυχος).

265. *Sch. Il.* 1.420b; 18.186 (ὅτι ὡς ὄρος τὸν Ὀλυμπον ‘ἀγάννιφον’ λέγει).

266. *Sch. Il.* 13.754a (ὅτι νιφόεντα τὰ ὄρη, καὶ Ὀλυμπος τοιγαροῦν ὄρος· νιφόεις γὰρ λέγεται).

267. *Sch. Il.* 2.48a (καὶ ὅτι ὄρος ὁ Ὀλυμπος· διὸ καὶ μακρός); 8.199c (ὅτι μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον ὡς ὄρος); 15.21c.

268. *Sch. Il.* 1.402 (ὅτι ‘μακρὸν’ τὸν Ὀλυμπον ὡς ὄρος· τὸν δὲ οὐρανὸν εὐρύν); 15.21d (ex. [Ariston.]).

269. *Sch. Il.* 17.425a (ὅτι πρὸς τὸν Ὀλυμπον ἀντιδιέστανται).

270. Of course, Zenodotus’ reading is not wrong, since heaven can also be defined as ‘high’. In fact, the epithet αἰπύς is used for οὐρανός in classical authors (e.g., *Soph. Aj.* 845). Aristarchus, however, needs to enforce the distinction between the cosmology of Homer (for whom Olympus is a mountain on earth) and the one of classical poets (for whom Olympus is in heaven), so that the epithets used for Olympus cannot be used for οὐρανός, and vice versa. On this point and Aristotle’s doctrine, see below, § 7 with footnote 307.

271. See also *Sch. Il.* 8.555a (Ariston.): αἰεὶ δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα ‘ἐν οὐρανῷ’ φησι καὶ οὐκ Ὀλύμπῳ [[Homer] always says the [celestial] phenomena to be ‘in heaven’, not on Olympus].

In addition, in *Il.* 16.364–366, which compares the shout of the soldiers rising from the ships to a cloud that rises from Olympus to heaven, clearly (σαφῶς) shows that Olympus is not heaven, as the cloud travels from the one place to the other. Aristarchus also notes that, since Homer always makes comparisons with something which is known, he could not use Olympus in this simile, were Olympus a distant heavenly place (*Sch. Il.* 16.364a: οὐδὲ μὴν τόπος ἐπουράνιος· ὁ γὰρ Ὅμηρος ἀπὸ τῶν γινωσκομένων πᾶσι ποιεῖται τὰς ὁμοιώσεις).²⁷² Further evidence that Olympus is a mountain and is attached to the earth can be found in *Il.* 15.187–193, when Poseidon explains that when they had to share the cosmos, he got the sea, Hades got the underworld, and Zeus won heaven, while the earth and Olympus remained common property. As Aristarchus remarks, if Olympus were part of heaven, it would be in Zeus' kingdom and would not be shared by all the gods (*Sch. Il.* 15.193a: εἰ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ οὐρανῷ ἢ μέρος ἐπουράνιον, οὐκ ἦν κοινός, ἀλλ' ἴδιος τοῦ Διός).²⁷³

Another interesting passage is *Il.* 8.13–26. Zeus forbids the gods to take part in the battle either on behalf of the Greeks or on behalf of the Trojans and threatens that he will hurl the one who disobeys into the Tartarus, 'as far below Hades as heaven (οὐρανός) is above earth' (l. 16). Aristarchus singles out this 'cosmic measurement' (with Tartarus and Hades below, and earth and heaven above),²⁷⁴ noting that Homer never mentions Olympus in these terms (*Sch. Il.* 8.16a: πρὸς τὴν καθ' Ὅμηρον τοῦ κόσμου τάξιν· καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὀλύμπου λέγει). Zeus then threatens the gods further: if he wanted, with a rope attached from heaven (l. 19) he could draw up the earth and the sea (ll. 23–24), bind the rope around a crest of Olympus and all those things would be in the air (ll. 25–26). Zeus' threat, however, makes sense only if Olympus is the mountain in Macedonia:

Sch. Il. 8.19 σειρὴν χρυσεῖην <ἐξ οὐρανόθεν κρεμάσαντες>: ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐκδεξόμεθα Ὀλυμπον (cf. *Il.* 8.25) τὸ ἐπὶ Μακεδονίας ὄρος, οὐ συμφωνήσει τῇ διαθέσει ταύτῃ· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ στάς φησιν τὸν Ὀλυμπον ἀνέλκειν τῆς σειρᾶς ἐκ τοῦ ῥίου (cf. *Il.* 8.25) ἐκδεθείσης.

'Hanging a golden rope from heaven': because if we do not take Olympus as the mountain in Macedonia, [this line] will not agree with this description. For

272. So the peaks of Olympus can be ἐπουράνιοι, 'heavenly' (as discussed above) because they reach into 'aether', which is also called 'heaven'; the mountain itself, as a place (τόπος), however, is not 'heavenly', because it is firmly placed on earth. On this scholium, see also Chapter 3.2.A § 4.

273. In this line (γαῖα δ' ἔτι ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ μακρὸς Ὀλυμπος) Aristarchus also notes that Homer has distinguished Olympus from the earth, even if the former is on earth (*Sch. Il.* 15.193b^{1,2} and 20.58); this is preeminence (ἐξοχή), which is a trope; see Chapter 3.2.A § 11.

274. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 173; Schmidt 1976, 105–111.

standing in heaven, he says that he draws up Olympus with a rope fastened on its crest.

According to Aristarchus, Zeus' words imply that, standing in heaven, he will attach the other hand of the rope to Olympus, and then pull up everything attached to it, earth and sea. This is possible because Olympus is a mountain, and it is thus attached to the earth and consequently to the sea (*Sch. Il.* 8.25b: συνερριζωμένης αὐτῷ μὲν τῆς γῆς, τῇ δὲ γῇ τῆς θαλάττης). Hence, by pulling up Olympus, Zeus can draw everything else up into heaven (*Sch. Il.* 8.26: δεικνυσιν ὅτι βέβηκεν ὁ Ὀλυμπος καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μετέωρος).²⁷⁵

All these elements serve as irrefutable proof for Aristarchus that Olympus, the abode of the gods, is a mountain, and not heaven. The perspective of the characters, however, is different from that of the poet. Therefore, when it is a character speaking, a god always comes down 'from heaven', and not 'from Olympus', because—from a human point of view—the gods come down from heaven to the earth. This seems to be the point when Aristarchus notes that the palace of Poseidon in the depths of the sea at Aege is invisible to mortals, just like the abode of the other gods on Olympus (*Sch. Il.* 13.21a).²⁷⁶ Thus, when in Book 19 Agamemnon speaks of Hera leaving the 'peaks of Olympus' (l. 114), he should have said 'starry heaven', as he does later (l. 130) in the same speech (*Sch. Il.* 19.114).²⁷⁷

Aristarchus' in-depth (sometimes even pedantic) discussion of this famous *zetema* can be explained by the fact that he had a polemical agenda. On the one hand, he was objecting against the neoteric (mis)interpretation of Homer's cosmos, as later poets turned Olympus into heaven.²⁷⁸ On the other, he was targeting some readings by Zenodotus. Finally, he was perhaps also objecting against Crates, who might have thought that the 'the divine threshold' of Zeus' palace, mentioned in *Il.* 1.591, was placed in the highest point of the cosmos, and thus Olympus was heaven. Whether or not Crates was among Aristarchus' targets (the evidence is debated),²⁷⁹ the *zetema* concerning the Homeric Olympus was a much-disputed problem, and was already discussed in the fourth century, since it is also attested in the Derveni papyrus.²⁸⁰ This

275. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 167. The passage is in fact difficult to interpret because it seems to conflate the two views of Olympus, on earth and in heaven (see Kirk 1990, 297–299). Zenodotus, for example, athetized lines 25–26 (*Sch. Il.* 8.25–6).

276. Cf. Meijering 1987, 122–123.

277. Cf. Schmidt 1976, 82 n. 36.

278. E.g., Soph. *OC* 1655; Eur. *Hipp.* 67–71.

279. Cf. Helck 1905, 7–15 (fr. I); Mette 1936, 12–14; Schmidt 1976, 86–87 and 93–94; Broggiato 2001, 180–182 (fr. 21); Schironi 2004, 124–130 (fr. 12); Nünlist 2011, 111–113; Bouchard 2016, 99–101.

280. *P.Derveni*, xii, 1–12. Cf. Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou 2006, 189–193. On this *zetema*, Aristarchus, and the Derveni papyrus, see Schironi 2001.

can explain Aristarchus' insistence on 'solving' it. Yet his tight argumentation can also be seen in a more positive light, as proof of his own consistency as an exegete and his extreme attention to minimal details in order to prove a specific idea—even when he sometimes had to 'stretch' his interpretation of the available data (e.g., when he must conclude that the aether, where Olympus' peak should reach, is also called 'heaven' in Homer).

5. Homeric Gods

In the Iliadic scholia, most of Aristarchus' fragments about gods concern the difference between Homer and the Neoterioi, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.3 § 4. What follows is limited to some general points about Homeric gods as noted by Aristarchus and mostly due to the need to explain the text, not Homeric religion.

5.1. The Gods' Nature, Dwellings, and Powers

As we have just seen, Aristarchus took an interest in where Olympus was located. He also delved into more specific details about the gods' place of residence. For example, he notes that Athena and Hera sit on either side of Zeus on Olympus, as is clear from *Il.* 24.100 (*Sch. Il.* 8.444a; 24.100a),²⁸¹ and Hephaestus has his forge there, as is clear from *Il.* 18.142–148 (*Sch. Il.* 18.369).²⁸² While Poseidon lives under the sea (*Sch. Il.* 13.21a),²⁸³ Hades' kingdom is in the underworld, and Homer calls him Ζεὺς καταχθόνιος 'Zeus of the nether world' (*Sch. Il.* 9.457a). Hades and his wife Persephone have their own attendants, the Erinyes, who come when Althea invokes Hades and Persephone to bring death on Meleager;²⁸⁴ Aristarchus explains that this is not a contradiction, because the Erinyes are the attendants of the infernal couple and carry out the deeds asked of their masters (*Sch. Il.* 9.569; 9.571a).²⁸⁵ Homer also clearly distinguishes between the Olympian gods and the Titans. The latter dwell in the nether regions, under Tartarus, and so are called ὑποταρτάριοι and ἐνέρτεροι and also Οὐρανίωνες (at *Il.* 5.898), that is, descendants of Ouranos (*Sch. Il.*

281. See also *Sch. Il.* 4.21a (Ariston?). Cf. Meijering 1987, 123.

282. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 183; see also Chapter 5.3 § 4.1.

283. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 185.

284. Commenting on the image of Althea beating the ground with her hands and invoking Hades to take vengeance upon Meleager, Aristarchus also observes that this is how ancient people invoked chthonic gods (*Sch. Il.* 9.568).

285. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 182.

14.279a; 15.225a).²⁸⁶ The Olympians, on the other hand, belong to the next generation, since Hera explicitly says that she and Zeus are born from Cronos (*Sch. Il.* 4.60b). Once again, all these comments on the gods are simply derived from the text itself, and do not come from any outside source or interest in Greek religion per se.

In fact, Aristarchus looks at the gods just like other characters in the poem. So he observes that both men and gods never spend the night outside; rather, they go home, as happens when the gods leave Zeus' palace to go home in Book 1 (*Il.* 1.606), as well as with the Greek kings who, after feasting in the hut of Agamemnon, go back to their own huts (*Il.* 23.58); similarly, the Suitors in the *Odyssey* feast in the palace of Odysseus but return to their own homes for the night, as in *Od.* 1.424 (*Sch. Il.* 23.58 and 1.606a: ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ἀναλύουσιν οἴκαδε καὶ κοιμῶνται). In these three passages, in fact, the same formulaic line occurs,²⁸⁷ and Aristarchus, who did not know about *formulae* and oral composition,²⁸⁸ interprets it as evidence for similar 'daily habits', of heroes as well as of gods.

Yet gods are stronger and have more dignity than humans. In particular, Aristarchus seems to think that Homer uses verbs in the present tense rather than in the past when describing the gods 'who are forever' (*Sch. Il.* 2.448c [Ariston.?] and 2.485, both against readings with a past tense).²⁸⁹ Because gods are stronger than us, when Apollo, helping the Trojans, destroys the trench in the Greek camp 'easily demolishing [its banks] with his feet (ποσσίν)' (*Il.* 15.356), Aristarchus rejects Zenodotus' reading χερσίν rather than ποσσίν: it is more in line with the divine nature of Apollo to destroy the banks with a kick rather than bending down and using his hands (*Sch. Il.* 15.356b). The enormous gap between divine and human force is also at the basis of *Il.* 12.437–442. During the Trojan assault on the Achaean wall, Hector eventually leaps inside the wall with Zeus' help. Then (l. 439) 'he shouts' to urge the Trojans to follow him; it is not clear whether the shouting refers to Hector or Zeus, but line 442 clarifies the ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία). Here Homer states that all the Trojans

286. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 173 and 189; Roemer 1924, 166. Aristarchus is probably pointing out this exception, as Οὐρανῖωνες normally are the Olympians (i.e., those who dwell in the οὐρανός—which of course for Aristarchus was another name for the 'aether', where Olympus' peaks reached; see above, § 4.4); cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 15.225a. Aristarchus is also arguing against Zenodotus, who read the superlative (ἐ)νέρτατος/οι instead of the comparative (ἐ)νέρτερος/οι in *Il.* 5.898 and 15.225 (*Sch. Il.* 5.898a and 15.225a; cf. also *Sch. Il.* 5.898b [Did.]).

287. *Il.* 1.606 ≡ *Il.* 23.58 ≡ *Od.* 1.424: οἱ μὲν [δὴ τότε in *Od.* 1.424] κακκείοντες ἔβαν οἶκον [κλισίην in *Il.* 23.58] δὲ ἕκαστος [and they went home [/ to their hut], each of them, to lie down].

288. At least in our modern sense. Aristarchus, however, did have sensitivity for repeated lines and formulaic expressions in Homer; see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.

289. In *Il.* 2.448 Zenodotus was the target of Aristarchus' criticisms. Cf. Roemer 1912, 318–319; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 73 and 168; West 2001, 177.

heard the cry; since the human voice is not that strong, Aristarchus concludes that only Zeus could have shouted so loudly (*Sch. Il.* 12.439a^{1,2}; 12.442a).

Homeric gods are powerful, but not almighty; for example, the night-and-day cycle is independent of them. Aristarchus spells this out when objecting to Zenodotus' reading at *Il.* 8.501. In this passage, Hector urges the Trojans to stop fighting and retreat for the night: he wanted to destroy the Greek ships and go back to Ilium, but 'darkness came sooner, which now especially saved / the Argives and their ships on the seashore' (*Il.* 8.500–501). According to Aristarchus, Zenodotus read the second hemistich of line 501 differently, taking it from *Il.* 10.45, so that the sense became that darkness has come 'since the mind of Zeus has changed'—an unfitting (ἀναρμόστως) reading because night does not come at Zeus' will (*Sch. Il.* 8.501).²⁹⁰

Even so, Zeus is the most powerful of the gods. Thus, when in *Il.* 1.526–527 Zeus says that his word is not revocable (παλινάγρετος), nor deceptive (ἀπατηλός), nor without result (ἀτελεύτητος), Aristarchus explains that this means that Homer's Zeus is firm, loves goodness, and is effective (*Sch. Il.* 1.525–7). He also sends signals to humans, not with rain, but with blood drops, as is clear from *Il.* 11.53–55, when Zeus lets drops of blood fall before the battle because he is about to send many heroes to Hades (*Sch. Il.* 11.54b). Despite the preeminence of Zeus, each god has his or her own area of influence, and these skills are fixed in the tradition. Poseidon, not Zeus, is the horseman; thus, in *Il.* 23.306–307 he does not accept Zenodotus' reading (which is also the vulgate), according to which both Zeus and Poseidon loved (φίλησαν) Antilochus and taught (ἐδίδαξαν) him horsemanship. For Aristarchus, both Zeus and Poseidon love Antilochus, but only Poseidon could have taught him horsemanship; hence, he leaves φίλησαν in line 307 but changes the verb ἐδίδαξαν into the singular ἐδίδαξεν (*Sch. Il.* 23.307a: Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ ἐνικῶς 'ἐδίδαξεν', ἐπὶ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἵππειος γάρ).²⁹¹

When praying, humans should address gods in the most suitable way, so that *captatio benevolentiae* can work. Thus, when Agamemnon invokes Zeus to help him to destroy Priam's palace as well as to defeat Hector and the Trojans (*Il.* 2.412–418), the generic invocation 'Zeus, most glorious, most great, shrouded in dark clouds, you who dwell in the sky' is appropriate. However, Aristarchus objects to a variant he found in some editions: 'Father Zeus, you who rule from Ida, most glorious, most great' (= *Il.* 3.276). As he explains, invoking 'Zeus from

290. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.45.

291. See also *Sch. Il.* 23.307b (Did.) and *Sch. Il.* 23.306–7 (ex.): τὸ μὲν φιλεῖν (cf. l. 306) ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων δεκτέον, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἵππικῆς (cf. l. 307) ἐπὶ μόνου Ποσειδῶνος [one must understand the love as referring to both [gods] but the part about horsemanship to Poseidon alone]. Aristarchus' reading, however, is syntactically problematic; cf. Wecklein 1919, 72–73; Roemer 1924, 38–39; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 155; Richardson 1993, 209.

Ida' is not a good incipit for Agamemnon, because 'it is not fitting to invoke the Zeus of the region [to ask him] to destroy it, but it is better to use a more common address' (*Sch. Il.* 2.412a).²⁹²

Once more, these 'theological' remarks are not stirred by an interest in Homeric gods per se, but rather derive from simple deductions based on what Homer himself says in the poem, or from a need to explain the text, or make it consistent with other passages, or, finally, to reject other scholars' readings.

5.2. The Gods' Epithets

One of the most common ways to discuss the gods both in antiquity and now is to analyze their epithets. Aristarchus often treated divine epithets in his Homeric exegesis and transmitted this interest to his most famous pupil, Apollodorus, who wrote an entire monograph on the topic: *Περὶ θεῶν*. Yet, unlike many ancient scholars, Aristarchus was not keen on discovering the inner nature of the gods through the analysis of their epithets; rather, he was mostly focused on the epithets' meaning and their appropriateness in line with his philological attitude to the text. In particular, for him, epithets should express a peculiar characteristic of the gods, unless they are κοινὰ, 'common', as with ἀθάνατος, which is clearly a generic epithet because it applies to every Olympian god.²⁹³ Other divine epithets, however, should be significant and specific to a particular god. For example, an epithet of Apollo is ἀφῆτωρ, usually understood as 'archer': 'nor all which the marble threshold of the archer (ἀφῆτορος) Phoebus Apollo encloses (ἐντὸς ἔργει) in rocky Pytho' (*Il.* 9.404–405). Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 9.404a), however, does not interpret it as meaning 'archer', but 'prophet' (probably from copulative ἀ- and φημί, since the scholium glosses it with the nonexistent ὁμο-φήτωρ).²⁹⁴ His discussion is directed against the Glossographers (fr. 6 Dyck), for whom ἀφῆτωρ was not an epithet of Apollo, but rather meant 'the door's pivot', as they read: 'nor all which the marble threshold of Phoebus Apollo encloses (ἐργει) in rocky Pytho inside the door's pivot (ἀφῆτορος ἐντὸς)'; the same interpretation was followed by Zenodotus, who also read the first part of line 405 differently (*Sch. Il.* 9.405).²⁹⁵ According to Aristarchus, all these readings are wrong because they eliminate a very spe-

292. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 357. On the contrary, the invocation to 'Zeus of Ida' is appropriate at *Il.* 3.276, when Agamemnon is offering sacrifices to Zeus together with the Trojans just before the duel between Paris and Menelaus. On ancient critics and the Homeric gods, see Nünlist 2009, 267–281.

293. On the difference between generic and specific epithets as well as on Zeus' epithet πανομφαῖος, 'prophetic' (*Sch. Il.* 2.41; 8.250a), see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.1.

294. These are the two ancient meanings given to this hapax. 'Archer', however, is probably the correct one, as already suggested by Philoxenus (fr. 388 Theodoridis). Certainly, the word is derived from ἦμι, not from φημί; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v., and *LfgreE*, s.v.

295. Cf. Dyck 1987, 123.

cific (and not generic) epithet to indicate Apollo Pythios: ἀφήτωρ, ‘prophet’, as the god speaks to those who come to consult him (*Sch. Il.* 9.404a: ἀφήτορα δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα ἐπιθετικῶς, οὐ κοινότερον, ἀλλὰ τὸν Πύθιον).

The idea that epithets should be appropriate to the gods to whom they refer is at work in *Il.* 5.31, when Athena addresses Ares as ‘approacher of walls’ (τειχεσιπλῆτα). Instead of τειχεσιπλῆτα, Zenodotus read τειχεσιβλήτα, ‘destroyer of walls’, a reading which Aristarchus considers unsuitable to Ares because ‘it is the task of Poseidon to overthrow buildings from the foundation and shake them to the ground; the task of Ares instead is to bring [the soldiers] near the wall’ (*Sch. Il.* 5.31d).²⁹⁶ For the same reason, Zenodotus is also wrong in reading, ‘Olympian Muses whose dress falls in deep folds (βαθύκολποι)’ rather than ‘Muses who dwell on Olympus’ (*Il.* 2.484): Homer uses the epithet βαθύκολποι only for the Trojan women (*Il.* 18.122, 339; 24.215), and never for Greek women (*Sch. Il.* 24.215b: ὅτι ἐπὶ βαρβάρων τὸ ἐπίθετον τίθησιν); therefore, βαθύκολποι is even less appropriate for the ‘Greek’ Muses (*Sch. Il.* 2.484; 18.339).²⁹⁷ The reverse phenomenon occurs at *Il.* 7.10, when the epithet βοῶπις, ‘ox-eyed’, typical of Hera, is used for a mortal woman, Phylomedusa (*Sch. Il.* 7.10a^{1.2}). It is not clear whether Aristarchus athetizes the line or not; in the scholium he mentions the other instance (*Il.* 3.144) where this epithet is used for a mortal woman, Clymene, and defines it as an ‘athetized line’. Yet *Il.* 3.144 is not suspicious to him because of the epithet but because it contains an (unrelated) ‘unbelievable’ detail, namely, the mention of Aethra, Theseus’ mother (*Sch. Il.* 3.144a).²⁹⁸

6. The World of the Heroes and the World of Homer

As discussed in the previous sections, the main distinction in Aristarchus’ analysis of the Homeric world was between the world depicted in the poems and

296. He also quotes Stesichorus’ πυλεμάχῳ (prob. πυλαιμάχῳ), ‘fighting at the gate’ (fr. 242 PMG), as a parallel. Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 44.

297. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 111–112; Bouchard 2016, 114–115.

298. Of course, the comment about ‘ox-eyed’ referring to the mortal Clymene could have been lost in *Sch. Il.* 3.144a. In fact, as we saw at § 1.2, Aristarchus even considers keeping the line by assuming homonymy. According to Friedländer 1853, 84, *Sch. Il.* 3.144a lost the part in which Aristarchus concluded that it was better to athetize the line. It might be so, but it cannot be proved. The other case where βοῶπις is not used for Hera (but for Halia, one of the Nereids) is *Il.* 18.40, a line in a list which Aristarchus athetizes; but the epithet is not mentioned as one of the reasons (*Sch. Il.* 18.39–49 [Did. + Ariston.]; see Chapter 5.3 § 5.2). Other divine epithets and some myths about gods involving the Neoteroi are treated in Chapter 5.3; atheteseis in speeches of gods are discussed in Chapter 3.6.B.

the world Aristarchus was living in, that is, what for him was the contemporary world. Nonetheless, he also noticed another, more subtle distinction within the Homeric poems: the difference between Homer, a poet who lived in a certain period,²⁹⁹ and the world of the Homeric characters, which was different from that of Homer and more ancient.³⁰⁰ In particular, he often noted the discrepancy between what Homer knew and what his characters knew. For example, Homer knows the trumpet, but this instrument is unknown to the Homeric heroes. Thus, while Homer never introduces heroes using a trumpet, he mentions this instrument in similes, as in *Il.* 18.219–221, comparing the voice of Achilles to the sound of a trumpet:

Sch. Il. 18.219a σάλπιγξ: ὅτι αὐτὸς οἶδε σάλπιγγας, χρωμένους δὲ τοὺς ἥρωας οὐκ εἰσάγει.

‘Trumpet’: because he himself knows trumpets, but he does not represent the heroes as using them.³⁰¹

In the same way, when the gods enter the battle in *Iliad* 21, it is Homer who says that heaven ‘trumpeted around’ (ἀμφὶ δ’ ἐσάλπιγξεν), since his heroes do not know trumpets (*Sch. Il.* 21.388a^{1.2.3}).³⁰² A similar case concerns boiled meat: Homer’s heroes only eat roasted meat,³⁰³ but in a simile in Book 21 Homer compares Xanthus boiling at the fire sent by Hephaestus to a boiling cauldron where some pork is cooking (*Il.* 21.362–365). Aristarchus concludes that Homer knows the technique of boiling meat, even if he never represents his heroes cooking meat in this way (*Sch. Il.* 21.362a.b). Homeric characters are also never represented riding horses; thus, Odysseus and Diomedes riding bareback horses at *Il.* 10.498–514 are an exception, due to the fact that they stole these horses from the Thracian camp (*Sch. Il.* 10.499a).³⁰⁴ Homer, however, does know about horseback riding, since both in *Il.* 15.679–686 and *Od.* 5.371 he compares Greek heroes (Ajax and Odysseus) to skilled horsemen (*Sch. Il.* 15.679a and *Sch. Od.* 5.371b:

299. See Chapter 5.1 § 4.

300. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 19; Roemer 1924, 177–179.

301. See also *Sch. Il.* 18.219b^{1.2} and 24.480–2a¹ (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 328; Schmidt 1976, 250–251. On the technical meaning of παράγειν and εἰσάγειν to indicate that the poet introduces characters into its narrative as if ‘bringing them onstage’, see Meijering 1987, 127.

302. Aristarchus also notes that only in two passages, in *Il.* 10.13 and in the description of the shield at *Il.* 18.495, does Homer mention *auloi* (*Sch. Il.* 10.13a; 18.495a). Schmidt 1976, 251–252, suggests that Aristarchus might have noticed this detail because these instruments were considered typically ‘barbaric’.

303. See above, § 2.3.

304. Cf. Hainsworth 1993, 202–203.

οἶδε μὲν ὁ ποιητὴς τὸν κέλητα, οὐκ εἰσάγει δὲ τοὺς ἥρωας αὐτῷ χρωμένους, εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν τῇ Δολωνείᾳ τὸν Διομήδην).³⁰⁵

7. Conclusions

Aristarchus' analysis of Homeric *historiai* was broad and diversified. It ranged from the discussion of homonymy among characters and geographic places, as well as the details of the Achaean camp, to broader topics concerning the world in which the stories in the two poems took place. He described the cosmology and the technological knowledge of the Homeric heroes, as well as their religious rituals, their diet, and their social conventions. In the process, he used 'evidence' from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as well as from Achilles' shield, because for him they all depicted the same world, which was self-consistent and different from 'modern' society. In addition, Aristarchus noticed a third reality, that of the poet, which was half way between heroic times and modern times, so that Homer knew usages and objects unknown to his heroes.

In this analysis, Aristarchus displays his usual accuracy and encyclopedic knowledge of the Homeric text, and incidentally sometimes provides the modern reader with a number of interesting observations about Homeric society or the physical geography of the places described in the *Iliad*. The reason why he discussed all aspects of this world at such length and in extensive detail was threefold. First, consistently with all the other aspects of his work, Aristarchus wanted to clarify the ambiguous or controversial aspects of the poems, in order to explain them to his readers and provide a clean, clear, and philologically correct Homeric text – an activity which also included selecting the best readings and deciding which lines were genuine and which were not. The other two goals were subordinate to the first one: (1) to discuss the points where Homer seemed to contradict himself and to show that they did not constitute a problem once put in the right light; and (2) to argue against other scholars who bent the Homeric text to their agenda—for example, to demonstrate that Stoic cosmological doctrines were embedded in the Homeric text, or that the Homeric poems were written by two different authors.

This philologically oriented attitude came with a price, however. From what the available evidence allows us to conclude, Aristarchus listed and explained many *historiai* but in doing so he never went *beyond* the text. His observations about *realia* and heroic customs were all geared toward the exegesis of the

305. Cf. Schmidt 1976, 229–231.

poem, not toward an interest in heroic society per se. Sometimes his analysis was sophisticated, for example concerning the knowledge of writing among heroes; more often, however, he seems to have limited himself to the simple retelling of what the text said, without going beyond it. For example, one of the most interesting aspects of his analysis of Homeric *historiai* is that the world that Homer describes in his poem is not only different from the 'contemporary' (i.e., Hellenistic) world, but also from the world of the poet himself. Aristarchus was fully aware of this. He had in front of himself three stages of Greek 'history'—his contemporary world, the world of Homer, and the world of the heroes—but he never tried to compare them, or to look at them in a historical perspective, at least on the basis of the available fragments. This is exactly the same attitude which emerged from his analysis of Homeric language: there too Aristarchus noticed the differences and was able to understand the text correctly but never tried to understand why Homeric idiolect was so different from Koine Greek. Similarly, his analysis of the Homeric gods seems to show no interest in discussing religious or 'philosophical' views in the poem; rather, he discussed fairly uncomplicated exegetical questions about where the gods lived and what they did, or analyzed their epithets. The latter analysis was on the border between semantic analysis, etymology, and analysis of *historiai*—and most of the time it was carried out with a polemical target in mind, to argue against Zenodotus' or other scholars' readings or interpretations.

Even with geography, Aristarchus either explained the meaning of certain geographic names or was mainly interested in mapping out the 'stage' of the poem—the gates of Troy, the disposition of the ships in the Greek camp, and the relative order of the Greek contingents. Again, these interests were purely philological and arose from the text itself, which was Aristarchus' main preoccupation. There is no evidence that he became interested in archeological or cultural details linking the reality described in the poem to the world outside. Thus, he was very far removed from scholars like Demetrius of Scepsis or Apollodorus who, commenting on the Homeric catalogs, took pains to analyze geographic and historical data and, even if they did not gather their data firsthand, at least made use of other antiquarian works whose primary focus was not the Homeric poems.³⁰⁶

Since his main concern was to make the text clear and to explain apparent inconsistencies in the Homeric poems, Aristarchus discussed very many cases of homonymy and of double names—but his was a purely philological and exegetical analysis, even when it dealt with geographic entities. In this regard,

306. The use of antiquarian and historical sources is attested for Demetrius; Apollodorus, on the other hand, used Demetrius; see Pfeiffer 1968, 250–251 and 258. On Aristarchus' lack of historical and geographic interest, see also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 231–243.

many of these *historiai* involving the distinction of places and heroes with the same name, as well the discussion of Olympus, were geared toward explaining the text and saving Homer from accusations of being inconsistent. To solve these *zetemata* Aristarchus often focused on epithets. Characters and places with the same name or whose identity was debated (as in the case of Olympus/heaven and Hesperus/Heosphorus) were shown to be different because Homer distinguished them through different epithets. This principle seems (once again) to derive from Aristotle, who in *Top.* 7.1 stated that two things are identical when every accident belonging to the one also belongs to the other.³⁰⁷

His most ‘geographically oriented’ discussions were those dealing with the Achaean camp and the battlefield. Yet Aristarchus discussed them not because he was interested in the ‘archaeology’ of the Trojan War, but rather because only by explaining how the Greeks and the Trojans were spatially distributed could the Homeric text be properly understood, especially in the battle descriptions. Similarly, geographic and mythical details were often crucial to corroborate *atheteseis* (as in the *athetesis* of *Il.* 2.529–530 analyzed above, at § 2.9.1 and § 3.3), and, most of all, to contrast Homer with the ‘later’ poets, i.e., Hesiod and the Neoteroi, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.3. In all these cases, geography and mythology were used only to answer exegetical and philological questions, but never became an interest *per se*.

In his analysis of Homeric *historiai*, therefore, Aristarchus distanced himself not only from the paradoxographic literature of his own time, but also, and most importantly, from the historical and ethnographic studies that were flourishing in the Hellenistic period. In this respect his interaction with the historians and ethnographers seems to have been less fruitful than that with Aristotle and the Hellenistic scientists. In fact, the scholia show an Aristarchus much more engaged in discussing the differences of the astronomical notions between Homer and the contemporary world than in trying to analyze the Homeric poems from a historical point of view. Two different and coexistent reasons may explain his attitude. First, he needed to engage with modern views of the cosmos vis-à-vis the Homeric depiction of the earth, in order to ‘defend’ Homer from allegorical or philosophical interpretations (e.g., those of Crates), which arbitrarily tried to discover modern scientific truths in Homer. Aristarchus also

307. Aristot. *Top.* 152a33–37: ἔτι ἐκ τῶν τούτοις συμβεβηκότων καὶ οἷς ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν ἐπισκοπεῖν· ὅσα γὰρ θατέρῳ συμβέβηκε, καὶ θατέρῳ δεῖ συμβεβηκέναι, καὶ οἷς θάτερον αὐτῶν συμβέβηκε, καὶ θάτερον δεῖ συμβεβηκέναι. εἰ δέ τι τούτων διαφωνεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ ταῦτά [[one must] also examine these things [i.e., things which are said to be the same] on the basis of their accidents or of the things of which they are accidents; for the accidents of one must be accidents of the other as well, and if one of them is an accident of something [else], the other also must be an accident [of the same thing]. And if there is any discrepancy in any of these points, it is clear that they are not the same thing].

had to defend Homer from detractors who found contradictions or ‘mistakes’ in his depiction of the cosmos. For both goals, he had to engage with the views of philosophers as well as those of modern scientists and geographers. On the contrary, he did not need to take on any ‘defense’ of Homer from a historical point of view, because this had never been an issue in Homeric scholarship—it had always been clear and undisputed that Homer’s heroes were depicted as living in a much earlier time, and so their society was different and sometimes odd compared to ‘modern’ standards. The second reason for Aristarchus’ lack of interest in the historical aspects of the Homeric poems is simply that he practically applied Aristotle’s teachings. The great philosopher stated that the world depicted in a poem must have its own life, independent from outside reality; in particular, he claimed that poetry is not history:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1451a38–b7: γὰρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμμετρα διαφέρουσιν . . . ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ’ ἱστορία τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον λέγει.

The poet and the historian do not differ because they use prose or verse . . . rather, the difference lies in this: one [i.e., the historian] tells the things that have happened, and the other [i.e., the poet] tells the things that might happen. Hence poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history; for poetry speaks more about universals, while history speaks about particulars.

Aristarchus seems to have approached the Homeric world from this angle. It was a self-consistent world which was different from his own (so he had to explain differences in life habits and worldview, including cosmology). Yet these two worlds, the modern and real one and Homer’s fictional one, did not need to be connected, because poetry was not history in the first place. So, once he had clarified the text, he did not need to go *beyond* it. His predecessor Eratosthenes also had the same opinion and famously claimed that the aim of every poet was to entertain and enthrall one’s mind, not to give instruction in geography or in any other technical discipline, as Strabo, who does not share this view, says:

Strabo 1.2.3: καὶ προσεξεργάζεται γε, πυνθανόμενος τί συμβάλλεται πρὸς ἀρετὴν ποιητοῦ πολλῶν ὑπάρχει τόπων ἔμπειρον ἢ στρατηγίας ἢ γεωργίας ἢ ῥητορικῆς ἢ οἷα δὴ περιποιεῖν αὐτῷ τινες ἐβουλήθησαν; . . . τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοις, ὧς Ἐρατόσθενης· ἐκεῖνα δ’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτὸν

τὴν τοσαύτην πολυμάθειαν καὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν γραῶδη μυθολογίαν ἀποφαίνων, ἧ δέδοται πλάττειν, φησὶν, ὃ ἂν αὐτῇ φαίνεται ψυχαγωγίας οἰκεῖον.

And [Eratosthenes] additionally asks how the fact that he is experienced in many [geographic] places, or in military strategy, or in agriculture, or in rhetoric, or in all the things that some wanted to attribute to him contributes to the excellence of a poet. . . . Perhaps, Eratosthenes, you might be right in claiming this [i.e., that Homer does not have universal knowledge and is not an expert in every art], but you are wrong when you deny Homer so vast a learning and declare that his poetic [art] is the storytelling of an old lady, whom we have allowed—he says—to invent whatever seems to her suitable for enthrallment.

Aristarchus shared this approach to poetry; he did not seek ‘external’ truths in Homer, but faced the Homeric world with the scientific attitude and the detachment of a surgeon, not the passion of a historian or a geographer—because, in fact, Homer was not at all about history or geography.³⁰⁸

308. See discussion in Chapter 6 § 6.

3.4

Discovery of Etymology

An Objective, Multipurpose Practice

1. Etymological Strategies
 - 1.1. Word Segmentation and Phonetic Changes
 - 1.2. Sharing of Letters/Consonants (κοινωνία τῶν στοιχείων/συμφώνων)
 - 1.3. Reaching beyond Homer
2. Etymology: A Method ‘from Within’
3. Etymology and Homeric *Glossai*
 - 3.1. Etymology and Words Used according to the Standard Meaning (κυρίως)
 - 3.2. Against the Glossographers
 - 3.3. Homer and the Neoteroi
4. Etymology and Compounds
5. Etymology and Interaspiration
6. Etymology and Variant Readings
7. Aristarchus’ Etymology versus Crates’ Etymology
8. Homer’s Etymologies
 - 8.1. *Figura Etymologica* (παρετυμολογεῖ [ὁ ποιητής])
 - 8.2. *Nomen Omen* (ὀνοματοθετικὸς ὁ ποιητής)
9. Conclusions

Etymology played a major role in Greek philosophy, grammar, and literary criticism, but it was a discipline very different from present-day etymology. For modern linguists, etymology is the study of origin of words and how their meanings change over time. For the ancients, on the other hand, etymology was the ‘study of the true (ἔτυμος) meaning’ of words; as a consequence, the right etymological analysis would have disclosed the hidden and real sense of

a word.¹ Even though ἐτυμολογία was developed as a self-standing discipline in the Hellenistic and Roman periods by scholars like the Stoic Chrysippus (ca. 281–208 BCE) and the grammarian Philoxenus, who worked at Rome in the first century BCE, it had been commonly used by poets, philosophers, physicians, orators, and others from a very early period. Homer and Hesiod already had employed etymology in their own poems.² The Sophists and fifth-century philosophers then used etymology extensively, as Plato's *Cratylus* testifies.³ The Stoics, in particular, appealed to etymology to understand the epithets and names of the gods as connected to the Stoic view of the cosmos.⁴ For example, with reference to Homeric poetry, Cleanthes (331–230 BCE) read ὀλοόφρων, epithet of Atlas in *Od.* 1.52, with a rough breathing rather than with a smooth breathing (ὀλοόφρων, 'evil'), so that it meant 'mindful of everything' (ὁ περὶ τῶν ὅλων φρονῶν) in agreement with Cleanthes' identification of Atlas with Stoic Providence (*SVF* 1, fr. 549).⁵ Etymology was also very popular in the school of Pergamum, and Crates of Mallos used it in order to support his allegorical reading of Homer. His analysis of Homeric words—and, in particular, of gods' epithets—was aimed at showing that the gods in Homer were actually representations of physical reality, according to Stoic doctrines.⁶

Yet etymology, even though often used as a tool for allegorical readings in Homer, must not be identified with *allegoresis*.⁷ In fact, Aristarchus extensively engaged in etymological analysis, but his use of this device could not be farther from the allegorical one; rather, he employed etymology mainly as a tool to analyze Homeric words.⁸ No interpretation of the 'message' of the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* was on his agenda. Within the division of the six parts of grammar,

1. For some recent overviews of ancient etymology, see Nifadopoulos 2003 and Sluiter 2015 (with bibliography).

2. For example, Homer connects the name Ὀδυσσεύς with ὀδύρεσθαι, 'to wail', to mean 'the wailing man' (*Od.* 1.55) and with ὀδύσασθαι (aor.), 'to hate', in the sense of 'the one hated by the gods' (*Od.* 1.62); he also explains Ἀστυάναξ, 'lord of the town', as a name given to Scamandrius, Hector's son, to honor Hector, since he alone defended the town (ἄστυ) (*Il.* 6.403).

3. Even though the general opinion is that in the *Cratylus* Plato is mocking excessive (sophistic?) etymological analysis, Sedley 1998 has interestingly proposed that Plato too, actually, took those etymologies seriously, at least from a linguistic point of view.

4. E.g., Zeno *SVF* 1, fr. 103; Cleanth. *SVF* 1, frs. 526, 535, 540–543, 546–547; Chrysipp. *SVF* 2, frs. 1021, 1062–1063. The same approach was adopted later on by Cornutus in his *Compendium of the Tradition of Greek Theology* (first century CE). Cf. Long 1992, 53–57.

5. On Stoic etymological analysis, see Long 1992, esp. 58–66.

6. On Crates' use of etymology and allegory, see Mette 1952, 6–8; Broggiato 2001, lx–lxiii; Broggiato 2003.

7. See Long 1992; in fact, Long even claims that the Stoics and Cornutus were not allegorists, but simply etymologists.

8. On Aristarchus' use of etymology, see also Schironi 2003; Bouchard 2016, 101–107. Lehrs 1882, 143–145, briefly reviews scholia in which Aristarchus performs etymological analysis (many of which are also analyzed in this chapter).

Aristarchus' 'discovery of etymology' can be seen as the ultimate exegetical practice, but also as a bridge to the last and more refined parts: the 'calculation of analogy', which was used to find specific readings and fix the orthography of debated forms and thus dealt with the *diorthosis*, and the 'judgment (κρίσις) of poems', which involved the decision about whether certain parts of the poems were spurious (athetesis) often through the analysis of the Homeric poetic technique. Etymology, on the other hand, was still working at the level of understanding the text; in fact, it seems to have been the last and most technical resource when the other methods—e.g., reading aloud or the explanation of *glossai* within the context—had failed. Yet etymology also helped in discussing variants, even if it was not sufficient by itself to choose the right reading; from this perspective, then, while being the last and most advanced exegetical technique, etymology was also a window into the *diorthotikon*, that is, the correction and emendation of the text.

1. Etymological Strategies

To perform etymological analysis the exegete must be able to break down the word into its components and connect the latter to other words or roots. In this regard, ancient etymologies were often wrong and lacked even a basic understanding of the linguistic elements of the word.⁹ Within this context, Aristarchus showed a remarkable attention to the 'form of the words', and—even if he himself sometimes fell short in his etymological analysis—he also employed some very sophisticated etymological strategies.

1.1. Word Segmentation and Phonetic Changes

Aristarchus was well equipped with the basic linguistic tools to proceed with an analysis of a word. Not only did he show an extraordinary ability in breaking down words into smaller units which very much overlap with modern morphemes, but he was even able to isolate the most significant of those to find out the correct etymology of the word at issue. He often analyzed words by going back to the verbal root: thus, ὤτειλή, 'wound', derives from οὐτάμεναι, 'to strike with a weapon in hand' (*Sch. Il.* 11.266);¹⁰ ἄβρομοι, 'noisy', derives from ἄγαν βρομοῦντες, 'making much noise', while αὐῖαχοι, 'with intense cries', de-

9. Several ancient etymologies are discussed by Sedley 1998 and by the articles in Nifadopoulos 2003.

10. On the meaning of οὐτάμεναι vs. βάλλειν, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.5.

rives from ἄγαν ἰαχοῦντες, ‘crying very much’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.41a).¹¹ These last two etymologies also show Aristarchus’ awareness of intensive ἀ-; in fact, he comments that the alpha adds intensity to the word (*Sch. Il.* 13.41a: κατ’ ἐπίτασιν τοῦ α κειμένου). He also clearly distinguished intensive ἀ- from privative ἀ-. For example, he observes that the hapax ἀεκήλια, a neuter plural in the phrase παθεῖν τ’ ἀεκήλια ἔργα, ‘to suffer unbearable things’, derives from the negation of ἔκηλος, ‘at rest’, ‘calm’, and it is applied to situations ‘in which it is impossible to keep quiet’ (*Sch. Il.* 18.77a: κατὰ ἀπόφασιν τοῦ ἐκήλου, ἐφ’ οἷς οὐχ οἶόν τε ἡσυχάζειν).¹² Similarly, ἀσβέστη, ‘unquenchable’, is ‘what is quenched with difficulty’, i.e., privative ἀ- + σβέννυσθαι, ‘to be quenched’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.123a: ἀσβέστη, οἶον ἀκατάσβεστος, ὃ ἐστι δυσκόλως σβεστή).

To support his etymologies, Aristarchus sometimes explained changes in the ‘shape’ of a word from the original form by assuming that some letters had been left out. For example, πρόμος, ‘fighter of the first row’, derives from πρόμαχος with syncope (*Sch. Il.* 3.44b; 7.75a^{1.2}),¹³ ἐπικάρ, ‘headlong’, derives from ἐπὶ κάρα with apocope (*Sch. Il.* 16.392a),¹⁴ and ἀβρότη, ‘immortal’, from ἀμβρότη with omission (παράλειψις) of μ (*Sch. Il.* 14.78a).¹⁵ On the other hand, words can have additional letters, like εἴσω, which derives from εἰς with pleonasm of ω (*Sch. Il.* 21.125). In his etymologies he could also connect words that were identical or very similar, but seemed uncorrelated. Thus, he relates βρότος, ‘gore’, with βροτός, ‘mortal’, ‘since βρότος is not all blood, but the blood that comes out from a mortal when he is killed’ (*Sch. Il.* 14.7a: ὅτι οὐ πᾶν αἷμα βρότος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπὸ βροτοῦ πεφονευμένου).¹⁶ On the contrary, with the proper name Alektryon he rejects the connection with ἄλεκτρυών, ‘cock’, because that common noun was not known yet (*Sch. Il.* 17.602: ὅτι οὐκ εἴρηται παρὰ τὸν ἄλεκτρυόνα τὸ ζῷον τὸ ὄνομα· οὐδέπω γὰρ ἔγνωστο).¹⁷ In fact, as will be discussed below (§ 3.2), Aristarchus refused to understand Homeric etymologies on the basis of words which Homer did not use. In this specific case, however, the suspicion arises that he dismissed the connection with a ‘cock’ because it was also not a very dignified etymology for the name

11. This is the correct etymology; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.vv. βρέμω and ἰάχω.

12. Aristarchus might have also suggested other etymologies for this hapax, as reported by *Sch. Il.* 18.77b (Hrd.) and 18.77c (ex.); cf. Lehrs 1882, 304. The origin of this term is still debated; see Chantraine, *DELG*, and *Lfgre*, s.v. ἀεκήλιος; West 2001, 245–246.

13. See Chapter 3.3.A § 1.2.

14. The phrase is often printed as two words: ἐπὶ κάρ (e.g., by Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. κάρᾱ; Janko 1994, 367). West, however, ad *Il.* 16.392, chooses the Aristarchean compound ἐπικάρ. Cf. also *Lfgre*, s.v. ἐπικάρ.

15. See analysis below (§ 1.3).

16. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 126. A connection between the two words had been suggested by Leumann 1950, 124–127; but see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. βρότος.

17. Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 32.

of a hero,¹⁸ while in his view normally Homer is very keen on ‘creating’ names which suit the ethos and ‘social function’ of his characters (see below, § 8.2).

Aristarchus also seems to have been remarkably aware of important phonetic changes in Greek words, so that he was able to connect a word with the right root, even if they looked very different. For example, when he notes that ἀρίζηλοι, ‘conspicuous’, is used instead of ἀρίδηλοι, since it does not derive from ζῆλος, ‘jealousy’ (*Sch. Il.* 22.27b: ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρίδηλοι· οὐ γὰρ ὁ ζῆλος ἔγκειται), Aristarchus rejects the most obvious connection (ἀρίζηλοι from ζῆλος, ‘jealousy’) and provides, in fact, the right analysis of the adjective.¹⁹ It is impossible to know whether in this case he was aware of the phonetic connection between δ and ζ; still, in many other instances he shows a refined sensitivity to how to divide words correctly into components and to connect them with roots which are not immediately obvious. For example, he analyzes καταιγίδες, ‘storms’, as ‘those who dart downward (αἱ κάτω αἵσσουσαι)’, dividing it into κατ(α)-αιγ-ίδες and connecting the radical αιγ to the verb αἵσσειν, whose stem is indeed αιγ- (*Sch. Il.* 11.297a; 17.594a). Similarly, he analyzes καλαῦρος, ‘shepherd’s staff’, as from κάλον, ‘wood’, and ῥέπειν, ‘to incline’, ‘to bend’ (*Sch. Il.* 23.845a: ἀπὸ τοῦ κάλου καὶ τοῦ ῥέπειν). It is not clear which etymological meaning Aristarchus gave to the compound (perhaps it was a ‘crooked’ staff?), yet he was certainly able to connect the o-grade ablaut in -ρος with the e-grade ablaut in ῥέπειν.²⁰

1.2. Sharing of Letters/Consonants (κοινωνία τῶν στοιχείων/συμφώνων)

Connected with his ability to isolate the etymologically important elements of a word analyzed above is a fairly technical idea that Aristarchus also availed himself of when discussing some challenging etymologies: the ‘sharing of letters/consonants’ (κοινωνία τῶν στοιχείων/συμφώνων). With this concept, he could link words and determine their meaning on the basis of whether they had letters in common. This idea is attested twice in the scholia to the *Iliad*. The first one is in the case of λικριφίς:

18. In fact, the proper name Ἀλεκτρυών and the name for the cock ἀλεκτρυών are etymologically connected, as they both derive from the verb ἀλέξειν, ‘to ward off’, ‘to defend’; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ἀλέξω (2).

19. See Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ἀρίζηλος.

20. The etymology of καλαῦρος is debated; Chantraine, *DELG*, and Frisk, *GEW*, s.vv. καλαῦρος and ῥέπω, connect the -ρος of καλαῦρος to the same root as ῥόπαλον, i.e., ῥεπ-. The καλαῦρος was a throwing stick which a shepherd would cast at cattle, as is clear from *Il.* 23.845–846. Cf. also *LfgreE*, s.v.

Sch. Il. 14.463a λικριφίς αἵξας: ὅτι δις κέχρηται τῇ λέξει, νῦν καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ (*Od.* 19.451). σημαίνει δὲ πλάγιος ὀρμήσας, ἀπὸ τοῦ λέχριος, κατὰ κοινωνίαν τῶν συμφώνων.

‘Leaping sideways (λικριφίς)’: because he has used this word twice, now and in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 19.451). It means ‘rushing on the side’, from λέχριος (‘slanting’), with sharing of consonants.

The analysis of the adverb λικριφίς, ‘sideways’, used twice by Homer, is carried out by connecting it with the adjective λέχριος, which means ‘slanting’, ‘diagonal’. The connection between these two forms, which apparently have nothing in common, is proved, according to Aristarchus, by their ‘sharing of consonants’. This idea implies the following analysis: λικριφίς is divided into λ(ι)-κρ(ι)-φίς, where -φίς can be ignored since it is an adverbial ending, and λέχριος is divided into λ(έ)-χρ(ι)-ος, where -ος can also be ignored since it is an adjectival ending. At this point, the two forms are reduced to the same sequence of consonants λ(+ vowel)-κρ(+ ι) and λ(+ vowel)-χρ(+ ι), with the only difference being the voiceless velar κ in one and the corresponding aspirate velar χ in the other. In this way, Aristarchus can prove that the two words are connected because their roots are the same. Thus, the meaning of λικριφίς becomes clear: it can now be seen as the adverbial form (because of the ending -φίς) of the adjective λέχριος.²¹ The same kind of analysis applies to another example as well:

Sch. Il. 21.281a¹ {νῦν δ’ ἔμε [sic]} λευγαλέω: ὅτι ἐκ τούτου οἱ νεώτεροι ἐξεδέξαντο λευγαλέον τὸν δίυγρον. ἔστι δὲ κατὰ κοινωνίαν στοιχείων λευγαλέον ὀλέθριον, παρὰ τὸν λοιγόν. καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ (*Od.* 2.61): ‘λευγαλέοι τ’ ἐσόμεσθα’.

‘Ruinous (λευγαλέω)’: because from this line the Neoterioi took λευγαλέος [as meaning] ‘watery’. But λευγαλέος is ‘deadly’, from λοιγός (‘ruin’), with sharing of letters. And in the *Odyssey*: ‘we will be miserable’ (*Od.* 2.61).

The Neoterioi, namely, the poets after Homer, use the adjective λευγαλέος with the meaning of ‘liquid’, ‘watery’,²² while in Homer it means ‘ruinous’, as in *Il.* 21.281, or ‘miserable’, as in *Od.* 2.61. For both Homeric meanings, Aristarchus connects the word with λοιγός, ‘ruin’, ‘destruction’.²³ His analysis is again based

21. The connection between λικριφίς and λέχριος is accepted by Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. λέχριος.

22. Perhaps in Sophocles (*TrGF* 4, fr. 785); yet Aristarchus may be targeting Hesiod as well; cf. Lehrs 1882, 106; Severyns 1928, 19, 83–84, 110. See Chapter 5.3 § 5.3.

23. See also *Sch. Od.* 2.61a¹ λευγαλέοι τ’ ἐσόμεσθα: ἀντὶ τοῦ λοιγαλέοι, παρὰ τὸν λοιγόν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀσθενεῖς [‘we will be miserable (λευγαλέοι)’: instead of λοιγαλέοι; from λοιγός (‘ruin’), instead

on ‘sharing of letters’: λευγαλέος is divided as λ(ευ)-γ-αλέος with -αλέος as adjectival ending,²⁴ while λαιγός is to be analyzed as λ(οι)-γ-ός. The two reduced forms are comparable, as they are based on the same consonant root λ(+ diphthong)-γ; therefore, they also share the meaning: ‘ruin’, ‘misery’ for the noun and ‘ruinous’, ‘miserable’ for the adjective. The conclusion is that the neoteric meaning does not accord with the right etymology.²⁵

1.3. Reaching beyond Homer

Even if Aristarchus very often claimed that the Neoterói misinterpreted Homeric words because they did not understand their etymologies,²⁶ nonetheless he sometimes turned to them to find a possible solution for especially difficult cases. A case in point is offered by ἄβρότη, a Homeric hapax referring to Nyx, which is generally understood as ‘holy’ or ‘immortal’:

Sch. Il. 14.78a {νῦξ} ἄβρότη: ὅτι ἦτοι κατὰ παράλειψιν τοῦ μ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμβρότη, οἷον ἀθάνατος. ἢ ἄβρότη, καθ’ ἣν βροτοὶ οὐ φοιτῶσιν.

‘Holy (ἄβρότη) [night]’: because [ἄβρότη] is either [used] instead of ἀμβρότη, that is, ‘immortal’, with omission of μ; or [it is] ἄβρότη, [which means] ‘during which mortals (βροτοὶ) do not go around’.

Aristarchus gives two possible etymological interpretations. One is that the word means ‘immortal’, and that ἄβρότη is indeed ἀμβρότη with omission of μ. With this solution he connects this adjective to a more common one, ἄμβροτος, which often occurs in Homer²⁷ as well as in later poets, like Hesiod, Sappho, Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles.²⁸ Furthermore, in *Od.* 11.330 the

of ‘weak’]. The form λαιγαλέος is attested only in the lexica to prove the link between λευγαλέος and λαιγός; it is thus an ‘in-between’ etymological formation, which Aristarchus probably invented to explain his analysis (as he does elsewhere; see below, § 3.2, with the nonexistent form γεράοχος to explain an etymological derivation). The adjective λευγαλέος might be understood as having both an ‘active’ meaning (‘destructive’ and ‘ruinous’) and a ‘passive’ one (‘miserable’); see *LfgreE*, s.v. Nevertheless, the main meaning is ‘miserable’, and Aristarchus’ derivation from λαιγός is wrong; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v.; Frisk, *GEW*, s.v.

24. Cf. Smyth 1956, § 858.7.

25. See also *Sch. Il.* 9.119a; 20.109a; 21.281b (ex. [Ariston.]). The note was also addressed against the Glossographers, as shown by *Sch. Od.* 5.312a (fr. 18 Dyck). Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 12; Dyck 1987, 123–124, 125, 147–148.

26. See, for example, the case of the aegis, discussed in Chapter 5.3. § 4.3.

27. E.g., *Il.* 5.339, 870 (ἄμβροτον αἶμα), *Il.* 16.380–381, 866–867 (ἵπποι ἄμβροτοι), *Il.* 17.194 (ἄμβροτα τεύχεα), *Il.* 20.358 (θεὸς ἄμβροτος).

28. E.g., Hes. *Th.* 43; Sappho, fr. 5.5 Voigt; Pind. *N.* 10.7, *I.* 8.30, fr. 75.16; Aesch. *Eu.* 259; Soph. *OT* 157.

epithet ἄμβροτος is used for νύξ. In this way, the weird and isolated ἀβρότη of *Il.* 14.78 is equated with a more common form, attested in so many authors and, moreover, used as an epithet with the very same noun in the *Odyssey*, even if in this case it is a two-termination adjective.²⁹ This neat solution can be obtained by simply allowing for the omission of a consonant μ. The other possibility is to think of another adjective, with a different meaning. Aristarchus proposes to interpret ἀβρότη as a compound of privative ἀ- and βροτός, meaning ‘without mortals’, or—as he puts it—‘during which mortals do not go around’. This interpretation is not Aristarchus’ invention, since this meaning of ἄβροτος occurs in the opening lines of the *Prometheus Bound* (l. 2): ‘[we have come] to a wilderness without men (ἄβροτον)’. The line and this etymology are quoted in an exegetical scholium (*Sch. Il.* 14.78b: καὶ Αἰσχύλος· ἄβροτον εἰς ἐρημίαν, ἐν ᾗ φῶς οὐ γίνεται). In the Aristonicus scholium the reference is missing; yet, since the etymology is the same, in all probability Aristarchus had this example in mind when proposing it.³⁰

Another case of etymological analysis which makes use of the Neoteroi concerns another Homeric hapax, ἄξυλος, which occurs in *Il.* 11.155, when Homer compares Agamemnon rushing upon the Trojans and killing them to a fire that falls upon a forest (ἐν ἀξύλῳ . . . ὕλῃ) and destroys all the trees. The adjective, referring to the noun ‘forest’, was obviously perceived as linked with the noun for ‘wood’ and ‘timber’: ξύλον. Its actual meaning, however, was a matter of discussion. Though a hapax in Homer, ἄξυλος is used by Herodotus,³¹ in a very straightforward sense of ‘without wood’, ‘without forests’, thus as if derived from privative ἀ- and ξύλον. Yet this classical and obvious meaning is clearly not suitable in the Homeric context, since the point of the comparison is that Agamemnon has slain as many Trojans as trees destroyed by the fire. Hence, the forest mentioned in the simile cannot possibly be ‘without trees’ or ‘without wood’. Other solutions are therefore needed:

Sch. Il. 11.155b ἐν ἀξύλῳ ἐμπέσῃ ὕλῃ: πρὸς τὴν ἄξυλον, ὅτι πολλάς ἐκδοχὰς ἔσχηκεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν θρυώδη ἀποδεδώκασιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν πολύξυλον. βέλτιον δὲ ἀφ’ ἧς οὐδεὶς ἐξυλίστατο, ὡς Ἡσίοδος (fr. 314 M-W). ‘τῇλε γὰρ ἀξυλίῃ κατεπύθετο κήλεα νηῶν’.

‘[When fire] falls on a dense (ἀξύλῳ) forest’: with reference to ἄξυλος, because it has had many interpretations, since some have interpreted it as ‘full of reeds’,

29. At least in Homer. The feminine is used in Pindar (fr. 75.16).

30. Of course, both ἄμβροτος, ‘immortal’, and ἄβροτος, ‘without human beings’, hence ‘desert’, derive from βροτός, ‘mortal’, and privative ἀ- (see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. βροτός). Aristarchus does not seem to have connected the two, even if both his solutions are sound.

31. Hdt. 4.61.1 and 4.185.3.

others as ‘with much wood’. It is better [to understand it] as ‘through which no one could gather wood’, as Hesiod [says] (fr. 314 M-W): ‘for faraway the ships’ timbers were rotting for lack of wood’.³²

The interpretation of ἄξυλος as meaning ‘with much wood’ implies an intensive ἄ-; those who understood the compound as ‘full of reeds’, on the other hand, probably considered it a privative ἄ- (i.e., without trees, but with reeds). Aristarchus, for his part, certainly regards it as a compound with a privative ἄ-. Yet the meaning he proposes in the Homeric passage is different from ‘full of reeds’ as well as from the Herodotean ‘without wood’. In *Il.* 11.155 ἄξυλος means ‘through which no one could gather wood’: the forest is so thick that it is impossible to enter it. He finds support for his analysis in a line by Hesiod: ‘for far away the ships’ timbers were rotting ἄξυλῆ’. Since it is taken out of context, Hesiod’s fragment is not entirely clear, but Aristarchus seems to understand ἄξυλῆ as meaning ‘lack of wood’ in the sense that it was impossible to gather it, and so the ships’ timbers rotted.³³ Aristarchus’ interpretation of ἄξυλος is not very straightforward but has a great advantage over the other two etymologies: it is consistent with the Homeric passage and, more importantly, it suggests one etymology that explains both the Homeric and the later classical usage. In this way, then, he proposes the existence of only one noun, used by Hesiod, and only one derived adjective, used by Homer and by Herodotus, both of which must be analyzed as compounds with a privative ἄ- at the beginning. This economic solution is better than assuming two homographs, one in Homer, with an intensive ἄ-, and one in Herodotus, with a privative ἄ-, having the opposite meaning. It is also better than the interpretation of ἄξυλος as ‘without trees, but with reeds’, which is frankly quite forced and does not entirely fit the simile, as a forest of only reeds sounds less powerful as an image. On the contrary, Aristarchus’ suggested negative meaning of ἄξυλος as used by Homer is different from, but not entirely incompatible with, the meaning in Herodotus. In the historian, the forest ‘does not give wood’ because the climate is unfavorable (he is talking of the Scythians at 4.61.1 and of the Libyans at 4.185.3); in Homer, on the other hand, it indicates a forest which ‘does not give wood’ because it is too thick for people to enter it. In this way, Agamemnon’s impetus is also compared to a very powerful natural image.

32. Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 44; Nünlist 2012c, 200–201.

33. This is at least the sense which Aristarchus seems to attribute to the line of Hesiod, even if ‘lack of wood’ here could simply mean that there were no forests around (so in the Herodotean sense of ἄξυλος).

2. Etymology: A Method ‘from Within’

Etymology is a method to deduce the meaning of a word by analyzing its components, allowing the scholar to discover the semantic value of a term ‘from within.’ From this perspective, etymology can therefore be seen as a strategy complementary—and even to some extent opposed—to the other main tactic employed by Aristarchus to understand Homeric *glossai*: the analysis of the context.³⁴ Chapter 3.3.A has focused on the latter strategy, showing how he deduced what a word meant in Homer by analyzing all its attestations in the poems and the contexts where it was used. In this regard, he argued against the interpretations of the Glossographers, who limited their analysis to one single attestation without considering other cases where the same *glossa* occurred (the faulty method of ἐν ἀνθ’ ἐνός, ‘one-for-one’).³⁵ The analysis of a word’s meaning on the basis of its different contexts was the most reliable method, as it allowed the exegete to ‘clarify Homer from Homer.’ But there were cases when this was not possible, either because there were not many attestations of the word, or because the contexts themselves were not clear enough. It was in these cases that etymology entered the picture as the other method to find out the meaning of a word, ‘from within,’ that is, independently from the context. Etymology was thus most useful for analyzing proper names, since by default proper names do not receive their meaning from the surrounding context—unless in the case of an *aition*, which, however, does not normally occur in Homeric poetry. Indeed, there are many examples in the Aristarchean scholia of etymological analysis of proper names³⁶ or divine epithets.³⁷

Another case when etymology became useful was when the word at issue was a hapax legomenon. In this case, the single occurrence of the word left the exegete with only one context to use to deduce the meaning of the word—and sometimes this one context was not sufficient. In particular, when the occurrence of the hapax was ambiguous and allowed for many different interpretations, etymology became the tool Aristarchus used to solve the problem. So in three scholia where he employs etymology he also adds that he is discussing a hapax (*Sch. Il.* 11.424b, 23.311a, and 23.845a).³⁸ In many other cases, however,

34. As also noted by Lundon 2003, 79: “they [i.e., etymologies] serve as an alternative procedure to inference from context for the constitution of Homeric semantics”.

35. See Chapter 3.3.A § 3.

36. Ἐχῖναι (*Sch. Il.* 2.625a), Παρθένιος ποταμός (*Sch. Il.* 2.854), Κραναή νῆσος and Ἐλένη νῆσος (*Sch. Il.* 3.445a), Μέντης (*Sch. Il.* 17.73a), Ἀλεκτρύων (*Sch. Il.* 17.602; see above, § 1.1), Ἀλίη (*Sch. Il.* 18.40a [Did.?]); perhaps also Πήδαιος (*Sch. Il.* 5.69a^{1,2} [Hrd.]).

37. Λυκηγενής (*Sch. Il.* 4.101a), ἀφήτωρ (*Sch. Il.* 9.404a; see Chapter 3.3.B § 5.2), Ἐνυάλιος (*Sch. Il.* 17.211a; see Chapter 5.3 § 4.2), ἥϊος (*Sch. Il.* 15.365a [Hrd.]; see below, § 7).

38. *Sch. Il.* 11.424b: ὅτι ἅπαξ τὴν πρότμησιν ὠνόμασεν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ ὑπὸ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν τόπος κατὰ τὴν λαγόνα, διὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ τέμνεσθαι τεχθέντα τὰ παιδιά [because he mentioned

etymology is applied to Homeric hapaxes, even though the scholia do not say that explicitly.³⁹ Aristarchus also applies etymology to words that, though not hapax legomena, are extremely rare: some have two occurrences in the *Iliad* and none in the *Odyssey*,⁴⁰ while others have one occurrence in the *Iliad* and one in the *Odyssey*;⁴¹ still others have one occurrence in the *Iliad* and two⁴² or three⁴³ in the *Odyssey*, or have two in the *Iliad* and one in the *Odyssey*.⁴⁴

Etymology was also useful for more frequently occurring *glossai*, which, however, had very debated meanings. In these instances, Aristarchus used etymology in order to show that his interpretation was more correct, as it was based on strict linguistic analysis, than those provided by the Neoterioi,⁴⁵ the Glossographers,⁴⁶ or anonymous τινές.⁴⁷ Etymology could also offer concurrent, yet all linguistically correct, interpretations of a difficult term.⁴⁸ It also helped with words that could be confusing because they had both a positive and a negative meaning. For example, ἀγῆνωρ can be used both for praise (‘manly’) and for blame (‘arrogant’). Aristarchus explains (*Sch. Il.* 9.699b) how both meanings are related to the same etymology: they derive from ἄγαν, ‘(too) much’, and ἡγορέη, ‘manliness’; consequently the positive meaning must be interpreted as ‘the one who has much manliness and courage’ (ὁ ἄγαν τῇ ἡγορέῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ χρώμενος) and the negative as ‘the one who is too insolent and

the name πρότμησις only once. It is the place underneath the navel toward the flank, [so called] because newborn babies are cut there first [i.e., πρότμησις is from πρῶτον . . . τέμνεσθαι]; *Sch. Il.* 23.311a: πρὸς τὸ ἀφάρτεροι, ὅτι ἅπαξ ἐνταῦθα. καὶ ἐσχημάτισται παρὰ τὸ ἄφαρ, ὃ ἐστὶ ταχέως [with reference to ἀφάρτεροι (‘nimble’), because [he has used it] only once here. And it has been formed from ἄφαρ, i.e., ‘swiftly’]; *Sch. Il.* 23.845a: ὅτι ἅπαξ καλαῦροπα. σημαίνει δὲ τὸ ῥόπαλον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κάλου καὶ τοῦ ῥέπειν [because [he has used] καλαῦροψ only once; it means ‘stick’, from κάλον (‘wood’) and ῥέπειν (‘to bend’)].

39. E.g., ἄξυλος (*Sch. Il.* 11.155b; see above, § 1.3), ὑπεραῆς (*Sch. Il.* 11.297a), ἄβρομοι and αὐῖαχοι (*Sch. Il.* 13.41a; see above, § 1.1), ἄβρότη (*Sch. Il.* 14.78a; see above, § 1.1) ὁμωθῆναι (*Sch. Il.* 14.209a¹), παχνοῦται (*Sch. Il.* 17.112a), ἀεκήλια (*Sch. Il.* 18.77a; see above, § 1.1), εἶρη (*Sch. Il.* 18.531a), πανόψιος (*Sch. Il.* 21.397a¹ [Did.]), ἰόεις (*Sch. Il.* 23.850b), ἐντυπᾶς (*Sch. Il.* 24.163a).

40. E.g., πολύκεστος and κεστός (*Sch. Il.* 3.371b and 14.214a), πρόβατα (*Sch. Il.* 14.124a), χειή (*Sch. Il.* 22.93a), καμμονίη (*Sch. Il.* 22.257a^{1,2}; 23.661a^{1,2}; see below, § 3.2).

41. E.g., ἀπριάτην (*Sch. Il.* 1.97–9 [Did.]), κλητοί (*Sch. Il.* 9.165a), τρίγληνα μορόεντα (*Sch. Il.* 14.183a; cf. also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 14.183d), λικριφίς (*Sch. Il.* 14.463a; see above, § 1.2), ἐξεσίη (*Sch. Il.* 24.235a [Hrd.]; see below, § 5).

42. E.g., δεύτατος (*Sch. Il.* 19.51a).

43. E.g., ἐφέστιοι (*Sch. Il.* 2.125a).

44. E.g., δ(ε)ινωτός (*Sch. Il.* 3.391a), περιωπή (*Sch. Il.* 14.8a).

45. E.g., ὀσσόμενος (*Sch. Il.* 1.105a; 22.356a; 24.172a; see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.4), λευγαλέος (*Sch. Il.* 9.119a; 20.109a; 21.281a¹; see above, § 1.2), ἀμαθύνειν (*Sch. Il.* 9.593a; see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.4), ὑπέρτερος (*Sch. Il.* 11.786a¹; see below, § 3.3).

46. E.g., ἀγέρωχοι (*Sch. Il.* 3.36b; 10.430b), καμμονίη (*Sch. Il.* 22.257a^{1,2}; 23.661a^{1,2}), ὄνειατα (*Sch. Il.* 24.367a); see below, § 3.2.

47. E.g., ταλαύρινος (*Sch. Il.* 7.239a; see below, § 5), μενοεικής (*Sch. Il.* 23.139a).

48. E.g., ἀμφίγυνος (*Sch. Il.* 13.147a).

has fallen into insolence because of his courage' (ὁ ἄγαν ὑβριστικὸς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὑπερπεπτωκὼς εἰς ὕβριν).⁴⁹ Aristarchus also employed etymology to underscore the more specific meaning that a word could have in Homer. For example, as seen above (§ 1.1), he stresses that ὤτειλή is not any 'wound', but one received in close combat, since it derives from οὐτάμεναι, 'to strike with a weapon in hand' (*Sch. Il.* 11.266; 14.518a; 17.86a),⁵⁰ and that βρότος has a very specific meaning, 'human blood' (*Sch. Il.* 14.7a). From this perspective, etymology was very useful, because it helped to identify when words were used καταχρηστικῶς⁵¹ or κυρίως,⁵² to highlight the peculiar Homeric meaning,⁵³ or simply to explain their meaning with some additional support from a linguistic and objective approach.⁵⁴ Many of these *glossai* have already been discussed in Chapter 3.3.A. Indeed, Aristarchus seems often to have applied etymology and semantic analysis 'within the context' together in order to give a 'scientific' basis to his exegesis: whereas the context gave the reason why his interpretation was correct *in Homer*, the etymological analysis was the objective proof *from within*.

In fact, Aristarchus used etymology beyond the interpretation of *glossai*. Etymology could, for example, help to discuss variants, especially when they were hapaxes or when a selection needed to be made between two unattested possibilities. In these cases, etymology became the key to deciding which variant was better,⁵⁵ sometimes also helping to answer the question of how to divide the *scriptio continua*.⁵⁶ Etymology was useful, moreover, for establishing the orthography of a word, especially in the case of aspiration and interaspiration.⁵⁷

49. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 145; Nünlist 2012c, 209. Another term with two slightly different yet connected meanings analyzed in terms of etymology is λευγαλέος, 'ruinous' and 'miserable' (*Sch. Il.* 9.119a; 20.109a; 21.281a¹; see above, § 1.2).

50. See below, § 8.1; on the meaning of οὐτάμεναι vs. βάλλειν, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.5.

51. E.g., κυνέη (*Sch. Il.* 10.258a, discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11 and Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.4).

52. E.g., ἔναρα and ἐξεναρίζειν (*Sch. Il.* 10.528b and 7.146b; see below, § 3.1), ὀμλεῖν (*Sch. Il.* 11.502; 11.523; see below, § 3.1), εὐήκης and τανυήκης (*Sch. Il.* 22.319a; 16.768a; see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.3).

53. E.g., εὐχόμενος (*Sch. Il.* 19.100a), as opposed to the Koine meaning (*Sch. Il.* 5.121; 10.461c); see Chapter 3.3.A § 1.2 and § 2.2.

54. E.g., δόρπον (*Sch. Il.* 2.381a [Ariston.]), ἔντεα (*Sch. Il.* 10.23c; see below, § 3.1), σφεδανόν (*Sch. Il.* 11.165a [Did.]), τέμενος (*Sch. Il.* 6.194b; 18.550a; see below, § 8.1), τάφος (*Sch. Il.* 23.29a).

55. E.g., ἀπτοεπές/ἀπτοεπές (*Sch. Il.* 8.209a), ἰθυπτίωνα/ἰθυκτίωνα (*Sch. Il.* 21.169b¹; see Chapter 4 § 1.5.1), αἰσυητῆρι/αἰσυμνητῆρι (*Sch. Il.* 24.347c [ex.] and 24.347a [Did.]).

56. E.g., ἔχε νήδυμος / ἔχεν ἥδυμος (*Sch. Il.* 2.2b; see Chapter 3.1 § 3), δι' ἀσπιδῆς / διὰ σπιδῆς (*Sch. Il.* 11.754a [Hrd.]; see below, § 7), κεν ὕλαγμόν / κυνυλαγμόν (*Sch. Il.* 21.575a¹ and 21.575b.c [Hrd.]; see below, § 6), ῥ' ἥμονες / ῥήμονες (*Sch. Il.* 23.886a; see below, § 6).

57. E.g., ἄρσαντες/ἄρσαντες (*Sch. Il.* 1.136a [ex.]), κοτυλήρυτον/κοτυλήρυτον (*Sch. Il.* 23.34b; see below, § 5), ἐξέσιη/ἐξέσιη (*Sch. Il.* 24.235a; see below, § 5).

3. Etymology and Homeric *Glossai*

As the survey in the previous section has shown, etymological analysis for Aristarchus was closely linked to the analysis of Homeric language and vocabulary. His use of etymology was thus distinctively ‘linguistic’ and hence very far from the approach of other scholars who employed etymology to support their allegorical reading of Homer (see below, § 7). In particular, the analysis of etymology was for him another method to interpret Homeric *glossai*, especially when they were particularly obscure, or when the context alone did not provide enough information to understand the meaning of the word at issue. I will review here some specific applications of etymology within the analysis of Homeric vocabulary.

3.1. Etymology and Words Used according to the Standard Meaning (κυρίως)

Etymology discovered the ‘true’, hence ‘standard’ (κύριον) meaning of a word. Once this meaning had been identified, it could be compared with the Homeric meaning of the same word to see whether the poet conformed to the standard usage (κυρίως), or made a shift from it, using the word in a peculiar way (ιδίως).⁵⁸ For example, Aristarchus interprets the verb ὁμιλεῖν as meaning ‘to bring the troops (ἱλαί) together (ὁμοῦ)’—that is, he divides the form as ὁμ-ιλ-εῖν, demonstrating that the primary, hence standard, meaning of the verb is ‘to fight’ (*Sch. Il.* 11.502; 11.523: ὅτι κυρίως λέγει ‘ὁμιλέομεν’, ὁμοῦ τὰς ἱλας συμβάλλομεν). As a consequence, he must have considered the other Homeric meanings of ὁμιλεῖν (namely, ‘to consort with’, ‘to deal with’, ‘to speak with’) as secondary (but not incorrect!).⁵⁹

An interesting example is given by the collective noun ἔντεα. When commenting on *Il.* 10.75–76 (‘beside him lay his richly wrought armor (ἔντεα), / his shield and two spears and a shining helmet’), Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 10.75b)

58. For the distinction between words used κυρίως and words used ιδίως, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.3.

59. *Sch. Il.* 10.338 notes that ὄμιλος usually means ‘battle’ in the *Iliad* and ‘crowd’, ‘assembly’ of people in the *Odyssey*, but that in this specific Iliadic passage ὄμιλος means ‘crowd’, just like in the *Odyssey* (see also *Sch. Il.* 10.499a). This comment sounds as though it is directed against the Chorizontes, who may have pointed to the different usage in the two poems as further proof that they were not by the same author (see Chapter 5.2 § 3.1). But, with his etymological analysis, Aristarchus was showing what the real meaning of the word was and why the other meaning, too, was possible. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 144; Kohl 1917, 58–59 (fr. *18); Nünlist 2012c, 210–211. Generally, the ‘standard meaning’ of ὁμιλεῖν is considered to be ‘to consort’, ‘to gather’, from which the sense of ‘to be joined in battle’ or ‘to fight’ derives; see *LSJ* and *Lfgre*, s.v. ὁμιλέω. The etymology of the term is still debated (see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ὄμιλος), but Adrados 1949 accepts the Aristarchean one.

explains that the plural ἔντεα properly (κυρίως) indicates the shield, the helmet, and the spears—a conclusion which he probably reached because he understood line 76 (ἀσπίς καὶ δύο δοῦρε φαεινὴ τε τρυφάλεια) in apposition to ἔντεα in line 75. Sometimes, however, Homer uses ἔντεα to indicate a lion- or panther-skin that a hero wears as a garment when he does not fully arm himself. For example, Agamemnon and Menelaus don such skins at *Il.* 10.23 and 29, and later at line 34 Homer refers to the lion skin of Agamemnon as ἔντεα (*Sch. Il.* 10.34). For Aristarchus this use is possible because ἔντεα derives etymologically from ‘having a man inside (ἐντός)’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.23c: ἔντεα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐντός ἔχειν τὸν ἄνδρα).⁶⁰ Therefore, even if warriors are normally ‘inside’ their armor, sometimes, when they do not fight, they wrap themselves in an animal skin; hence, this secondary meaning is not incorrect, as it is still linked with the word’s etymology.

The same happens in the case of the noun ἔναρα and certain verbs connected with it. Aristarchus analyzes the noun as follows:

Sch. Il. 10.528b {Τυδείδης δὲ χαμᾶζε θορῶν} ἔναρα {βροτόεντα}: ὅτι περιεκτικῶς καὶ τὰ τόξα καὶ τὸ δόρυ ‘ἔναρα’ εἴρηκε σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις. κυρίως δὲ ἔναρα λέγεται, οἷς ἐνάρηρε τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐνήρμοσται, θώραξ καὶ κυνέα.

‘Spoils (ἔναρα)’: because he has also called the bow and the spear ἔναρα, comprehensively with the rest. In the standard usage, however, [the things] to which bodies have been fitted (ἐνάρηρε) and adapted, [i.e.,] the corselet and the helmet, are called ἔναρα.⁶¹

Even if in this specific case Homer uses ἔναρα ‘in a comprehensive way’ (περιεκτικῶς) for the bow and the spear together with the helmet and a wolf’s hide,⁶² the proper meaning of ἔναρα only includes things that are attached to the body, namely, the corselet and the helmet, since the word derives from ἐναραρίσκειν, ‘to fit’. Once he has determined the standard meaning of ἔναρα through etymology,⁶³ Aristarchus analyzes the derivative verb ἐξεναρίζειν, which is thus used in the ‘standard meaning’ when it means ‘to take away the ἔναρα’, that is, the armor (*Sch. Il.* 7.146b: ὅτι κυρίως τὸ ‘ἐξενάριξεν’ νῦν, τὰ

60. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 144–145.

61. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.570, where the latter meaning is defined ‘according to the common usage’ (κοινῶς).

62. This is what Odysseus and Diomedes take from Dolon at *Il.* 10.458–459.

63. The real etymology of ἔναρα, however, is debated, though the word does not seem to be connected with the verb ἐναραρίσκω; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ἔναρα.

ἔναρα περιεῖλεν).⁶⁴ Along with ἔναρα and ἐξενάριζειν, Aristarchus discusses ἐναίρειν, another verb derived from ἔναρα:⁶⁵

Sch. Il. 21.485a¹ θῆρας ἐναίρειν: ὅτι ἐναίρειν καταχρηστικῶς· θῆρες γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσι παντευχίαν ὥστε σκυλευθῆναι.

‘To slay (ἐναίρειν) beasts’: because ἐναίρειν is misused; for the beasts do not have armor so that they can be stripped.⁶⁶

As already concluded in Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11, the presence of words used καταχρηστικῶς does not imply that Aristarchus wanted to change the text. Homer did not commit a mistake in vocabulary, but rather he consciously employed the word in a deviant way according to a specific trope, namely, κατάχρησις. Still, etymology was often the tool which allowed Aristarchus to point to such ‘stylistic quirks’ because it revealed the ‘true’, standard meaning.

In certain instances, etymology could also explain why a word had or might have had a metaphorical meaning. For example, the epithet ἀμφίγυος, which is always and exclusively used for the ἔγχος, ‘spear’, was problematic. According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 13.147a), some interpreted this epithet as meaning ‘handled with *two hands*’, from γυῖα, which in Homer only means ‘hands’, ‘extremities’;⁶⁷ others analyzed it as derived from γυῖωσαι, ‘to wound’, because it *wounds on both sides*; still others took it metaphorically, in the sense of ‘*double pointed*’, because γυῖα are the ‘extremities’ (ἄκρα), and the spear has an extremity (ἄκρον) on both sides. In the scholium, Aristarchus does not indicate which solutions he prefers; still, while the first two analyses use etymology to discover the word’s literal sense, in the last one etymology is employed to understand it as a metaphor—probably one ‘from animate beings to inanimate objects’ according to the distinctions of ancient scholars.⁶⁸

3.2. Against the Glossographers

Aristarchus accused the Glossographers not only of limiting their analysis to one attestation of a problematic word (according to the method of ‘one-for-one’,

64. See also *Sch. Il.* 6.417 οὐδὲ μιν ἐξενάριξε: ὅτι διδάσκει, τί τὸ ‘ἐξενάριξεν’· ἐπιφέρει γὰρ ‘ἄλλ’ ἄρα μιν κατέκρη σὺν ἔντεσιν’ (*Il.* 6.418) [‘and he did not despoil him’: because [the poet] explains what ἐξενάριξεν means; for he adds: ‘but he burned him together with his armor’ (*Il.* 6.418)]. Cf. Nünlist 2012a, 114–115.

65. See Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ἔναρα; *Lfgre*, s.v. ἐναίρω.

66. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 145; Lotz 1909, 27 (with a completely different interpretation of the scholium).

67. On the meaning of γυῖα, see Chapter 3.3.A § 1.1.

68. On this type of metaphor, see Chapter 3.2.A § 3.

ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνός),⁶⁹ but also of interpreting words without regard for their etymology or according to a faulty etymology. Therefore, he often used etymology to argue against their analysis of Homeric words, as for example with καμμονή, which is 'the victory that is obtained by enduring in the same place (καταμονή)' rather than any kind of 'victory' (*Sch. Il.* 23.661a¹),⁷⁰ and τὰ ὀνείατα, which is 'everything that brings some advantage (ὀνησις)', rather than simply 'food' (*Sch. Il.* 24.367a).⁷¹

Another case concerns the adjective ἀγέρωχοι, an epithet used for people in the *Iliad*.⁷² The word is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 3.36b, without mentioning the Glossographers:

Sch. Il. 3.36b <Τρώων> ἀγέρωχων: ὅτι ἀγέρωχους τοὺς Τρώας, οὐ μόνον τοὺς Ῥοδίους (cf. *Il.* 2.654), ὥς τινες ᾤήθησαν, διὰ τὸ ἀγείρειν τὴν ὀχὴν, τουτέστι τὴν τροφήν· ὁ γὰρ Ὅμηρος ἀγέρωχους τοὺς ἄγαν γεράοχους καὶ σεμνοὺς λέγει.

'Of the honorable (ἀγέρωχων) Trojans': because [he calls] the Trojans ἀγέρωχοι, and not only the Rhodians (cf. *Il.* 2.654), **as some believed, because of 'gathering (ἀγείρειν) nourishment (ὀχὴν)', which is 'food'.** For Homer calls those who are full of honor (οἱ ἄγαν γεράοχοι) and venerable ἀγέρωχοι.

Aristarchus argues against the interpretation of ἀγέρωχοι as 'those who gather (ἀγείρειν) food (ὀχὴν)', proposed by 'some' scholars. Rather, the meaning is 'honorable', since the word is connected with γέρας, 'gift of honor'. Even if the Aristonicus scholia do not allow us to determine the identity of these τινές,⁷³ an entry from the *Epimerismi Homerici* reports the same explanation (highlighted in bold in the text), and refers it to the Glossographers:

Ep. Hom. α 163 ἀγέρωχων: . . . ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος τοὺς ἄγαν ἐντίμους, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄγαν ἐπὶ τοῦ γέρωσ ὀχεῖσθαι· ὥς αὖτις καθ' ὁμιλον ἔδν Τρώων ἀγέρωχων' (*Il.* 3.36)· ὁμοίως καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ· 'ἐννέα νῆας ἄγεν Ῥοδίων ἀγέρωχων' (*Il.* 2.654). **ἐνιοι δὲ τῶν Γλωσσογράφων** (fr. 1 Dyck) ἰδίως τούτους ἔδοξαν ἀγέρωχους λέγεσθαι, ἐπεὶ νησιῶται ἐπείσᾱκτῳ τροφῇ χρῶνται· **φασὶ γὰρ**

69. See discussion in Chapter 3.3.A § 3.

70. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.257a^{1,2}; 23.661a². Cf. Lehrs 1882, 105; Dyck 1987, 124, 144 (fr. 14).

71. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.367b (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 149; Dyck 1987, 123, 151–152 (fr. 23).

72. Rhodians in *Il.* 2.654, Trojans in *Il.* 3.36, 5.623, 7.343, 16.708, 21.584, and Mysians in *Il.* 10.430.

73. The other Aristonicus scholium that analyzes the word (*Sch. Il.* 10.430b) does not mention the Glossographers either; so too *Sch. Il.* 2.654 (ex. [Ariston.?).

εἰρῆσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγείρειν ὀχήν, τουτέστι τροφήν, Ὅμηρου μὲν οὐδέποτε τὴν τροφήν ὀχήν εἰρηκότος, ἔπειτα καὶ τοὺς Τρῶας ὄντας νησιώτας οὐδαμῶς ἀγέρωχους λέγοντος.

‘Of the honorable (ἀγέρωχων)’: . . . Homer [uses ἀγέρωχοι for] those who are much esteemed, from ‘to be carried (ὀχεῖσθαι) in much honor (ἄγαν ἐπὶ τοῦ γέρωσ)’; [as in] ‘so he went back into the crowd of the honorable Trojans’ (*Il.* 3.36). And similarly, also when he says in the Catalog of the Ships:⁷⁴ ‘he led nine ships of the honorable Rhodians’ (*Il.* 2.654). **Some of the Glossographers** thought that he called them ἀγέρωχοι in a peculiar way, because they are islanders and thus use food brought in from outside; **for they say that they are thus called from ‘gathering (ἀγείρειν) nourishment (ὀχήν)’**, which is ‘food’. But Homer has never called food ὀχή. And then he also calls the Trojans, who are not islanders at all, ἀγέρωχοι.⁷⁵

The entry from the *Epimerismi Homerici* matches the etymology of the Aristonicus scholium (underlined in the text), as well as adding more information. It is thus likely that it reports Aristarchus’ full analysis of the problem, which was curtailed in the scholium. According to the Glossographers, the adjective ἀγέρωχοι meant ‘those who gather (ἀγείρειν) food (ὀχή)’ because it refers to the Rhodians who, living on an island, have to acquire food from elsewhere. Aristarchus rejects this etymology, however, for two main reasons. First, the adjective ἀγέρωχοι is used not only for the Rhodians, but also for the Trojans (and the Mysians), who are not islanders, so that the meaning ‘those who gather food (from outside)’ is not applicable to other cases where the epithet occurs. Second, the word ὀχή, which the Glossographers assumed to be at the root of the epithet, is never used by Homer to indicate ‘food’. In fact, the term ὀχή is Hellenistic,⁷⁶ and thus for Aristarchus it cannot be used to analyze a Homeric word. His solution, on the contrary, is completely ‘Homeric’, since he etymologizes ἀγέρωχοι as οἱ ἄγαν γεράοχοι, ‘those who have much honor’, where the keyword is the Homeric γέρας, ‘honor’. The word γεράοχος is attested only in the scholia of Aristonicus to *Il.* 3.36 and 10.430; unless it occurred in a passage now lost, γεράοχος must have been invented by Aristarchus in order to make the etymology clear. In this light, γεράοχος might be a (fictive) compound derived from Aristarchus’ etymology (τὸ ἄγαν ἐπὶ τοῦ γέρωσ ὀχεῖσθαι, ‘to be carried in much honor’, as preserved by the *Epimerismi Homerici*), in order to

74. In antiquity, the Catalog of the Ships was called ‘Boeotia’ because the first contingent mentioned is indeed the one of the Boeotians (on this, see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.6). For example, this is how the section is introduced also in the D scholia: ἀρχὴ τῆς Βοιωτίας (van Thiel 2014b, 95, ad *Il.* 2.494).

75. See also *EM* 7.47–8.2; *EGud.* 10.9–12 Stef.; Hsch. α 462.

76. See *LSJ*, s.v. The word is used, for example, in Lyc. *Al.* 482. On the other hand, Arat. 1069, uses it as a synonym of ὀχεῖα, ‘mating’, ‘impregnating’.

explain ἀγέρωχος. Thus, ἀγέρωχος is equivalent to ὁ ἄγαν γεράοχος and is to be understood as ἄ + γέρ + ωχος, where ἄ- is intensive and stands for ἄγαν, γέρ- is the root of γέρας, the ‘gift of honor’ in the Homeric society, and -ωχος is a lengthened form of -οχος, which derives from the verb ὀχεῖσθαι, ‘to be carried’, ‘to be held’. This example is extremely interesting in terms of Aristarchean methodology. He rejects a possible interpretation of a Homeric word, both on the basis of the context and on the basis of etymology. First, he criticizes the Glossographers’ method of ‘one-for-one’ (ἐν ἀνθ’ ἐνός), since they based their etymology on only one occurrence of the adjective, at *Il.* 2.654, where it refers to the Rhodians, and which is also the first occurrence of the form. Moreover, an etymology of a Homeric word based on a non-Homeric word (such as the Glossographers’ ὀχή) is *ipso facto* wrong because, even when working within etymology, the principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’ (Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν) should be respected.⁷⁷

3.3. Homer and the Neoterioi

Even if Aristarchus sometimes used occurrences of a word in later poets (the Neoterioi) to understand the etymology of a Homeric word, as seen in § 1.3, later poets were normally not to be trusted, since they often misinterpreted Homeric vocabulary. In fact, Aristarchus’ etymological analysis also had the purpose of showing that Homer was indeed closer to the original—i.e., etymological—meaning of a word than later poets. The case of λευγαλέος analyzed above (§ 1.2) is an excellent example. Another interesting case of this kind of procedure is directed against Archilochus:

Sch. Il. 11.786a¹ {τέκνον ἐμὸν} γενεῇ μὲν <ὕπερτερος>: ὅτι Ἀρχίλοχος (fr. 38 West) ὑπερτέρεην τὴν νεωτέραν ἐδέξατο· οἴην Λυκάμβεω παῖδα τὴν ὑπερτέρεην ἀντὶ τοῦ τὴν νεωτέραν. καὶ τὸ ἔτυμον δὲ ἀντιπίπτει· ὁ γὰρ ὑπερέχων κατὰ τί ἐστιν ὑπερτερος. καὶ νῦν λέγει, τῷ γένει, τῇ εὐγενείᾳ ὑπερέχει διὰ τὸ εἶναι θεᾶς μητρός· σὺ δὲ πρεσβύτερος εἶ (cf. *Il.* 11.787).

‘[He is] superior (ὕπερτερος) in birth’: because Archilochus understood ὑπερτέρεη as ‘younger’: ‘only the younger (ὕπερτέρεην) daughter of Lycambe’ (fr. 38 West), instead of νεωτέρα. But the etymology contradicts [this interpretation], for ὑπερτερος is the one who is superior (ὕπερέχων) in something. And here he says: ‘in birth’, that is, ‘[Achilles] is superior in nobility of birth because he has been born from a goddess, but you are older’ (cf. *Il.* 11.787).⁷⁸

77. Cf. Dyck 1987, 131.

78. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.786a².

Nestor reminds Patroclus that Peleus exhorted him to take care of Achilles upon sending them off to war and said: ‘my child, in birth (γενεῇ) Achilles is ὑπέρτερος, but you are older (πρεσβύτερος)’ (*Il.* 11.786). In Aristarchus’ opinion, the juxtaposition of ὑπέρτερος with πρεσβύτερος, ‘older’, led some Greek speakers to assume that it meant ‘younger’. One of them was Archilochus, who used ὑπέρτερος as a synonym of νεώτερος, ‘younger’, in a line about the younger daughter of Lycambe (fr. 38 West).⁷⁹ Yet for Aristarchus this interpretation is contradicted by the etymology (καὶ τὸ ἔτυμον δὲ ἀντιπίπτει) because ὑπέρτερος is a comparative from ὑπέρ, and thus means ‘someone superior in something’ (ὁ γὰρ ὑπερέχων κατὰ τι).⁸⁰ In this passage, the specification is offered by the dative γενεῇ, whose primary meaning is not ‘age’, but rather ‘birth’ in the sense of ‘family’, ‘race’.⁸¹ Hence, what Peleus is saying is that Achilles is ‘superior’ in terms of nobility, but Patroclus in terms of age⁸² and thus he must take care of Achilles. Aristarchus’ etymological analysis is flawless. Moreover, it makes sense for the Homeric text, while according to the other interpretation Peleus would be uttering a meaningless tautology: ‘Achilles is younger in terms of age, but you are older’.⁸³

4. Etymology and Compounds

Closely connected to the question of etymology was that of compounds. Aristarchus used etymology both to explain the meaning of a compound and also to discuss whether the compound was the best solution rather than the division of the *scriptio continua* into separate words. In general, he often simply divided compounds according to their components. Without being the most

79. In fact, Archilochus might have used the adjective correctly to mean the ‘superior’ daughter of Lycambe, perhaps in terms of sexual position, as suggested by West 1974, 123. If so, Aristarchus misunderstood Archilochus. On the other hand, Eust. 884.33–35 (ad *Il.* 11.786) takes ὑπέρτερος as an Ionic form for νεώτερος, probably misled both by the ambiguity of the Homeric passage and by the use of ὑπέρτερος in Archilochus.

80. Cf. Chantraine *DELG*, s.v. ὑπερ.

81. See also *Sch. Il.* 4.60b. Aristarchus’ analysis of γενεῇ is correct; see *LSJ*, s.v. γενεά; Chantraine *DELG*, s.v. γίγνομαι, A) 1°.

82. In *Sch. Il.* 23.94 Aristarchus observes that it is clear that Achilles was younger than Patroclus from the way the former addresses the latter’s ghost (ἡθεῖη κεφαλῇ). He came to this conclusion by noticing that the vocative ἡθεῖε was used by younger people to address older ones, as in the cases of Menelaus addressing Agamemnon (*Il.* 10.37), and Athena, disguised as Hector’s younger brother Deiphobus, when she addresses Hector (*Il.* 22.229, 239); see *Sch. Il.* 10.37; 22.229a; 22.239. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 185.

83. Another famous polemical argument against the Neoterioi in which Aristarchus uses etymology involves Sleep’s epithet νήδυμος, analyzed in Chapter 3.1 § 3.

refined type of analysis, this operation, too, was part of ancient etymology because the division of a compound into its ‘components’ is indeed the first step toward its etymological, and hence semantic, analysis. In particular, when dealing with especially arcane compounds, Aristarchus sometimes divided them into their components before then ‘translating’ each of these components into simpler forms of Greek. For example, he paraphrases the epithet *πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο* (referring to Hades, ‘the strong gate-fastener’) as ‘the one who hangs on (*ἐπαρτῶντος*), that is, who fastens (*ἀρμόζοντος*) the gates (*τὰς πύλας*) strongly’ (*Sch. Il.* 13.415c): he thus understands *πυλ-άρταο* as deriving from *πύλας ἐπαρτῶντος*⁸⁴ and then also glosses his own etymology from *ἐπαρτάω* with the clearer *ἀρμόζω*, so that the meaning of the compound becomes plain. In this case, etymology is the first step to interpreting a compound by showing its components, which are then further clarified by an easier, and not etymologically connected, paraphrase.⁸⁵

Etymology was also useful for deciding whether to write words as compounds or separately. Aristarchus does not seem to have followed a specific rule: sometimes he writes compounds,⁸⁶ sometimes he prefers to have two separate words,⁸⁷ or observes that Homer writes what normally is a compound as two separate words (*διαλελυμένως*).⁸⁸ In fact, at least in one case Aristarchus seems to have been open as to whether to read a form ‘in composition’ (*ἐν συνθέσει*) or ‘in juxtaposition’ (*ἐν παραθέσει*), namely, as two separate words:

Sch. Il. 24.318a ἘΥΚΛΗΪΣ ἀραρυῖα: ὅτι δύναται καὶ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἑὺκλήϊς, εὐεπὶκλειστος, χωρὶς δὲ τὸ ἀραρυῖα. δύναται δὲ καὶ κατὰ συναλιφήν, εὖ ταῖς κλ<ε>ίσιν ἀραρυῖα.

ἘΥΚΛΗΪΣ ἀραρυῖα: because it can be [read] as a compound *ἑὺκλήϊς*, ‘with good bolts’, and, separately, ‘fastened’ (*ἀραρυῖα*). But it can also be [read] in synalepha: ‘well fastened with bars (*εὖ ταῖς κλεισὶν ἀραρυῖα*)’.

84. Aristarchus’ etymology probably arises from the fact that he imagined the gates of Hades as having two panels (*πύλαι*) held by transversal bars (*ὀχῆες*), which Hades would ‘hang on’ (*ἐπαρτάω*) and ‘fasten’ (*ἀρμόζω*) strongly. In fact, *πυλάρτης* derives from *πύλας* + *ἀραρίσκειν*; see *Lfgre*, s.v. *πυλάρτης*; Chantraine, *DELG*, s.vv. *ἀραρίσκω* and *πύλη*.

85. For another similar example, see *Sch. Il.* 7.305b and 15.538a (discussing the phrase *φοίνικι φαεινός*, ‘bright with purple’).

86. E.g., Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.59d; 4.410a; 8.527a.b; 9.130a with 9.130b (ex. [Ariston.?]); 9.147a^{1,2}; 9.236b; 10.38d; 10.247a; 11.326b with 11.326a (Ariston.) and 11.326c (ex. [Hrd.]); 13.450a¹; 16.497b (ex. [Hrd.?]); Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 6.319a; 16.31a; 22.51a¹ with 22.51d (Hrd.) and 22.51e (ex.); Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 17.481a; and *Sch. Il.* 1.572a.b (Ep. Hom.). Some of these cases have been discussed in Chapter 3.1 § 4.3.

87. E.g., Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 4.94a^{1,2,3}; 8.441b¹; 16.483.

88. E.g., Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 6.257; 6.317a; 7.345b—all on the fact that Homer uses *ἄκρη πόλις* instead of the compound *ἄκροπόλις*. See also *Sch. Il.* 13.12d (discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 3.1).

One can read ΕΥΚΛΗΪΣ, referring to a door ἀραρυῖα, ‘fastened’, as a compound, ἐϋκλήϊς, in the sense of ‘well-closed’ (εὐεπικλειστός), and independently from ἀραρυῖα, so as to have ‘well-closed (ἐϋκλήϊς) and fastened (ἀραρυῖα)’. Otherwise, one can read εὖ κληῖς ἀραρυῖα, where the full form is the Ionic dative for κλείς, ‘bar’, and thus κληῖσι⁸⁹ in synalepha with the alpha of ἀραρυῖα, so as to have ‘well fastened (εὖ . . . ἀραρυῖα) with bars (κληῖσι)’. Aristarchus’ main argument, however, seems to be that the choice between the variants is not crucial because etymologically these two readings are identical, even if they are syntactically different.⁹⁰ His flexibility in this case was probably due to the fact that the Homeric usage itself showed both solutions, even with the same word. In fact, at *Il.* 23.523 Homer uses the compound δίσκουρα, ‘discus cast’, to mean a measure indicating the distance covered by a discus throw, but earlier at *Il.* 23.431 the same idea was expressed with two words: δίσκου οὔρα. Herodian (*Sch. Il.* 23.523b) has preserved a direct quotation of Aristarchus, who notes: “what he said before in two words (κατὰ διάλυσιν), ‘as far as the cast of a discus (δίσκου οὔρα)’ (*Il.* 23.431), now he has pronounced it as a compound (κατὰ σύνθεσιν).”⁹¹

Since etymology, if performed correctly, allowed the exegete to understand a compound, then there was no need for Aristarchus to keep a line where the compound was resolved into its components, especially when the compound was easy to understand. This is the case with *Il.* 8.527–528: in line 527 Hector calls the Greeks κηρεσσιφορήτους [dogs], i.e., ‘[dogs] brought by the Keres’, and in the next line he repeats the concept while breaking the compound into its components: ‘whom the Keres (κῆρες) bring (φορέουσι) on the dark ships’. According to Herodian (*Sch. Il.* 8.527a.b), Aristarchus wrote κηρεσσιφορήτους as a compound (and not κήρεσσι φορητούς), which is correct ‘because [Homer] resolves it into οὓς κῆρες φορέουσιν (*Il.* 8.528), for it is his custom often to resolve compounds’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.527b: ἐπεὶ ἀναλύει αὐτὸ ‘οὓς κῆρες φορέουσιν’. ἔθος γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλάκις τὰ σύνθετα ἀναλύειν). This is, however, Herodian’s point of view rather than Aristarchus’. In fact, the latter athetized line 528 as superfluous (περισσός), exactly because the same idea was expressed in a concise way (συντόμως) in the compound κηρεσσιφορήτους (*Sch. Il.* 8.528).⁹²

89. Used in Homer in *Il.* 16.170, *Od.* 2.419 = 4.579 (where the word means rowing bench), etc.

90. In *Sch. Il.* 24.318b Herodian assumes that Aristarchus read it as a compound, ἐϋκλήϊς (the reading that he himself prefers), while he attributes the reading εὖ κληῖς(ι) to Tryphon. Cf. Ribbach 1883, 14, and Richardson 1993, 306.

91. See also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 23.523a. Both scholia are translated and discussed in Chapter 1.1 § 4.1.

92. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 19; Meijering 1987, 173; Lührs 1992, 95. See also Chapter 3.3.A § 1.1 and Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4.

5. Etymology and Interaspiration

Aristarchus also applied etymology to compound words to discover their ‘inner’ orthography when the problem involved the question of interaspiration. Interaspiration was a concept often used among ancient grammarians who, in analyzing compound words, wanted to signal the kind of breathing present in all the elements of the word at issue.⁹³ Indeed breathings within a word are still marked in papyri⁹⁴ and ancient manuscripts; for example, in the *Venetus A* there are cases like ἀέκων in *Il.* 11.557, ἀάπτους in *Il.* 7.309, and ἐνήκε in *Il.* 20.80.⁹⁵ Aristarchus could certainly mark aspirations in the *ekdosis*; sometimes, however, he discussed the more difficult cases in the *hypomnema*, and Aristonicus has preserved one fragment concerning interaspiration:

Sch. Il. 23.34b κοτυλήρυτον: ὅτι ψιλῶς προενεκτέον ‘κοτυλήρυτον’. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ῥύσεως, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρύσαι· κοτύλη δὲ εἶδος ποτηρίου κοίλου. Ἀρίσταρχος πολὺ, ὥστε κοτύλη ἀρύσασθαι.

‘Copious (κοτυλήρυτον)’: because κοτυλήρυτον must be pronounced with a smooth breathing: for it does not [derive] from ῥύσις (‘flow’), but from ἀρύσαι (‘to draw’). The *kotyle* is a species of hollow vessel. Aristarchus [says that κοτυλήρυτον means] ‘much’, so to be drawn (ἀρύσασθαι) with a *kotyle*.⁹⁶

The statement that κοτυλήρυτον, which starts with κ, ‘must be pronounced with a smooth breathing’ sounds odd, unless we think in terms of interaspiration. In fact, the discussion concerns the breathing of the second element of the compound, -(ή)ρυτον, and the solution depends on the etymology: κοτυλήρυτον can be divided as κοτυλή-ρυτον or as κοτυλ-ήρυτον. In the former case, the compound is derived from κοτύλη and ῥυτόν, a verbal adjective from ῥέειν, ‘to flow’ (hence the derivation from ῥύσις in the scholium); the compound would thus mean ‘flowing copiously’, ‘streaming’. Otherwise, in the case of κοτυλ-ήρυτον, the compound is formed by κοτύλη and ἀρυτόν (with a change of α into η), the verbal adjective of ἀρύειν, ‘to draw (water, wine, etc.)’; interpreted in this way, the compound would mean ‘to be drawn in cups’. In terms of interaspiration, the first solution gives κοτυλήρυτον, whereas the second gives

93. Cf. Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 219; Smyth 1956, § 12. On interaspiration in Aristarchus and other ancient grammarians (especially Herodian), see Ribbach 1883, 9–10; La Roche 1866, 416–420; Lehrs 1882, 300–325 (who has an entire chapter entitled ‘De interaspiratione’, where he discusses the question beyond Aristarchus).

94. For examples, see Chapter 3.1 § 5.

95. Cf. West, ad loc.

96. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 304.

κοτυλήρυτον. It is clear that, from a semantic point of view, both solutions are sound. This Homeric hapax is in fact referring to the blood (αἷμα) of the sacrificial victims slaughtered during the funeral feast for Patroclus; the context requires the blood to be flowing copiously—a meaning that both κοτυλήρυτον and κοτυλήρυτον convey. Aristarchus' decision for κοτυλήρυτον is thus purely based on the etymology of the word, κοτυλ-ήρυτον in the sense of 'drawn in cups', which indeed is the correct etymology.⁹⁷ Furthermore, we might speculate that for Aristarchus this interpretation might have also been preferable as it was more 'suggestive',⁹⁸ because it expressed that the blood is so copious that it could be 'drawn in cups'.

A similar question arose for ἐξεσίη, which means 'embassy', and was analyzed either as deriving from ἵημι/ιέναι, 'to send', or from εἶμι/ιέναι, 'to go'. Herodian (*Sch. Il.* 24.235a) states that Aristarchus opted for ἵημι; hence, he wrote ἐξεσίη,⁹⁹ whereas Neoptolemus of Parium selected εἶμι, and thus wrote ἐξεσίη. As Herodian explains, Aristarchus based his analysis on internal evidence. The word has only two occurrences in Homer, namely, in *Il.* 24.235 and in *Od.* 21.20. Aristarchus focuses on the latter to prove his etymology. *Od.* 21.20–21 reads: 'for this case Odysseus went on an embassy (ἐξεσίην . . . ἦλθεν) on a long trip, when he was young; for his father and the other elders sent (ἦκε) him forth'. According to Aristarchus, the aorist ἦκε from ἵημι in line 21 proves that ἐξεσίη is a compound from ἵημι, because playing with the etymology of words by adding etymological references nearby is a typical stylistic feature of Homer (see below, § 8.1).¹⁰⁰

Even the question of whether a word was a compound or not could be addressed in terms of etymology and interaspiration, as with the adjective ταλαύρινος:

Sch. Il. 5.289b¹ (Hrd.) ταλαύρινον: Ἀρίσταρχος ψιλοῖ τὸ ρ· οὐ γάρ, φησί, σύνθετον δεῖ νοεῖν τὸν σχηματισμόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀπλὴν ἔννοιαν· τὸν γὰρ εὐτολμον καὶ ἰσχυρόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης. Τρύφωνι (fr. 96 Velsen)

97. See Chantraine, *DELG*, s.vv. ἀρύω (1) and κοτύλη.

98. On 'suggestiveness' (ἔμφασις), see Chapter 3.2.A § 17.

99. The form is marked with interaspiration (so, ἐξεσίη) even in the *Venetus A*, fol. 315v.

100. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 302. Herodian shares Aristarchus' etymology, but does not use Homer to demonstrate that ἐξεσίη from ἵημι is better than ἐξεσίη from εἶμι. Rather, he explains that many nouns in -σία are derived from sigmatic futures, such as θυσία from θύσω, ἀξία from ἄξω, δοσία from δώσω, προδοσία from προδώσω. Ἐξεσία is the same, since the ending -σία is a signal that there is a future at the basis of this compound. In particular, ἐσία is derived from ἦσω, the future of ἵημι, and not from εἶμι, because the latter does not have a sigmatic future. Though he shares Aristarchus' solution, then, Herodian reaches it in a very different way, which measures the difference between the two scholars in approaching linguistic and etymological issues. On the different approaches of Aristarchus and Herodian, see also Chapter 3.5 § 9.

δὲ ἀρέσκει ὁ σχηματισμὸς σύνθετος εἶναι παρὰ τὸ ταλαόν καὶ τὸ ῥινόν. . . . ἡ μέντοι παράδοσις ἐπείσθη Ἀριστάρχῳ.

ταλαύρινον: Aristarchus writes ρ with a smooth breathing; for, he says, the formation must not be understood as a compound, but with a simple meaning: for [it means] the courageous (εὐτολμον) and strong. Aristophanes also [takes it] in the same way. Tryphon (fr. 96 Velsen) instead wants a compound formation from ‘one who bears’ (ταλαός) and ‘hide’ (ῥινός). . . . The tradition, however, followed Aristarchus.¹⁰¹

The adjective ταλαύρινος is an epithet of Ares in Homer,¹⁰² but it is used once adverbially in ταλαύρινον πολεμίζειν (*Il.* 7.239), in the sense of ‘to fight toughly’. Modern scholars consider ταλαύρινος a compound of the radical τλά-, ‘to bear’, and ῥινός, ‘hide’, literally meaning ‘bearing a shield of oxhide’;¹⁰³ this is also the etymology provided by Tryphon. Aristarchus, however, does not consider it a compound, and uses interaspiration to make this point clear. He writes ταλαύρινον with a smooth breathing on ρ, which means that the word is not to be divided into ταλαύ-ρινον, since all the words beginning with ρ in Greek have initial aspiration. The reason behind Aristarchus’ choice is indeed the word’s use in *Il.* 7.239, since in his opinion ταλαύρινον πολεμίζειν hardly means ‘to fight by bearing a shield of oxhide’,¹⁰⁴ but rather ‘to fight bravely’. This corresponds to his etymology of ταλαύρινον, which, as he adds again, has nothing to do with the word ῥινός, ‘hide’ (*Sch. Il.* 7.239a: εὐτολμον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ῥινὸς ἔγκειται, ὡς ᾠήθησάν τινες). Ταλαύρινος just means ‘courageous’ because it is a derivative from the radical τλα-, in the sense of ‘to suffer’ and ‘to dare’. This can work both as an epithet of Ares and as an adverb in the phrase ταλαύρινον πολεμίζειν. Aristarchus thus finds a solution which fits every Homeric occurrence within its context—and supports it with etymology.

6. Etymology and Variant Readings

Though this was not its primary function, etymology could also be employed to discriminate among different variants. In these cases, etymology was not the deciding factor, but rather a tool to understand the meaning and origin

101. See also *Sch. Il.* 5.289b² (Hrd.) and 5.289a. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 304–305.

102. In *Il.* 5.289 = 20.78 = 22.267: Ἄρηα, ταλαύρινον πολεμιστήν.

103. See Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ῥινός; *Lfgre*, s.v. ταλαύρινος.

104. Indeed, the use in *Il.* 7.239 is difficult to understand; cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ῥινός. A fairly complicated (as well as unconvincing) solution is suggested by Leumann 1950, 196–202.

of a variant and to see whether it was plausible or not. A case of a variant (or emendation) chosen by Aristarchus on the basis of the etymology concerns *Il.* 22.66–69, where Priam, trying to convince Hector not to fight with Achilles, foreshadows his own future. Once all his sons are killed—Priam laments—he himself will be slain by a Greek, and ‘in front of the doors (πρώτησι θύρῃσιν) the dogs who eat raw meat will tear me apart as the last one . . . , the dogs that I reared in my palace at my table as guardians of my doors (θυραωρούς)’. Didymus notes that θυραωρούς is Aristarchus’ reading, as he rejected the variant πυλαωρούς (*Sch. Il.* 22.69a¹). Didymus does not specify the reason why Aristarchus chose this reading, but he probably chose it because at line 66 Priam mentions πρώτησι θύρῃσιν, which are the ‘doors’ of a house, and not the ‘gates’ (πύλαι) of a city. Thus, Priam is talking about his palace, and the dogs are those trained to keep watch at ‘the doors of the house’, not at ‘the gates of the city’ (which would have been a ridiculous statement). Hence, the compound must be θυραωρούς, which fits the context: the dogs guard θύραι, and not πύλαι.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, with this reading Homer would also engage his readers with etymological wordplay, by first using θύρῃσιν and then the compound θυραωρούς (see below, § 8.1). On the other hand, overspecification arising from a compound is sometimes rejected on the basis of etymology:

Sch. Il. 21.575a¹ οὐδὲ φοβεῖται, ἐπεὶ κεν ὑλαγμὸν ἀκούσῃ: . . . καὶ ὅτι ἐν τισι γράφεται ‘κυνυλαγμὸν’. οὐκ ἀνάγκη δέ ἐστιν· ὁ γάρ ὑλαγμός ἴδιος κυνῶν. σύνδεσμος δέ ἐστιν ὁ κέν, εἴτα ὑλαγμὸν.

‘[The leopard] does not flee when (κεν) she hears barking (ὑλαγμὸν)’: . . . and because in some copies there is written κυνυλαγμὸν (‘dog-barking’). But there is no necessity: for ὑλαγμός (‘barking’) is typical of dogs. It is κέν, conjunction, and then ὑλαγμὸν.¹⁰⁶

The variant κυνυλαγμός, ‘dog-barking’, found in some copies, is discarded on the basis that it is not semantically necessary since ὑλαγμός alone means the ‘barking’ of dogs. There is no need for any additional element in the word in order to specify further that such a sound belongs to a dog, as with κυν- in

105. See also Eust. 1257.36 (ad *Il.* 22.69). Yet *Sch. Il.* 22.69b (ex.) supports the other reading on the basis that the ancients used to have dogs at city gates, so that they could alert the townspeople with their barking if intruders were trying to enter. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 124; Hofmann 1905, 24; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 140.

106. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.575a²; 21.575b (Hrd.); 21.575c (Hrd. | Did.). The variant κυνυλαγμὸν was in Zenodotus’ text; Stesichorus, too, used the form κυνυλαγμός (fr. 255 *PMG*). Cf. Duentzer 1848, 45; Monro 1891, § 296; Dimpfl 1911, 10; Wecklein 1919, 33; Rengakos 2000, 327; West 2001, 262.

κυνυλαγμός; rather, instead of κυν-, it is much better to read κεν and associate it with the subjunctive ἀκούσῃ.

As this case shows, etymology is excellent for choosing variants arising from *scriptio continua*. Another example concerns *Il.* 23.886: during the funeral games, ‘also the javelin-throwers (καὶ ῥ’ ἥμονες ἄνδρες) stood up’. The *scriptio continua* KAIPHMONEΣΑΝΔΡΕΣ, however, can also be divided into καὶ ῥήμονες ἄνδρες. Aristarchus analyzes both variants and concludes that, while ἥμονες means ‘throwers’ because it is derived from ἰέναι, ῥήμονες, read by τινές, is equivalent to ῥήτορες and so is wrong, since ‘the contest is not one of oratory’ (*Sch. Il.* 23.886a: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λογιστικὸς ὁ ἀγών).¹⁰⁷

7. Aristarchus’ Etymology versus Crates’ Etymology

Crates of Mallos often used etymology in order to support his views about Homer’s πολυμάθεια, ‘wide learning’.¹⁰⁸ His analysis of Homeric words—and, in particular, of divine epithets—was directed at showing that the gods in Homer were actually allegories of physical reality, according to Stoic doctrines.¹⁰⁹ For example, he derived the accusative for Zeus, Δία, from διαίειν, ‘to wet’, because Zeus ‘moistens’ the earth with the rain, making it fertile (*Lyd. Mens.* 4.71).¹¹⁰ Such a ‘philosophical’ use of etymology to read Homer was most alien to Aristarchus, who instead conceived of etymology as a purely linguistic tool to analyze Homeric words. In the case of Apollo’s epithet ΗΙΟΣ, whose meaning and orthography were debated in antiquity, it is possible to compare directly the use of etymology in Crates and Aristarchus:¹¹¹

Sch. Il. 15.365a (Hrd.) {ὥς ῥα σὺ} ἦϊε: Ἀρίσταρχος δασύνει, ἀπὸ τῆς ἔσεως τῶν βελῶν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράτητα (fr. 23 Broggiato) ψιλῶς, ἀπὸ τῆς ἰάσεως· καὶ οὕτως ἐπείσθησαν οἱ γραμματικοὶ πρὸς διάφορον ἐτυμολογίαν διαφόρως ἀναγινώσκειν.

‘HIE’: Aristarchus pronounces [ḥiē] with a rough breathing, from ‘shooting’ (ἔσις) of the arrows. Those around Crates (fr. 23 Broggiato) [read it] with a

107. See also Herodian in the second part of *Sch. Il.* 23.886a; cf. also *Sch. Il.* 23.886b (ex. [Ariston. + Hrd.]); 23.891 (Ariston. | Hrd.).

108. On Crates’ idea of Homer’s πολυμάθεια, see Broggiato 2001, lv–lix, and Chapter 6 § 6.

109. On Crates’ etymologies, see the introduction to this chapter (with bibliography).

110. Cf. Mette 1936, 138–139 (fr. 3); Broggiato 2001, 278 (fr. 130).

111. Other cases of opposing etymologies adopted by Crates and Aristarchus are discussed by Broggiato 2003, and Schironi 2004, 124–130 (fr. 12).

smooth breathing, from ‘healing’ (ἰασις). And so the grammarians were persuaded to read in a different way according to the different etymology.¹¹²

The difference in orthography for this epithet originates from the different etymologies given by the two scholars. Crates links ἥϊος with the verb ἰᾶσθαι, ‘to heal’, and considers it to mean ‘healer’. Aristarchus, on the contrary, reads ἥϊος with a rough breathing, deriving it from ἰέναι, ‘to let go’, ‘to throw’, and holds that the epithet means ‘shooter’.¹¹³ This etymological analysis seems to be connected to the myth of the killing of Python. The story is recounted by Callimachus in the *Hymn to Apollo*,¹¹⁴ where he tells the *aition* of this epithet: at Delphi, Apollo was urged to kill Python by the people who shouted (l. 103): ἦ ἦ παιῆον, ἔει βέλος, which is the refrain to invoke Apollo in the rest of the hymn.¹¹⁵ The invocation ἦ ἦ παιῆον is interpreted as ἔει, παῖ, ἰόν, ‘shoot the dart, boy’. From this *aition*,¹¹⁶ Aristarchus probably deduced his etymology of ἥϊος from ἰέναι, so that these epithets celebrate Apollo as an archer.¹¹⁷

This orthographical question had more far-reaching consequences than simply the choice of breathing and the etymology of an epithet. In choosing to read ἥϊος with aspiration and refusing to see Apollo as a healer (ἥϊος), Aristarchus was also arguing against those who identified Apollo with Paean, the physician of the gods. Among them were the Neoteroi and, in particular, the tragedians, but such identification is extraneous to Homer, who clearly distinguishes between the two figures.¹¹⁸ At Pergamum, Zenodotus of Mallos, a pupil of Crates, also identified them as one god¹¹⁹ and might have even written

112. In what follows in the scholium, Herodian gives his personal solution, which is to write the epithet with a smooth breathing, regardless of its etymology, because η before a vowel always loses aspiration. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.365b (ex.).

113. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 326; Ribbach 1883, 8; Helck 1905, 35–40 (fr. VII); Mette 1952, 71–74 (fr. 55); Broggiato 2001, 184–185 (fr. 23); Broggiato 2003, 67–69; Schironi 2004, 359–366 (fr. 45); Bouchard 2016, 103–104. According to van Thiel 2014a, II 576, this is also a case of interaspiration, because the aspiration was on the iota, so ἥϊος from ἰᾶσθαι, ‘to heal’, and ἥϊος from ἰέναι, ‘to throw’. This is possible. Wherever the aspiration was placed, however, the two etymological arguments are the same.

114. Call. *Hy.* 2.97–104. Cf. also Call. *Aet.* IV, frs. 88 and 89 Pfeiffer.

115. Call. *Hy.* 2.21, 25, 80, 97, with either ἦ παιῆον or simply ἦ ἦ.

116. This *aition* is also known to Apollonius Rhodius (2.701–713); cf. Williams 1978, 85; Hunter 1986, 59–60. On this myth, see Schreiber 1879.

117. This is considered a popular etymology; ἥϊος (together with the alternative form ἰῆϊος) actually derives from the ritual invocation of Apollo ἦ (and ἦ?); see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.vv. ἦτε, ἰῆϊος. But Wecklein 1919, 70, connects the epithet with ἠώς, ‘dawn’.

118. See discussion in Chapter 5.3 § 4.2.

119. *Sch. Il.* 15.262 (ex.) ἔμπνευσε μένος μέγα <ποιμένι λαῶν>: Ζηνόδοτος ὁ Μαλλώτης (fr. 2 Broggiato) ἐκ τούτου συνάγει ὅτι Παιήων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἀπόλλων, εἶγε αὐτὸς ἐπιρρώνυσι τὸν Ἑκτορα [‘[Apollo] infused the chief of men with great strength’]: from this line Zenodotus of Mallos concludes that Apollo is Paean if he really gives strength to Hector]. Cf. Broggiato 2014, 126–131.

a treatise dedicated to arguing against Aristarchus on this topic.¹²⁰ There is no fragment of Crates explicitly identifying Apollo with Paeon; still, Crates' interpretation of ΗΙΟΣ as 'healer' might suggest that he shared this idea as well.¹²¹ Crates' ἥϊος for Apollo the 'healer', however, seems to have had another and more important agenda, since this etymology supports his allegorical interpretation of the *Iliad*. In fact, according to the Pergamene scholar, Apollo represents the sun.¹²² Interestingly, a passage from Macrobius connects Apollo as the sun with the epithet ΙΗΙΟΣ (closely connected with ΗΙΟΣ), according to Crates' interpretation:

Macr. Sat. 1.17.16: *cum ergo sint huiusce sideris, id est solis, duo maximi effectus, alter quo calore temperato iuvat mortalium vitam, alter quo iactu radiorum nonnumquam pestiferum virus immittit, duo eademque cognomina circa singulos effectus propriis enuntiationibus signant, appellantes deum Ἰήϊον atque Παῖνα. quae cognomina utrique effectui apta sunt, ut sit Ἰήϊος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰᾶσθαι, id est a sanando, et Παῖνα ἀπὸ τοῦ παύειν τὰς ἀνίας, et rursus Ἰήϊος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰέναι, ab immittendo, et Παῖνα ἀπὸ τοῦ παίειν, a feriendo.*

The main effects of this star, namely, the sun, are two: one, that with its temperate heat it benefits human life; the other, that with its darting rays it sometimes sends a deadly pestilence. For this reason, they establish the same two names with a specific meaning for these two distinct effects, calling the god Ἰήϊος and Παῖνα. These nouns are appropriate for both effects so that Ἰήϊος comes from ἰᾶσθαι, that is, from 'healing' and Παῖνα comes from παύειν τὰς ἀνίας [from 'ending the pain']; or conversely Ἰήϊος comes from ἰέναι, from 'sending off' and Παῖνα from παίειν, from 'striking'.

120. Sch. Veron. Verg. Aen. 10.738: Zenodotus (T 1 Broggiato) in eo, quem inscribit Παινονίαν [corr. Baschera: ΠΕΙΤΟΝΙΗΝ cod. V] [histo]riam, sub nomine Naucratis facit disser[ere] Aristarchios, qui putant alium Paeana esse, alium Apollinem; ipse eundem nec diver[sum] multis docet [in the work entitled Παινονία under the name of Naucratis, Zenodotus gives voice to the pupils of Aristarchus, who think that Paeon is one [god] and Apollo is another; but he teaches in many places that [Paeon] is the same god and not a different one]. This piece of evidence and especially the title of Zenodotus' treatise are debated, however, because the only codex (Veron. Bibl. Capit. XL (38)) offers the corrupt and meaningless ΠΕΙΤΟΝΙΗΝ. Cf. Wachsmuth 1860, 28; Schrader 1880–1882, 430–431; Helck 1905, 38–39; Nickau 1972, 46–47; Broggiato 2014, 119–120.

121. Yet, without necessarily identifying Apollo and Paeon, Crates could have simply observed that Apollo indeed has healing powers, as he heals the wounds of Glaucus at *Il.* 16.527–531 and takes care of the dead Hector at *Il.* 24.18–21.

122. As Porphyry testifies in Sch. *Il.* 18.240b (= QH *Il.* 224.15–225.4): . . . Κράτης (fr. 26 Broggiato) μὲν τὸν αὐτὸν Ἀπόλλωνα εἶναι καὶ ἥλιον [Crates [maintains] that Apollo is the same as the sun]. See also Sch. *Il.* 18.240a (ex.). Cf. Mette 1936, 58–59 n. 2; Broggiato 2001, 188–189 (fr. 26). The identification of Apollo with the sun is Stoic: see Cleanth. SVF 1, frs. 540–542, and Chrysipp. SVF 2, fr. 1095.

Macrobius does not mention Aristarchus or Crates; however, he reports their etymologies as far as the epithet *Ἰηϊός* is concerned, framing them within an allegorical reading of Apollo as the sun.¹²³ Aristarchus did not accept this identification, but his etymology of *Ἰηϊός* from *ἰέναι* was apparently accepted by other scholars who fitted it into the allegorical reading of Apollo as sun. Among those scholars, here left anonymous, was probably Timotheus, as Macrobius explains elsewhere.¹²⁴ In addition, Macrobius seems to prove that the two points made by Crates about Apollo—(1) the epithet *Ἰηϊός*/*Ἰηϊός* derives from *ἰᾶσθαι* because Apollo is a ‘healer’; and (2) Apollo is to be identified with the sun—are connected, as Apollo-sun is a healing, beneficent god.¹²⁵ On the contrary, far from the later reinterpretation of Macrobius, Aristarchus rejects the identifications of Apollo with the sun and with Paean; rather, he uses the etymological analysis of *Ἰηϊός* to connect the epithet with the most famous myth about Apollo: his killing of the snake Python at Delphi.

We can also compare Aristarchus’ and Crates’ etymological exegesis in one line from Nestor’s story of his own deeds against the Eleans. He tells Patroclus that the Pylians won and chased the Eleans ‘along the wide plain’ (*Il.* 11.754):

Sch. Il. 11.754a (Hrd.) {τόφρα γὰρ οὖν ἐπόμεσθα} δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο: . . . ὅτε Ἀρίσταρχος ἐκεῖνο ἀποφαίνεται ὡς ὅτι· “τινὲς μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ α ποιοῦνται τὴν διαστολήν, ἵν’ ἢ ‘ἀσπιδέος’, ὡς εἰκαστικώτερον τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἀσπιδὲς τὸ πεδίον εἰρηκότος τῷ τὰ μακρὰ τῶν πεδίων καὶ εὐρέα περιφερῇ φαίνεσθαι, μηδενὸς ἄλλου ὀρωμένου τέματος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὀρίζοντος ἀέρος. ἄλλοι δὲ ἐκδέχονται ‘ἀσπιδέος’ τοῦ ἔχοντος πολλὰς ἀσπίδας, καθότι ἐπιφέρει ‘ἀνὰ τ’ ἔντεα καλὰ λέγοντες’ (*Il.* 11.755). οἱ δὲ φασιν ἐκ πλήρους ‘σπιδέος’ καὶ ἀποδιδοῦσι πολλοῦ καὶ μακροῦ· καὶ γὰρ Αἰσχύλος πολλάκις τὴν λέξιν οὕτως ἔχουσιν τίθησιν, ὅταν λέγῃ (*TrGF* 3, fr. 378)· ‘σπίδιον μῆκος ὁδοῦ’, καὶ ὁ Ἀντίμαχος (fr. 149 Matthews)· ‘οὐδὲ σπιδόθεν προνοῆσαι, τουτέστι μακρόθεν’. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος.”¹²⁶

123. See also *Macr. Sat.* 1.17.7.

124. Timotheus (fr. 800 *PMG* = *Macr. Sat.* 1.17.20) connected the epithet *Ἰηϊός* for Apollo/Sun with the sending (*ἰέναι*) of arrows/rays. In the *Περὶ θεῶν* Apollodorus (*FGrHist* 244, F 95 = *Macr. Sat.* 1.17.19), on the contrary, explained the epithet of Apollo/Sun as ‘being sent and going (*ἰεσθαι* καὶ *ἰέναι*) in the cosmos’.

125. Yet Broggiato 2001, 189, does not see any connection between these two fragments (frs. 23 and 26) on Apollo. Macrobius also considers Apollo the same as Paean—however, this evidence does not imply that Crates, too, made the same identification.

126. The scholium continues with Herodian’s additional details about the readings of Zenodotus and Crates (on which see below). Finally, at the end of the scholium, there is a very short note by Aristonicus (*Sch. Il.* 11.754a): ἡ διπλὴ πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως [the *diple* [is placed here] with reference to the meaning of the word]. Cf. Roemer 1924, 212.

‘Along the wide plain (δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο)’: . . . Aristarchus says this: “some make the division from the α, so that it is ἀσπιδέος, as if the poet said that the plain was ‘shield-like’ (ἀσπιδής) in a somewhat figurative way because long and vast plains seem rounded, as no other boundary is seen but only the air marks their limit. Others, on the other hand, understand ἀσπιδέος as ‘having many shields’ since [the poet] adds: ‘and picking up their beautiful armor’ (*Il.* 11.755). Still others say that the full form is σπιδέος, and understand it as ‘long and wide’. For Aeschylus, too, often uses this word with that meaning, when he says (*TrGF* 3, fr. 378): ‘for a long (σπίδιον) length of road’; and Antimachus (fr. 149 Matthews): ‘not to foresee from afar (σπιδόθεν)’, which is ‘from a long way’”. And Aristarchus says this.

The question concerns the choice of variants and the meaning resulting from the two different divisions of the *scriptio continua* ΔΙΑΣΠΙΔΕΟΣΠΕΔΙΟΙΟ. In the direct quotation from Herodian, Aristarchus reports the different solutions given by other scholars (whom he leaves anonymous). Those who wanted to read δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο connected the adjective ἀσπιδής with the noun ἀσπίς, ‘shield’. Thus, ἀσπιδής meant ‘of the shape of a shield’, i.e., ‘rounded like a shield’, as this interpretation was based on the fact that the ἀσπίς was a round shield.¹²⁷ For another group of scholars who also chose to read δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο, the adjective ἀσπιδής was indeed linked with ἀσπίς, ‘shield’, though it did not refer to the shape of the plain, but rather to the fact that the plain was ‘covered by shields’ left by the defeated enemies, which were chased by the Pylians. To support this interpretation they quoted the following line, in which Nestor says that he and his companions picked up the weapons of the dead. According to this reading, then lines 754–755 meant: ‘so long did we chase them along the plain covered by shields (δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο) / killing them and picking up their beautiful armor (ἀνὰ τ’ ἔντεα καλά λέγοντες)’. With this interpretation, it was Homer himself who was to give a clue about the meaning of the adjective ἀσπιδής by adding a sort of gloss in the following line. The third possibility was to read διὰ σπιδέος πεδίοιο, and thus to assume an adjective σπιδής, in the sense of ‘long and wide’. Aristarchus cannot find any etymology which could support this solution, only parallel uses in Aeschylus (σπίδιον) and Antimachus (σπιδόθεν).¹²⁸ The choice among these variants is not easy. On the one hand, neither of these adjectives is used by Homer, and, on the other, they all are somehow suitable to the context. Aristarchus himself does not seem to make a choice, probably because δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο was supported by the etymology,

127. See *Sch. Il.* 2.389a; 6.117a and Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.2.

128. Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 39–40; Matthews 1996, 349–351; Schironi 1999, 285–286; Rengakos 2000, 328–329; Schironi 2004, 297–304 (fr. 36).

whereas διὰ σπιδέος πεδίοιο was supported by the authority of other (though later) poets. Both reasons were valid in his mind, perhaps without either being decisive in this particular case.¹²⁹

Aristarchus leaves all these interpretations anonymous, but Herodian adds some further details about Zenodotus, who read διὰ σπιδέος πεδίοιο and considered σπιδής to mean ‘harsh’, as well as about Crates, who read δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο (*Sch. Il.* 11.754a: Κράτης δὲ προκρίνει τὴν διὰ τοῦ α γραφήν).¹³⁰ From the sources, it is impossible to know how Crates interpreted this expression. James Porter suggests that Crates embraced the sense of ‘shield-like plain’, because he could then connect the idea of a ‘rounded’ plain with his theory of the *sphairopoiia*.¹³¹ If Porter is right, Crates again applies etymology, a well-respected philological tool used by the Alexandrians, to read the text in a certain way and ‘prove’ his cosmological views. In his direct quotation, Aristarchus reviews the reading δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο, but does not attribute it to Crates, leaving it anonymous like all the other suggestions he presents. He might not have known that this was Crates’ view or, if he did, we might speculate that he did not attack Crates here, as such a reading was not necessarily to be linked with the theory of the *sphairopoiia*. Defining a plain as ‘shield-like’, hence ‘rounded’, does not in fact imply that the entire universe is spherical; rather, it is a plausible description of what human eyes see in a vast area, where the horizon seems to carve a plain surface into a circular shape.

8. Homer’s Etymologies

The application of etymology as an exegetical tool went beyond the analysis of strange words used by Homer and reached into stylistic investigations. In fact, a characteristic of Homeric style was the etymological game in which the poet engaged his readers. According to Aristarchus, this etymological play took place in two closely connected areas: Homer could play with etymologies by

129. For a discussion of the variants, see de Lamberterie 1990, 249–253. Both Allen and West, ad loc., choose διὰ σπιδέος πεδίοιο; the majority of manuscripts, on the other hand, has δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο, which is the reading chosen by Van Thiel, ad loc.

130. This is the reading of the A scholium. The Byzantine *Etymologica* have a different text which attributes to Crates the opposite reading, διὰ σπιδέος πεδίοιο; cf. Schironi 2004, 301–302. Indeed, the opinions held by Zenodotus, Aristarchus, and other grammarians, but especially by Crates on *Il.* 11.754, have been an object of debate; cf. Duentzer 1848, 54 n. 14; Wachsmuth 1860, 43–44; Pusch 1890, 151–152, 195–196 (fr. 5); Helck 1905, 15–19 (fr. II); Broggiato 2001, 169–170 (fr. 15); Schironi 2004, 297–304 (fr. 36). By attributing δι’ ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο to Crates I follow, among others, Broggiato, the most recent editor of Crates’ fragments.

131. Porter 1992, 103–107. On Crates’ *sphairopoiia*, see Chapter 3.3.B § 4.1 and Chapter 6 § 6.

alluding within his text to the etymology of a word, or he could ‘invent’ proper names that were etymologically meaningful and very effective at describing the characters to whom they were applied.

8.1. *Figura Etymologica* (παρετυμολογεῖ [ὁ ποιητής])

In Aristarchus’ opinion, Homer often plays with language and παρετυμολογεῖ, ‘alludes to the etymology of a word’, within his own poetry.¹³² This idea has emerged already in cases where Aristarchus chooses a specific reading on the basis of the fact that a similar and etymologically connected word is used nearby, as with ἐξεσίη in *Od.* 21.20–21 discussed in § 5.¹³³ This stylistic principle is clearly spelled out in some scholia, such as the one commenting on *Il.* 6.194, where Homer uses τέμενος τάμον, ‘they cut off a piece of land’:¹³⁴

Sch. Il. 6.194b {καὶ μὲν οἱ λύκιοι} τέμενος τάμον: ὅτι παρετυμολογεῖ τὸ ‘τέμενος’ ἀπὸ τοῦ τεμεῖν καὶ ἀφορίσαι.

‘They cut off a piece of land (τέμενος τάμον)’: because he alludes to the etymology of τέμενος, from ‘to cut off’ (τεμεῖν) and to mark off.¹³⁵

Aristarchus also considers the phrase κατ’ οὐταμένην ὠτειλήν, ‘in the stricken wound’, as a case of etymological wordplay, since ὠτειλή, ‘wound’, derives from οὐτάμεναι/οὐτάσαι, ‘to strike by hand’, as he notes in *Sch. Il.* 14.518a (ὅτι παρετυμολογεῖ τὴν ὠτειλήν ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐτάσε) and *Sch. Il.* 17.86a (ὅτι παρητυμολόγησεν τὸ ὄνομα).¹³⁶

In Aristarchus’ opinion, therefore, Zenodotus disregarded the poet’s penchant for wordplay in a case involving the meaning of φοβεῖν/φόβος, which in Homer do not mean ‘to fear’/‘fear’, as in Koine, but ‘to flee’/‘rout’.¹³⁷ At *Il.* 10.10 Zenodotus read φοβέοντο instead of τρομέοντο, referring to the heart

132. While we consider *figura etymologica* a rhetorical figure, I was not able to find it listed in the ancient lists of tropes and figures. In fact, the verb παρετυμολογεῖν, when referring to Homer, seems to be used mostly in the scholia of Aristonicus and in sources (e.g., Eustathius or the Byzantine *Etymologica*) which derive from them. In this respect, Eustathius very often speaks of the ‘etymological trope’ (τρόπος ἐτυμολογικός; for example, see below, footnote 139). Aside from his testimony, however, this trope is mentioned only rarely, e.g., in one exegetical scholium to Homer, in some scholia to Aeschylus and Oppian, and in a Byzantine scholium to Euripides (*Or.* 472).

133. The same idea is probably behind Aristarchus’ choice for the variant θυραωρούς at *Il.* 22.69, as at line 66 Homer speaks of θύραι; see above, § 6.

134. As is well known, τέμενος properly means ‘a piece of land cut off from the rest’.

135. See also *Sch. Il.* 18.550a. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 150.

136. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 59. On the meaning of οὐτάσαι/οὐτάμεναι and ὠτειλή, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.5 and § 4.4. In fact, the etymology of ὠτειλή is far from clear: see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v.

137. See Chapter 3.3.A § 1.2 and § 2.1.

(φρένες) of Agamemnon that ‘trembled’ during a sleepless night. This reading is wrong, not only because φοβεῖν does not mean ‘to be afraid’ in Homer, but also because at *Il.* 10.25 Homer adds ‘and similarly a trembling (τρόμος) held Menelaus’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.10b¹: ἐλέγχεται δὲ ὁ Ζηνόδοτος ἀμαρτάνων ἐκ τοῦ ‘ὥς δ’ αὖτως Μενέλαον ἔχε τρόμος’).¹³⁸ According to Aristarchus, this line with Menelaus’ τρόμος corresponds to the feeling which seized Agamemnon fifteen lines above, so that at *Il.* 10.10 the right reading is τρομέοντο (*Sch. Il.* 10.25a: ἡ δὲ διπλῆ, ὅτι ἀνταποδοτικόν ἐστι τοῦ ἄνω γράφειν ‘τρομέοντο δέ οἱ’ ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον). The lexical analysis is supported here by an additional stylistic remark: Homer has used an ‘etymological’ recapping, and Zenodotus should have been alert to it. The same process with the same choice of variants occurs in *Il.* 19.14, where τρόμος, ‘fear’, seizes the Myrmidons at the sight of Achilles’ new armor. Zenodotus read ἔλεν φόβος instead of ἔλε τρόμος, which is again to be rejected because it is against the Homeric usage (*Sch. Il.* 19.14) and also because in the next line Homer repeats the same concept using the verb ἔτρεσαν, ‘they fled in fear’. In this case, too, Aristarchus remarks that such a *figura etymologica* should have alerted Zenodotus to his mistake (*Sch. Il.* 19.15: ὅτι ἐλέγχεται Ζηνόδοτος γράφων ‘ἔλεν φόβος’· τὸ γὰρ τρέσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ τρόμου).¹³⁹

Aristarchus also identified many *figurae etymologicae* with proper names, but these cases are more difficult to judge, given that the etymologies are often debated. He correctly recognized the famous etymology of Astyanax at *Il.* 6.403—from ἄστυ and ἄναξ, meaning ‘the lord of the town’, on the basis that ‘alone Hector defended Ilium’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.403: ὅτι παρετυμολογεῖ). Yet other cases are more ambiguous. In *Il.* 6.201, for example, Homer says that Bellerophon ‘wandered (ἄλᾳτο) alone over the Aleian plain (καὶ πεδίον τὸ Ἀλήϊον)’, and Aristarchus connects the proper name Ἀλήϊον with the verb ἀλᾶσθαι, ‘to wander’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.201a). Similarly, even if the proper name Thoötes (Θοώτης) is connected with θέειν, ‘to run’, and with θοός, ‘swift’,¹⁴⁰ the etymological play that Aristarchus recognizes at *Il.* 12.343—when Menestheus says: ‘go, noble Thoötes (Θοῶτα), run (θέων, lit. ‘running’) and call Ajax’ (*Sch. Il.* 12.343a: ὅτι παρετυμολογεῖ τὸν Θοώτην ἀπὸ τοῦ θέειν)—might not have been obvious to ancient audiences due to ablaut. Another problematic case concerns *Il.* 9.137:

138. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.10b². Cf. Lehrs 1882, 76.

139. See also Eust. 1169.13 (ad *Il.* 19.14): τὸ δὲ ‘τρόμος’ καὶ τὸ ‘ἔτρεσαν’ οὐ μακρὰν ἀλλήλων κείμενα, ἐτυμολογικὸν ἐκφαίνουσι τρόπον [‘τρόμος’ and ‘ἔτρεσαν’, not used very far from one other, produce an etymological trope]. Zenodotus also chose φόβος over τρόμος in *Il.* 18.247, but there is no corresponding use of the verbs τρέμειν or τρεῖν to back Aristarchus’ critique (*Sch. Il.* 18.247). On Aristarchus’ critical attitude toward Zenodotus, see Chapter 4 § 1.

140. See below, § 8.2.

Sch. Il. 9.137a νῆα ἄλις χρυσοῦ <----νησάσθω>: ὅτι παρετυμολογεῖ τὴν ναῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ νῆσαι, ὃ ἐστὶ σωρεῦσαι. καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα τὰ ὀνόματα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐτύμου¹⁴¹ λαμβάνει, Τερπιάδην τὸν Φήμιον (cf. *Od.* 22.330–331) ἀπὸ τοῦ τέρπειν τὸν κιθαρωδόν· ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα ποιητής.

‘Let him pile up (νησάσθω) his ship (νῆα) with enough gold [and bronze]’: because he alludes to the etymology of ναῦς from νῆσαι, which is ‘to heap’. In the *Odyssey*, too, he uses names from their etymology: [he calls] Phemius ‘Terpiades’ (Τερπιάδης; cf. *Od.* 22.330–331) from the fact that the citharode pleases (τέρπειν); so the poet is the same.¹⁴²

As often happens in his exegesis, Aristarchus finds parallels in the *Odyssey* when commenting on the *Iliad*.¹⁴³ In this case, he recalls Homer’s fondness for inventing ‘speaking’ names with the example of Phemius Τερπιάδης (see also below, § 8.2) to support his view that in *Iliad* 9 Homer also plays with etymologies when he juxtaposes νῆα . . . νησάσθω in the same line. This time, however, Aristarchus’ analysis is wrong. The sequence νῆα . . . νησάσθω looks like a *figura etymologica*, but it is an incorrect etymology. In fact, ναῦς is not connected with νηέιν, which means ‘to heap’ and ‘to pile up’.¹⁴⁴ Yet, since ships were used also to transport goods, and this is clearly the function for which this ship is mentioned in *Il.* 9.137, the etymology from νηέιν ‘to heap’ could work. In addition, in Homer the word for ‘ship’ is νηῦς with vocalism in η, which would have recalled νηέιν more than the Attic ναῦς could. However, linguistically the two words have nothing in common, and νῆα . . . νησάσθω seems more a pun or paronomasia.

8.2. *Nomen Omen* (ὀνοματοθετικός ὁ ποιητής)

For Aristarchus, another characteristic of Homer was the creation of names reflecting the essence of the person or thing named.¹⁴⁵ One example is the name Terpiades (from τέρπειν, ‘to delight’) for a ‘pleasing’ singer, mentioned in *Sch. Il.* 9.137a above.¹⁴⁶ The herald Thoötes has also been mentioned because in

141. The correct reading ἐτύμου (rather than ἐτοίμου present in the *Venetus A*) was suggested by Buehler; in his text in vol. II of the *Scholia Maiora*, Erbse had ἐτοίμου but corrected it to ἐτύμου in the Addenda (vol. III, 682).

142. On the formula ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα ποιητής, see Chapter 5.2 § 1.

143. See Chapter 5.2 § 3.

144. See Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. νηέω, and Frisk, *GEW*, s.v. 3-νέω, who both conclude that the etymology of νηέιν is unknown. The word for ‘ship’ derives from an IE root *nāu-s*, and is not even connected with νέειν, which means ‘to swim’; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.vv. ναῦς and νέω (1).

145. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 18.

146. See also *Sch. V Od.* 22.330. Cf. *LfggrE*, s.v. Τερπιάδης; von Kamptz 1982, 28 (§ 10.a.2), 267–268 (§ 71.b.6).

Aristarchus' view Homer uses a *figura etymologica* in *Il.* 12.343 (διε Θούτα, θέων). In the previous line, when the herald is introduced,¹⁴⁷ he points out that Θούτης is actually a good name for a herald (because it is connected to θέειν, 'to run')¹⁴⁸ and that 'the poet is prone to name-giving' (*Sch. Il.* 12.342a¹: καὶ ὅτι ὀνοματοθετικὸς ὁ ποιητής).¹⁴⁹ For Aristarchus, in other words, this character was 'invented' by Homer and given such a name in order to stress his main characteristic and function. The same etymological inventiveness of Homer (along with the parallel of Τερπιάδης in *Od.* 22.330) is mentioned in the discussion of the patronymic 'son of Harmon' (Ἀρμονίδης) in *Sch. Il.* 5.60a:¹⁵⁰ Harmon is a perfect name for a carpenter, as his work consists in 'fitting' (ἀρμόζειν) things together.¹⁵¹ Homer also invented a suitable name for a servant: Calseus (Καλήσιος) from καλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ ξένια, 'to invite to dinner' (*Sch. Il.* 6.18).¹⁵² The poet's creativity, in fact, extends even to insults. For example, in *Il.* 21.394, during the battle of the gods, Ares calls Athena κυνάμυια, 'dog-fly', a compound created by Homer and which combines Athena's two bad qualities (in Ares' view): the shamelessness of a dog and the arrogance of a fly (*Sch. Il.* 21.394a: ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐσχημάτισε τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ κυνὸς καὶ τῆς μυίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κύων ἀναιδής, ἡ δὲ μυῖα θρασεῖα).¹⁵³

9. Conclusions

Etymology was a well-developed discipline in ancient Greece even before Aristarchus' time—to the point, in fact, that even Homer and later poets, as Aristarchus pointed out, used and played with it in their poems. The most im-

147. The herald Thoötes appears only in this episode.

148. Cf. *Lfgre*, s.v. Θούτης; von Kamptz 1982, 26 (§ 10.a.1), 146 (§ 53.a.2), 147 (§ 53.b.1), 264 (§ 71.b.2).

149. See also *Sch. Il.* 12.343a (ὅτι παρετυμολογεῖ τὸν Θούτην ἀπὸ τοῦ θέειν) and 12.343b (ex. [Ariston.?).

150. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 23; Bouchard 2016, 105–106.

151. Cf. *Lfgre*, s.v.; von Kamptz 1982, 27 (§ 10.a.1), 163–164 (§ 61.a.1), 266 (§ 71.b.5).

152. Cf. von Kamptz 1982, 12 (§ 3.b.3), 117 (§ 39.c.3).

153. The ability of Homer to create proper names that reflect the essence of a character in part corresponds to the trope of ὀνοματοποιία, which is properly the creation of neologisms by poets. Yet for Tryphon ii (§ 8), ὀνοματοποιία consists only in onomatopoeic words. However, Tryphon i (196.12–197.2) lists seven different ways one can create a neologism: κατὰ ἐτυμολογίαν, κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, κατὰ παρονομασίαν, κατὰ σύνθεσιν, κατὰ ἐναλλαγήν, κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ πεποιημένον. The cases discussed here correspond to the ὀνοματοποιία κατὰ ἐτυμολογίαν, even if Tryphon does not mention any proper name in his example (Tryph. i 196.18–19: κατὰ μὲν ἐτυμολογίαν 'εὐλαβῆ λίθον' τὸν εὐληπτὸν [according to etymology, [for example] an 'easy-to-take stone' is the one which is easily taken]).

portant aspect of Aristarchus' etymological analysis is its almost exclusively linguistic focus. He used etymology to understand difficult words, either because they were unattested except in one debated line (that is, they were hapaxes), or because they were particularly difficult to understand and the contexts where they occurred did not clarify them enough. In these cases, etymology was used as a last resort. This applied also to the analysis of proper names, which had little or no connection to the context where they occurred, except in the few instances where Homer used etymological wordplay in giving names to the minor characters of his poems. Aristarchus' approach to etymology was thus closely connected to his efforts to understand and explain the Homeric text from a linguistic point of view.

Such a completely linguistic focus placed Aristarchus' use of etymology at odds with the applications made by other scholars. The most important differences occurred with the school of Crates of Mallos, who employed etymology as a tool to pursue an agenda which had little to do with linguistic analysis, namely, to read the Homeric poems according to Stoic physics. Even if Crates was a skilled scholar and his etymologies were as polished and plausible as those by Aristarchus, as the case of $\text{HIO}\Sigma/\text{IHIO}\Sigma$ shows, the difference in approaches between the two scholars is immense and shows how much more 'scientifically grounded' Aristarchus' application of etymology was. In fact, ancient etymology aimed at the discovery of the real ($\epsilon\tau\upsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$) meaning of a word, rather than understanding its origin and development with time, as etymology is now conceived. The assumption that a word had a real, fixed, true meaning that could be recovered through an objective analysis places ancient etymology on a footing similar to physical sciences, where a phenomenon has an independent, fixed, 'true' reality of its own, which the scientist must discover. Both Crates and Aristarchus probably believed that they discovered the 'real' meaning of a word through their etymologies. Yet Crates' use of etymology exposes him as biased toward the meaning that best helped him in his pursuit of a different agenda than understanding the meaning of the word, for example going beyond Homer when he identified Apollo with the sun. On the other hand, since he was not interested in anything other than the word's true meaning from a merely linguistic point of view, Aristarchus could be much more unbiased and objective—or, at least, linguistically grounded.

Moreover, the methods that Aristarchus used to study etymology were fairly sophisticated. He divided words into components, regardless of whether they were simple words or compounds, and broke them down into their most basic parts, which are comparable to modern morphemes. He was thus able to recognize suffixes and prefixes and understand their meanings, so that he could eventually isolate the root of a word. In fact, he showed a great skill and ability at connecting certain roots to specific verbal themes, even if the latter

had a different phonetic profile, or to words with a different grade of ablaut. To dissect words to their very bone, Aristarchus even introduced the concept of ‘sharing of letters/consonants’ (κοινωνία τῶν στοιχείων/συμφώνων): the roots of words were reduced to a series of sounds, and the similarity among series produced by dissecting different, apparently unrelated words provided a basis upon which to state that those words were connected and shared a common meaning, even if at first sight they appeared unrelated due to different suffixes and vocalisms. Whether or not his etymologies were sound, Aristarchus’ phonetic ability and skill in connecting different sounds arising from different ablaut grades is impressive.

His strictly linguistic etymological method was particularly useful in the case of hapax legomena and other rare words, as it gave Aristarchus a basis to relate these words to more common ones. At a more general level, this method allowed him to ground his analysis in the words themselves. This ‘objective’ method, unrelated to the context and purely linguistic, could thus yield the most secure results, once it was performed correctly. The almost ‘scientific’ nature of his etymological method allowed Aristarchus to defend successfully his own interpretations, his readings, and, in general, his philological choices. With it, he was able to prove his points on the basis of linguistic ‘facts’ against, for example, the flawed analysis of the Glossographers, who based their etymologies on non-Homeric words.

Aside from exegesis, Aristarchus also used etymology in his *diorthosis*: through it, he was able to find out the ‘real’ nature of a word—and, hence, to determine its correct orthography, as in the case of interaspiration. Etymology was also used to discuss Homeric style, as when he highlighted Homer’s tendency to indulge in etymological play on words. As a consequence, even if Aristarchus was not interested in etymology per se (especially when compared to other scholars of the same or later periods, who mainly used etymology as a key interpretative tool), etymology permeated his activity at all levels because it was objective and ‘scientifically’ grounded, making it a last and almost infallible resource when other methods failed.

3.5

Calculation of Analogy

A ‘Scientific’ Method Applied to the Text

1. Types of Analogical Proportions
2. Fragments with Aristarchus’ Analogies
3. The Criteria of Analogy
4. The Choice of *Comparanda*: Homer and Beyond
5. Semantic Analogy
6. The Function of Analogy
7. Analogy and Deductive Reasoning
8. Implied Analogies and ‘Rational Relationships’ among Forms
9. Herodian’s Analogy and Aristarchus’ Analogical Proportions
10. Conclusions

Dionysius Thrax defines the fifth part of grammar as the ‘calculation of analogy’ (ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός). As has already been suggested,¹ analogy mostly pertains to the *diorthosis*. In fact, it does not help in explaining a text, but becomes of paramount importance in emending it or choosing among competing variants with different accentuation, morphology, or orthography. This is the main function of analogy in the practice of the Alexandrian grammarians.

The method of analogy was first developed in the Greek world from mathematics, since the primary meaning of ἀναλογία from the fifth century until the end of the Hellenistic period was that of ‘mathematical proportion.’² The grammarians adopted analogy as a heuristic tool that allowed them to determine a morphological form by using a comparison (A1 : A2 :: B1 : B2 or,

1. See Chapter 3.0 and introduction to Chapter 3.4.

2. See Schironi 2007 and Schironi 2018b. Siebenborn 1976, 56–66, already pointed out the link between mathematics and grammatical analogy.

more simply, A :: B),³ which set the form at issue side by side with similar forms whose orthography or inflection was known. This chapter will focus on how and for what purposes Aristarchus ‘calculated’ analogy. Since analogy was a tool linked with mathematical reasoning, it was necessary to apply it rigorously, according to certain criteria: the more rigorous these criteria were, the more accurate the analogical proportion would be. Aristarchus’ precision in the application of this method confirms the suggestion that he saw it as a rigorous heuristic method, which had to be used according to strict rules in order to work.

1. Types of Analogical Proportions

The evidence offered by the scholia shows that Aristarchus used various types of analogy to find a particular grammatical form or to establish the correct accentuation or orthography of a word. The simplest form of analogy consisted of a comparison between two similar forms in Homer. Faced with a linguistic or orthographic difficulty, Aristarchus supported a reading by citing another form, which was similar in terms of inflection, endings or accentuation, but was free from uncertainties. He thus used the latter form as a model to support his reading. In the scholia to the *Iliad* there exist plenty of examples for this kind of analogy, for instance:

Sch. Il. 17.539b (Hrd.) < καταπέφνων:> Ἀρίσταρχος ὡς τέμνων.

καταπέφνων (‘killing’): Aristarchus [read καταπέφνων] like τέμνων (‘cutting’).

Problem: accent of ΚΑΤΑΠΕΦΝΩΝ: καταπέφνων or καταπεφνών?

Analogy/Comparison: καταπέφνων :: τέμνων

Solution: καταπέφνων

In this example, Aristarchus has to determine the orthography of an ambiguous participle for which no other clear examples are attested anywhere else that can serve as guideline.⁴ Therefore, he finds a comparable form (i.e., the same part

3. On the difference between these types of comparisons, see below, § 1 and § 6.

4. This participle is attested only one other time in Homer, at *Il.* 16.827 (in the accusative), and there too the form was debated (*Sch. Il.* 16.827 [Hrd.]).

of speech, with a similar ending, with the same type of morphology), and uses it as a model for establishing the orthography of the form at issue.⁵ For reasons that will become clear in the following discussion, we can call this procedure ‘two-term analogy’. The principle underlying this procedure is that some criteria which can be applied to language and allow the comparison between two forms, using one to correct the other on the basis of common characteristics. At first sight, this analogy is based on a very common logical procedure, by which the human mind tries to understand phenomena by relating them to other similar but simpler or already known ones, as Geoffrey Lloyd explains in his *Polarity and Analogy*:⁶

I shall take ‘analogy’ in its broadest sense, to refer not merely to proportional analogy ($a : b :: c : d$) but to any mode of reasoning in which one object or complex of objects is likened or assimilated to another.

Aristarchus, however, employed a further development of this procedure, which I will call ‘four-term analogy’. This type of analogy is more complicated and compares two different forms of the same word (A1 and A2) with two different forms of another word (B1 and B2) in the following way: the words A and B are comparable and the relationship between A1 and A2 (in terms of inflection or of derivation) is the same as the relationship between B1 and B2. Thus, a correlation of this type is built, $A1 : A2 :: B1 : B2$, where A2 is a form whose relationship to A1 is the same as the relationship of B2 to B1. This proportion can also be written as $A1 : B1 :: A2 : B2$. For example, A1 and B1 might be the indicative forms of two comparable verbs whose participles are A2 and B2:

Sch. Il. 4.153a <στενάχων> ὅτι δεῖ βαρυτονεῖν τὸ ‘στενάχων’ ὡς ὀρέγων (‘stretching’) (*Il.* 15.371, etc.)· καὶ γὰρ ‘στενάχοντο’ (*Il.* 16.393, etc.) ὡς ὀρέγοντο.

στενάχων (‘groaning’): because στενάχων must be read as barytone like ὀρέγων (‘stretching’) (*Il.* 15.371, etc.), for στενάχοντο (*Il.* 16.393, etc.) [is] like ὀρέγοντο.

Problem: accent of ΣΤΕΝΑΧΩΝ: στενάχων or στεναχῶν?

Premises: στενάχοντο :: ὀρέγοντο

5. Aristarchus’ chosen accentuation and his analogy shows that he considered καταπέφνων a present from an unattested *πέφνω, which is incorrect (even if καταπέφνων is also the reading of the vulgate; cf. West, app. ad *Il.* 17.539). The correct accentuation is καταπεφνών, as this is an aorist participle from the reduplicated aorist (κατ)ἔπεφνον (e.g., *Il.* 3.281, 6.180), connected with the present θείνω, ‘to slay’; see Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 748; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 191, 396–397; Janko 1994, 417; cf. also La Roche 1866, 341. See discussion below, at § 4.

6. Lloyd 1966, 175.

Analogies/Proportions:

ὀρέγοντο : ὀρέγων :: στενάχοντο : x
 ὀρέγοντο : στενάχοντο :: ὀρέγων : x

Solution: x is στενάχων

Four-term proportions can be further developed with the addition of another term, becoming thus a six-term proportion, where there are three inflected or derived forms of the same terms in the proportion, A1 : A2 : A3 :: B1 : B2 : B3. For example, A2 might be the genitive of a noun whose vocative is A3 and whose nominative is A1. If so, B2 is the genitive of a comparable noun whose vocative is B3 and whose nominative is B1, for example:

Sch. Il. 1.86 Κάλχαν: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος χωρὶς τοῦ ν, ‘Κάλχα’ τὰ δὲ εἰς ας λήγοντα, διὰ τοῦ ντ κλινόμενα ἐπὶ τῆς γενικῆς, ἔχει τὴν κλητικὴν εἰς ν, ‘Θόαν’ (*Il.* 13.222, 228), ‘Αἶαν’ (*Il.* 7.234, etc.).

Κάλχαν (‘Calchas’): because Zenodotus [writes] Κάλχα without ν. But the nouns ending with -ας and inflecting in -ντ- at the genitive have the vocative in -ν: Θόαν (*Il.* 13.222, 228), Αἶαν (*Il.* 7.234, etc.).⁷

Problem: vocative of Κάλχας: Κάλχα or Κάλχαν?Premises: Κάλχας :: Θόας :: Αἶας and they all have the genitive in -οντοςAnalogies/Proportions:

Θόας : Θόαντος : Θόαν :: Αἶας : Αἶαντος : Αἶαν :: Κάλχας : Κάλχαντος : x
 Θόας : Αἶας : Κάλχας :: Θόαντος : Αἶαντος : Κάλχαντος :: Θόαν : Αἶαν : x

Solution: x is Κάλχαν

In what follows I will take into account these three types of analogy to investigate how and for what purpose Aristarchus employed them.⁸

7. See also *Sch. Il.* 13.68a (ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι ἀναλόγως ἐκφέρει τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ ποιητής) and 13.222a. Cf. La Roche 1866, 293.

8. On Aristarchus’ analogy, see Steinthal 1890–1891, II 82–111 and discussion below, at § 9 (with bibliography); on Aristophanes of Byzantium’s use of analogy, see Callanan 1987, 107–122, and Ax 1990. On the criterion of analogy, see Siebenborn 1976, 56–84; his claim (71) that Aristarchus mostly used two-term proportions and not the more complex four-term proportions is rightly criticized by Matthaios 1999, 28–30.

2. Fragments with Aristarchus' Analogies

The first problem for studying how Aristarchus used analogy concerns how to select the right material for analysis. When an analogical proportion occurs in the Aristonicus scholia (sixteen cases),⁹ it can be assumed to go back to Aristarchus, as was shown when discussing the sources for Aristarchus' fragments.¹⁰ More problems arise for the scholia of Herodian, even if they are the richest source for analogical proportions. Herodian's interests centered on accentuation and prosody, and how they affected orthography, which were among the philological problems solved by Aristarchus through analogy. When a scholium reads: 'ἄστρασι: Aristarchus [read ἀστράσι] like πατράσι(ν)' (*Sch. Il.* 22.28a), or 'ταρφειαί: Aristarchus read it like πυκναί' (*Sch. Il.* 19.357a), or 'γεγωνεῖν: . . . Aristarchus pronounces it as perispomenon like φιλεῖν' (*Sch. Il.* 12.337b¹), Herodian is probably reporting Aristarchus' analogies. On the other hand, when the scholium reads: 'ἔνεσαν like ἔλεξαν. So also Aristarchus' (*Sch. Il.* 6.244) or 'ὀνομάκλυτος: like τοξόκλυτος [i.e., as a compound]; so also Aristarchus' (*Sch. Il.* 22.51d), it is difficult to decide whether the analogy was used only by Herodian,¹¹ who also noted that Aristarchus' choice agreed with his own, or whether the analogy itself goes back to Aristarchus. Such doubt seems to be confirmed in the last example quoted, because there is also an exegetical scholium which attributes a different analogy to Aristarchus: 'ὀνομάκλυτος: Aristarchus [reads it] as one word, like πασιμέλουσα' (*Sch. Il.* 22.51e). Both scholia agree on Aristarchus' decision to read ὀνομάκλυτος as a compound, but it is impossible to determine which comparison he used to reach this solution. These cases remain uncertain and so I have simply not counted them,¹²

9. *Sch. Il.* 1.86, 13.68a, and 13.222a; 2.520; 3.152a¹; 4.153a; 4.478; 8.349a¹ (Ariston.); 10.84a; 11.601a^{1,2}; 13.28b; 14.421a^{1,2}; 16.354a; 19.97a; 20.484a^{1,2}; 23.1a; 23.800a^{1,2}; 24.566b. I have excluded *Sch. Il.* 5.323 as the scholium is corrupted (and so it is difficult to determine the proportion used by Aristarchus); cf. Friedländer 1853, 111.

10. Needless to say, it is impossible to have absolute certainty about the fact that every detail in an Aristonicus scholium derives from Aristarchus; yet this is a reasonable assumption, which I have adopted, as many other scholars have before me (see Chapter 1.1 § 4.1 and § 6 with footnote 96). Since it is an *assumption*, and not a secure fact, the results achieved through it have, by default, an element of uncertainty, which is inevitable when working on fragments of ancient scholarship preserved in complex sources such as the scholia.

11. Herodian, too, could use analogical proportions in a 'heuristic' way; see Schironi 2018b, § 6.

12. E.g., Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 9.164; 13.450a¹; 16.508a; 23.254b¹. For the same reason, I have excluded a T scholium from Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 13.541a²), which reads: <Αἰνέας> ὥς Ἑρμέας. οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος [Αἰνέας: like Ἑρμέας. So Aristarchus]. This is even more suspicious, because in the b scholium, in theory still derived from Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 13.541a³), the same comparison is attributed to Herodian: ὥσπερ Ἑρμέας οὕτως Αἰνέας, καθὼς Ἡρωδιανῷ δοκεῖ [just like Ἑρμέας so Αἰνέας, as Herodian teaches]. The mention of Herodian also shows that the scholium has been

unless there is another scholium that strongly suggests that the analogy goes back to Aristarchus himself.¹³ With these criteria, namely, selecting only those analogies which Herodian explicitly attributes to Aristarchus, it is possible to single out forty such cases preserved by Herodian.¹⁴ There are also two cases of Aristarchean analogies in the Didymus scholia¹⁵ and one in the exegetical scholia,¹⁶ in addition to the sixteen cases of analogy in the Aristonicus scholia mentioned above. Since in three cases different scholia discuss the same case,¹⁷ a total of fifty-six cases of analogies in the scholia to the *Iliad* can reasonably be associated with Aristarchus.

Another problem arises in reconstructing Aristarchus' proportions even within these fifty-six 'secure' analogies. For example, with reference to *Il.* 14.421, the Aristonicus scholium in A has ἰάχοντες ὡς ὀρέγοντες (*Sch. Il.* 14.421a¹), but the version in T has ἰάχοντες ὡς στενάχοντες (*Sch. Il.* 14.421a²), which makes it impossible to determine Aristarchus' original *comparandum*. Similarly, with reference to *Il.* 24.566, the Aristonicus scholium attributes to Aristarchus the analogy 'φυλακούς like ἀγαθούς' (*Sch. Il.* 24.566b), while the Herodian scholium attributes to him the analogy 'φυλακούς like φρουρούς' (*Sch. Il.* 24.566d¹). A different case is given by *Il.* 13.191: according to Didymus, in both of his editions Aristarchus read χροός like λόγος (*Sch. Il.* 13.191b: οὕτως αἱ Ἀριστάρχου 'χροός' ὡς λόγος), while Herodian seems to be in doubt as to which reading Aristarchus chose and which analogical proportion he adopted:

Sch. Il. 13.191c (Hrd.) {ἀλλ' οὐ πη} χροός: Ἀλεξίων (fr. 53 Berndt) φησὶν ὅτι Ἀρίσταρχος ὡς σοφός προηνέγκατο, Τυραννίων (fr. 32 Haas) δὲ ὡς πόλος. καὶ ἔχει λόγον ἑκάτερα ἢ ἀνάγνωσις . . .

manipulated and changed from the original, since Didymus certainly could not refer to Herodian, who lived much later. The scholium in A (*Sch. Il.* 13.541a¹), on the other hand, does not mention any analogy but simply Aristarchus' reading: <ἐνθ' Αἰνέας Ἀφαρήα> οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος χωρὶς τοῦ ι. ἐνιοὶ δὲ 'Αἰνείας δ' Ἀφαρήα' ['then Aeneas [leapt on] Aphareus (ἐνθ' Αἰνέας Ἀφαρήα)]: so Aristarchus, without ι; but some [write] Αἰνείας δ' Ἀφαρήα].

13. As with *Sch. Il.* 16.827 (Hrd.) πέφνοντα: ὡς τέμνοντα. οὕτως καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος [πέφνοντα: like τέμνοντα. So also Aristarchus], confirmed by *Sch. Il.* 17.539b (Hrd.) <καταπέφνων> Ἀρίσταρχος ὡς τέμνων [καταπέφνων: Aristarchus [reads it] like τέμνων].

14. *Sch. Il.* 1.52; 1.493a; 2.262b; 2.592b; 2.755b; 3.198a.b; 4.235a^{1,2}; 5.69a¹; 5.299b; 5.609a (Hrd. [Did.]); 6.422a¹; 6.518b¹; 7.289a; 8.355; 9.147a^{1,2}; 9.150a^{1,2}; 10.38d; 11.239c^{1,2}; 11.454a and 22.67a; 11.495; 11.659c; 11.677a¹; 12.20b; 12.158 and 19.357a; 12.201d; 12.337b¹; 13.191c; 13.371a (Hrd. vel. Did. + Hrd.); 14.60a; 14.463b; 15.302b¹; 15.320–1a¹; 16.324d; 16.415a; 16.827 and 17.539b; 22.28a; 24.8a; 24.228a; 24.318b; 24.566d¹. In what follows, in order to avoid repetitions, I will omit noting that these scholia are from Herodian every time I mention one of them in passing.

15. *Sch. Il.* 13.191b; 18.506f^{1,2} (Did.?).

16. *Sch. Il.* 15.75b.

17. *Sch. Il.* 11.601a^{1,2} (Ariston.) and 5.299b (Hrd.); *Sch. Il.* 13.191b (Did.) and 13.191c (Hrd.); *Sch. Il.* 24.566b (Ariston.) and 24.566d¹ (Hrd.).

χροός ('flesh'): Alexion (fr. 53 Berndt) says that Aristarchus pronounced χροός like σοφός. Tyrannion (fr. 32 Haas), instead, like πόλος. And both readings have a rationale.

Aristonicus confirms that for Aristarchus χροός had to be read as barytone (*Sch. Il.* 13.191a: 'χροός' ἀντὶ τοῦ χρώς διὸ βαρυτονητέον), but does not mention any analogical comparison. As for the choice of *comparandum*, either Didymus or Tyrannion might be right, and Aristarchus could have read either χροός like λόγος or χροός like πόλος.¹⁸ As for Alexion, he was either wrong in reporting Aristarchus' reading (and analogy) or reported what Aristarchus might have suggested as a possibility, but never really accepted in the editions inspected by Didymus.¹⁹

These examples show that the analysis of Aristarchus' analogies can sometimes be clouded by uncertainties. Such problems are not so pervasive as to prevent some general conclusions on his use of analogical proportions; still, it is worth signaling them before proceeding to the analysis of the fifth part of grammar in Aristarchus' practice.

3. The Criteria of Analogy

Analogy is a method that consists of comparing two forms or sets of forms which share some common characteristics in order to deduce some other characteristics for one of the sets. Any 'scientific' method relies on some rules, and it is up to the scholar who uses that method to determine these rules and to apply them as rigorously as possible. Charisius, a Latin grammarian of the fourth century CE, attributes to Aristophanes and Aristarchus some criteria needed in order to apply analogy correctly:

Charisius 149.26–150.2 Barwick: *Huic [i.e., analogiae] Aristophanes quinque rationes dedit vel, ut alii putant, sex; primo ut eiusdem sint generis de quibus quaeritur, dein casus, tum exitus, quarto numeri syllabarum, item soni. sextum Aristarchus, discipulus eius, illud addidit, ne umquam simplicia compositis aptemus.*

18. Even if λόγος sounds more likely because it is a much more common word and is also used in Homer (see below, § 4).

19. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 29; Berndt 1906, 37–38. On this reading, which is still problematic, see Chantraine 1953–1958, II 50–51; Haas 1977, 138–139; Janko 1994, 71. On Aristarchus' changes of mind, see Schironi 2015.

Aristophanes gave analogy five criteria or, as some believe, six: first, that the objects of inquiry be of the same gender; then, of the same case; then, of the same ending; fourth, of the same number of syllables; finally, of the same accent. Aristarchus, his pupil, added this sixth [rule]: that we never link simple forms to compounds.

These criteria—namely, (1) same gender; (2) same case; (3) same ending; (4) same number of syllables; (5) same accent;²⁰ and (6) same ‘compositional status’ (σχῆμα in Greek)—are suitable to nominal declension. Examples of analogies in the scholia, however, prove that comparable criteria were used when applying analogy to verbs or other parts of speech. In the case of verbs, for example, instead of having same gender and case, the *comparanda* needed to have the same person, number, tense, mood, and voice.

An analysis of the examples of Aristarchean analogy in the scholia to the *Iliad* shows that he generally follows these criteria. In particular, the criteria always respected for nouns and adjectives are (1) same gender, (2) same case, and (3) same ending. For verbs, there is always the same person, number, tense, mood, and voice—all criteria which amount to the same ending in verbs. There are only a few exceptions to these rules, but in most of them there is a specific reason for not following the six criteria, as becomes clear when we look at these cases.²¹

For example, with nominal forms,²² the ‘same case’ rule (2) is always respected. As for gender (1), the only real exception is κατ’ ἐνῶπα compared to κατὰ δῶμα (*Sch. Il.* 15.320–1a¹) because δῶμα is a neuter while ἐνῶπα is an isolated form²³ which Aristarchus connects with the feminine ὤψ, ‘face’ (whose accusative is ὤπα).²⁴ Yet the fact that the form was odd might have forced him to disregard the gender in favor of a phonological similarity (which ἐνῶπα and δῶμα have).

To have the same ending (3) means that the ‘general shape’ of the word endings should be similar, especially in terms of vocalism and alternation of

20. *Sonus* is not simply ‘sound’ but also ‘accent’; see, e.g., Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.25 (*acuto sono*) and 1.5.30 (*gravem . . . sonum*); Mart. Cap. 3.272 (*acutum sonum*); Diom. in *GL* 1, 431.3–5 (*accentus quidam fastigia vocaverunt . . . ; alii tenores vel sonos appellant*). I would like to thank Philomen Probert for bringing some of these passages to my attention.

21. A similar, but more limited, survey of how these six criteria were applied by Aristarchus has been carried out by Siebenborn 1976, 75–78 and, for Aristophanes, by Callanan 1987, 26–27 and 43–44. See also Schenkeveld 1994, 284–285.

22. Aristarchus included both nouns and adjectives in the same grammatical category (ὀνόματα); see Matthaios 1999, 210–211, 240–241, and 290–291. Hence in his analogies he could compare nouns to adjectives and vice versa.

23. Cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, and *Lfgre*, s.v.

24. Cf. Schironi 2004, 353–358 (fr. 44).

vowels/consonants, without necessarily having the same consonants. If the criterion is understood in this way, then it is always respected, because endings are the ‘same’ even in cases like when Μέ-γην is compared to Μέσθ-λην (*Sch. Il.* 15.302b¹) and ὑψιπέ-της to παντοπό-λης (*Sch. Il.* 12.201d), since both sets end with consonant + ην/ης. Similarly, κατ’ ἐνῶπα is comparable to κατὰ δῶμα (*Sch. Il.* 15.320–1a¹) in that they both have consonant + ῶ + consonant + α.

Normally, the *comparanda* also have the same accent (5). This criterion is always followed, with only one exception, ἰωκὴν : ἰῶκα :: κρόκην : κρόκα (*Sch. Il.* 5.299b and 11.601a¹). In this case, Aristarchus is looking for a pair of nouns which have both an accusative of the first declension (in Koine) and one of the third declension (in some literary authors like Homer). There are no other examples of accusatives like ἰῶκα, ‘rout’, in Homer; such accusatives are also rare in Greek in general.²⁵ So the best he can find is the quasi-similar κρόκα, ‘weft’, in Hesiod (*Op.* 538), even if the Koine form κρόκην does not have the same accent as ἰωκὴν.

As for having the same ‘compositional status’ (6), the criterion introduced by Aristarchus himself, this is followed in all cases except the following:

1. Παν-οπεύς : Παν-οπηῖ : Παν-οπηά :: Ἀχιλλεύς : [Ἀχιλλῆϊ : Ἀχιλλῆα]²⁶ (*Sch. Il.* 2.520)
2. ἐπι-μίξ :: κουρίξ (*Sch. Il.* 14.60a)
3. ἐπ-αμοιβαδὶς :: λικριφίς (*Sch. Il.* 14.463b)
4. δι-ἐτμαγεν : δι-ετμάγησαν :: κόσμηθεν : [κοσμήθησαν] (*Sch. Il.* 16.354a)

Among these exceptions, there are both compound adverbial forms (ἐπι-μίξ, ἐπ-αμοιβαδὶς) compared to simple ones (κουρίξ, λικριφίς) and a verb with preverb (δι-ἐτμαγεν) compared to a simple one (κόσμηθεν). Yet the ‘compositional status’ became important only in the case of nouns because, according to Aristarchus, when nouns were compounded with prepositions, the accent changed according to whether the prepositional prefix altered the meaning of the noun or not.²⁷ None of the examples listed above corresponds to such a case, since the only noun is the proper noun Πανοπεύς, which, if it is a compound at all, is formed with an adjective (Παν-), not a preverb.

The only criterion that is not consistently applied is the same number of

25. Cf. Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 584; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 231.

26. In this case, as in others below, I have put the members of the proportion that are not specifically mentioned in the scholium in square brackets; yet they are obviously assumed for the analogy to work. As for the choice of the name Ἀχιλλεύς, even if it may originally be a compound from Ἀχιλᾶος, as Palmer 1963, 79, suggested (but cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v.), Aristarchus most probably considered it a noncompound proper noun.

27. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 605, 612–613; Schironi 2004, 110–117 (fr. 10).

syllables (4). Among the fifty-six analogies here collected, fourteen do not comply with this rule:

1. ἀπορρώξ :: θυλακοτρώξ (*Sch. Il.* 2.755b)
2. ἰωκήν : ἰῶκα :: κρόκην : κρόκα (*Sch. Il.* 5.299b and 11.601a^{1.2})²⁸
3. πινυτήν :: καλήν (*Sch. Il.* 7.289a)
4. ἀφυσγετόν :: ὑετόν (*Sch. Il.* 11.495)
5. ταρφειάς :: πυκνάς (*Sch. Il.* 12.158) and ταρφειαί :: πυκναί (*Sch. Il.* 19.357a)²⁹
6. γεγωνεῖν :: φιλεῖν (*Sch. Il.* 12.337b¹)
7. ἐπιμίξ :: κουρίξ (*Sch. Il.* 14.60a)
8. λικριφίς :: ἐπαμοιβαδὶς (*Sch. Il.* 14.463b)
9. διέτμαγεν : διετμάγησαν :: κόσμηθεν : [κοσμήθησαν] (*Sch. Il.* 16.354a)
10. ἀμοιβηδόν :: κλαγγηδόν (*Sch. Il.* 18.506f^{1.2})
11. [Μενέλεως] : Μενέλεω :: Πείρεως : Πείρεω (*Sch. Il.* 20.484a^{1.2})
12. φέρων : ἐφέροντο :: στενάχων : (ἐ)στενάχοντο (*Sch. Il.* 23.1a)
13. φωριαμῶν :: κιβωτῶν (*Sch. Il.* 24.228a)³⁰
14. {φυλακοὺς :: φρουροὺς (*Sch. Il.* 24.566d¹)}³¹

Among all the criteria for analogy, the number of syllables is the least important since the length of a word does not normally affect its morphological aspect. Even if Aristophanes introduced this rule, then, Aristarchus might have realized that it had little impact and thus probably did not follow it himself.

Aristarchus thus seems to have applied the rules for analogy rigorously. This was extremely important because, for a method like analogy to be scientifically valid, it needed to be founded on strict criteria, so that only forms that were really comparable were used in the proportion and any arbitrariness was removed.

28. Even if iota before a vowel that is followed by a consonant can be occasionally treated as consonantal in poetry (see Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 244–245), at *Il.* 11.601, the only place where ἰῶκα occurs in Homer, the word is clearly trisyllabic.

29. Πυκναί and πυκνάς are alternative forms of πυκιναί (e.g., *Il.* 4.281, 5.93) and πυκινάς (e.g., *Il.* 13.680, 14.167). Whereas πυκναί is attested in Homer (*Il.* 7.61, 23.716), πυκνάς is not. Therefore, I wonder whether in *Sch. Il.* 12.158 we should correct ταρφειάς :: πυκνάς to ταρφειάς :: πυκινάς, and so have a *comparandum* which is a Homeric word and with the same number of syllables. On this scholium, see discussion below, at § 9.

30. Just like with ἰῶκα in footnote 28 above, φωριαμῶν has four syllables in its only occurrence in Homer (*Il.* 24.228). The only other attestation of the word, φωριαμοῖσιν in *Od.* 15.104, also has a vocalic iota, as the word has five syllables.

31. This according to Herodian—unless the ‘real’ proportion was φυλακοὺς :: ἀγαθοὺς, as Aris-tonicus implies (*Sch. Il.* 24.566b: ὅτι φυλακοὺς τῷ τόνῳ ὡς ἀγαθοὺς προεφέρετο ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος); in this case, the number of syllables would have been the same; see also below, footnote 50.

4. The Choice of *Comparanda*: Homer and Beyond

An analysis of the fragments of Aristarchean analogies clearly shows that the large majority of *comparanda* which he used were Homeric words, according to the principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’ (Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὅμηρου σαφηνίζειν). This choice is also consistent with Aristarchus’ tenet that the Homeric language was a microcosm with its own rules: controversial forms needed to be discussed and clarified from within the same microcosm. Yet Aristarchus was not always able to find forms in Homer that could work as an adequate model; so he had to use words that were either attested in other authors with a sort of ‘literary pedigree’, or words from daily language, that is, standard Koine. Both procedures can be found in the sample analyzed, and specific reasons normally emerge for the choice of specific models. For example, Homer does not have any other forms comparable to ἰῶκα, ‘rout’ (*Il.* 11.601), an isolated accusative from the third declension derived from the same stem which gives the nominative of the first declension ἰωκή (which occurs at *Il.* 5.521).³² Thus Aristarchus, who might have considered such a form Aeolic,³³ looks at the ‘Aeolic’ Hesiod, who offers the similar accusative κρόκα, ‘weft’ (*Op.* 538), for a noun whose nominative follows the first declension (κρόκη), to build up the proportion ἰωκήν : ἰῶκα :: κρόκην : κρόκα (*Sch. Il.* 11.601a¹).³⁴ Something similar might be at work with Πείρεως, a proper noun following the Attic declension. To exemplify the correct genitival form, Aristarchus uses the paradigm of Μενέλεως, Μενέλεω (*Sch. Il.* 20.484a^{1,2}), which is not found in Homer but in Herodotus, Sophocles, and Euripides. The choice for a non-Homeric model here is probably due to the fact that the other proper nouns belonging to the Attic declension in Homer can be problematic, especially as far as the genitive -εω is concerned.³⁵ So, rather than picking up a debated Homeric form for his analogy, Aristarchus chooses the ‘standard’ example for this declension, Μενέλεως, Μενέλεω.

In a relatively large group of these fragments, the *comparandum* is taken

32. For the ancient grammarians, this was a metaplasma, that is, the formation of other nominal cases from nonexistent nominatives. On ἰωκή/ἰῶκα, see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ἰωκή; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 143 and 231; Risch 1974, 6, 11, 163.

33. See Chapter 5.1 § 2.3.

34. On this scholium and *Sch. Il.* 5.299b (Hrd.), see below, § 7.

35. For example, Aristarchus did choose the Attic form Ἄρεω at *Il.* 18.100 and 213 (Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 18.100d^{1,2} and 18.213; cf. Schironi 2004, 343–352, fr. 43); however, since it was a disputed form, it could hardly serve as a model (but cf. Ribbach 1883, 42–43). Choerob. in *Theod. Can.* 1.374.19 (= Hrd. 1.407.19) equates Πηνέλεως, Πηνέλεω to Μενέλεως, Μενέλεω. Indeed, the nominative Πηνέλεως is attested in Homer (e.g., *Il.* 2.494, 14.496) but the only genitive used in Homer, according to the majority of manuscripts (including papyri), is Πηνελέοιο (cf. West, ad *Il.* 14.489); thus, for Aristarchus, this, too, might have not been a viable example; cf. Janko 1994, 54 and 220–221. On the Attic declension in Homer, see Chantraine 1953–1958, I 197.

from what can be defined as standard Koine Greek. These are words which can also be found in literary sources but do not belong to literary language only. Sometimes, a Koine Greek word is selected because there is no parallel in Homer. This is the case with δηλαδή used as a model for ὅτεδή (*Sch. Il.* 1.493a), since there is no other compound adverb ending in -δή in Homer,³⁶ and with οἰκεῖε, used as a model for ἡθεῖε (*Sch. Il.* 6.518b¹), because Homer does not have other vocatives ending in -εῖε. Similarly, Aristarchus probably chose Κάνωβος as a model for Κάρησος (*Sch. Il.* 12.20b) because there is no other proper trisyllabic name in -ησος in Homer.³⁷ Even if the ending is not identical aside from the final -ος, Κάνωβος has the same ‘shape’: long vowel + consonant + ος. Moreover, Canobus or Canopus, the city in the Nile delta and an important religious center, was a very popular name at Alexandria, making it thus both an obvious choice and easy to remember. In the same way, the proper name Ἀπελλῆν as a parallel for Μενεσθῆν (*Sch. Il.* 5.609a) is an easy example, as in Hellenistic times the fame of the painter of Alexander the Great surely made the name Apelles (Ἀπελλῆς) well known, and hence paradigmatic for this type of declension.³⁸

Another easily remembered model occurs in an analogy concerned with derivational morphology. When Aristarchus wants to demonstrate that the right form for ‘the recompense that a son would pay his parents for his upbringing’ is not θρεπτ-ά (read by Zenodotus) but θρέπτ-ρα with ρ, he builds the following proportion connecting words with similar meanings but different suffixes (*Sch. Il.* 4.478): θρέπτ-ρα is to θρεπτ-ήρια (both meaning ‘recompense for nourishing’) like λύτ-ρα is λυτ-ήρια (both meaning, ‘ransom’, ‘that which liberates’). There are no other pairs of similar words ending in -ρα/-ήρια in Homer. In this case, however, λύτρα was probably also an obvious choice for an Alexandrian philologist since, even though the word λύτρα itself was not used by Homer, Ἐκτορος λύτρα indicated Book 24 of the *Iliad*, which is about the ‘ransom of Hector’ by Priam.³⁹ In addition, it was also the title (Φρύγες ἢ

36. For this choice, another reason is also probably at work; see below, § 9 with footnote 121.

37. The only one would be Καβησόθεν, ‘from Cabesus’ (*Il.* 13.363); yet this is not a good example, as its declensional pattern is ‘hidden’ by the suffix -θεν. The other proper nouns in -ησος—Δρῆσος (*Il.* 6.20), Μνῆσος (*Il.* 21.210), and Πῆσος (*Il.* 10.435, 474, etc.)—are all too short by one syllable, which in this case is important because in Κάρησος the accent is retracted. On the accent of Κάρησος, cf. also Lehrs 1882, 259.

38. Homer does have a similar contracted inflection with Ποδῆν (*Il.* 17.590), from a nominative Ποδῆς (*Il.* 17.575), and Ἑρμῆν (*Od.* 8.334), from a nominative Ἑρμῆς (*Il.* 20.72). Yet Πο-δῆς has a different ‘shape’ from Μενε-σθῆς because it has only one consonant before the ending -ῆς; on the other hand, the name ‘Hermes’ has a very complex declensional pattern and Homer usually has the form Ἑρμείας, so it might not have been the best *comparandum* in any case.

39. See *Sch. Il.* 1.4d (ex.); Eust. 1335.27 (ad *Il.* 24.1). Eustathius, in particular, explains that the common title (κοινὴ ἐπιγραφὴ) is indeed Ἐκτορος λύτρα; cf. also Allen, ad *Il.* 24.1 (periocha iii).

Ἑκτορος λύτρα, *Phrygians* or *The Ransom of Hector*) of a play by Aeschylus,⁴⁰ who also used λυτήρια in *Supp.* 268.

Sometimes Aristarchus seems to have chosen a non-Homeric model over a Homeric one because the non-Homeric word was closer phonetically to the form at issue. This seems to be true of the proper noun Σαρπήδων : Σαρπήδοντος compared to the non-Homeric Χαλκῶδων : Χαλκῶδοντος (*Sch. Il.* 23.800a^{1,2}). The declension of proper nouns in -δων, -δοντος is attested (both in the nominative and in the genitive) in Homer for Εὐρυμέδων (e.g., *Il.* 4.228, *Od.* 7.58), Αὐτομέδων (e.g., *Il.* 9.209, 17.498), Λαομέδων (e.g., *Il.* 5.269, 20.237), and Ἀμφιμέδων (e.g., *Od.* 22.242, 24.120). Nevertheless, if he wanted a long vowel before the ending -δων, none of these examples would have been suitable—hence, perhaps, his choice of Χαλκῶδων, Χαλκῶδοντος. The same reason probably underlies the comparisons between τέμνων/τέμνοντα and πέφνων/πέφνοντα (*Sch. Il.* 16.827; 17.539b), where Aristarchus (incorrectly) interprets πέφνων as a present participle from a verb *πέφνω.⁴¹ Actually, in Homer there are similar present participles ending in consonant + νων, such as μίμνων (*Il.* 9.617) and τάμνων with α instead of ε (*Il.* 11.88, *Od.* 14.24). Yet they do not occur in the accusative singular, which was important, since one of the debated forms was indeed πεφνόντα at *Il.* 16.827. Thus, Aristarchus probably preferred a very obvious example, with a regular Koine verb, τέμνων/τέμνοντα, which in addition was even more similar in the ending, as it also had an ε before the consonant followed by -νων. Similarly, the choice of πατράσι as a model for ἀστράσι (*Sch. Il.* 22.28a) seems to be suggested by phonetic similarity. In fact, third-declension dative plural forms in -άσι are attested in Homer with ἀνδράσι (*Il.* 2.122, 3.6, etc.) and νιάσι (*Il.* 5.463, 15.197, etc.). Yet, if the cluster -τρ- before the ending was also important to Aristarchus, he could find no other Homeric example to match ἀσ-τράσι—even if, admittedly, ἀνδράσι would have been similar, only having the voiced dental δ rather than the voiceless dental τ. Perhaps his choice, aside from the phonetic identity, was also suggested by the fact that πατήρ was a very common word, whose declension was certainly well known. In all these cases, then, Aristarchus goes beyond the criteria of analogy as transmitted by Charisius, as he not only takes into consideration the number of syllables and the ending of a word but looks for a stricter similarity, which extends to the preceding syllables of the word, so that the words sound even more similar as the phonetic string is the same. The reasons for such a choice are never disclosed. Yet this criterion recalls the ‘sharing of letters’ (κοινωνία τῶν στοιχείων/συμφώνων) that Aristarchus followed in his etymological

40. Aesch. *TrGF* 3, p. 364. Incidentally, Aristarchus also took a specific interest in this tragedy when commenting on the ‘neoteric’ mimesis of Homer’s poetry; see Chapter 5.3 § 2 and § 3.4.1.

41. See above, § 1 with footnote 5.

analysis;⁴² thus, perhaps, he considered phonetic similarity just as important when discussing morphology.

A different case is represented by σαφέσσι used as a model for ψευδέσσι (*Sch. Il.* 4.235a¹), which Aristarchus considers an adjective (hence ψευδέσσι), and not the dative plural of the noun ψεῦδος (which would be ψεύδεσσι).⁴³ A dative ἀεικέσσι from a nominative ἀεικής occurs at *Il.* 2.264, but this is a compound with privative ἀ-, and so it does not respect the sixth criterion of the same ‘compositional status’. Since there is no other dative plural of a simple adjective in -ής in Homer, Aristarchus had to look outside Homer. So he came up with σαφέσσι, dative plural from σαφής, which worked very well. Indeed σαφής is a common adjective; moreover, it is an almost paradigmatic example for that specific declension. Yet the Koine-Attic form would be σαφέσι, which would not work in terms of the ending. The form at stake, ψευδέσσι, implies an Aeolic dative plural, and so Aristarchus, while choosing a common adjective (σαφής), used the Aeolic (and Doric) variant σαφέσσι. The problem (for us) is that the dative σαφέσσι is not attested elsewhere aside from *Sch. Il.* 4.235a¹.⁴⁴ This might not have been a problem for Aristarchus: after choosing the best Koine *comparandum* (σαφής), he could have created the corresponding Aeolic form in order to match the form at issue in Homer.

Finally there are cases in which Homer would have offered a *comparandum* that that would have worked equally well (or even better) for the analogical proportion, but Aristarchus still chose a non-Homeric parallel. For example, the adverb ἀνεκτῶς compared to non-Homeric ἀνδρικῶς (*Sch. Il.* 8.355), the noun Γοργώ, Γοργοῦς to the non-Homeric Σαπφώ, Σαπφοῦς (*Sch. Il.* 8.349a¹ [Ariston.?¹]), and ὠμῆσται to the non-Homeric ἀθληταί (*Sch. Il.* 11.454a; 22.67a). In all these cases, there would have been equally good Homeric examples (e.g., χαλεπῶς or κρατερῶς in the first case,⁴⁵ Λητῶ, Λητοῦς in the second,⁴⁶ ὑβρισταί or the noun ὀρχησται for the third). While for ἀνεκτῶς : ἀνδρικῶς it is impossible to understand Aristarchus’ criteria, in the other cases his choice of *comparanda* might have been dictated by the need to find an ‘easy’

42. See Chapter 3.4 § 1.2.

43. Cf. Schironi 2004, 190–196 (fr. 21).

44. In fact, the corresponding scholium in T (*Sch. Il.* 4.235a²) had ἀφέσι, corrected by Maas into the Koine σαφέσι. Yet σαφέσι can hardly be the original *comparandum*—exactly because it represents the Attic/Koine form, while Aristarchus needs an Aeolic dative plural.

45. Aside from πάντως, which has a different accent, there are no other adverbs ending in consonant + τῶς. Still, ἀνδρικῶς is not a better example, since it ends in vowel + κῶς.

46. We know that Aristarchus took an interest in this noun, as Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 2.262b says that Aristarchus read the accusatives Πυθῶ and Λητῶ as oxytone, and distinguished them from αἰδῶ and ἡῶ, which he read as perispomena; cf. Lehrs 1882, 249–250; Linke 1977, 35–36. Yet perhaps Λητῶ was not a good example because its accentuation was disputed; cf. also Chantraine 1953–1958, I 47.

example, either because it is very common (ἀθλητής) or very famous (Σαπφώ). One could even speculate that these were the ‘classical’ examples for these declensions, which were probably taught to children at the school level to learn basic grammar.⁴⁷ If so, Aristarchus might have used these paradigms, known to his students from their school days, so that they could fit obscure Homeric words into recognizable declensional patterns.

5. Semantic Analogy

The analysis of the fragments where Aristarchus uses an analogical proportion shows that he sometimes chose words that not only followed the formal criteria of analogy, as transmitted by Charisius, but also had a semantic similarity. Not counting when Aristarchus established the accentuation of the city name Ἰρήν on the basis of the adjective ἱρήν, because he clearly considered the former derived from the latter (*Sch. Il.* 9.150a^{1,2}: Ἀρίσταρχος ὁξύνει ὁμοίως τῷ ἐπιθετικῷ τῷ ἱρήν),⁴⁸ the cases where analogy is joined with correspondence in meaning are the following:

1. θαμειαί :: πυκιναί, ‘close-set’, ‘thick’ (*Sch. Il.* 1.52)
2. οἰῶν :: αἰγῶν, ‘sheep/goats’ (*Sch. Il.* 3.198a.b)
3. ἐπιμείλια :: ἐπιφέρνια, ‘dowry’ (*Sch. Il.* 9.147a^{1,2})
4. ἐπίσκοπον :: κατάσκοπον, ‘spy’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.38d)
5. ταρφειαί :: πυκναί, ‘thick’ (*Sch. Il.* 12.158; 19.357a)
6. ἄχρις :: μέχρις, ‘until’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.324d)⁴⁹
7. φωριαμῶν :: κιβωτῶν, ‘chest’ (*Sch. Il.* 24.228a)
8. {φυλακοὺς :: φρουροὺς, ‘sentinel’ (*Sch. Il.* 24.566d¹)}⁵⁰

47. In fact, in later grammarians Σαπφώ is one of the prototypes for this declension. See for example, Choerob. in *Theod. Can.* 1.308.20–315.21. Other epic names, however, are mentioned: Herodian equates Θεανώ to Σαπφώ in [Arcad.] 133.18–19 (= Hrd. 1.347.3–4).

48. See Chapter 3.1 § 4.2.

49. The meaning ‘until’ is indeed the standard meaning of ἄχρις, when, like μέχρις, it is used as a preposition; in this specific passage, though, ἄχρις is an adverb, meaning ‘thoroughly’, ‘utterly’; cf. Kirk 1985, 395–396; Janko 1994, 359. Still, its adverbial use is rare and ἄχρις is much more common as a preposition and synonym to μέχρις, and this is why Aristarchus compared the two. That this was Aristarchus’ reasoning is also confirmed by Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 16.324d: Ἀρίσταρχος ὡς ‘μέχρις’ (*Il.* 24.128) ἀνεγίνωσκε, παρὸ καὶ ἐγένετο [Aristarchus read ἄχρις like μέχρις (*Il.* 24.128), on the basis of which it was also formed].

50. So Herodian; however, the scholium of Aristonicus (*Sch. Il.* 24.566b) gives φυλακοὺς :: ἀγαθοὺς. Whichever the original solution was, Aristarchus seems to have chosen non-Homeric *comparanda*, since both φρουρός and the masculine accusative plural of ἀγαθός are not attested in Homer. Both ἀγαθοὺς and φρουροὺς have their merits. The latter is a literary word (used by

All these pairs of words conform to the canons set out by Aristophanes and Aristarchus (except, in a few cases, the number of syllables), but they share one more characteristic that makes them even ‘more comparable’: they have the same meaning, as if the semantic bond that links these words could guarantee a better analogy.

The reasons which led Aristarchus to choose a semantic parallel for a *comparandum* are not easy to determine. In some cases, the *comparanda* that he could find in Homer did not fulfill the criteria listed by Charisius. Hence, he had to look for a *comparandum* outside Homer and chose a Greek word of similar meaning. For example, with ἐπίσκοπος, ‘guard’ and ‘spy’, Homer can only provide ἐϋσκοπος, ‘watchful’, epithet of Hermes (e.g., *Il.* 24.24, *Od.* 1.38) or Artemis (*Od.* 11.198), and ἄσκοπος, ‘inconsiderate’ (*Il.* 24.157 = 186). These two compounds of σκοπός are used as adjectives rather than nouns, but this is not a problem; Aristarchus could compare an adjective to a noun since he did not differentiate between these two categories, but grouped them together, under the label of ὀνόματα.⁵¹ What was a problem, it would seem, is that in both cases the first element of the compound is not a preposition. In this regard, the choice of κατάσκοπος makes sense. Similarly, with φωριαμῶν, Aristarchus is dealing with a feminine noun in -ος (φωριαμός). In order to respect the same-gender criterion, he must exclude all masculines or neuters of the second declension. Moreover, in Homer, none of the genitive plurals in -ῶν of feminines can work because they all belong to the first declension⁵² or to the third.⁵³ Therefore, there is indeed no available Homeric *comparandum*.⁵⁴ Hence Aristarchus looks outside Homer and chooses κιβωτός, a feminine belonging to the second declension, which is not only used by classical authors⁵⁵ but is also similar in meaning.

In other cases, however, Aristarchus could compare forms in Homer which were similar from a phonetic point of view and fulfilled all the criteria; even so, he picked a *comparandum* from outside Homer with the same meaning. This

Euripides and Thucydides) and has a semantic link, but the former not only has the same number of syllables as φυλακούς, but also is a very common word—another criterion which Aristarchus used, as suggested above (§ 4). In this case, then, it is impossible to decide which *comparandum* Aristarchus chose to build his analogical proportion (see also footnote 31).

51. See Matthaios 1999, 210–211, 240–241, and 290–291.

52. E.g., τρυφαιῶν (*Il.* 12.339), παρειῶν (*Il.* 24.794, *Od.* 4.198, etc.).

53. E.g., γυναικῶν (*Il.* 2.714, 3.171, etc.), θυγατρῶν (*Il.* 2.715, 3.124, etc.), χειρῶν (*Il.* 5.506, 5.582, etc.).

54. The other possibility would be to use a two-termination compound adjective; only τηλεκλειτός is attested in the genitive plural in Homer, at *Il.* 5.491, but it is masculine in that case, and so would not work. In addition, a comparison with a compound adjective would violate the sixth criterion of analogy, which requires the same compositional status.

55. Aristoph. *Eq.* 1000, *Ve.* 1056; Lys. 12.10.

happens with ἐπιμείλια, where the question is whether to write it as compound or not. Plenty of similar neuter plural compounds in Homer end in -ια and have a similar accent: for example ἐνώπια, ‘facade’ (*Il.* 8.435, 13.261, etc.), ὑπερώϊα, ‘upper rooms of the house’ (*Od.* 16.449, 18.206, etc.), ἐφημέρια, ‘short-lived thoughts’ (*Od.* 21.85). All these Homeric neuter plural prepositional compounds are eligible. Yet ἐπιφέρνια, which is not a literary form used elsewhere as far as we can tell, is closer from a semantic point of view. Indeed, the best possible situation occurs when the *comparandum* is Homeric *and* respects all six criteria *and* is also semantically similar; this happens with οἰῶν, compared to αἰγῶν (*Il.* 1.41, 1.66, etc.), with the adjectives ταρφειαί and θαμειαί compared to πυκιναί (*Il.* 4.281, 5.93, etc.),⁵⁶ and with ἄχρις compared to μέχρις (*Il.* 24.128).

‘Semantic analogy’ must not be confused with Varro’s statement that a *similitudo* is *duplex et perfecta* when the compared forms have both *figura* and *materia* (*LL* 10.11–12). As Daniel Taylor explained,⁵⁷ by *figura* Varro means the ‘phonological form’ and by *materia* the ‘grammatical content’, that is, the grammatical characteristics of the words. The semantic analogy sought after by Aristarchus seems in fact to have already been forgotten in the first century BCE. This is understandable from a grammatical point of view: since analogy dealt with morphology rather than semantics, only morphological criteria were crucial, especially when analogy became an increasingly popular tool for discovering inflectional patterns during and after Varro’s time.⁵⁸ Yet the context of Aristarchus’ work can explain, at least to some extent, why he also looked for semantic similarity when possible. Given his sophisticated linguistic awareness, which his use of etymology demonstrates,⁵⁹ Aristarchus could have hardly believed that the ‘semantic content’ of a word could also have an effect on its ‘morphological form’. Rather, the main reason seems to have been another one, namely, the context in which he used analogies: his teaching. Remembering good *comparanda* would have been easier for a student if he could also support his memory with a similar meaning. Using forms with the same meaning in the proportion was therefore probably more a mnemonic issue rather than another analogical criterion, since similar semantic content could have helped Aristarchus and his students to pick up and remember the right *comparanda* and hence the correct analogies. The same reason can also explain the cases of non-Homeric parallels discussed in the previous sections. Just as with

56. In this case, Homer also has παρειαί, ‘cheeks’, and ζειαί, a type of wheat, as possible *comparanda*. They are both nouns, but this is not a problem per se. Yet the former is a very controversial reading (cf. Schironi 2004, 157–165, fr. 17) and the latter is used only twice in Homer and is not a very common word (plus, it has one syllable less). Πυκιναί sounds like a much better choice.

57. Taylor 1977, 315.

58. See Schironi 2018b, § 5.

59. See Chapter 3.4.

semantically similar words, well-known and commonly used words as well as words that sounded similar were easier to remember, and so an analogy made up by these forms could be recalled more immediately.

6. The Function of Analogy

In order to understand how and for what purpose Aristarchus used analogy, we can try to roughly divide the fifty-six cases of two-, four-, and six-term analogical proportions, as established at § 1, according to the main purpose they serve, as follows:⁶⁰

A. Two-term proportions (A :: B):

- To determine the accent of a nominal form (either noun or adjective) with no reference to its declensional pattern.⁶¹
- To determine the accent of a verbal form with no reference to its conjugational pattern.⁶²
- To determine the accent of an indeclinable part of speech (mostly adverbs).⁶³

60. I have divided the material according to what seems to have been Aristarchus' main point in using specific analogies, not Herodian's (who most often preserves the material). Often Herodian adds long grammatical explanations to the brief Aristarchean analogies and I have not considered those additions in my analysis. In parentheses I have, however, added some further points which Aristarchus may have had in addition to his main reason in using specific analogies.

61. Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.52 (θαμειαί :: πυκιναί); 2.262b (αἰδῶ :: ἡῶ); 2.592b (Αἰπύ :: ὀξύ); 2.755b (ἀπορρώξ :: θυλακοτρώξ); 3.198a.b (οἰῶν :: αἰγῶν; also to determine the number of syllables in the word); 4.235a^{1,2} (ψευδέσσι :: σαφέσσι; also to determine whether it is a noun or an adjective); 5.69a¹ (Πήδαιον :: Πήδασον); 5.609a (Hrd. [Did.]) (Μενεσθῆν :: Ἀπελλῆν); 6.422a¹ (ἰῶ :: σοφῶ); 6.518b¹ (ἡθεῖε :: οἰκεῖε); 7.289a (πινυτήν :: καλήν); 9.150a^{1,2} (Ἰρήν :: ἱρήν); 11.239c^{1,2} (λῖς :: θῖς); 11.454a and 22.67a (ὠμησται :: ἀθληται); 11.495 (ἀφυσγετόν :: ὑετόν); 11.677a¹ (ληῖδα :: Χαλκίδα); 12.20b (Κάρησος :: Κάνωβος); 12.158 and 19.357a (ταρφειάς :: πυκνάς and ταρφειαί :: πυκναί); 15.302b¹ (Μέγην :: Μέσθλην); 16.415a (Ἀμφοτερόν :: δεξιτερόν); 22.28a (ἀστράσι :: πατράσι[v]); 24.228a (φωριαμῶν :: κιβωτῶν); Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 24.566b (φυλακούς :: ἀγαθούς) with Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 24.566d¹ (φυλακούς :: φρουρούς); Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 13.191b (χροός :: λόγος) with Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 13.191c (χροός :: σοφός or χροός :: πόλος; also to determine whether it is a nominative or a genitive).

62. Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 11.659c (οὐτάμενοι :: ἰστάμενοι; also to determine whether it is a present or a perfect); 12.337b¹ (γεγωνεῖν :: φιλεῖν); 16.827 and 17.539b (πέφνοντα :: τέμνοντα and πέφνων :: τέμνων; also to determine whether it is a present or an aorist).

63. Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 8.355 (ἀνεκτῶς :: ἀνδρικῶς); 14.60a (ἐπιμίξ :: κουρίξ); 14.463b (λικριφίς :: ἐπαμοιβαδῖς); 16.324d (ἄχρις :: μέχρις); Didymus (?) in *Sch. Il.* 18.506f^{1,2} (ἀμοιβηδόν :: κλαγγηδόν; also a variant reading).

- To determine whether to write a word as a compound or as two separate words.⁶⁴

B. Four-term proportions (A1 : A2 :: B1 : B2):

- To determine the accent of a nominal form (either noun or adjective) with reference to its declensional pattern.⁶⁵
- To determine the accent of a verbal form with reference to its conjugational pattern.⁶⁶
- To determine whether an aberrant nominal form, for example a metaplasm (that is, the formation of other nominal cases from a nonexistent nominative), is correct by comparing it to regular forms.⁶⁷
- To determine whether an aberrant verbal form is correct by comparing it to regular forms.⁶⁸
- To determine the orthography of a variant on the basis of nominal derivation.⁶⁹

C. Four- (A1 : A2 :: B1 : B2) or six-term proportions (A1 : A2 : A3 :: B1 : B2 : B3):

- To determine the declensional pattern of a nominal form (often for proper nouns).⁷⁰

64. Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.493a (ότεδή :: δηλαδή); 9.147a^{1,2} (ἐπιμείλια :: ἐπιφέρνια); 10.38d (ἐπίσκοπον :: κατάσκοπον; also to determine the accent); 15.320–1a¹ (κατ' ἐνῶπα :: κατὰ δῶμα; also to determine the accent); 24.318b (ἐϋκλήης :: ἐϋκνήμης).

65. Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 12.201d ((ὕψι)πέτης : (ὥκυ)πέτα :: παντοπώλης : παντοπῶλα).

66. Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 4.153a (στενάχων : ὀρέγων :: στενάχοντο : ὀρέγοντο); 14.421a^{1,2} (ιάχοντες : ὀρέγοντες :: ιάχων : ὀρέγων); 23.1a (φέρων : ἐφέροντο :: στενάχων : (ἐ)στενάχοντο); Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 24.8a (ἔκειρε : κείρων :: ἔπειρε : πείρων); and *Sch. Il.* 13.371a ([Hrd. vel. Did. + Hrd.] βιβάς : βιβάντα :: [δαμείς] : δαμέντα; also a variant reading).

67. Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 5.299b (ἰωκήν : ἰῶκα :: κρόκην : κρόκα :: ἀλκήν : ἄλκα :: [σαρκήν] : σάρκα and σάρκα : ἄλκα :: σαρκί : ἀλκί) and Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 11.601a^{1,2} (ἰωκήν : ἰῶκα :: κρόκην : κρόκα).

68. Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 16.354a (διέτμαγεν : διετμάγησαν :: κόσμηθεν : [κοσμήθησαν]).

69. Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 4.478 (θρέπτρα : θρεπτήρια :: λύτρα : λυτήρια).

70. Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 1.86, 13.68a, and 13.222a (Κάλχας : Κάλχαντος : Κάλχαν :: Θόας : Θόαντος : Θόαν :: Αἴας : Αἴαντος : Αἴαν); 2.520 (Πανοπεύς : Πανοπήϊ : Πανοπήα :: Ἀχιλλεύς : Ἀχιλλήϊ : Ἀχιλλήα); 3.152a¹ (δένδρος : κάλλος :: δένδρει : κάλλει; or δένδρον : βάθρον :: δένδρω : βάθρω; or δένδρεον : χάλκεον :: δένδρέω : χαλκέω); 8.349a¹ (Ariston.?: Γοργώ : Σαπφώ :: Γοργοῦς : Σαπφοῦς); 10.84a (κοῦρος : [κούρων] :: οὔρος : οὔρων); 13.28b (κευθμός : αὐλός :: κευθμῶν : [αὐλῶν]); 19.97a (θῆλυς : πῆχυς :: θήλεας : πήχεας); 20.484a^{1,2} ([Μενέλεως] : Μενέλεω :: Πείρεως : Πείρεω); 23.800a^{1,2} (Χαλκῶδων : Χαλκῶδοντος :: Σαρπήδων : Σαρπήδοντος). *Sch. Il.* 15.75b (ex.) should probably also be counted in this category, as it reads: κάρητι: τινὲς ἀπὸ τοῦ κάρη· Ἀρίσταρχος κάρης ὡς 'Δάρης' (*Il.* 5.9), ἔν' ἧ ἄρσενικῶς ['with my head (κάρητι)]: some say [that

A series of interesting conclusions can be drawn. First, analogy was never employed to ‘explain’ the text but always to ‘correct’ it (in terms of orthography), or to decide whether a reading was acceptable or not. Thus, as already suggested, analogy was closely linked with the *diorthosis*. Second, analogy was mainly used to decide over three issues: (1) which accent words should have had; (2) the inflectional patterns to which they belonged; and (3) whether they should have been considered compounds (ἐν συνθέσει) or not (ἐν παραθέσει).⁷¹ These questions correspond roughly to morphology in modern terms.

In this regard, the above list highlights the difference in the use of two-term analogy on the one hand, and of four- or six-term analogy on the other. The former is employed to determine accentuation or orthography when inflectional morphology is not at stake; for example, with indeclinable words (e.g., adverbs) or when the question is whether to write two words in composition or separately. In this case, the words are considered indeclinable even if they are not, because their inflectional patterns do not affect the issue of composition. In fact, the decision whether to write a word as a compound or not precedes the question of which type of inflectional pattern this word may have. Two-term proportions are also used when the question of accentuation concerns nominal or verbal forms considered ‘in isolation’ from their inflectional pattern, that is, when the scholar needs only to decide about the accent of a specific case-form, without any concern for the inflectional morphology of the form itself or for how the accent behaves in other cases of that form.⁷² Here a clarification is in order. In this case, obviously, the declensional or conjugational pattern is present in the background, even if not explicitly mentioned and not at the center of the scholar’s interest. For example, it would be impossible to conclude that ψευδέσσι is to be accented like σαφέσσι (*Sch. Il.* 4.235a^{1,2} [Hrd.]), unless the two forms are felt to be comparable since they are also similar in other cases,

κάρητι is] from κάρη; Aristarchus [says it comes from] κάρης like Δάρης, so that it is masculine]. Aristarchus’ reasoning implies a four-term proportion κάρης : κάρητι :: Δάρης : [Δάρητι].

71. Needless to say, these three points often coincide, because the change of accent impacts the inflectional pattern; similarly, the decision of whether or not to write words as compounds affects the accent. Many of the scholia analyzed are in fact also examined by Lehrs 1882, 294–300, and Ribbach 1883, 19–32, when they deal with Aristarchus’ choices about accentuation (the field in which Aristarchus’ analogical attitude mostly emerges, according to Ribbach 1883, 16–17). Ribbach (1883, 41–48) also discusses other examples, more connected with inflectional morphology, which I have excluded either because they do not come from the scholia to the *Iliad* which I selected for this study (see Chapter 1.1 § 5), or because they do not meet my selection criteria for attributing an analogical proportion to Aristarchus (see above, § 2).

72. This at least is the impression one gets when reading Aristarchus’ comments as reported in the scholia. Sometimes in the rest of the scholium Herodian mentions the inflectional patterns of the word at issue. Such additional information, however, seems to come from Herodian, not from Aristarchus; cf. Schironi 2018b, § 6.

such as the nominative singular $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ and $\sigma\alpha\phi\acute{\eta}\varsigma$. These types of two-term proportions, thus, are, strictly speaking, a sort of four-term proportion of the type $\sigma\alpha\phi\acute{\eta}\varsigma : \psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{\eta}\varsigma :: \sigma\alpha\phi\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota : \psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota$, where, however, unnecessary parts of the proportion are not expressed.

We can perhaps even go a step further. Interestingly enough, all the analogies transmitted by Aristonicus are four-term proportions except one (*Sch. Il.* 24.566b), whereas most of the Aristarchean analogies transmitted by Herodian are simple two-term analogies. This may be perhaps due to Herodian's selection: he was only interested in Aristarchus' choice in terms of accent and did not need the rest of the proportion to explain which inflectional pattern his predecessor used to establish the comparison. In fact, Herodian had fully developed inflectional rules ($\kappa\alpha\nu\acute{o}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$), which could have easily helped him to recognize the type of declension (or conjugation) with which he was dealing.⁷³ Thus, for declinable forms Aristarchus perhaps originally availed himself only of four-term proportions, which Herodian reduced to simple two-term proportions because they were redundant for him. Aristonicus, on the contrary, preserved the four-term proportions more closely, as he simply reported Aristarchus' reasoning in the *hypomnemata*. If this is correct, a 'pure' two-term proportion was thus strictly used only for indeclinable words, such as adverbs, or words considered indeclinable, for example when the problem concerned compounds; in the latter case, even if the words were per se declinable, the decision of whether or not to regard them as compounds was not dictated by their inflection. Hence, a two-term proportion was enough.

Analogy helped to determine the morphology and thus the orthography of single words. The word which covers these aspects in ancient scholia is $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha$, which means 'figure', 'shape'. As discussed in the introduction to Chapter 3.2.B, $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha$ could indicate two phenomena in language: the 'figures of phrases', which dealt with changes in the usual syntactic rules and were analyzed under the second part of grammar, and the 'figures of words', which referred to changes in morphology. In the latter sense, $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha/\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ indicated the forming or shaping a word out of certain inflectional or derivational patterns (namely, its *grammatical form*),⁷⁴ and this was the function of analogy in such instances. Indeed, in the scholia, $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha$, $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$, and $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ are often used in connection with analogical proportions. In these cases, Aristarchus applies the verb $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ or the noun $\sigma\chi\eta\mu\alpha$ to Homer, who 'fashioned' a form in a

73. On the meaning of analogy in Herodian, see Sluiter 2011 and Schironi 2018b, §§ 6–7.

74. See also Matthaios 1999, 204–205 and 257–258.

specific way.⁷⁵ Hence, following Homer's lead, it is possible to denounce later interpolations, as they fail to comply with Homeric morphology:

Sch. Il. 10.84a ήέ τιν' οὐρήων <διζήμενος ή τιν' έταίρων>: άθετεΐται, ότι 'οὐρήων' βούλεται λέγειν τῶν φυλάκων, καί οὐκ έκράτησε τοῦ σχήματος· οὔρον γάρ λέγει ως κοῦρον τόν φύλακα, οὔρεά δέ τόν ήμίονον.

'Seeking one of your mules (οὐρήων) or one of your companions': [the line] is athetized because [the interpolator⁷⁶] wants to say οὐρήων [meaning] 'of the sentinels', but he did not master the declension: for [Homer] says οὔρος, 'sentinel', like κοῦρος, but [he says] οὔρεϋς, [which is] 'mule'.

One reason to athetize the line is a morphological mistake, because the genitive οὐρήων derives from οὔρεϋς, 'mule', and this is wrong, since Nestor's question to Agamemnon does not make sense.⁷⁷ Nestor should be asking Agamemnon, who is walking around the camp at night, whether he is looking for his companions or for his 'sentinels', not for his 'mules'.⁷⁸ The right word for 'sentinel' is instead οὔρος, often used by Homer,⁷⁹ and it declines like κοῦρος, another Homeric word.⁸⁰ Thus, Aristarchus builds up a proportion that follows the Homeric usage: κοῦρος : [κούρων] :: οὔρος : x, which proves that the correct genitive plural is οὔρων. The interpolator, though, 'did not master the declension' (οὐκ έκράτησε τοῦ σχήματος) and used a genitive that belonged to another word (οὐρήων from οὔρεϋς).⁸¹ From this example and especially from the final phrase 'for [Homer] says οὔρος, 'sentinel', . . . but [he says] οὔρεϋς, [which is] 'mule'', it is clear that, according to Aristarchus, the *auctoritas* for declensions was Homer himself, not a grammatical rule developed outside of and independent from the epic poet.⁸²

75. *Sch. Il.* 19.97a (ότι οὔτως σχηματίζει 'θῆλυς' ως 'πήχυς' [because [Homer] forms θῆλυς in this way, like πήχυς]; 20.484a¹ (νῦν δέ έσχημάτικεν από τοῦ Πείρεως, ως Μενέλεω [now he has formed [Πείρεω] from Πείρεως, like Μενέλεω [i.e., is from Μενέλεως]]). See also *Sch. Il.* 2.302a.b (discussed below, at § 8, with footnote 95) and *Sch. Il.* 24.566c (ότι οὔτως έσχημάτισε τοὺς φύλακας).

76. ό διασκευαστής as suggested by Friedländer (see Erbse, app. ad loc.).

77. The other reason for the athetesis, which is mentioned in the final part of the scholium and omitted in the quotation above, is that this question is 'out of place' (on this criterion, see Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2).

78. Yet now οὐρήων, 'mules', is considered the right reading; see West, ad loc.; cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 445; Hainsworth 1993, 165. On οὔρηες, 'mules', see also *Sch. Il.* 1.50a, discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 1.2.

79. E.g., *Il.* 8.80 ≅ 11.840 (οὔρος); *Od.* 15.89 (οὔρον).

80. E.g., *Il.* 4.321 (κοῦρος); *Il.* 6.59 and *Od.* 19.523 (κοῦρον).

81. On the work of the interpolators (διασκευασταί) and Aristarchus' analysis in this regard, see Chapter 3.6.B § 7.

82. This is also valid when the subject of the verb σχηματίζειν is not Homer but a scholar, such

7. Analogy and Deductive Reasoning

Some examples of Aristarchean analogy especially illustrate how he worked with morphological questions arising in the *diorthosis*. For example, his skill at applying analogy is demonstrated by the following scholium discussing a metaplasma, that is, a form created from a nonexistent nominative or present base form:

Sch. Il. 5.299b (Hrd.) ἀλκί: ἀλκί ὡς σαρκί, καὶ ἔστι κατὰ μεταπλασμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλκή. τινὲς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ †ἀλκίς† Αἰολικοῦ αὐτὸ φασιν· τοῖς γὰρ εἰς ἡ παράκειται †εἰς† ις, ὡς ‘ἐορτή’ (*Od.* 20.156, 21.258) καὶ ἐορτίς καὶ ἐν ὑπερθέσει ἔροτις (cf. *Eur. El.* 625). ὠφείλε δὲ ἐκτείνειν τὸ ι. †εἴτε† ἀπ’ εὐθείας τῆς ἄλξ πεποιήται, ὡς οἶεται ὁ Ἀσκαλωνίτης (p. 46 Baege). Τρύφων δὲ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀναγνώσεως (fr. 97 Velsen) φησὶν ὅτι Ἀρίσταρχος λέγει ὅτι ἔθος αὐτοῖς ἔστι λέγειν τὴν ἰωκὴν ‘ἰῶκα’ (*Il.* 11.601) καὶ τὴν κρόκην ‘κρόκα’ (*Hes. Op.* 538) καὶ τὴν ἀλκὴν ἄλκα ὡς σάρκα. εἰ δὲ σάρκα ὡς ἄλκα, καὶ ἀλκί ὡς σαρκί.

‘[Trusting] in his strength (ἀλκί)’: ἀλκί like σαρκί (‘flesh’), and it is from ἀλκή (‘strength’) with metaplasma. But some say that it is from the Aeolic †ἀλκίς†; for, together with forms in -η, [in Aeolic] there are forms in -ις, such as ἐορτή (*Od.* 20.156, 21.258) and ἐορτίς (‘feast’) and, by letter transposition, ἔροτις (cf. *Eur. El.* 625). But it should have lengthened the ι. †Or† [ἀλκί] has been created from the nominative ἄλξ, as [Ptolemy] of Ascalon believes (p. 46 Baege). But in *On the Ancient Reading* (fr. 97 Velsen) Tryphon reports that Aristarchus says that their [i.e., the Aeolians?⁸³] custom is to say ἰωκὴν as ἰῶκα (‘rouf’) (*Il.* 11.601) and κρόκην as κρόκα (‘weft’) (*Hes. Op.* 538) and ἀλκὴν (‘strength’) as ἄλκα, like σάρκα (‘flesh’). If σάρκα is like ἄλκα, then ἀλκί is like σαρκί.

Ἀλκί, an isolated dative of the third declension with a nominative ἀλκή, ‘strength’, of the first declension, finds no parallel in Homer, as the other oxytone datives of the third declension do not work in this case because they are not metaplasms. In order to prove that ἀλκί is indeed correct, Aristarchus nests two different proportions. The first is ἰωκὴν : ἰῶκα :: κρόκην : κρόκα :: ἀλκὴν : *ἄλκα to show that in Homer (who uses ἰῶκα from ἰωκή) and in Hesiod (who uses κρόκα from κρόκη) there are cases in which a noun that has a nominative belonging to the first declension can have an accusative in -α, following the third declension.⁸⁴ Aristarchus thus assumes the same for ἀλκή: an accu-

as Zenodotus in *Sch. Il.* 2.520 καὶ Πανοπῆα: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘καὶ Πανοπτέων’, . . . οὐ καθ’ Ὅμηρον σχηματίζων τὸ ὄνομα [καὶ Πανοπῆα: because Zenodotus writes καὶ Πανοπτέων . . . not forming the noun according to Homer].

83. On whether Aristarchus considered these forms to be Aeolic, see Chapter 5.1 § 2.3.

84. In fact, Aristarchus recalls the parallel κρόκα with the same analogical proportion when

sative of the third declension *ἄλκα is *in theory* possible, even if it is unattested. If so, the theoretically ‘possible’ accusative *ἄλκα is identical to σάρκα, the regular accusative of the third declension from σάρξ, ‘flesh’. Thus one can form a second proportion using these two forms from the third declension: σάρκα : *ἄλκα :: σαρκί : ἀλκί. In other words, once the unattested *ἄλκα has been demonstrated to be possible because of the attested ἰῶκα and κρόκα and shown to be comparable to σάρκα, and since the dative of the latter is σαρκί, it follows that the dative of *ἄλκα will be ἀλκί: the form in the Homeric text is thus correct. Without postulating a nonexistent nominative *ἄλξ by analogy with σάρξ (as Ptolemy of Ascalon in the early imperial period did), Aristarchus explains a metaplasm (ἀλκί) only by recalling other metaplasms attested in literary authors. These attested forms (ἰῶκα and κρόκα) show that metaplasms do occur, even in the absence of a nominative of that declension, and so they prove that ἀλκί is correct.⁸⁵

Another instructive case is provided by the discussion of the declension of the word for ‘tree’ at *Il.* 3.152:

Sch. Il. 3.152a¹ δενδρέω {ἐφεζόμενοι}: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘δένδρει’. ὁ μὲν οὖν λέγων δένδρος ὡς κάλλος ἐρεῖ δένδρει ὡς κάλλει, ὁ δὲ δένδρον ὡς βάθρον ἐρεῖ δένδρω ὡς βάθρῳ. Ὅμηρος δὲ λέγων ‘δένδρεον ὑσιπέτηλον’ (*Il.* 13.437) ὡς χάλκεον ἐρεῖ καὶ δενδρέω ὡς χαλκέω.

‘On a tree (δενδρέω)’: because Zenodotus writes δένδρει. One who says δένδρος like κάλλος will say δένδρει like κάλλει; one who says δένδρον like βάθρον will say δένδρω like βάθρῳ. But Homer who says δένδρεον ὑσιπέτηλον (*Il.* 13.437) like χάλκεον will say δενδρέω like χαλκέω.

In arguing against Zenodotus, Aristarchus mentions all the three declensional patterns of the noun for ‘tree’: δένδρον, -ου, which is declined like βάθρον, -ου (neuter of the second declension), δένδρος, -εος, which is

analyzing ἰῶκα at *Il.* 11.601 (the only occurrence of the word in Homer) in *Sch. Il.* 11.601a¹ ἰῶκά τε δακρυόεσσαν: ὅτι τινὲς γράφουσιν ‘ἰῶ’, εἴτα ‘καταδακρυόεσσαν’. γίνεται δὲ ἔκθεσμον· ὁ γὰρ Ὅμηρος ‘ἰῶκα’ τὴν ἰωκὴν, οἷον δίωξιν, ὡς Ἡσίοδος (*Op.* 538) τὴν κρόκην ‘κρόκα’ [‘the tearful rout (ἰῶκα)’]: because some write ἰῶ and then καταδακρυόεσσαν [instead of ἰῶκά τε δακρυόεσσαν]. But this is incorrect. For Homer says ἰῶκα [for what in Koine is] ἰωκὴν, that is, the rout, as Hesiod says (*Op.* 538) κρόκα [for what in Koine is] κρόκην].

85. I assume that the entire last part of the scholium, from the quotation of Tryphon on (printed in bold), reports Aristarchus’ original argument. This is certainly true for the first proportion (as shown by *Sch. Il.* 11.601a¹, quoted in the above footnote). Additionally, the wording of the entire passage suggests that Tryphon is quoting the entire procedure followed by Aristarchus. The accusative ἰῶκα and the dative ἀλκί are indeed singled out together as Homeric peculiarities even now; see Chantraine 1953–1958, I 231.

declined like κάλλος, -εος (neuter of the third declension), and δένδρεον, -ου, which is declined like χάλκεον, -ου (a neuter uncontracted adjective which follows the second declension).⁸⁶ Since Homer only uses the latter, Zenodotus' reading is wrong because, even if his proportion (κάλλος : κάλλει :: δένδρος : δένδρει) is in principle correct, it is based on the wrong assumption, namely, that Homer uses δένδρος, and so must be rejected. The phrasing of the scholium, if it is original, is also interesting, since the three types of declensional patterns are seen as 'compulsory' according to Aristarchus' rigorous analogies: ὁ μὲν οὖν λέγων A . . . ἐρεῖ A1 . . . , ὁ δὲ [λέγων] B . . . ἐρεῖ B1. Ὅμηρος δὲ λέγων C . . . ἐρεῖ C1. In other words, if one pronounces the nominative in a certain way, he will have no other choice than using a specific type of dative. Therefore, and without exception, since Homer says δένδρεον in the nominative, he can only say δένδρέῳ in the dative. The idea of analogy as a rigorous deductive method to determine the correct morphological solution is here extremely evident.

Another example of deductive reasoning through the use of analogies can be found in a scholium discussing the verb στενάχοντο, 'they groaned':

Sch. Il. 23.1a {ὡς οἱ μὲν} στενάχοντο: ὅτι εἰ ἦν στεναχῶν ὡς φρονῶν, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως ἔλεγεν 'στενάχοντο'. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ φέρων ἐφέροντο (*Od.* 10.54, 124), οὕτως ἀπὸ τοῦ 'στενάχων' (*Il.* 1.364, 4.153, etc.) 'στενάχοντο' λέγει.

'They groaned (στενάχοντο)': because, if it were στεναχῶν like φρονῶν, he would have not said in this way στενάχοντο; but as from φέρων [he says] ἐφέροντο (*Od.* 10.54, 124), so from στενάχων (*Il.* 1.364, 4.153, etc.) he says στενάχοντο.⁸⁷

In this case, the explanation is given 'by contradiction'. Aristarchus states that if the present participle were like φρονῶν (i.e., στεναχῶν), then the imperfect would be the contracted στεναχοῦντο rather than στενάχοντο. But this is impossible since Homer uses the participle στενάχων, and never στεναχῶν. Hence, the pattern to follow is not the one of contracted verbs but rather that of uncontracted verbs like φέρειν. As φέρειν has an imperfect ἐφέροντο, the imperfect for the similar στενάχειν will be (ἐ)στενάχοντο. The proof by contradiction ('*reductio ad absurdum*') is, of course, a logical and mathematical procedure extensively used by both Aristotle and Euclid.⁸⁸

86. As already noted (see above, footnote 22), the equation between a noun and adjective was not a problem for Aristarchus because for him they were both ὀνόματα.

87. Closely connected is *Sch. Il.* 4.153a (above, § 1); see also *Sch. Il.* 1.364a; 1.364b² (Hrd.); cf. La Roche 1866, 351; Lehrs 1882, 299–300; Matthaios 1999, 411–412.

88. Cf. Heath 1926, I 136–137.

Aristarchus' use of analogy as a deductive and heuristic method is further demonstrated by a verbatim quotation in *Sch. Il.* 24.8a:

Sch. Il. 24.8a (Hrd.) πείρων: Πάμφιλος περισπᾶ, λέγων τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ι μὴ ἐξαλλάσσειν τὸν τόνον· εἰ δὲ περῶ οἶδεν ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ 'περόωσι' (*Od.* 4.709, 6.272, etc.) καὶ 'περάα<ν> μέγα λαῖτμα' (*Od.* 5.174), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ 'πειρῶν'. ὁ μέντοι Ἀρίσταρχος βαρύνων ἀναγινώσκει, ὡς 'κείρων' (cf. *Il.* 21.204, *Od.* 24.459). φησὶ γοῦν οὕτω γενόμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ 'παννυχίη μὲν ῥ' ἢ γε καὶ ἡῶ πείρε κέλευθον' (*Od.* 2.434). "τὸ 'πείρε' διδάσκει ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν 'πείρων' μετοχὴν βαρύνειν· ὡς γὰρ ἔκειρε κείρων, οὕτως ἔπειρε πείρων· εἰ γὰρ περισπᾶτο, ἦν ἂν ὁ παρατατικὸς ἐπείρα". ἔστιν οὖν διττὸν τὸ ῥῆμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν σὺν τῷ ι βαρυνθήσεται, τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῦ ι περισπασθήσεται.

'Making it through (πείρων) [wars of men and painful waves]': Pamphilus pronounces [πείρων] as perispomenon, saying that the addition of ι does not change the accent: if the poet knows the verb περῶ and περόωσι (*Od.* 4.709, 6.272, etc.), and [says] 'to drive through (περάαν) the great depths of the sea' (*Od.* 5.174), it is clear that [he also knows] πειρῶν. Aristarchus, however, reads it as barytone like κείρων (cf. *Il.* 21.204, *Od.* 24.459). Thus, coming to discuss 'thus all night long and through the dawn [the ship] made it through (πείρε) her journey' (*Od.* 2.434), he says: "**πείρε teaches us that the participle πείρων is also barytone, for as ἔκειρε κείρων, so ἔπειρε πείρων. If it were perispomenon, the imperfect would be ἐπείρα**". The verb is double: the one with ι will be barytone, the one without ι will be perispomenon.

According to Aristarchus, then, the analogical proportion (ἔκειρε : κείρων :: ἔπειρε : πείρων), based on Homeric forms (the imperfects (ἐ)κειρε and (ἐ)πειρε occur in *Il.* 16.120 and *Od.* 2.434 respectively) 'teaches' (διδάσκει) us that the right accent for the problematic participle ΠΕΙΡΩΝ is πείρων, and not πειρῶν. Indeed πείρων is the form of the vulgate, also adopted by modern editors.⁸⁹ To establish the accent, however, Aristarchus is not invoking any grammatical rule, but is simply appealing to a set of 'logical' ratios which give only one solution, in line with his 'scientific' attitude to language and linguistic analysis.⁹⁰

89. See Allen, van Thiel, West, ad loc.

90. On this scholium, see Erbse 1980, 237–239, who takes it as proof that Aristarchus was working within a fairly sophisticated frame of linguistic analysis. Cf. also La Roche 1866, 335–336; Lehrs 1882, 299; Matthaios 1999, 330, 343, 344–345, 409–410, 411, 421.

8. Implied Analogies and ‘Rational Relationships’ among Forms

In the above survey, I have analyzed scholia where analogies (i.e., two-, four-, or six-term proportions) are present and introduced by such formulas as *ὡς* or *ὁμοίως τῷ*, or where the inflectional analogical relationships in the *comparanda* are clearly spelled out (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.86). Analogical reasoning, however, is also used in other fragments, even if the proportion is not completely spelled out. I call these cases ‘implied analogy’. For example:

Sch. Il. 3.273a ἄρνῶν ἐκ κεφαλῶν: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ἄρνέων ἐκ κεφαλῶν. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ὀρθὴν ληγόντων εἰς ες οὐ γίνονται τοιαῦται διαιρέσεις, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς αἰ· εἰ δὲ ἄρνες, ἄρνῶν. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ κεφαλαί κατὰ λόγον κεφαλῶν.

‘[He cut off the hair] from the heads (ἐκ κεφαλῶν) of the lambs (ἄρνῶν)’: because Zenodotus writes ἄρνέων ἐκ κεφαλῶν. But these resolutions [of a diphthong] do not occur in [nouns] ending in -ες in the nominative, but in those ending in -αι; if it is ἄρνες, [the genitive will be] ἄρνῶν. Instead, from κεφαλαί logically [the genitive will be] κεφαλῶν.

Aristarchus is arguing against a genitive plural ἄρνέων in Zenodotus’ text, probably formed on the basis of κεφαλῶν.⁹¹ This is wrong because ἄρνες and κεφαλαί belong to different declensional patterns. To explain this, Aristarchus does not quote a grammatical rule but uses analogy. In fact, only by assuming two different implied analogical proportions does the final comment make sense: ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ κεφαλαί κατὰ λόγον κεφαλῶν, that is, given the nominative plural κεφαλαί, the genitive ‘logically’ (κατὰ λόγον) will be κεφαλῶν. Aristarchus, therefore, must have built a proportion like [βουλαί : βουλέων] :: κεφαλαί : κεφαλῶν, to which he opposed another one explaining the declension of ἄρνες, for example, [ἄνδρες : ἀνδρῶν] :: ἄρνες : ἄρνῶν.⁹² We may perhaps speculate that in the note the phrase κατὰ λόγον, if original, might be even closer to the primary, mathematical sense of λόγος, ‘ratio’, and so mean ‘according to a logical relationship’, that is, the ‘implied analogical proportion’. At any

91. The form ἄρνέων is a hyper-Ionicism, as was common in Zenodotus’ text (see Chapter 5.1 § 2.1.1). As Albio Cesare Cassio observed to me, when noting that ‘these resolutions [of a diphthong] do not occur in [nouns] ending in -ες in the nominative, but in those ending in -αι’, Aristarchus seems to think that the ending in -εων for the genitive plural of α-stems is indeed typically Ionic (cf. Buck 1955, § 41.4; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 69) but now applied to the wrong declension.

92. Even if ἀρήν, ἀρνός cannot be fully compared to ἀνήρ, ἀνδρός in the entire declension, it can be for the nominative and genitive plural. Cf. Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 568.

rate, whether or not here κατὰ λόγον implies a more mathematical meaning, it does underscore the logical reasoning that Aristarchus followed in determining inflectional patterns.⁹³

Another case of implied analogy concerns another attack on Zenodotus for not mastering the declension of the noun for ‘witness’, which in Homer belongs to the second declension (nominative μάρτυρος), and not to the third (nominative μάρτυς).⁹⁴ Several Aristonicus scholia address the question,⁹⁵ and in one the implied analogical proportion becomes more evident:

Sch. Il. 7.76b ἐπιμάρτυρος: ὅτι οὕτως λέγει, ὁ μάρτυρος, ἀφ’ οὗ οἱ μάρτυροι. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ μάρτυς μάρτυρες.

‘Witness (ἐπιμάρτυρος)’: because he says in this way, μάρτυρος, from which μάρτυροι [derives]. But μάρτυρες [is] from μάρτυς.

Aristarchus again uses two implied analogies which can be reconstructed *exempli gratia* as follows: [σάτυρος : σάτυροι ::] μάρτυρος : μάρτυροι, according to the second declension, and [ρήτωρ : ρήτορες ::] μάρτυς : μάρτυρες, according to the stems in ρ of the third declension.⁹⁶ Because of this analysis, Aristarchus can accuse Zenodotus of not knowing that the correct Homeric form in the plural is μάρτυροι ‘in conformity’ (ἀκολουθῶς) with the nominative μάρτυρος (*Sch. Il. 14.274a*: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος ‘μάρτυρες’ γράφει, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι μάρτυροι λέγειν δεῖ ἀκολουθῶς τῷ μάρτυρος). Here the adverb ἀκολουθῶς points to the close connection between the singular nominative (ἐπι)μάρτυρος, used by Homer in *Il. 7.76* and *Od. 16.423*, and the nominative plural μάρτυροι in *Il. 14.274*. Hero-

93. Indeed, the phrase κατὰ λόγον seems to be always connected to logical thinking, also in classical authors such as Herodotus (‘proportionally’ in, e.g., 1.134.2, 2.13.2, 2.14.1, 2.68.2), Thucydides (‘according to calculation’ in 2.89.6, 3.39.4 and ‘proportionally’ in 6.25.2), Aristophanes (‘according to calculation’ in *Nub.* 619—of the calendar days); in the Hippocratic Corpus (‘according to what is expected’ in *Aēr.* 10.2; ‘according to reasoning’ in, e.g., *Prog.* 17.18, 18.5; *Morb. IV* 46 l. 23; ‘according to calculation’ or ‘proportionally’ in, e.g., *Nat. Puer.* 18 ll. 20, 28, 35, 50, 61; *Morb. IV* 42 l. 15—I thank Tyler Mayo for bringing these passages to my attention); Plato (‘according to a rational principle’ in, e.g., *Resp.* 500c5, 545c6; *Ti.* 89d4; *Leg.* 689d7); Aristotle (‘according to reason / a rational principle’ in, e.g., *de An.* 414a25, 429a12; *Cael.* 268b25; *EN* 1095a10, 1098a7; *Metaph.* 989a31–32, 1046b22–23, 1048a2; ‘proportionally’ in, e.g., *Cael.* 276b25; *HA* 496b15, 500a20). Probably because it seems to always imply rational thinking, reasoning, and calculation, the phrase is typical of philosophical language (it is used by the Presocratics, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Chrysippus) and in the *Corpus Hippocraticum* to indicate that something happens ‘according to calculation / rational expectation’.

94. Cf. Chantraine 1953–1958, I 232.

95. *Sch. Il.* 2.302a.b; 3.280a; 7.76b; 14.274a; 22.255a; cf. La Roche 1866, 308.

96. Of course, a *comparandum* is much more difficult to find here, given the idiosyncratic declension of μάρτυς. It is, however, a theme in ρ (see Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 569); thus, the example of ρήτωρ, ρήτορες would have worked for Aristarchus’ purposes.

dian, too, uses the adverb ἀκολουθῶς (together with the adjective ἀκόλουθος) in two scholia among those preserving Aristarchean analogies⁹⁷ and also elsewhere,⁹⁸ in the sense of ‘in conformity’ with a grammatical rule. In the Aristonicus scholia, the term seems to mean simply ‘according to what expected,’ ‘in conformity’ with a rational principle, since it also occurs elsewhere with reference to the syntax or to the logical connection within a passage.⁹⁹ Thus, when used in connection with morphological patterns, ἀκολουθία indicates the presence of some ‘rational principle’ behind the forms at issue, which one should respect when discussing Homeric inflectional patterns (σχήματα).¹⁰⁰

9. Herodian’s Analogy and Aristarchus’ Analogical Proportions

Herodian’s concept of analogy is very different from Aristarchus’ use of analogical proportions. This becomes clear from the following example:

Sch. Il. 12.158 (Hrd.) ταρφείας: Ἀρίσταρχος ὀξύνει ὡς πυκνάς. ὁ δὲ Θρᾷξ Διονύσιος (fr. 5 Linke) ὁμοίως προεφέρετο τῷ ταχείας, παρὰ τὸ ταρφύς ἀρσενικόν, οὗ πολλὰ ἦσαν χρήσεις παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ (cf. *Il.* 11.69, 387, etc.). καὶ δὴλον ὅτι ἀναλόγως μὲν ἀναγινώσκει ὁ Θρᾷξ, ἐπεκράτησε δὲ ἡ Ἀριστάρχου.

‘Thick (ταρφείας)’: Aristarchus pronounces ταρφείας oxytone like πυκνάς. Dionysius Thrax (fr. 5 Linke), on the other hand, pronounced it like ταχείας, from the masculine ταρφύς, of which there were many uses in the ancients and Homer (cf. *Il.* 11.69, 387, etc.). And it is clear that [Dionysius] Thrax reads it according to analogy, but the reading of Aristarchus prevailed.¹⁰¹

Both Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax use an analogical proportion, though they choose different *comparanda*, which lead in turn to different results: Aris-

97. *Sch. Il.* 13.191c; 22.28a.

98. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.662a¹; 9.230a; 13.29b; 16.173a.

99. See, for example, *Sch. Il.* 5.245a and 24.614–7a (the latter discussed in Chapter 5.3 § 3.2.4).

100. Ἀκολουθία and its derivatives occur in the definition of ἀναλογία among Greek and Latin grammarians; cf. Schironi 2018b, § 7. The terms ἀκόλουθος and ἀκολουθῶς are frequent in mathematical writing too and mean ‘in conformity with,’ ‘consequentially’; they are thus not used to indicate proportions but deductive reasoning, often connected with geometric demonstrations. They are especially common in later mathematicians such as Pappus and Eutocius; see Mugler 1958, 46–47.

101. Cf. La Roche 1866, 279, 360–361; Lehrs 1882, 256; Linke 1977, 36–37; Schironi 2004, 315–319 (fr. 39); van Thiel 2014a, I 57–58.

tarchus reads ταρφείας on the basis of πυκνάς,¹⁰² whereas Dionysius reads ταρφείας on the basis of ταχείας. Yet Herodian observes that only the reading of the latter is analogical, though the reading of Aristarchus prevailed. This apparent contradiction can be understood as arising from the difference between the *analogical operation* employed by Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax, on the one hand, and Herodian's *grammatical analogy*, on the other. According to Herodian, Aristarchus' solution is not analogical because 'grammatical correctness' says that this adjective has the same declensional pattern as ταχεῖα, whose accusative plural is ταχείας. Therefore, the 'right' form is ταρφείας, as Dionysius gives. Aristarchus, on the contrary, reads ταρφείας like πυκνάς and proposes the same oxytone accentuation for the corresponding nominative plural ταρφεῖαι and the similar θαμειαί (Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.52; 19.357a).¹⁰³ This for Aristarchus is analogy, in fact even semantic analogy,¹⁰⁴ because he uses πυκ(ι)ναί, which has the same meaning of ταρφεῖαι and θαμειαί, 'close-set', 'compact', as a model for the analogical proportion. Yet for Herodian Aristarchus' results are not analogical, in the sense that they are not according to the right declensional pattern, which is the meaning of analogy at his time.¹⁰⁵

In fact, why does Aristarchus choose the *comparandum* πυκ(ι)νάς, which is obviously less immediate than ταχείας? An answer to this question has been suggested by Martin West and Albio Cesare Cassio.¹⁰⁶ They connect Aristarchus' choice with Wackernagel's opinion that the accent of ταρφεῖαι, ταρφείας, and θαμειαί was the original one, derived from the Indo-European *devī* inflection.¹⁰⁷ This demonstrates that recitations were never discontinued and that the Alexandrians and Aristarchus, in particular, were aware that in the Homeric texts the diction and the prosody of some words were different from the corresponding, 'analogical' forms in Koine Greek. This is correct, but should not lead to the conclusion that Aristarchus could never have found this accentuation marked in a papyrus and was relying only on oral sources. In fact, some system to mark accents existed in the Hellenistic period and even before the Alexandrians, as is confirmed by Aristotle in *Soph. El.* 177b4–7 and by papyri of the second century BCE, which show some accents for the most

102. Or πυκινάς; see above, footnote 29.

103. In *Sch. Il.* 1.52 (Hrd.), Aristarchus' solution for θαμειαί is opposed to that of Pamphilus, which is in line with Dionysius' reading: Πάμφιλος 'θαμείαι' λέγει ὡς 'ὄξεῖαι' (*Il.* 11.268, *Od.* 19.517), Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ ὡς 'πυκιναί' (*Il.* 4.281, 5.93, etc.). ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ταρφεῖαι [Pamphilus says θαμείαι like ὄξεῖαι (*Il.* 11.268, *Od.* 19.517), Aristarchus instead [says θαμειαί] like πυκιναί (*Il.* 4.281, 5.93, etc.). And in the same way [he reads] also ταρφεῖαι].

104. See above, § 5.

105. On Herodian's analogy, see Sluiter 2011; Schironi 2018b, § 6.

106. West 1981, 114; West 1998–2000, I xxi; Cassio 2002, 113–114.

107. Wackernagel 1955, II 1173, 1176–1178. On the *devī* inflection in Greek and Latin, see Sihler 1995, 275–278.

difficult words.¹⁰⁸ Controversial cases such as those of ταρφειαί, ταρφειάς, and θαμειαί would have been the most likely candidates to be marked with the ‘right’ accent. Perhaps in ‘common copies’ (αἱ κοιναί), with no learned pretension, no σημείωσις was used, but good editions (αἱ χαριέστεραι), even those with only a few reading aids, would have marked these prosodic exceptions. A library like that of Alexandria would have certainly had copies of such editions, which would have been available to Aristarchus. He could thus preserve an odd, but original, accentuation which went against any grammatical standard of the Koine Greek of his time, as he might have found manuscript evidence to support it.¹⁰⁹ Still, he did not quote manuscript evidence or ‘oral’ recitations to confirm this aberrant accentuation; he simply used an analogical proportion to show that *in principle* such a nonstandard accent was *logically* possible.¹¹⁰ If this reconstruction is correct, it is also interesting to note that while both Dionysius Thrax and Aristarchus applied analogy, the former used morphological regularity as a leading criterion, while Aristarchus followed ‘tradition’ (and manuscript evidence). This difference highlights the divergent criteria in dealing with textual problems as well as the contrasting attitudes toward their job as ‘grammarians’ in two scholars divided only by a generation (as is well known, Dionysius was a direct pupil of Aristarchus).

The important distinction between Aristarchus’ use of analogical proportions (to find out debated forms in Homer) and Herodian’s analogy (as a set of rules to which linguistic forms should adapt) also explains other instances in which Herodian accuses Aristarchus of not following analogy:

Sch. Il. 16.415a (Hrd.) Ἀμφοτερόν: εἰς διαστολήν τὸ κύριον ὀξύτόνως ἀνέγνω ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος ὡς ‘δεξιτερόν’ (*Il.* 5.393, etc.)· καὶ ἐπείσθησαν οἱ γραμματικοί. περὶ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀνωμαλίας τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν ἑτέροις ἡμῖν εἴρηται.

‘Amphoterus (Ἀμφοτερόν)’: Aristarchus read the proper noun as oxytone like δεξιτερόν (*Il.* 5.393, etc.) to distinguish it [from the homograph ἀμφότερον]. And the grammarians followed him. We have discussed elsewhere this anomaly of the man [i.e., Aristarchus].

108. See Cassio 2002, 127–128, and Chapter 3.1 § 1 and § 4 (with some examples from papyri).

109. Cassio *per litteras* agrees with the notion that Aristarchus found his solution not through oral recitations but in manuscripts. On Aristarchus’ use of manuscript evidence, see Chapter 2.2.

110. In *Sch. Il.* 5.502b Herodian observes that the oxytone accentuation of θαμειαί and ταρφειαί is ‘more Ionic’. If Aristarchus also felt the same, this might explain his choice: this reading was not only perhaps marked in ancient copies and logically possible, but also closer to the language originally spoken by Homer (see Chapter 5.1 § 2.1, § 3, and § 4). A similar case in which Aristarchus adopts, according to Herodian, an aberrant accentuation concerns ἀκάκητα, ‘benevolent’, an epithet for Hermes; see *Sch. Il.* 16.185a¹ (Hrd.); cf. Lehrs 1882, 256–257.

This scholium has already been mentioned in Chapter 3.1 § 4.2 regarding the use of accents to distinguish homographs. Herodian, however, finds Aristarchus' behavior 'anomalous'. Although Herodian refers to other places where he discussed the question, there are no surviving fragments which explain what he means by 'anomaly' here.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, he probably did not mean that Aristarchus followed 'anomaly' as opposed to 'analogy'. Even if scholars, especially in the past, have often postulated an opposition between the doctrine of 'analogy' (followed at Alexandria) and the doctrine of 'anomaly' (followed at Pergamum), according to which the formation of words followed the speakers' usage rather than grammatical rules,¹¹² Detlev Fehling¹¹³ and David Blank¹¹⁴ have argued that this strong opposition never really existed and is mostly due to Varro.¹¹⁵ Whether or not one accepts the existence of a controversy between 'anomalists' and 'analogists' as reported by Varro, evidence shows that ancient grammarians could both look for rules of inflection according to analogy as well as for spoken usage.¹¹⁶ Yet the latter was not labeled as 'anomaly' by technical grammarians¹¹⁷—rather, 'anomaly' generically meant 'irregularity' and 'inconsistency'.¹¹⁸ If this is the correct meaning of ἀνωμαλία, where does Aris-

111. Erbse refers to Hrd. 2.4.5–7, but in Lentz's collection the fragment consists only of this scholium.

112. See, e.g., Ribbach 1883, 5 and 34; Steinthal 1890–1891, II 71–161, esp. 127–161; Rostagni 1933, 115–119; Collart 1954, 135–149; Collart 1963; Fraser 1972, I 463 and 465–466; Siebenborn 1976, 97–104; Robins 1976; Baratin and Desbordes 1981, 43–46; Ax 1991, 289–295 (esp. 294).

113. Fehling 1956, esp. 264–270.

114. Blank 1982, 1–5, 11–12; Blank 1994, 151–158; Blank 1998, xxxiv–xl.

115. This view is now the prevailing one: see Pfeiffer 1968, 203 and 245; Pinborg 1975, 109–112; Taylor 1986, 180–182; Broggiato 2001, xxxiii–xli. On the other hand, Fehling and Blank give different solutions to the question of the origin of this controversy, whether it is Varro's own creation (Fehling 1957) or rather is due to the sources that Varro used (Blank 1998, xxxvi–xl).

116. As already remarked by Broggiato 2001, xxxvi, and Ascheri 2004, esp. 347 (in relation to Demetrius Ixion). In fact, even Ax, who believes in the controversy between anomaly and analogy, concedes that Aristarchus could follow both principles even if he preferred analogy (Ax 1991, 287); cf. also Ribbach 1883, 36. On this point, see also below, § 10.

117. Chrysippus used the word 'anomaly' in a work (Περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς λέξεις ἀνωμαλίας πρὸς Δίωνα, in Diog. Laert. 7.192 = SVF 2, fr. 14) which analyzed the question of the relationship between the signified and the signifier (Varro LL 9.1 = SVF 2, fr. 151). As is clear, this idea of 'anomaly' is very different from what Varro supposes anomaly to mean; see Fehling 1956, 267; Blank 1994, 152–154; Blank 1998, 254. In the very few occurrences in the exegetical scholia or in the fragments of Porphyry on Homer the word 'anomalous' simply means 'odd', 'inconsistent', and is never used in a grammatical context. In sum, while ἀναλογία is indeed a term employed to define the analogical approach, ἀνωμαλία is not a technical term to qualify the opposite procedure. On the difference between Chrysippus and the Alexandrians in their understanding of analogy, see also Callanan 1987, 108–109, 121.

118. To account for morphological 'anomalies' due to the influence of spoken usage and against what expected from regular rules of inflection, Greek grammarians (especially the *technikoi* of the Roman period: Apollonius Dyscolus and Herodian) used the term 'pathology'; see Blank 1982, 41–49, and Lallot 1995.

tarchus' inconsistency lie? Herodian, who does in fact agree with Aristarchus' accentuation,¹¹⁹ seems to be bothered by the fact that Aristarchus does not apply the criterion of using different accents to distinguish homographs consistently.¹²⁰ Similarly, in *Sch. Il.* 1.493a (Hrd.) he accuses Aristarchus of reading ὅτεδή as one word like δηλαδή illogically (παραλόγως), whereas Pamphilus' preference for two words, ὅτε and δή, is according to analogy (ἀναλόγως). This is only a question of *scriptio continua* and Herodian might have simply wanted to stress that it was more regular to read ὅτε and δή as separate words. Yet Aristarchus' choice, even if less preferable in Herodian's view, is based on another interesting analogy: ὅτεδή is compared to δηλαδή because both have the same 'compositional' morphology: ὅτε + δή and δῆλα + δή, where the first element is disyllabic and originally accented on its first syllable, while the second is the emphatic particle δή.¹²¹

In three cases where Herodian's interpretation of analogy does not accord with Aristarchus' use of analogical proportion, Herodian observes that, rather than analogy, Aristarchus followed the χαρακτήρ of the form.¹²² Literally, χαρακτήρ indicates 'what is engraved' in something, hence what is most typical; in grammar, it is often translated as 'typical form' to mean the inflectional pattern. Herodian's comment is key to understanding the difference between Aristarchus' use of analogy and the later one. According to Herodian, Aristarchus selects words which are similar in sound (namely, they have the same χαρακτήρ) and by comparison finds the forms he needs. This is not analogy for Herodian, as it does not comply with any grammatical

119. [Arcad.] 81.6–7 (Hrd. 1.196.5–6): τὸ δὲ ἀμφοτέρως ἐπιθετικόν, τὸ δὲ Ἀμφοτερός ὡς κύριον ὀξύνεται [ἀμφοτέρως is the adjective, while Ἀμφοτερός is oxytone because it is a proper noun].

120. See also *Sch. Il.* 18.39–46 (Hrd.), discussed in Chapter 3.1 § 4.2.

121. See Denniston 1950, 203–262, who also mentions the formation of δηλαδή (1950, 205) and of ὅτεδή (1950, 220). From this point of view, Aristarchus' analogy can even become a four-term proportion, which focuses on derivational/compositional morphology, as follows: ὅτεδή : [ὅτε + δή] :: δηλαδή : [δῆλα + δή].

122. *Sch. Il.* 11.239c¹ λῖς: . . . τῷ μέντοι χαρακτήρι τοῦ κίς καὶ 'θίς' (*Od.* 12.45) καὶ ρίς, καίτοι γε διαφόρως κλιθεῖσι πρὸς τὸ λῖς, συνεξωμοίωσεν αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸν ὅν Ἀρίσταρχος [λῖς: . . . but Aristarchus assimilated it [i.e., λῖς] to the typical form of κίς, θίς (*Od.* 12.45), and ρίς regarding the accent, though [these nouns] decline differently from λῖς]; *Sch. Il.* 11.659c οὐτάμενοι: . . . προπαρωξύνθη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου διὰ τὸν χαρακτήρα, ἐπεὶ αἱ τοιαῦται μετοχαὶ προπαρωξύνοντο, 'ιστάμενος' (*Il.* 4.203, etc.), κιχράμενος· ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ τῷ χαρακτήρι μᾶλλον τοὺς τόνους προσνέμει [οὐτάμενοι . . . it is pronounced as a proparoxytone by Aristarchus because of the typical form of these verbs, since these participles are proparoxytone, ιστάμενος (*Il.* 4.203, etc.), κιχράμενος; for the man [i.e., Aristarchus] assigns accents more on the basis of the typical form]; *Sch. Il.* 16.827 πέφνοντα: . . . δῆλον ὅτι ὀφείλομεν καὶ τὴν μετοχὴν ὀξύνειν. ὁ μέντοι Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ τῷ χαρακτήρι τῆς φωνῆς ἐπείσθη καὶ οὕτως ἐβάρυνεν [it is clear that we must also pronounce the participle as an oxytone. Nevertheless, Aristarchus followed the typical form of the word and so pronounced it as a barytone]. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 252–253.

rule (κανών). In his view, Aristarchus does not follow ἀναλογία, but rather a more impressionistic principle: the word's χαρακτήρ. This seems to be how later grammarians looked at the Aristarchean analogical proportions, which—even if different from later analogy meaning ‘grammatical rule’—were actually the application of the original idea of ἀναλογία, the mathematical proportion.¹²³ In fact, the χαρακτήρ can be seen as the *summa* of the criteria for analogy which Aristarchus followed: to have the same gender (1), the same case (2), the same ending (3), the same number of syllables (4), the same accent (5), and the same σχῆμα (6). According to Aristarchus, when two (or more) forms had the same χαρακτήρ, they were comparable, and thus one could be used as a model for the other with scientific rigor.

10. Conclusions

Aristarchus used heuristic analogical proportions in the *diorthosis* to establish the orthography and the inflectional patterns of debated forms. In fact, proportions were the tools that he employed to determine the right ‘shape’ (σχῆμα) for Homeric words: their accent, whether to write words as compounds (ἐν συνθέσει) or not (ἐν παραθέσει), and which ‘shape’ they took in a specific inflected form. All these morphological questions were solved by using analogical proportions, which could have two, four, or six members. In fact, the two-term proportions involving declinable parts of speech (i.e., nouns, adjectives, and verbs), used when the inflectional pattern was not at stake, were also in all probability conceived (originally or implicitly) as ‘real’ four-term proportions, as concluded in § 6. Furthermore, even if the proportions are not explicitly spelled out in the scholia, it is sometimes possible to identify ‘implied’ analogies, as for example in *Sch. Il.* 3.273a.

In all the cases where analogical proportions were used in the *diorthosis* the underlying assumptions were that language was rational and Homer was self-consistent; hence, once an inflectional pattern was detected in Homer, all the occurrences of similar examples had to be ‘in conformity’ (ἀκολουθῶς) with it. Even if the analysis of terminology in scholia should always be taken with a grain of salt, expressions like ἀκολουθῶς or κατὰ λόγον used in some Aristonicus scholia dealing with analogical relationships reveal the ‘rational’ principles that Aristarchus saw behind the Homeric language. This ‘rationality’ was the premise to apply the analogical method to Homer’s text. Later on, and especially with Herodian, analogy was more closely connected with grammatical rules identified by the grammarian.¹²⁴

123. This point is fully discussed in Schironi 2018b.

124. Cf. Schenkeveld 1994, 283.

Since analogy was a method, it depended on how it was applied. The criteria for analogy initiated by Aristophanes and further developed by Aristarchus ensured that the analogical proportions were correct and hence provided good results. Indeed, Aristarchus seems to have followed these principles very rigorously; the only one which appears to have been less strictly followed is the one concerning the number of syllables, which admittedly is a less necessary criterion for producing meaningful proportions. In addition to the six criteria for analogy reported by Charisius, Aristarchus strove for something more. Sometimes he looked for semantic proximity between the two *comparanda*, and sometimes for a similar phonetic 'shape' extending beyond the ending of the words. These additional criteria did not increase the rigor of the method, but made it easier to use. In fact, both the phonological and the semantic criteria helped one to remember the analogical proportions because the two sets of words to be compared were similar either in sound or in meaning. In this way, Aristarchus might have adapted the analogical method for his teaching needs in order to make it more functional and practical for his students.

Normally, the *comparandum* was found within Homer, and this was consistent with the principle of 'clarifying Homer from Homer'. Since Aristarchus' goal was to correct the Homeric text, using forms attested in Homer as models was indeed the best method. The choice of mostly employing examples from Homer's usage to build up an analogical proportion also shows that following 'analogy' and following 'spoken usage' were not mutually exclusive principles; rather, they could even be combined in the same operation, as Aristarchus did when using 'analogical proportions' based on Homer's 'spoken' language.

Other literary authors could also be a good source of *comparanda*, however. In particular, in the case of words pertaining to a particular dialect, other poets whose language had a much more consistent and stronger dialectal varnish provided more compelling linguistic parallels, such as Hesiod for Aeolic forms. On the other hand, very common words taken from daily language were also used as *comparanda*. The reason was probably that they were easier to remember; moreover, they might have been felt as paradigmatic for a certain declension or conjugation, and perhaps were already employed in elementary school teaching as examples. After all, everyone who is trained in classical languages tends automatically to use paradigms learned at school to determine a specific morphological form, like *amo* and λύω for Latin and Greek verbs. The same may have occurred with paradigmatic forms taken from everyday language that Aristarchus used to remind his students how obscure Homeric words were inflected.

To conclude, the way in which Aristarchus used analogy seems also to highlight two fundamental and coexistent traits of his activity: on the one hand, he was a scholar who was looking for a 'scientific' method to carry out his research and his Homeric *diorthosis* in the most objective and rigorous

way; on the other, he was a teacher with an eye on the needs of his students. Consequentially, he tried to adapt his scientific method to his teaching goals and to make it easy to use—either by using words that were close in meaning or in sound, or by using paradigmatic examples from daily language. In this way, analogical proportions became easier to remember. Even so, he applied them with the same uncompromising rigor that was typical of his nature.

3.6.A

Judgment of Poems

Aristotle's Lesson

1. Aristotle and Aristarchus
2. A Preliminary Assumption about Tragedy and Epos
3. Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: Plot (μῦθος)
4. Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: Characters (ἥθη)
5. Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: Thought (διάνοια)
6. Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: Diction (λέξις)
7. Conclusions

Dionysius Thrax states that the sixth part of grammar is the most beautiful of all (κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ). The ‘judgment of poems’ (κρίσις ποιημάτων) was primarily the judgment of the authenticity of texts. This was the acme of exegetical activity because a scholar needed to have a full background and training in all the other aspects of ‘grammar’ in order to be able to judge accurately questions of authenticity. Indeed, only through the study of all that was typical of a poet, from his vocabulary to his morphology, from his mythical background to his tropes and *schemata*, could a scholar become an expert in that author and thus decide whether a work (or part of a work) was genuine. The κρίσις of a poet and his works would eventually lead the scholar to decide whether to include him in the list of ‘chosen’ authors (οἱ ἐγκριθέντες) that needed to be read by anyone who wanted to acquire a Greek *paideia*.¹ Certainly, Homer was a ‘classic’ for the Alexandrians—in fact, he was the first of the ἐγκριθέντες—and Aristarchus did not even bother to question his preeminence, which was taken for granted. Yet Homer did need the κρίσις ποιημάτων, insofar as this part of grammar dealt with problems of authenticity, which

1. Pfeiffer 1968, 203–208; see also Chapter 3.0, with footnote 19.

included not only the judgment of whether or not an entire work was by a certain author, but also the judgment of whether one or more lines within a poem were authentic. According to Aristarchus, in fact, Homer required both types of κρίσις: the discussion of spurious lines, because his text had suffered many interpolations, as well as the ‘judgment’ about his authorship of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, as at that time there were already scholars (the so-called Chozizontes), who denied that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the work of the same poet. I will discuss the latter question in a later chapter dedicated to the topic (Chapter 5.2), when I deal with Aristarchus’ view of Homer. In this section of Part 3, I will instead focus on the former one, that is, the discussion of suspicious lines and the consequent athetesis of those considered to have been interpolated (Chapter 3.6.B). In discussing the sixth part of grammar, moreover, I have also dedicated a chapter to another aspect that can be roughly called ‘literary criticism.’ This aspect can be considered part of the judgment of poems to the extent that it was also by discussing Homeric literary and narrative techniques that Aristarchus could ‘judge’ the Homeric text and show that it was indeed correct, once certain literary devices were properly understood (Chapter 3.6.C). In this way, then, both his analysis of Homer’s literary techniques and his rejection of lines ‘unworthy’ of Homer help to reconfirm Homer’s position as a ‘chosen’ author. Before addressing these two specific areas of the κρίσις ποιημάτων, however, it is necessary to frame the ‘highest part of grammar’ in its historical context. In particular, I will focus on the impact of Aristotle on Aristarchus’ ‘judgment of poems’ to show another aspect—in fact, the most important one—of the Peripatetic influence on Alexandrian scholarship.²

1. Aristotle and Aristarchus

The Peripatetic influence on many of the fields of inquiry developed at Alexandria is undeniable: chronology, ethnography, paradoxography, glossography, literary biography, and bibliography (*pinakes*), as well as medicine and mechanics,³ owed much to the Aristotelian school and its approach to scholarship and science. In recent years, against Pfeiffer’s tendency to deny important links between Aristotle and the Alexandrian grammarians,⁴ scholars such as Gallavotti,

2. This chapter derives (with some changes and several abridgments) from a longer article I published in *Classical Philology* (Schironi 2009).

3. A relationship between Aristotle and Alexandrian medicine, both sharing the principle of teleology, has been suggested by von Staden 1997.

4. Pfeiffer 1968, 67, 87–88, 95, 272. For a criticism of Pfeiffer’s view, see in particular Rossi 1976, 110–115, and Montanari 1994, 2, 29–31.

Schenkeveld, Nickau, Lührs, Porter, Montanari, Richardson, Matthaios, and, most recently, Bouchard⁵ have also argued in favor of the influence of Aristotle on Alexandrian philology and, in particular, on Aristarchus' scholarship. Some parallels between Aristotle and Aristarchus have been already emphasized in the course of this study, for example, in the way the latter dealt with Homeric *glossai*, respecting and explaining them, often with the help of additional Aristotelian ideas (like the difference between 'genus' and 'species', or the opposition between words used *κυρίως* and those used *οὐ κυρίως/ἰδίως*).⁶ We have also noticed the correlation in the analysis of similes and metaphors and how Aristarchus developed Aristotle's ideas of metaphor 'by analogy'.⁷ Similarly, he seems to have followed the philosopher in his attitude toward the 'historical' reality of the Homeric poems.⁸ In the final part of this study (Part 5), which is devoted to the analysis of Aristarchus' view of Homer, Aristotle's influence will again surface in the distinction between Homer and the Cyclic poets,⁹ as well as in the theory that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are creations of one poet, Homer.¹⁰

In this chapter, on the other hand, I would like to focus on what is probably the most important influence Aristotle seems to have had on Aristarchus' work on Homer: his theory of poetry and literary style as outlined (for us) in the *Poetics* and in the *Rhetoric*. This comparison must first be put in the right context, as it is clear that the ethos and essence of the work of Aristotle and that of Aristarchus were fundamentally different. Whereas Aristotle wrote theoretical treatises, as far as we know Aristarchus did not produce a single speculative work; all his theoretical background must be inferred from his own practice in dealing with the *diorthosis* of Homer, as witnessed by the Homeric scholia. We can thus oppose Aristotle's theory to Aristarchus' practice and see whether and how the Aristotelian conceptual framework fits with Aristarchus' methodology.¹¹

5. Gallavotti 1969; Schenkeveld 1970; Nickau 1977, 134–183 (on Zenodotus and his analysis of narrative contradictions); Lührs 1992, 13–17; Porter 1992, esp. 74–80; Montanari 1993, 259–264; Richardson 1993, 35–36; Richardson 1994; Matthaios 1999, *passim*; Matthaios 2002, 174–177, 189–191; Bouchard 2016. In fact, even Roemer (e.g., Roemer 1912, 441–445; Roemer 1924, 226–227) had already recognized Aristotle's influence on Aristarchus' approach to Homer. Aristotle is also a constant presence in the study by Meijering 1987 on literary theories in Greek scholia. On the Peripatetic scholars as literary critics, see Podlecki 1969 and Montanari 2001.

6. See Chapter 3.3.A, *passim*, and especially § 2.3 and § 2.9.

7. See Chapter 3.2.A § 3 and § 4.

8. See Chapter 3.3.B § 7.

9. See Chapter 5.3 § 6 and § 7.

10. See Chapter 5.2.

11. In what follows, the Aristonicus scholia to the *Odyssey* will also be taken into account, as some of them show the close relationship between Aristarchus' practice and Aristotle's theory especially well.

2. A Preliminary Assumption about Tragedy and Epos

At the beginning of the *Poetics* (1448b24–1449a6), Aristotle draws a famous distinction between the two main ‘genres’ of poetic works: serious and comic. Among the former he counts tragedy, which he claims is derived from the serious epic represented by the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, just as comedy is derived from the Homeric *Margites*:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1448b24–1449a2: διεσπάσθη δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἡθῇ ἢ ποιήσις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια. . . . ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὅμηρος ἦν (μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὖ ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν), οὕτως καὶ τὸ τῆς κωμωδίας σχῆμα πρῶτος ὑπέδειξεν, οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας· ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιάς καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγωδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμωδίας.

Poetry was divided according to the individual characters; for the more dignified people represented noble actions and the actions of noble people, and the more ordinary people [represented] the actions of base people, first composing invectives, just as the others [were composing] hymns and encomia . . . and just as Homer was the best poet as far as serious poems (for he was singular not because he composed well, but because he also composed dramatic representations), so too was he the first to show the form of comedy, putting into a drama not an invective but the ridiculous. For the *Margites* stands in an analogical relation: just as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are in relation to tragedies, so too is [the *Margites*] in relation to comedies.

Tragedy and epos are thus not so far apart:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1449b16–20: μέρη δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς τραγωδίας· διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγωδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἐπῶν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ.

As for their parts, some are the same, and some are peculiar to tragedy. Therefore whoever knows about tragedy, good and bad, knows also about epic poetry. For the parts that epic poetry has belong to tragedy, but the parts of tragedy are not all in epic poetry.

It is this close relationship between tragedy and epic¹² that allows for the identification of Aristotelian criteria within the work of a Homeric scholar like Aristarchus. If what I argue is sound, Aristarchus knew what the philosopher had said about the affinity between these two genres and therefore thought it legitimate to apply Aristotle's criteria for a good tragedy to epic poetry. The Alexandrians knew some of the Aristotelian works, and whether or not the *Poetics* was available to them, the dialogue *On Poets* (in which Aristotle discussed the same topics as in the *Poetics*) and the *Homeric Problems* were probably known at Alexandria.¹³

For Aristotle, tragedy is composed of six parts (*Poet.* 1450a7–10): plot (μῦθος), characters (ἥθη), diction (λέξις), thought (διάνοια), spectacle (ὄψις), and music (μελοποιία). In the chapters on epic (*Poet.* 1459b9–10), he picks up this division again, but rightly states that epic lacks the last two, music and spectacle.¹⁴ This is a very useful working distinction, which helps Aristotle to set out a systematic view of the main constituents of a tragedy (and of an epic too). This division of epic into four elements also seems to have been operative in Aristarchus' methodology—especially when he needed to decide about an athetesis or a variant reading, because a line was generally judged with reference to its function for the plot, for the characters, for the thought it expressed, as well as in terms of its diction. Therefore, I will follow this division in the following analysis to investigate what Aristotle and Aristarchus had to say about the plot, the characters, the thought-element, and the diction.

3. Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: Plot (μῦθος)

Since tragedy (as well as epic) is for Aristotle a representation (*mimesis*) of a complete and whole action with some magnitude (*Poet.* 1450b23–25: κείται

12. As proven also by the last chapters of the *Poetics* (§§ 23–26), where Aristotle focuses on epic poetry, drawing on the previous chapters where he analyzed tragedy. For an account of Aristotle's views on Homer, see Richardson 1992; Richardson 1993, 31–35. On Aristotle's theory of epos, see Koster 1970, 42–80.

13. See Richardson 1993, 35–36; cf. also Nickau 1977, 138–139, with n. 16; Lührs 1992, 14–15. The *Poetics*, in particular, does not seem to have enjoyed great popularity in antiquity: ancient sources are silent, and the earliest quotation is in Porphyry (quoted by Simpl. *in Cat.* in CAG 8, 36.16–31): see Janko 1982. On the much-debated problem about the destiny of Aristotle's library and its books, see Moraux 1973, 3–31; Canfora 1988, 34–37, 59–66; Richardson 1994, 9–13; Nagy 1998, 198–206; Barnes 1997; Canfora 2002.

14. Of course, one problem is assessing whether this difference can be interpreted as a demonstration that tragedy is a more accomplished form of art than epic. Yet there are also advantages in the lack of spectacle in the epic; see below, footnote 82.

δὴ ἡμῖν τὴν τραγωδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος), and the plot (μῦθος) is defined as a *mimesis* of the action (*Poet.* 1450a3–4: μίμησις τῆς πράξεως), it follows that the plot is ‘the principle and, so to speak, the soul of tragedy’ (*Poet.* 1450a38–39: ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἶον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγωδίας). One of the most important criteria for the plot is that it must be in accordance with probability and necessity:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1451a36–38: φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

From what has just been said it is clear also that the job of the poet is not to say what has happened, but what might happen and what is possible according to probability and necessity.

Aristot. *Poet.* 1451b8–10: ἔστιν δὲ καθόλου μὲν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἅττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη.

A universal is certain things that happen to a certain person to say and to do according to probability or necessity—which is the aim of poetry, though [poetry] adds names.

For Aristotle, then, plots can contain what is ‘necessary’ (ἀναγκαῖον), but also something which is ‘according to probability’ (κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς).¹⁵ In other words, a plot must consist of a necessary or probable sequence of events. This is due to the particular status of poetry, which distinguishes it from history: poetry represents universals—not particulars, as history does—hence, it is more philosophical (*Poet.* 1451b5–7).¹⁶ Moreover, elements that are impossible in reality are nevertheless admitted in poetry, because in this way the poet is able to astonish his audience and make them feel a certain amount of amazement (*Poet.* 1460a17: τὸ θαυμαστόν), which is the purpose (τέλος) of poetry:

15. The same kind of contrast is found again when Aristotle is dealing with episodic plots, which present one episode after the other without necessity or probability (*Poet.* 1451b33–35): τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν μύθων καὶ πράξεων αἱ ἐπεισοδιώδεις εἰσὶν χεῖρισται· λέγω δ’ ἐπεισοδιώδη μῦθον ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἐπεισόδια μετ’ ἄλληλα οὐτ’ εἰκὸς οὐτ’ ἀνάγκη εἶναι [among simple plots and actions the episodic ones are the worst. I consider ‘episodic’ a plot in which there is no probability, nor necessity in the sequence of the episodes].

16. See Chapter 3.3.B § 7.

Aristot. *Poet.* 1460b23–26: ἀδύνατα πεποιήται, ἡμάρτηται· ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς (τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται), εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος.

Impossibilities have been created; then, a mistake has been committed. But this is fine if it obtains the aim of poetry itself (for its aim has been defined)—if in this way it makes this or that part [of the poem] more stunning.

Since supernatural, impossible elements make poetry more interesting,¹⁷ Aristotle thus judges the plot not according to whether it is possible or not, but whether it is 'believable or not' (πιθανός/ἀπίθανος):

Aristot. *Poet.* 1460a26–27: προαιρεῖσθαι τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.

What is impossible [but] probable should be preferred over what is possible [but] unbelievable.

Aristot. *Poet.* 1461b9–12: ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἀνάγειν. πρὸς τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἰρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατόν.

In general, what is impossible must be related to the poetic composition or to what is better [for the poem] or to opinion. For, with reference to poetic composition, what is impossible [but] believable is preferable to what is possible [but] unbelievable.

What is 'probable' (εἰκός) is thus also 'believable' (πιθανόν). It is thus better to choose plots that are believable—though they may not be possible in the real world (πιθανὰ ἀδύνατα)—than stories that could happen, but are not believable (δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα).¹⁸

Since a poet, in order to achieve the goal of poetry, amazement (τὸ θαυμαστόν), has a certain freedom with regard to outside reality, the criterion of 'believability' becomes an internal one: something is believable if it follows from what has been stated before as a logical consequence. Within a work of

17. In this light, Homer is a master of lies, as Aristotle says at *Poet.* 1460a18–19: δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὥς δεῖ [Homer has especially taught the other [poets], too, to tell lies as they ought].

18. This is because what is possible is believable, but not all that is believable is possible, but only that which has happened (*Poet.* 1451b16–19); hence, believability is a wider concept.

poetry, there are rules that are typical of poetry, and the poetic work is thus good as long as these rules are respected by the poet—no matter how the plot (μῦθος) in itself corresponds to truth in the real world. The premise behind these prescriptions is that poetry is an art (τέχνη) that works according to rules which are its own and different from those of other arts:¹⁹

Aristot. *Poet.* 1460b13–15: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς.

In addition, correctness in politics is not the same as that in poetry, nor is [correctness] in any other art [the same] as that in poetry.

For Aristarchus, too, just as for Aristotle, the main criterion for judging the plot was not the distinction between what was possible and what was not, but that between what was believable and what was not. ‘Impossibilities’ (ἀδύνατα) were not necessarily to be excluded if they helped poetic goals. In the Homeric scholia there are very few cases of lines which Aristarchus athetizes because they contain details that are ‘impossible’. One such case occurs in the *Nekyia*:²⁰ the lines about Otus and Ephialtes’ project to put Pelium on top of Ossa on top of Olympus in order to reach the sky (*Od.* 11.315–316) are rejected by Aristarchus ὡς ἀδύνατοι (*Sch.* V *Od.* 11.315).²¹ Here, however, the question is not about the fact that this action is ‘impossible’ in reality (the meeting with Polyphemus and Odysseus’ peeking into Hades are also ‘impossible’ in reality, but Aristarchus had nothing against them); rather, he probably did not like Otus and Ephialtes’ piling up mountains as this was almost ridiculous and, hence, unbelievable.²²

Another case of ‘impossibility’ is at *Od.* 22.144–145, where Melanthius takes out from the storeroom twelve shields, the same number of spears, and the same number of helmets in order to help the Suitors:

Eust. 1921.55 (ad *Od.* 22.144): σημείωσαι δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὸ περὶ τῶν δώδεκα σακέων καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς Ἀρίσταρχος ἀθετήσας κεχίακεν, ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἰπὼν τοσαῦτα βαστάσαι ἄνθρωπον.

Note also that Aristarchus athetized and marked with a critical sign²³ the line

19. Cf. Richardson 1992, 36.

20. The *Nekyia* was particularly suspect to Aristarchus, as we will see.

21. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 170–172.

22. See also below, § 5, on ‘ridiculous’ thoughts.

23. On this translation for the verb χιάζειν, see McNamee 1992, 19 n. 60, and Chapter 2.1, footnote 39.

about the twelve shields and the following one, saying that it was impossible for a person to carry all these [weapons].²⁴

In this case, however, the lines are impossible not because they contain something that is 'fabulous', but rather because it is impossible for human beings to carry so many shields—the picture is thus 'unbelievable' within the context.²⁵ In the *Iliad*, on the other hand, I could not find cases of athetesis due to ἀδύνατα, in the sense of 'fantastic' actions that could not happen 'in reality'. The impossible actions against which Aristarchus argues are in fact actions that are 'unbelievable' within the context, not 'impossible' because they belong to a fantastic and unreal world. Thus, at *Il.* 2.667, when Homer tells the story of Tlepolemus arriving at Rhodes after killing Lycymnius, Zenodotus' reading αἶψα δ' ὁ γ' ἐς Ῥόδον ἵξεν, 'and he came at once to Rhodes' (instead of αὐτὰρ ὁ γ' ἐς Ῥόδον ἵξεν, 'and then he came to Rhodes') is dismissed since it would be impossible for a fugitive, who has to build a ship first (l. 664) and then wander in the Aegean (l. 667), to arrive 'at once' (αἶψα) at Rhodes (*Sch. Il.* 2.667: οὐ δύναται δὲ ταχέως ἐληλυθέναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥόδον ὁ πρότερον μὲν ναῦς πεπηχώς, εἶτα ἀλώμενος).²⁶

Otherwise, elements that are absurd (ἄλογα) from a rational point of view are allowed because of poetic license.²⁷ In fact, this is especially valid in epic, since one advantage that it has over tragedy is that, lacking spectacle (ὄψις), epic can afford to contain some absurdities because the audience is not as likely to notice incongruity without seeing the plot performed:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1460a11–14: δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα.

Thus in tragedies one should produce amazement, but what is absurd, through which amazement mostly arises, is more allowed in epic poetry because we do not see the person acting in front of us.

24. Eustathius is probably quoting Aristonicus here (see Carnuth 1869, 158–159) from a collection of scholia richer than the one that has reached us (which does not have any scholium to *Od.* 22.144–145).

25. Aristarchus does not seem to have taken into consideration the possibility that Melanthius might have carried all these weapons in more than one journey. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 4.

26. The final part of the scholium (not reported in the quotation above) is corrupt; see Erbse, ad loc. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 4.

27. On 'poetic license' in Aristarchus' exegesis, see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.3; cf. also Lotz 1909, 33–42, and Roemer 1924, 225–238 (both to be approached with caution; see Preface § 2).

In regards to plots, for Aristarchus, too, probability was paramount. In the Aristonicus scholia we often read comments along these lines: something takes place according to probability and is therefore acceptable. For example, in the Doloneia, Diomedes addresses Dolon by name: ‘Do not, Dolon (Δόλων), put in your mind any thought of escape’ (*Il.* 10.447). Some ancient scholars found fault in the fact that the Greek hero seems to know Dolon’s name, since this is the first time that they meet. To solve this *zetema*, they read δολῶν, the participle of δολόω, ‘to deceive’, so that the phrase became: ‘Do not put in your mind any thought of escape, trying to deceive (δολῶν) [me]’. Aristarchus defends the text, however: for him, it is probable (εἰκός) that the Greeks knew certain enemies’ names after ten years of besieging Troy:

Sch. Il. 10.447a Δόλων: ὅτι ζητεῖται, πῶς τὸ ὄνομα ἔγνω· διό τινες ἀνέγνωσαν ‘δολῶν’ ὡς νοῶν . . . εἰκός δέ τινων γινώσκεσθαι ὀνόματα ὡς ἂν δεκαετοῦς γεγονότος χρόνου, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ Δόλωνος· ἦν γὰρ κήρυκος υἱὸς ‘πολύχρυσος πολύχαλκος’ (*Il.* 10.315).

‘Dolon’: because there is a question about how [Diomedes] knew his name; hence, some [scholars] read δολῶν (‘deceiving’), [perispomenon] like νοῶν (‘thinking’) . . . But it is probable that they knew the names of some [enemies] since a decade had passed [with them there], and in particular, [they knew the name] of Dolon; for he was son of a herald, ‘rich in gold, rich in bronze’ (*Il.* 10.315).²⁸

The criterion of probability/believability is mainly expressed in the Aristonicus scholia by the pair πιθανός/ἀπίθανος. It is one of the most common justifications given for an athetesis or for rejecting Zenodotus’ readings, which—in Aristarchus’ opinion—often lacked believability.²⁹ For example, in the assembly of the Achaean leaders at *Il.* 2.50–86, he does not find Zenodotus’ text credible, because, according to the latter, Agamemnon stands up to speak in front of only seven heroes (*Sch. Il.* 2.55a: ἀπίθανον δὲ ἐν ἑπτὰ ὀρθὸν δημηγορεῖν)—the audience seems too small for the king to rise up to address it.³⁰ Details that seem to go against human chronology are rejected on

28. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.478b. Elsewhere Aristarchus accepts the fact that the Greeks know the names of and other details about the Trojans; see *Sch. Il.* 14.45a (Chapter 5.4, footnote 50) and 20.389. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 9; Roemer 1912, 214–215; Roemer 1924, 233–235.

29. On this criterion in Aristarchus’ scholarship, see also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 4–5.

30. In fact, Aristarchus also athetized lines 76–83 in the same episode, containing the speech of Nestor. He had several reasons, but the first had to do with line 76, when Homer says after Agamemnon has spoken: ‘so he spoke and sat down, and among them [Nestor] stood up’. The scholium (*Sch. Il.* 2.76a) notes: . . . ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι ὀκτώ, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθοῦ εἰρηκότος τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος λέγει ‘ἦτοι ὃγ’ ὡς εἰπὼν κατ’ ἄρ’ ἔξετο’, ὅπερ ἀπίθανον [eight lines are athetized, because while Aga-

the same ground—such as, for example, that Aethra, the maid of Helen, is to be identified with the mother of Theseus, who would have been extremely old by then (*Sch. Il.* 3.144a: εἰ μὲν τὴν Θησέως λέγει μητέρα ἀθετητέον· ἀπίθανον γὰρ ἔστιν Ἑλένης ἀμφίπολον <εἶναι> τὴν οὕτως ὑπεραρχαίαν).³¹

The famous problem of the use of the dual forms in *Iliad* 9³² is also solved by Aristarchus with the criterion of believability: only Odysseus and Ajax are part of the embassy and thus the duals correctly refer to them, while Phoenix joins them later on, and then only as a friend of Achilles. Otherwise, it would not be believable to have Odysseus leading, if Phoenix also were part of the embassy, since Phoenix is older:

Sch. Il. 9.192a τῷ δὲ βάτην <προτέρω, ἡγεῖτο δὲ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς>: ὅτι ἐπὶ Ὀδυσσεύς καὶ Αἴαντος τὸ δυϊκόν· παρόντος γὰρ τοῦ Φοίνικος ἀπίθανον λέγειν ἡγεῖτο δὲ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.

‘The two of them went forward, and noble Odysseus was leading’: because the dual is for Odysseus and Ajax. For, if Phoenix had been present, it would have been unbelievable to say ‘noble Odysseus was leading’.

Believability played an important role even in the supernatural episodes where Aristarchus, like Aristotle, seems to have put a limit to the ‘amazement’ (τὸ θαυμαστόν); thus, within the microcosm of the epic, although the supernatural was allowed, believability still applied. For example, in poetry it is fine for an animal to speak, like Xanthus, the horse of Achilles, who at *Il.* 19.408–417 tells Achilles that the day of his doom at the hand of the gods is near.³³ Even so, it is too much to have a horse speak proverbs, as happens at *Il.* 19.416, when Xanthus says: ‘[we may be running together with the blow of Zephyrus], which, they say, is the lightest of all things’, a line which Aristarchus condemns because ‘it is unbelievable for a horse to say ‘they say’ like an erudite

memnon did not speak standing up, he says ‘so he spoke and sat down’, which is unbelievable]. Cf. Roemer 1912, 501–506; Kirk 1985, 121 and 123; Lührs 1992, 144 and 260–261 n. 365. *Sch. Il.* 1.400a and 10.317a discuss other cases in which Aristarchus criticizes Zenodotus’ readings because they eliminated believability; see Chapter 4 § 1.3.1.

31. On this scholium, see also Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2 and § 5.2.

32. For a discussion of the dual in the embassy of Book 9, see Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.2.

33. In this episode, Aristarchus athetizes *Il.* 19.407, where the speech of Xanthus is introduced with ‘white-armed Hera made him speak with human voice’; however, at the end of Xanthus’ speech (l. 418), we read: ‘after he spoke this way, the Erinyes stopped his voice’. For Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 19.407a; 19.418a), line 407 is superfluous and contradictory (ὥς περιττὸς καὶ ἐναντίον ἔχων) because in Homer when an animal is given voice or is made to appear by a god, the same god makes him stop or disappear, as in *Il.* 2.308–319 (where Zeus sends a snake and makes it disappear); cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 408–409; Lührs 1992, 141–144. On the criterion of ‘ἐναντίον’, see below.

man' (*Sch. Il.* 19.416–7a: καὶ ἀπίθανον ἵππον λέγειν 'φασὶν' ὥσπερ ἄνδρα πολυίστορα).³⁴

The most important case of the limitation of what is absurd (τὸ ἄλογον) is the second part of the *Nekyia* (*Od.* 11.568 [or 565?]-627), where Odysseus claims to have seen Minos, Orion, Tityus, Tantalus, Sisyphus, and Heracles. Notwithstanding the admissibility of a 'marvelous' journey to the Underworld, and although the lines are not considered to be inferior in style, Aristarchus rejects this episode as suspicious. Odysseus never enters Hades but remains outside of it (cf. *Od.* 11.36–37, 150, 563–564), making it impossible for him to have seen all these mythical examples of wickedness being punished down in Erebus (*Sch. HT Od.* 11.568). The Aristonicus scholia³⁵ bear witness to a long series of comments or questions by Aristarchus along these lines. How can Minos come to the sacrificial blood? It is absurd (ἄλογον) that he goes with all the people he is going to judge together with his throne (*Sch. HQT Od.* 11.570). It is absurd (ἄλογον) for Orion to hunt in Hades; how, then, could he come forward, together with all the beasts he is hunting (*Sch. HT Od.* 11.573)? Moreover, it is also ridiculous (καταγέλαστα καὶ ταῦτα)³⁶ that Tityus comes to the sacrifice, if he is lying on the ground with his liver devoured by two vultures (*Sch. QT Od.* 11.577). For the same reason, how can Tantalus arrive there, together with the trees and the marshy lake in which he lies (*Sch. H Od.* 11.588)? Or how does Odysseus see what is within Hades from outside of it (*Sch. H Od.* 11.588)? And how can Sisyphus, who must push the huge stone up a hill, reach the place of the sacrifice (*Sch. QT Od.* 11.593)? All this, according to Aristarchus, is too much and—instead of being astonishing—the episode is absurd and ridiculous.³⁷

The conception of the work of poetry as a microcosm with its own rules leads naturally to the principle of noncontradiction. Avoiding inconsistencies within the plot was a central tenet for Aristotle, who argues repeatedly against what is ὑπεναντίον, 'contradictory':

Aristot. *Poet.* 1455a22–26: δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὁμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὕρισκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι [τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία.

[The poet] should compose plots and refine them through diction, putting

34. In fact, Aristarchus athetizes both lines, 416 and 417, also because they are 'not necessary'; see Lührs 1992, 46–48; cf. also Roemer 1912, 150–151; Bouchard 2016, 120.

35. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 108–111.

36. On the idea of 'ridiculous', see also below, § 5.

37. On the criterion of ἄλογον applied to atheteseis of repeated lines, see Lührs 1992, 167–194.

them before the eyes as much as possible; for in this way, seeing them most clearly as if he were present in the middle of the actions [of his plots], he would find what is suitable and be least likely to miss contradictions.³⁸

Inconsistencies within the poems were constantly rejected by Aristarchus too, who seems to have developed Aristotle's theory into a more complete system, where the philologist had to work on a text as a self-sufficient unity which must be purged of internal contradictions. Aristarchus took exception to contradictions in the text (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 8.39–40: ἐναντιοῦνται δὲ ἐνθάδε τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις) and, as a rule, was in favor of athetesis when contradictions occurred.³⁹ He also argued against Zenodotus for readings that were contrary to some data present in the poems.⁴⁰ The idea that something is inconsistent with the rest of the plot can also be expressed in the Aristonicus scholia with phrases like οὐ . . . συμφωνεῖν, 'not to be in agreement' or ἀσυμφώνως, 'in disagreement', for example to argue against a reading by Zenodotus (*Sch. Il.* 4.339b) or to support Aristarchus' own interpretation, as otherwise there would be a contradiction in the text (*Sch. Il.* 8.19).⁴¹ On the contrary, a line is συμφώνως, 'in harmony', 'in agreement', with the rest of the poem when Aristarchus wants to show that Homer is self-consistent (*Sch. Il.* 3.230a),⁴² or to defend his own readings in the name of Homer's self-consistency (*Sch. Il.* 7.330b¹; 8.562). Alternatively, the same idea is expressed with μάχεται/-ονται, to mean that one or more lines 'are at odds' with what has been said or known before.⁴³ And the negative phrase 'οὐ μάχεται' is, on the other hand, used to solve a problem by showing that there are no internal contradictions in Homer.⁴⁴

An example of seemingly contradictory, but actually acceptable, lines concerns the famous question (*zetema*) of how many times Hector and Achilles run around Troy. At *Il.* 22.208 Homer says that Zeus lifted his scales and decided the fate of Hector 'when for the fourth time they came to the springs', but, later on, at *Il.* 22.251 Hector shouts: '[Achilles, I do not flee you anymore, as when before] I ran three times around the great city of Priam'. Ancient scholars took exception to this passage because it seemed contradictory (*Sch. Il.* 22.208a²: σημειοῦνται δέ τινες διὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι 'τρὶς περὶ ἄστν

38. For Aristotle on ὑπεναντίον, see also *Poet.* 1461a31–33; 1461b15–18; 1461b22–24.

39. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.838–9; 7.334–5 (see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.6); 11.767a^{1,2}; 19.407a (see above, footnote 33); 21.570a¹; 22.199–201a; 24.45a. On atheteseis due to internal contradiction, see Chapter 3.6.B § 4.1.

40. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.334–5a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.5); 5.807.

41. On *Sch. Il.* 8.19, see Chapter 3.3.B § 4.4.

42. On *Sch. Il.* 3.230a, see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.2.

43. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a, discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.3.

44. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 9.571a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 5.1); 13.365a (see Chapter 5.2 § 2.2).

μέγα Πριάμου δῖον' καὶ 'ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον').⁴⁵ Aristarchus, on the other hand, solves the problem, by arguing that the heroes complete three entire laps, but in the fourth they go as far as the fountains without going around the city in full. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the two lines:

Sch. Il. 22.251a τρὶς περὶ ἄστν <μέγα Πριάμου δῖον>: . . . οὐ μάχεται δὲ τῷ 'ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ τὸ τέταρτον' (*Il. 22.208*).· τρεῖς μὲν γὰρ τελείους κύκλους περιέδραμον, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ἕως τῶν κρουνῶν ἐλθόντες οὐκέτι περιῆλθον τὴν πόλιν.

'I ran three times around the great city of Priam': . . . it does not contradict 'but when for the fourth time' (*Il. 22.208*); for they ran around for three full circles and in the fourth they arrived at the fountains and did not go around the city.⁴⁶

4. Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: Characters (ἦθη)

At *Poetics* 1448a1–5 Aristotle states that every mimetic art represents 'characters', which can be either σπουδαῖοι, 'serious', or φαῦλοι, 'base'. Poetry too, then, has to choose which ἦθη are to be the target of its *mimesis*. In this regard, epic and tragedy are identical, in that both of them represent 'serious' people (*Poet.* 1449b9–10). Hence, what is valid for tragedy with respect to characters is to be considered valid for epic too. Characters of tragedy and epic must be 'serious', as well as better than reality; in other words, they must not be caricatures of real people—as happens in comedy—because everything that is ridiculous is to be avoided in tragedy and epic. When Aristotle comes to a detailed account of tragic/epic characters in *Poetics* § 15, he first states that such characters must be 'worthy', 'appropriate', 'similar to reality', and 'consistent':

Aristot. *Poet.* 1454a16–28 περὶ δὲ τὰ ἦθη τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον, ὅπως χρηστὰ ἦ. ἔξει δὲ ἦθος μὲν ἐὰν ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ποιῇ φανερόν ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις προαίρεσιν τινα <ἢ τις ἄν> ἦ, χρηστὸν δὲ ἐάν

45. This is the wording of the note in T. The scholium in A has very similar phrasing but has ἄπορον instead of ἐναντίον (*Sch. Il. 22.208a*¹: σημειοῦνται τινες διὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἄπορον εἶναι . . .). *Aporia* is, in fact, what arises after the scholar has perceived a contradiction in the text.

46. In analyzing plot, Aristotle also dealt with the difference between simple and complex plots (*Poet.* 1452a12–1452b13), which were characterized by the presence of 'recognition' (ἀναγνωρισμός), 'reversal of circumstances' (περιπέτεια), and 'suffering' (πάθος). These concepts are not present in Aristarchus' fragments and this is probably due to the fact that they were more part of a theoretical discussion of a literary work than concepts that could be used in his philological activity.

χρηστήν. ἔστιν δὲ ἐν ἐκάστω γένει· καὶ γὰρ γυνή ἐστιν χρηστή καὶ δοῦλος, καίτοι γε ἴσως τούτων τὸ μὲν χειρόν, τὸ δὲ ὅλως φαῦλόν ἐστιν. δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀρμόττοντα· ἔστιν γὰρ ἀνδρείαν μὲν τὸ ἥθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀρμόττον γυναικί οὕτως ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι. τρίτον δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ χρηστοῦ τὸ ἥθος καὶ ἀρμόττον ποιῆσαι ὡς προεῖρηται. τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν· κἂν γὰρ ἀνώμαλός τις ἦ ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων καὶ τοιοῦτον ἥθος ὑποτεθῇ, ὅμως ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι.

About characters, there are four things at which [the poet] must aim; first and foremost, that they are worthy. [Tragedy] will have character if, just as it was said, its words or actions clearly make a choice, whatever it is, and [it will have] a worthy character if [its words or actions make] a worthy choice. [A worthy character] is possible in each kind [of person]; for a woman or a slave can be worthy, though the former perhaps is inferior and the latter is completely base. Second, [characters must be] appropriate; it is possible [that a woman] is manly in character but it is not appropriate for a woman to be so manly or dreadful. Third, [a character should be] similar [to reality]; for this is different from making a character worthy and appropriate, as has been said. Fourth, [characters must be] consistent, for even if the one who provides the example for the representation is someone inconsistent and such a character is assumed as a model, nevertheless it must be consistently inconsistent.

If being χρηστὰ, 'worthy', 'good', is necessary due to the essence of tragedy, which represents 'serious' (σπουδαῖα) actions and characters, the other three characteristics are more interesting to consider and deserve some explanation. Characters (ἥθη) must be ἀρμόττοντα, 'appropriate', in the sense that each character must fit the characteristics of the kind of individual he or she represents. This concept is later on coupled with that of being πρέπον, 'suitable' (*Poet.* 1454a28–31: ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα . . . τοῦ δὲ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἀρμόττοντος ὃ τε θρῆνος Ὀδυσσεώς ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ). Furthermore, characters must be ὅμοια, 'similar' to their model in 'real life' or in the mythical tradition to which the poet refers.⁴⁷ Finally, they must be ὁμαλὰ, 'consistent', and not behave in a contradictory way. The last three characteristics are thus sharply distinct. Τὸ ἀρμόττον refers to the relationship between the 'type' the poet has in mind and how the character relates to it—thus centering on how 'convincing' the representation of that particular human being is (considered in terms of gender, age, social sta-

47. Cf. Janko 1987, 109: "the character should be 'like', literally; but like what? This means either that the type should be recognisable to us as one we know, i.e. lifelike, or that it should be like us. As there is no explanation or example, Aristotle must have regarded the meaning as obvious. . . . Clearly a character who is not lifelike will also be unlike ourselves, so the first explanation brings the second with it".

tus, etc.). Τὸ ὅμοιον refers to the relationship between reality outside the work of poetry (i.e., the real life or the mythical tradition in the background) and the characters, in the sense that the audience has to recognize the character as someone similar and comparable to people from their own experience. Finally, τὸ ὁμαλόν is an internal criterion to judge the development of the character within the poetic work. Aristotle then summarizes these criteria with the principle of κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός—when the poet portrays a character, as when putting the plot together, he has to aim at necessity and probability:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1454a33–36: χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθεσιν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός.

Also in the characters just as in the structure of the [plot's] incidents, [the poet] must always seek what is necessary or what is probable, so that it is either necessary or probable that a certain type of person says or does certain types of things and that it is either necessary or probable that this [incident] happens after that [incident].

The analysis of characters plays a central role in the second book of the *Rhetoric* because knowledge of different characters is essential for a good orator. In this work, the philosopher develops these ideas especially in the direction of what is typical of different ages. In three insightful chapters (*Rhet.* 2 §§12–14), where he is explaining how a good orator should depict various ἡθῆ in order to be persuasive, Aristotle highlights the main characteristics of young people (impulsive, optimistic, generous), old people (prone to reflect, pessimistic, selfish), and mature people (a middle way between the two). If one wants to achieve a good *mimesis*, one cannot depict a character with the characteristic of another age, as this would go against the criterion of τὸ ἀρμόττον. In this light, the poet must be particularly careful when putting words into the mouths of his characters, because their diction (λέξις) must be ἡθικὴ, namely, consistent with the character that uses it, as Aristotle makes clear in the third book of the *Rhetoric* (1408a10–11: τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἡ λέξις, ἐάν ᾗ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἡθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον). This is because each age and class has its own mode of expression, and a good representation of a character must consider these characteristics:

Aristot. *Rhet.* 1408a25–32: καὶ ἡθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτε ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ ἀρμόττουσα ἐκάστω γένει καὶ ἔξει. λέγω δὲ γένος μὲν καθ' ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς ἢ ἀνὴρ ἢ γέρων, καὶ γυνή ἢ ἀνὴρ, καὶ Λάκων ἢ Θετταλός, ἔξεις δέ,

καθ' ἃς ποιός τις τῷ βίῳ· οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἅπασαν ἔξιν οἱ βίοι ποιοί τινες. ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγῃ τῇ ἔξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἥθος· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα οὐδ' ὡσαύτως ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν.

The proof based on signs is 'expressive of character' when it is suitable and adapts to each type of person and disposition. By 'type' I mean according to the age, for example, a boy, a man, or an old man; or a woman and a man; or a Spartan or a Thessalian. By 'dispositions' I mean the dispositions according to which someone is a certain type of person in life; for lifestyles are of a certain type, not according to every disposition. Thus if one uses the words appropriate to his own disposition, he will create a character; for an ignorant man and an educated man would not say the same things nor [speak] in the same manner.

The interest in characterization in Homer is very well attested for Aristarchus as well. At *Il.* 1.117, when Agamemnon, angered by the response of Calchas, agrees to give Chryseis back and says, 'I prefer that the army be safe rather than destroyed,' Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 1.117a) objects to the athetesis of Zenodotus, according to whom the thought expressed was silly (ὡς τῆς διανοίας εὐήθους οὐσης), by noting that ἐν ἧθει γὰρ λέγεται, i.e., the line suits the character of Agamemnon—probably to be understood in the sense that Agamemnon qua leader of the expedition needs to show care for his army.⁴⁸

Following Aristotle, Aristarchus argued also for consistency and credibility of ἥθος: characters (usually called πρόσωπα in the scholia) should behave according to what is appropriate (τὸ ἀρμόττον), suitable (τὸ πρέπον), and proper (τὸ οἰκεῖον). As for Aristotle, ἀπρεπής became a synonym of οὐκ ἀρμόττων, in the sense of 'not appropriate,' 'unsuitable' to the type of person at issue.⁴⁹ This criterion embraced all the subtle distinctions of the *Poetics* as well as those of the *Rhetoric*: characters were ἀρμόττοντα if they behaved as their social position, their status, their age, their present situation, or their 'mythical model' required. Aristarchus thus denied 'un-heroic' words to Homeric

48. Cf. Bouchard 2016, 260. In *Sch. Il.* 15.505a, Aristarchus notes that a line is according to Ajax's character (ἡθικῶς); see Chapter 5.4 § 3.

49. Thus, with the word ἀπρεπής, Aristarchus did not (or not only) mean a moral judgment of poetry according to the behavioral standards of the refined Ptolemaic court, as Cobet 1876, 225–239, Lehrs 1882, 333–335, Bachmann 1902–1904, I 30–32, and, more recently, van der Valk 1963–1964, II 11–13, 108, 395, maintained. Because he understood the criterion in this way, Roemer 1912, 316–461, spent a considerable amount of pages on 'saving' Aristarchus from athetizing lines because of ἀπρέπεια (on Roemer's method, see Preface § 2). The correct sense of πρέπον in ancient literary criticism ('fitting with a context', which can *also* imply a moral judgment when it comes to what is fitting for a certain character to say or do) has been explained by Pohlenz 1933 and Schenkeveld 1970, 167–170. In particular, Pohlenz 1933, 57–59, also connected the idea of πρέπον with Aristotle's theories almost along the same lines which I have outlined.

heroes. It is unacceptable, for instance, to have Agamemnon dwelling on the pleasure he is going to enjoy from Chryseis back in Argos (*Sch. Il.* 1.29–31: ἀθετοῦνται . . . ἀπρεπὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα τοιαῦτα λέγειν) or showing himself too greedy (*Sch. Il.* 1.133–4: ἀθετοῦνται, ὅτι . . . καὶ μὴ ἀρμόζοντες Ἀγαμέμνονι). Aristarchus also rejects Achilles' petty insinuations against Aeneas (*Sch. Il.* 20.180–6a: ἀθετοῦνται . . . καὶ οἱ λόγοι οὐ πρέποντες τῷ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως προσώπῳ). Base insults directed at Diomedes are denied to Hector as well (*Sch. Il.* 8.164–6a: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τρεῖς . . . ἀνάρμοστα δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα τοῖς προσώποις). He also clearly deplores Ajax' characterization as a kind of *miles gloriosus* who brags of his military superiority (*Sch. Il.* 7.195–9: στίχοι πέντε ἀθετοῦνται, ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὸν Αἴαντα οἱ λόγοι).⁵⁰

By the same token, there are words which may suitably be said to kings, and words which may suitably be said to subjects.⁵¹ The same holds true for women, who must behave properly and, for example, not give orders to superior beings like gods, as in the case of Helen, who at *Il.* 3.406–407 tells Aphrodite to go and take care of Paris, since she will not do it (*Sch. Il.* 3.395),⁵² or in the case of Andromache, when she gives tactical advice to her husband Hector during their meeting:

Sch. Il. 6.433–9 λαὸν δὲ στῆσον παρ' ἐρινεόν <— — — καὶ ἀνώγει>: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι ἑπτὰ ἕως τοῦ 'ἢ νῦ καὶ αὐτῶν θυμός' (*Il.* 6.439), ὅτι ἀνοίκειοι οἱ λόγοι τῇ Ἀνδρομάχῃ· ἀντιστρατηγεῖ γάρ τῳ Ἑκτορι.

'Station the army near the fig tree [where above all the city is easy to access . . . or their [i.e., the Greeks'] heart now urges] and orders them [i.e., to attack Troy on that side]': seven lines are athetized until 'or their heart now [urges and orders them]' (*Il.* 6.439), because the words are inappropriate for Andromache; for she is acting as a general instead of Hector.⁵³

A young princess like Nausicaa is not allowed to dwell too much on the gossip

50. For an analysis of these scholia in terms of characterization of these heroes, see Chapter 5.4 § 1 (Achilles), § 2 (Agamemnon), § 3 (Ajax), and § 5 (Hector). *Sch. Il.* 9.612b criticizes a reading by Zenodotus, defining it παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπον.

51. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.192a, discussed in Schironi 2017, 614–619.

52. This is only one of the reasons for the athetesis of *Il.* 3.396–418, which is discussed in Chapter 3.6.B § 6.

53. See also *Sch. Il.* 6.441a, where Aristarchus claims that Hector's sympathetic reply proves that Andromache did not give him any military advice, as he responds only to her worries (which she voiced at lines 431–432 and which would conclude her speech according to Aristarchus' athetesis of lines 433–439). In what follows of *Sch. Il.* 6.433–9 (omitted here) Aristarchus notes that the lines are also false because the description of the walls of Troy in Andromache's words does not correspond to what Homer depicts elsewhere. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 29–30; Roemer 1912, 414–417; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 418; West 2001, 198–199.

people might make upon seeing her enter the city with Odysseus (*Sch. Od.* 6.275a: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι ἰδ' ὥς ἀνοίκειοι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ προσώπῳ) and a mother like Thetis cannot give excessively explicit advice to her son (*Sch. Il.* 24.130–2a: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τρεῖς, ὅτι ἀπρεπὲς μητέρα υἱῷ λέγειν 'ἀγαθὸν ἔστι γυναικὶ μίσγεσθαι').⁵⁴

As between men and women, there is a clear distinction exists between what is allowed to gods and to humans: it is suitable for gods to know the future, but not for humans, as Zenodotus seemed to believe by making Achilles speak as if he knew what was going to happen (*Sch. Il.* 1.204b).⁵⁵ Iris is allowed to rebuke old Priam and give harsh commands to Hector, but Polites, Priam's young son, who should respect his father and elder brother, is not (*Sch. Il.* 2.791).⁵⁶ Even among the gods there is a hierarchy: what is permitted to Zeus is not allowed to Iris (*Sch. Il.* 8.406–8: ὅτι τῷ τοῦ Διὸς προσώπῳ ἀρμόζουσιν οἱ λόγοι, τῷ δὲ τῆς Ἰριδος οὐκέτι).⁵⁷

The distinction between Greeks and barbarians and what is fitting for a Greek hero to say plays an interesting role in the athetesis of *Il.* 16.237, where Achilles prays to Zeus to give glory to Patroclus, who is off to the battlefield, just as he listened to him in the past (l. 236) when 'you did me honor, and greatly oppressed the army of the Achaeans' (l. 237). According to Aristarchus, the line is wrongly repeated from *Il.* 1.454, where it is in the right place, in the prayer to Apollo by Chryses, since he is a barbarian who hates the Greeks:

Sch. Il. 1.454 <τιμήσας μὲν ἐμέ,> μέγα δ' ἴψαο λαὸν <Ἀχαιῶν>: ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Πατρόκλου ἔξοδον (*Il.* 16.237) οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται, ἐντεῦθεν μετενεχθεῖς· οὐ γὰρ εἰκότως Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐπιχαίρει τῇ ἡττῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων. ὁ δὲ Χρύσης βάρβαρος καὶ μισέλλην.

'You did me honor, and greatly oppressed the army of the Achaeans': because in the expedition of Patroclus (*Il.* 16.237) [this line] is not right, but was transferred from here. For it is not appropriate for Achilles to rejoice at the defeat of the Achaeans. But Chryses is a barbarian and enemy of the Greeks.⁵⁸

Likewise, words and actions must be suitable to the age and the social level of the characters. A typical case occurs in *Iliad* 3, when the old Trojans see

54. On this scholium, see Chapter 2.3 § 4 and Chapter 3.6.B § 7.2.

55. On this scholium, see Chapter 4 § 1.3.2.

56. On this scholium, see Chapter 3.6.B § 7.2.

57. See also *Sch. Il.* 8.420–4a and discussion in Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3.

58. According to Aristarchus, the line is also inconsistent with the rest of the narrative, as it is Thetis, not Achilles, who prayed to Zeus to favor the Trojans over the Greeks in order to give glory to Achilles; see *Sch. Il.* 15.75a (ex. [Did.]); 16.236a; 16.237a. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 44; Lührs 1992, 198–202. See also Chapter 5.4 § 1.

Helen arriving on the tower. The scene is introduced as follows: ‘and when they saw Helen coming up the tower (ἐπὶ πύργον ἰοῦσαν), they softly (ἤκα) spoke (ἀγόρευον) winged words to one another’ (*Il.* 3.154–155). Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 3.155a) argues against a variant given by Zenodotus, ὤκα, ‘swiftly’, instead of ἤκα, ‘softly’, because that adverb is ἀπρεπές, if it is referring to Helen (a noble woman cannot come ‘quickly’, that is, run), and ἀνάρμοστον, if it is referring to the old Trojans (old men are βραδυλόγοι, so they cannot speak ‘swiftly’).⁵⁹ This comment echoes Aristotle’s points about old age in *Rhetoric* (Book 2 §13, mentioned above)—though, admittedly, Aristotle does not talk about the old people’s ‘slowness’ of speech, but focuses on a psychological description. Yet the Aristotelian idea that old age is the opposite of young people’s impulsiveness, and so never inclined to excess, seems to be in Aristarchus’ mind; thus, he is suspicious about the lines (*Od.* 7.311–316) where Alcinous boldly offers Odysseus his daughter Nausicaa in marriage, insisting on how much he would enjoy having him as a son-in-law—when, Aristarchus notes, Alcinous does not even know that man (*Sch. P Od.* 7.311).⁶⁰

A case where the contacts between Aristotelian theory and Aristarchus’ practice are particularly strong concerns *Odyssey* 4. Pisistratus confirms to Menelaus that his companion is Odysseus’ son. He also adds that Telemachus wanted to see the Spartan king:

so that you could suggest some word or action to him. For when his father is away, a son suffers many woes at home, if he does not have others who can help him, as it is now for Telemachus: his father is far away, and there is no one else who can ward off evil among his people (*Od.* 4.163–167).⁶¹

Aristarchus athetizes these five lines (*Sch. Od.* 4.163a)⁶² as they are superfluous and utterly unsuitable to be spoken by a young man (περιττοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ νέου παντάπασι λέγεσθαι ἀπρεπεῖς). This comment echoes what Aristotle had stated in the *Rhetoric*:

Aristot. *Rhet.* 1395a2–6: ἀρμόττει δὲ γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικία μὲν πρεσβυτέρων, περὶ δὲ τούτων ὧν ἔμπειρός τις ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικούτον ὄντα

59. See also *Sch. Il.* 3.155b (Nic.). Cf. Roemer 1912, 17; Bouchard 2016, 109–110.

60. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 76–77; Roemer 1912, 331–332.

61. *Od.* 4.163–167: ὄφρα οἱ ἢ τι ἔπος ὑποθήσεται ἢ τι ἔργον. / πολλὰ γὰρ ἄλγε’ ἔχει πατὴρ παῖς οἰχομένοιο / ἐν μεγάροις, ὃ μὴ ἄλλοι ἀοσητήρες ἔωσιν, / ὥς νῦν Τηλεμάχῳ ὁ μὲν οἴχεται, οὐδέ οἱ ἄλλοι / εἶς, οἳ κεν κατὰ δῆμον ἀλάλκοιεν κακότητα.

62. The scholium is attributed by Pontani to Didymus. Yet both its content (athetesis) and its wording suggest that it might derive from Aristonicus; cf. Carnuth 1869, 43.

γνωμολογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δὲ ὧν ἄπειρος, ἡλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον.

Speaking in maxims is appropriate to old age, and [it is appropriate only] about things in which one is experienced; as a consequence, speaking in maxims is unsuitable for one who is not old enough, just like telling stories; and it is foolish and silly [to speak] about things in which one is inexperienced.⁶³

A young man could not speak in maxims, then, either for Aristotle or for Aristarchus.⁶⁴

One last case suggests another point of contact between Aristotelian theory and Aristarchean practice. In Book 21, after Apollo has just invited Poseidon to stop their fighting 'because he felt shame in exchanging blows with his uncle' (ll. 468–469), an angry Artemis rebukes her brother, also adding that she does not want to hear him again boasting on Olympus that he would fight against Poseidon (ll. 475–477). For Aristarchus, this comment is not in line with Homer's depiction of the god in this episode: an Apollo bragging on Olympus and challenging family members to open combat is at odds with the god's feeling of shame in front of his uncle at lines 468–469 (*Sch. Il.* 21.475: οὐ δύναται γὰρ ὁ αἰδούμενος 'πατροκασιγνήτοιο μιγήμεναι ἐν παλάμησιν' (*Il.* 21.469) ἀεὶ προκαλεῖσθαι τὸν Ποσειδῶνα ἐν τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ πρὸς μάχην). Additionally, a boasting Apollo, thirsty for a fight, is simply not in agreement with the general characteristics of Apollo, even beyond the poem: Apollo is not a warlike god, but enjoys music and dances (*Sch. Il.* 21.475: ἄλλως τε οὐδὲ πολεμικός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χοροῖς καὶ φόρμιγγι τέρπεται).⁶⁵ In this case, then, Aristarchus seems to apply the Aristotelian ideas of τὸ ὅμοιον, which looks at whether the character faithfully mirrors 'reality' (in this case the mythical/religious tradition in the background), and τὸ ὁμαλόν, which is about the internal consistency of a character within the poetic work (Aristot. *Poet.* 1454a16–28, quoted above). Artemis' comment about Apollo's past boasting gives a picture of the god which falls short on both criteria, so the three lines (ll. 475–477) must be rejected.⁶⁶

63. See also *Rhet.* 1404b15–16: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰ δοῦλος καλλιποῖτο ἢ λίαν νέος, ἀπρεπέστερον, ἢ περὶ λίαν μικρῶν [for even there [i.e., in poetry], it is fairly inappropriate if a slave or a very young man should use refined language or if [refined language should be used] about very trivial topics].

64. Cf. Roemer 1912, 419–420.

65. Cf. Roemer 1912, 321–322; Richardson 1993, 94.

66. The attention to characterization and what is fitting for each character is also used in the so-called λύσεις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου, which are typical of Aristarchus' exegesis. On this principle, see Dachs 1913 (another follower of Roemer; see Preface, footnote 17); Roemer 1924, 253–256; Schmidt 1976, 23–24; Nünlist 2009, 116–117 (with further bibliography).

5. Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: Thought (διάνοια)

Aristotle defines διάνοια as the thought-element, that is, everything transmitted and conveyed with words (*Poet.* 1450a6–7). Thus, διάνοια refers to the content of speeches, either uttered by characters or by the poet himself when he intervenes in the narrative.⁶⁷ In this sense, ‘thought’ (διάνοια) is opposed to ‘diction’ (λέξις), which is the form in which the former takes shape. In the *Poetics* Aristotle does not treat διάνοια extensively but refers (*Poet.* 1456a34–35) his readers to the *Rhetoric*, where the opposition between the thought-element and the formal element in speeches is stated more explicitly. Yet he states (*Poet.* 1456a37–1456b2) that the two main parts of the διάνοια are ‘to demonstrate and to refute’ (τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν) and ‘to produce emotions, and also [to produce] magnitude and triviality’ (καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας).⁶⁸

The thought expressed by the characters or by the poet must thus reflect the genre. In particular, the διάνοια of tragedy and epic must be in keeping with the solemnity and seriousness that characterize both of them. Therefore, anything that is γελοῖον, ‘ridiculous’, must be avoided because this is typical of comedy and low genres and so extraneous to tragedy and epic:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1449a32–37: ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἵπομεν μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μῶριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἷσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης.

As we have said, comedy is a representation of fairly base [people], though not according to every sort of vice—but what is ridiculous is a portion of what is

67. On the poet’s direct intervention in the narrative, see Chapter 3.6.C §§ 2.2–5.

68. This dichotomy between diction (λέξις) and thought (διάνοια) can indeed be found in the three books of the *Rhetoric*, where the first two deal with thought, whereas Book 3 deals with diction. In particular, Book 1, where Aristotle analyzes the different kind of speeches and arguments, seems to correspond to the first part of διάνοια (‘to demonstrate and to refute’), while Book 2, dedicated to the analysis of the different emotions and characters that the good orator must imitate in order to persuade, reflects the second part (‘to produce emotions, and also [to produce] magnitude and triviality’). Book 3, on the other hand, is dedicated to ‘prose style’, which is extraneous to poetry. This is probably why in the *Poetics* Aristotle refers his readers to the *Rhetoric* as far as διάνοια is concerned (the thought-element obeys the same rules both for prose and for poetry), whereas he needs to have a proper section on diction in the *Poetics* (since poetic diction is different from the style needed in prose). On the dichotomy between diction (λέξις) and thought (διάνοια), see also Aristot. *Rhet.* 1403a34–1403b3.

shameful. For the ridiculous is a sort of mistake and a deformity which does not cause pain and harm; for example a ridiculous mask is clearly something shameful and distorted without pain.⁶⁹

Aristarchus certainly shared the idea that epic was mainly concerned with 'serious' content, since he often rejected lines expressing a ridiculous thought.⁷⁰ For example, at *Il.* 12.176, describing the battle at the Achaean wall, the poet says 'it would be difficult for me, as if I were a god, to tell all this', a statement which Aristarchus rejects as γελοῖον (*Sch. Il.* 12.175a¹). For the same reason, he objects to the concluding line of the long catalog of the Nereids mourning Patroclus (*Il.* 18.39–49). In this passage, after listing the names of thirty-three Nereids, the poet concludes: 'and all the other Nereids that were in the depth of the sea'—as if, Aristarchus comments, Homer first intended to list them all by name, but then got tired (*Sch. Il.* 18.39–49: γελοῖόν τε ἐξ ὀνόματος προθέμενον εἰπεῖν πάσας, ὥσπερ ἀποκαμόντα εἰπεῖν 'ἄλλαι θ' αἱ κατὰ βένθος ἄλδος Νηρηίδες ἦσαν').⁷¹

Aristarchus also found fault with words uttered by the characters. At *Il.* 8.189, for instance, it is most ridiculous that Hector, talking to his horses, remembers that Andromache mixed wine for them to drink since horses do not drink wine (*Sch. Il.* 8.189a: γελοιότατος ἐπὶ ἵππων ὁ στίχος ὅτι οἶνον ἵπποι οὐ πίνουσι).⁷² Other atheteseis due to a 'ridiculous' thought in a character's words concern, for example, Odysseus' questions to Dolon in *Il.* 10.409–411 (*Sch. Il.* 10.409a);⁷³ or Poseidon's speech to the Greeks in *Il.* 14.376–377 (*Sch. Il.* 14.376a).⁷⁴ The exemplum of Niobe that Achilles tells to convince Priam to eat something is also considered 'ridiculous' because a straightforward paraphrase would give 'eat, since Niobe too ate and then was turned into stone' (*Sch. Il.* 24.614–7a: καὶ ἡ παραμυθία γελοία· φάγε, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ Νιόβη ἔφαγε καὶ ἀπελιθώθη)—a poor rhetorical example indeed.⁷⁵ Alternatively, Aristarchus notes that his predecessors (Zenodotus in particular) imputed 'ridiculous'

69. On the opposition between γελοῖον (typical of comedy) and σεμνόν (typical of tragedy), see *Rhet.* 1406b6–8: εἰσὶν γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμωδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς), αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνόν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν [for metaphors are also inappropriate, some because they are ridiculous (for comic poets also use metaphors), others because they are too solemn and tragic].

70. Γελοῖον was surely part of the Aristarchean vocabulary since it appears in a direct quotation of Aristarchus by Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 2.420a¹.

71. On this scholium, which Erbse attributes to both Didymus and Aristonicus, see also Chapter 5.3 § 5.2.

72. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 395; Lührs 1992, 46 n. 92; West 2001, 202.

73. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.208–10; cf. Lührs 1992, 226–228.

74. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 395; Janko 1994, 210.

75. On this athetesis, see Chapter 5.3. § 3.2.4.

ideas to certain characters, and so their readings are to be rejected, for example when Paris speaks to Hector in Book 3 (*Sch. Il.* 3.74a).⁷⁶ A fairly close synonym of γελοῖον is εὔηθες, 'silly', when Aristarchus athetizes lines because of their 'silliness' in the thought expressed by the character (*Sch. Il.* 1.139a; 2.76a, concerning *Il.* 2.80–81).⁷⁷

Even if most of the time Aristarchus rejects what is ridiculous, there is, however, a telling exception: Thersites. Since he is a base character, he can have ridiculous traits even in a serious epic poem. This principle underlies Aristarchus' polemic against Zenodotus, who athetized many lines in the Thersites episode because they were 'ridiculous'. Aristarchus, however, defends these lines in which Thersites is especially γελοιοποιός (*Sch. Il.* 2.226b; 2.227) or where the most ridiculous moments happen (*Sch. Il.* 2.231–4: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος τοὺς τέσσαρας ἠθέτηκεν, ἐν οἷς πάλιν ἐστὶ τὰ γελοιότατα).⁷⁸ Thersites belongs to a different genre, comedy, and so he is in fact supposed to have ridiculous traits and to say ridiculous things. Aristotle would have probably agreed.

Another category of lines singled out are those which contained something 'cheap' (εὐτελής) in their thought (and often in their composition as well). Εὐτελής, 'cheap', 'of no value', is often used in the Aristonicus scholia to convey the idea that the content or the style of a passage is not consonant with the serious content of the epic.⁷⁹ Aristotle likewise employs εὐτελής when comparing two contrasting types of authors: the σεμνοί ('the dignified people'), who write tragedies, and the εὐτελεῖς ('the ordinary'), who prefer comedies (*Poet.* 1448b24–26, quoted above, at § 2). Therefore, in Homer one must avoid everything that is εὐτελής. And indeed many Aristarchean atheteseis are justified on the basis that certain lines spoken by characters are εὐτελεῖς τῇ συνθέσει καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, 'cheap in composition and thought' (*Sch. Il.* 1.133–4, Agamemnon to Achilles; *Sch. Il.* 15.212a, Poseidon to Iris), εὐτελεῖς κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, 'cheap in thought' (*Sch. Il.* 3.395 on *Il.* 3.414, Aphrodite to Helen), or εὐτελεῖς τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ τοῖς νοήμασι, 'cheap in construction and ideas' (*Sch. Il.* 20.180–6a, Achilles to Aeneas).⁸⁰ Aristarchus also condemns variant readings which he found elsewhere, for example in Zenodotus' text, as 'cheap in composition and thought' (*Sch. Il.* 16.93a, Achilles to Patroclus).⁸¹ In the narrative, too, 'cheap' elements are rejected; thus Aristarchus athetizes the

76. See also *Sch. Il.* 3.257.

77. See Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2 with footnote 82. This criterion also serves as the basis for an athetesis by Zenodotus in *Sch. Il.* 1.117a (see above, § 4).

78. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 334; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 32; Roemer 1912, 367–369; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 396; Bouchard 2016, 263–264.

79. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 23–24.

80. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 28; Lührs 1992, 191 n. 153.

81. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 18 and 23.

simile comparing Achilles and Hector running around Troy to a dream in which the pursuer cannot reach the one who runs away at *Il.* 22.199–201, as the lines are 'cheap' (εὐτελείς) both in form and content (*Sch. Il.* 22.199–201a: καὶ τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ τῷ νοήματι εὐτελείς).⁸²

On the other hand, the Aristotelian principle that epic διάνοια is concerned with or must express magnitude (τὸ μέγεθος)⁸³ seems to have served as the basis of Aristarchean practice as well. Arguing against Zenodotus' athetesis of *Il.* 17.260–261, he maintains that those lines containing a comment by the poet himself actually amplify the magnitude (τὸ μέγεθος) of the battle for Patroclus' corpse (*Sch. Il.* 17.260a: αὐξοῦσι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ὑπὲρ Πατρόκλου μάχης).⁸⁴

6. Aristotelian Theory and Aristarchean Practice: Diction (λέξις)

In the *Poetics* (1457b1–3), the analysis of ποιητικὴ λέξις starts with an analysis of how a word (ὄνομα) can be employed: each word can be standard (κύριον), a *glossa* (γλῶττα), a metaphor (μεταφορά), an embellishment (κόσμος), invented (πεποιημένον), lengthened (ἐπεκτεταμένον), truncated (ὕφηρεν), or altered (ἐξηλλαγμένον).⁸⁵ Moreover, whereas the standard use is typical of the prose style, the others are characteristic of the poetic style. In particular, at *Poetics* 1459a9–10 *glossai* are said to be the most apt for epic; this was one of the points of contact between Aristotle and the work done at Alexandria and especially by Aristarchus, as the analysis of the 'explanation of *glossai*' in Chapter 3.3.A has shown. Nevertheless, poetic style cannot be

82. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.199–201b (ex. [Ariston.?]); this episode is further analyzed in Chapter 3.6.C § 5. Although for a different reason (the risk of being 'ridiculous'), the chasing of Hector by Achilles in *Iliad* 22 is discussed by Aristotle as well (*Poet.* 1460a11–17): δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα. ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα ἂν φανείη, οἱ μὲν ἐστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὃ δὲ ἀνανεύων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔπεσιν λανθάνει [thus in tragedies one should produce amazement, but what is absurd, through which amazement mostly arises, is more allowed in epic poetry because we do not see the person acting in front of us. For the episode of Hector's pursuit would clearly look ridiculous on the stage, with some [people] standing still and not chasing him and one [i.e., Achilles] saying no [to their participation in the chase] with his head, but in the epic poem it escapes notice].

83. Because one of the functions of 'thought' is τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας [to produce emotions, and also [to produce] magnitude and triviality] (*Poet.* 1456a38–56b2).

84. *Il.* 17.260–261: τῶν δ' ἄλλων τίς κεν ἦσι φρεσὶν οὐνόματ' εἴποι, / ὅσσοι δὴ μετόπισθε μάχην ἤγειραν Ἀχαιῶν; [but of the rest, who, in his mind, could list the names of all those who afterwards roused the battle of the Achaeans?]. On this rhetorical question, see also Chapter 3.2.A § 17 and Chapter 3.6.C § 2.4.

85. See introduction to Chapter 3.3.A.

reduced only to tropes, figures of speech, or *glossai*; to be a good poet, for Aristotle, one has also to be clear:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1458a18–34: λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφὴ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σαφεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ ταπεινὴ . . . σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἢ τοῖς ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη· ξενικὸν δὲ λέγω γλῶτταν καὶ μεταφορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον. ἀλλ’ ἂν τις ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ, ἢ αἰνίγμα ἔσται ἢ βαρβαρισμός· ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἰνίγμα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστὶ, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι . . . δεῖ ἄρα κεκρᾶσθαι πως τούτοις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἰδιωτικὸν ποιήσῃ μηδὲ ταπεινόν, οἷον ἡ γλῶττα καὶ ἡ μεταφορὰ καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ εἰρημένα εἶδη, τὸ δὲ κύριον τὴν σαφήνειαν.

The virtue of diction is to be clear and not ordinary. The diction made up of standard words is the clearest, but it is also ordinary . . . The one which has made use of foreign words is solemn and far from the trivial; by ‘foreign’ I mean *glossa*, metaphor, lengthening, and everything which is against standard [usage]. But if someone produces all words of this type, it will result in a riddle or in a barbarism. If [the diction is made up] of metaphors, it will result in a riddle; if [the diction is made up] of *glossai*, [it will result] in barbarism. For this is the distinctive character of a riddle, speaking and connecting together [words] that are impossible [to connect] . . . So [the poet] must mix somehow these [two types of words]; one type [of words], that is, *glossa*, metaphor, embellishment, and all the other forms which we discussed, will produce what is not trivial nor ordinary; while the standard [word] will produce clarity.

To achieve clarity one must use ‘standard’ words (κύρια); however, this can lead to ταπεινότης, ‘meanness of style’, which must be avoided in poetry. Therefore, poets should also use words and phrases that depart from common language—for example, *glossai* and metaphors—but they must not be excessive. The aim is thus to achieve an equilibrium between the norm and novelty, where the true poet is able to mix the two and thus be both clear and striking at the same time.⁸⁶

Attention to both form and diction was also important for Aristarchus; in particular, the definition of what was typical of Homeric style and what was not, as was discussed in Chapters 3.2.A and 3.2.B, seems to have been the coherent development of the Aristotelian distinction between poetic and prosaic λέξις.⁸⁷

86. For a similar analysis of prose style, see Aristot. *Rhet.* 1404b1–5.

87. In this case, an important change in terminology had occurred, since for Aristarchus λέξις

Language must first be σαφής, 'clear', for Aristarchus too, and Homer, despite his extensive use of tropes and figures, is a champion of clarity (σαφήνεια): he always builds his sentences in the clearest way (*Sch. Il.* 15.8a: ἔνεκα σαφηνείας). Thus, in *Il.* 14.169, 'and she [Hera], entering (εἰσελθοῦσα) there [i.e., her chamber], closed (ἐπέθηκε) the bright doors', the indicative ἐπέθηκε should be kept against Zenodotus' reading of the participle ἐπιθεῖσα, according to which the main verb was to be found only at line 171 (κάθηρεν). Homer—Aristarchus argues—prefers to have another main clause with a finite verb at line 169 and, thereby, to be clear and avoid a postponed principal clause (*Sch. Il.* 14.169a: ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος ἄλλας ἀρχὰς λαμβάνει, ἵνα μὴ ἀσαφὴς ἡ περίοδος γένηται ἢ τοι ὕστεροπερίοδος).⁸⁸

Aristotle in particular maintained that σαφήνεια was due to the use of κύρια ὀνόματα, 'standard words'. As already discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 2.3, Aristarchus recognized words used κυρίως, i.e., according to the standard usage, hence 'clear',⁸⁹ as well as those used ἰδίως, i.e., according to the style 'proper' to Homer. Sometimes when a poet expresses himself οὐ κυρίως, the purpose is to give his words a deeper meaning, as when Aristarchus claims that the image of Zeus pouring gold is used κυρίως in Pindar (*O.* 7.34) and as a metaphor in Homer (*Il.* 2.670) to 'suggest' the abundance of gold (*Sch. Il.* 2.670: πρὸς ἔμφασιν τοῦ πλούτου).⁹⁰ Similarly, when Homer says that the sword of Agamemnon is 'with silver nails', at *Il.* 2.45, and that it has 'golden nails', at *Il.* 11.29–30, his words are not to be taken literally (κυρίως); otherwise, Homer would contradict himself by depicting Agamemnon's sword once as silver-nailed and once as golden-nailed. Rather, he attributes to the same sword different ornamental details for poetic embellishment (*Sch. Il.* 2.45a: οὕτω καὶ τὸ ξίφος κοσμεῖ).⁹¹

Just as Aristotle allows poetic diction to depart from common language in order to avoid ταπεινότης, 'meanness of style', so Aristarchus athetizes lines⁹² or rejects readings⁹³ because the words or the stylistic composition are εὐτελείς,

meant 'word', and not 'diction', as in Aristotle; see Matthaios 1999, 198–200, and also Matthaios 1996, 68–69. For 'diction', 'composition of words', hence 'style', in the Aristonicus scholia we find instead σύνθεσις and κατασκευή.

88. See also *Sch. Il.* 13.172a: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει . . . ἀγνοεῖ δὲ ὅτι Ὅμηρος διακόπτει τὰς φράσεις, ἵνα μὴ μακροπερίοδος γένηται [because Zenodotus writes . . . but he does not realize that Homer cuts his sentences so that he does not make long periods]. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 27.

89. Aristarchus could not adopt the Aristotelian phrase κύριον ὄνομα, as by his time it meant something different, denoting the grammatical category of 'nouns' (both proper and common); see Matthaios 1996, esp. 65–66, 69–70; Matthaios 1999, 218–225.

90. See Chapter 3.2.A § 3.

91. See Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.3.

92. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 8.164–6a (εὐτελείς εἰσι τῇ κατασκευῇ); 10.497a (τῇ συνθέσει εὐτελής); 11.767a¹ (ἡ σύνθεσις αὐτῶν πεζή . . . εὐτελής δὲ ἡ σύνθεσις); 15.56a (κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν εἰσιν εὐτελείς). On σύνθεσις as a technical term, see Bottai and Schironi 1997.

93. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.314b (εὐτελής δὲ ἡ λέξις); 11.413a (εὐτελής γίνεται ἡ σύνθεσις). In *Sch. Il.*

‘cheap’.⁹⁴ Notwithstanding this shift from common language, Homer never violates the rules of correct language. Hence, anything which sounds like a barbarism must be rejected, as in *Sch. Il.* 12.34 (ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει . . . ἔστι δὲ βάρβαρον) and in *Sch. Il.* 15.716 (ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει . . . ὥστε βαρβαρίζειν τὸν Ὅμηρον)—both notes against Zenodotus’ readings.⁹⁵

Finally, some interesting parallels with the *Rhetoric* are in order. For prose, one of the most serious vices is to be ψυχρός, ‘frigid’, and this can arise from four causes: the use of *glossai*, of excessive epithets, of strange compounds, and of improper metaphors—all devices that pertain to poetry rather than prose:

Aristot. *Rhet.* 1405b35–1406b8: τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέτταρσι γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἓν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, . . . πάντα ταῦτα γὰρ ποιητικὰ διὰ τὴν δίπλωσιν φαίνεται. μία μὲν οὖν αὕτη αἰτία, μία δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις . . . τρίτον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις τὸ ἢ μακροῖς ἢ ἀκαίροις ἢ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ποιήσει πρέπει ‘γάλα λευκὸν’ εἰπεῖν, ἐν δὲ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν ἀπρεπέστερα . . . καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίνεται· εἰσὶν γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμωδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς), αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν.

Frigidities in diction happen in four [areas]: in compound words . . . for all these [phrases] sound poetic because of the use of compounds. This is, then, one cause; another one is the use of *glossai*. . . ; third is in the epithets, the use of long, out-of-place, or densely used [epithets]; for in poetry it is appropriate to say ‘white milk’, but in prose these words are more inappropriate . . . And then, in the fourth place, frigidity happens in metaphors. For metaphors are also inappropriate, some because they are ridiculous (for comic poets also use metaphors), others because they are too solemn and tragic.

Aristarchus applied the same principle to poetry, which needed to avoid constructions that sounded too typical of prose. In fact, some of his atheteseis are due to the style which is πεζός, ‘prosaic’.⁹⁶ On the other hand, he (like

11.130a Aristarchus notices lines which ‘seem cheap in their [metrical] construction’ (εὐτελείς τῇ κατασκευῇ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οἱ τοιοῦτοι) but does not emend them; see discussion in Chapter 4 § 1.5.2.

94. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 27–28. Aristotle, too, uses the word εὐτελής in relation to diction when he compares two different results in composing iambs: when Euripides substituted a *glossa* instead of a κύριον ὄνομα in an iambus which Aeschylus had previously composed, the resulting line was ‘beautiful’ (καλός), while the one in Aeschylus sounded ‘cheap’ (εὐτελής) (*Poet.* 1458b19–22).

95. See Chapter 4 § 1.2.2.

96. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.252a (πεζότεροι τῇ συνθέσει); 3.432 (πεζότεροί εἰσι καὶ τοῖς νοήμασι ψυχροὶ καὶ ἀκατάλληλοι); 9.688–92a (καὶ τῇ συνθέσει πεζότεροι); 11.767a¹ (ἡ σύνθεσις αὐτῶν πεζή . . . εὐτελής δὲ ἡ σύνθεσις).

Aristotle) did notice epithets which were 'out of place' (ἐπίθετα ἄκαιρα). Yet he rarely rejected a line because of this—only in one case does this happen in the Iliadic scholia (Sch. *Il.* 23.581a). This can, in fact, probably be interpreted as further proof that Aristarchus was following Aristotle's theories about diction: while 'out-of-place' epithets were wrong in prose (as the philosopher explained in the *Rhetoric*), in poetry and especially in Homeric poetry, which was full of epithets with no real meaning *within* the context (in our terms, 'fixed epithets'), things were different. Therefore Aristarchus noticed them and indicated them with an Aristotelian label (ἐπίθετα ἄκαιρα), but did not reject them because he was dealing with poetry and not with prose.⁹⁷

7. Conclusions

As in other cases discussed in the previous chapters,⁹⁸ Aristarchus seems to have been aware of Aristotle's reflection on poetry. He used Aristotelian categories and critical concepts in his work on Homer, especially when dealing with atheteseis or arguing against Zenodotus' readings. Interesting similarities between Aristotle and Aristarchus are found in their attitudes toward 'serious poetry', namely, epic and tragic poetry. For both of them the plot could contain 'impossible elements', but they had to be 'according to necessity or probability'; characters were of necessity 'serious', and their behavior must be according to what was considered 'proper'; the thought-element, too, should be serious and, hence, all the comic elements must be avoided; the diction had to be clear, but also poetic, i.e., rich in *glossai* and metaphors.

There is a fundamental distinction, however, between Aristotle and Aristarchus: whereas the philosopher theorized these principles, the philologist applied them. In this practical approach, Aristarchus was different from colleagues like Crates or the *kritikoi*.⁹⁹ The latter claimed to be 'critics' and not simply 'grammarians', because they aimed to give prescriptive views on how one should write (and read) a poem. Aristarchus did not claim anything like that, but tried to put forth a better text of Homer by editing and commenting

97. Roemer 1912, 342–343, and Parry 1971, 123 [= Parry 1928, 152–153], thought that Aristarchus understood and so respected 'ornamental' epithets (which he labeled as 'used ἀκαίρως'), so they denied that he even athetized *Il.* 23.581; Parry, in particular, concluded: "we can be sure that this condemnation derives from some other critic who was opposed by Aristarchus". Perhaps this is to give too much trust to the Alexandrian philologist, even if, without a doubt, Aristarchus did have a rather refined sense of 'fixed' epithets; see Matthaios 1999, 237–239, and my discussion of ἐπίθετα ἄκαιρα in Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2 and Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.2.

98. See Chapter 3.2.A § 3 and § 4; Chapter 3.3.A § 2.3; Chapter 3.3.B § 7.

99. On the *kritikoi* in relationship to Aristarchus, see Schironi 2009, 304–312, and Chapter 6 § 6 (with further bibliography).

on it. He (along with his Alexandrian predecessors) had thus a very different perspective than other scholars, who—like Crates, the *kritikoi*, and, from this standpoint, Aristotle as well—wanted to develop more general theories about poetry from their own reading of Homer and other poets. For Aristarchus, on the contrary, Aristotelian philosophy and poetics was just a tool that he used to do his job, which consisted uniquely in dealing with already written texts, editing and explaining them. The contrast could not be greater: on the one hand, there were literary critics like Crates and the *kritikoi*, who had a particular agenda or were influenced by Hellenistic philosophy, and, on the other, there stood grammarians like Aristarchus, who had a more practical goal connected with a specific text. He used many inputs from Aristotle, mainly from his literary and rhetorical studies, as this chapter has shown. Even if Aristotelian influences in Aristarchus go beyond this area, to embrace some more philosophically oriented distinctions, such as the dichotomy genus-species or the idea that if two things are the same, every accident that belongs to the one belongs to the other,¹⁰⁰ yet it is indeed in the ‘judgment of poems’ that the influence of Aristotle becomes paramount. Just as with his use of grammatical and syntactic categories when analyzing Homeric language, so too in the ‘judgment of poetry’ did Peripatetic theories offer Aristarchus a tool and guidelines to proceed with his philological work. Yet because the final part of grammar is also the finest (κάλλιστον, as Dionysius calls it), Aristotelian ideas were especially important for Aristarchus, because they offered the frame through which he could ‘judge’ poetic texts.

100. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.9 and Chapter 3.3.B § 7.

Aristotle and Aristarchus on the Four Parts of Epic Poetry

	Aristotle	Aristarchus
μῦθος (plot)	- Plot must be composed according to probability and necessity (κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον) - What is ‘probable’ (εἰκός) is also ‘believable’ (πιθανόν) - Impossibilities (ἀδύνατα) are allowed in poetry for the sake of ‘amazement’ (τὸ θαυμαστόν) - Better to have plots that are impossible but believable (πιθανὰ ἀδύνατα) than plots that are possible but unbelievable (δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα) - Internal inconsistencies (ὑπεναντία) must be avoided	- Lines/readings which are believable (πιθανοί) or according to probability (εἰκός) are kept - Impossibilities are allowed in poetry - Lines/readings which are unbelievable (ἀπίθανοι) are athetized/rejected - Lines/readings which are inconsistent with the rest (ἐναντίος, ἐναντιοῦται/-οῦνται, μάχεται/-ονται, ἀσύμφωνος) are athetized/rejected
ἥθη (characters)	- In characters, too, the poet must seek what is necessary and what is probable (ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός) - Characters must be appropriate (ἀρμόττοντες) - Characters must behave and speak according to what is suitable (τὸ πρέπον) - Character differences include age, sex, nationality, etc.	- Lines/readings which do not befit and are unsuitable to specific characters (ἀπρεπεῖς, μὴ ἀρμόζοντες, οὐ πρέποντες, ἀνάρμοστοι, παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπον, ἀνοίκειοι) are athetized/rejected - There are behavior codes for heroes, kings and subjects, women, young and old people, Greeks and barbarians, gods and humans, etc. Lines/readings which violate such codes are athetized/rejected
διάνοια (thought -element)	In tragedy and epic the thought-element is serious and not ridiculous or cheap (φαῦλος, γελοῖος, εὐτελής)	Lines/readings which are ridiculous or cheap in their thought-element (γελοῖοι, εὐτελεῖς τῇ διανοίᾳ) are athetized/rejected
λέξις (diction)	- Poetic diction must be clear (σαφῆ) and not ordinary (μὴ ταπεινή) - Clarity (σαφήνεια) is achieved through the use of ‘standard words’ (κύρια ὀνόματα) - What is not standard (τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον) helps to avoid ordinary diction - While in poetry diction should be ‘not ordinary’ (μὴ ταπεινή), in prose diction must not be ‘poetic’—otherwise, prose becomes ‘frigid’ (ψυχρός) - Out-of-place epithets (ἐπίθετα ἄκαιρα) should not be used in prose	- Homer abides by clarity (σαφήνεια) and uses words according to the standard meaning (κυρίως) - Homer uses words ‘according to a non-standard/peculiar meaning’ (οὐ κυρίως/ιδίως) - In poetry, lines/readings which are ‘fairly prosaic’ (πεζότεροι) or ‘cheap’ (εὐτελεῖς), i.e., ordinary, are athetized/rejected. - Out-of-place epithets (ἐπίθετα ἄκαιρα) are noticed but not usually rejected (because Homer’s poems are not prose but poetry)

3.6.B

Judgment of Poems

The Art of Athetesis

1. The 'Invention' of Athetesis
2. A General Rule for Athetesis
3. Aristarchus' Atheteseis and Manuscript Evidence
4. Main Reasons to Suspect Lines
 - 4.1. Internal Inconsistency and Contradictions
 - 4.2. Unsuitable Lines
 - 4.3. Unbelievability
 - 4.4. Superfluous or Unnecessary Lines
 - 4.5. Non-Homeric Language or Society
5. Additional Reasons to Suspect Lines
 - 5.1. 'Prosaic' or 'Cheap' Composition
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6. Athetesis of Longer Passages
7. Why Should Some Lines Be Athetized?
 - 7.1. The Pernicious Work of the 'Interpolators' (διασκευασταί)
 - 7.2. Aristarchus and the 'Interpolators' (διασκευασταί)
8. Aristarchus' Attempt to Recover the 'Original' Script
9. Conclusions

In many chapters of this book, we have encountered cases of atheteseis whose reasons were related to the topic discussed in each specific chapter (e.g., Homeric style and language, the heroic world and Homeric geography, etc.). This chapter, more specifically, will focus on the very 'idea' of athetesis and its criteria, taking the atheteseis of the *Iliad* as evidence.

The topic has been studied by various scholars and probably represents

the field in the Aristarchean studies with the least unanimity of opinion. After the quite balanced view put forward by Karl Lehrs, who, however, mostly compared Zenodotus' and Aristarchus' behavior in this area,¹ the discussion of atheteseis was strongly impacted by scholars' different agendas and opinions about Aristarchus and Alexandrian scholarship in general. So Adolph Roemer, who considered Aristarchus an infallible critic, attributed to him only those atheteseis with which a modern critic would agree; he thus simply dismissed all the atheteseis that he deemed unworthy of Aristarchus as due to misunderstandings by Aristonicus.² Roemer's views as well as his methodology (for example, preferring anonymous exegetical scholia, Porphyry, or Eustathius over Aristonicus and Didymus when they better suited his own ideas about Aristarchus) are highly questionable.³ Later, George M. Bolling maintained that all Aristarchus' atheteseis were based on manuscript evidence.⁴ A completely opposite view was taken by Marchinus van der Valk, who argued that they were conjectural and poorly, or at least subjectively, founded.⁵ The most relevant contribution to this field has been made by Dietrich Lührs, who has studied two specific categories of lines athetized by Aristarchus, the 'superfluous' lines (στίχοι περισσοί) and the repeated lines (*Wiederholungsverse*, as he labels

1. Lehrs 1882, 328–344, where he surveys examples of athetesis by Zenodotus and Aristarchus due to the following reasons: details which are against what is fitting (πρέπον); inconsistencies within the narrative; repeated lines; lines with 'Hesiodic character'; superfluous lines; lines that diminish the suggestiveness (ἐμφασίς) and so are against Homer's art; words and phrases against Homer's language. Cf. also Lehrs 1882, 425–427.

2. Roemer 1912 (for his agenda, see, e.g., 128–130).

3. This was already highlighted by Allen 1914 in his review of the book and again underscored more recently by Lührs 1992, 1–2; see also Ludwich 1914. For this reason, Roemer's opinions have been mostly disregarded in this study. Yet, as explained in Preface § 2, in what follows I will provide references to Roemer 1912 when discussing specific atheteseis; readers, however, should be aware of the problems concerning Roemer's methodology, which impact both his analysis of and his conclusions on much of the evidence at issue.

4. Bolling 1925 and Bolling 1944 (esp. 30–42).

5. Van der Valk 1963–1964, II 370–475, divides Aristarchus' atheteseis into eight categories: (1) atheteseis 'caused by Aristarchus' wrong conception of archaic manners and mentality' (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 391); (2) atheteseis 'which concern religious points' (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 406); (3) atheteseis 'where the objections of Aristarchus sometimes seem to be excusable, for the passages contain incongruities to which Aristarchus from his point of view could not but take exception' (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 415); (4) atheteseis 'which [are] typical of Aristarchus, for he offered them in order to defend or to corroborate his special views on Homeric problems' (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 436); (5) atheteseis due to the presence of words 'which did not seem to fit in with his systems' (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 442); (6) atheteseis 'for stylistic reasons' (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 450); (7) atheteseis of repeated lines—στίχοι διφορούμενοι (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 455); (8) atheteseis of superfluous lines—στίχοι περισσοί (van der Valk 1963–1964, II 465). As much as van der Valk's approach to Aristarchus is much more negative than mine, to a certain extent I reach conclusions close to his; see below, § 9.

them).⁶ His thorough and solid study is a landmark in this field; starting from his results, and within the limits of a chapter in a monograph, I will try to further inquire into the principles which Aristarchus followed when judging the authenticity of verses.

1. The ‘Invention’ of Athetesis

The operation of athetesis and the use of the *obelos* to mark athetized lines were, as far as we know, already carried out (and perhaps introduced?) by Zenodotus.⁷ This represented a revolution in the field of scholarship, because for the first time an editor signaled that a particular line was suspicious in his view, but he still did not delete it from his edition in order to give the reader the opportunity of independently checking and judging the evidence. In a way, then, we can see the use of *obeloi* as the first step toward a scientific method in producing a critical edition: although it was still far from a real critical apparatus, the user of the *ekdosis* had at least the possibility to check the ‘original’ text even if the scholar considered it spurious.⁸

We normally associate the operation of athetesis with the three famous Alexandrian grammarians, Zenodotus, Aristophanes, and Aristarchus. In fact, other scholars also adopted this practice, for example Apollonius Rhodius, since Aristarchus mentions one of his atheteseis (*Sch. Il.* 11.97). Crates, too, was familiar with this philological operation; for example, he athetized the proems of the *Theogony* and of the *Works and Days*.⁹ It is impossible to know whether Crates marked his atheteseis with *obeloi*, as the Alexandrians did; it is a matter of fact, however, that after the very common *diplai*, the *obelos* is the most recurrent of the Aristarchean signs in Homeric papyri, even if it is indeed not as widespread as one might expect.¹⁰ The *obelos* is also found in

6. Lührs 1992.

7. See Nickau 1977, 9–10, and Chapter 2.1 § 1 with footnote 6. On Zenodotus’ atheteseis (and deletion of lines), see Chapter 4 § 1.3.3, § 1.6, and § 1.7.

8. As was discussed in Chapter 1.2 § 3, the Alexandrians seem to have chosen one specific edition (perhaps Aristarchus chose the Athenian and Zenodotus an Ionic text) to serve as their base text. Even if they might have written some variants in the margins, the idea of a critical apparatus collecting all the variants present in different manuscripts was completely foreign to them. Leaving suspicious lines in the base text without eliminating them completely from their *ekdosis* was thus the closest they could come to a ‘scientific’ edition presenting the evidence for the reader.

9. See *Vita Dion. Perieg.* 72.56–61; cf. Broggiato 2001, 239 (fr. 78).

10. See McNamee 1992, 8, with Table 1. On Aristarchean critical signs in papyri, see Chapter 2.1 § 3 and § 4; and also McNamee 1981; Schironi 2019d.

non-Homeric texts, but its meaning is often unclear.¹¹ Origen, on the other hand, took the *obelos* over from the Alexandrians in order to indicate passages that were missing in the Hebrew text compared with the Septuagint.¹² This later use in biblical scholarship may indeed suggest that the *obelos* had become the standard sign for indicating 'suspicious' lines or passages, at least among professional circles of philologists.

2. A General Rule for Athetesis

Even if atheteseis did not imply the cancellation of the lines in the text, the basic rule behind this operation was that, if the suspicious lines were removed, the text was still sound. In other words, the reader could skip the athetized line(s) and still enjoy a continuous narrative without any gap. This was not a great problem when the atheteseis included many lines, because they were often part of the same long sentence or of many sentences so that, once taken away, the syntax (and the narrative content) did not suffer. The problem arose with shorter atheteseis of one or two lines, as these few lines often amounted to only a portion of a sentence. In these cases, the challenge for a scholar was to preserve a syntactically sound sentence even when the suspicious line was removed.

Aristarchus seems to have been very sensitive to this syntactic issue, as none of his atheteseis, as far as we can see from the scholia to the *Iliad*, disrupts the flow of the narrative and of the syntax. They often concern lines which do not include any major element in the sentence or are simply circumstantial clauses whose loss is syntactically irrelevant. Sometimes, the athetesis concerns lines containing a verb which, though important for the sentence, can be easily 'supplied', like the verb 'to be' in *Il.* 9.415–416: 'my great glory is ruined but for me a long life / there will be (ἔσσεται), and the doom of death would not reach me soon.'¹³ Aristarchus athetizes the second line (*Sch. Il.* 9.416a), and this is not a problem because ἔσσεται can be easily supplemented on the basis of the ἔσται of *Il.* 9.413, while the rest of line 416 does not really add any other necessary information.¹⁴ Similarly, he can get rid of the second part in Achilles' words at *Il.* 1.295–296, 'order (ἐπιτέλλεο) these things to others (ἄλλοισι), but to me (ἔμοιγε) do not / say (σήμαινε) this, for I do not think I will obey you',¹⁵ because

11. As noted by McNamee 1992, 11 and 12 nn. 14 and 15, and Table 3.

12. See Schironi 2012a.

13. *Il.* 9.415–416: ὦλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δὴρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν / ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ' ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη.

14. Cf. Roemer 1912, 184; Lührs 1992, 26–27.

15. *Il.* 1.295–296: ἄλλοισιν δὴ ταῦτ' ἐπιτέλλεο, μὴ γὰρ ἔμοιγε / σήμαιν'. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔτι σοὶ

σήμαινε in line 196 is not needed since ἐπιτέλλεο can govern both ἄλλοισι and ἔμοιγε (*Sch. Il.* 1.295a).¹⁶

Even when the subject of the clause was in the line that Aristarchus wanted to athetize, he was very careful to ensure that the athetesis did not ruin the syntax. For example, he athetizes the second line in *Il.* 14.39–40, ‘and the old man (γεραιός) met (ξύμβλητο) them, / Nestor (Νέστωρ), and he alarmed (πτῆξε) the heart in the breasts of the Achaeans’,¹⁷ because the use of πτῆξε is improper (ἄκυρον) and the line is superfluous. Even if the athetized line has the subject (Νέστωρ) of the verb ξύμβλητο in line 39, the syntax still works without line 40, since γεραιός in line 39 can now serve as subject rather than being in apposition to Νέστωρ (*Sch. Il.* 14.40a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων νοοῦμεν ὅτι Νέστωρ ἐστὶν ὁ ‘γεραιός’).¹⁸ The main rule followed by Aristarchus was therefore that for any athetesis, no matter how many lines were included, the syntactic connection (συνέπεια) of the remaining lines had to be sound. Indeed, in the scholia Aristarchus does sometimes highlight this point by saying that even without the lines he wants to athetize, the συνέπεια is safe.¹⁹ As a corollary of this rule, it follows that every line that is athetized is by default ‘not necessary’, at least from a syntactic point of view. This point will become important when discussing the category of ‘unnecessary lines’ (§ 4.4) as well as in the conclusions (§ 9).

3. Aristarchus’ Atheteseis and Manuscript Evidence

Many Aristonicus scholia argue against an athetesis or even an omission by Zenodotus²⁰ or by some anonymous scholars.²¹ While this can be evidence of Aristarchus’ disagreements with his colleagues, it cannot per se prove that Aristarchus was more respectful of the transmitted text than his predecessors because we do not know whether his predecessors agreed on athetizing *all the other lines* that Aristarchus himself athetized. Yet Aristarchus seems to have indeed been fairly conservative when we look at the amount of text that he wanted to

πείσεσθαι ὀΐω.

16. Cf. Roemer 1912, 199; Lührs 1992, 20–21.

17. *Il.* 14.39–40: . . . ὃ δὲ ξύμβλητο γεραιός / Νέστωρ, πτῆξε δὲ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν.

18. See also *Sch. Il.* 14.40b (Did.) and 14.40c^{1.2} (ex. [Did.]); cf. Roemer 1912, 192; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 447–448; Lührs 1992, 58–59; West 2001, 226.

19. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.395 (see below, § 6); 19.365–8a¹ (Did.; cf. Schironi 2015, 623 and n. 38).

20. See Chapter 4 § 1.3.3, § 1.6, and § 1.7.

21. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.489–90. For Aristarchus’ defense of lines deemed suspicious by others, see Chapter 3.6.C, *passim*.

reject compared with the entire *Iliad*. I counted circa 525 athetized lines in the *Iliad*, according to the scholia. In this figure, I include 506 (or 507) lines which were securely or most likely athetized;²² in addition, there are 9 lines which were probably athetized,²³ 7 lines which were first athetized, but then may have been retained,²⁴ and, finally, 3 lines that were first retained and then athetized.²⁵ More importantly, compared with the total number of the lines of the *Iliad* (15,693 in the vulgate as edited by Allen and van Thiel) these 525 athetized lines roughly amount to 3.3% of such total, a tiny fraction of the entire text.²⁶ It is important to note, however, that this estimate only represents a lower limit to the number of atheteseis really carried out by Aristarchus. In fact, only a fraction of them might have reached us, and it is possible that Aristarchus' criticism affected the text more deeply than we can reconstruct at the moment with the material currently available to us. This possibility is in fact suggested when we compare the scholia discussing atheteseis by Aristarchus with the *obeloi* preserved in the *Venetus A*. Even if there is normally a correspondence between scholia mentioning an athetesis and the *obeloi* in the margin of this manuscript, sometimes *obeloi* in the *Venetus A* do not have corresponding scholia²⁷—and of course there are also atheteseis discussed in the Aristonicus scholia which are not matched by *obeloi* in the *Venetus A*.²⁸ The mismatch should alert us to the fact that we might have lost evidence for other athetized lines. On the other

22. The additional line in the total sum depends on whether Aristarchus athetized also *Il.* 12.181 or only *Il.* 12.175–180, which is unclear; see *Sch. Il.* 12.175a¹; 12.175–81a (ex. [Did.]); 12.175–81b (ex.); cf. Roemer 1912, 83; West 2001, 218–219. In the group of secure atheteseis I also include lines for which Aristarchus seems to have favored the athetesis, even if he also mentions another possible solution to retain them (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.144a and *Sch. Il.* 13.658–9a, both discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2).

23. *Il.* 6.318–320 (*Sch. Il.* 8.493a; cf. Lührs 1992, 211–213); and *Il.* 21.130–135 (*Sch. Il.* 21.130–5a¹ [Did.]; cf. Lührs 1992, 9 n. 31; see Chapter 4 § 2).

24. *Il.* 19.365–368 (*Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹ [Did.]; see below, § 4.2); and *Il.* 15.449–451 (*Sch. Il.* 15.449–51a; 15.449–51b [ex.]; cf. Lührs 1992, 174–185).

25. *Il.* 10.397–399 (*Sch. Il.* 10.397–9a [Did.]; 10.397–9b [x]; see below, footnote 189). In my count, on the other hand, I have not included *Sch. Il.* 1.424c, in which we read διὸ ἀθετεῖται. The text of the note is too corrupt to make any sense of it. I have also not counted *Sch. Il.* 8.535–7, which discusses two sets of tautological lines, one of which Aristarchus wanted to eliminate, and not simply to athetize; see Schironi 2017, 611–614.

26. The counts of Bolling 1944, 36, include also the atheteseis of Zenodotus and Aristophanes, thus reaching a total of 764 athetized lines, which makes ca. 4.9% of the *Iliad*. Bolling, too, agrees on the general conservatism of Aristarchus' text.

27. For example, in Book 1, line 493 has an *obelos* but there is no scholium alerting about the athetesis (see Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 1.493).

28. For example, in Book 1, Aristarchus athetizes lines 133–134 (*Sch. Il.* 1.133–4) but there is only one *obelos* at line 133; an *obelos* is also missing at line 296, which Aristarchus athetizes (*Sch. Il.* 1.295a).

hand, even taking this mismatch into consideration, the number of *obeloi* in the *Venetus A*, 506 in total,²⁹ confirms the relatively conservative approach of Aristarchus to the text of the *Iliad*.

The first question that arises when discussing Aristarchus' *atheteseis* is whether they were based on manuscript evidence or on internal reasons only. The scholarly debate on this question has gone from one extreme to the other: while for Bolling the *atheteseis* of the Alexandrian scholars were all based on manuscript evidence, for van der Valk they were all derived from their own subjective choices, so they were conjectural.³⁰ As was previously concluded,³¹ Aristarchus certainly looked at manuscripts when preparing his 'working text'. This means that he used their evidence to eliminate poorly attested lines, thus stabilizing the ancient vulgate, as proven by the disappearance of the 'wild papyri' around 150 BCE. Therefore, manuscript evidence played a fundamental role in eliminating lines which were badly attested in the preliminary phase of Aristarchus' *diorthosis*. Such a verdict is more difficult to reach for the *athetesis* of suspicious lines in Aristarchus' *ekdosis*. He might have checked manuscripts for lines which he suspected to be spurious; however, even if we were able to show that some of his *atheteseis* correspond to lines missing in the Ptolemaic papyri, this does not prove that he based his judgment on manuscript evidence. A poor attestation for a line perhaps might have stirred his suspicions;³² even so, as has become clear from the other areas of his scholarship, Aristarchus mostly worked by internal principles. An analysis of the *atheteseis* attested in the scholia to the *Iliad* confirms this. First, in no case does he support an *athetesis* by saying that the lines were missing in other manuscripts. The information that lines *athetized* by Aristarchus were not present in certain editions is sometimes given by Didymus (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 8.284a; 19.388–91b), who certainly looked at manuscript evidence.³³ Yet in the Aristonicus scholia the reasons for *atheteseis* are all internal. Sometimes Aristarchus points out that Zenodotus and/or Aristophanes already *athetized* or even eliminated the lines under scrutiny (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 8.37a; 18.597–8). Still, even in this case, what emerges is that he checked the editions of his predecessors, not that he used their choices as evidence for his decisions about lines. Rather, he seems to have included this information as a sort of additional support for rejecting lines—a judgment which, however, was based purely on internal reasons.

29. These are the figures given by Bird 2009, 92–94 (taken from Allen 1931) for the critical signs in the *Venetus A*: *obelos* (440), *asteriskos* and *obelos* (52), *obelos* and *asteriskos* (14).

30. As clearly stated by Bolling 1944, 30–31, and by van der Valk 1963–1964, II 372–374.

31. In Chapter 1.2 § 3 and Chapter 2.2 § 3.

32. And, on the contrary, he retained a line well attested in many manuscripts, even if he did not like it; see the case of *Sch. Il.* 9.222b¹ (Did.), discussed in Chapter 2.2 § 1 and Chapter 3.6.C § 1.1.

33. See Chapter 1.1 § 4.2 and Chapter 2.2 § 1.

These conclusions are even confirmed by the only case where an Aristarchean athetesis is supported by manuscript evidence going back to the Hellenistic period: *Il.* 23.92, which Aristarchus athetizes (*Sch. Il.* 23.92a), is also missing from a famous Ptolemaic papyrus of the third century BCE, *P.Heid.* fr. 1264a.³⁴ Even though an exegetical scholium, derived from Didymus, remarks that the line was not in all editions (*Sch. Il.* 23.92b: ἐν πάσαις {δὲ} οὐκ ἦν ὁ στίχος), Aristarchus still athetizes the line for internal reasons only. In Book 23, the ghost of Patroclus appears to Achilles and begs him, once Achilles' fate is accomplished, to have the bones of both of them put together in an 'urn' (σορός) (l. 91), a 'golden one, a jar with two handles (ἀμφιφορεύς), which [your] noble mother gave you' (l. 92). Aristarchus athetizes line 92 because the word ἀμφιφορεύς, 'jar with two handles' is at odds with the 'urn' (σορός) at line 91. He notes that σορός is a hapax (*Sch. Il.* 23.91a), and that it is a synonym of λάρναξ, the word normally used by Homer to mean 'cinerary urn' (*Sch. Il.* 23.92a; 24.795) but also, more generally, 'box' (*Sch. Il.* 18.413a).³⁵ Therefore, the noun ἀμφιφορεύς, 'jar', is unnecessary and in fact confusing here. Line 92—Aristarchus further explains in *Sch. Il.* 23.92a—has been transferred here from the *Odyssey*, where in the second *Nekyia* Agamemnon tells Achilles how they mourned him for seventeen days and on the eighteenth they cremated his body and put the ashes in a golden jar with two handles that his mother gave them (*Od.* 24.73–74: δῶκε δὲ μήτηρ / χρύσειον ἀμφιφορῆα), so that his remains were mixed with those of Patroclus (*Od.* 24.76–77). Yet for Aristarchus these were probably two different containers, because according to Agamemnon's story the jar was given by Thetis to the Greeks, after Achilles' death, at his funeral.³⁶ In this complex explanation preserved by Aristonicus, there is no indication that Aristarchus athetized *Il.* 23.92 for being poorly attested. Rather, the omission in the Ptolemaic papyrus and the note about the lack of this line in other ancient copies in *Sch. Il.* 23.92b (ex. [Did.?.]) prove that the line was

34. The fragment is part of a long Ptolemaic papyrus (*P.Grenf.* 2.4 + *P.Hib.* 1.22 + *P.Heid.* inv. 1262–1266 = MP³ 979, dated to the third century BCE), which originally contained *Iliad* 21–23. Cf. West 1967, 136–191, especially 146 and 171–172.

35. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 149; Andronikos 1968, 30.

36. The Aristonicus scholium is corrupted but this is what we can infer from *Sch. Il.* 23.92b (ex. [Did.?.]): ἐν πάσαις {δὲ} οὐκ ἦν ὁ στίχος. καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος ἐκ τῆς <δευτέρας> Νεκυίας αὐτὸν ἐσπᾶσθαι φησίν. 'δῶκε δὲ μήτηρ / χρύσειον ἀμφιφορῆα' (*Od.* 24.73–74), ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ εὐλόγως πρὸς ὕψωσιν τῆς ταφῆς [the line was not in all editions. And Aristarchus says that it was brought [here] from the second *Nekyia*: 'and your mother gave a golden jar with two handles', but there it is plausible, because of the magnificence of the burial]. In fact, Aristarchus considered the entire second *Nekyia* (*Od.* 24.1–204) an interpolation for several reasons (*Sch. MV Od.* 24.1). So he could reject a line (*Il.* 23.92) which he considered transferred from another passage (*Od.* 24.73–74), which was also suspicious to him (for other reasons). In fact, even if he admitted that the double-handled jar was better suited in the *Odyssey* episode, Aristarchus might not have wanted a link between what he considered an interpolation in the *Odyssey* and Book 23 of the *Iliad*. Cf. Roemer 1912, 223; Haslam 1992, 36–37; Lührs 1992, 172–174; Richardson 1993, 176–177.

not necessary and could be omitted. Perhaps the interpolation had not spread to all copies or the line was suspicious *also* for the scribe or scholar who copied the text in *P.Heid.* fr. 1264a. Aristarchus might have been aware that *Il.* 23.92 was missing from manuscripts similar to *P.Heid.* fr. 1264a; still, the reasons he gave in the *hypomnema*, as far as the evidence goes, did not include manuscript evidence. As Erbse³⁷ and Lührs already remarked,³⁸ it is impossible to demonstrate that Aristarchus supported his atheteseis by manuscript evidence. This evidence seems, on the other hand, to have been used before the *diorthosis* itself, when Aristarchus had to prepare his ‘working text’, in which he must have *eliminated* (hence, not simply athetized) lines scarcely attested in the editions that he could consult. Otherwise, we could not explain the disappearance of the so-called ‘wild papyri’, as discussed in Chapter 1.2 § 3.

4. Main Reasons to Suspect Lines

Dietrich Lührs’ monograph on the atheteseis of Aristarchus in the *Iliad* is the first long study on the topic carried out with scientific rigor. In particular, Lührs focuses on two types of lines which Aristarchus often athetized: superfluous lines and repeated lines. While I agree with his conclusions (see below, § 4.4 and § 5.3), my approach will be different. Rather than studying a particular category of lines, I have focused on the reasons that led Aristarchus to athetize one or more lines. Chapter 3.6.A has showed that in the κρίσις ποιημάτων he followed the criteria laid out by Aristotle, especially in the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*. The question is now whether, in Aristarchus’ opinion, some reasons were stronger than others for deciding on the authenticity of a line. Most of his atheteseis in the scholia are motivated by more than one reason,³⁹ and this allows Aristarchus to provide more evidence to give a solid basis to his rejections. These cases, however, are not helpful for determining whether some criteria were more important than others. More useful and significant in this regard are the atheteseis justified by *one reason only*, because in such cases the reason seems to have been strong enough on its own to be sufficient for rejecting a line. Obviously, the underlying assumption is that no additional argument has been lost in these scholia, and this cannot be proved. Even so, the Aristonicus scholia are the best evidence at our disposal; in addition, if a relative large number of atheteseis are supported by the same single reason, it is unlikely that something

37. Erbse 1959, 302 n. 3.

38. Lührs 1992, 10–13.

39. See below, § 9.

was lost in all these scholia; therefore, the results obtained from multiple occurrences of the same reason can be overall trusted.

4.1. Internal Inconsistency and Contradictions

One of the strongest reasons that made Aristarchus suspicious of a line was when it contradicted or was inconsistent with other passages in the poem, according to the Aristotelian idea of ὑπεναντίον.⁴⁰ In the Aristonicus scholia, atheteseis due to internal contradictions are often signaled by expressions like ἐναντίον or ἐναντιοῦται/-οῦνται,⁴¹ μάχεται/-ονται,⁴² or ψεῦδος.⁴³ Otherwise, we can read a comment which clearly emphasizes that the lines at issue are inconsistent with others.⁴⁴ There are many atheteseis motivated by internal contradiction, and sometimes this is the only reason for rejection.

Some cases of internal contradiction were so self-evident that Aristarchus did not need to gather much evidence. For instance, he athetizes *Il.* 2.860–861, where Homer introduces Ennomus, leader of the Mysians, saying: ‘but he was slain by the hands of the swift-footed grandson of Aeacus / in the river where he slaughtered the Trojans and the others’. This comment contradicts the narrative of Achilles’ slaughter of the enemies in the waters of the Scamander in Book 21, where there is no mention of Ennomus at all. Alternatively, Aristarchus proposes to athetize only line 861, which clearly points to the battle along the Scamander, and keep line 860, which is more generic, not linking the death of Ennomus at the hands of Achilles to a specific moment (*Sch. Il.* 2.860–1).⁴⁵ Similarly, *Il.* 24.71–73, where Zeus says that it is impossible to steal Hector’s body since Thetis is always with Achilles, is plainly untrue (ψεῦδος) because Thetis does not spend all her time with her son. Hence, the lines can be athetized without further discussion (*Sch. Il.* 24.71–3).⁴⁶ Another example is the athetesis of *Il.* 3.108–110, when after Paris’ challenge to single combat, Menelaus asks Priam to take the oaths instead of his sons, who are ‘arrogant and not to be trusted’ (l. 106: ἐπεὶ οἱ παῖδες ὑπερφίαλοι καὶ ἄπιστοι), but then adds (ll. 108–110) that the hearts of young people are unstable, while old men are more balanced. In this way, Menelaus first condemns Priam’s sons but then seems to excuse them by implying that

40. See Aristot. *Poet.* 1455a22–26, discussed in Chapter 3.6.A § 3.

41. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.838–9; 8.39–40; 19.407a.

42. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.3).

43. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.164a¹; 6.433–9; 8.475–6.

44. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.130–3; 2.860–1; 20.322–4a, all discussed below.

45. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 10; Kohl 1917, 81–82 (fr. *32); Bouchard 2016, 201–202 (who offers a different interpretation of the note).

46. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.109a^{1,2}. Cf. Roemer 1912, 143–144.

young people are less reflexive and so they (i.e., Paris especially) did nothing against the norms of hospitality (*Sch. Il.* 3.108a: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τρεῖς, ὅτι ἀπολογία ἐστὶν αὕτη ὑπὲρ τῶν παραβάντων Πριαμιδῶν).⁴⁷

Another easy case occurred when Aristarchus could simply get rid of one or very few lines that contradicted a nearby longer passage, thus choosing the most economical solution. An example is the athetesis of *Il.* 20.322–324 in the combat between Achilles and Aeneas. Earlier in the same episode, at lines 274–281, Homer describes how Achilles' spear hits the shield of Aeneas but does not pierce it, passes over Aeneas' back, and sticks into the ground; however, later on, at lines 322–324, Poseidon, who has come down to help Aeneas, draws that same spear out from his shield. This is in contradiction with the previous narrative and thus needs to be athetized, as Aristarchus notes (*Sch. Il.* 20.322–4a). While it does not make much of a difference whether the spear is planted in the ground or in Aeneas' shield, Homer takes eight lines (*Il.* 274–281) to describe the trajectory of Achilles' spear and also refers to it at line 283 as planted in the ground close to Aeneas; thus, it is more economical to athetize the three lines about Poseidon pulling the spear from the shield (*Il.* 322–324) because their removal does not alter the narrative significantly.⁴⁸

Sometimes, however, the κρίσις was more complicated and required more work on Aristarchus' part. This happened, for example, when lines were not obviously wrong in themselves, and only by a thorough analysis of the rest of the poem did they turn out to contradict other passages. For example, at *Il.* 2.130–133 Agamemnon, in his speech to the Greek army, says that, even if the Greeks outnumber the Trojans who live in Ilium, the Trojans' many allies do not let him conquer the citadel. Aristarchus athetizes these four lines because 'Homer always states that the Trojans with their allies are fewer than the Greeks' (*Sch. Il.* 2.130–3). In fact, just above (*Il.* 2.122), Agamemnon has claimed that the Greeks are fighting against fewer men, a general statement about the enemy army as a whole, which Aristarchus duly notices (*Sch. Il.* 2.122a). Beyond Agamemnon's words, Homer himself confirms the numeric superiority of the Achaeans: at *Il.* 15.407, Aristarchus observes that Homer 'clearly' (σαφῶς) shows that the Trojans and their allies *together* are indeed a smaller force than the Greeks (*Sch. Il.* 15.407a),⁴⁹ while at *Il.* 8.56 he states that

47. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 30; Kirk 1985, 278. In the same speech by Menelaus, Aristarchus objects to Zenodotus' reading Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἄτης ('because Alexander was blinded') instead of Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἀρχῆς ('because Alexander started it') exactly for the same reason, i.e., because Menelaus seems to excuse Paris, considering his action the result of *ate* rather than a conscious action which began the war (*Sch. Il.* 3.100b); see Chapter 4 § 1.3.2.

48. Cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 20.276–7. For another case in which Aristarchus gets rid of one line which contradicts nearby lines, see *Sch. Il.* 7.44 and 7.53a (athetesis of line 53, which is inconsistent with lines 44–45).

49. *Sch. Il.* 15.407a: ὅτι σαφῶς οἱ Τρῶες ἐλάττονες συνίστανται τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τῶν

the Greeks are ‘always’ said to be more numerous in Homer; he also adds that his comment is made with reference to the athetesis of *Il.* 2.130–133 (*Sch. Il.* 8.56a: ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἀθετούμενα).⁵⁰ The suspicious nature of the lines in Book 2 is thus demonstrated by more than one passage,⁵¹ and so there is no doubt about their athetesis.⁵²

An even more difficult case occurred when one passage contradicted another, but there was no indication of which one was correct. The only way to solve the issue for Aristarchus was to find a third passage which exhibited another contradiction with either of the two, so that one passage was at odds with two other passages in the poem and hence was clearly spurious. This is the case of the athetesis of *Il.* 7.443–464, which narrates Poseidon’s irritated reaction when he sees the Achaeans building the wall (because the Greeks built it without offering hecatombs to the gods and because that wall will outshine the wall that he and Apollo built around Troy) and Zeus’ calm reply (Poseidon can destroy the wall as soon as the Greeks leave Troy). Aristarchus athetizes these twenty-two lines,⁵³ as they are inconsistent with the beginning of Book 12, which gives the same information about the wall: the Greeks built it without offering hecatombs (*Il.* 12.5–6), and after the sack of Troy Poseidon and Apollo destroyed it (*Il.* 12.17–35). Aristarchus points out that in Book 12 Homer speaks of the wall ‘as if he had not mentioned it before’, which is not true if *Il.* 7.443–464 is genuine (*Sch. Il.* 7.443–64a).⁵⁴ However, either passage could be in theory correct. The decisive proof against *Il.* 7.443–464 is that these lines are also inconsistent with *Il.* 21.436–460. Here Poseidon reminds Apollo of when Laomedon cheated them and did not pay them for their work of one year, after he (Poseidon) had built the wall and Apollo had herded his cattle.

ἐπικούρων ἐξεληλυθότων [because clearly there are fewer Trojans than Greeks, even with the allies having come forth [to help them]]. On the meaning of ‘σαφῶς’ in Aristarchean exegesis, see Chapter 3.3.A § 1.2.

50. In what follows of *Sch. Il.* 8.56a, Aristarchus also explains that his observation is against Zenodotus, whose reading at *Il.* 8.562 (μυρία, ‘countless’, for the fires kindled by the Trojans, rather than χίλια, ‘thousand’) contradicts the fact that there were fewer barbarians (Trojans and allies together) than Greeks; see also *Sch. Il.* 8.562 (διὰ παντὸς γὰρ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐλάσσονας τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνίστησιν).

51. In fact, at *Il.* 8.56 and *Il.* 15.407 the Trojan force is described as being smaller than the Greek, but there is no mention of the allies. Nevertheless, since Aristarchus thought that ‘Trojans’ are all the people living in the Troad and not only those living in Troy (see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.4), these two passages offered definitive proof for him. Roemer 1912, 479–483, as typical of him, gives a very different reading of this question.

52. This precision (indeed obsession) in looking for internal consistency and singling out all the passages that ‘demonstrate’ his point is typical of Aristarchus; for example, he does the same for the athetesis of *Il.* 20.269–272, analyzed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.3.

53. As by Zenodotus and Aristophanes before him: see Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 7.443–64b^{1,2}. Cf. Bouchard 2016, 283.

54. See also *Sch. Il.* 12.17a. Cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 12.4.

Aristarchus notes (*Sch. Il.* 21.446a^{1,2}; 21.446b^{1,2}) that this passage—and, in particular, line 446, where Poseidon clearly says that he alone built the Trojan wall—contradicts *Il.* 7.452–453, where he says that he and Apollo together built it. The twenty-two lines in Book 7, therefore, are inconsistent with two other passages in the poem and so must be eliminated.⁵⁵

This review of athetesis due only to internal contradictions suggests that for Aristarchus a narrative inconsistency was itself reason enough to suspect a line.⁵⁶ On the other hand, when two passages were in contradiction, he needed to find a third passage (or more) that confirmed one of the two competing versions. Otherwise, he athetized the passage that it was more economical to remove in order to disrupt the narrative as little as possible.

4.2. Unsuitable Lines

A distinct form of inconsistency happens when lines do not fit the specific situation, that is, they sound ‘unfitting’ and ‘inappropriate’ within the context. As was discussed in Chapter 3.6.A § 4 and § 5, the criterion of appropriateness was paramount in Aristotle, especially for characters (ἥθη) and thought (διάνοια). The scholia indicate ‘inappropriate’ or ‘unfitting’ lines with several labels: the most common are ἄκαιρος / ἀκαίρως,⁵⁷ ἄτοπος,⁵⁸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς / οὐ δεόντως / οὐκ εἰκότως,⁵⁹ ἀπεικῶς,⁶⁰ and κακῶς.⁶¹ Just as with internal contradictions, sometimes the scholia do not label an ‘unsuitable’ line as such, but ask a rhetorical question to reveal that the line is unfitting.⁶² Otherwise, they can simply explain why the line is incompatible with its context.⁶³

Many atheteseis seem to have been proposed on grounds of unsuitability only, in particular for lines that occurred in a speech. In this respect, Aristarchus seems to have been aware of the rhetorical needs of a specific situation and, if one or more lines did not meet those needs, they had to be athetized. Unsuitability

55. Cf. Kohl 1917, 119–120 (fr. **53); Rusten 1982, 30–40; Kirk 1990, 288–289.

56. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 21. Other examples of atheteseis due to internal contradiction only are in *Sch. Il.* 3.230a (perhaps, in this case, the line at stake, *Il.* 2.558, was even completely eliminated, not only athetized; see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.2) and in *Sch. Il.* 5.183. Cases of multiple inconsistencies with other passages are offered by the atheteseis of *Il.* 15.668–673 (*Sch. Il.* 15.668a; cf. Nünlist 2009, 162–163) and *Il.* 11.78–83 (*Sch. Il.* 11.78–83a; see also *Sch. Il.* 11.75a; 11.183).

57. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.352a; 8.284a; 14.317a; 15.231; 24.130–2a.

58. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.19–20; 5.906a; 8.108a.

59. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.405a (with reference to *Il.* 5.906); 1.454 (with reference to *Il.* 16.237); 5.734–6 (with reference to *Il.* 8.385–387); 10.409a; 16.44–5 (with reference to *Il.* 11.802–803). These examples all concern repeated lines, on which see below, § 5.3.

60. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.193a¹.

61. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 10.208–10 (with reference to *Il.* 10.409–411); 12.71 (with reference to *Il.* 15.69–70).

62. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.27a; 2.124a.

63. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.108a; 9.23–5b.

could affect even a simple word within a speech. In this regard, sometimes 'out-of-place epithets' (ἐπίθετα ἄκαιρα)⁶⁴ can be a sufficient reason for an athetesis, as in *Il.* 23.581 when Menelaus, angry with Antilochus, warmly addresses him as 'nourished by Zeus' (*Sch. Il.* 23.581a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι ἀκαίρως λέγει 'διοτρεφές', ὀργιζόμενος αὐτῷ).⁶⁵

More often, when an athetesis is involved, it is not only one word which is 'out of place' but rather a concept expressed by one or more lines. For example, at *Il.* 15.221–235, after he has ordered Poseidon to leave the Greeks on their own, Zeus tells Apollo to help Hector until the Achaeans flee back to their ships, concluding that then he will ensure that the Greeks rest from the wearing toils of war. Aristarchus athetizes this conclusion because 'the prediction [i.e., that Hector will be able to repel the Greeks only back to their ships and that Zeus will then give them respite] is out of place and not pleasing to [the pro-Trojan] Apollo' (*Sch. Il.* 15.231: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι πέντε, ὅτι ἄκαιροι οἱ λόγοι, . . . ἄκαιρος ἢ πρόρρησις καὶ οὐ κεχαρισμένη τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι).⁶⁶ Very similar is the athetesis of *Il.* 8.284, when Agamemnon, in congratulating Teucer for his success against the Trojans (*Il.* 8.281–291) also remembers his father, Telamon, '[who] took care of you in his house even if you were an illegitimate son (νόθος)' (l. 284). Aristarchus does not like the line because 'the genealogy is out of place (ἄκαιρος) and does not convey any encouragement but rather rebukes and dissuades' (*Sch. Il.* 8.284a).⁶⁷ As is clear from these two examples, lines within a speech were often athetized as unsuitable if they seemed to decrease the effectiveness of the speech in convincing the interlocutor. There are several other atheteseis due to unsuitable ideas in a direct speech. For instance, at *Il.* 2.193–197, where Odysseus addresses the Greek chiefs and tries to convince them not to go back to Greece, he speaks offensively about Agamemnon and uses strong words which are unsuitable and not conducive to submission (*Sch. Il.* 2.193a¹: ἀπεικότες οἱ λόγοι καὶ οὐ προτρεπτικοὶ εἰς καταστολήν).⁶⁸

64. On ἐπίθετα ἄκαιρα, see Chapter 3.6.A § 6 and Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.2.

65. Cf. Roemer 1912, 342–343; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 393; Parry 1971, 123 [= Parry 1928, 152–153] (quoted in Chapter 3.6.A, footnote 97); Lührs 1992, 44 n. 85. Out-of-place epithets are not always a sufficient reason for athetesis; ἀκαιρία may be a reason enough for the athetesis of *Il.* 21.331, if indeed it is an athetesis (but in *Sch. Il.* 21.331a †ἀθετεῖται† is between cruces, while *Sch. Il.* 21.331b simply notes that the epithet is ἄκαιρον καὶ ἀπρεπές, without mentioning any athetesis; cf. Erbse, ad loc.). In *Sch. Il.* 3.352a, on the other hand, the line is athetized because it is not necessary, as the moment requires conciseness, and the epithet is 'out of place'; cf. Roemer 1912, 148–149, 203, 347 (who, according to his views, denies the athetesis to Aristarchus); Lührs 1992, 42–45; van Thiel 2014a, I 324.

66. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 41; Roemer 1912, 146–147; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 452.

67. Zenodotus did not have the line and Aristophanes athetized it; see Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 8.284a.b. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 41; Roemer 1912, 52–53.

68. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.193a². Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 42; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 454–455; Schironi 2017, 614–619. For other atheteseis of lines unfitting within a speech, see *Sch. Il.* 4.55–6

A more specific aspect of the context is ‘characterization’, namely, all the traits that are typical of a particular character. In a sense, a character creates a ‘context’ for his or her *persona*, and everything which is said *about* or *by* him or her should fit within this context. Lines unsuitable to characters are labeled with keywords such as *παρά τὴν ἀξίαν* (τοῦ προσώπου) / *παρά τὸ πρόσωπον*,⁶⁹ *μὴ ἀρμόζοντες* / *ἀνάρμοστοι* / *ἀναρμόστως*,⁷⁰ or *ἀνοίκειος*.⁷¹ A similar meaning is carried by *οὐ πρέπον* / *οὐ πρέποντες* and *ἀπρεπές*,⁷² which do not mean ‘morally inappropriate’ but ‘against the expectation’ that one has for a specific character in a specific situation—sometimes, but not necessarily, including ‘morally proper’ behavior.⁷³ Some *atheteseis* have also additional reasons that Aristarchus adds to support them,⁷⁴ but some are grounded only on the basis that the lines are unsuitable for the character. One example concerns Achilles’ last words to Patroclus as he is about to go to battle: he wishes that every Trojan and every Greek may die so that only the two of them survive and can sack Troy (*Il.* 16.97–100). These words are *athetized* simply because they are not in line with Achilles’ character:

Sch. Il. 16.97–100a αἱ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ <——— λύωμεν>: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τέσσαρες, διότι κατὰ διασκευὴν ἐμφαίνουσι γεγράφθαι ὑπὸ τινος τῶν νομιζόντων ἐρᾶν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τοῦ Πατρόκλου· τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ‘πάντες ἀπόλιντο πλὴν ἡμῶν’. καὶ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς οὐ τοιοῦτος, συμπαθὴς δέ.

‘For I wish, father Zeus, . . . and that [alone] we may destroy [the sacred bastions of Troy]’: four lines are *athetized* because they appear to have been interpolated by one of those who believed that Achilles was in love with Patroclus. For the words ‘[I wish] that all might die but us’ are of this kind [i.e., these words support the idea of an Achilles in love with Patroclus]. But Achilles is not like that, but is sympathetic [to the Greeks].⁷⁵

and also 4.55b (ex.) (cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 391–392; Kirk 1985, 337) and *Sch. Il.* 14.213a (cf. Janko 1994, 183–184, who rightly notes that Aristarchus missed the ironic point in Aphrodite’s reply).

69. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.395; 22.393–4a.

70. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.133–4; 8.164–6a; 15.166–7a; 24.556–7.

71. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.791; 6.433–9.

72. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 18.597–8; 20.180–6a; 24.130–2a.

73. On the concept of *πρέπον*, see Chapter 3.6.A, footnote 49.

74. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.395 (discussed below, at § 6) and 24.130–2a (discussed below, at § 7.2).

75. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.97–100b (ex. [Did.]); cf. Lehrs 1882, 185; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 44; Roemer 1912, 61–62; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 397–398. For other *atheteseis* due to unsuitability to Achilles’ character (and other reasons), see Chapter 5.4 § 1.

Because gods for Aristarchus are simply 'characters', they too need to behave 'appropriately'. Homeric gods and their moral ambiguity indeed are a difficult problem, which had worried the ancients since the archaic period. Aristarchus, however, does not seem to have been bothered by their lack of morality; certainly he did not try to justify them by applying an allegorical reading,⁷⁶ nor did he athetize lines because they provided an ethically questionable portrayal of the gods. Rather, he judged divine characters according to his usual Aristotelian principles of characterization and rejected lines which did not seem suitable for the personality of each deity. For example, Hera's dignity and character are at the core of an athetesis in Book 15:

Sch. Il. 15.147–8a αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν ἔλθῃτε <——ἀνώγη>: ἀθετοῦνται ἀμφότεροι, ὅτι ἀνηθοποίητοί εἰσι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ἐνετείλατο ἡ Ἥρα, ὥφειλον ὑπακούειν τῷ Διὶ. καὶ λόγον ἂν εἶχεν ἡ ἐντολή, εἰ κεχαρισμένον τι αὐτῇ ἐπετέλουν καὶ μὴ ἐναντίον ὥστε ἔδει μᾶλλον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὸ παριδεῖν τι τῶν ὑπὸ Διὸς προστασσομένων.

'Once you have arrived . . . [do whatever he may order and] command': both [lines] are athetized because they do not give exact delineation of character. For, even if Hera had not ordered it, they had to obey Zeus. Her order would have had a rationale if they were accomplishing something dear to her and not against her [i.e., as happens here], so that she ought rather to have asked them to disregard some of Zeus' commands.

At *Il.* 15.146–148, Hera tells Apollo and Iris: 'Zeus orders that you two go to Ida as soon as possible; / once you have arrived there and looked Zeus in the face, / then do whatever he may order and command'. Aristarchus athetizes the last two lines as they are not in line with Hera's character. Zeus' orders are against her interests,⁷⁷ so Hera should not be worrying about Apollo's and Iris' obedience to him. Rather, more in accord with her character, she should urge them to ignore Zeus' commands. Thus the bare communication to go to him is more than enough.⁷⁸

One of the Aristotelian postulates shared by Aristarchus was that epic and tragedy were characterized by seriousness; as a consequence, anything 'ridiculous' was unsuitable to epic. Except for Thersites, who is a comic

76. On Aristarchus' attitude toward allegory and *allegoresis*, see Chapter 3.2.A § 5.

77. Indeed, Zeus will command Iris to stop Poseidon from helping the Greeks (*Il.* 158–167) and Apollo to help Hector and arouse fear in the Greeks (*Il.* 221–235).

78. Cf. Roemer 1912, 377; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 452.

character, heroes should not behave in a ridiculous way.⁷⁹ Several *atheteseis* are due to ‘ridiculous’ (γελοῖον/γελοῖως)⁸⁰ or ‘silly’ (εὔηθες/εὐήθως)⁸¹ content applied to heroic characters or situations. Often this is one among other reasons for rejecting lines,⁸² but in three *atheteseis* this is the only reason. All of them involve the greatest heroes of the poem, Achilles (*Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹ [Did.]) and Hector (*Sch. Il.* 8.189a; 22.329). In one case, Aristarchus seems to have had second thoughts, as his *athetesis* of *Il.* 19.365–8 was debated among his pupils. According to Didymus, Dionysius Sidonius claimed that the lines first were *athetized* because Achilles was ridiculous when depicted grinding his teeth (*Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹: γελοῖον γὰρ τὸ βρυχᾶσθαι τὸν Ἀχιλλέα), but then Aristarchus changed his mind and deleted the *obeloi* ‘considering it a poetic image’ (*Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹: ὕστερον δὲ περιελεῖν τοὺς ὀβελούς, ποιητικὸν νομίσαντα τὸ τοιοῦτο).⁸³

The other two cases concern Hector—hardly a ‘ridiculous’ character. At *Il.* 8.189 he talks to his horses and asks them to pay him back for the wheat that Andromache gave them (*Il.* 186–188) and adds: ‘and the wine she poured for you to drink, when your hearts commanded’ (*Il.* 189)—a line that Aristarchus rejects as being ‘very ridiculous’ because horses do not drink wine and because the expression ‘when your hearts commanded’ is also laughable (*Sch. Il.* 8.189a: γελοϊότατος ἐπὶ ἵππων ὁ στίχος, ὅτι οἶνον ἵπποι οὐ πίνουνσι. καὶ ὅτι ‘θυμὸς ἀνώγοι’ εἰς μέθην γελοῖον).⁸⁴ In this case, then, it is a compounding of ridiculous elements in one line. Lastly, when Achilles fatally wounds Hector, his spear does not cut Hector’s throat ‘so that (ὅφρα) he could speak in answer to him’ (*Il.* 22.329). Aristarchus *athetizes* the line with the final clause because it is ridiculous—as if the spear decided not to cut Hector’s throat for that very

79. See Chapter 3.6.A § 5.

80. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 6.311a; 8.189a; 10.409a; 18.39–49; 24.614–7a (the last three are discussed in Chapter 3.6.A § 5; on *Sch. Il.* 24.614–7a and 18.39–49 respectively, see also Chapter 5.3. § 3.2.4 and § 5.2).

81. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.139a; 2.76a; 8.185a; 12.175a¹.

82. For example, the *athetesis* of *Il.* 1.139 is due to the fact that the first part is not necessary and the second is εὔηθες, ‘silly’ (*Sch. Il.* 1.139a; cf. also *Sch. Il.* 1.137); cf. Lührs 1992, 29–33. The *athetesis* of *Il.* 14.376–377, on the other hand, is due to a ridiculous statement by Poseidon (*Sch. Il.* 14.376a, briefly discussed in Chapter 3.6.A § 5), but also because these lines are in contradiction with line 382 below (*Sch. Il.* 14.382a); cf. Janko 1994, 210.

83. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 341; Roemer 1912, 101–102; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 399; West 2001, 253–254; Schironi 2015, 621–624 (with further bibliography); Bouchard 2016, 116. See also Chapter 5.4 § 1.

84. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 395; Lührs 1992, 46 n. 92; West 2001, 202. The line had already been *athetized* by Aristophanes; see *Sch. Il.* 8.189b (Did.). In this speech to the horses, Aristarchus also *athetizes* its beginning, when Hector calls his horses by name, because there is a grammatical inconsistency (in the rest of the speech Hector uses the dual but at line 185 he addresses four horses) and because direct address is itself silly; see *Sch. Il.* 8.185a (discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.8).

purpose (*Sch. Il.* 22.329). He also adds that those who wanted to defend the line said that what had happened by chance (that is, that the spear did not cut Hector’s throat) was turned into an intentional fact, perhaps for poetic reasons. Probably, Aristarchus did not agree with this justification, but might have mentioned it in order to ‘save the text.’⁸⁵ In the scholia, then, few atheteseis are due only to a line (or lines) being ‘ridiculous’; still, within the Aristotelian view that epos was about ‘serious’ people and ideas, the category of the ridiculous could be seen as a subcategory of ‘unsuitable’ lines.⁸⁶ From this perspective, the classification γελοῖον/εὐήθεσ was for Aristarchus a strong reason for an athetesis, as the ‘ridiculous’ was unfitting to epic as a poetic genre.

4.3. Unbelievability

Following Aristotle’s teachings, Aristarchus held that poetry should follow ‘probability’ rather than ‘reality’ because poetry does not deal with plain facts but with universals.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, even if poetry stages events and phenomena that in reality never occur, such as interventions of gods, speaking animals, portents, and visions of various types, the story should still follow some logical patterns and be narrated credibly. Therefore, a lack of credibility was a sufficient reason for athetesis. This is expressed with the keyword ἀπίθανον / οὐ πιθανόν⁸⁸ or with a simple question highlighting that the narrative does not sound believable.⁸⁹ Believability in a poem is closely connected to the principle of noncontradiction, in the sense that, if something is inconsistent with something else, it is of course not believable. Yet the category of unbelievability is wider, because something might be unbelievable even if it is not in contradiction with other passages in the poem. For this reason, ‘unbelievability’ is a reason different from internal contradictions, analyzed in § 4.1.

Unbelievability is alone a good reason for suspecting lines, as in the cases of the athetesis of *Il.* 3.144, analyzed in Chapter 3.6.A § 3.⁹⁰ Another revealing case is the athetesis of *Il.* 21.290. In Book 21 Achilles invokes help from Zeus when

85. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 7; Roemer 1912, 132–133; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 416; Richardson 1993, 139; Bouchard 2016, 307. On this athetesis, see also Chapter 5.2 § 3.3.

86. For example, the athetesis of *Il.* 7.195–199 links the two reasons (*Sch. Il.* 7.195–9): στίχοι πέντε ἀθετοῦνται, ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὸν Αἴαντα οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἀνθυποφέρει γελοίως [five lines are athetized, because this speech is not worthy of Ajax, and it is ridiculous that he replies to himself]. See Chapter 5.4 § 3.

87. See Chapter 3.6.A § 3.

88. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.144a; 12.350a; 19.416–7a; 21.290a. When a line is athetized, the text can also become ‘more believable’ (πιθανώτερον), as in *Sch. Il.* 2.319a¹ (cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 146–148; Montanari 2008; Bouchard 2016, 190–196).

89. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 23.810a.

90. On this scholium, see also Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2 and § 5.2.

attacked by the Scamander (*Il.* 21.273–283); Poseidon and Athena, disguised as two men, then go to Achilles, and Poseidon says: ‘for among the gods we two are such helpers / with the approval of Zeus, I and Pallas Athena’ (*Il.* 289–290). Aristarchus athetizes line 290 because it is not believable that, disguised as a mortal, Poseidon introduces himself with ‘Athena and I’ (*Sch. Il.* 21.290a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι ἀπίθανον εἰς ἀνδρὸς μορφὴν ὁμοιωμένον λέγειν ‘ἐγὼ καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη’). How can Achilles know that these two men are divinities?⁹¹ The problem here is not that Poseidon and Athena appear to Achilles (this is possible in fiction!); rather, it is unbelievable that Poseidon introduces himself to Achilles and says ‘Athena and I’ when the two gods are disguised as mortals.

In fact, unbelievability can simply involve fairly normal situations which are somehow not convincing. Thus, it is unbelievable that Achilles offers a feast for only two contestants (Ajax the Great and Diomedes) in the armed duel rather than inviting everyone: ‘what have these two done more than the others?’ asks Aristarchus, who consequently athetizes the line (*Sch. Il.* 23.810a).⁹² Another case occurs with the athetesis of *Il.* 12.350 = 12.363. During the battle at the wall, Menestheus sends his herald Thoötes to the two Ajaxes to ask for help against the Lycians. Menestheus then adds that, if they are pressed hard on their side too, then at least Ajax son of Telamon should come: ‘and let Teucer, who is very skilled with the bow, follow as well’ (*Il.* 12.350). The same line is repeated by Thoötes to the Ajaxes when he finds them (*Il.* 12.363). Aristarchus athetizes both lines because it is not believable (οὐ πιθανόν) that Menestheus, through Thoötes, orders Teucer to come, as he is the squire of Ajax the Great, hence he obviously has to follow him (*Sch. Il.* 12.350a; 12.363).⁹³

The ‘unbelievability’ of these lines—it must be noted—is not due to the fact that they describe events which in reality cannot happen. They are simply unconvincing, because they are ‘at odds’ with our expectations; hence, as observed above, the strict connection with the principles of noncontradiction and of suitability. In a sense, all three of these categories of ‘flawed lines’ can all be reduced to the same basic idea: facts, characters, and ideas in speeches should be consistent with what we find in the rest of the text as well as with our expectations—which most often derive from the text itself. When this does not happen, these elements fail to ‘convince’ us and so represent a flaw in the text.

91. Cf. Nünlist 2009, 277. The same athetesis (but with additional reasons) is discussed in *P.Oxy.* 221, xv, 6–27, the commentary by Ammonius to *Iliad* 21; cf. Schironi 2012b, 421–423.

92. Cf. Roemer 1912, 50–51; Richardson 1993, 261.

93. See also *Sch. Il.* 12.350b (Did.) and 12.350c (ex.); cf. Roemer 1912, 160. Aristarchus may also have athetized line 371, where Homer describes Teucer going with Ajax (*Sch. Il.* 12.371a); he certainly athetized line 372, where Homer says that Pandion went with them carrying Teucer’s bow: why—asks Aristarchus—can Teucer not carry his bow by himself? (*Sch. Il.* 12.372); cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 394–395; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 12.371a; Hainsworth 1993, 356, 357.

Yet I have tried to differentiate among these ideas because they do underline some slight differences. In fact, though lines are athetized just because they are unbelievable, there are in fact far fewer cases of *atheteseis* purely due to ‘lack of believability’ than lines rejected because they show internal inconsistencies, or because they are unsuitable and inappropriate within a specific context or in relation to a specific character. This situation reveals the Aristotelian approach that Aristarchus seems to have adopted. In line with what the philosopher said, Aristarchus looked most of all for self-consistency *within* a work of poetry and *in respect to* the ethos of the characters. On the other hand, he allowed a certain degree of freedom in the events and stories narrated by the poet, excusing details that might not be believable in reality.

4.4. Superfluous or Unnecessary Lines

Another important criterion was the redundancy of a line. If a line was superfluous (περισσός) or unnecessary (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖος), it was suspicious, since Homer liked conciseness (συντομία).⁹⁴ Lührs distinguishes between three types of superfluous lines (στιχοὶ περισσοί):⁹⁵

1. *Formal supplement*: lines which start with verbs like εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι in enjambment with the preceding line. These lines were unnecessary because in Homer these verbs could be supplied. Similar supplements could also occur with *apo koinou* constructions.⁹⁶ While Aristarchus considered them suspicious, he athetized only those lines which had this ‘formal supplement’ in their first half *and also* presented useless repetitions or unnecessary information or were in contradiction with the context in the second part. On the other hand, if the line had an enjambment with the verb ‘to be’ or a similar, easily supplied verb, but its second part contained information considered necessary to the context, Aristarchus did not athetize the line.⁹⁷
2. *Content-based supplement*: lines containing unnecessary clarifications for words or phrases from the line(s) above. As in the previous case, not all of them were athetized. In this specific case, Aristarchus would reject only

94. ‘Conciseness’ is a trope listed by Tryphon i (202.7–15) and defined as follows (202.8–9): συντομία ἐστὶ φράσις αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τοῦ δηλουμένου ἔχουσα [conciseness is an expression which has all the necessary elements of what is being set forth]. Here too, there is a connection between being ‘concise’ and avoiding what is ‘not necessary’.

95. Lührs 1992, 18–148. Superfluous lines have also been discussed by Lehrs 1882, 338–339; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 20–22 (with a focus on the idea of Homer’s συντομία); Roemer 1912, 173–461, esp. 180–219 (to be approached with the usual caveats; see above, footnote 3, and Preface § 2); van der Valk 1963–1964, II 465–475; and Meijering 1987, 173–176.

96. See Chapter 3.2.B § 6.1 and § 7.1.

97. See Lührs 1992, 39–41; cf. also Lehrs 1882, 338–339.

those lines whose second part was not only dispensable, *but also* contained an inconsistency with the surrounding lines or was completely redundant in general. Otherwise, if the rest of the line was necessary or, even without being necessary, still more or less fit with the context, he kept it. Yet, when the content-based supplement occupied the entire line, Aristarchus would reject it immediately without looking for an additional reason.⁹⁸

3. *Repetition of content or addition of unnecessary details*: lines providing details like genealogies, or summaries of what had already happened or been said, or anticipations of what would happen. In this case, Aristarchus might add additional reasons in order to support his athetesis,⁹⁹ but in general these types of superfluous lines needed to be athetized.¹⁰⁰

While Lührs first defines three types of ‘superfluous lines’ and then looks at Aristarchus’ reaction to them, I have looked at the reasons that the Aristonicus scholia give for an athetesis. My analysis confirms Lührs’ conclusions, though I have reached them from a different perspective. Indeed, I found several cases of athetesis motivated only by the fact that the lines are ‘superfluous’ (περισσοί), and they belong to all three categories defined by Lührs. Categories 1 and 2 as defined by Lührs need additional reasons linked with the second part of the line, but often the problem with the second part of the line is that it is ‘superfluous’ as well, as Lührs himself recognizes. In this case, the entire line is superfluous, and this is exactly what I mean when I claim that being ‘superfluous’ (according to the different categories as defined by Lührs) was itself a strong argument for athetesis. Moreover, even if Lührs’ analysis is correct because these ‘superfluous’ lines also have a ‘superfluous’ second part, we never read ‘the line is athetized because the first part is superfluous and so is the second’ in the Aristonicus scholia. Instead, we read ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι περισσός, ‘the line is athetized because it is [all] superfluous’. For example, in Lührs’ first category, this is valid for the athetesis of *Il.* 1.296 with enjambment of σήμαινε (*Sch. Il.* 1.295a);¹⁰¹ of *Il.* 1.444 with enjambment in ἱερὴν ἑκατόμβην / ῥέξαι (*Sch. Il.* 1.443a; 1.444a);¹⁰²

98. See Lührs 1992, 97–100.

99. For example, Aristarchus athetizes *Il.* 20.205–209, where, upon meeting Achilles, Aeneas tells him about both their parents—a genealogical detail that Aristarchus defines as unnecessary and also ‘out of place’ (*Sch. Il.* 20.107; 20.205–9a^{1.2}); cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 467; Lührs 1992, 102–104.

100. See Lührs 1992, 146–147.

101. See above, § 2. Cf. Roemer 1912, 199; Lührs 1992, 20–21; van Thiel 2014a, I 107, who in line with his peculiar view of Aristarchus’ *ekdosis*, suggests: “Vers 296 hat in A keinen Obelos . . . , was bedeuten kann, dass διὸ ἀθετεῖται hypothetisch . . . ist”.

102. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 338; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 25; Roemer 1912, 199–200; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 219; Lührs 1992, 21–23. The athetesis has been analyzed in Chapter 3.2.B § 6.1.

of *Il.* 9.44 with enjambment of ἐστᾶσι (*Sch. Il.* 9.44a);¹⁰³ and of *Il.* 9.416 with enjambment of ἔσσεται (*Sch. Il.* 9.416a).¹⁰⁴

As for Lührs' second category, *Il.* 21.470–471 is a case in point: 'his sister rebuked (νείκεσε) [Apollo] harshly, the mistress of the animals, / Artemis the huntress, and addressed him with words of reproach'. The first hemistich of the second line with 'Artemis the huntress' supposedly clarifies 'his sister . . . the mistress of the animals' of the previous line; in addition, the second hemistich contains a redundant repetition of what νείκεσε in line 470 has already expressed.¹⁰⁵ Aristarchus, however, does not distinguish between the two hemistichs, but simply athetizes the line as 'superfluous', and comments on the silly explanation with a dismissive comment: 'it is athetized because it is superfluous . . . who is the hunter goddess if not Artemis?' (*Sch. Il.* 21.471a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι περισσός . . . τίς δὲ κυνηγετική θεὸς εἰ μὴ ἡ Ἄρτεμις;).¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, the second category defined by Lührs also contains lines that consist entirely of content-based supplements, that is, glosses of the previous line. This is the case of *Il.* 8.527–528: '[dogs], brought by the Keres (κηρεσσιφορήτους) / whom the Keres (κῆρες) bring (φορέουσι) on the dark ships'. Aristarchus athetizes the relative clause in line 528, which glosses the compound in the previous line, simply because it is superfluous (*Sch. Il.* 8.528: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι περισσός).¹⁰⁷

Seen in this way, being 'useless' is a strong reason for an athetesis, as lines that are considered περισσοί or οὐκ ἀναγκαῖοι can be athetized without any additional argument. In particular, superfluous lines due to either syntactic additions or 'exegetical' explanations of unobvious phrases could be seen by Aristarchus as interpolations made by someone who did not know Homeric syntax or figurative expressions well enough and felt the need of clarifications,¹⁰⁸ as is clear in *Sch. Il.* 9.416a (ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι νομίσας τις κρέμασθαι τὸν λόγον προσέθηκεν αὐτόν [it is athetized because someone thinking that the sentence was hanging added it]).

As for the third category defined by Lührs, namely, lines containing

103. Lührs 1992, 24–26, considers that the second part also weakens the force of the line. This is true, because Aristarchus says that, once line 44 is taken away, the sentence becomes more suggestive (*Sch. Il.* 9.44a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι περισσός ἐστι καὶ μὴ προσκειμένου αὐτοῦ ἐμφαντικώτερος ὁ λόγος γίνεται); however, this is not an additional argument but rather a side comment, emphasizing the result of the athetesis. Aristarchus' only reason is that the line is περισσός because there is an *apo koinou* construction (*Sch. Il.* 9.43b). Cf. also Roemer 1912, 183.

104. Cf. Roemer 1912, 184; Lührs 1992, 26–27; see above, § 2.

105. See also Lührs 1992, 68–69.

106. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.471b and 21.511b^{1,2}.

107. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 19; Meijering 1987, 173; Lührs 1992, 95; see Chapter 3.3.A § 1.1 and Chapter 3.4 § 4. Similar is the athetesis of *Il.* 2.143 (*Sch. Il.* 2.143a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι κενῶς ἐπεξηγείται· τὸ γὰρ νοούμενον τὸ αὐτό); cf. Lührs 1992, 67–68 and 69.

108. On this point, see below, § 7.1.

repetition of content or addition of unnecessary details, there are many examples of athetesis justified only because the lines are ‘superfluous’, for example, those with a word ‘recapping’ or repeating another one in a previous line. Aristarchus athetizes the last one, as is clear from two almost identical examples, which come from Book 1 (Calchas’ speech to the Greeks about Apollo’s wrath) and Book 13 (Zeus’ eagerness to grant the Trojans victory to satisfy Achilles):

He does not blame us because of a prayer or a hecatomb,
 but because of the priest (ἀλλ’ ἔνεκ’ ἀρητῆρος) whom Agamemnon
 dishonored
 and he did not release his daughter and did not accept the ransom.
For this reason (τοῦνεκ’) the far-shooting has given woes and still will
 give them.
(Il. 1.93–96)

Zeus wanted to grant the victory to the Trojans and Hector,
giving honor to swift-footed Achilles (κυδαίνων Ἀχιλῆα πόδας ταχύν);
 but he did not
 want the Achaean army to be completely destroyed in front of Ilium,
 but he gave honor (κύδαινε) to Thetis and her brave son.
(Il. 13.347–350)

In both cases Aristarchus athetizes the last line, where Homer repeats the same idea, and the explanations in the scholia sound extremely similar:

Sch. Il. 1.96 τοῦνεκ’ ἄρ’ ἄλγε’: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι περισσός. πρόκειται γὰρ ‘ἀλλ’ ἔνεκ’ ἀρητῆρος ὃν ἠτίμησ’ Ἀγαμέμνων’ (Il. 1.94).

‘For this reason [the far-shooting has given] woes’: [the line] is athetized because it is superfluous. For there previously is: ‘because of the priest whom Agamemnon dishonored’ (Il. 1.94).

Sch. Il. 13.350 ἀλλὰ Θέτιν κύδαινε <καὶ νιέα καρτερόθυμον>: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖος. προείρηται γὰρ ‘κυδαίνων Ἀχιλῆα πόδας ταχύν’ (Il. 13.348).

‘But he wanted to give honor to Thetis and her brave son’: [the line] is athetized because it is not necessary. For it has been previously said: ‘giving honor to swift-footed Achilles’ (Il. 13.348).

The lines are not necessary because everything has already been said (even with the same words) in the lines above.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps Aristarchus thought that the 'recapping' lines had been added by someone who felt the need to underline the main concept by repeating the keyword in the sentences. The repetition of identical words is a common device in epic poetry, as well as in rhetoric (ancient as modern). In fact, Aristarchus did recognize the use of similar words 'side by side' (ἐκ παραλλήλου) and 'resumption' (ἐπανάληψις) among Homeric tropes.¹¹⁰ Yet in these specific cases he seems to have objected to this rhetorical recapping, in all probability because the rest of the line did not add any important details and could be cut without problem.¹¹¹

Lines containing 'useless details' which could not be explained as glosses or syntactic additions inserted by someone to clarify the text also belong to this third category. Aristarchus rejected them as simply 'superfluous' when there was no need of them in the specific context. Thus in Book 8, when Athena tells Hera that Zeus fulfilled the prayers of Thetis, 'who kissed his knees and clasped his chin with her hand, begging him to give honor to Achilles, the sacker of cities' (*Il.* 8.371–372), there is no need to explain what Thetis did and asked of Zeus, as Hera knows it already; in fact—Aristarchus adds—not even we mortals like to go over superfluous details in our conversations (*Sch. Il.* 8.371–2a: ὅτι οὐκ ἔδει κατὰ μέρος διηγῆσασθαι ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν καλῶς εἰδυῖαν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς περισσὸν τι προσιστοροῦμεν).¹¹²

In all the cases analyzed in this section, lines are athetized only as superfluous or not necessary, either because they provide unnecessary explanations or because their content is not called for by the context. This evidence shows that the criterion of περισσός / οὐκ ἀναγκαῖος was alone sufficient to justify an athetesis. Yet one point should be made; as already explained at § 2, a line that can be athetized must be 'superfluous' by default, at least from a syntactic point of view. So, while there are certainly lines which are athetized just because they are not necessary, on the other hand *all* athetized lines are in theory syntactically 'superfluous'; otherwise they could not be rejected. This point will be important for my overall interpretation of Aristarchus' criteria for athetesis and for my partial departure from Lührs' analysis of 'superfluous' and 'repeated lines', as

109. Cf. Roemer 1912, 191 and 198; Meijering 1987, 173; Lührs 1992, 104–105 and 109. These two examples also prove that 'not necessary' is synonymous with 'superfluous'.

110. See Chapter 3.2.A § 9 and § 10.

111. Similar is the athetesis of *Il.* 1.110 recapping line 111 (*Sch. Il.* 1.110a¹: αἰρομένου τούτου σύντομος γίνεται ἡ ἐρμηνεία καὶ οὐδὲν ἑλλιπὲς ἔχουσα); cf. Roemer 1912, 197; Meijering 1987, 175; Lührs 1992, 110–111.

112. See also *Sch. Il.* 8.371–2b^{1,2} (Did.?). But perhaps Aristarchus also took exception to the epithet πολίπορθος used in reference to Achilles at line 372; see Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 8.371–2a, and Chapter 5.2 § 2.3. Cf. Roemer 1912, 144–146; Lührs 1992, 139–140; West 2001, 202–203.

will be discussed in the conclusions (§ 9). As for the present focus, we can conclude that being superfluous was a reason enough for a line to be rejected; yet, as Lührs has also proved, normally Aristarchus would find another reason to support the rejection of *στίχοι περισσοί*—so being superfluous seems to have been less problematic than being ‘unsuitable’ or ‘contradictory’.

4.5. Non-Homeric Language or Society

One of Aristarchus’ main concerns was to define what was ‘properly Homeric’, both in terms of lexicon and grammar as well as in terms of myth and societal customs. The definition of what was ‘in line with the Homeric usage’ (*Ὀμηρικῶς*) gave Aristarchus the ability to judge whether something fit within this category or not, which ultimately was a key to choosing one variant over another. Hence one would expect that non-Homeric details in language, style, and content would be a very good reason for rejecting a line. While this is certainly the case, Aristarchus’ behavior in such cases seems to have been more nuanced.

Considering his painstaking work on Homeric language,¹¹³ we would expect that he deemed mistakes in vocabulary or grammar an excellent reason for athetesis. In fact, there are a few examples of atheteseis solely motivated by the presence of a word used *οὐχ Ὀμηρικῶς* (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 4.140a and 4.149a; 24.304a^{1.2})¹¹⁴ or by an incorrect syntactic construction (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.64a)¹¹⁵—yet there are not many. Of course, the presence of more than one word employed contrary to the Homeric usage makes lines even more suspicious.¹¹⁶ By the same token, lines describing rituals, habits, and customs different from those typical of Homeric society should also have been suspicious; yet I could only find one case of athetesis solely due to habits out of keeping with Homeric society.¹¹⁷

Indeed, compared with the strong reasons analyzed above, namely, ‘internal contradictions’, ‘unsuitability’, and lack of ‘believability’ or of ‘necessity’, the group of atheteseis due to being ‘not according to the Homeric usage’ (*οὐχ Ὀμηρικῶς*) is fairly small. This is even more striking because a linguistic use not in line with Homeric idiolect seems a much more objective criterion than, for example, the idea that a line is ‘superfluous’ or ‘unsuitable’ or ‘unconvincing’. Similarly, even among the atheteseis due to internal contradictions, there are

113. See especially Chapter 3.2.B and Chapter 3.3.A.

114. Both cases are discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 4.4.

115. Cf. Kirk 1990, 61; Matthaios 1999, 476–477 (fr. 123).

116. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 4.117a (but cf. Lehrs 1882, 64–65); 7.475a.c.

117. The atheteseis of *Il.* 24.476 and *Od.* 7.174 are both due to the fact that tables were not removed while diners were still sitting, and this does not happen in these two scenes; see *Sch. Il.* 24.476a (ex. [Ariston.]) and *Sch. HPQT Od.* 7.174, discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.3. On the contrary, calling a Greek *λινόθωρηξ*, ‘with a linen corselet’, which is against the usual habit of the Greek army, as the Achaeans have bronze corselets, is only one among other reasons for the athetesis of *Il.* 2.529–530 (*Sch. Il.* 2.529–30; see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.1).

many cases which could be easily resolved if Aristarchus had a more flexible attitude. An incorrect use of the Homeric lexicon (or syntax) or the presence of unusual habits in the heroic world, on the other hand, sounds like a more robust reason to reject lines. We can only speculate as to why Aristarchus seems to have preferred those more subjective criteria. For a non-Homeric usage, which normally did not involve more than a few words and often only one, his first step may have been either an 'alternative' exegesis or emendation, not athetesis. In fact, as was discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11, Aristarchus employed the 'trope' of catachresis to 'excuse' Homeric mistakes in vocabulary by labeling them as a specific stylistic choice. This was probably the path that he often followed when he found a linguistic oddity. His own method favored it. Since he usually did not use any external proof aside from the Homeric usage itself to determine whether a word or syntactic construction was allowed (following the principle of 'clarifying Homer from Homer himself'), Aristarchus was his own master in deciding whether or not to accept an 'odd' linguistic use, as he could excuse it by claiming that it was a trope or a figure.

Something similar might be occurring with mistakes in the depiction of the Homeric world. Given Aristarchus' method, it was difficult to prove that a habit was against the usages of the Homeric society. In fact, since, as Chapter 3.3.B has shown, Aristarchus deduced the practices of the Homeric society from the text itself, rejections due to non-Homeric customs also became a question of internal consistency, thus collapsing into the strong criterion analyzed in § 4.1.¹¹⁸ By the same token, because he did not use any external evidence to establish what was typical of Homeric society, then any habit could be in principle accepted as 'Homeric' if Aristarchus were willing to accept it.¹¹⁹ This is exactly what he did with linguistic catachresis, which allowed him to overlook the many linguistic oddities of the Homeric idiolect.

5. Additional Reasons to Suspect Lines

The review of atheteseis justified by a single reason has shown what criteria were alone sufficient to make Aristarchus suspicious of a line. In many atheteseis, however, additional reasons are provided. These other reasons do not seem to have been sufficient to demand an athetesis by themselves, but were combined with other arguments.

118. So this is the case with the athetesis of *Il.* 7.334–335 (*Sch. Il.* 4.174; 7.334–5). The reason is a non-Homeric habit in funerary practices (deduced from other passages in Homer), but Aristarchus also notices a contradiction with what is said right after those lines; see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.6.

119. Indeed, this is what happens in *Sch. Il.* 24.476a (ex. [Ariston.]), where a possible explanation is given for why the typical Homeric dining practices are not respected; see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.3.

5.1. ‘Prosaic’ or ‘Cheap’ Composition

Stylistic elements like composition (σύνθεσις or κατασκευή) seem to have been a less compelling reason for athetesis, since most scholia discussing an athetesis due to style also report another justification.¹²⁰ Some lines are athetized because they are ‘fairly prosaic’ (πεζότεροι), but also show additional problems: a linguistic misuse (*Sch. Il.* 2.252a: πεζότεροι τῇ συνθέσει καὶ τὸ ἥσαι οὐ κυρίως),¹²¹ ‘frigid’ content and a grammatical mistake (*Sch. Il.* 3.432: πεζότεροί εἰσι καὶ τοῖς νοήμασι ψυχροὶ καὶ ἀκατάλληλοι),¹²² or unfitting thoughts (*Sch. Il.* 9.688–92a).¹²³ Otherwise, the composition can be bad and the lines can also contain a linguistic misuse, on top of being ‘superfluous’ (*Sch. Il.* 19.94a: περισσὸς καὶ κακοσύνθετος . . . οὐχ ὕγιως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον τέτακται).¹²⁴ In other instances, the style is defined ‘cheap’ (εὐτελής), but other reasons are also given for the athetesis: the lines are also unfitting to the character (*Sch. Il.* 8.164–6a: εὐτελεῖς εἰσι τῇ κατασκευῇ . . . ἀνάρμοστα δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα τοῖς προσώποις); they are also cheap in content (*Sch. Il.* 1.133–4: εὐτελεῖς τῇ συνθέσει καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ μὴ ἀρμόζοντες Ἀγαμέμνονι); they also contain a contradiction within the context (*Sch. Il.* 15.712a: ὅτι εὐτελής ὁ στίχος καὶ <ή> ιδιότης τῆς μάχης οὐ σώζεται).¹²⁵

While it is relatively easy to understand why a line is unsuited to a character or why it contradicts something else in the poem, it is harder to figure out what Aristarchus meant by ‘cheap’ or ‘prosaic’ style in the absence of a more detailed explanation. Nonetheless, it seems clear that stylistic blunders alone were not reason enough to reject a line.

5.2. Tautologies

As discussed above (§ 4.4), one of the reasons to reject ‘unnecessary’ lines was that they repeated information which was already known, using recapping (as in *Sch. Il.* 1.96 and *Sch. Il.* 13.350) or even identical words (as in *Sch. Il.* 8.528).

120. On atheteseis due to ‘cheap’ composition, cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 27–28.

121. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 453–454. These lines (*Il.* 2.252–256) also contain an inconsistency; cf. Lührs 1992, 144 n. 449.

122. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 388, who concludes: “I do not think I misrepresent matters, when saying that the ψυχρότης must not be ascribed to the poet but to his sagacious critic”.

123. The scholium in the *Venetus A* reads: ὅτι †καὶ νεώτεροι† τοῖς νοήμασι (which Lehrs, quoted by Erbse, ad loc., corrected to κοινότεροι). Richard Janko convincingly suggests καινότεροι. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 450–451.

124. Cf. Roemer 1912, 137–139; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 449; Lührs 1992, 64–67.

125. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.712b (ex. [Ariston. + ex.]) and discussion in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.4. For another case of athetesis due to bad composition as well as to an inconsistency, see *Sch. Il.* 22.199–201a, discussed in Chapter 3.6.A § 5 and Chapter 3.6.C § 5.

A different form of repetition is tautology, which involves repeating the *same idea* using *different words*. The Alexandrians seem to have been particularly sensitive to tautologies, as apparently both Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus employed distinctive signs to mark them, even if it is difficult to determine what these signs were (*antisigma* and *stigma*?) and how they were used.¹²⁶ The very fact that there was a sign (or signs, whatever their shapes were) exclusively dedicated to tautologies means that the latter were not automatically athetized, because they were not marked with *obeloi*. Their presence was signaled, but not all tautologies deserved athetesis.

Yet, while tautology was not a strong reason per se, it made Aristarchus suspicious. But in order to athetize tautological lines he also found other, often more serious reasons. For example, he rejects *Il.* 10.51–52 because they are a repetition of *Il.* 10.49 (with recapping of identical words)¹²⁷ and also because line 52 contains a tautology, as *δηθά* and *δολιχόν* both mean 'for a long time' (*Sch. Il.* 10.51–2a¹: ὅτι παλιλλογεῖ ταῦτα—δι' ἄλλων γὰρ προεῖρηται [i.e., l. 49] . . . καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ ταῦτόν φέρει 'δηθά' καὶ 'δολιχόν').¹²⁸

Another example is the athetesis of *Il.* 16.261, in a simile where Homer compares the Myrmidons marching out to battle under Patroclus' leadership to wasps stirred up by boys: 'at once they came out similar to wasps / that have nests on the road (*εἰνοδίους*) and that boys irritate (*ἐριδμαίνωσιν*) as is their custom (*ἔθοντες*), / always (*αἰεὶ*) provoking (*κερτομέοντες*) them who have their nests on the street (*ὁδῷ ἔπι οἰκί' ἔχοντας*)' (*Il.* 16.259–261). Aristarchus athetizes the last line for the following reasons:

Sch. Il. 16.261a αἰεὶ κερτομέοντες <ὁδῷ ἔπι οἰκί' ἔχοντας>: ἀθετεῖται, <ὅτι> τὸ κερτομεῖν οὐ τίθησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ δι' ἔργων ἐρεθίζειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ λόγων. καὶ ὅτι διὰ τοῦ προειρημένου στίχου (*Il.* 16.260) ταῦτόν εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ 'εἰνοδίους' (*Il.* 16.260) ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ 'ὁδῷ ἔπι οἰκί' ἔχοντας', καὶ τὸ 'ἐριδμαίνωσιν' (*Il.* 16.260) τῷ 'κερτομέοντες', καὶ τῷ 'αἰεὶ' τὸ 'ἔθοντες' (*Il.* 16.260), ἐξ ἔθους συνεχῶς ἐπιφοιτῶντες.

126. See Schironi 2017.

127. *Il.* 10.49–52: ὅσσ' Ἐκτωρ ἔρρεξε Διὶ φίλος υἱας Ἀχαιῶν / αὐτως, οὔτε θεᾶς υἱὸς φίλος οὔτε θεοῖο. / ἔργα δ' ἔρεξ' ὅσα φημὶ μελησέμεν Ἀργείοισι / δηθά τε καὶ δολιχόν· τόσα γὰρ κακὰ μῆσατ' Ἀχαιοῦς [so many things Hector, dear to Zeus, did to the sons of the Achaeans / just as he is, [he who is] not a dear son of a god or a goddess; / deeds he did which I say will weigh on the soul of the Argives / for a long time and at length; for so many evils he wrought against the Achaeans]. I have underlined the lines which Aristarchus athetized; in bold I have marked the recapping words in the Greek text.

128. See also *Sch. Il.* 10.51–2a². Lührs 1992, 113–115, discussing this athetesis, also remarks (114) that tautologies per se were not a problem for Aristarchus. Cf. also Roemer 1912, 53–54, 182; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 470–471.

‘Always provoking them who have their nests on the street’: [the line] is athetized because he does not use κερτομεῖν for ‘to provoke with actions’, but ‘with words’. And because the same is said in the preceding line (*Il.* 16.260): for ‘that have nests on the road (εἰνοδίοις)’ is the same as ‘who have their nests on the street (ὁδῷ ἐπὶ οἰκί’ ἔχοντας)’, and ‘they irritate (ἐριδμαίνωσιν)’ is the same as ‘provoking (κερτομέοντες)’, and ‘always (αἰεὶ)’ is the same as ‘as is their custom (ἔθοντες)’, [that is], ‘coming continually [to provoke wasps] as is their habit’.¹²⁹

Lines 260 and 261 are tautological because they use synonymous words to say the same thing (ταὐτὸν εἶρηται). Indeed, line 261 simply adds two circumstantial participles, one referring to the boys (κερτομέοντες) and the other to the wasps (ὁδῷ ἐπὶ οἰκί’ ἔχοντας), but does not contain any important syntactic element for the sentence and simply repeats the previous line. Since being tautological is not a sufficient reason for rejection, Aristarchus finds an additional argument: a linguistic misuse, because κερτομεῖν in Homer does not mean ‘to provoke with actions’ but ‘to provoke with words’, a meaning which does not apply to wasps as they presumably do not understand human language. Thus Aristarchus rejects line 261 and keeps 260 which has the same idea but says it better (*Sch. Il.* 16.260a: ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν διάνοιαν ἔχει τῷ ἑξῆς καὶ ὑγιέστερον εἶρηται).¹³⁰

We can conclude that when he could not find another reason to reject a tautological line,¹³¹ Aristarchus would keep it; he could either mark these tautologies with *antisigma* and *stigma*, when the tautology concerned entire lines and phrases,¹³² or, if the tautology involved only a couple of words, consider them a trope—the use of similar words ‘side by side’ (ἐκ παραλλήλου) or ‘resumption’ (ἐπανάληψις), which, as we saw, could also concern different words with the same meaning.¹³³

129. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.261b (Did.) and 16.261c (ex. [Ariston.]): ἀθετεῖται διὰ τὴν ταὐτολογίαν.

130. According to Lührs 1992, 92–94, this is a case of a superfluous line with content-based supplement. It is no doubt correct that line 161 is a gloss of line 160; yet the reason given in the scholium is that it is a tautology, while the note does not define the line as being ‘superfluous’ (περισσός)—even though of course it is, but this is so because by default a tautology is unnecessary. This is why I have placed this case in a different category than Lührs. Cf. also Lehrs 1882, 114; Roemer 1912, 181; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 448–449.

131. An athetesis due to a tautology and some other reasons is also discussed in *Sch. Il.* 7.295a (where ἔτας καὶ ἑταίρους, ‘relatives and companions’, is defined as a διλογία). The athetesis of *Il.* 14.500 in the scholia (*Sch. Il.* 14.500 with also *Sch. Il.* 14.499b; 14.499–500a¹ [Hrd.]) is justified only because of its tautological and unnecessary content; yet Aristarchus also objects against the misuse of the verb φράζειν to mean ‘to speak’ in that line; see Ap. Soph. 165.7–10 and Eust. 999.25–27 (ad *Il.* 14.499–500). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 84–86; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 444–445; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 14.500; Lührs 1992, 86–90; Janko 1994, 222; van Thiel 2014a, I 65–66, II 499 and 517.

132. See Schironi 2017, 613–614.

133. See Chapter 3.2.A § 9 and § 10.

5.3. Repeated Lines

Aristarchus used a special sign to note repeated identical lines in Homer, the *asteriskos* (*), which he combined with the *obelos* (*—) when he thought that the repeated lines (στίχοι διαφορούμενοι) had to be athetized.¹³⁴ As with tautologies, the fact that he used a dedicated critical sign to signal repeated lines implies that he did not necessarily athetize them qua repeated. Homeric poetry, being formulaic, is full of repetitions, especially if we also regard lines that are similar but not identical as repetitions—for instance, lines with only a hemistich in common or lines that present many identical words but have a change of person. Indeed, even if most cases that he discussed involve real repetitions, i.e., lines that were totally identical, sometimes Aristarchus considered lines that were very similar but not identical 'repetitions', such as when the grammatical person changed (for example, in reported speeches) or when some words in the line were different.¹³⁵ In addition, together with repeated lines, he included lines that were neither identical nor even similar, as long as they were grouped with others that were indeed repeated from somewhere else, forming a closely connected cluster.¹³⁶ Furthermore, the concept of repetition concerned both Homeric poems, because he saw them as a single poetic unit; thus, a line occurring once in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey* was a 'repeated' line.¹³⁷

With rare exceptions, scholia indicate that lines are repeated from elsewhere at each occurrence of those lines, even in cases of multiple repetitions. This demonstrates the 'encyclopedic' and comprehensive nature of Aristarchus' work and also the care with which his fragments have been preserved by excerptors and scholiasts over the centuries. This impression is confirmed when we look at the *Venetus A*, which most often preserves *asteriskoi* correctly in the passages where Aristarchus kept the repeated lines, and *asteriskoi* and *obeloi* in those passages which he athetized. In some cases, no scholium alerts us to the athetesis, but *obeloi* in the manuscript still confirm that the lines are rejected (e.g., the athetesis of *Il.* 1.372–379, lines repeated from *Il.* 1.13–16 and 22–25).¹³⁸

134. Aristophanes of Byzantium was the first to use the *asteriskos* for repeated lines; see Chapter 2.1 § 1.

135. E.g., *Il.* 1.195–196 ≅ 1.208–209 (*Sch. Il.* 1.195–6a; 1.208–9; cf. Lührs 1992, 253–254); *Il.* 1.405 ≅ 5.906 (*Sch. Il.* 1.405a; 5.906a; cf. Lührs 1992, 187–189); *Il.* 4.195–197 ≅ 4.205–207 (*Sch. Il.* 4.195a; 4.205a; cf. Meijering 1987, 173; Lührs 1992, 245–246); *Il.* 15.166–167 ≅ 15.182–183 (*Sch. Il.* 15.166–7a; 15.182–3a; this example is discussed below); *Il.* 20.128 ≅ 24.210 (*Sch. Il.* 20.125–8a; 24.210).

136. For example, Aristarchus athetizes *Il.* 15.449–451 because the lines are repeated from *Iliad* 17 (*Sch. Il.* 15.449–51a), but only the first two lines are repeated (*Il.* 15.449–550 = 17.291–292); in the same way he athetizes *Il.* 20.195–198 repeated from *Il.* 17.29–32 (*Sch. Il.* 17.29–32; 20.195–8a¹²), but *Il.* 20.195 ≠ 17.29, *Il.* 20.196 ≅ 17.30, and *Il.* 20.197–198 = 17.31–32.

137. See Chapter 5.2 § 3.3.

138. In fact, Aristarchus athetizes the entire block of lines 366–392, in which Achilles tells Thetis

The category of repeated lines has been already studied by Lührs.¹³⁹ He rightly notes that that repeated lines were suspicious to the Alexandrians because they were the easiest way for an interpolator to add lines in the poem—using ‘real’ Homeric lines instead of composing new ones. Even so, Aristarchus always looked for other, stronger reasons to athetize a repeated line. Through a very detailed review, Lührs isolates two main reasons used by Aristarchus to support an athetesis of repeated lines:¹⁴⁰

1. The repeated lines presented a logical contradiction or were inconsistent with the context.
2. The repeated lines were not particularly objectionable in themselves, but when compared with the other place(s) where they recurred, the comparison showed their ‘quotation-like’ nature, because the lines to be athetized did not seem as appropriate in their context as in the ‘original’ passage(s).¹⁴¹

On the other hand, Aristarchus kept formulaic lines when they were not in obvious conflict with the context or had no function.¹⁴² Lührs concludes that Aristarchus did not reject repeated lines by default—even if he did not like them.¹⁴³ Even in the case of repeated lines which seemed not to fit in a specific context, he rejected them only if he found an additional, stronger reason.

Without necessarily agreeing with Lührs’ strict division into these two

about his quarrel with Agamemnon (which is not necessary since Thetis knows about it, as Achilles says at line 365). The athetesis of lines 366–392 is signaled by the *obeloi* in the *Venetus A* as well as by *Sch. Il.* 1.365a (ὅτι παλιλλογεῖν παρήτηται. ἀλλότριοι ἄρα οἱ ἐπιφερόμενοι στίχοι εἴκοσι ἑπτὰ). The *asteriskoi*, on the other hand, are present only for lines 372–379, which in this block of athetized lines are the only ones which are repeated (from *Il.* 1.13–16 and 22–25). Only *Sch. Il.* 1.13–16 mentions the transposition (to *Il.* 372–375); the other scholia are missing (cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 1.22, 1.365, 1.372, and 1.376). Cf. Roemer 1912, 286–289; Kirk 1985, 91–93; Lührs 1992, 123–129; van Thiel 2014a, I 48–49 and 116.

139. Lührs 1992, 149–270; cf. also Lehrs 1882, 336–337; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 20; Roemer 1912, 245–278; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 455–465.

140. Lührs 1992, 262, 270–271.

141. Thus, Lührs 1992, 208 and 217, rightly wonders what Aristarchus might have done if those repeated lines were not repeated in another place in which they fit better; perhaps, had they not been present in another, more suitable place, the lines might not have been athetized.

142. In this, Lührs 1992, 262, objects to Schenkeveld 1970, 171, who maintained that repeated lines without any function were suspicious to Aristarchus. Indeed, just like Lührs, I have not found any athetesis of repeated lines justified by the sole reason that they are ‘superfluous’ (περισσοί) or have no function.

143. Lührs 1992, 254–260, suggests that Aristarchus labeled repeated lines which he did not like as κυκλική κατάχρησις, namely, ‘misuse worthy of the cyclic poets’, and that this was a criticism of Homer. On this label and formulaic repetition, see Chapter 3.6.C, footnote 14, and Chapter 5.3, footnote 264.

categories,¹⁴⁴ I concur that repetition in itself was not a sufficient reason for athetesis. A scholar like Aristarchus must have realized that Homeric poetry is repetitive and respected this peculiarity of Homer's poems. Indeed, had Aristarchus been so opposed to repetitions as defined above (i.e., not only identical repetitions, and repetitions across both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*), he would probably have had to athetize ample portions of the *Iliad* (and of the *Odyssey*)—which would have been out of the question.¹⁴⁵ He was thus not against repeated lines per se, as is proved by the cases where a group of lines is repeated and he athetizes only some of them. For example, he athetizes *Il.* 9.23–25 (= *Il.* 2.116–118),¹⁴⁶ but keeps *Il.* 9.17 ($\cong$ *Il.* 2.110) and *Il.* 9.18–22 (= *Il.* 2.111–115), and also *Il.* 9.26–31 (= *Il.* 2.139–141 and *Il.* 9.693, 695–696). In fact, he criticizes Zenodotus for eliminating the entire block of *Il.* 9.23–31, just because the lines were repeated:

Sch. Il. 9.26–31 ἀλλ' ἄγεθ'—ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος ἤρκε τοὺς στίχους πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τοῦ κατ' ἄλλους τόπους φέρεσθαι. τοιοῦτος δέ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν διαφορουμένων.

'But come on . . . [at length then spoke] Diomedes, good [at the war cry]': because Zenodotus eliminated these lines according to no necessity, but because they are transmitted in other places. He is like that with repeated [lines].¹⁴⁷

Aristarchus accuses Zenodotus of being opposed to repeated lines *as such*, which implies that for Aristarchus repeated lines must be athetized only if they are also problematic in other respects. Even if Zenodotus, too, probably had other reasons to delete those lines,¹⁴⁸ which Aristarchus could not recover,¹⁴⁹ the latter certainly did not reject repeated lines by default, as Lührs has shown. In fact, if the repeated verses contained a serious problem, such as an inconsistency or a flaw that violated the principles of good poetry, Aristarchus athetized

144. In fact, Lührs, too, is aware that the two categories are not always clearly distinguishable; see Lührs 1992, 263.

145. For a list of repetitions in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (both totally and partly identical lines), see Strasser 1984, 84–138.

146. See *Sch. Il.* 2.116–8; 9.23–5b. Cf. Roemer 1912, 268; Lührs 1992, 189–190.

147. According to Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 9.23–5a), lines 23–25 (i.e., those athetized by Aristarchus) were missing in Zenodotus' text. On the wording of *Sch. Il.* 9.26–31 (Ζηνόδοτος ἤρκε τοὺς στίχους) and deletion of lines by Zenodotus, see Chapter 4 § 1.6.

148. Cf. Nickau 1977, 24–25, 62–72; van Thiel 2014a, II 80. According to Nickau 1977, 62 and 103, Zenodotus, too, was cautious with repeated lines—in fact, even more cautious than Aristarchus, especially with *formulae*; on this point see, however, Lehrs 1882, 336–337, and Lührs 1992, 150–152, 265.

149. See Chapter 4 § 1.1.

them wherever they recurred, simply because they did not accord with the greatness of Homer as an artist. This happens with *Il.* 12.350 = 363, an identical line athetized at both places where it only occurs because it is unbelievable (*Sch. Il.* 12.350a; 12.363), as we saw above (§ 4.3).

As Lührs notes, Aristarchus was very skeptical when an entire block of verses was repeated in speeches (e.g., messenger's speeches), within the same scene, and the repeated lines fit one situation, but not the other(s).¹⁵⁰ For example, when in Book 8 Zeus summons Iris and orders her to tell Athena and Hera to stop helping the Greeks, he says (*Il.* 8.406–408) 'so that the goddess with shining eyes will know what it is to fight against her father. But I am not so angry or enraged against Hera, because she is always accustomed to frustrate whatever I say'. These lines are appropriate, as they describe Zeus' frustration with his rebellious daughter and his obstinate wife. When Iris repeats the same message to the two goddesses, not only does she use the same three lines (*Il.* 8.420–422), but she even adds two additional and even stronger lines against Athena (*Il.* 8.423–424): 'but you are a terrible, impudent bitch, if truly you dare to raise your huge spear against Zeus'. Aristarchus athetizes these five lines because they are fitting for the character of Zeus but not for Iris (*Sch. Il.* 8.406–8: ὅτι τῷ τοῦ Διὸς προσώπῳ ἀρμόζουσιν οἱ λόγοι, τῷ δὲ τῆς Ἰριδος οὐκέτι). In particular, she could never say κύνον ἀδεές ('impudent bitch') to Athena, who is far superior to her (*Sch. Il.* 8.420–4a).¹⁵¹ The same problem occurs in *Il.* 15.166–167 (≅ *Il.* 15.182–183), when Zeus wants Poseidon to stop helping the Greeks. Zeus commands Iris to tell Poseidon that he should obey: 'I say that I am much stronger in might / and I am older by birth; but his heart does not hesitate / to say that he is equal to me, and the others hate him' (*Il.* 165–167). Aristarchus athetizes lines 166–167 for the following reasons:

Sch. Il. 15.166–7a καὶ γενεῇ πρότερος <—καὶ ἄλλοι>: ἀθετοῦνται ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ἀστερίσκοι παράκεινται, ὅτι τοὺς ὕστερον (*Il.* 15.182–183) λεγομένους ὑπὸ τῆς Ἰριδος δι' ἐπιείκειαν ἐνθάδε τις μετενήνοχεν· ἀναρμόστως γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς, ὥσπερ δεδοικῶς καὶ συλλυθῆναι βουλόμενος, 'εἰξάτω μοι', φησί, 'καθόσον εἰμι προγενέστερος'. τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τῶν δεομένων· 'καὶ μοι ὑποστήτω, ὅσ<σ>ον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι / ἢδ' ὅσ<σ>ον γενεῇ προγενέστερος' (*Il.* 9.160–161).

'And [I am] older by birth—and the others [hate him]': both lines are athetized, and *asteriskoi* are put next to them, because someone has transferred

150. Cf. Lührs 1992, 237–254.

151. Cf. Roemer 1912, 275–276, 379; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 407; Lührs 1992, 238–240, 244–245; West 2001, 203. In fact, Aristarchus' athetesis of lines 423–424, which are not repeated anywhere, proves that the main problem in *Il.* 8.420–424 was their unfittingness in Iris' speech, not their being repeated from Zeus' words.

here the lines said by Iris later on (*Il.* 15.182–183) because she wants to be fair [to Poseidon]; [they are athetized here] for it is not fitting that Zeus says: 'he must obey me because I am older', as if he were afraid and wanted to come to a settlement. For these words are typical of those who beg [as in]: 'let him submit himself to me, as much as I am more kingly and also as much as [I claim to be] much older in birth' (*Il.* 9.160–161).

For Aristarchus it is not fitting (ἀναρμόστως) for Zeus to mention that he is the elder because it makes it sound as if he fears Poseidon and is begging him. Interestingly, the 'negative' example that he provides is Agamemnon, who in Book 9, after listing all the gifts he is offering to Achilles, concludes (*Il.* 9.160–161): 'let him submit himself to me, as much as I am more kingly and also as much as I claim to be much older in birth'. But Zeus has a higher status than Agamemnon; while the king can humiliate himself, the god cannot. Rather, these words are appropriate when used by Iris at *Il.* 15.182–183 (*Sch. Il.* 15.182–3a): she wants to be polite to Poseidon and less confrontational than Zeus. Thus, she needs to smooth the words of Zeus, who speaks only in terms of power:¹⁵² Zeus—she adds very diplomatically—is also older, and so Poseidon should obey him.¹⁵³

In addition, identical lines placed in the mouth of the different characters in unrelated episodes and in totally different contexts could stir Aristarchus' suspicions. For example, Iris (again!) can say that she is a messenger of Zeus, 'who, though so far away, is very much concerned about you and feels pity', to Priam in *Il.* 24.174, when she instructs the desperate old king to go to Achilles and ransom Hector. The same words about Zeus' care, on the other hand, do not fit in Book 2, when the Dream appears to Agamemnon (*Il.* 2.27) and when Agamemnon repeats them to his army (*Il.* 2.64). Here Zeus cannot have any pity for Agamemnon—in fact, the god is tricking Agamemnon into action with a deceiving Dream; furthermore, the Dream itself scolds the king because he is sleeping rather than taking action (*Il.* 23–26). Therefore, Aristarchus keeps the line only in Book 24 and athetizes the two occurrences in Book 2 (*Sch. Il.* 2.27a; 2.64; 24.174a^{1,2}).¹⁵⁴

152. For in Aristarchus' version, Zeus' speech is now limited to line 165: 'I say that I am much stronger in might'.

153. Aristarchus finds additional proof that lines 166–167 are not original in Iris' words to Poseidon. When replying to Poseidon, who resists Zeus' orders, Iris adds that the Erinyes always obey the elder-born (l. 204); Poseidon recognizes that she has spoken well, because a messenger knows what is good to say (*Il.* 205–206). Hence Aristarchus concludes (*Sch. Il.* 15.204a): ὅτι τοῦτο παρ' ἑαυτῆς προσέθηκεν ἡ Ἴρις καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω οὖν οὐχ ὑπὸ Διὸς εἴρηται 'καὶ γενεῇ πρότερος' (*Il.* 15.166) [because Iris added this on her own and the lines above 'I am older by birth' (*Il.* 15.166) are not spoken by Zeus]. Cf. Roemer 1912, 378–380; Lührs 1992, 241–245.

154. Cf. Roemer 1912, 262–263; Lührs 1992, 204–205. Similar atheteseis of repeated lines in different speeches and in different situations are those of *Il.* 9.23–25 (= *Il.* 2.116–118), discussed in

Repetitions also occur in the narrative context. For example, similes can be repeated and can better fit one passage than another, as with the athetesis of *Il.* 8.557–558 (= *Il.* 16.299–300), analyzed in Chapter 3.2.A § 4. Another revealing example is the athetesis of *Il.* 15.265–268 (= *Il.* 6.508–511). Homer twice uses a famous simile in which he compares Paris (in *Il.* 6.506–511) and Hector (in *Il.* 15.263–268) rushing back to the battlefield to a beautiful horse: ‘just as when a stabled horse, well-fed at the manger, / breaks what ties him and runs galloping over the plain / —he is used to wash his body in the fair-flowing river— / he is exultant; he keeps his head high, and his mane / is shaken on his shoulders; he is confident in his magnificence, / and his knees nimbly bring him to the places and pastures of horses.’ According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 15.265a), such a simile is more fitting for Paris than Hector because the reference to beauty is more suited to someone who has been idle all day (like Paris who, after being scolded by Hector, finally goes back to battle in Book 6), rather than to a soldier who has been fighting bravely and has even been hit (like Hector who, after being struck with a huge stone by Ajax in the previous book, is urged by Apollo to rejoin the battle). Moreover, the joyous mood of the horse does not fit Hector, who has just recovered from fainting. Yet Aristarchus does not athetize the entire group of repeated lines in Book 15; rather, he athetizes *Il.* 15.265–268 (= *Il.* 6.508–511) but keeps *Il.* 15.263–264 (= *Il.* 6.506–507), because the first two lines of the simile (‘just as when a stabled horse, well-fed at the manger, / breaks what ties him and runs galloping over the plain’) are necessary.¹⁵⁵ In fact, they are correlated to what follows at lines 269–270, where Homer says: ‘so (ὥς) Hector moved his feet and knees nimbly, urging his charioteers, because he had heard the voice of the god.’ The ὥς at line 269 makes a simile necessary (*Sch. Il.* 15.265a: τοὺς μέντοι προκειμένους τῶν ἡθετημένων δύο στίχους δεῖ μένειν, πρὸς οὓς καὶ ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις γίνεται). Thus, Aristarchus cannot eliminate the horse simile completely, but shortens it enough so that the horse to whom Hector is compared is not as beautiful or particularly energetic.¹⁵⁶ No matter how we judge Aristarchus’ lack of sensitivity for oral stock imagery, this operation is sophisticated and shows his constant attempt to adapt the lines to their context.

Sch. Il. 2.116–8; 9.23–5b (cf. Lührs 1992, 189–190), and of *Il.* 20.195–198 (≅ *Il.* 17.29–32), discussed in *Sch. Il.* 17.29–32; 20.195–8a^{1,2} (cf. Lührs 1992, 191–194; see Chapter 5.4 § 1).

155. See also *Sch. Il.* 6.506–11a^{1,2} and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 15.265b.

156. Thus, his text reads as follows: ὥς δ’ ὅτε τις στατὸς ἵππος ἀκοστήσας ἐπὶ φάτνῃ / δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας θείῃ πεδίοιο κροαίνων (*Il.* 263–264) / ὥς Ἑκτωρ λαιψηρὰ πόδας καὶ γούνατ’ ἐνώμα / ὀτρύνων ἱππῆας, ἐπεὶ θεοῦ ἔκλυεν αὐδὴν (*Il.* 269–270) [just as when a stabled horse, well-fed at the manger, / breaks what ties him and runs galloping over the plain / so Hector moved his feet and knees nimbly, urging his charioteers, because he had heard the voice of the god]. For an in-depth analysis of this athetesis, see Lührs 1992, 213–219; cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 14; Roemer 1912, 246–248; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 462–463; Nickau 1977, 118–119; Janko 1994, 256; West 2001, 231–232.

Finally, one last example concerns a longer passage, *Il.* 8.28–40, which Aristarchus athetizes because it consists of lines transferred from other places (*Sch. Il.* 8.28: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τρεῖς καὶ δέκα, ὅτι ἐξ ἄλλων τόπων μετάκεινται).¹⁵⁷ Indeed, these thirteen lines contain many repetitions (more or less approximate) from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.¹⁵⁸ They appear at the start of Book 8, after Zeus has forbidden the other gods to help either the Greeks or the Trojans, lest they suffer terrible punishments. The gods remain silent at Zeus' words (*Il.* 28–29), but eventually Athena speaks and tells Zeus that they pity the Greeks, and so, even if they refrain from helping them openly, they will give them advice (*Il.* 30–37). Zeus then smiles and agrees to Athena's request (*Il.* 38–40).¹⁵⁹ Lührs mentions this one as the only athetesis justified simply because the lines are repeated.¹⁶⁰ Here too, however, Aristarchus provides further reasons for rejecting these lines. Aside from a linguistic misuse in line 31 (*Sch. Il.* 8.28; 8.37a),¹⁶¹ he finds an inconsistency: Zeus' warm reply to Athena at lines 39–40 ('take courage, Tritogeneia, my dear daughter. I am not speaking with my earnest mind, I want to be kind to you') contradicts what he just said at the beginning of the assembly, when he threatened all the gods with dire punishment if they disobeyed him (*Sch. Il.* 8.39–40: ἐναντιοῦνται δὲ ἐνθάδε τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις).¹⁶² The linguistic mistake and the internal inconsistency

157. See also *Sch. Il.* 8.32–4; 8.463–5, both of which simply note the repetition of these three lines only (*Il.* 8.32–34 ≡ 8.463–465; see next footnote).

158. *Il.* 8. 28 = *Il.* 3.95, 7.92, 7.398, 9.29, 9.430, 9.693, etc.; *Il.* 8.29 = *Il.* 9.694, ≡ 9.431; *Il.* 8.30 ≡ *Od.* 3.330; *Il.* 8.31 = *Od.* 1.45, 1.81, 24.473; *Il.* 8.32 ≡ *Il.* 8.463; *Il.* 8.33 = *Il.* 8.464; *Il.* 8.34 = *Il.* 8.465; *Il.* 8.35 ≡ *Il.* 8.466; *Il.* 8.36 = *Il.* 8.467; *Il.* 8.37 = *Il.* 8.468; *Il.* 8.38 ≡ *Il.* 4.356, 10.400 + 1.511, 1.517, 1.560, 4.30, etc.; *Il.* 8.39 = *Il.* 22.183; *Il.* 8.40 = *Il.* 22.184.

159. *Il.* 8.28–40: so he spoke, and they all became silent and quiet, wondering at his words; for he had spoken in very stern terms. Finally the goddess Athena with gleaming eyes spoke among them: 'Father of all us, son of Cronus, supreme among the lords, we too know that your might is unyielding. But even so, we take pity on the Danaan spearmen, who will die fulfilling an evil fate. Still, we will stay away from the battle, as you order; but we will give advice to the Argives, which will be useful, so that they may not all die because you are angry.' Smiling, the cloud-gatherer Zeus answered her: 'Take courage, Tritogeneia, my dear daughter. I am not speaking with my earnest mind, I want to be kind to you.'

160. Lührs 1992, 152–154, 166.

161. The possessive τεοῖο is wrongly used in the sense of the personal pronoun σοῦ in line 37; cf. Matthaios 1999, 480–481 (fr. 126). This mistake is of course found also in *Il.* 8.468, the other occurrence of the line. We do not know what Aristarchus did with it since there are no scholia to *Il.* 8.468; however, *Il.* 8.466–468 are missing in the vulgate and in two papyri (see West, ad loc.). So perhaps Aristarchus did not read them. If so, then, *Il.* 8.35–37 (≡ 8.466–468) were not repeated lines themselves, but belonged to a group of repeated lines (*Il.* 8.28–40). A recent scholium in *Brit. Mus. Harl. 1771* says that *Il.* 8.466–468 were athetized in some copies (see Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 8.466–8).

162. As Aristarchus notes, Zeus' gentle words at lines 39–40, repeated from *Il.* 22.183–184, suit the scene in Book 22, when Athena asks his permission to help Achilles after Zeus' scales have decided the fate of Hector; however, they do not fit in Book 8, because Zeus is angry there (*Sch. Il.* 22.183–4a²: μετηνέχθη<σαν> ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν θεῶν· καὶ εἰσιν ἐνταῦθα οἰκειότεροι· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὀργίζεται; see also *Sch. Il.* 22.183–4a¹).

are thus the two additional problems at the basis of the athetesis. Yet, if Zeus' smooth reply to Athena (ll. 39–40) is rejected, Athena's first reaction to Zeus' orders (ll. 30–37) must also be removed because otherwise she would object to his strong command and, oddly, Zeus would simply go away (as he does at lines 41–47) without replying. This would entail very peculiar and inconsistent behavior on Zeus' part if he is as enraged as his harsh words at lines 5–27 suggest. In this example, then, even if the repetitive nature of such a long passage probably attracted Aristarchus' attention, the reason why he athetized it was more complex. This case, too, confirms Lührs' rule: for all the repeated lines, Aristarchus only athetized them if he found another reason.¹⁶³

In addition, the first two lines in this block of repeated verses, which contain the gods' reaction to Zeus' harsh words (*Il.* 8.28–29: 'so he spoke, and they all became silent and quiet, / wondering at his words; for he had spoken in very stern terms'), are identical to *Il.* 9.693–694, when they refer to the Achaeans' reaction after Odysseus has reported Achilles' refusal to accept the gifts and return to battle. Interestingly enough, Aristarchus also athetizes *Il.* 9.694 (but not the preceding line) for the following reason:

Sch. Il. 9.694b μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι: ὅτι ἐξ ἄλλων τόπων ἐστὶν ὁ στίχος· νῦν γὰρ οὐχ ἀρμόζει· τότε γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐπιφωνεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου καταπληκτικά τινα προενέγκηται. νῦν δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐπὶ Ὀδυσσέως λέγοιτο τοῦ μηνύοντος τὰ ὑπ' Ἀχιλλέως εἰρημένα;

'Wondering at his words': because the line comes from other places. For here it does not fit: for it is customary to respond [with marvel] when the one in power has said something striking in his speech. But now how could this be said of Odysseus reporting Achilles' words?¹⁶⁴

In the *Iliad*, this line occurs in three slightly different forms (with the same first hemistich and variations in the second):

1. μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι· μάλα γὰρ κρατερῶς ἀγόρευσε(ν) in *Il.* 8.29 = 9.694
2. μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι· μάλα γὰρ κρατερῶς ἀπέειπεν in *Il.* 9.431
3. μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι Διομήδεος ἵπποδάμοιο in *Il.* 7.404 = 9.51 = 9.711¹⁶⁵

163. Yet for Lührs 1992, 153 n. 12, the linguistic mistake with τεοῖο at line 31 and the inconsistency at lines 39–40 are both 'Zusatzgründe'. Cf. Roemer 1912, 231–232.

164. Zenodotus did not write the line and Aristophanes athetized it; see *Sch. Il.* 9.694a^{1,2} (Did.).

165. Unfortunately, there are no scholia from Aristonicus on any of these lines, except *Sch. Il.* 9.694b, reported above, and *Sch. Il.* 7.404, which states that the lines were transferred from there to *Il.* 9.694; cf., however, Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 9.431.

According to Aristarchus, in the other places the line describes the astonishment of an audience that has just heard a striking speech by someone in a position of power. This indeed is the case in *Il.* 9.431, where the line describes the reaction of Phoenix, Odysseus, and Ajax to Achilles' strong words of refusal, and in *Il.* 7.404 = 9.51 = 9.711, which describe the reaction of the Greeks to strong and authoritative speeches by Diomedes. To some extent, this is also the case of *Il.* 8.29, where the line describes the gods' reaction to Zeus' strong words. The case of *Il.* 9.694 is different, because the speech which Odysseus delivered just before (*Il.* 9.676–692) has no particular authority or strength; it simply summarizes Achilles' reply and admits the embassy's failure. For Aristarchus, the reaction to such a speech cannot be 'awe' or 'amazement': the Greeks can perhaps fear Achilles and be sad at the outcome (and in fact he keeps line 693: 'so he spoke, and they all became silent and quiet'), but they cannot wonder at Odysseus' reports of his embassy. To conclude, the formulaic line $\mu\theta\omicron\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\sigma\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota\ \dots$ is acceptable at *Il.* 7.404, 9.51, 9.431, and 9.711 because it expresses the reaction to particularly strong speeches. It may also be in the right place at *Il.* 8.29, but the line belongs to a passage (*Il.* 8.28–40) which is problematic for other reasons, and so it must be athetized in its entirety.¹⁶⁶ Finally, it is incorrectly used in *Il.* 9.694 because it is inconsistent with its context.¹⁶⁷

6. Athetesis of Longer Passages

In the case of atheteseis covering many lines (for example, more than three) Aristarchus took particular trouble to look for more than one reason to support his decision. The several Aristonicus scholia that provide examples of these types of athetesis are considerably longer than the average, because they include many arguments so as to better support the rejection.¹⁶⁸

166. Otherwise, if only lines 28 and 30–40 were athetized and line 29 were kept, the text would be syntactically and semantically odd: 'so he spoke, and they all became silent and quiet (l. 29). / So speaking, he prepared his two bronze-hooved horses under the chariot (l. 41).'

167. See Lührs 1992, 223–224; cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 26, and van der Valk 1963–1964, II 451 (who, on the contrary, defends the line). On Aristarchus and Homeric *formulae*, see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.

168. E.g., the multiple-reason atheteseis of *Il.* 2.76–83 (*Sch. Il.* 2.76a; see also *Sch. Il.* 24.222a; cf. Lührs 1992, 144); of *Il.* 11.767–785 (*Sch. Il.* 11.767a¹²); *Il.* 12.175–180 or even *Il.* 12.175–181 (*Sch. Il.* 12.175a¹; 12.175–81a (ex. [Did.?])); see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.3); *Il.* 15.56–77 (*Sch. Il.* 15.56a; 15.63–4; 15.69; 15.71a; 15.77a; see also *Sch. Il.* 12.71; 12.115; cf. Lührs 1992, 129–132; Janko 1994, 234–235; see Chapter 3.2.A § 13, Chapter 3.3.A § 4.4, Chapter 4 § 1.5.1, and Chapter 5.2. § 2.3); *Il.* 15.212–217 (*Sch. Il.* 15.212a; cf. Janko 1994, 249–250); *Il.* 15.610–614 (*Sch. Il.* 15.610–4a; cf. Lührs 1992, 52–58; see Chapter 5.4. § 5); *Il.* 20.251–255 (*Sch. Il.* 20.251–5a¹; cf. Lührs 1992, 117–120; see Chapter 5.4 § 8); *Il.* 22.487–499 (*Sch. Il.* 22.487a); *Il.* 24.6–9 (*Sch. Il.* 24.6–9a¹; see Chapter 3.2.A § 17); *Il.* 24.25–30 (*Sch. Il.* 24.25–30 and also *Sch. Il.* 24.23 (ex.) and 24.30a (Did.)); see Chapter 5.3 § 3.1.1).

A good example of an athetesis concerning many lines and supported by different reasons is *Il.* 3.396–418. When Aphrodite saves Paris from Menelaus in Book 3, she brings him back to his palace (*Il.* 379–382). Then she goes to Helen, who is on the high wall (*Il.* 383–384), and disguised as an old woman invites her to join him (*Il.* 385–395). Helen recognizes the goddess from her beautiful features (*Il.* 396–398) and refuses to go to Paris because she feels ashamed in front of the Trojan women; if Paris is so dear to Aphrodite—she goes on—then the goddess should go to him herself (*Il.* 399–412). Aphrodite reacts with anger (*Il.* 413–417), and Helen, seized by fear, eventually obeys (*Il.* 418–420). Aristarchus athetizes the entire exchange between Helen and Aphrodite, beginning when Homer says that Helen recognizes the goddess (from l. 396 to l. 418). In this way, the syntactic connection (συνέπεια) is saved and his final version reads (*Sch. Il.* 3.395: αἰρομένων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς συνεπείας γινομένης οὕτως): ‘So she [Aphrodite] spoke, and roused (ὄρινε) [Helen’s] heart in her breast (l. 395). / She [Helen] went covering herself with her fine bright robe (l. 419), / in silence and all the Trojan women did not notice her; the goddess led her (l. 420).’¹⁶⁹ According to Aristarchus, those twenty-three lines were added by someone who did not correctly understand ὄρινε at line 395, and took it as meaning ‘she made angry’, while its real meaning is ‘she urged’; because of his misunderstanding, then, he needed to add lines that explained why Helen got angry (*Sch. Il.* 3.395: ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀκούειν ἐκ τοῦ ‘θυμὸν ὄρινεν’ ἐθύμωσεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρώρμησεν· δεξάμενος δὲ τις τὸ πρότερον τοὺς ἐξῆς ἐνδιασκευάζει). Thus, the interpolator (διασκευαστής) invented the story that Helen recognized Aphrodite, accused her of favoring Paris, and invited the goddess to go to him in her place. He also had to justify the fact that eventually Helen went to Paris, and so he added the strong words of Aphrodite’s reply, which tamed Helen. Aristarchus then proceeds to show that all these additions have flaws. First, how can Aphrodite, disguised as an old woman, have a beautiful neck (l. 396), shining eyes, and a lovely breast (l. 397)? If Aphrodite did appear as an old woman, Helen could not have recognized her. And even if Helen recognized Aphrodite, it is contrary to her character to address a goddess with such irreverent words (*Il.* 3.406–407): ‘you go and sit with him, leave the path of the gods, and do not go back to Olympus with your feet’ (*Sch. Il.* 3.395: βλάσφημα παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπόν ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα).¹⁷⁰ Finally, at line 414, Aphrodite’s reply (‘do not provoke me, miserable woman’) is cheap

169. Ὡς φάτο, τῇ δ’ ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσιν ὄρινε· (l. 395) / βῆ δὲ κατασχομένη ἐανῶ ἀργῇτι φαιινῶ (l. 419) / σιγῇ, πάσας δὲ Τρῳὰς λάθεν· ἦρχε δὲ δαίμων (l. 420).

170. According to Bouchard 2016, 202–205, Aristarchus condemns Helen’s words because she here is not depicted as being in love with Paris, as is usual in Homer. This contradiction in Helen’s attitude might have been present in Aristarchus’ mind, but the specific comment about the words ‘against character’ (παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπον) is here only targeting Helen’s reply to Aphrodite.

in terms of content (*Sch. Il.* 3.395: εὐτελής κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν). To conclude, the lines sound wrong for many reasons: the recognition of a disguised goddess is inconsistent, some words are unfitting to a human character, and some other words cannot possibly belong to a goddess.¹⁷¹

In the first instance, Aristarchus probably did not like seeing two dignified characters such as Helen and Aphrodite quarreling like vulgar women and so found an explanation to remove the passage: someone who did not know Homeric idiolect had added them. In fact, commenting on the same formulaic line (ὥς φάτο, τῷ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι ὄρινε) in *Il.* 4.208, he remarks:

Sch. Il. 4.208a ὥς φάτο, <τῷ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι ὄρινε>: ἡ διπλὴ πρὸς τὸ 'ὄρινεν', ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἐκίνησεν. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορά πρὸς τὸ 'ὥς φάτο, τῇ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι ὄρινεν' (*Il.* 3.395), ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐθύμωσεν, ὥς ὁ διασκευάσας ἐκλαβὼν ἔταξεν τοὺς ἐξῆς εἴκοσι <τρεῖς> στίχους (*Il.* 3.396–418), ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκίνησε καὶ παρώρμησε κατὰ τὸ ἐρωτικόν.

'So he spoke, and roused (ὄρινε) the heart in his breast': the *diple* because of ὄρινεν, [since it is used] instead of 'he moved his soul'. The reference is to ὥς φάτο, τῇ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι ὄρινεν (*Il.* 3.395), because it is not 'she made [her] angry', as the one who interpolated the passage thought [it meant] and thus added the following twenty-three lines (*Il.* 3.396–418), but [it is used] instead of 'she moved and urged her to erotic intercourse'.

For Aristarchus, the misunderstanding of ὄρινεν according to a non-Homeric sense is the origin of the interpolation, which is wrong on many levels.¹⁷²

This other example of an athetesis covering multiple lines presents fewer reasons for an athetesis but well represents Aristarchus' rationalistic approach to Homer. In Book 14 he athetizes most of Zeus' response (*Il.* 317–327) to Hera's seduction, when, after telling Hera that he has never felt such desire for a woman or a goddess, he lists his many lovers (Ixion's wife Dia, Danae, Europa, Semele, Alcmene, Demeter, and Leto):

Sch. Il. 14.317a οὐδ' ὅπότε ἡρασάμην: . . . ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ ἕως τοῦ 'οὐδ' ὅποτε Λητοῦς ἐρικυδέος' (*Il.* 14.327) ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι ἑνδεκα, ὅτι ἄκαιρος ἡ ἀπαρίθμησις τῶν ὀνομάτων· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀλλοτριοῖ τὴν Ἥραν ἢ προσάγεται. καὶ ὁ ἐπ<ε>γόμενος συγκοιμηθῆναι, διὰ τὴν τοῦ κεστοῦ δύναμιν, πολυλογεῖ.

171. *Sch. Od.* 4.12b also recalls this athetesis and mentions the non-Homeric use of δούλη to mean 'servant' at line 409; cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 447.

172. Cf. Roemer 1912, 399–414; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 395–396; Kirk 1985, 322–323 (who is pleased that Aristarchus' "stringent views had no effect on the vulgate").

‘Not even when I fell in love’: . . . From here until ‘not even when [I fell in love with] glorious Leto’ (*Il.* 14.327) eleven lines are athetized, because counting the names [of his lovers] is out of place. For he alienates Hera rather than drawing her toward himself. And for one who is urged to sleep with her by the power of [Aphrodite’s] girdle he talks too much.¹⁷³

Zeus is not really saying what a wife wants to hear with his list of past lovers. Not only is this list out of place (ἄκαιρος), but Zeus also sounds too talkative for someone under Aphrodite’s spell. Perhaps Aristarchus did not get the irony and comic undertones of this famous passage, but he certainly knew what women want (and do not want) to hear and how a romantic rendezvous should go—too much talking is never elegant.

7. Why Should Some Lines Be Athetized?

The athetesis of *Il.* 3.396–418 discussed in the section above provides a good introduction to the last section of this chapter, which explores how Aristarchus conceived the process of interpolation of the Homeric text. In fact, the very existence of an operation like athetesis implies that, for ancient scholars, there was an original text of Homer, that such a text had suffered interpolations over the centuries, and that it was their duty to identify these additions and to signal or eliminate them, so as ‘to recover’ the original text.

Who was responsible for these interpolations? The Aristarchean scholia never mention anyone specifically; they simply state that certain lines were added or written by ‘someone’¹⁷⁴ or by a διασκευαστής, an ‘interpolator,’¹⁷⁵ a technical term derived from διασκευάζειν, ‘to compile.’¹⁷⁶ The fact that these

173. See also *Sch. Il.* 14.315a οὐ γὰρ πώποτε μ’ ὦδε <θεᾶς ἔρος οὐδὲ γυναικός>: ὅτι ἔξαρκεί τὸ κεφαλαιωδῶς εἰπεῖν. τὸ δὲ ἐξ ὀνόματος ἐπιφέρειν ἐνέκοπτε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔπειθεν [‘since such a desire, not for a woman, nor for a goddess, has ever [conquered] me’: because it is enough to say it in summary. To go on listing the names offended [Hera] rather than persuading her]. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 41; Roemer 1912, 308–309; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 392; Meijering 1987, 154; Schenkeveld 1970, 175. On the principle of ‘narrating in summary’ (κεφαλαιωδῶς), see Chapter 3.6.C § 3.2.

174. For example: τις . . . προσέθηκεν in *Sch. Il.* 1.474a; 2.668; 9.416a; τις . . . προσανεπλήρωσεν in *Sch. Il.* 7.353a; τις . . . (ἐν)ἔταξεν in *Sch. Il.* 13.658–9a; 21.570a¹ and τινὲς . . . προσεπέταξαν in *Sch. Il.* 14.500; τις . . . ἐνέγραψεν in *Sch. Il.* 5.183; τὸν στίχον . . . ὑπὸ τινων γραφόμενον in *Sch. Il.* 3.230a; συνήγαγέ τις τὰ διὰ πολλῶν εἰρημένα εἰς ἓνα τόπον in *Sch. Il.* 18.444–56a.

175. For example in *Sch. Il.* 6.441a; 8.73–4.

176. The verb is used, for example, in τὸν τὰ ἐπάνω διασκευάσαντα in *Sch. Il.* 2.807; τις . . . ἐνδιασκευάζει in *Sch. Il.* 3.395; διεσκευασμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ τινος in *Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a; διεσκεύακε δέ τις in *Sch. Il.* 24.130–2a; ὁ διασκευάσας in *Sch. Il.* 4.208a; 11.11a. ‘Interpolation’ is διασκευή

‘interpolators’ remain anonymous should not surprise us: Aristarchus was dealing with a centuries-old text, whose history and transmission were impossible to pin down and identify precisely. Unlike modern scholars, who are aware of the characteristics of oral poetry, he did not think that these supposed interpolations were due to oral recitations generating a fluid text. There is no hint anywhere in the Aristarchean scholia that he considered the Homeric text as orally sung or transmitted and for this reason open to changes over time. Aristarchus was rather thinking in terms of a written text which some editor/ reviser (the διασκευαστής) changed on purpose.

7.1. The Pernicious Work of the ‘Interpolators’ (διασκευασταί)

According to Aristarchus, these interpolators added lines because they did not know Homeric poetry well enough and felt that additions were needed in order to repair the text that they did not understand correctly. In the scholia he provides a variety of unflattering explanations as to why the *diaskeuastai* altered the text: they added lines because they did not know the meaning of Homeric words,¹⁷⁷ or did not understand the cryptic syntax of Homeric poetry¹⁷⁸—especially when Homer uses ellipsis of the verb εἶναι¹⁷⁹—or they felt that a sentence was not complete,¹⁸⁰ or they took it too literally.¹⁸¹ Sometimes, their addition derived from misconceptions about the Homeric world and its myths; for example, the *diaskeuastai* added a line because they identified Apollo with Paean,¹⁸² or because they thought that Achilles was in love with Patroclus.¹⁸³ They could also add lines simply because they had not read the poem carefully enough and thought that something was missing in the plot.¹⁸⁴ In some cases, these compilers did not ‘invent’ these interpolations but recopied (and slightly adapted) lines from elsewhere, whether from another passage in Homer (hence the suspicious repeated lines, analyzed above)¹⁸⁵ or from other authors, such as Hesiod.¹⁸⁶

(e.g., κατὰ διασκευὴν . . . γεγράφθαι ὑπὸ τινος in *Sch. Il.* 16.97–100a) and ἡ προδιασκευή (in *Sch. Il.* 24.109a¹). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 329–331.

177. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.807 (see below, § 7.2); 3.395 and 4.208a (see above, § 6); 14.500.

178. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.183 together with *Sch. Il.* 5.177a and 5.191a.

179. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 7.353a; 9.416a (see above, § 2 and § 4.4); 21.570a^{1,2}; 24.45a (see below, § 7.2).

180. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.668; 24.130–2a (see below, § 7.2).

181. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 13.658–9a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2).

182. *Sch. Il.* 1.474a (see Chapter 5.3 § 4.2).

183. *Sch. Il.* 16.97–100a and 16.97–100b (ex. [Did.?.]) (see above, § 4.2).

184. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 21.130–5a^{1,2} (Did.) (see Chapter 4 § 2).

185. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 12.175a¹ and 15.414a^{1,2} (see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.3 with footnote 197); 18.444–56a; 19.400 and 23.295a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.8).

186. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 24.45a (see below, § 7.2).

In one instance, for Aristarchus the interpolators even acted in bad faith and added a line because they wanted to create a new *zetema*, that is, a ‘problem’ in the text for other scholars to solve. This is the case with the shield of Achilles, which in *Il.* 20.267–272 seems to have the golden layer underneath and hidden by the other, less precious layers, as was analyzed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.3. Without rediscussing the *zetema*, we can still usefully recall Aristarchus’ line of thought in this case. In his view, ‘four lines are athetized because they were added by one of those who want to create a question’ (*Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τέσσαρες, ὅτι διεσκευασμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ τινος τῶν βουλομένων πρόβλημα ποιεῖν). As ridiculous as it sounds, Aristarchus seems to believe that someone maliciously manipulated the text in order to create problems for other scholars. In his opinion, then, the interpolators’ targets were not so much the readers (or listeners) of poetry but rather the scholars, who were probably the only ones interested in these subtle contradictions. Rejecting lines that are problematic and accusing someone of having inserted them to create that problem is a very easy, effective, and cheap way to ‘solve’ *zetemata*. In Aristarchus’ defense, this is an isolated case (and even in this case, he offers another, alternative solution)— he generally solves (or at least tries to solve) a *zetema* without choosing the shortcut of athetesis.¹⁸⁷

7.2. Aristarchus and the ‘Interpolators’ (διασκευασταί)

No doubt, in the course of its long tradition, the text of the Homeric poems had been altered, not in its main traits but with additions and deletions of lines as well as with new readings.¹⁸⁸ Scholars now tend to consider these changes as mostly due to oral recitations, but we cannot exclude that in some cases ‘real’ interpolators changed the text on purpose. So, in principle, Aristarchus’ suspicions about the *diaskeuastai* were plausible. Yet the scholia that discuss the activity of these *diaskeuastai* illustrate Aristarchus’ perception of these interpolators more than the reality behind them. His attitude toward them is exemplified by his athetesis of *Il.* 13.658–659, which we discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2. In his view, someone misled by a line above added those lines in which an already dead hero (Pylaemenes, killed by Menelaus at *Il.* 5.576–579) is ‘resurrected’; otherwise, if the lines are kept, the identity of Pylaemenes should be considered a case of homonymy (*Sch. Il.* 13.658–9a). Interestingly, even if he seems certain that someone added a line, Aristarchus also suggests an alternative solution, *as*

187. See Chapter 3.6.C § 5. In another case (*Sch. Il.* 10.372a) Aristarchus accuses the *diaskeuastai* of altering the text to create a problem and shows that the received text is sound (see Chapter 3.3.A § 4.1); cf. Lehrs 1882, 205–206.

188. As, for example, proven by the ‘wild’ Homeric text provided by the Ptolemaic papyri studied by West 1967.

if the lines were original. This second alternative, in fact, undermines his previous claim that the lines were interpolated.

Indeed, Aristarchus sometimes changed his opinion about an athetesis.¹⁸⁹ These second thoughts can be interpreted as evidence that he had no definitive proof that the lines he wanted to athetize were not original, let alone that they had been added by someone else. This conclusion also suggests that he did not have or use any 'external' support (= manuscript evidence) to ground his philological doubts, at least in general. Rather, he must have normally decided that certain lines were suspicious for internal reasons and, to support his athetesis, assumed that these lines had been added by 'someone' who either did not understand the original text or wanted 'to create a problem'.

This idea is confirmed when we look in detail at the Aristonicus scholia that mention these supposed interpolations. An interesting example occurs in Book 2, when Zeus sends Iris to the Trojans (ll. 786–790); having taken the shape of Polites, a son of Priam, who was on guard watching for the Greeks (ll. 791–795), she rebukes Priam for talking too much and gives orders to Hector (ll. 796–806). According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 2.791), Iris' divine intervention is inconsistent. If the purpose of this scene is only to announce the arrival of the Greeks, there is no need of Iris, since Polites, who is on watch, is enough. If instead Zeus wants to urge the Trojans to take action, this speech needs to be very strong, and so Iris herself must be present without disguise to rebuke Priam and give orders to Hector. These words, however, are inappropriate if Iris has disguised herself as Polites because the young prince cannot show this lack of respect for his father and his elder brother. Hence the athetesis of lines 791–795, so that now Iris speaks in her own persona. In trying to understand how this passage was added in the original text, Aristarchus suggests a false interpretation of an interpolator, who misunderstood the closing line of this scene: 'so she spoke and Hector recognized (οὐ . . . ἡγνοίησεν) the word of the goddess' (l. 807):

Sch. Il. 2.807 <οὐ> . . . ἡγνοίησεν: ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλανῆσαν τὸν τὰ ἐπάνω (*Il.* 2.791–795) διασκευάσαντα. οὐ κεῖται δὲ συνήθως ἡμῖν τὸ ἡγνοίησεν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἀπίθησεν.

'He recognized': because this is what misled the one who interpolated the lines above (*Il.* 2.791–795). For ἡγνοίησεν is not used here with the meaning usual to us, but instead of 'he did not disobey'.

189. See *Sch. Il.* 10.397–9a (Did.) and 10.397–9b (x), on which cf. Roemer 1912, 276–278; Lührs 1992, 229–231, 233–237; Filoni 2007; Schironi 2015, 617–621; and *Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹ (Did.), on which cf. Schironi 2015, 621–624 (with further bibliography). On Ammonius, who is quoted in both sets of scholia, see Chapter 1.2 § 2.1.

According to Aristarchus, someone understood ἀγνοεῖν with its usual meaning of ‘not recognizing’ and hence thought that Hector recognized the goddess, who thus must have been disguised as someone else. But here the verb does not mean ‘not to recognize’ in a literal sense but rather has the secondary meaning of ‘to disobey’. So there is no need to assume that Iris was disguised as someone else, twisting the rest of the narrative.¹⁹⁰ As should be clear, the problem for Aristarchus is Polites, rebuking his father and giving orders to his elder brother, because such a behavior is ‘unfitting’ (ἀνοίκειον), as we read in *Sch. Il.* 2.791, and Homer is good at depicting credible and consistent characters. This is the real issue in these lines, and the misunderstanding of ἡγνοίησεν by an interpolator sounds like an ‘ad hoc’ excuse to reject them with some pretension of objectivity.

Another example is the athetesis of *Il.* 24.130–132, when Thetis invites Achilles to find solace by lying with a woman, especially because he himself does not have a long life ahead (*Il.* 24.128–132):

τέκνον ἐμὸν τέο μέχρις ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων
 σῆν ἔδεαι κραδίην μεμνημένος οὔτε τι σίτου
 — οὔτ’ εὐνῆς; ἀγαθὸν δὲ γυναικί περ ἐν φιλότῃτι
 — μίσγεσθ’. οὐ γάρ μοι δηρὸν βέη, ἀλλὰ τοι ἤδη
 — ἄγχι παρέστηκεν θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή.

My son, for how long crying and being afflicted
 will you devour your heart, not taking heed of food
 — nor of bed? It is good even to have sexual intercourse with a woman,
 — for you won’t live for long but already
 — death and a strong fate are close to you.

For Aristarchus, lines 130–132 must be rejected because they are full of improprieties. First, it is inappropriate (ἀπρεπές) for a mother to tell her son to have sex (*Sch. Il.* 24.130–2a: ἀπρεπές μητέρα υἱῷ λέγειν ‘ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ γυναικὶ μίσεσθαι’).¹⁹¹ In fact, such advice is particularly against Achilles’ interest

190. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 6; Roemer 1912, 421–422; Dimpfl 1911, 8; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 477. A more complete note on this athetesis is preserved in *P.Oxy.* 1086, ii–iii, 61–73, 75–82, 84–88; cf. Lundon 2002a, 123–126, 133; Nünlist 2009, 275–277. Another athetesis due to lack of believability in the appearance of gods ‘in disguise’ concerns *Il.* 21.290, discussed above (§ 4.3).

191. These words are inappropriate in terms of the situation and the character who utters them (a mother to her own son!) more than of ‘morality’ per se; cf. Lührs 1992, 39 (though Schenkeveld 1970, 169–170, suggests the contrary). On the idea of πρέπον in Aristarchus, see Chapter 3.6.A, footnote 49.

(*Sch. Il.* 24.130–2a: ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων ἀσυμφωρώτατον), as it is given to a soldier risking his life in combat, and in war people need to be vigorous and alert. It is also completely out of place (ἄκαιρον) to say that death is close to Achilles. These lines—concludes Aristarchus—were added by someone who thought that line 129, μεμνημένος οὔτε τι σίτου, 'not taking heed of food', was incomplete and thus added the rest.¹⁹² The argument, however, sounds specious because this explanation accounts for the addition of line 130 with οὔτ' εὐνῆς, 'nor of bed', which would have required supplementary words to fill out the line, but certainly not three full additional lines. If the problem was only the second hemistich in line 129, therefore, it would have been enough to complete line 130 after οὔτ' εὐνῆς. It seems that in this case, too, Aristarchus worked backward. He did not like Thetis' lines because they were inconsistent with her role as mother, since a mother would not invite her son to enjoy sex, and also because it was not a good occasion to remind Achilles that his life would be short, especially when he was already distressed. The fact that these lines were unsuitable to Thetis and to the specific occasion was thus the real reason for the athetesis. At that point, however, Aristarchus sought a reason as to why those wrong lines were in the text and so invoked the usual 'interpolator' who did not understand Homeric syntax.

Another telling case involves *Il.* 24.45. In *Il.* 24.44, Apollo observes that Achilles has lost all pity and has no shame (οὐδέ οἱ αἰδώς), but in the next line he adds: '[shame], which harms and also benefits men greatly'.¹⁹³ As Aristarchus points out, if shame really harms people, then Achilles would do the right thing in losing it! (*Sch. Il.* 24.45a: εἰ γὰρ βλάπτει ἡ αἰδώς, εὐλογον, <εἰ> Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀναιδέστατος βούλοιτο εἶναι). In fact, according to Aristarchus, line 45 was added by an interpolator who wanted to add a verb 'to be' to complement the οὐδέ οἱ αἰδώς of line 44,¹⁹⁴ and then completed the line with Hesiod, *Op.* 318,¹⁹⁵ where the statement about 'shame' harming greatly is at the right place because it is a *gnome* (*Sch. Il.* 24.45a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν Ἡσιόδου μετενήνεκται ὑπὸ τινος νομίσαντος ἐλλείπειν τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐναντίον τι πεποίηκεν . . . παρὰ μέντοι Ἡσιόδῳ γνωμικῶς). Now, perhaps the gnomic and Hesiodic character of the line might have made Aristarchus suspicious. However, the decisive fact was that line 45 was in flagrant contradiction (ἐναντίον) with the preceding line. This is what led Aristarchus to reject it, finding a reason in

192. The scholium is discussed also in Chapter 2.3 § 4; cf. Roemer 1912, 143, 445; Wecklein 1919, 99; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 398; Lührs 1992, 39.

193. *Il.* 24.44–45: ὥς Ἀχιλλεὺς ἔλεον μὲν ἀπώλεσεν, οὐδέ οἱ αἰδώς / γίγνεται, ἥ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἡδ' ὀνίνησι.

194. Which is wrong, Aristarchus explains, because ἐστίν can be supplemented from outside (*Sch. Il.* 24.45a: δεῖ δὲ ἔξωθεν προσυπακοῦσαι τὸ ἐστίν, ἵν' ἡ 'οὐδέ οἱ αἰδώς ἐστι' καὶ πλήρης ὁ λόγος). On 'external supplements' of the verb 'to be', see Chapter 3.2.B § 7.1.

195. Hes. *Op.* 318: αἰδώς, ἥ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἡδ' ὀνίνησιν.

the possible syntactic ambiguity due to the lack of the copula and so assuming that someone might have wanted to 'fix' it by inserting a line from Hesiod.¹⁹⁶

These examples thus suggest that Aristarchus' suspicion was first raised by an un-Homeric element or an inconsistency in the context or characters; then he justified his athetesis by considering the line(s) at issue a possible interpolation and finding ad hoc explanations for why the interpolation was made in the first place.

8. Aristarchus' Attempt to Recover the 'Original' Script

This survey of Aristarchus' atheteseis and their arguments has shown that he was a meticulous critic who searched for compelling reasons to suspect a line. Some grounds were strong enough to guarantee an athetesis, but other reasons were not sufficient on their own to warrant a rejection. In particular, one of his major reasons for suspecting a line was that the line was 'superfluous' or 'not necessary'. Similarly, even though repeated lines and tautologies were not rejected by default, they no doubt sounded suspicious to Aristarchus, who scrutinized them with care; if he found additional reasons to doubt their authenticity, he would go for an athetesis. This attitude also reveals his view of the Homeric text, as having qualms about what is 'superfluous', 'repeated', or 'tautological' is the most antioralist stance that a critic can take. Indeed, Aristarchus' attitude to superfluous and repeated lines attracted the critique of van der Valk, who accused him of having no feeling for archaic poetry.¹⁹⁷ Hopefully, we have passed beyond this stage and can finally assess Aristarchus as a historical figure in his historical context. Of course, he had no sense of oral poetry or of the Homeric poems as texts assembled over a long time through oral composition and performances, but this should not be taken as a basis for accusing him of not understanding Homer. It is in fact anachronistic. Aristarchus was no different from any of his colleagues. With the exception of the famous passage in

196. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.44 (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Lührs 1992, 33–36, who rightly points out that the line's occurrence in Hesiod was not a reason for the athetesis—perhaps it might have stirred suspicion but there was another reason (for Lührs, that it started with an unnecessary copula; for me, that the line contradicted the previous one. On this difference of interpretation, see below, § 9). Cf. also Lehrs 1882, 337; Roemer 1912, 185; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 472–473.

197. Van der Valk 1963–1964, II 113–114: "we can say that sometimes he [i.e., Aristarchus] also misjudged the characteristics of archaic poetry . . . It then appears that he failed to appreciate the *parallelismus membrorum* and the accumulation of synonyms which describe the same matter. These features are typical of archaic poetry . . . The Alexandrian critics, as we already saw, took exception to διφορούμενοι and in the case of parallel passages, they sometimes tried to alter one of the corresponding parts".

Josephus' *Against Apion*,¹⁹⁸ generally no one in antiquity and, in fact, until the eighteenth century, with d'Aubignac's *Conjectures académiques ou Dissertation sur l'Iliade* (1715),¹⁹⁹ Vico's *Della scoperta del vero Omero* (1744),²⁰⁰ and Wolf's *Prolegomena ad Homerum* (1795), conceived of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as anything other than 'fixed' written poems, like any other literary text. There might have been doubts about whether Homer was the author of both poems, as we will see in Chapter 5.2, but no one really doubted that these were 'texts', composed and 'written' down by someone, so that one could indeed try to go back to the 'original text'. In this respect, Aristarchus was no exception. All his work on Homer was indeed based on his view of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as written texts by the same author;²⁰¹ these texts could be compared, corrected, and improved in order to return to what Homer originally had written. Moreover, Aristarchus had a specific view of Homeric style, namely, that it was concise and to the point: for this reason he strove to cut out unnecessary and superfluous lines, which did not adhere to these principles and so could not be Homeric. According to him, these lines must have been added by others who naively thought they could improve on or, at least, compete with Homer: the *diaskeuastai*. I have tried to show that these supposed later 'additions' were often a construction of Aristarchus himself, who only by supposing an external interpolator could 'save' his Homer and make him comply with his own ideas of Homeric style. Of course, as the so-called 'wild papyri' show,²⁰² interpolators did exist and tamper with the Homeric texts before the second century BCE, but Aristarchus' reasoning about their 'interpolations' to support atheteseis is no doubt circular. Still, his approach represented a great improvement in that he treated the text as a unity. We may not agree with Aristarchus' view that Homeric style is characterized by 'conciseness' (συντομία), but his self-consistent and unitarian approach to the Homeric text was critical and to some extent rev-

198. Joseph. *Ap.* 1.12: ὅλως δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν οὐδὲν ὁμολογούμενον εὐρίσκεται γράμμα τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως πρεσβύτερον, οὗτος δὲ καὶ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν ὕστερος φαίνεται γενόμενος· καὶ φασιν οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἐν γράμμασι τὴν αὐτοῦ ποιήσιν καταλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ διαμνημονευομένην ἐκ τῶν ᾄσμάτων ὕστερον συντεθῆναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ σχεῖν τὰς διαφωνίας [on the whole, among the Greeks no generally recognized form of writing is to be found which is more ancient than Homer's poetry. He also clearly lived after the Trojan War. And they say that not even he left his own poetry in writing, but it was memorized and then put together from the songs and because of this there are many discrepancies in it]. Cf. Nagy 2004, 9–10.

199. See, e.g., *Conjectures académiques*, pp. 92–101, in Lambin 2010, 157–162. For an overview of the content of the *Conjectures académiques*, see Lambin 2010, 85–89, who also defines the Abbé d'Aubignac as the 'inventor of the Homeric Question' (Lambin 2010, 289–292).

200. See, e.g., Vico 1744/1948, 284–285 (§§ 849–855 = Book III, Section I, Chapter VI, x–xvi), 287 (§§ 860–864 = Book III, Section I, Chapter VI, xxi–xxv), 289 (§ 873 = Book III, Section II, Introduction), 290 (§ 875 = Book III, Section II, Chapter I, i).

201. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 328; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 26–27.

202. See West 1967.

olutionary for the development of philology. This is what matters when looking at Aristarchus' work in his historical context, not the fact that he did not appreciate the specific nature of oral poetry.

9. Conclusions

After considering the criteria that Aristarchus took from Aristotle in the previous chapter, this chapter has looked at which of these criteria were the most important for him to proceed with an athetesis.

When Aristarchus had to decide whether to athetize a suspicious line, different reasons had different weights. He was much more concerned by the content of a line or a passage rather than by its style. Internal contradictions, unbelievable and unsuitable details, superfluous or unnecessary lines, and mistakes regarding the 'Homeric universe' (embracing both language and worldview) were sufficiently strong reasons for athetizing a line. In fact, even among those reasons some were stronger than others, as Aristarchus seems to have been particularly sensitive to internal contradictions and to lines and words which sounded inappropriate to the situation or to a character's ethos, especially in direct speeches spoken by the characters themselves. When lines contained really unbelievable details or words contrary to the Homeric usage, they were also rejected—even though we find fewer examples of this type of athetesis. Aristarchus was also very critical of lines which he considered superfluous; according to him, these had been slipped in by unnamed interpolators (*διασκευασταί*), who, because they did not understand the original text, added them in an attempt either to align the syntax to the Koine rules, or to provide unnecessary clarification of words or phrases occurring in the previous lines. On the other hand, stylistic weakness was not a sufficient reason for an athetesis and always needed some additional support. Similarly, repeated or tautological lines could arouse Aristarchus' suspicions, but he required further stronger reasons before rejecting them, as he was aware that Homeric style could sometimes indulge in repetitiveness. In fact, his objections to repeated lines concerned their unsuitability or inconsistency *within the context* rather than their merely being repeated.

Most often atheteseis were grounded in a combination of these reasons. The presence of a non-Homeric word or construction was alone a good enough reason to suspect a line; even so, most of the atheteseis due to a linguistic misuse seem to have been paired with another reason. In this case, the linguistic reason might have been used to confirm the suspicious nature of the lines. Thus, in the scholia some lines are athetized because they do not say much more than

what is said in the previous one(s) *and also* because of a linguistic mistake,²⁰³ or because the line is unsuited to its context or a certain character *and also* because a word is employed against the Homeric usage.²⁰⁴ Otherwise, a mistake in the Homeric worldview can be combined with a linguistic misuse in a line which is also silly.²⁰⁵ There are cases of athetesis that are due to a line being 'superfluous' or 'not necessary' *in addition to* another reason, for example, because it is also contradictory,²⁰⁶ or false,²⁰⁷ or linguistically incorrect and written in a bad style;²⁰⁸ or because an epithet there is also not used appropriately;²⁰⁹ or because the line is also wrongly repeated from another place where it fits more suitably.²¹⁰ Repeated lines, on the other hand, are rejected because they are also illogical in the context of one of their occurrences²¹¹ or are unfitting to a character and inconsistent with other episodes in the poem.²¹²

The analysis of Aristarchus' attitude toward the *diaskeuastai* is the key to understanding his approach to the 'judgment' of poems. When he found lines that did not fit his own ideas about Homeric poetry (e.g., with inconsistencies, inappropriate details or words, or linguistic mistakes), he concluded that they must have been added by someone else. If he could find a mistake which he thought originated from ignorance of Homeric style and language, Aristarchus had 'proof' of such an interpolation, and athetized the line. These are the cases studied by Lührs when he discusses superfluous lines 'with formal supplements' (group 1) or 'with content-based supplements' (group 2). According to Lührs, Aristarchus did not like these additions but, even if he considered these lines superfluous, he athetized them only when he found another, stronger reason, such as an inconsistency, or because nothing essential for the plot was added in the second hemistich. While I agree with Lührs' analysis, my impression is that Aristarchus worked in the opposite way. First, he was annoyed by internal contradictions, unfitting details or words, non-Homeric usages, or the general lack of useful information in the line (this latter case arose when, for Lührs, the second part of the line was also superfluous); at this point, he found an 'excuse' by postulating an interpolation. His proof was that in the supposedly

203. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 8.524–5; 24.514a (cf. Lührs 1992, 115–117; see Chapter 3.3.A § 4.4).

204. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 10.84a; 18.597–8.

205. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 8.185a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.8).

206. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 19.407a and 19.418a (cf. Lührs 1992, 141–144; see Chapter 3.6.A, footnote 33).

207. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 18.444–56a with *Sch. Il.* 18.444–56b (ex.); 18.460a; 18.461 (cf. Lührs 1992, 120–123).

208. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 19.94a (cf. Lührs 1992, 64–67; see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11).

209. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 3.352a (see above, footnote 65, and Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.2).

210. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 4.195a with *Sch. Il.* 4.205a (cf. Meijering 1987, 173; Lührs 1992, 245–246).

211. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 23.772a with *Sch. Il.* 5.122a and 13.61a (cf. Lührs 1992, 154–159).

212. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.454; 15.75a (ex. [Did.]); 16.236a; 16.237a (all concern the athetesis of *Il.* 16.237; cf. Lührs 1992, 198–202; see Chapter 3.6.A § 4 and Chapter 5.4 § 1).

interpolated line (which, for example, contained a contradiction or was generally superfluous) there was an additional mistake, namely, the use of a verb ‘to be’ or other easily omissible verbs in enjambment with the previous line, or unnecessary clarifications. These supplements were not necessary, and only demonstrated the interpolators’ ignorance of the Homeric dialect. This reconstruction seems to be more correct for at least four reasons.

1. As Lührs also recognizes, Aristarchus did *not* athetize all the lines that started with a useless clarification or a verb in enjambment with the previous line and which could be easily supplemented. He only rejected those lines for which he could find another important reason for athetesis.
2. Aristarchus was obsessed with internal inconsistencies of every kind: in narrative, characterization, language, and style. For him, these were all important reasons, not only for an athetesis, but also for arguing against other scholars’ readings, as we saw in Chapter 3.6.A.²¹³ Thus, he would probably have been suspicious whenever the Homeric text showed an inconsistency—he was simply extremely attentive to this aspect when reading Homer.
3. Furthermore, all Aristarchus’ critical and exegetical activity (again, beyond athetesis) was based on internal rules, following the principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’. Because of this, he would have been especially sensitive not only to internal contradictions, but also to any element which would go against what he had established to be the ‘Homeric usage’—both in terms of language and also in terms of content, from depicting suitable and consistent characters to avoiding unfitting ‘thoughts’ and details.
4. Finally, while the Homeric poems were certainly interpolated and changed over the centuries, in the specific cases when Aristarchus invokes the existence of interpolators (διασκευασταί), he does not support his conclusion by offering manuscript evidence which could have showed that the supposedly interpolated lines were actually missing in part of the tradition. In addition, in some cases Aristarchus himself proposes another, alternative solution to the athetesis of the supposedly interpolated lines. This behavior strongly suggests that he was simply guessing the activity of interpolators but did not have any external proof, such as manuscript evidence, to prove it.

These four points suggest that Aristarchus *first* objected to lines which were against his own ideas of the supreme art of Homer, and *then* looked for additional reasons and excuses to justify his rejection of such ‘un-Homeric’ lines and claim that they had been interpolated.

213. See also Chapter 4 § 1.3.

Aristarchus thus judged Homeric poems on the basis of the 'internal' rules that he had himself discovered while working on Homer.²¹⁴ His Homer was the ideal Aristotelian poet and his poems were superb, because Homer knew how to put together 'believable' plots (μῦθοι). He never contradicted himself and was self-consistent in everything: in his linguistic usage (λέξις and γλῶσσαι), in the heroic world he depicted (ἱστορίαι), in the characterization of his heroes (ἥθη), and in the thoughts (διάνοιαι) he put into their minds. As a consequence, his characters also always behaved and spoke in an appropriate and suitable manner. Finally, Homer was also a master at using language and did not like to add superfluous details (συντομία). This is an anthology of Aristotelian principles which, as was demonstrated in Chapter 3.6.A, were present throughout Aristarchus' critical activity. But these are also the 'strong reasons' for athetesis, analyzed in § 4 of this chapter: internal inconsistency and contradictions (§ 4.1); unsuitable lines, for characters or situations (§ 4.2); unbelievable lines (§ 4.3); superfluous lines (§ 4.4); language and a worldview contrary to the Homeric usage (§ 4.5). Aristarchus' κρίσις ποιημάτων revolved around these internal criteria. All the other arguments (including the mysterious, ignorant interpolators) were ad hoc explanations in order to further justify his atheteseis.

No doubt, Aristarchus was not acting in bad faith, consciously deceiving his readers; on the contrary, he probably believed that this was the correct method to employ, because it was founded on 'objective' criteria that he thought he had discovered in Homer (and in Aristotle): that Homer never contradicted himself, that he did not like superfluous lines, and that he always composed credible narratives, with suitable characters who would always express fitting thoughts. The downside of this approach is that by eliminating lines where these principles were not respected, he *forced* Homer to follow them as well. In other words, Aristarchus was correcting the text in order to make it as *his own Homer* would have written it.

There are different ways to look at Aristarchus' attitude. His work might seem entirely subjective and biased; this may be the conclusion of those who expect Aristarchus to be a 'modern' scholar. Otherwise, one can appreciate the fact that he established solid criteria in his work, even if his method was neither perfect, nor free from bias, nor infallible. In fact, unlike in the field of exegesis, where Aristarchus' opinions were generally respected, the scholia preserve many cases of rejection of his atheteseis. This is hardly surprising: many of his atheteseis were indeed based on subjective arguments, as the examples surveyed here demonstrate. The most famous adversary of Aristarchus' atheteseis was the grammarian Pius. His chronology is uncertain; scholars have proposed dating him between the first century BCE and the third or even the

214. In this respect, van der Valk is correct in his analysis of Aristarchus' scholarship.

fourth century CE. In only one case do the scholia report an attack by Pius against Aristarchus.²¹⁵ Still, many exegetical scholia preserve objections to his *atheteseis*,²¹⁶ which shows that Aristarchus' choices often met with resistance among contemporaries and later critics. It seems that the κρίσις ποιημάτων, the highest but probably also the most complex of the parts of grammar, was also the most open to debate.

To conclude, Aristarchus' methodology for *athetesis* was extremely rationalistic; when applied to a poem like the *Iliad*, it might seem not only anachronistic but also devoid of any sense of poetry. Moreover, by applying these rigorous criteria about what was properly Homeric (internal consistency, appropriateness, believability, conciseness), he was creating *his own Homer*, who was indeed always self-consistent and unfailingly made his characters and scenes fit the context, who created believable plots, and who did not like unnecessary details and redundant lines. Still, there was no proof that Homer was as he imagined. This major flaw cannot be denied; yet we should also appreciate that the consistency and rationality adopted by Aristarchus in his work were unparalleled in his own time. Despite its flaws, his work marked a cornerstone in the development of philology, especially as he was working on a text like the Homeric poems, which had undergone many changes and had been transmitted in many different versions over the centuries. If the highest, most beautiful task of a scholar was that of 'judging' poems and deciding what was genuine and what was not, Aristarchus' rational and clear criteria deserve only praise—at least, that is, until the advent of Milman Parry's theory in 1920s, which revolutionized the way we understand Homeric poetry and taught us (but not Aristarchus) that Homer *can* in fact *contradict himself*.

215. For the *athetesis* of *Il.* 12.175–180 (or 175–181) (*Sch. Il.* 12.175a¹), which is rebutted by Pius in *Sch. Il.* 12.175–81b (ex.), see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.3 with footnote 197.

216. Many of them have been analyzed by Lühns 1992. Hiller 1869, 96, proposed to attribute to Pius most scholia which object to Aristarchus' *atheteseis*, but this is not correct; cf. Lühns 1992, 269 n. 376.

3.6.C

Judgment of Poems

The Art of 'Saving' the Homeric Text

1. Homer's Formulaic Style
 - 1.1. Misuse (κατὰχρησις) of Formulaic Lines
 - 1.2. Homer's Epithets
 - 1.2.1. Generic Epithets (καθολικά/κοινὰ ἐπίθετα) and Nongeneric Ones
 - 1.2.2. Out-of-Place Epithets (ἄκαιρα ἐπίθετα)
 - 1.2.3. Epithets and Poetic License
2. Homer's Poetic Persona
 - 2.1. The Poet's Persona (ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου/ποιητικοῦ προσώπου) and His Characters' Persona (ἐκ τοῦ ἡρωϊκοῦ προσώπου)
 - 2.2. The Poet 'Speaks Up' (ἀναφωνεῖ [ὁ ποιητής])
 - 2.3. The Poet Speaks in Anticipation (προαναφωνεῖ [ὁ ποιητής])
 - 2.4. Homer's Rhetorical Questions (and Answers)
 - 2.5. Homer's Direct Addresses (ἀποστροφαί)
 - 2.6. Homer's 'Generic You' (ὥς πρὸς τινα / ὥς πρὸς ὑποκείμενον πρόσωπον)
3. Homer's Narrative Technique
 - 3.1. Events Which Happened 'Tacitly' (κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον)
 - 3.2. Events by Conclusion (κατὰ συμπέρασμα) or in Summary (κεφαλαιωδῶς)
 - 3.3. Summaries with Details and Detailed Descriptions
 - 3.4. Completing the Audience's Knowledge
 - 3.5. Handling of Plot and Time: Zielinski's Law
 - 3.6. Switching between Narrative and Speech
4. Pathos and Feelings in Homer
5. *Zetemata* and *Lyseis*
6. Aristarchus' 'Judgment' (κρίσις) of Homeric Mistakes
7. Conclusions

The ‘judgment of poems’ (κρίσις ποιημάτων) mainly consisted in deciding the authenticity of lines, especially for an author like Homer. If a scholar suspected that certain lines were not original, he needed to explain why they had to be rejected in order to argue for an athetesis. This point has been examined in the previous chapter, which focused on the reasons that led Aristarchus to suspect lines. Yet such a ‘judgment’ could also lead to the opposite solution, that is, that debated lines were in fact authentic. Even in this case, nonetheless, a scholar had to justify his decision to preserve them. This chapter mainly explores this aspect of the ‘judgment of poems’, namely, how Aristarchus addressed certain Homeric problems and defended lines which other scholars had suspected. Earlier chapters have already illustrated that he often ‘saved’ the received text by using an array of justifications: by giving a different interpretation of the wording of the lines, by ‘excusing’ odd stylistic choices and labeling them as tropes, or by using the principle of ‘homonymy’ for inconsistencies involving characters. This chapter, on the other hand, will focus on more complex cases in which Aristarchus’ ‘judgment’ is carried out through what can loosely be defined as ‘literary criticism.’¹ In fact, Aristarchus engaged in ‘literary criticism’ in a very limited way, and a brief acquaintance with the *scholia maiora* immediately shows that the best sources for literary criticism are the exegetical scholia rather than the scholia derived from the VMK.² If we judge from the available fragments, Aristarchus seems almost never to have been interested in highlighting the effects that Homeric poetry had on the readership, or in discussing how good Homer was in portraying characters or in handling the plot. In this sense, the Aristarchean fragments discussing Homeric poetry do not provide anything close to the comments of the anonymous author of *On the Sublime*. In the first place, Aristarchus does not seem to have been particularly interested in the theoretical perspective of literary criticism. Rather, he had a very specific goal: to analyze the narrative techniques and poetic devices employed by the poet; if a specific technique or literary strategy was typical of Homer, it could then be used to defend the received text or fight against other scholars’ readings. The examination of how Homer narrated his story and how he dealt with his characters was therefore an integral part of Aristarchus’ study of ‘the typically Homeric’ (τὸ Ὅμηρικόν). One can consider these more literary subjects as part of the sixth part of grammar, because Aristarchus especially discussed them for

1. The survey will be fairly cursory, as many of these scholia have been already treated and discussed by Nünlist 2009 (to whom I will refer in the following footnotes); Bachmann 1902–1904, too, is still useful; cf. also Roemer 1924, 207–263 (‘ästhetische Exegese’). On literary criticism in the scholia, see also Griesinger 1907 (Homeric scholia) and Meijering 1987 (especially Homeric and tragic scholia).

2. Cf. Schmidt 2002, 170–176. Indeed, Nünlist 2009 takes examples most often from the exegetical scholia.

the κρίσις ποιημάτων. By focusing on and explaining the specific and sophisticated stylistic and narrative habits of Homer, he could prove that the original text was sound and had to be respected, and this against less expert critics who had found fault in it. Even when he did not discuss questions of authenticity, however, issues dealing with Homer’s narrative techniques and specific stylistic devices belonged to the highest part of grammar because they involved a fairly refined literary analysis. In this regard, then, these comments can also be seen as Aristarchus’ way of dealing with a text like the *Iliad*, which stemmed from oral tradition and so had many problematic points—from odd repetitions to the use of fixed epithets and unusual narrative strategies. Thus, when ‘judging the poems’, he had to address all these Homeric peculiarities, in order to justify and fit them within his idea that Homer was ‘the poet’ par excellence, the first in the list of ‘chosen’ authors (οἱ ἐγκριθέντες).

1. Homer’s Formulaic Style

Many of the problems that Aristarchus had to face when dealing with Homer were due to the specific nature of oral poetry.³ Repetitions, superfluous lines, and ‘mistakes’ due to the impromptu essence of this poetry certainly struck him. For many of these problems, he found ad hoc solutions, for example, homonymy for heroes who were killed and then resuscitated⁴ or the appeal to specific tropes, figures, and variation in vocabulary for Homer’s uneven use of language.⁵ As this section will demonstrate, Aristarchus dealt with Homeric formulaic style using the same approach.

1.1. Misuse (κατάχρησις) of Formulaic Lines

Without realizing what formulaic poetry was, Aristarchus did have fairly sophisticated ideas concerning repeated phrases in Homer and in general accepted them, unless they were inconsistent with the context. As was concluded in the previous chapter,⁶ he never athetized lines just because they were repeated, i.e., because they were formulaic, but because he felt that they were unfitting

3. Standard and famous studies on oral-formulaic poetry and Homer are Lord 1960/2000; Parry 1971 (which, at pp. 1–190, also offers an English translation of Parry 1928); Foley 1988; Foley 1991. For a concise overview of the developments of (and disagreements over) the oral formulaic theory, see Elmer 2011; Russo 2011.

4. See Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2.

5. See Chapters 3.2.A, 3.2.B, and 3.3.A.

6. See Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3.

in a specific place. One paradigmatic example of this is his discussion of *Il.* 9.694, ‘wondering at his words; for he had spoken in very stern terms,’ which Aristarchus athetizes not because the line is repeated (i.e., it is formulaic), but because ‘admiration’ is completely unjustified for Odysseus’ speech reporting the unsuccessful embassy to Achilles.

Yet in some cases, even if he did not like a formulaic line within a specific context, he did not reject it, as with *Il.* 9.222. This is the ever-present line describing a meal (αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο), referring here to the meal that Achilles offers Odysseus, Ajax, and Phoenix when they arrive on the embassy. Aristarchus comments that the line is used in a repetitive way since the envoys have already eaten (*Sch. Il.* 9.222a: κυκλικώτερον⁷ κατακέχρηται τῷ στίχῳ δεδειπνηκότων αὐτῶν πρὸ ὀλίγου). Indeed, at *Il.* 9.92 the same line recurs to describe the meal that Agamemnon arranges for the Achaean leaders in his hut before they decide to send the embassy. With the inclusion of *Il.* 9.92 and 222 in the text, Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax would thus be eating twice within a very short period. With this in mind, it is interesting to see Didymus’ comments on this passage:

Sch. Il. 9.222b¹ (Did.) αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος <ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο>: φαίνονται καὶ παρ’ Ἀγαμέμνονι πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν πρεσβείαν στείλασθαι δειπνοῦντες· φησὶ γοῦν ‘αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ σπεῖσάν τ’ ἔπιόν θ’, ὅσον ἤθελε θυμός, / ὠρμῶντ’ ἐκ κλισίης’ (*Il.* 9.177–178). ἄμεινον οὖν εἶχεν ἄν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, <εἰ> ἐγέγραπτο ‘ἄψ ἐπάσαντο’ ἢ ‘αἶψ’ ἐπάσαντο,’ ἵν’ ὅσον χάρισσασθαι τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ γεύσασθαι μόνον καὶ μὴ εἰς κόρον ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν λέγωνται. ἀλλ’ ὅμως ὑπὸ περιττῆς εὐλαβείας οὐδὲν μετέθηκεν, ἐν πολλαῖς οὕτως εὐρὼν φερομένην τὴν γραφήν.

‘But when they had satisfied their desire of food and drink’: they have clearly also eaten at Agamemnon’s before being sent on the embassy. For he says ‘but when they had poured libations and had drunk as much as their heart wanted, they left the hut’ (*Il.* 9.177–178). It would be better, Aristarchus says, if it were written ‘they had tasted food again’ (ἄψ ἐπάσαντο) or ‘they had quickly tasted food’ (αἶψ’ ἐπάσαντο), so that they are said to have a taste of food just to be gracious to Achilles and [they are] not [said] to eat and drink until full. But nevertheless he [i.e., Aristarchus] did not change anything out of excessive scruple, because he had found this reading in many [editions].⁸

7. On the meaning of κυκλικώτερον/κυκλικῶς, see below, footnote 14, and Chapter 5.3 § 6.

8. See also *Sch. Il.* 9.222b^{2,3} (Did.); cf. Lehrs 1882, 130–131; Lotz 1909, 21; Roemer 1912, 134–135; Roemer 1924, 235–238. The scholium has also been discussed in Chapter 2.2 § 1, as it offers important information on Aristarchus’ use of manuscript evidence.

First of all, Didymus refers to *Il.* 9.177–178 as the 'other' meal and not to *Il.* 9.92. In fact, lines 177–178 describe the libation before the embassy's departure, not the meal proper, even if it happens just after the meal at line 92.⁹ Thus, both Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 9.222a and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 9.222b¹ refer to the same moment and the same meal. Didymus gives some additional information, though: Aristarchus suggested a better reading for line 222. Instead of αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἔντο, 'but when they had satisfied their desire of food and drink', he proposed αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἄψ [or: αἶψ'] ἐπάσαντο, so that the meaning became 'but when they had again [or: quickly] touched food and drink'. Yet this remained a mere suggestion, probably proposed in the *hypomnema* or in the margin of the *ekdosis*, because Aristarchus did not find any other manuscript containing this reading, and so he did not feel confident enough to substitute it in his text. It is interesting, however, to see how Aristarchus suggests an 'adjustment' to a formulaic line in order to make it more consistent with the narrative, yet without emending the text. He finds that the same formulaic line is again misused at *Il.* 24.628 to describe the meal that Priam and Achilles share, as the latter has just finished eating when Priam enters his hut at lines 475–476; so it would not make sense for Achilles to eat again (*Sch. Il.* 24.628a: ὅτι κατακέχρηται τῷ στίχῳ).¹⁰ In this passage too, Aristarchus simply notices the problem but does not provide any solution. In another case, on the contrary, he chooses one formulaic line over another because the former fits with the situation more elegantly (*Sch. Il.* 12.230, against Zenodotus).¹¹ In two other instances, he seems to slightly 'adapt' a formulaic line to better fit the context (*Sch. Il.* 16.710a¹⁻²; 23.527—again all against Zenodotus).¹² We cannot say for sure whether Aristarchus emended the text or found the better fitting variant in his manuscripts. In all these three cases, however, our vulgate

9. The eighty-five lines in between line 92 and lines 177–178 are mostly occupied by the long speech in which Agamemnon lists all the gifts he is giving to Achilles and by Nestor's two shorter speeches framing Agamemnon's words.

10. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.628b (ex. [Ariston.]); cf. Roemer 1912, 135.

11. Aristarchus reads τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη κορυθαίολος Ἑκτώρ, 'and looking grimly at him Hector of the glancing helmet said', which also occurs in *Il.* 17.169, 18.284, while Zenodotus read τὸν δ' ἡμείβετ' ἔπειτα μέγας κορυθαίολος Ἑκτώρ, 'and then to him replied great Hector of the glancing helmet', also used in *Il.* 6.263, 359 (but with τὴν δ' . . .). Cf. Roemer 1912, 367.

12. In particular, at *Il.* 16.710 Zenodotus read ὡς φάτο, Πάτροκλος δ' ἀνεχάζετο τυτθὸν ὀπίσσω, 'so he said, and Patroclus retreated backward a bit', just like *Il.* 5.443 (with Τυδείδης instead of Πάτροκλος), while Aristarchus reads πολλόν rather than τυτθόν to mean ' . . . Patroclus retreated backward for quite a distance'. As for *Il.* 23.527, Zenodotus read [- ~ -] παρέλασσ' ἢ ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν, ' . . . he would have passed him or made the outcome [of the race] disputed' just like *Il.* 23.382, while Aristarchus reads οὐδ' instead of ἢ, so to mean ' . . . he would have passed him and would have not made the outcome [of the race] disputed'.

as well as papyri preserve Aristarchus' readings, which he could have then simply found in his copies.¹³

Thus, these examples suggest that Aristarchus was not against formulaicity in itself, but wanted formulaic lines to be in harmony with the context. When they did not seem to work in a specific passage, he could either athetize the lines (as with *Il.* 9.694), or perhaps even adapt them to the context (as with *Il.* 12.230, 16.710, 23.527). Sometimes he did not intervene, though, either because there was strong manuscript evidence against the emendation (as with *Il.* 9.222), or for other reasons which cannot be recovered (as with *Il.* 24.628). When that happened, he 'solved' the issue by labeling it as a case of *κατάχρησις*, a 'misuse' of a line, which he seems to have accepted as he accepted linguistic oddities, which he also labeled as *catachresis*.¹⁴

1.2. Homer's Epithets

As with repeated lines, Aristarchus' approach to Homeric epithets was not naive.¹⁵ On the one hand, he realized that there was a close link between a name and its epithet, so that the epithet became for him fundamental to identifying

13. See West, ad *Il.* 12.230, 16.710, 23.527. Indeed, especially the two cases in Books 16 and 23 are ambiguous, because both these 'formulaic lines' are only attested in two places each (*Il.* 5.443 and *Il.* 16.710; *Il.* 23.382 and *Il.* 23.527), so it could be simply a variation of the same formulaic line attested in the tradition (as suggested by Janko 1994, 401, for *Il.* 16.710), and not Aristarchus' adaptation of a line to the context; cf. also Richardson 1993, 215 and 227.

14. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11. According to Lührs 1992, 254–260, Aristarchus labeled repeated lines as *κυκλική κατάχρησις*, namely, 'misuse worthy of the cyclic poets' and not of Homer, because they were badly composed (as already suggested by Bachmann 1902–1904, II 31; cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 25–26). For Lührs, Aristarchus' disdain of 'cyclic repetition' is shown by the athetesis of *Il.* 15.610–614, where, among other reasons, Homer repeats himself 'in a cyclic manner' (*Sch. Il.* 15.610–4a: *καὶ κυκλικῶς ταυτολογεῖται*). But—Lührs also rightly remarks—in other cases of unfitting repetition of a formulaic line, such as *Il.* 9.222 and 24.628, in the absence of a stronger reason Aristarchus did not choose athetesis and simply noticed Homer's inaccuracy. With his reconstruction, Lührs criticizes Lotz 1909, 20–22 and 28, according to whom the idea of *κυκλική κατάχρησις* is a *Lösungsprinzip*, and not a criticism by Aristarchus. I lean toward a middle course: no doubt, Aristarchus used the trope of *catachresis* to 'justify' Homer when the poems contained something that sounded (linguistically or stylistically) odd. This, however, does not mean that he used this principle as an aesthetic category to account for the repetitiveness of Homeric poetry (as Lotz and his teacher Roemer wanted; see Roemer 1912, 135–136; Roemer 1924, 236). Aristarchus probably did not like such misuses and wished they were not there (so Lührs is partly correct in calling these comments a 'criticism' of Homer); yet he was attentive and sensitive enough to Homeric poetry to avoid emending or deleting lines which had those oddities, *unless* he found other reasons to eliminate them. On the other hand, I object to Bachmann's and Lührs' idea that with *κυκλικώτερον/κυκλικῶς* Aristarchus linked these misuses with the poets of the cycle (Lührs 1992, 258); those terms mean 'cyclic' simply in the sense of 'repetitive'; see also Chapter 5.3 § 6.

15. Cf. Lührs 1992, 43–44 n. 85; Matthaios 1999, 233–242.

different people or places which had the same names.¹⁶ On the other hand, he almost seems to have anticipated the discoveries of the oralists, when he pointed out that Homeric epithets sometimes did not have a real meaning, but were simply used as 'fillers'.

1.2.1. *Generic Epithets (καθολικά/κοινὰ ἐπίθετα) and Nongeneric Ones*

Aristarchus isolated a class of epithets which he defined as 'generic' (καθολικά/κοινὰ) because they did not carry a 'specific' meaning for the noun to which they referred. This is a typical feature of many Homeric lines, which often contain epithets whose main function is that of 'filling' the cola rather than adding meaning.¹⁷ For example, ἱερός is often attached to nouns that are not related to anything 'sacred' or 'religious'. This peculiarity of Homer is well known, and the Indo-European root of this adjective has led modern scholars to explain its common use with nouns like ἡμαρ, 'day', κνέφας, 'darkness', and ἄλφιτον, 'barley', as meaning 'active' or, better, 'strong'.¹⁸ Likewise, Aristarchus comments that ἱερός ἰχθύς, 'sacred fish', does not indicate a particular kind of fish, such as the 'pompilus' or the 'beauty-fish', as some thought;¹⁹ rather, ἱερός in this case is to be understood as 'well-fed' and 'large', 'in a fairly generic way' (κοινότερον) (*Sch. Il.* 16.407d).²⁰

Generic epithets, in particular, can be associated with certain characters, as is clear from a discussion of two very similar lines: '[Polypoetes] son of Peirithous, whom immortal (ἀθάνατος) Zeus begot' (*Il.* 2.741) and 'of whirling Xanthus, whom immortal (ἀθάνατος) Zeus begot' (*Il.* 21.2). In both lines, Zenodotus read ἀθάνατον rather than ἀθάνατος, thus applying the epithet 'immortal' not to Zeus but to his son, Peirithous in Book 2 and Xanthus in Book 21. In the latter case, in principle, the epithet is still reasonable since rivers are divine; however, for Peirithous, king of the Lapiths, ἀθάνατος is

16. See Chapter 3.3.B § 1.1 and § 3.1.

17. In modern terms, they are 'fixed epithets', as Parry 1971, 165 [= Parry 1928, 208], defines them: "(1) Fixed epithets are used in accordance with their metrical value and not in accord with their signification; (2) they are traditional; (3) they are always ornamental; (4) they are often generic". Cf. also Foley 1988, 25–26. More recently Foley 1991 has developed the idea of 'traditional referentiality' to explain how even generic epithets in oral poetry can have a meaning (a 'metonymic' meaning, as he calls it); see Foley 1991, 22–29 and 139–149 (specifically on Homeric epithets).

18. For a survey of the problem and various possible solutions, see Hooker 1980.

19. On the 'pompilus' (πομπίλος in Greek), a fish which follows ships, see *Athen.* 7.282e and 284d. On the 'beauty-fish' (κάλλιχθυσ in Greek), see *Athen.* 7.295b and 8.344f.

20. Cf. Hooker 1980, 20; Janko 1994, 369. *Sch. Il.* 10.56b, a composite scholium, in part (and tentatively) attributed to Aristonicus by Erbse, parallels the use of ἱερός ἰχθύς to ἱερὸν τέλος ('sacred' military division), in the sense of 'big'; it also notes that the same interpretation (μέγα τάγμα) had been offered by the Glossographers (fr. 11 Dyck); if so, for once Aristarchus agreed with them; cf. Dyck 1987, 141–142. On the Glossographers, see Chapter 3.3.A § 3.

simply false, as Aristarchus observes (*Sch. Il.* 2.741: ὅπερ ψεῦδος), because no child of Zeus and a mortal woman is immortal.²¹ Yet he also rejects Zenodotus' reading in *Il.* 21.2 because, even if Xanthus could be 'immortal', the epithet ἀθάνατος is typically used for the Olympian gods and for Zeus in particular in this formulaic line (*Sch. Il.* 21.2c: καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ εἴρηται 'υἱὸς Σπερχειοῖο, τὸν ἀθάνατος τέκετο Ζεὺς'.²² καὶ καθόλου 'ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι').²³

Aristarchus distinguished this type of 'generic' epithet from the cases where the epithet carried a specific meaning, even if at first sight it seemed 'generic'. For example, when Homer calls Zeus πανομφαῖος, 'sender of all prophecies', in *Il.* 8.250, the epithet is not used generically, since Zeus has just sent an eagle as omen to the Greeks (*Sch. Il.* 8.250a: ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι καθολικὸν ἐπίθετον ὁ πανομφαῖος).²⁴ The distinction between 'generic' and 'nongeneric' epithets is clearly outlined for the noun γῆ, 'earth':

Sch. Il. 14.114a Τυδέος, <ὃν Θήβησι χυτὴ κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψεν>: ὅτι χυτὴ γῆ ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς νεκροῖς ἐπιχεομένη, οὐ καθολικῶς, ὡς 'μέλαινα' (*Il.* 2.699, etc.) καὶ φερέσβιος (*Hes. Th.* 693).

'[I claim to be of the lineage] of Tydeus, whom in Thebes heaped-up earth covered': because 'heaped-up' (χυτὴ) earth is the [earth] poured on the dead, not in a generic sense, like 'black' (*Il.* 2.699, etc.) and 'life-giving' (*Hes. Th.* 693).

The phrase χυτὴ γαῖα is not simply equivalent to γαῖα, as is the case with other epithets for 'earth', such as 'black' (μέλαινα) and 'life-giving' (φερέσβιος), which are generic. Χυτὴ, in fact, gives an additional and important specification: this is earth which has been 'poured over', namely, a mound of earth functioning as a tomb. So χυτὴ is not generic because not all earth is χυτὴ, but only that which is poured on the dead (*Sch. Il.* 6.464b; 23.256: ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα γῆ χυτὴ, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῖς νεκροῖς ἐπιχεομένη).²⁵

In the Aristonicus scholia, 'nongeneric' epithets can also be indicated with a verbal phrase: οὐ παρέλκει, 'it is not redundant'.²⁶ For example, at *Il.* 18.416–417 Homer describes Hephaestus grasping a 'thick staff' (σκῆπτρον παχύ) and going out limping; Aristarchus notes that the epithet παχύ is not redundant (i.e., ornamental) because the god is lame and needs to lean on it (*Sch. Il.* 18.416b: ὅτι οὐ παρέλκει τὸ 'παχύ', ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἐπερείδειν χωλὸν ὄντα τὸν

21. Cf. Kirk 1985, 235.

22. Here the scholium conflates *Il.* 2.741, υἱὸς Πειριθόοιο τὸν ἀθάνατος τέκετο Ζεὺς, with *Il.* 16.174, υἱὸς Σπερχειοῖο διπυτέος ποταμοῖο. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 305, and Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 21.2c.

23. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.2d (ex. [Ariston.]); cf. Düntzer 1848, 91–92; Page 1955, 5.

24. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.41; cf. Lehrs 1882, 88–89.

25. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 102.

26. On the meaning of παρέλκει in the scholia, see Chapter 3.2.B § 1.3.

Ἡφαιστον). In the same scholium he also points out that at line 410 Homer has called Hephaestus a πέλωρ αἶητον, 'huge creature', which further proves that the god needs a 'thick' staff to support him.²⁷ Finally, he also quotes as a parallel *Od.* 2.94, which refers to the 'great web' (μέγας ιστός) that Penelope set up in the hall. In this instance as well, the adjective μέγας is not used generically, but refers to the never-ending work with which she deceives the Suitors.²⁸

The same epithet could thus be used sometimes 'specifically' and sometimes 'generically'. In particular, when an adjective has a predicative function, as in phrases like βάσκ' ἴθι Ἴρι ταχεῖα, 'come on, go swift, Iris' (*Il.* 8.399, 11.186, etc.), or τότε μοι χάνοι εὐρεῖα χθών, 'may the earth open wide for me' (*Il.* 4.182 = 8.150), Aristarchus notes that the epithet is not 'generic' or 'common' (καθολικὸν/κοινὸν ἐπίθετον) and then adds a paraphrase to make clear that the adjective functions as a predicate (*Sch. Il.* 4.182a; 8.150c; 8.399a).²⁹ While he usually explains these occurrences as adjectives used instead of adverbs (e.g., ταχεῖα instead of τάχεως), which is more of a 'syntactic' analysis,³⁰ the idea of 'generic'/'common' epithet has more to do with Homeric style. Yet the underlying idea is the same.

In fact, in Homer the adjective 'swift' (ταχύς) is also used in connection with specific nouns, as a fixed epithet, specifically with Ajax, son of Oileus (Οἰλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας) (e.g., *Il.* 2.527, 13.66). In this case, the epithet, as Aristarchus observes, has the important function of distinguishing Oilean Ajax from the other Ajax (*Sch. Il.* 10.110; 10.175a).³¹ While we do not know whether he considered this a 'generic' or a 'specific' use of a fixed epithet, since the scholia do not provide this information, something else can be learned from the other set of adjectives used to distinguish the two Ajaxes: 'the Lesser' (μείων) for Oilean Ajax and 'the Great' (μέγας) for Telamonian Ajax. Aristarchus gives both of them the same function, namely, to distinguish the two homonymous characters (*Sch. Il.* 16.358a²: πρὸς διαστολήν τοῦ Ὀϊλέως).³² Yet he also observes that they are not completely deprived of sense, as they compare the two heroes

27. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 287, and Parry 1971, 120 [= Parry 1928, 149].

28. Indeed, Aristarchus makes this observation in *Sch. Od.* 2.94b μέγαν ιστὸν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν: οὐ ποιητικῶς κόσμου χάριν προσέρριπται τὸ 'μέγαν', ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πολυχρόνιον τῆς τοῦ ἔργου κατασκευῆς ['[she set] a great web in the hall': the [epithet] 'great' has been added not for poetic embellishment but [to express] the time-consuming preparation of this work]. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 27.

29. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 27; Matthaios 1999, 424 and 529–530 (fr. 139).

30. As in *Sch. Il.* 11.186b^{1,2}; 15.158; 24.144, which have in fact been discussed when dealing with 'syntactic figures' in Chapter 3.2.B § 3.9 (with footnote 192).

31. On homonymous characters, see Chapter 3.3 B § 1.1 and § 1.2.

32. In *Sch. Il.* 2.111b (Did.) Aristarchus also explains that Homer employs μέγας in two ways: absolutely, when referring to Zeus, 'the great Zeus', and relatively, to distinguish 'Ajax the Great' from the other Ajax, the son of Oileus. On this scholium, where Didymus quotes Aristarchus from two different sources, the monograph *Against Philitas* and the 'perfected' commentaries, see Schironi 2015, 612–615 (with further bibliography).

in terms of stature (*Sch. Il.* 16.358a¹ and 17.115: ὅτι πάλιν ‘μέγαν’ εἶπεν τὸν Τελαμῶνος Αἴαντα κατὰ σύγκρισιν τοῦ Ὀϊλιάδου· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μικρότερος). Indeed, Homer himself says so at *Il.* 2.528: ‘[The swift son of Oileus, Ajax] the Lesser (μείων), not at all as great as (οὐ τι τόσος γε ὅσος) Telamonian Ajax’. In fact, because this line is necessary to explain why Telamonian Ajax is called ‘the Great’, Aristarchus criticizes Zenodotus for athetizing it (*Sch. Il.* 2.528: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος ἠθέτηκεν αὐτόν· ἀναγκαῖος δέ ἐστι· προδιασυνίστησι γὰρ ὅτι ἥττων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου).³³

Thus for Aristarchus fixed epithets could also have a meaning that corresponded to the (fictional) reality described in the poem. Another example is ‘broad’ (εὐρύς), which we have also just discussed as used ‘not in a generic way’ when working predicatively in εὐρεῖα χθών. When the adjective is used as a fixed epithet of the ‘sea’,³⁴ it does have a meaning because the sea is indeed wide, just like Telamonian Ajax is ‘great’ and Oilean Ajax is ‘lesser’. When however the epithet ‘wide’ in one of these *formulae* is applied to the Hellespont, Aristarchus notes that this strait is in fact narrow (*Sch. Il.* 18.140: ὅτι τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον στενὸν ὄντα ‘εὐρέα’ ἐκάλεσεν).³⁵ This remark suggests that for him an epithet, when used in a *formula*, could also have a meaning that was not only ‘generic’, but in fact even contrary to the reality to which it was applied. He might not have liked this imprecision but, as far as we can tell, he did not change or eliminate the line because of this. A typical example of such apparently unsuitable fixed epithets is ὠκύπους, ‘swift-footed’, as occurs in *Il.* 23.301–312. In this passage, Antilochus yokes his ‘swift-footed’ (ὠκύποδες at l. 304) horses, and Nestor tells his son that he is worried because his horses are βάρδιστοι θείειν, ‘the slowest at running’ (l. 310). For Aristarchus, such a comment is evidence that the first epithet is used ‘in a fairly generic way’ (κοινότερον), and thus should not be taken literally (*Sch. Il.* 23.304: ὅτι κοινότερον κατακέχρηται τῷ ἐπιθέτῳ).³⁶

33. Zenodotus probably also athetized lines 529–530, which are strictly connected with line 528; cf. van Thiel 2014a, I 236. Aristarchus, on the other hand, only athetizes lines 529–530 (‘but far lesser. He was small, with a corselet of linen, but with his spear he excelled over all the Hellenes and Achaeans’) because Homer has already said that Oilean Ajax is ‘smaller’ than Telamonian Ajax in line 528, so line 529 is unnecessary; in addition, corselets of linen (l. 529) are unknown to the Greeks and the term Πανέλληνες (l. 530) is unknown to Homer; see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.1 and § 3.3.

34. E.g., ἐπ’ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης (‘over the broad back of the sea’) in *Il.* 2.159, 8.511, 20.228, *Od.* 3.142, 4.313, etc.; or ἀλός/θαλάσσης εὐρέα κόλπον (‘the broad bosom of the sea’) in *Il.* 18.140, 21.125, *Od.* 4.435.

35. It is not clear why only the Hellespont should be understood here, since in *Il.* 18.140 Thetis invites the Nereids to plunge into the sea and go to ‘the old man of the sea’; certainly, the Achaean camp where the Nereids are at the moment is on the Hellespont (cf. Janko 1994, 131), but the ‘broad bosom of the sea’ in *Il.* 18.140 (ὕμεις μὲν νῦν δῦτε θαλάσσης εὐρέα κόλπον) can indicate any place under the sea beyond this area. Aristarchus anyway seems to think that ‘broad bosom’ refers only to the Hellespont.

36. Cf. Combellack 1965, 42–43; Richardson 1993, 209. On κατάχρησις, see footnote 14 above.

1.2.2. Out-of-Place Epithets (ἄκαιρα ἐπίθετα)

Aristarchus used the label 'out of place' (ἄκαιρα, ἀκαίρως) for epithets that did not really bear a meaning 'fitting' to the context. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3.6.A § 6 and Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2, he might have taken exception to them, yet the only secure case of an athetesis motivated *just* by an epithet used ἀκαίρως is provided by *Sch. Il.* 23.581a. Normally, however, he seems to have simply noted that an epithet was 'out of place' without athetizing the line, unless other reasons suggested its rejection. This is demonstrated by how he deals with the epithets δῖος/δῖα.³⁷ Aristarchus athetizes *Il.* 3.352, in which, Menelaus oddly calls Paris δῖος, 'noble', but above all because the line is not necessary, since the moment requires Menelaus to be concise as he is praying to Zeus while rushing toward Paris with his spear (*Sch. Il.* 3.352a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἐπιλέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ὁ καιρὸς τὸ σύντομον ἔχειν θέλει. καὶ δῖον ἀκαίρως ὁ Μενέλαος τὸν ἐχθρὸν λέγει).³⁸ Elsewhere, though, he simply notes that the epithet δῖος/δῖα is used ἀκαίρως, but does not athetize the line for that reason: when it refers to Antea, a lustful woman (*Sch. Il.* 6.160a);³⁹ or when Hector speaking to the Trojan and Greek armies together calls himself 'noble' (*Sch. Il.* 7.75a¹). Lastly, there are even cases when δῖος/δῖα have no real meaning in a formulaic expression, but he simply singles them out without labeling them as used ἀκαίρως. Aristarchus does not find it problematic, for instance, that Zeus calls the sea 'noble' (δῖα) (*Sch. Il.* 15.161b; 15.223), or that he applies the epithet δῖος to Hector in *Il.* 15.15 and calls Odysseus θεῖος, 'divine', in *Od.* 1.65 (*Sch. Il.* 15.15a).⁴⁰ This difference in analysis can only be explained by assuming that in these latter cases Aristarchus considered δῖος/δῖα as simply 'generic' rather than 'out of place'. Hence, he had no problem with it. In the former cases, instead, when the epithet 'noble' was used to address an enemy (Menelaus addressing Paris), or for less-than-honorable women (Antea), or when someone (Hector) was applying it to himself, the celebratory side of δῖος/δῖα was in striking contrast with the context. Still, in most of these cases, this was not enough of a reason to reject the line. Aristarchus behaves in the same way with the epithet ἐρατεινός, 'lovely'. At *Il.* 21.218 the river Scamander, talking to Achilles, calls its own streams ἐρατεινὰ; as he points out, however, the Scamander's

37. On the epithet δῖος in Homer, see Parry 1971, 145, 146–147 [= Parry 1928, 181–182, 183–185].

38. Cf. Roemer 1912, 148–149, 203, 347; Lührs 1992, 42–45; van Thiel 2014a, I 324. Aristarchus also objects to Menelaus' kind words about Paris in *Sch. Il.* 3.108a (discussed in Chapter 3.6.B § 4.1).

39. Cf. Roemer 1912, 346; Parry 1971, 122 [= Parry 1928, 151]; Combellack 1965, 41.

40. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.15b (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Roemer 1912, 352–354 (who differentiates between epithets said by the characters and those said 'by the poet'; the latter would be the case for these examples; this could certainly be an Aristarchean criterion—unfortunately Roemer has to treat the evidence with some liberty in order to fit it within this view); Pontani, ad *Sch. Od.* 1.65.

streams are bloody and full of dead bodies because of Achilles' slaughter—thus, they can hardly be 'lovely' (*Sch. Il.* 21.218a: ἄκαιρον τὸ ἐπίθετον). Even so, there is no evidence that he athetized the line.⁴¹

To conclude, in some cases epithets which are defined as 'out of place' (ἄκαιρα) can more simply be considered equivalent to 'generic' (καθολικά) epithets.⁴² Yet, for an epithet, being 'out of place' seems to be more specific than its simply being 'generic'. A use ἀκαίρως has a negative connotation for an epithet since it entails the idea that the adjective is employed 'against the καιρός' required by the context.⁴³ If the terminology goes back to Aristarchus, these examples suggest that he might have wanted to distinguish between cases where epithets simply had no real meaning or a generic one (καθολικά ἐπίθετα) and cases where epithets were in fact at odds with the context (ἄκαιρα ἐπίθετα). Nevertheless, both uses were attested in Homer and should normally be respected.⁴⁴ This distinction surprisingly anticipates some of Milman Parry's ideas about oral poetry and the use of epithets there.⁴⁵

1.2.3. Epithets and Poetic License

On the other hand, in Aristarchus' opinion, Homer could use specific epithets exclusively for aesthetic purposes rather than to 'say something meaning-

41. Cf. Roemer 1912, 337; Parry 1971, 120 [= Parry 1928, 149].

42. In *Sch. Il.* 21.218a Aristarchus quotes *Il.* 8.555 with the epithet 'bright' for the moon (φαεινὴν ἀμφὶ σελήνην) as a parallel for the ἄκαιρον epithet ἐρατεινός. In *Sch. Il.* 8.555a, a scholium attributed to Aristonicus with some doubt by Erbse, the very same epithet is defined καθολικόν (οὐ τὴν τότε οὖσαν 'φαεινὴν', ἀλλὰ τὴν καθόλου 'φαεινὴν' [[the poet calls the moon] 'bright' not because it was so at that time [of night] but because it is generically bright]; see also Ap. Soph. 161.20–26. Cf. Roemer 1912, 337–338; Parry 1971, 121 [= Parry 1928, 150]; Combellack 1987, 207–209; Matthaios 1999, 239.

43. Indeed, the idea that epithets should be used according to καιρός and not in an excessive quantity goes back to Aristotle, who warns against using epithets which are long, out of place, and too frequent (*Rhet.* 1406a10–11: τρίτον δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις τὸ ἢ μακροῖς ἢ ἀκαίροις ἢ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι); see Chapter 3.6.A § 6.

44. For Lotz 1909, 29–32, while the idea of κατάχρησις had an exegetical goal (to explain and save the text—see above, footnote 14), that of ἀκαιρία, 'untimeliness', instead had a critical goal, because Aristarchus athetized lines labeled as ἄκαιροι. As a consequence (and according to Roemer's method), for Lotz the cases in which the principle of ἀκαιρία explains or justifies the use of an epithet perceived as 'out of place' do not derive from Aristarchus. No doubt Aristarchus did athetize lines that were 'out of place' (*Sch. Il.* 8.284a; 23.581a; 24.130–2a); yet, as shown in Chapter 3.6.A § 6 and here, this was not always the case, as he realized that the Homeric text often offered stylistic inconsistencies that had to be respected, either employing the trope of κατάχρησις or the idea of ἀκαιρία in the use of formulaic epithets.

45. See Parry 1971, 1–190, esp. 118–171 [= Parry 1928, 146–217], where, looking at Homeric epithets, he distinguishes between the particularized, or distinctive, epithets and the generic ones. Cf. also Foley 1988, 24–26. Of course, my rendering of the Greek καθολικά ἐπίθετα in the scholia as 'generic epithets' does not imply that Aristarchus' idea was identical to Parry! Yet his analysis of epic epithets was quite sophisticated, as Parry himself recognized; see Parry 1971, 123–124 [= Parry 1928, 152–154].

ful’. One example is Agamemnon’s sword, which in *Il.* 2.45 is ‘silver-studded’ (ἀργυρόηλον), but in *Il.* 11.29–30 has gleaming ‘studs of gold’ (ἐν δέ οἱ ἥλοι / χρύσειοι πάμφαινον). Aristarchus’ comments at both places are instructive:

Sch. Il. 2.45a ξίφος ἀργυρόηλον: ὅτι τὸ Ἀγαμέμνονος <ξίφος> νῦν μὲν ‘ἀργυρόηλον’, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ (sc. *Il.* 11.29–30) χρυσόηλον. καὶ Εὐριπίδης ‘σφυρῶν σιδηρᾶ κέντρα’ εἰπὼν (*Phoen.* 26) ἐν ἄλλοις φησί (*Phoen.* 805) ‘χρυσοδέτοις περόναις’. τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ κυρίως οὐ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἐπιφοράν ἐστι ποιητικῆς ἀρεσκείας. ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸν θώρακα καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα διαφορώτερον φράζει (sc. *Il.* 11.19–28, 32–40), οὕτω καὶ τὸ ξίφος κοσμεῖ (sc. *Il.* 11.29–31).

‘Silver-studded sword’: because Agamemnon’s sword now is ‘silver-studded’ (ἀργυρόηλον), but is gold-studded elsewhere (cf. *Il.* 11.29–30). Euripides, too, says [in one place] ‘iron pins through the ankles’ (*Phoen.* 26) and elsewhere ‘bound-in-gold brooches’ (*Phoen.* 805). But these words are not used according to the standard meaning, but belong to a search for poetic pleasure in accordance with an impulse. Just as he speaks of the armor and the shield in a more distinguished manner (cf. *Il.* 11.19–28 and 32–40), so he also embellishes the sword (cf. *Il.* 11.29–31).

Sch. Il. 11.30 χρύσειοι πάμφαινον: ὅτι νῦν μὲν χρυσόηλον, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ (sc. *Il.* 2.45) ‘ἀργυρόηλον’. ἦτοι κατ’ ἐπιφοράν ἢ διὰ τὴν ἀριστ<ε>ίαν κοσμεῖ διαφορωτέρα πανοπλία.

‘Golden [studs] shone’: because now it is gold-studded, elsewhere (cf. *Il.* 2.45) it is ‘silver-studded’ (ἀργυρόηλον). And he embellishes [Agamemnon] with a more distinguished panoply either in accordance with a [poetic] impulse or because of [Agamemnon’s] *aristeia*.

The apparent contradiction between these two passages can be explained as due to ‘poetic license’ as the poet can say things ‘in accordance with an impulse’ (κατ’ ἐπιφοράν) just for the sake of poetic pleasure (ποιητικὴ ἀρέσκεια). For Aristarchus, Homer is not using epithets in this case according to the ‘standard’, real meaning (κυρίως),⁴⁶ but rather to enhance the beauty of his poem. This is typical of poetry, as the example of Euripides’ *Phoenician Women* demonstrates.⁴⁷ In the note to *Il.* 11.30, moreover, he suggests another alternative solution: Book 11 celebrates Agamemnon’s *aristeia*, and Homer might have embellished his hero with a more distinguished and

46. On the meaning according to standard usage (κυρίως), see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.3.

47. The parallel with Euripides (who in the same tragedy defined the pins which pierced Oedipus’ ankles as both ‘iron’ and ‘golden’) moreover shows that for Aristarchus the use of adjectives devoid of meaning was not typical of Homeric poetry only.

luxurious panoply (i.e., made of gold rather than silver) for that reason.⁴⁸

Similarly, Aristarchus dismisses the contradiction between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* about Crete, which is called ‘of the hundred cities’ (ἐκατόπολις) in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 2.649), while in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 19.174) Homer says that there were ‘ninety cities’ (ἐννῆκοντα πόλεις). This contradiction was singled out by the Chorizontes as evidence that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were not written by the same poet; however, Aristarchus explains that in the *Iliad* the epithet is used generically to mean πολύπολις, ‘with many cities’, or because the number is rounded up, while in the *Odyssey* Homer was more precise (*Sch. Il.* 2.649).⁴⁹

2. Homer’s Poetic Persona

When looking at Homer’s narrative techniques, the question of the ‘identity’ of the narrator is one of the first questions to address. Aristarchus conceived of Homer as intruding in the poem, almost interacting with his characters as well as with his readers through comments, questions, and direct addresses. The following sections will review the different ways in which Aristarchus saw Homer’s persona emerging from the text.

2.1. The Poet’s Persona (ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου/ποιητικοῦ προσώπου) and His Characters’ Persona (ἐκ τοῦ ἡρωϊκοῦ προσώπου)

As seen in Chapter 3.3.B § 6, Aristarchus distinguished between the world of the heroes and the world of Homer: the poet knows objects and habits unknown to his characters, and introduces them only in similes outside the main narrative. In order to distinguish between these two worlds, the Aristonicus scholia use two different formulas: ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου/ποιητικοῦ προσώπου, ‘from his own persona / from his poetic persona’, and ἐξ ἡρωϊκοῦ προσώπου, ‘from the heroic persona’, that is, from the point of view of his characters, the Homeric heroes. For example, in the case of the trumpet, an object known to Homer but not to his characters,⁵⁰ the Aristonicus scholium in *Ge* notes that the

48. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 186; Lehrs 1882, 342; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 26 and 32; Lotz 1909, 34; Roemer 1912, 263–264, and Roemer 1924, 225; Kohl 1917, 78–79 (fr. *30); Meijering 1987, 65–66; Nünlist 2009, 175–176; Bouchard 2016, 199–200.

49. See also *Sch. V Od.* 19.174 (ἐν Ἰλιάδι ἐκατόπολιν τὴν Κρήτην λέγει, οὐχ ὠρισμένως ἐκατὸν πόλεις ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλὰς); cf. Carnuth 1869, 150. The problem had been addressed before by Aristotle (fr. 146 Rose), Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 171 Wehrli), and Ephorus (*FGrHist* 70 F 146); cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 2.649; Kohl 1917, 17–20 (fr. 2); Montanari 1995a, 16–19; Bouchard 2016, 252–256. See Chapter 5.2 § 2.2.

50. See Chapter 3.3.B § 6.

metaphorical phrase ‘great heaven trumpeted around’ in *Il.* 21.388 is ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου (*Sch. Il.* 21.388a³), meaning that Homer is speaking in his own persona, since a character could not use this metaphor. Similarly, when in the *Iliad* we hear of Corinth, Homer speaks ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου, but when the same city is called Ephyra, he is speaking in his character’s persona, ἐξ ἡρωϊκοῦ προσώπου (*Sch. Il.* 2.570a¹; 6.152b; 13.301b).⁵¹ Likewise, when Homer speaks of the sun rising from or setting into Oceanus, he is speaking ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου; on the contrary, when we read of the sun rising from the earth, this is said ἐξ ἡρωϊκοῦ προσώπου (*Sch. Il.* 8.485a; 11.735b^{1,2}).⁵² Aristarchus uses these formulas to explain that these cases do not represent contradictions but are simply due to different characters, who speak a different language and live in a different world.

The distinction between Homer’s persona and those of his characters extends beyond the simple analysis of *historiai*, however. For instance, there are epithets more suitably used by the poet and epithets more appropriately employed by characters. Thus, when Apollo, disguised as Phaenops, talks to Hector and describes Menelaus as a ‘weak warrior’ (μαλθακὸς αἰχμητής), Aristarchus comments that these words should not be taken as if Menelaus really were a weak warrior; rather, it is said by a character who is an enemy and wants to slander Menelaus; in fact, Homer calls Menelaus ἀρηϊφίλος, ‘dear to Ares’ (*Sch. Il.* 17.588a).⁵³

By the same token, characters cannot say things that the poet should say, such as adding explanatory comments. Thus, when Idomeneus speaks about Diomedes and adds ‘an Aetolian by race, and he rules among the Argives’ (*Il.* 23.471), Aristarchus athetizes this line because this kind of explanation is the task of the poet, not of characters (*Sch. Il.* 23.471: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι τὸ ἐπεξηγεῖσθαι ποιητικόν, οὐχ ἡρωϊκοῦ προσώπου).⁵⁴ Similarly, when Nestor boasts about

51. Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 2.570a²; on Ephyra/Corinth, see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.1 and § 3.2. The following scholia do not use these formulas, but the concept is the same: *Sch. Il.* 6.210: ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἥρωες Ἐφυραν παράγονται λέγοντες, αὐτὸς δὲ Κόρινθον λέγει τὴν πόλιν [the heroes are introduced as calling the city ‘Ephyra’, but he himself calls it ‘Corinth’]; and *Sch. Il.* 13.664b (ex. [Ariston.]): ὅτε ἥρωας λέγει, Ἐφυραν ὀνομάζει [when a hero speaks, he says ‘Ephyra’]. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 228.

52. See Chapter 3.3.B § 4.2. Similar but without the formula is *Sch. Il.* 7.422: ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν ἐξ Ὀκεανοῦ ἀνατέλλειν καὶ εἰς Ὀκεανὸν φησι καταδύεσθαι τὸν ἥλιον. ὁπότεν δὲ πρόσωπον ἡρωϊκὸν εἰσάγη, ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν . . . [because Homer himself says that the sun rises from Oceanus and sets into Oceanus, but when he introduces a heroic character, [the character says] ‘over the earth’ and ‘below the earth’ . . .].

53. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 40; Roemer 1924, 254–255; Bouchard 2016, 262. Roemer and Erbse (ad *Sch. Il.* 17.588a) suggest that Aristarchus might be thinking of Plato here, who in *Symp.* 174c1 quotes this line as proof that Homer depicts Menelaus in a negative light.

54. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 19; Roemer 1912, 201 and 347–348; Schenkeveld 1970, 173; Lührs 1992, 69–72; Bouchard 2016, 302–303. Yet in *Sch. Il.* 23.627a Aristarchus accepts a linguistic ‘gloss’ in Nestor’s words (see Chapter 3.3.A § 1.1). According to van Thiel 2014a, III 463 and 474,

his deeds against the Epeians, he describes himself as springing upon the enemies ‘like a black tempest’ (*Il.* 11.747), a simile that Aristarchus comments upon by saying that the heroic character onstage has fallen into ‘poetic style’ within the poem (*Sch. Il.* 11.747a: ὅτι ἐκπέπτωκεν εἰς ποιητικὴν κατασκευὴν τὸ παρηγμένον ἡρώϊκον πρόσωπον κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν). Similes are proper to poetry and poets, not fictional characters.⁵⁵

On the other hand, patronymics are not simply ‘poetic’ epithets, but are part of the ancient social conventions, according to which people used to call each other by mentioning their lineage. This is demonstrated by Agamemnon, when he invites Menelaus to call each man using patronymics:

Sch. Il. 10.68c πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς: ὅτι ἀρχαϊκὴ ἡ συνήθεια, ὥστε εἴ που τοιοῦτον εὐρίσκομεν, εἰδέναι δεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιθέτου ἔχει χώραν.

‘[Calling each man] by his family, adding the father’s name’: because the habit is archaic, so that if we find something of that kind [i.e., a patronymic] we must know that it does not have the function of an epithet.

In the scholium there is no opposition between what is said ἐξ ἡρώϊκοῦ προσώπου and what is said ἐκ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ προσώπου, but it is tempting to assume that such a distinction underlies Aristarchus’ comment here. In this case, he might have wanted to distinguish the use of patronymics. When they occur within the narrative, they are just part of the poetic style, since Homer likes to ‘adorn’ his characters by adding epithets; on the contrary, when patronymics are used directly by the characters themselves, this is not a ‘poetic embellishment’, but is due to the ‘archaic habit’ (ἀρχαϊκὴ συνήθεια) of naming people through their father’s name.⁵⁶

2.2. The Poet ‘Speaks Up’ (ἀναφωνεῖ [ὁ ποιητής])

Aristarchus also observed that Homer sometimes intervenes with his own persona into the narrative and ‘speaks up’ (ἀναφωνεῖ), commenting on the sad

Aristarchus athetized ‘explanations’ provided by characters when they occupied an entire line (as in *Il.* 23.471) and not only half of it (as in *Il.* 23.627). This might be true; but perhaps Aristarchus simply adopted two different behaviors because Nestor’s ‘gloss’ is minimal and quite natural in the context of his words (‘my limbs (γυῖα), my feet (πόδες), are no longer firm’—namely, he clarifies that γυῖα mean feet), while the clarification about Diomedes’ origin and role in the army in *Il.* 23.471 sounds very odd in the mouth of Idomeneus, who is speaking to the other Greek leaders.

55. As suggested by his comment on *Il.* 11.747 about the ‘poetic style’ (ποιητικὴ κατασκευή), Aristarchus also seems to have agreed with Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1406b24–25) in considering similes typical of poetry and not of prose. On Aristarchus and similes, see Chapter 3.2.A § 4.

56. For another case of ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου, see *Sch. Il.* 10.240, discussed in the next section. On the opposition between the poet and his characters in ancient exegesis, see also Schironi 2019c.

destiny of some of his heroes. For example, when Patroclus begs Achilles to let him use his armor and fight, Homer comments: ‘so he spoke praying—a great fool: for he was doubtlessly praying for his own cruel death and destiny’ (*Il.* 16.46–47). Aristarchus remarks that the poet has stepped into the middle of the narrative to say something in his own persona (*Sch. Il.* 16.46c¹: διὰ μέσου ἀναπεφώνηται) and also quotes *Od.* 1.18–19 as a parallel, where Homer says that Odysseus finally returns to Ithaca, ‘but not even there was he going to escape toils, even among his own people.’⁵⁷ In these lines, however, more than commenting on the events, Homer is anticipating what is going to happen in the poem: Odysseus’ return home and the challenges he will meet there. Indeed, Aristarchus does not seem to have sharply differentiated between ‘comments’ and ‘anticipations’ (prolepseis, see below, § 2.3).⁵⁸ This should not be surprising, though, especially because most of Homer’s ‘comments’ include some kind of anticipation of what is going to happen.

The intrusions of the poet can be also more subtle, as when Homer uses an adjective that somehow either comments on what is happening or anticipates future events. For example, when Hector promises Dolon horses as a reward for his volunteering to go on a night expedition to spy on the Greeks, he seals the promise with an oath, and Homer concludes that ‘he swore a false oath (ἐπίορκον ἐπώμοσε)’ (*Il.* 10.332). Obviously, ἐπίορκον (lit., ‘falsely sworn’) is Homer’s own comment, since Hector cannot know that Dolon will be killed and thus this oath will not be fulfilled, as Aristarchus remarks:

Sch. Il. 10.332a {ὥς φάτο} καί ῥ’ ἐπίορκον ἐπώμοσε: . . . τοῦτο δὲ ἔξωθεν ἐπιπεφώνηται ‘ὄρκον ἐπίορκον ὤμοσεν’, οὐχ οἷον ἐκουσίως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ <μὴ> ἀποτελεσθῆναι τοῦτο, ὅπερ ὤμοσεν.

‘And he swore a false oath’: . . . [The poet] has said this [intruding] from outside: ‘he swore a false oath’, not because [he swore a false oath] willingly but because what he swore is not going to happen.⁵⁹

Similarly, Homer expresses concerns about Asius approaching the Greek ships during the battle at the wall in *Il.* 12.113: ‘fool that he was! For he was not going to escape his evil fate’. This example is quoted as a parallel in a scholium on *Il.* 10.240, where Homer comments on Agamemnon, who has invited Diomedes to choose whoever he wants as companion for his incursion to the Trojan camp, ‘so he [i.e., Agamemnon] spoke, but he feared for blond Menelaus’, namely, Agamemnon was afraid that Diomedes might choose Menelaus. Aristarchus

57. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 23.

58. See Nünlist 2009, 43–45, who also touches upon the examples discussed here.

59. Cf. Bouchard 2016, 306.

considers both *Il.* 10.240 and 12.113 ‘external comments’ by the poet himself (*Sch. Il.* 10.240: ἡ δὲ διπλῆ, ὅτι ἔξωθεν ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου ἀναφωνεῖ).⁶⁰ In fact, he also athetizes line 240 as superfluous and redundant (περισσὸς ὁ στίχος καὶ παρέλκων) and adds that the thought is fully expressed without it (still *Sch. Il.* 10.240). The line is not necessary because it adds no significant information: Diomedes eventually chooses Odysseus without hesitation, and Menelaus’ name is never suggested.⁶¹ Aristarchus probably also did not like the line because a hero such as Agamemnon should not be afraid, so this glimpse into the king’s feelings is not necessary—actually, it is inappropriate for the specific character.⁶²

2.3. The Poet Speaks in Anticipation (προαναφωνεῖ [ὁ ποιητής])

The term ‘prolepsis’ (or anticipation) more specifically indicates when the poet ‘anticipates’ something in the narrative.⁶³ The ancient ‘technical’ terms are προαναφωνεῖν and προαναφώνησις; the latter, in particular, is listed as a trope by Tryphon,⁶⁴ and as a ‘rhetorical elaboration’ (κατασκευή) by Pseudo-Herodian in his *De Figuris*.⁶⁵ There are only two Aristonicus scholia discussing prolepsis in the *Iliad*. In the first one, it is clear that the idea of ‘anticipation’ extends to the *Odyssey*, because Aristarchus notes that Homer can give glimpses in the *Iliad* of what he is going to treat in more depth in the *Odyssey*, in particular concerning the relationship between Odysseus and Telemachus (*Sch. Il.* 2.260a: ἡ διπλῆ δὲ <ὅτι> προδιασυνίστησιν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν μέλλοντα λόγου τυχεῖν πλείονος).⁶⁶ The other scholium uses prolepsis in Homer to solve a *zetema*:

60. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 207; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 23 and II 16; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 12.113; Nünlist 2009, 44 and 119 n. 15; Bouchard 2016, 304.

61. Cf. Roemer 1912, 203–204; Meijering 1987, 175; Lührs 1992, 84–86; Bouchard 2016, 303.

62. On Agamemnon as a hero, see Chapter 5.4 § 2.

63. On anticipation in ancient scholia and literary criticism, see Meijering 1987, 204–209, and Nünlist 2009, 34–45.

64. Tryph. i 203.15–16: προαναφώνησις ἐστὶ λέξις περὶ τῶν μελλόντων προαναφωνουμένη μεταξὺ τῆς συνεχούσης διηγήσεως [statement by anticipation is an expression which announces beforehand what is going to happen in the middle of a continuous narrative].

65. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 61: προαναφώνησις δὲ ἡ τὰ μέλλοντα αὐθις διὰ πλείονων ῥηθήσεσθαι προσυνιστώσα φράσις, οἷον· ‘ἢ γὰρ ἔμελλε / οἱ τ’ αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι’ (*Il.* 16.46–47) [statement by anticipation is a phrase that brings together beforehand things that are going to be said again later with more words, for example, ‘for he was doubtlessly praying for his own cruel death and destiny’ (*Il.* 16.46–47)]. In fact, *Il.* 16.46–47 is among the examples analyzed in the previous section; yet here Pseudo-Herodian limits the quotation only to the second part, which is indeed an anticipation. Aristarchus, on the other hand, probably referred to the sympathetic comment by Homer at the beginning of line 46: ὧς φάτο λισσόμενος μέγα νήπιος [so he spoke praying—a great fool].

66. Cf. Meijering 1987, 203–204; Nünlist 2009, 33–34. This idea confirms that for Aristarchus the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were part of the same literary and mythical universe; see Chapter 5.2 § 1.

Sch. Il. 11.604b κακοῦ δ’ ἄρα οἱ πέλεν ἀρχή: σημειοῦνται τινες ὅτι οὐ πόρρωθεν ἢ προαναφώνησις. κάκεϊ οὖν οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ πόρρω ἢ ἀπότασις ‘Διὸς δ’ ἐτελείετο βουλή’ (*Il.* 1.5).

‘And it was the beginning of evil for him’: some mark the line because the anticipation is not far [i.e., from the actual events recounted in the narrative]. Thus there too, ‘and the will of Zeus was accomplished’ (*Il.* 1.5), the reference is not to events very far in time.

In *Il.* 11.599–615 Achilles sees that Nestor is going to help the wounded Machaon and calls on Patroclus to go and see what has happened. Homer comments (l. 604) ‘this was the beginning of evil for him’, anticipating the death of Patroclus in Book 16, since the meeting with Nestor will convince Patroclus to go to war wearing Achilles’ armor. Aristonicus notes that ‘some’ pointed out that the distance between Homer’s comment about Patroclus’ destiny and the realization of this destiny is small—namely, only five books. This comment alludes to a *zetema* regarding the beginning of the *Iliad*, when Homer says in the proem that the will of Zeus was accomplished (*Il.* 1.5). Ancient scholars discussed what the ‘accomplishment’ of Zeus’ will really was. For Aristarchus, it simply refers to Zeus’ promise to Thetis to honor Achilles, offended by Agamemnon (*Il.* 1.503–530). Thus, Homer is not alluding to an event far off in time and, above all, outside the poem, as the Neoteroi wanted, since they interpreted the ‘will of Zeus’ as the god’s decision to solve the problem of overpopulation by causing a war (*Sch. Il.* 1.5–6).⁶⁷ Whether or not he was originally included among those τινές who made the comment about the short-term anticipation in *Il.* 11.604,⁶⁸ Aristarchus seems to have used the example of Book 11 with a prolepsis to Book 16 to confirm his point about the prolepsis in Book 1.⁶⁹

2.4. Homer’s Rhetorical Questions (and Answers)

Homer can also intrude into the poem by asking rhetorical questions which he himself answers.⁷⁰ This happens in Book 11, where Homer asks the Muses to tell him who among the Trojans and their allies came to face Agamemnon (*Il.*

67. See also *Sch. D Il.* 1.5 and the discussion in Chapter 5.3 § 3.1.1 (with footnote 49).

68. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 15. On the question of the anonymous τινές in the Aristonicus scholia, see Chapter 1.1 § 4.1.

69. Cf. Nünlist 2009, 40. Yet, unlike Nünlist, I do not think that on the basis of this scholium we can conclude that, according to Aristarchus, Homer was fond of internal prolepsis, since these are the only examples; rather, for Aristarchus Homer was *not* fond of anticipations too far off in time. Cf. also Meijering 1987, 204 (whose analysis, however, is not very clear, as already remarked by Nünlist).

70. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 15.

218–220), and he himself provides an answer: ‘It was Iphidamas, son of Antenor, brave and great’ (l. 221). Aristarchus comments on this line by saying that Homer has responded to the question as if he was inspired (*Sch. Il.* 11.221a: ὥς ἐμπνευσθεὶς ἀνταποδέδωκε)—namely, inspired by the Muses, who are the addressees of the question. In the same scholium, he also quotes *Il.* 1.8–9 (‘who of the gods brought them to fight in discord? / The son of Leto and Zeus’) as another example of this technique. Aristarchus even seems to have considered rhetorical questions not followed by an answer as typical of Homer. For this reason, in fact, he argues against Zenodotus, who athetized one such question at *Il.* 17.260–261: ‘but who could list in his own mind the names of the others / who roused the battle of the Achaeans afterward?’ This rhetorical question should be kept, as it amplifies the magnitude and epic flavor of the battle for Patroclus’ body (*Sch. Il.* 17.260a: ἀλλ’ αὖξουσὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ὑπὲρ Πατρόκλου μάχης).⁷¹

2.5. Homer’s Direct Addresses (ἀποστροφαί)

Apostrophe indicates any time a speaker ‘turns away’ (ἀποστρέφειν) from one person to another; so it included many different phenomena, as explained by Nünlist.⁷² Here I will focus on the ‘apostrophe’ proper: when the poet ‘turns away’ from the usual narrative mode and addresses his characters directly in order to create an emotional effect.⁷³ Aristarchus, for example, notes the apostrophe to Melanippus (*Sch. Il.* 15.582b) and to Patroclus (*Sch. Il.* 16.20: πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἀποστροφήν) during battle scenes. The latter (at *Il.* 16.20) is the first of many direct addresses to Patroclus (certainly one of Homer’s favorite heroes) in Book 16, most of which are singled out in the Aristonicus scholia.⁷⁴ In this case, Aristarchus is especially keen to notice when Homer switches from a direct address to Patroclus (with verbs in the second-person singular) to a normal narrative tone (with verbs in the third-person singular), and the

71. On amplification (αὖξισις or ἐπαύξισις), see Chapter 3.2.A § 17.

72. Nünlist 2009, 114; cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 16; Lausberg 1998, §§ 762–763.

73. [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 7: ἡ δὲ τῶν προσώπων μετάβασις ποιεῖ τὴν καλουμένην ἀποστροφήν, οἷον ‘τὸν δ’ ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη Πατρόκλεις ἵππευ·’ (cf. *Il.* 16.20) καί, ‘ἔνθα κέ τοι Μενέλαε φάνη βιοτοῖο τελευτή’ (*Il.* 7.104). τὸν γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον ἀφείς εἰς τὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐτράπη, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίτου προσώπου τὴν μετάβασιν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῦτερον ἐποιήσατο [the change of person produces the so-called apostrophe, for example ‘answering to him you said, horseman Patroclus’ (cf. *Il.* 16.20) and ‘and then, Menelaus, the end of life would have appeared to you’ (*Il.* 7.104). For, leaving the speech about him, he turned directly to him, that is, he made a change from the third person to the second person]. On Aristarchus’ approach to this type of ἀποστροφὰ τοῦ λόγου from a grammatical point of view, see Matthaios 1999, 389–391 (frs. 87 and 89).

74. *Sch. Il.* 16.584 (ἀπέστροφε τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῶν περὶ <αὐ>τοῦ <εἰς τὸν> πρὸς αὐτόν); 16.586 (μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Πάτροκλον λόγου {καί} πάλιν εἰς τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ); 16.697a¹ (ἀπέστροφε τὸν λόγον ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ πολλάκις ἀποστροφὰς ποιεῖται); 16.789b (ἀπέστροφε τὸν λόγον ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ); 16.812 (πρὸς τὴν ἀποστροφήν).

Aristonicus scholia indicate this phenomenon with the formulas πρὸς αὐτόν (direct address) versus περὶ αὐτοῦ (narrative), both of which recall the phrasing used by Aristotle in *Rhet.* 1358a37–b2.⁷⁵ The latter, as Matthaios notes,⁷⁶ does not know the word ἀποστροφή, which instead seems to have been known to Aristarchus (if we trust Aristonicus’ testimony). If this is the case, then we can see another development in critical terminology in ‘naming’ tropes and figures between the time of Aristotle and that of Aristarchus, as we already noticed in Chapter 3.2.A § 18.

In the series of direct addresses to Patroclus, in particular Aristarchus argues against Zenodotus (*Sch. Il.* 16.697a¹⁻²), who at *Il.* 16.697 read ἔλες, ‘you killed’, instead of the third-person ἔλεν, thinking that Homer is still addressing Patroclus directly. In fact, Homer addresses the hero directly at lines 692–693, when he asks him whom he slew when the gods themselves were about to call him to death.⁷⁷ The list of the heroes killed by Patroclus follows (*Il.* 694–696), ending with the final comment (l. 697): ‘those he killed (ἔλεν); and the others, each of them, turned their mind to flight’. With this comment, according to Aristarchus, Homer switches from a direct address to his normal descriptive technique, though Zenodotus did not realize that—even if apostrophes are often used by Homer (*Sch. Il.* 16.697a¹: ἀγνοεῖ δὲ ὅτι ἀπέστροφε τὸν λόγον ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν ἐπὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ πολλάκις ἀποστροφὰς ποιεῖται).⁷⁸ Similarly, when Homer directly addresses Menelaus at *Il.* 17.679 and 702, while returning in between to the battle description, Aristarchus duly notices all these switches in narrative modes (*Sch. Il.* 17.681b; 17.702; 17.705).⁷⁹

2.6. Homer’s ‘Generic You’ (ὡς πρὸς τινα / ὡς πρὸς ὑποκείμενον πρόσωπον)

Another, different type of ‘direct address’ is when Homer uses the second-person singular for generic statements, as if addressing a person in front of

75. See Nünlist 2009, 110–111. In fact, the formulas περὶ αὐτοῦ and πρὸς αὐτόν are used by Pseudo-Herodian as well in the definition reported in footnote 73.

76. Matthaios 1999, 390.

77. *Il.* 16.692–693: ἔνθα τίνα πρῶτον τίνα δ’ ὕστατον ἐξενάριξας / Πατρόκλεις, ὅτε δὴ σε θεοὶ θάνατον δὲ κάλεσαν; [and then whom did you slay first and whom last, Patroclus, when the gods were calling you to your death?].

78. Cf. Janko 1994, 398; Matthaios 1999, 391; Bouchard 2016, 312–313.

79. Cf. Nünlist 2009, 110 n. 63. A different type of apostrophe is when characters change person in the middle of speeches (see [Hrd.] *Fig.* § 35; *Alex. Fig.* 23.28–24.20); Aristarchus notices them and calls them ἀποστροφαί (*Sch. Il.* 2.12c; 3.99a; 17.250a). I am not discussing these cases here because they do not concern Homer’s poetic persona; rather, they are similar to notes like *Sch. Il.* 5.878a and 16.496a, discussed (together with other changes of persons in verbal forms) in Chapter 3.2.B § 3.8. Another, yet different type of ἀποστροφή is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 4.303a; see below, § 3.6.

him but outside the narrative (so, not his characters).⁸⁰ This happens, for example, when in battle descriptions Homer says phrases such as (οὐκ) ἄν γνοίης, ‘you would (not) have known’, or (οὐδὲ) φαίης κε, ‘you would (not) have deemed’, as in *Il.* 4.429–430,⁸¹ 5.85–86,⁸² and 15.697–698.⁸³ In the scholia to these lines (*Sch. Il.* 4.429–31a; 5.85a; 15.697) Aristarchus first notes that Homer speaks (λέγει/διαλέγεται) ‘as if addressing someone / an existing character’ (ὥς πρὸς τινα / ὥς πρὸς ὑποκείμενον πρόσωπον) before then paraphrasing the second-person statement into a generic statement with τις.⁸⁴ When the same device occurs in *Il.* 4.223,⁸⁵ Aristarchus simply observes that Homer is not speaking to a fictitious character, again paraphrasing it with a third-person statement (*Sch. Il.* 4.223c: ὅτι οὐ πρὸς ὑφ’εστὸς πρόσωπον, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἴδοι τις ἄν).

Just as with apostrophes, characters too can say ‘you’ while speaking to someone, but without addressing this person and in order to make a generic statement. These cases are trickier because, unlike with Homer, who in ‘normal narrative’ uses the third person and switches to the second in the apostrophes or when using the ‘generic you’, the character speaking is already addressing another character with the second person. So Aristarchus must alert readers that in these cases the speaker is not really addressing his interlocutor, but rather making a statement with a ‘generic you’. In two out of three scholia noticing this rhetorical device (*Sch. Il.* 3.220a; 3.392b; 14.58a), Aristarchus observes that this is typical of Homer (κατὰ μέντοι γε Ὀμηρικὴν συνήθειαν in *Sch. Il.* 3.220a and Ὀμηρικὸν τὸ ἔθος in *Sch. Il.* 14.58a).

As is clear, both the apostrophe and the ‘generic you’ often also involve a change in person, from the third to the second (except in this last case, where there is only the second person but a different referent—i.e., not the character being addressed). Thus, they also belong to the analysis of figures and syntax, even if they are specifically connected with the analysis of the poet’s persona and its relation with his characters (though the same phenomena can also be observed within the characters’ speeches).

80. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 392 (fr. 88); Bouchard 2016, 311–312.

81. *Il.* 4.429–430: ‘the others went in silence—you would not have deemed (οὐδέ κε φαίης) that such a huge multitude that followed had a voice in their breasts’.

82. *Il.* 5.85–86: ‘but you could not have known (οὐκ ἄν γνοίης) with which army Tydeus’ son was, whether he was on the side of the Trojans, or of the Achaeans’.

83. *Il.* 15.697–698: ‘you would have deemed (φαίης κ’[ε]) that they faced one another in war all unwearied and unworn, so furiously they fought’.

84. That is, οὐδέ κε φαίης in *Il.* 4.429 is paraphrased as οὐδὲ φαίη τις ἄν; οὐκ ἄν γνοίης in *Il.* 5.85 is paraphrased as οὐκ ἄν τις ἔγνω; φαίης κ’(ε) in *Il.* 15.697 is paraphrased as φαίη τις ἄν.

85. *Il.* 4.223–225: ‘and then you would not have seen (οὐκ ἄν . . . ἴδοις) noble Agamemnon slumbering, nor cowering, nor unwilling to fight, but striving after battle where men win glory’.

3. Homer’s Narrative Technique

Another important aspect of Homer’s art is his narrative technique, namely, how Homer recounts his events and how his readers are expected to deal with, and react to, his narrative. Rather than stemming from a genuine interest in ‘narratology’ per se, Aristarchus’ analysis of Homeric narrative techniques originated from the need to explain unclear passages, as well as from his desire to ‘save’ Homer from the charge of being obscure or, worse, of contradicting himself. Therefore, these remarks perfectly fit into the sixth part of grammar because their aim was to prove the soundness of the Homeric text. In his analysis, furthermore, Aristarchus displayed a keen sense for some subtle aspects of narrative technique.

3.1. Events Which Happened ‘Tacitly’ (κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον)

As Nünlist has shown,⁸⁶ the principle of κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον was widely employed by ancient critics, including Aristarchus. The idea behind it was that the reader sometimes needed to fill in gaps in the narrative by assuming that the poet did not ‘openly’ (κατὰ τὸ ῥητόν or ῥητῶς) mention an event which happened ‘tacitly’ (κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον or σιωπωμένως), because it must be taken for granted in the course of the story.⁸⁷ A similar phenomenon is also listed among tropes by Tryphon i.⁸⁸

In particular, Aristarchus criticizes Zenodotus for not recognizing this principle when he comments on such a case (*Sch. Il.* 21.17b¹: ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον, ἀγνοοῦντα ὅτι πολλὰ δεῖ προσδέχεσθαι κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον ἐνεργούμενα).⁸⁹ In two other passages from Book 16 he also accuses Zenodotus

86. Nünlist 2009, 157–164.

87. On this principle, see also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 8–9; Meinel 1915 (who also calls it σχῆμα σιωπήσεως); Roemer 1924, 181–184 and 239–248 (σχῆμα σιωπήσεως); Bouchard 2016, 188–197. In particular, Meinel 1915, 8–12, distinguishes three types of this *schema* in the Aristonic scholia: (1) when the poet tells the end but not the beginning of an event (*Il.* 16.432, 16.666, 21.17); (2) when the poet tells the beginning but not the end of an event (*Il.* 9.224, 10.215–216 and 571); (3) when the poet refers to details which happened before but which he has never told (*Il.* 6.337, 17.24, 8.230, 12.211). The cases of *Il.* 10.215–216 and 571 are discussed below, at § 3.2, and the case of *Il.* 8.230 at § 3.4. Meinel (1915, 11) also distinguishes between ‘real’ σχῆμα σιωπήσεως (when the reader must guess details on his own) and παράλειψις, ‘omission’ (when the poet himself later says things that have happened before), noting, however, that the scholia do not distinguish precisely between these two categories. On this distinction, see Nünlist 2009, 161–162.

88. Tryph. i 199.26–200.2: παρασιώπησις ἐστὶ λόγος, ἐν ᾧ δύο ὀφειλόντων πραγμάτων κατὰ τὸ πλήρες λέγεσθαι, τοῦ μὲν ἐνός ἐστὶν ἀπαγγελία, τοῦ δ’ ἑτέρου παρασιώπησις κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον νοουμένη [passing over in silence is a way of speaking in which of two events which should be narrated in full, one is reported, while the other is passed over in silence and understood by inference].

89. On the specific question of Book 21, see also *Sch. Il.* 21.17b²; 21.67a^{1,2}. Cf. Roemer 1924, 243; Nünlist 2009, 159.

of either deleting or changing the text because he did not realize that specific facts (in these two cases, that Hera and Zeus have moved from one place to another) must be assumed *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον* (*Sch. Il.* 16.432a; 16.666b^{1,2}; 16.677).⁹⁰

Although the expression *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον* is most common in the Aristonicus scholia to express this concept,⁹¹ other words or phrases can sometimes be used to signify the same idea.⁹² Aside from the cases already discussed by Nünlist, where Aristarchus properly applies this principle, there are more questionable instances. For example, Book 9 ends with a powerful speech by Diomedes (*Il.* 9.697–709), who says that he wished Agamemnon had not offered Achilles all those gifts because they have only increased his arrogance; Achilles can either stay or fight, but his scornful answer should not prevent the Greeks from fighting and resisting the Trojans. Later on, in Book 16, when Patroclus begs Achilles to let him take his armor and fight, Achilles finally agrees, as he sees that the Trojans are overwhelming the Achaeans and comments: ‘for the spear does not rage in the hands of Diomedes, the son of Tydeus, to avert destruction from the Danaans’ (*Il.* 16.74–75). Aristarchus concludes that, to make such a sarcastic remark, Achilles must have heard Diomedes’ comments in Book 9 *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον* (*Sch. Il.* 9.698a; 9.709a; 16.74a). This conclusion, though reasonable, is not the only possible explanation of Achilles’ comment. In his speech, the hero is commenting generally on the weakness of the Greeks (*Il.*

90. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.432b (ex. [Did. + ex.?). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 336; Roemer 1924, 244; Nünlist 2009, 158–159, who also observes that Zenodotus seems to have recognized this principle, but perhaps did not apply it to the passages in Book 16. For a long and elaborated defense of Zenodotus, see Nickau 1977, 139–154. Aristarchus discusses another case of both Hera and Zeus going somewhere (to Olympus in this case) *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον* in *Sch. Il.* 18.356a^{1,2}; see below, § 3.2 with footnote 96.

91. See *Sch. Il.* 6.337a (at *Il.* 6.337–338 Paris tells Hector that Helen has urged him to go to war, and we must understand that Helen’s recommendation has already happened *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον*); *Sch. Il.* 9.224 (at *Il.* 9.224 Odysseus offers Achilles a cup of wine, and we must assume that he has accepted it *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον*, since at line 225 Odysseus starts his speech); *Sch. Il.* 17.24a (in *Il.* 17.24–28 Menelaus refers to the offensive words that Hyperenor addressed to him before being killed by Menelaus himself; when Hyperenor dies in *Il.* 14.516–519, however, his abusive behavior is not mentioned, but ‘perhaps’ must be understood *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον*; see also *Sch. Il.* 14.516b; cf. Nünlist 2009, 162).

92. See, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 12.211a (σημειοῦνται τινες ὅτι τοῦτο ὡς γινόμενον λέγει, γινόμενον δὲ οὐ παρίστησι [some mark the line because he speaks about this fact as if it had happened, but does not show it as happening]). Nünlist 2009, 164, also includes cases with the verb (προσ)ὑπακούειν (*Sch. Il.* 7.353a and 9.77a), which mostly concern syntactic and semantic supplements rather than ‘mental supplements’ of events not fully narrated (see Chapter 3.2.B § 7 with footnotes 232 and 234). In fact, the literary principle of *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον* must be kept distinct from the cases where *τὸ σιωπώμενον* is used alone to mean a syntactic gap which needs to be supplemented in order to understand a sentence, as for example in *Sch. Il.* 3.224a. This looser sense of *σιωπώμενον* in *Sch. Il.* 3.224a has already been suggested by Nünlist 2009, 170 and n. 33.

66–69), including that of Agamemnon (Il. 76–77); moreover, Diomedes is one of the strongest warriors. Hence, remarking that not even he can do anything against the Trojans is a way of stressing the danger of the situation—with no need to assume that Achilles is alluding to Diomedes’ speech. Furthermore, it is not obvious how Achilles could have heard this speech: while Achilles’ hut is at the extreme right side of the camp, Agamemnon’s hut, where Diomedes delivered his speech (cf. *Il.* 9.669–670), is on the left, even though it is near the center.⁹³ Achilles could not have overheard the speech from his hut, unless he went and spied on the meeting in Agamemnon’s quarters (something not at all in line with Achilles’ character),⁹⁴ or unless someone else reported Diomedes’ speech to him. Aristarchus, however, does not discuss these options, and his comments are limited to the unconvincing suggestion that Achilles overheard Diomedes’ comments κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον.⁹⁵

3.2. Events by Conclusion (κατὰ συμπέρασμα) or in Summary (κεφαλαιωδῶς)

The underlying assumption of the events κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον is that the poet does not mention them but takes them for granted, and the readers are simply presented with the conclusions. Indeed, the principle that Homer’s focus is sometimes only on the conclusion (συμπέρασμα) of an action is explicitly spelled out at least twice in the Aristarchean scholia. In both cases, moreover, this principle is connected to details that happened κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον. So Aristarchus once says that ‘the poet mentions many events which have happened tacitly by their conclusion’ (*Sch. Il.* 16.432a: πολλὰ κατὰ συμπέρασμα λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς σιωπώμενως γεγονότα); and then, commenting on the fact that at *Il.* 18.356 Zeus and Hera have reached Olympus ‘tacitly’, he concludes that one should not be puzzled when Homer mentions events ‘by their conclusion’ (*Sch. Il.* 18.356a¹: κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον . . . καὶ οὐ ξενιστέον, ὅταν λέγῃ κατὰ συμπέρασμα).⁹⁶

Homer’s focus on the conclusion of events was closely linked with another

93. On Aristarchus’ view of the order of the Achaean contingents in the camp, see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.2 and § 3.5.3.

94. And not even in line with what Aristarchus thought of Achilles as a character; see Chapter 5.4 § 1.

95. To solve this question, Roemer 1912, 215, considers the scholia to this passage as due to a misunderstanding of Aristonicus (as typical of Roemer’s method): rather, Aristarchus would have only noted that Achilles’ words in Book 16 would remind readers of Diomedes’ comments in Book 9. Cf. also Meinel 1915, 12; Roemer 1924, 234.

96. This is the first type of σχῆμα σιωπῆσεως for Meinel 1915, 8 (see above, footnote 87). Yet Meinel (1915, 11–12), following Roemer’s teachings, denies that *Sch. Il.* 18.356a^{1,2} is derived from Aristarchus because in that case the principle is not well applied; a more balanced discussion is now in Nünlist 2009, 160.

important principle which Aristarchus identified in Homeric poetry, namely, that Homer liked to narrate in summary (κεφαλαιωδῶς). The connection between these two ideas is clear in the following example from Book 10. During the council of the Greeks, Nestor asks for volunteers for a night expedition to spy on the Trojans, promising a gift (l. 213): each of the leaders will give them a black sheep and a lamb (ll. 214–216). Aristarchus notes that, whereas the promise of a gift is openly made in this speech, the fulfillment of this promise, after Odysseus and Diomedes have come back from the night expedition, is not mentioned and therefore must be assumed as having happened (*Sch. Il.* 10.216a: ἡ μὲν ἐπαγγελία τοῦ δώρου ῥητή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτέλεσμα ὑποσεσιώπηται. δεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς συνεκδέξασθαι). Indeed, when the two heroes come back to the Greek camp (ll. 540–579), Nestor congratulates them; they then go back to their huts, bathe, sacrifice to Athena, and have a meal, but no word is made of those gifts. Aristarchus notes this ‘omission’:

Sch. Il. 10.571a θῆκ’ Ὀδυσσεύς, <ὄφρ’ ἱρὸν ἐτοιμασσαίαντ’ Ἀθήνη>: ὅτι περὶ μὲν τῆς θυσίας σαφῶς λέγει, περὶ δὲ τῆς δόσεως τῶν δώρων ἐσιώπησεν, ἀρκεσθεῖς τῷ ἄνω (*Il.* 10.215–216) κεφαλαιωδῶς εἰρημένῳ.

‘Odysseus put [Dolon’s spoils on the stern of the ship] so to prepare a sacrifice for Athena’: because he speaks clearly about the sacrifice, but he did not say that the gifts were given [to them], being satisfied with what was said above in summary (*Il.* 10.215–216).

In order for Odysseus to offer a sacrifice to Athena (*Il.* 10.571) and have a banquet (*Il.* 10.578–579), he and Diomedes must have received the promised sheep; however, Homer only mentions their sacrifice and the meal, taking for granted that the animals have been given to Odysseus and Diomedes. This assumption is possible because Homer has mentioned earlier that a gift was going to be given in a sort of ‘pre-event’ summary.⁹⁷

Homer thus likes to narrate events ‘in summary’ (κεφαλαιωδῶς), focusing on their conclusion (κατὰ συμπέρασμα) and avoiding details—or assuming them as having happened ‘tacitly’ (κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον). This idea is at the core of Aristarchus’ rebuke to Zenodotus for athetizing three lines on Menestheus’ ability to marshal horses and warriors (*Il.* 2.553–555), perhaps—Aristarchus guesses⁹⁸—because Homer has not presented Menestheus in the very act of ordering his troops. But this detail is unnecessary, as Homer tells of many

97. This is the second type of σχῆμα σιωπῆσεως for Meinel 1915, 9 (see above, footnote 87).

98. ‘Μήποτε διότι’ in *Sch. Il.* 2.553a; on Aristarchus’ uncertainty about Zenodotus’ reasons for certain textual choices, see Chapter 4 § 1.1.

events in summary, omitting the details (*Sch. Il.* 2.553a: πολλά μέντοι Ὅμηρος κεφαλαιωδῶς συνίστησιν, αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα παραλιπών).⁹⁹ In the same scholium, Aristarchus quotes Machaon’s *aristeia* as a parallel. The episode is completely omitted in *Iliad* 11, but Homer alludes to it when he says that Paris put an end to Machaon’s excellence in battle at *Il.* 11.506. Commenting on this line and also recalling *Il.* 2.553, Aristarchus again underscores that Homer only indicates the conclusion of the hero’s deeds without having narrated anything before (*Sch. Il.* 11.506a: ὅτι μηδὲν προδιασυστήσας κατὰ συμπέρασμα ‘παῦσεν ἀριστεύοντα’ φησίν).¹⁰⁰

3.3. Summaries with Details and Detailed Descriptions

Homeric narrative style is not uniform; in fact, the poet sometimes focuses on details and enjoys the pleasure of descriptions rather than giving only the final summary without specifics. Aristarchus, too, was aware of and appreciated this aspect of Homer’s descriptive technique.

Sometimes, for example, Homer provides some kind of introduction wherein he summarizes the main points of an event before elaborating it in more detail.¹⁰¹ Aristarchus calls attention to this characteristic when Hector strikes Ajax’s spear with his sword and cuts its point off (*Il.* 16.114–118):

Standing near, Hector struck the ashen spear of Ajax with his great sword, at the base of the point, and knocked it off completely (ἀντικρὺ δ’ ἀπάραξε); and Telamonian Ajax brandished in vain a spear without point in his hands, and far from him the bronze point fell on the ground and made a loud noise (βόμβησε πεσοῦσα).¹⁰²

Some scholars found the passage contradictory (*Sch. Il.* 16.116a: ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι δοκεῖ μάχεσθαι), because at line 116 Homer says that Hector utterly cut

99. Cf. Bouchard 2016, 198. On Zenodotus’ reason for the athetesis, see Nickau 1977, 177–178.

100. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 441–442; Roemer 1924, 247; Nünlist 2009, 207–208 (for whom this is a ‘summary without elaboration’; see next footnote). The idea that Homer speaks through summaries rather than giving full details is also used to justify the athetesis of *Il.* 14.317–327 in *Sch. Il.* 14.315a (see Chapter 3.6.B § 6 with footnote 173) and of *Il.* 10.253 in *Sch. Il.* 10.253a¹ (see below, § 5).

101. On this principle (derived from rhetorical theories) in scholia, see Nünlist 2009, 204–208, who distinguishes between ‘summaries with elaboration’ (those analyzed in this section) and ‘summaries without elaboration’ (those analyzed in the previous section). On ἐξεργασία (elaboration) in literary criticism, see also Meijering 1987, 148–156. On Aristarchus’ attitude on detailed descriptions, see Schenkeveld 1970, 171–173.

102. *Il.* 16.114–118: Ἐκτωρ Αἴαντος δόρυ μείλινον ἄγχι παραστάς / πλῆξ’ ἄορι μεγάλῳ αἰχμῆς παρὰ καυλὸν ὀπισθεν, / ἀντικρὺ δ’ ἀπάραξε· τὸ μὲν Τελαμώνιος Αἴας / πῆλ’ αὐτῶς ἐν χειρὶ κόλον δόρυ, τῆλε δ’ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ / αἰχμὴ χαλκείη χαμάδις βόμβησε πεσοῦσα.

off (ἀντικρὺ δ' ἀπ' ἀραξέ) the point from Ajax's spear, but then at lines 117–118 he goes back and describes it falling. Aristarchus defends the text, since the lines are not inconsistent and can be explained simply as a question of narrative technique: Homer has first given us a glimpse of the entire scene, freezing it in the final moment like a picture; then, the poet goes back to the details and elaborates on them for the pleasure of narrative (*Sch. Il.* 16.116a: ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρίσταρχος τὸ συμπέρασμα λέγει προειρῆσθαι, εἶτα κατὰ μέρος ἐπηκριβῶσθαι).¹⁰³ In particular, according to Aristarchus, Homer's point is that Hector landed a decisive stroke on the spear's top, which only fell when Ajax shook the spear. On a smaller scale, the same idea emerges with reference to Odysseus killing Democoön in *Il.* 4.496–504, where at line 502 Homer says that he struck Democoön in his head (κόρση) before then explaining that the point of Odysseus' spear passed through the temples (κρόταφοι). In this case too, Aristarchus observes that Homer first gives the final tableau, and then focuses his attention on the specific part of the head that was hit by Odysseus (*Sch. Il.* 4.502b: προειπὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν διέσταλκε κατὰ μέρος τὸν κρόταφον).

Even if he often narrates by summaries or by only giving certain details of an event, Homer is also fond of longer excursions in which he indulges in elaborate descriptions. Aristarchus also recognized this aspect of Homeric art¹⁰⁴ and maintained that a good critic should be able to recognize both narrative styles as typically Homeric, and not reject lines because they seemed to contradict the usual conciseness (συντομία) of Homer. The latter is exactly what happens in one of the most notable atheteseis by Zenodotus: the athetesis of the entire description of Achilles' shield (*Il.* 18.483–608):

Sch. Il. 18.483a ἐν μὲν γαῖαν <ἔτευξ'— θάλασσαν>: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος ἠθέτηκεν ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ στίχου τὰ λοιπὰ, ἀρκεσθεῖς τῇ κεφαλαιώδει προεκθέσει. Ὅμηρος δὲ οὐκ ἂν προετραγώδησεν τὰ κατὰ τὰς φύσας, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῆς ποικιλίας κατασκευὴν ἔμελλε διατίθεσθαι.

'On it he modeled the earth . . . and the sea': because from this line Zenodotus athetized the rest [of the description] (i.e., *Il.* 18.483–608), being content with the prefatory account (i.e., *Il.* 18.478–482). But Homer would not have put all

103. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 18–19.

104. Aristarchus accepted excursions, but when he encountered them, he often rephrased the lines, so as to cut the unnecessary (often mythological) details of the excursus and thus focus on the content necessary for the narrative. In *Il.* 2.740–744, for example, Homer is speaking of Polypoetes and in three lines (*Il.* 742–744) he narrates how Hippodameia conceived him from Pirithous during the fight against the Centaurs. Aristarchus notices the excursus and then rephrases for the reader lines 740 and 745, while skipping the mythological intrusion (*Sch. Il.* 2.745: ὅτι διὰ μέσου τὰ περὶ τοὺς Κενταύρους παριστόρηται. τὸ δὲ ἐξῆς ἐστὶ τοῦ λόγου . . .).

the description of the bellows (i.e., *Il.* 18.470–473) onstage, had he not also been going to describe the construction of this intricate piece of art.

The *ekphrasis* of the shield of Achilles stirred much interest in antiquity; in particular, Crates and his school probably interpreted it allegorically.¹⁰⁵ Zenodotus athetized it, however, perhaps because he considered the description too long and external to the narrative. Aristarchus keeps the long excursus, but does not give any speculative interpretation of it; rather, he considers the description the result of Homeric artistry. The poet himself has ‘prepared the stage’ (προετραγώδησεν) for it by giving such attention to Hephaestus and his work. The readers—Aristarchus explains—would now be expecting something exceptional to come from Hephaestus’ bellows, and Homer satisfies the expectations with a wonderful and variegated description in 126 lines. In this case, a summary would be completely out of place, since Homer himself has aroused curiosity and expectation.¹⁰⁶ A similar idea underlies the comments on the arming of Agamemnon at *Il.* 11.15–46, on which Homer has elaborated in order to prepare the audience for the upcoming *aristeia* of the hero (*Sch. Il.* 11.17a: ὅτι ἐπανείληφεν ἐξεργαστικώτερον τὰ περὶ τὸν ὅπλισμόν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, προεπιτηδεύων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀριστείαν).¹⁰⁷

3.4. Completing the Audience’s Knowledge

Aristarchus was also aware that Homer sometimes assumed that his readers knew myths and stories beyond those narrated in the poem. He notes, for example, that Homer takes his readers’ knowledge that the Greeks stopped in Lemnos before arriving at Troy for granted, since he does not narrate this episode but assumes it (*Sch. Il.* 8.230a: ὅτι τοῦτο γινόμενον μὲν οὐ παρέστησεν, ὡς γινόμενον δὲ παραδίδωσιν).¹⁰⁸ At other times, however, Homer needs to provide some necessary information because otherwise the readers could not follow the story. This happens, for instance, with Thetis’ action in favor of Zeus when Hera, Poseidon, and Athena threatened to put him in chains, an episode of which Achilles reminds his mother at *Il.* 1.396–406. Zenodotus athetized this passage (*Sch. Il.* 1.396a), but Aristarchus argues that it is necessary, since Thetis hints at this episode when she tries to convince Zeus to grant her re-

105. Cf. Mente 1936, 30–42; Porter 1992, 91–94; Broggiato 2001, 157–164 (fr. 12).

106. Cf. Nickau 1977, 236–240; Nünlist 2009, 207; van Thiel 2014a, III 198.

107. Cf. Meijering 1987, 173 and 200. Similar comments are repeated later on, when Homer describes Agamemnon’s sword at *Il.* 11.29–31 (*Sch. Il.* 11.30; see above, § 1.2.3).

108. Cf. Meijering 1987, 24. This is the third type of σχῆμα σιωπῆσεως for Meinel 1915, 10–11 (see above, footnote 87); cf. also Roemer 1924, 247–248. Nünlist 2009, 48 and 161, on the other hand, considers it an analepsis.

quests on Achilles' behalf, saying: 'accomplish this wish for me if, among the immortals, I have ever helped you in word or deed' (*Il.* 1.503–504). This brief allusion is comprehensible only because of Achilles' summary at *Il.* 1.396–406; with Zenodotus' athetesis, on the contrary, the words in *Il.* 1.503–504 would be obscure and puzzling (*Sch. Il.* 1.504a: ὅτι εἰ μὴ προῖστορήσαμεν τὰ περὶ τῶν δεσμῶν, ἐφ' ὧν ἡ Θέτις ἐβοήθησεν αὐτῷ, ἐζητοῦμεν ἄν, τί αὐτὸν ὤνησεν).¹⁰⁹ For Aristarchus, therefore, summaries that might have seemed unnecessary at first sight had a function within the narrative; this became particularly important in the case of obscure myths, such as the binding of Zeus. On the other hand, the story of the stop at Lemnos before the arrival at Troy was a very well-known episode in the Trojan saga, and Homer could afford to take it for granted.

A story is sometimes narrated or alluded to in more than one passage in the poem, and it is the job of the readers to connect these hints.¹¹⁰ Two Aristarchean fragments discuss this phenomenon, both in relation to the episode of Hephaestus being thrown from Olympus to Lemnos. Hephaestus himself refers to this event in Book 1 to explain why he is not going to help his mother Hera for a second time (*Il.* 1.590–594); then in Book 15 Zeus reminds Hera of the time when he hung her from heaven and cast down everyone who wanted to help her (*Il.* 15.18–24):

Sch. Il. 1.591a ῥίψε ποδός: ὅτι ἀπὸ δυεῖν τόποιν συμπεπλήρωκε τὸν μῦθον· νῦν μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἐρρίφη, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑπόμνησιν τῶν τῆς Ἥρας δεσμῶν (*Il.* 15.18–30) καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν ἐρρίφη.

'[He took me] by the foot and hurled [me]': because he has completed the story from two places: for here [he says] that [Hephaestus] was thrown down, and when he mentions the binding of Hera (*Il.* 15.18–30) [he tells of] the occasion and the reason why he was thrown down.

Sch. Il. 15.18a ἢ οὐ μέμνη, ὅτε τ' ἐκρέμω: . . . ἡ διπλῇ δέ, ὅτι ἐκ δυεῖν τόπων, τούτου τε (*Il.* 15.18–31) καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν Α ῥαψωδίαν (*Il.* 1.590–594), ὁ ποιητῆς τῆς τοῦ Ἥφαιστου ῥίψεως καὶ τῶν Ἥρας δεσμῶν πληροῦται μῦθον.

'Don't you remember when you were hung [?]': . . . the *diple* because from two passages, this one (*Il.* 15.18–31) and the one in Book 1 (*Il.* 1.590–594), the poet completes the story of the throwing of Hephaestus and of the binding of Hera.

109. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 17; Nünlist 2009, 30–31.

110. Technically speaking, this is called 'piecemeal disclosure', and many exegetical scholia analyze it; see Nünlist 2009, 170–172.

In order to have a full understanding of the story a reader must connect the two passages, as the first gives the details of the event and the second provides an explanation of why it happened. According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 15.23a), the connection between the two passages is further demonstrated by the fact that Homer uses exactly the same words to describe the casting down of Hephaestus from Olympus, ῥῖψε ποδὸς τεταγών¹¹¹ ἀπὸ βηλοῦ θεσπεσίῳ at *Il.* 1.591 and ῥίπτασκον τεταγών ἀπὸ βηλοῦ at *Il.* 15.23.¹¹²

3.5. Handling of Plot and Time: Zielinski’s Law

A peculiar aspect of literary technique concerns how an author handles the narrative plot (opposed to story/*fabula*) and how he manages time in his work. An important principle of Homeric poetry is Zielinski’s Law, named after the first scholar who formulated it.¹¹³ Zielinski’s Law has been conceived of in at least three different ways: (1) no simultaneous events occur in Homer at all, namely, the poet is not able to describe two simultaneous events; (2) simultaneous events are represented as happening in succession; (3) Homer never goes back in time to tell events that have already occurred.¹¹⁴ Leaving aside the modern debate surrounding the effective existence of this ‘law’ (or ‘rule’) in Homer and what is the best formulation of it, the focus here will be on the ancient debate. In a very famous passage, Aristotle discusses simultaneous events:

Aristot. *Poet.* 1459b22–28: ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος πολὺ τι ἢ ἐποποιία ἴδιον διὰ τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα πραττόμενα πολλὰ μέρη μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μόνον· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ διήγησιν εἶναι ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα, ὑφ’ ὧν οἰκείων ὄντων αὖξεται ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος ὄγκος.

Epic poetry has a characteristic, which is proper to it, to extend its magnitude because in tragedy it is not possible to represent many parts happening at the same time, but it is possible only [to represent] the part of the actors and what happens onstage. In epic poetry, on the other hand, because it is a narrative, it

111. I adopt West’s reading τεταγών rather than Allen’s τετάγων (in fact, Allen has τεταγών at *Il.* 15.23). The form τεταγών is an isolated reduplicated aorist participle, fossilized in this Homeric phrase; cf. Janko 1994, 231–232.

112. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 17.

113. Zielinski 1901. On Zielinski’s Law, see Whitman and Scodel 1981; Rengakos 1995; Olson 1995, 91–119; Scodel 2008 (the latter has a useful summary of the *status quaestionis* as well as bibliographical references). I would like to thank Ruth Scodel for discussing this issue with me and clarifying many points about what she calls ‘Zielinski’s Rule’ (not ‘Law’, since it has exceptions; see Scodel 2008, 108).

114. See Rengakos 1995, 1–2; Lundon 2002b, 582.

is possible to represent many parts as taking place at the same time, by which, if they are appropriate, the magnificence of the poem is increased.

Aristotle is here talking about the ‘content’ of the plot. While tragedy cannot cover more than one action, epic can embrace multiple simultaneous actions. Yet he never explains ‘how’ the depiction of simultaneous events is produced in epic poetry, nor does he say that the poet portrays these simultaneous actions as successive. Without hinting at anything close to Zielinski’s Law, Aristotle is concerned only with the ‘quantitative’ difference between epic and tragedy in terms of the events covered.¹¹⁵

On the other hand, some exegetical scholia and scholia on papyrus report statements very similar to Zielinski’s Law.¹¹⁶ With Aristarchus, the evidence is more nuanced. He seems to articulate the main idea behind Zielinski’s Law when he comments on the opening of Book 12: ‘so among the huts the strong son of Menoetius was curing the wounded Eurypylus; but the others, Greeks and Trojans, were fighting in crowds’ (*Il.* 12.1–3). Aristarchus explains that ‘[the poet] cannot report things happening at the same time as they happen. While he was curing him, they were fighting’ (*Sch. Il.* 12.2: ὅτι τὰ ἅμα γινόμενα οὐ δύναται ἅμα ἐξαγγέλλειν. ἐν ὧσιν δὲ οὗτος ἰᾶτο, ἐκεῖνοι ἐμάχοντο). Here indeed the focus seems to be on how Homeric narrative works: the poet is able to portray simultaneous events but cannot narrate them at the same time.¹¹⁷

Another important scholium discusses two concurrent events described one after the other in Book 10: at *Il.* 10.1–298 the council of the Achaeans, where it is decided to send Diomedes and Odysseus on a night expedition to the Trojan camp, and at *Il.* 10.299–337 the council of the Trojans, where similarly Dolon volunteers to spy on the Greeks:

Sch. Il. 10.299a οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδὲ Τρῶας <ἀγήνορας εἶασεν Ἑκτωρ>: ἡ διπλή, ὅτι οὐχ ὥς ἡ τῶν ἐπῶν ἔχει τάξις, οὕτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα· οὐ γὰρ προεληλυθότων ἤδη τῶν περὶ Ὀδυσσεύα καλεῖ τοὺς προβούλους ὁ Ἑκτωρ, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν καὶ ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς συμπεσοῦνται οἱ ἀπεσταλμένοι; διὸ καὶ ἀντιδιασταλτικῶς λέγει ‘οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ Ἑκτωρ εἶασε τοὺς Τρῶας εὔδειν’ (cf. *Il.* 10.299–300).

‘Nor did Hector let the courageous Trojans [sleep]’: the *diple* because the order of the narrative is not that of the facts. For Hector does not summon his leaders

115. Cf. Meijering 1987, 167–168, who in fact does not mention Zielinski’s Law in connection with this passage.

116. See, e.g., *P.Oxy.* 1086, ii, 57–60 (ad *Il.* 2.788); cf. Lundon 2002a, 86–87, 121–123, and Lundon 2002b. On Zielinski’s Law in the scholia, see Griesinger 1907, 72–74; Nünlist 2009, 79–83.

117. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 7–8.

when the party of Odysseus¹¹⁸ has already left, but exactly at the same moment as Agamemnon also [calls the assembly]. For in this way those who have been sent off will run into each other. Therefore, and in order to oppose one scene against the other, [the poet] says: ‘and neither did Hector let the Trojans sleep’ (cf. *Il.* 10.299–300).

Here Aristarchus observes that the council summoned by Agamemnon takes place at the same time as the council summoned by Hector, as only in this way can the two sets of ‘spies’ run into each other.¹¹⁹ Without saying that Homer is not able to portray these events simultaneously, he simply remarks that the sequence of the narrative (ἡ τῶν ἐπῶν τάξις) does not coincide with the temporal sequence of the events (τὰ πράγματα). More subtly, he notes that Homer gives the readers a clue that these two successive sequences are happening at the same time when he opposes one to the other (ἀντιδιασταλτικῶς λέγει). Aristarchus is probably referring to the ‘οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδέ’ (‘nor did Hector [let the courageous Trojans sleep]’) at the beginning of line 299,¹²⁰ which connects Agamemnon, who has woken up the other Greek leaders, to Hector, who similarly does not let his soldiers sleep.¹²¹

From this evidence Aristarchus appears to have been a ‘predecessor’ of Zielinski, as long as Zielinski’s Law is understood as stating that (1) Homer cannot portray simultaneous events as simultaneous (*Sch. Il.* 12.2); (2) the order of narrative does not always coincide with the temporal sequence (*Sch. Il.* 10.299a); and (3) Homer can use linguistic devices to signal that certain facts happen *at the same time* (*Sch. Il.* 10.299a).¹²² This roughly corresponds to version number 2 of Zielinski’s Law. If the law is interpreted instead in a more restrictive sense—either that in Homer there are no simultaneous events (version no. 1), or that the poet never goes back in time (version no.

118. Cf. Lundon 2002b, 588 n. 20.

119. Ruth Scodel rightly pointed out to me that Homer here might not consider these councils simultaneous because, when Odysseus and Diomedes meet Dolon, the two Greeks have covered a much longer distance; in fact, they are almost in the camp of the Trojans and their allies, while Dolon seems to have just departed.

120. All the Iliadic manuscripts give οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδέ; cf. West, ad *Il.* 10.299. The Aristonicus scholium in the *Venetus A*, however, quotes the line as οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδέ (as a direct check on the digital image of the *Venetus A*, fol. 131v, has confirmed). However, the quotation in the scholium clearly is not precise (the correct Homeric text is οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδέ Τρῶας ἀγήνορας εἴασεν Ἑκτωρ / εὔδειν, and not οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδέ ὁ Ἑκτωρ εἴασε τοὺς Τρῶας εὔδειν as in the scholium).

121. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 8; Rengakos 1995, 6–7; Lundon 2002b, 588–589; Nünlist 2009, 81–82.

122. As suggested by Rengakos 1995, 7, Aristarchus might have noticed the same link between the two sequences of events in *Il.* 12.1–2 as well, with the opposition of μὲν and δὲ (ὥς ὁ μὲν ἐν κλισίῃσι Μενoitίου ἄλκιμος υἱὸς . . . οἱ δὲ μάχοντο), and noted it (*Sch. Il.* 12.2: ἐν ὅσῳ δὲ οὗτος ἰᾶτο, ἐκεῖνοι ἐμάχοντο).

3)—Aristarchus' comments do not reflect the same understanding of the Homeric handling of time.

On the other hand, the instances where Aristarchus notes that two facts happen at the same time but does not discuss *how* the poet describes them do not prove that he is applying Zielinski's Law. For example, in *Il.* 22.375 Homer describes the Greeks going around the body of Hector: 'thus one would speak (εἶπεσκε) and would wound (οὐτήσασκε) him standing next to him.' Aristarchus explains that Homer is describing these soldiers as talking and as wounding Hector *at the same time* (*Sch. Il.* 22.375a: ὅτι οὐ πάντως πρότερον ἔλεγον, ἀλλ' ἅμα παίοντες ἐπεφώνουν). The point here is the use of the iterative forms εἶπεσκε and οὐτήσασκε, which mean that each soldier was speaking and wounding Hector's body continually and for a long time, not only once. It would seem, then, that these remarks concern the iterative value of these verbal forms, not Homeric narrative modes.

Aristarchus' ideas about the beginning of Book 8 must be judged similarly.¹²³ The book opens with the rise of dawn and Zeus summoning the assembly of the gods (*Il.* 8.1–40); then, Zeus goes to Ida and looks down on the Greeks and the Trojans (*Il.* 8.41–52). The Greeks have breakfast and prepare to go to war as the Trojans do (*Il.* 8.53–59). The battle starts and goes on until midday, at which time Zeus weighs the destinies of the two armies on his scale, and the doom of the Achaeans sinks (*Il.* 8.60–72). According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 7.482a), Zenodotus 'had deleted' (ἤρκε)¹²⁴ the last line of Book 7 (mentioning the Greeks and Trojans sleeping) and the first line of Book 8 (mentioning the rise of dawn); in fact, he moved *Il.* 8.1 just before *Il.* 8.53:

Sch. Il. 8.1a ἡὼς <μὲν κροκόπεπλος ἐκίδνατο πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν>: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος μετατίθησι τὴν ἀνατολὴν κάτω πρὸς τὸ 'οἱ δ' ἄρα δεῖπνον ἔλοντο' (*Il.* 8.53), ὥστε τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀγορὰν ὁψὲ γίνεσθαι ἀπρεπῶς.

'Dawn with her yellow robe was spreading over the entire earth': because Zenodotus transfers the rising of the sun below, before line 53: 'and they [i.e., the Greeks] took their meal', so that the assembly of the gods happens late in the night, which is not appropriate.

Sch. Il. 8.53a οἱ δ' ἄρα δεῖπνον ἔλοντο <καρηκομόωντες Ἀχαιοί>: ὅτι πρὸ τούτου τὴν ἀνατολὴν τίθησι Ζηνόδοτος. τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς τοῦ λόγου οὕτως ἐστίν· ἡμέρας ἐνστάσης ὁ μὲν Ζεὺς θεῶν ἀγορὰν ἐποιεῖτο, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιοὶ δεῖπνον εἴλαντο.

123. On this passage and Zielinski's Law, see Scodel 2008, 123–124.

124. On the deletion of lines by Zenodotus, see Chapter 4 § 1.6.

‘And the long-haired Achaeans took their meal’: because Zenodotus places the rising of the sun before this [line]. But the natural order of the narrative is as follows: with the rising of the day, Zeus gathered the assembly of the gods and the Greeks took their meal.

In Zenodotus’ text, the assembly of the gods was late in the night, after which Zeus goes to Ida; then, at line 52a (= *Il.* 8.1), there was the rising of dawn and, at line 53, the Greeks having breakfast.¹²⁵ It is impossible to know why Zenodotus made these changes. He might not have liked having the gods wake up early because of an assembly or might have had other reasons unknown to us.¹²⁶ Yet it is also possible that he did not make any change himself, but rather had a text with the lines in this order.¹²⁷ Indeed, a Ptolemaic papyrus (*P.Grenf.* 2.2 + *P.Hibeh* 1.21 + *P.Heid. inv.* 1261 = MP³ 819, dated to the third century BCE) has space for plus lines between *Il.* 8.51 and 53 (at least four lines in addition to line 52); unfortunately, the original text is not preserved there, and these additional lines have been only hypothetically (and variously) reconstructed.¹²⁸ Whatever Zenodotus’ reasons might have been, Aristarchus finds that a night assembly of the gods, as present in Zenodotus’ text, is ἀπρεπῶς. It is actually difficult to understand why he considers it ‘not fitting’ or ‘inappropriate’: perhaps the gods should not gather in the night but rather rest?¹²⁹ He also explains that the natural order of the narrative (τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς τοῦ λόγου) is different from the sequence in which these facts appear in the poem since the assembly of the gods and the breakfast of the Greeks are contemporaneous: both happen at dawn.¹³⁰ This idea corresponds to Zielinski’s Law; however, Aristarchus here does not discuss this passage in terms of narrative devices and techniques but rather simply objects to Zenodotus’ ordering of the text. Thus, even if the theoretical premises are the same, his focus is slightly different.

This evidence proves that Aristarchus believed—like Aristotle—that Homer could do something that was impossible to achieve in tragedy: he could depict more than one event, and even simultaneous events.¹³¹ In particular, and going a step further than Aristotle, Aristarchus also noted that simultaneous events were narrated one after another in the poem; yet Homer could indicate that

125. For δεῖπνον as ‘breakfast’ in Homer, see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.3.

126. On Zenodotus’ choice, see Griesinger 1907, 72–73; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 19; Nickau 1977, 202–203; Rengakos 1995, 7–8; Nünlist 2009, 83.

127. See Chapter 4 § 1.7.

128. See West 1967, 77, 82–83.

129. In *Sch. Il.* 1.606a Aristarchus notes that gods (and men) always go home to sleep at night (see Chapter 3.3.B § 5.1); perhaps his comment about the inappropriateness of a late assembly for the gods can be explained with this observation.

130. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 8; Nünlist 2009, 83.

131. Cf. also Bouchard 2016, 314–316.

they happened at the same time by using connective particles, thus allowing readers to interpret the sequence of events correctly.

3.6. Switching between Narrative and Speech

Finally, Homer alternates narrative (τὸ διηγηματικόν) and speech (τὸ μιμητικόν).¹³² Nünlist rightly observes¹³³ that ancient scholars noticed the transition from ‘narrative to mimetic’ only when the beginning of a speech was not expressly marked by an introduction, such as a *verbum dicendi*. In particular, Aristarchus singles out *Il.* 4.303 and *Il.* 23.855 for this reason (*Sch. Il.* 4.303a and 23.855a: ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ διηγηματικοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μιμητικὸν μετέλθεν οὕτως).

A different type of transition concerns *Il.* 16.203, when Achilles reminds the Myrmidons about how they accused him of not allowing them to fight. Achilles quotes their words verbatim within his speech, and this, too, for Aristarchus is a change from narrative to a mimetic mode (*Sch. Il.* 16.203a: ὅτι ἀπέστροφε τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ διηγηματικοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μιμητικόν). As Nünlist explains,¹³⁴ this is a speech within a speech, so that Aristarchus’ comments now indicate an ‘unmarked transition to speech,’ independently of whether the starting point is in the narrative or in another speech. Here too, there is no introduction to the direct quotation of the Myrmidons’ words, that is, Achilles simply starts quoting them without alerting his audience.¹³⁵

4. Pathos and Feelings in Homer

In Aristarchus’ opinion, Homer was not only a great narrator who was able to alternate short summaries with detailed descriptions and refocus the attention of the reader where necessary to keep his interest alive; more than that, he was even able to give realistic depictions of feelings. Even if Aristarchus was not very much concerned with the emotional effects of Homeric poetry on the readers, he sometimes expressed his approval of the way Homer depicted a

132. I will discuss this point only briefly, as it has been fully treated by both Matthaios 1999, 395–400 (fr. 89), and Nünlist 2009, 102–106.

133. Nünlist 2009, 103.

134. Nünlist 2009, 106.

135. *Il.* 16.202–204: πάνθ’ ὑπὸ μνηθμόν, καί μ’ ἠτιάσθε ἕκαστος / σχέτλιε Πηλέος υἱὲ χόλῳ ἄρα σ’ ἔτρεφε μήτηρ, / νηλεές, ὃς παρὰ νηυσὶν ἔχεις ἀέκοντας ἐταίρους. [. . . for all the time I was angered, and each of you accused me: ‘O cruel son of Peleus, no doubt your mother raised you on gall, pitiless, you who keep your companions close to the ships against their will’]. On changes of speakers in ancient scholarship, see Schironi 2019c.

scene. For example, an exegetical scholium on *Iliad* 16 reports that Aristarchus praised Homer when, at the appearance of Patroclus dressed in Achilles' armor, he does not make the Trojans flee right away, but depicts their shock and astonishment (*Sch. Il.* 16.280–1b).¹³⁶ Similarly, Aristarchus defends the Homeric choice of words in *Il.* 1.60, when Achilles first addresses Agamemnon and says that he thinks that the Greeks should return home because of the plague—'if (εἴ κεν) we should escape death.' Zenodotus instead read 'those of us who (οἱ κεν) escape death.' This reading is unsuitable, as it expresses more certainty about salvation for some of the Greeks; on the contrary, the statement becomes much more uncertain and darker with the hypothetical εἴ κεν—which Aristarchus approves by commenting that 'the despair about their salvation is beautiful' (*Sch. Il.* 1.60: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος 'οἱ κεν' γράφει, οὐ καλῶς· καλὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόγνωσις τῆς σωτηρίας).¹³⁷

In one case, Aristarchus seems to desire a different text in order to have a more pathetic scene. In Book 22, in the famous scene of Andromache's despair at the news of Hector's death, when she arrives at the wall and sees the body of her husband dragged by Achilles' chariot (ll. 463–465), she faints (ll. 466–467) and casts her headbands, nets, and veil on the ground (ll. 468–472); her sisters-in-law then hold her (ll. 473–474) until she recovers and starts her lamentation (ll. 475–476):

Sch. Il. 22.468a τῆλε δ' ἀπὸ κρατὸς <χέε δέσματα σιγαλόεντα>: ὅτι βελτίων ἂν ἦν ἡ διάθεσις, εἰ μὴ ἐκπεπληγμένη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀπέβαλεν, ἀλλ' ὕστερον, ὅτε ἀναπινύσκειται τε καὶ ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαμβάνει, ἴν' ἢ οὕτως· ἡ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄμπνυτο καὶ ἐς φρένα θυμὸς ἀγέρθη, / ἀμβλήδην γοόωσα <μετὰ Τρωῆσιν ἔειπεν />· τῆλε δ' ἀπὸ κρατὸς χέε δέσματα <——μυρία ἔδνα> (*Il.* 22.475–476 + 468–472).

'And far off her head she let fall her glittering headbands': because the representation would have been better if she had thrown away the ornaments not while fainting, but later on, when she breathes again and recovers herself, so that it would be: 'and when she recovered and her spirit was gathered again in her heart, she started wailing and spoke among the Trojans. And far off her head she let fall her glittering headbands, her diadem, her hairnet and twisted band, and the veil that golden Aphrodite gave her the day when Hector of the glancing helmet took her away as bride from the house of Eëtion, after he had offered countless gifts' (*Il.* 22.475–476 + 468–472).

136. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 37.

137. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 41.

For Aristarchus, it would have been better if Andromache first faints, then recovers, throws away all the ornaments, and starts the wailing (thus postponing ll. 468–472 until after l. 476), because with this ordering she would willingly despoil herself of her ornaments in her despair. This would be more pathetic than the vulgate version, where she loses her ornaments while unconscious. According to Didymus, at *Il.* 22.468 Aristarchus read βάλε, ‘she threw’, and not χέε, ‘she let fall’, which was the reading of the ‘common (κοινά) editions’ (*Sch. Il.* 22.468c^{1,2}). If this is true, the change of ordering is even more meaningful, because with βάλε Andromache’s action is voluntary, while with χέε it is involuntary: she cannot ‘throw’ away (βάλλειν) headbands, nets, and veil on the ground intentionally if she has fainted. Aristonicus does not seem to be aware of this reading, as he quotes line 468 with χέε,¹³⁸ so it is impossible to know whether Aristarchus read βάλε from the very beginning and this was why he wished for a different line ordering (in which case, the χέε in the Aristonicus scholium would be a mistake), or whether the reading βάλε, which, in a way, also ‘confirmed’ that a different line ordering would have been better, was proposed only in his second edition (either as an emendation, or because Aristarchus found this reading in some manuscripts).¹³⁹ In the latter case, Aristonicus would be reporting the reading χέε of the first edition (and second *hypomnema*), while Didymus would be referring to the latest stage of Aristarchus’ *diorthosis* (i.e., the second *ekdosis*).¹⁴⁰ Yet, except for this possible change of reading, Aristarchus is simply ‘wishing for’ a different order of lines without in fact altering the text in this direction, in accordance with his generally conservative attitude toward the text, as seen in the case of ‘misused’ formulaic verses.¹⁴¹

138. Not in the lemma, which has been supplemented by Erbse, but in the scholium.

139. Most manuscripts and some papyri have χέε; βάλε is offered by some manuscripts and is adopted by West and Allen, ad loc. (but without changing the order of lines!); van Thiel, on the other hand, follows the vulgate and has χέε.

140. On Aristarchus’ Homeric editions and commentaries, see Chapter 1.2 §§ 2–4; on which of these works were used by Aristonicus and Didymus, see Schironi 2015.

141. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 28–29; Roemer 1912, 398, and Roemer 1924, 216–217; Wecklein 1919, 50; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 166; Richardson 1993, 157 (who also notes that χέε does not work very well with τῆλε, ‘far’). Both Bachmann 1902–1904, I 28, and Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 22.468a, observe that the new order suggested by Aristarchus is problematic because now line 476 (‘she started wailing and spoke among the Trojans’) is not followed by Andromache’s lamentation, but rather by the description of her throwing away her ornaments (ll. 468–472). So, between the announcement of the wailing (l. 476) and Andromache’s words (which begin at l. 477), there would now be five lines. This is probably also the reason why Aristarchus only ‘wished’ that the line ordering were different, but did not alter the text.

5. *Zetemata* and *Lyseis*

The so-called ζητήματα/*zetemata* (or ἀπορίαι/*aporiai*) represented a particular type of inconsistency that troubled many readers of the Homeric poems. Strictly speaking, any question about a literary text was a *zetema*; however, the labels ζητήματα or ἀπορίαι were generally associated only with famously perceived contradictions in the text which many scholars had tried to solve over the centuries; their (more or less convincing) solutions were called λύσεις/*lyseis*.¹⁴² Aristotle was among the initiators of the 'genre', having devoted an entire treatise to the topic.¹⁴³ This exegetical activity became very popular and, according to Porphyry, scholars in Alexandria collected *zetemata* and *lyseis*.¹⁴⁴ Even though Aristarchus might not have been among those collectors and aficionados of Homeric questions,¹⁴⁵ he certainly addressed many *zetemata*, some of which have already been discussed in the previous chapters, including the questions of Pylaemenes,¹⁴⁶ of the shield of Achilles,¹⁴⁷ of the Actorione,¹⁴⁸ and of whether Olympus is heaven.¹⁴⁹ Even if in some cases Aristarchus showed some uneasiness with certain *zetemata* and accused 'some' of changing the text in order to create problems,¹⁵⁰ he normally tried to solve them without changing the text or athetizing lines.

For example, in the battle between Menelaus and Paris narrated in Book 3, Menelaus first throws his spear at Paris. The spear pierces through Paris' shield and corselet, without reaching any vital part (ll. 355–360); Menelaus then rushes with his sword, which breaks (ll. 361–368), and finally jumps on Paris and seizes him by the helmet until Aphrodite intervenes and rescues the Trojan prince (ll. 369–378). Then Homer says that Menelaus 'leapt (ἐπόρουσε) again, eager to kill [Paris] with his bronze spear (ἔγχεϊ χαλκείῳ)' (Il. 3.379–380). Scholars were puzzled about the reference to the spear, since Menelaus has used it already

142. On Homeric *zetemata* and *lyseis*, see Lehrs 1882, 197–221; Gudeman 1927, 2511–2519; Slater 1982 and the reply by Blank and Dyck 1984; Combellack 1987.

143. See Pfeiffer 1968, 69–71; Richardson 1992, 36–37. The fragments (fr. 142–179 Rose) are discussed by Hintenlang 1961.

144. Porph. *QH Il.* 141.17–18 (ad *Il.* 9.682): ἐν τῷ μουσείῳ τῷ κατὰ Ἀλεξάνδρειαν νόμος ἦν προβάλλεσθαι ζητήματα καὶ τὰς γινομένας λύσεις ἀναγράφεσθαι [in the Museum at Alexandria it was customary to put forward questions and write down the ensuing solutions].

145. Lehrs 1882, 205–208, and Pfeiffer 1968, 70, maintained that 'serious' Alexandrian scholars did not take any real interest in *zetemata*, but discussed them as a pastime. Perhaps they treated those 'questions' in their scholarly activity to a lesser extent than others, but the evidence from the scholia shows that Aristarchus addressed some of these problems in his *hypomnemata*.

146. *Sch. Il.* 2.851b, 13.643b, and 13.658–9a, discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2.

147. *Sch. Il.* 4.138a and 20.269–72a, discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.3.

148. *Sch. Il.* 23.638–42, discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 4.1; see also Chapter 5.3 § 5.1.

149. Discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 4.4.

150. *Sch. Il.* 10.372a (see Chapter 3.3.A § 4.1); 20.269–72a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.3).

and had only one spear to begin with.¹⁵¹ Aristarchus solves the question by reading the line differently (*Sch. Il.* 3.380a), as he makes ἔγχεϊ χαλκείῳ the indirect object of the verb ἐπόρουσε: ‘he leapt (ἐπόρουσε) again *on* his bronze spear (ἔγχεϊ χαλκείῳ), eager to kill [Paris]’. In this way, there is no longer any inconsistency: Menelaus, eager to kill Paris, rushes to remove his original spear, which is fixed in Paris’ shield and corselet, and use it again.¹⁵² Another *zetema* concerned Patroclus’ death. When he is about to die, he addresses Hector and tells him not to be too proud of this victory, since ‘ruinous fate and the son of Leto killed me and, among men, Euphorbus; you are the third one to slay me’ (*Il.* 16.849–850). The question was: why does Patroclus list four agents in his death (fate, Apollo, Euphorbus, and Hector), but then he counts Hector as third rather than fourth? Aristarchus solves the question by explaining that fate (Μοῖρα) is not counted by Patroclus, as fate is common to all, while Apollo, Euphorbus, and, as third, Hector are the ones really responsible for his death (*Sch. Il.* 16.850a).¹⁵³

These cases, as well as the other cases analyzed in the preceding and following chapters,¹⁵⁴ illustrate that Aristarchus tried to give solutions (*lyseis*), either by rereading the text in a way that removed inconsistencies, or by providing specific (and sometimes far-fetched) interpretations, such as the principle of homonymy, or by invoking Homeric habits in style, narrative techniques, and language. Only in more difficult cases, when he did not know how to solve the *zetema*, did he athetize the problematic lines. This was the ‘easy way out’, as Aristarchus himself recognizes in the case of the shield of Achilles, where he gives an alternative solution ‘in order that he does not seem to have been at loss for a solution and for this reason to have athetized the line’ (*Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a: ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῇ λύσεως ἠπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἠθετηκέναι, φησὶν ὅτι . . .). He does the same with the *zetema* of the ‘resurrected’ Pylaemenes where—aside from the athetesis—he suggests considering it a case of homonymy (*Sch. Il.* 13.658–9a).¹⁵⁵ The athetesis of lines containing a *zetema* was thus the last resort

151. As is clear from the identical arming of Paris and Menelaus in *Il.* 3.328–339; see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.5.

152. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 226; Kirk 1985, 320.

153. Cf. Janko 1994, 419–420.

154. Other *zetemata* (often introduced with the formulas πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον, πῶς . . . or ὅτι ζητεῖται, πῶς . . .) are discussed by Aristarchus in *Sch. D Il.* 2.494a and *Sch. Il.* 2.494–877 (ex.) (see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.6); 3.65; 9.347a (see Chapter 5.2 § 3.2); 10.447a (see Chapter 3.6.A § 3); 11.636a and 11.636b (Hrd.); 16.170a^{1,2} (ex.) (see Chapter 5.4 § 1); 21.344 and 21.345; 22.202a (discussed below). *Zetemata* can also be passages that ‘seem to be in contradiction’ (πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν μάχεσθαι/ὅτι δοκεῖ μάχεσθαι) or ‘to be contradictory/a problem’ (διὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον/ἄπορον εἶναι), such as those analyzed in *Sch. Il.* 6.265 (see Chapter 5.4 § 5); 11.51a (see Chapter 3.3.A § 4.2); 16.116a (see above, § 3.3); 22.208a^{1,2} and 22.251a (see Chapter 3.6.A § 3).

155. Both *zetemata* are discussed in Chapter 3.3.B, at § 2.9.3 (*Sch. Il.* 20.269–72a) and § 1.2 (*Sch. Il.* 13.658–9a).

for Aristarchus. In only one case does he seem to opt for it without providing an alternative solution—and then only when dealing with a notorious *zetema*, which many other scholars before him had tried to solve. At *Il.* 10.251–253 Odysseus urges Diomedes to go back to the camp, ‘for the night is almost finished and dawn is near; / the stars have moved ahead and the night has passed, more (πλέων) / than two parts (τῶν δύο μοιράων), and only a third is left (τριτάτη δ’ ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται)’. The *zetema* involved the question of how one-third of the night was left, if more than two-thirds of it had passed. Porphyry¹⁵⁶ discusses this *zetema* at length, giving various solutions, among which are those suggested by Aristotle in the *Homeric Problems* (fr. 161 Rose)¹⁵⁷ and by Chrysippus (*SVF* 3, fr. 772). Aristarchus points out that this passage has been variously debated and solved (*Sch. Il.* 10.252a: διὰ τὸ πολυθρύλλητον ζήτημα καὶ τὰς γεγонуίας ἀποδόσεις). He does not seem to be convinced by any of the previous solutions, nor can he find one himself:

Sch. Il. 10.253a¹ τῶν δύο μοιράων, <τριτάτη δ’ ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται>: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι αὐτάρκες τὸ κεφαλαιωδῶς εἰπεῖν ‘ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε’ (*Il.* 10.252). τὸ γὰρ τοῦ καιροῦ τοῦτο ἀπαιτεῖ, τὸ δὲ προσδιασαφεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τὸ παρεληλυθὸς καὶ τὸ περιλειπόμενον ὥσπερ ἀστρονόμου τινός. οὐχ Ὀμηρικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ‘τῶν δύο’. οἱ ‘δύο’ μὲν γὰρ λέγει (*Il.* 5.303, etc.) καὶ τοὺς ‘δύο’ (*Il.* 2.346, etc.), <‘τῶν δύο’ δὲ> ἢ ‘τοῖς δύο’ οὐκ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ. Ζηνόδοτος <οὐ>δὲ ἔγραφεν, Ἀριστοφάνης ἠθέτει.

‘[More] than two parts, and only a third is left’: [the line] is athetized because it is sufficient to say it in summary: ‘the stars have moved ahead’ (*Il.* 10.252), for the moment requires it, but making clear with precision what has passed and what is left [of the night] sounds as if he were an astronomer. And also τῶν δύο is not Homeric, for he says οἱ δύο (*Il.* 5.303, etc.) and τοὺς δύο (*Il.* 2.346, etc.), but in Homer it is not possible to find τῶν δύο or τοῖς δύο. Zenodotus did not write [the line], and Aristophanes athetized it.¹⁵⁸

The linguistic mistake (i.e., τῶν δύο as genitive), which alone was reason enough for an athetesis,¹⁵⁹ suggests the possibility of rejecting the line *in toto*.

156. Porph. *QH Il.* 147.5–153.18 (ad *Il.* 10.252).

157. Aristotle briefly mentions this *zetema* also in *Poet.* 1461a25–26.

158. Cf. Roemer 1912, 144, 157–159, 203; van der Valk 1963–1964, I 124–125; Meijering 1987, 153–154; Lührs 1992, 60–63; Hainsworth 1993, 177–178; van Thiel 2014a, II 177–178; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 10.252a.

159. As concluded in Chapter 3.6.B § 4.5. Because of his different views of the question of superfluous lines (see Chapter 3.6.B § 9), for Lührs 1992, 62, the grammatical point is only a ‘Zusatzargument’ (cf. also Chapter 3.6.B, footnote 163). What Roemer 1912, 159, claims about this use (namely that τῶν δύο and τοῖς δύο are attested elsewhere in Homer) is incorrect.

In fact, line 252 can stand alone and *Il.* 10.251–252 together mean: ‘for the night is almost finished and dawn is near; / the stars have moved ahead and the major part of the night (πλέων νύξ) has passed (παροίχων δέ)’.¹⁶⁰ This shorter version is also in line with Homer’s narrative technique of telling things ‘in summary’ (κεφαλαιωδῶς; see above, § 3.2). In conclusion, the problems raised by this difficult passage were for Aristarchus additional proof that it had to be rejected, rather than being a *zetema* to be ‘solved’.

Finally, some *zetemata* could be solved simply by reading further down in the same passage; hence, they were not *zetemata* at all. The first false problem occurs in Book 6, when Hector rebukes Paris for not fighting and tells him that it is not good to have anger in one’s heart (l. 326: οὐ μὲν καλὰ χόλον τόνδ’ ἔνθεο θυμῷ). Scholars wondered about this ‘anger’: to what did he refer? Aristarchus claims, however, that the problem can be solved by looking at the content (ὑπόθεσις)¹⁶¹ of the passage (*Sch. Il.* 6.326a: ὅτι ἄπορον, ποῖον χόλον. λύοιτο δ’ ἂν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως). In fact, at lines 335–336 Paris replies that the reason for his not fighting is not the Trojans’ anger (Τρώων . . . χόλῳ), but his desire to give in to sorrow. Aristarchus singles out this line as clarifying the issue (*Sch. Il.* 6.335a: ὅτι σαφὲς γέγονε τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω ἄδηλον). Thus he concludes that Paris might have been irritated by the cursing of the Trojans, who after the duel in Book 3 were furious at him (*Il.* 3.451–454)—this of course means that he interpreted Τρώων . . . χόλῳ at line 335 as an objective genitive, ‘the anger against the Trojans’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.326a: μήποτ’ οὖν ἀκούων τοὺς Τρῶας καταρᾶσθαι αὐτῷ ἐχολοῦτο).¹⁶² A similar case is provided by a *zetema* concerning Hector and Achilles’ run around Troy in Book 22:

Sch. Il. 22.202a πῶς δέ κεν Ἑκτωρ <κῆρας ὑπεξέφυγεν θανάτοιο>: . . . ἡ διπλῇ πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον, πῶς ὁ ποδώκης οὐ καταλαμβάνει τὸν Ἑκτορα. λέλυκε δὲ αὐτὸ ὁ ποιητής, ὅτι ὑπὸ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐβοηθεῖτο (sc. *Il.* 22.203–204).

160. According to van der Valk 1963–1964, II 232 and n. 668, Aristarchus also gave a different interpretation of the line by claiming that πλέων meant πλήρης, ‘full’, on the basis of *Sch. Il.* 9.71: ὅτι ‘πλεῖαι’ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρεις, πρὸς τὸ ‘παρώχηκε<ν> δὲ πλέω νύξ’ (cf. *Il.* 10.252) ἀντὶ τοῦ πλήρης [because πλεῖαι means ‘full’, with reference to ‘more night had passed’ (*Il.* 10.252), [with πλέω] instead of πλήρης]. But πλέων in *Il.* 10.252 is an epic comparative of πολὺς, while πλεῖαι in *Il.* 9.71 derives from πλεῖος (the epic form of πλέος or πλέως), which does indeed mean ‘full’. It is hardly credible that Aristarchus missed the difference; see Lührs 1992, 61. Yet the correct interpretation of *Sch. Il.* 9.71 is debated; cf. also Friedländer 1853, 155–156; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 9.71. Whatever meaning Aristarchus gave to πλέων, however, does not affect his grounds for athetesis (as already remarked by Lührs 1992, 61).

161. In the scholia and Alexandrian criticism, ὑπόθεσις means ‘content’, as opposed to σύνθεσις, ‘(word) composition’, ‘form’; see Meijering 1987, 105–133; Bottai and Schironi 1997; Nünlist 2009, 67 and 385.

162. Cf. Roemer 1912, 350–351; Kirk 1990, 203.

'How could Hector have escaped the fates of death': . . . the *diple* with reference to the question, how the swift-footed [Achilles] does not catch Hector. But the poet himself has solved it, [saying] that he was helped by Apollo (i.e., *Il.* 22.203–204).

Even if it might seem odd that 'swift-footed' Achilles could not catch Hector, as is clearly stated in *Il.* 22.199–201 when the two are compared to what happens in a dream when one cannot pursue one who flees before him,¹⁶³ Homer himself gives the solution in the lines directly following the problematic one (l. 201). He does so through a rhetorical question which includes his own answer: 'how could Hector have escaped the fates of death if Apollo did not help him for the last time, by giving him force and making his legs swift?' (cf. *Il.* 22.202–204). As discussed above at § 2.4, rhetorical questions are a typical trait of Homeric style; in this case, they actually help the readers to solve a problem. In fact, Aristarchus does athetize the 'dream' simile (*Il.* 199–201); however, the reason is not because the *zetema* is unsolvable. For him, these lines are cheap in content and style; in addition, the simile suggests a perpetual and endless run, and this is in contradiction with a previous simile (*Il.* 22.162–166), when Hector and Achilles are compared to horses racing for a prize (*Sch. Il.* 22.199–201a: τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ τῷ νοήματι εὐτελεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπραξίαν δρόμου καὶ τὸ ἀπαράβατον σημαίνουν, ἐναντίως τῷ 'ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἀεθλοφόροι περὶ τέρματα μώνυχες ἵπποι' (*Il.* 22.162)).¹⁶⁴ Yet, even without the simile at lines 199–201, now athetized, the idea that Achilles is running after Hector for a while without being able to catch him is still conveyed by lines 188–194, where the two are compared to a hound chasing a fawn for a while until the hound catches his prey. This simile now precedes Homer's rhetorical question and answer at lines 202–204 to explain why Hector can run so fast.

163. *Il.* 22.199–201: ὥς δ' ἐν ὀνείρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν· / οὔτ' ἄρ' ὁ τὸν δύναται ὑποφεύγειν οὔθ' ὁ διώκειν· / ὥς ὁ τὸν οὐ δύνατο μάρψαι ποσὶν, οὐδ' ὃς ἀλύξαι [as in a dream one cannot chase one who flees; neither can one flee from the other, nor can the other chase, in the same way the one [i.e., Achilles] could not catch the other with his feet, nor could the other [i.e., Hector] escape].

164. It is not completely clear what Aristarchus' criticism is. Perhaps he might have felt that the second image was contradicting the desire for victory and eagerness of running expressed by the first one. *Sch. Il.* 22.199–201b (ex. [Ariston.]) claims that these similes also belittle Achilles' swift-ness. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 13–14 and 28; Roemer 1912, 55–58 (who denies the athetesis to Aristarchus); van der Valk 1963–1964, II 382–385; Richardson 1993, 128.

6. Aristarchus' 'Judgment' (κρίσις) of Homeric Mistakes

Even if Aristarchus seems to have considered these last two examples false *zetemata*, other 'problems' did pose challenges, which he overcame by giving alternative (and more or less convincing) solutions. Aristarchus' *lyseis* are an example of his efforts to preserve the received text and minimize his own alterations to it: before turning to a drastic solution like athetesis, he tried to explain the text as it stood and show that there were no contradictions. Only in extreme cases did he athetize the problematic line(s) in order to eliminate the *zetema* completely. On other occasions, he simply noticed that something did not work, without proposing any solution. For example, in *Sch. Il.* 17.125a Aristarchus singles out another inconsistency in the description of Patroclus' death. At *Il.* 17.125 Hector strips the Greek hero of his armor, but this contradicts *Il.* 16.804, where Apollo is said to have loosened Patroclus' corselet in order to offer him as an easy victim first to Euphorbus and then to Hector. As Aristarchus observes in *Sch. Il.* 17.125a, Hector wounds Patroclus when the latter has already been deprived of his armor, so it impossible for Hector to despoil him at *Il.* 17.125 (and at *Il.* 16.815 Homer clearly says that Patroclus is 'unarmed': Πάτροκλον γυμνόν περ ἔόντ' ἐν δηϊοτήτι).¹⁶⁵ Yet, as far as our evidence goes, he does not seem to have offered any solution to this inconsistency, beyond noticing it.¹⁶⁶

165. On the incipit of *Sch. Il.* 17.125a (ὅτι ἔοικε παρεπιτιμῶντι ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος τῷ Ὀμήρῳ), which is probably corrupt, see Lehrs 1882, 15 n. 2; van der Valk 1963–1964, I 562; Erbse, ad loc. However, the rest of the scholium clearly points to a problem of internal contradiction: οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ Ἑκτώρ ὁ σκυλεύσας τὸν Πάτροκλον, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ περιόντος ἀφείλετο τὰ ὄπλα αὐτὸς Ἀπόλλων, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸν γυμνὸν ἔτρωσεν. ἄλυσε δὲ οἱ θώρηκα ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων' (*Il.* 16.804) [for it was not Hector himself who despoiled Patroclus, but Apollo himself took the armor from him when he was successful: and he [i.e., Hector] wounded [Patroclus] when he was already without armor: 'Lord Apollo, son of Zeus, loosed his corselet' (*Il.* 16.804)]. In addition, *Sch. Il.* 17.205–6a (ex.), which responds to Aristarchus (see next footnote), clearly says that Aristarchus 'condemns' line 125 (ἄνω δὲ ἐπιτιμᾷ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος). For Dionysius (probably Dionysius Thrax), on the other hand, the *diple* at *Il.* 17.125 had been placed because the case had changed: Πάτροκλον ἐπεὶ κλυτὰ τεύχε' ἀπηύρα instead of Πατρόκλου (*Sch. Il.* 17.125a). Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, I 562; Linke 1977, 41–42 (fr. *12); van Thiel 2014a, III 113. On the alternative interpretations by Dionysius Thrax, see Chapter 1.1 § 4.1.

166. Modern scholars, too, have noticed this inconsistency and consider it a problem arising from the inappropriate use of type-scene elements and *formulae*: see, e.g., Combellack 1965, 47–51; Edwards 1991, 74–75. A response to Aristarchus' criticism might be found in *Sch. Il.* 17.205–6a (ex.) and Eust. 1102.44 (ad *Il.* 17.205), commenting on *Il.* 17.205–206, when Zeus says that Hector 'improperly' (οὐ κατὰ κόσμον) took Patroclus' armor from his head and shoulders. According to Edwards (1991, 74), these lines, too, are part of the same mistake. For Eustathius, however, they mean that Hector did not strip the armor from Patroclus' body, as is normal, but took the armor from the ground (where Apollo had left it) as a 'gift' (1102.44: τὸ δὲ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἀπὸ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων εἶλεν' ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἐσκύλευσας, ὡς ἐχρήν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Φοίβου τὸν Πάτροκλον ἀφοπλίσαντος, σὺ δῶρον εἶλον αὐτὰ ἢ καὶ ὡς εὔρημα). Eustathius' solution was also adopted by van Leeuwen (see Combellack 1965, 50).

Another interesting example can be found in the games for Patroclus. When Achilles announces the archery games, he sets two sets of prizes: one set for the winner, who will be able to hit the target dove, and another for the runner-up, who will not hit the bird, but 'by chance' will hit the rope to which the dove is bound (*Il.* 23.855–858). This is exactly what happens, as Meriones hits the dove and receives the first prize, while Teucer, who did not promise Apollo any offerings, misses the bird and only hits the rope (*Il.* 23.859–883). Aristarchus observes that it would have been better if Achilles had not said anything about the rope being hit since this was going to happen only by chance (*Sch. Il.* 23.857a: ὅτι βέλτιον ἦν τοῦτο μὴ προλέγεσθαι ὑπὸ Ἀχιλλέως ὥσπερ προγινώσκοντος τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης συμβησόμενον).¹⁶⁷ Since Achilles does not have the gift of prophecy, it is impossible for him to predict how the game would unfold.¹⁶⁸ Aristarchus' comment here recalls his 'wish' about a different order in Andromache's wailing in Book 22 (see above, § 4). Yet in another instance that presents similar issues he opts, strangely enough, for the opposite choice, i.e., athetesis. At *Il.* 23.405–406 Antilochus, urging his horses on during the chariot race, tells them that Diomedes is winning because of Athena's help. Although this is true, as Homer has told us so (*Il.* 23.399–400), given the peculiar nature of divine interventions, which usually happen without the notice of the other human characters in the Homeric poems, Aristarchus wonders: 'how can Antilochus know what Athena has done?' (*Sch. Il.* 23.405–6a). With this remark he seems to discriminate between the characters and the readers, acknowledging that the latter might know something that the former do not. In other words, this comment suggests Aristarchus' awareness of 'dramatic irony', i.e., that the audience/readers have a privileged point of view since they know more than the characters do. In this case the boundary between the reader and the character is thus crossed, which violates the poem's believability. For this reason, Aristarchus athetizes the two lines.¹⁶⁹ His rationale here is very clear, but also makes his decision in the previous example more mysterious. Indeed, *Il.* 23.857–858 (Achilles' prediction) can be dispensed with without problem, at least from a syntactic point of view. We can only speculate as to why Aristarchus did not choose athetesis in this case, which can sound even more problematic than the Antilochus one. Without lines 857–858, Achilles would only mention the first prize at lines 855–856 and not the second, and this perhaps might have been a problem for Aristarchus, who paid attention to the prizes offered in the funeral games for Patroclus and how they matched the number of the contestants.¹⁷⁰ Or perhaps he kept those lines in Book 23 because they were

167. See also *Sch. Il.* 23.857b (ex. [Ariston.]).

168. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 6–7. The same criticism has been raised by modern scholars; see, e.g., Richardson 1993, 265–266.

169. Cf. Roemer 1912, 211–212; Lührs 1992, 95–96.

170. See Chapter 3.3.B § 2.7.

consistently attested in his manuscripts. Still, without more evidence, these are only speculative suggestions.

In noticing these inconsistencies, Aristarchus was doing exactly what modern scholars do when reading the Homeric text: however, while the latter can explain them as slips typical of oral poetry, Aristarchus could not. He simply noticed them, as he noticed 'out-of-place' epithets, or linguistic mistakes. For some of these 'slips'—certain *zetemata* or odd linguistic uses—he was able to find ad hoc solutions; however, for some of these contradictions involving the content, it was much more difficult to find an answer. He could athetize them, but apparently this was not always his choice. Sometimes he simply limited himself to noticing these problems in Homer and wishing that he had a different text at his disposal.

7. Conclusions

Aristarchus' analysis of formulaic and narrative techniques can be seen as part of his efforts to determine what was 'typically Homeric', though in this case applied to the highest level of textual analysis: poetic intrusions, apparent inconsistencies in the use of repetitive fixed epithets and formulaic lines, or the treatment of time in the narrative. As happened in other areas of his scholarship, like the study of Homer's language, style, or worldview, once Aristarchus had defined what was 'typically Homeric' in terms of narrative techniques, he used these newly found 'rules' to explain passages which might have seemed unclear or, worse, contradictory. This chapter has thus brought out the other side of Aristarchus' 'judgment of poems' (κρίσις ποιημάτων): while the previous chapter discussed the cases where he eliminated suspicious lines with an athetesis, here the focus has generally been on his efforts to show that the original text was in fact sound as long as it was interpreted in a certain way. Similarly, and in line with his Aristotelian view of Homer as an excellent poet who was always self-consistent, Aristarchus exerted most of his energies to solve *zetemata*, as well as other narrative slips, by interpreting the text in a different way.

Despite his efforts to 'save' the text, Aristarchus was still not satisfied with it in some cases. This happened with some 'unsolvable' *zetemata* which he could only 'solve' by athetizing the lines at issue. He also had problems when a formulaic line was used in obvious contradiction to the context, or when Homer made his characters tell of details which they should not have known. In these cases, he either opted for an athetesis or left the text as it was. It is sometimes puzzling, though, to see that he chose opposite solutions for very similar cases. For example, he athetized *Il.* 23.405–406, where Antilochus oddly

knows that Diomedes is winning the chariot race with Athena’s help, but kept *Il.* 23.857, with Achilles knowing things that will only happen in the future, even though he notes that Achilles’ foreknowledge is problematic. It is impossible to know the precise reasons for Aristarchus’ opposite behavior in these two almost identical cases. As in the case of *Il.* 9.222 (see above, § 1.1), he might have decided not to athetize or change a problematic line because of manuscript evidence, or, perhaps, he found another way to ‘save’ those passages, which is now lost to us.

Aristarchus’ analysis of fixed epithets—distinguishing ‘specific’, ‘generic’, and ‘out-of-place’ epithets—was sophisticated for his time and to a certain extent anticipated the modern oralist views of the same phenomena. Similarly refined was his awareness that Homer could intrude into the text with his own persona, and that such intrusions had specific effects in the poem. The way that he dealt with Homer’s narrative techniques, his ‘discovery’ of Zielinski’s Law, and his handling of events described only partially or considered ‘as happened’ were all equally advanced. In the opening of the chapter I used the term ‘literary criticism.’ As has now become clear, though this type of analysis is more advanced than the explanations of *glossai* or the recognition of a trope, it is very different from the literary criticism found in treatises like the anonymous *On the Sublime* or those by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. While the latter works aimed at giving theoretical rules, deducing them from specific examples, Aristarchus’ main interest was practical. As with the Aristotelian principles which were ‘practically’ applied in his exegesis, his remarks about narrative techniques and literary devices seem never to have been framed within a theoretical perspective in his Homeric commentaries; rather, they were ‘used’ to explain the text or argue with other scholars (in particular, with Zenodotus).

There are also important differences between Aristarchus’ notes and the notes in the exegetical scholia. The latter constantly comment on the ability of Homer in using certain devices and often focus on the effects that the poet is able to create on his readership. Aristarchus’ perspective seems to have been completely different, at least from the evidence available to us. In his remaining fragments he very rarely comments on the poetic ability of Homer or on the reactions he could stir in readers—one exception being *Sch. Il.* 2.681a, where Aristarchus praises the φιλοτεχνία of Homer.¹⁷¹ This does not mean, however, that he did not consider Homer a good poet. Quite the contrary: Homer’s extraordinary ability was one of Aristarchus’ main assumptions for his entire scholarly work—he did not need to repeat it in each of his comments.¹⁷² The praise of and admiration for Homer in fact lay behind all of Aristarchus’ scholarship.

171. See Schenkeveld 1970, 163–164.

172. See Chapter 6 § 2.1.

This is why his comments were eminently exegetical, not laudatory: the analysis and explanation of Homer's sophisticated literary devices for him were not a way to determine whether Homer was a good poet, but rather to defend the received text, exactly *because Homer was an excellent poet*. In other words, while Homer's excellence did not require any further demonstration, the knowledge of his (excellent) narrative and formulaic techniques was fundamental, as Aristarchus used it to justify and explain slips and inconsistencies surfacing in the text. As with the other aspects analyzed in the other five parts of grammar, 'literary criticism' was for him a way to 'save' Homer and reconfirm Homeric greatness.

Part 4

Aristarchus and His Colleagues

Zenodotus, Aristophanes, and Others

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2. Aristarchus and Aristophanes of Byzantium
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4. Aristarchus and Crates of Mallos
 - 4.1. Aristarchus' Knowledge of Crates' Work (and Vice Versa)
 - 4.2. The Aristonicus Scholia Discussing Crates' Views
5. Conclusions

Aristarchus did not work in isolation. Part 4 of this study will thus concentrate on his attitude toward, and disagreements with, his colleagues, including his predecessors in Alexandria and other contemporary critics such as Crates in Pergamum. The focus will primarily be on Aristarchus' attitude and reactions to them, and not on reconstructing the actual choices and methods of these

other scholars, all the more since the sources which preserve their fragments are fraught with problems. Moreover, even though many examples will be discussed, they by no means present an exhaustive picture of the activity of these other Alexandrian grammarians or of Crates, nor do they cover all the polemical debates in which Aristarchus was engaged.¹ My primary interest in looking at these fragments is thus to investigate how Aristarchus dealt with his predecessors and contemporary colleagues in order to bring to light another aspect of his methodology.

1. Aristarchus and Zenodotus

The previous chapters have shown many instances where Aristarchus dealt with a specific problem and at the same time criticized Zenodotus' choices. In this section the focus will be broader, since the goal is to discuss Aristarchus' general attitude toward his predecessor. Rather than reconstructing Zenodotus' methodology and scholarship,² the attention will thus be on Aristarchus' criticism of it. Due to the substantial number of scholia regarding Zenodotus (more than 470 in the collection at the basis of the present study), I will take into account only a select few cases which—while limited—will still provide a comprehensive overview of Aristarchus' many claims against his predecessor.

1.1. Sources

Zenodotus was the main target of Aristarchus' criticism. Indeed, Aristarchus even devoted a new marginal sign to marking the lines where he had some critique to make against his predecessor: the *diple periestigmene* (>:).³ In the scholia which discuss and criticize Zenodotus' choices, however, the *diple* (twenty cases)⁴ is more often mentioned than the *diple periestigmene* (four cases).⁵ With the exception of two or perhaps three instances where the scholium also con-

1. As mentioned many times, my focus is always on Aristarchus' opinions as transmitted mostly by Aristonicus. I am not aiming at a complete reconstruction of the ancient debates on specific Homeric problems. On the criteria used to select the evidence for this study, see Chapter 1.1 § 5.

2. On Zenodotus' scholarship, see Duenzter 1848; Pusch 1890; Nickau 1977; West 2001, 33–45. On Zenodotus' Homeric text and the Alexandrian poets, see Rengakos 1993, 49–87.

3. *An. Rom.* 54.16–18 (see Chapter 2.1, footnote 14).

4. *Sch. Il.* 1.336a; 1.396a; 2.616; 4.139b; 9.537a; 10.545a; 10.546b¹; 11.413a; 13.315b; 13.627a; 16.150b; 16.202a; 16.243a; 17.368d; 17.551a¹; 18.230; 18.247; 18.570a; 19.26a; 23.533a.

5. *Sch. Il.* 2.673–5; 3.423a; 4.88a; 19.388–91a. In *Sch. Il.* 9.405 Erbse, following Villoison, adds ἡ διπλὴ περιεστιγμένη, ὅτι in the text because the sign is in the margin. These are the only cases in which the *diple periestigmene* is mentioned in the *scholia maiora* to the *Iliad*.

tains another philological note which can justify the presence of the simple *diple*,⁶ all the other scholia simply contain Aristarchus' rebuttal of Zenodotus' choices.⁷ Assuming that Aristonicus reported the signs correctly, since they were his main focus, these cases can be explained as a mistake by the scholiast, who did not see the *stigmai* next to the *diple*—in fact, the same lines are almost always marked in the *Venetus A* with *diplai periestigmenai*.⁸ Otherwise, the scholiast might have used '*diple*' as a cover term that included the *diple periestigmene*.

Aristarchus seems to have been very certain about what Zenodotus' choices were. In only two cases, at *Il.* 2.111⁹ and 14.37,¹⁰ does Ptolemy Epithetes, who probably worked at Alexandria roughly at the same time as Aristarchus and was an anti-Aristarchean (hence his nickname, Epithetes, 'the attacker'),¹¹ attribute to Zenodotus a reading different from the one mentioned by Aristarchus. Aside from these two cases, there is no other evidence indicating that Aristarchus had unreliable information on Zenodotus' textual choices. This seems to suggest that the Zenodotean edition, or a copy of it, was available to Aristarchus, even if it sometimes might not have been well preserved, so that the latter could have been mistaken on some specific readings.¹²

In fact, the Aristonicus scholia show that, if Aristarchus was aware of Zenodotus' ecdotic choices, most of the time he did not seem to know the

6. *Sch. Il.* 4.139b; 16.202a; 17.368d (perhaps).

7. The scholia mentioning a *diple* to argue against Zenodotus should be kept distinct from cases like *Sch. Il.* 1.62, 13.68a, and 17.700a, where both a *diple* and Zenodotus are mentioned, but the former does not indicate Aristarchus' critique of the latter; rather the *diple* points to a word / grammatical use / stylistic device in that line, which Aristarchus then uses to criticize Zenodotus' choices somewhere else: e.g., *Sch. Il.* 17.700a: ἡ διπλῆ, δέ, ὅτι οὕτως εἰώθε λέγειν, οἱ πόδες ἔφερον, οὐχὶ τοὺς πόδας. πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον μεταγράφοντα (sc. *Il.* 6.511) 'ρίμφ' ἐὰ γούνα φέρει' [the *diple* because [the poet] is used to saying in this way, 'his feet (οἱ πόδες) brought (ἔφερον) [him]', and not '[he brought] his feet (τοὺς πόδας)'. With reference to Zenodotus who writes: '[he] nimbly (ρίμφ) brings his knees (ἐὰ γούνα)' (sc. *Il.* 6.511)]. On this specific question and Zenodotus' reading in *Il.* 6.511, see below, § 1.5.1.

8. With the exception of only three cases of a simple *diple* (at *Il.* 4.139, 18.570, and 23.533) and three cases where the *Venetus A* has no sign at all (at *Il.* 1.396, 17.368, and 17.551).

9. *Sch. Il.* 2.111b (Did.) and *Sch. Il.* 2.111a (Ariston.); cf. Montanari 1988, 98–100 (fr. 1). On these scholia, cf. also Nickau 1977, 4, 24, 64–66, 201; van Thiel 2014a, I 176 (in line with his eccentric view of the Alexandrian *ekdoseis*); Schironi 2015, 612–615 (with bibliography).

10. *Sch. Il.* 14.37b^{1.2} (Did.); cf. Montanari 1988, 101–104 (fr. 3).

11. On Ptolemy Epithetes, see Montanari 1988, 77–110.

12. According to Montanari 1988, 84 and 101, Zenodotus' *ekdosis* was already unavailable in Aristarchus' time and there were many doubts about his choices. However, despite the (rare) cases where Aristarchus does not know Zenodotus' readings, most of the time he seems certain about them. Unless we assume that Aristarchus was disingenuous or that Aristonicus did not preserve Aristarchus' uncertainties about his predecessor's readings faithfully, we must conclude that he did know about Zenodotus' *ekdosis* whether through a still-preserved manuscript, or through a copy, or through a work collecting Zenodotus' choices (just as Didymus collected Aristarchus' readings).

reasons *why* Zenodotus made those choices. Sometimes the scholia try to guess Zenodotus' reasons by adding cautionary expressions like μήποτε¹³ or ἴσως,¹⁴ in the sense '[Zenodotus made such choice] *perhaps* because ...'. In most cases, however, we are not given Zenodotus' explanations; among the Aristarchean fragments, very few mention a specific reason for Zenodotus' reading.¹⁵ The scholia do not generally report Zenodotus' arguments, probably because Aristarchus did not know them himself in the first place and thus did not report them in his commentaries. This corresponds to what scholars have been able to reconstruct about the work of Zenodotus: while Aristarchus produced commentaries (*hypomnemata*), where he could explain his choices, Zenodotus and Aristophanes did not.¹⁶ Rather, they only produced editions (*ekdoseis*), which were the sole place where they could report their philological choices (which they must have explained orally during their lectures). Zenodotus could probably write very brief marginal comments in his *ekdosis*,¹⁷ and these were the only 'explanations' available to Aristarchus, who of course never attended Zenodotus' lectures and could only criticize his predecessor's *ekdosis* without reading a commentary where those choices could be justified.

The survey of Aristarchus' fragments discussing Zenodotus' readings unquestionably shows that the latter is criticized in the vast majority of these instances. No doubt, Aristarchus had problems with his predecessor. Yet this impression may also be due to the selection of the material: Aristonicus probably recorded only the instances where Zenodotus was criticized, because Aristarchus himself in all likelihood only reported (and discussed) disagreements in his *hypomnemata*, but not the cases where he shared Zenodotus' choices.¹⁸ Didymus paints a different picture, however: when he lists the readings he finds in different editions, often Zenodotus and Aristarchus are in agreement.¹⁹ The situation occurring in the case of athetesis is similar. Normally, the Aristonicus

13. In *Sch. Il.* 1.62; 2.553a; 11.104a¹ (analyzed below, at § 1.5.2).

14. In *Sch. Il.* 2.641; 11.548a.

15. *Sch. Il.* 1.117a; 2.579–80a; 18.39–49 (Did. + Ariston.); 21.95a^{1,2}; 21.538–9. More doubtful is the case of *Sch. Il.* 16.97–100b (ex. [Did.?]), because the reason which Aristarchus attributes to Zenodotus for an athetesis is the same as Aristarchus' own justification given by Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 16.97–100a (see Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2). The exegetical scholium might have mixed two pieces of information: (1) Aristarchus' reason for the athetesis as reported by Aristonicus; and (2) the fact that those lines had already been athetized by Zenodotus.

16. See, e.g., Wecklein 1919, 85; Pfeiffer 1968, 108, 115, 173–174, 212; Schironi 2012a, 91–93. On Aristarchus' *ekdoseis* and *hypomnemata*, see Chapter 1.2 §§ 2–4.

17. Cf. Montanari 1998, 8.

18. The possibility of a 'selection effect' is reinforced when looking at Aristarchus' comments on Aristophanes' choices: the two scholars were more often in agreement and, as a consequence, there are very few Aristonicus scholia mentioning Aristophanes (see below, § 2).

19. E.g., Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 1.91; 1.598a; 2.579; 3.57a; 3.126a; 8.304a; 14.285b; 14.400b. See also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 13.450a¹.

scholia report the instances when Aristarchus objects to an athetesis by Zenodotus,²⁰ whereas Didymus sometimes mentions cases where the two agree on rejecting the same lines.²¹ Again, this discrepancy may be due to the fact that, when Aristarchus approved of Zenodotus in his *atheteseis*, Aristonicus reported only the former's decision, either because Aristarchus himself did not mention the identical choice of his predecessor, or because the reference to Zenodotus was not transcribed by Aristonicus on purpose or was lost in the course of the epitomization process.

1.2. Zenodotus, ὁ οὐχ Ὀμηρικός

In general, Aristarchus' main issue with Zenodotus was that the latter did not have a deep enough knowledge of Homer and of his poems: not knowing what was 'typically Homeric', he often made mistakes in his edition. This problem emerged in every aspect of Zenodotus' Homeric scholarship: from his variant readings to his decisions about lines' authenticity. In certain cases, Aristarchus pointed out a Homeric usage in language or style simply to demonstrate that Zenodotus' reading elsewhere was wrong, because it was 'not Homeric'. To mark these polemical notes, the Aristonicus scholia use the formula [ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ] πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον, that is: 'the reference is to Zenodotus'.²²

1.2.1. Zenodotus and Homeric Vocabulary

According to Aristarchus, Zenodotus showed through his readings that he did not know the real meaning and use of certain Homeric *glossai*;²³ for his lexical

20. Only occasionally does Aristonicus mention an athetesis by Zenodotus without indicating whether Aristarchus shared it or not, and these omissions might be due to corruption of the original text (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.225–33; 1.396a; 2.727).

21. See, for example, Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 7.443–64b^{1,2} and 16.97–100b (ex. [Did.?]), while Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 7.443–64a and 16.97–100a discusses Aristarchus' athetesis but does not say that Zenodotus had already rejected the lines.

22. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 15.405a, 17.700a, and 18.148a (see below, footnote 108); 10.25a with 10.10b^{1,2} (see Chapter 3.4 § 8.1). The same phrasing is used when Aristarchus criticizes Zenodotus for other reasons, beyond linguistic mistakes; see, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 7.390 (see below, footnote 86); 11.111 (see below, § 1.5.2). In fact, this phrase could also be translated as '[the reference is] *against* Zenodotus', since it has obviously a polemical meaning. However, in the scholia ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς + accusative, or simply πρὸς + accusative, is also used in a more neutral meaning to indicate a reference to a *zetema* (e.g., the question of Pylaemenes in the scholia quoted in footnote 16 of Chapter 3.3.B). I have thus preferred to keep the same meaning for what seems to be a technical term in commentaries to indicate the object of a comment, polemical or not. On this formula and the meaning of ἀναφορὰ in the scholia, see Nünlist 2012a, 116–118; cf. also Roemer 1924, 18–19.

23. *Sch. Il.* 5.128b (see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.3); 7.127a^{1,2} and 9.616b (see Chapter 3.3.A § 4.2); 9.3c (see Chapter 3.3.A, footnote 58); 10.10b^{1,2}, 18.247, 19.14, and 19.15 (see Chapter 3.4 § 8.1); 10.515a; 11.86a and 11.730a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.3); 13.610 (see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.4); 13.627a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 4.3); 21.95a¹ and 24.47a.

incompetence, in fact, Zenodotus is even once grouped with the Glossographers.²⁴ In particular, he often opted for Koine readings, that is, according to the meaning that words had in Zenodotus' *own* time, forgetting that Homeric language was different from Koine;²⁵ or he read forms which were only used by later poets (the Neoterói).²⁶ As a consequence, his readings were often not in line with the Homeric usage.²⁷ Occasionally Zenodotus even seems to have missed the meaning of normal Greek words,²⁸ and some of his readings cannot be even defined as 'Greek' in Aristarchus' view.²⁹ Because of his faulty knowledge of Homeric vocabulary, then, Zenodotus also athetized lines because he did not understand words in the Homeric sense,³⁰ or took them too literally.³¹

An example of Aristarchus' insistent criticism of Zenodotus' flawed approach to Homeric idiolect can be found in a set of notes discussing the meaning of βάλλειν. As seen in Chapter 3.3.A § 2.5, Aristarchus opposed the verb βάλλειν, 'to hit by hurling something', to verbs like τύπτειν and οὐτάμεναι, which instead indicate 'to strike with a weapon in hand'. He finds fault with Zenodotus regarding this semantic distinction in an interesting set of scholia on Book 16, when Patroclus becomes easy prey for enemies because of the intervention of Apollo, who weakens him (ll. 788–806). Patroclus is then wounded twice, first by Euphorbus (ll. 806–817), who throws a spear (l. 807: βάλε) into his back between his shoulders, and then by Hector (ll. 818–828), who fatally strikes him (l. 820: οὐτα) by thrusting his spear into his lower belly. Thus, even if the weapon is identical (a spear), it is employed in a different way, because Euphorbus throws his spear as a missile (hence βάλλειν), while Hector uses it as a 'sword' to strike Patroclus from nearby (hence οὐτάμεναι). At line 807, however, with reference to Euphorbus' action, Zenodotus read οὐτασε instead of βάλε (*Sch. Il.* 16.807a). In a series of scholia, Aristarchus criticizes this reading by pointing out that very clear textual clues prove that βάλε is the right verb here. First, at line 812 Homer addresses Patroclus directly, saying: 'he [i.e., Euphorbus] first hurled (ἐφῆκε) the missile (βέλος) at you, horseman Patroclus'. As Aristarchus remarks, the verb ἀφίημι and the noun βέλος clearly

24. *Sch. Il.* 9.404a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 5.2).

25. *Sch. Il.* 2.56b; 3.99a; 3.206a; 12.346a with 3.297a.

26. *Sch. Il.* 2.144b, 14.499–500a¹ (Hrd.), and 14.500 (see Chapter 5.3 § 1).

27. *Sch. Il.* 8.470a (ἔστι δὲ ἡ λέξις οὐχ Ὀμηρικὴ); 9.612b (ἔστι δὲ οὐχ Ὀμηρικὸν καὶ παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπον).

28. *Sch. Il.* 11.528, 12.348a, 12.359a¹, and 12.368 (all on the distinction between adverbs of place and adverbs of direction; cf. Lehrs 1882, 133–134); 20.11a¹.

29. *Sch. Il.* 14.37a¹ (τὸ ὄψα ἀνελλήνιστον) and 14.37a² (βάρβαρον); see, however, also *Sch. Il.* 14.37b¹ (Did.), discussed above, at § 1.1 with footnote 10.

30. *Sch. Il.* 1.62 and 5.149 (see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.9); 1.159 and 3.286a.

31. *Sch. Il.* 21.538–9 (see Chapter 2.3 § 5).

mean that the spear was thrown as a missile (*Sch. Il.* 16.807a; 16.812).³² Second, at line 819, before wounding Patroclus, Hector sees him βεβλημένο[ς] ὁξεί χαλκῷ, which recalls the βάλε at line 807 (*Sch. Il.* 16.819). Third, at line 828 Homer says that Hector takes Patroclus' life *from close by* and *with his spear* (σχεδὸν ἔγχρ' ἑυμὸν ἀπηύρα), proving that Hector wounds him with a weapon in his hand, while Euphorbus hit him with a missile (*Sch. Il.* 16.828: ὅτι οὗτος μὲν οὔτασεν, ὁ δὲ Εὐφορβος βέβληκε). Fourth, at *Il.* 17.12–17 Euphorbus urges Menelaus to abandon Patroclus' body and brags that before him none of the Trojans had hit (l. 15: βάλε) Patroclus with a spear (*Sch. Il.* 17.15). All these notes about the same point show just how much effort Aristarchus exerted in proving that Zenodotus' readings were wrong.³³

1.2.2. Zenodotus, Homeric Morphology, and Syntax

After Aristarchus' critique of Zenodotus' weakness in Homeric vocabulary, his ignorance (in Aristarchus' eyes) of Homeric grammar, from basic morphology to more complex issues, should come as no surprise. According to many Aristonicus scholia, Zenodotus showed faults in declining forms in line with the Homeric usage, including proper nouns,³⁴ common nouns,³⁵ and adjectives;³⁶ he also incorrectly adopted Hellenistic forms unknown to Homer, like the nominative singular comparative in -ω rather than in -ων.³⁷ Zenodotus had also problems with verbal forms. He was not aware, for example, that ἐπιστέαται is a third-person plural, as he used it to refer to a singular subject instead of ἐπίστηται (*Sch. Il.* 16.243a).³⁸ Zenodotus' morphological and syn-

32. Against Aristarchus' view, Seleucus (*Sch. Il.* 16.807b [ex.]) argued that it was impossible to hurl a spear 'from nearby', as the Homeric text says at line 807 (σχεδόθεν βάλε); this might have also been the reason that led Zenodotus to read [σχεδὸν] οὔτασε instead of [σχεδόθεν] βάλε. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 125–126; Lehrs 1882, 55 and 60; Janko 1994, 414.

33. Aristarchus employs the same strategy to show that Zenodotus did not really know the meaning of βάλλειν in another famous episode: the battle between Achilles and Aeneas in Book 20. Aristarchus accuses Zenodotus of having wrongly read νύξε instead of βάλε for Achilles' use of the spear against Aeneas (l. 274), for a wound which is later on (l. 283) called βέλος, and he carries on his polemics in many scholia: *Sch. Il.* 20.273–4a^{1,2}; 20.279 (ὅτι σαφῶς συνίστησιν ὅτι βέβληται); 20.283; 20.346a^{1,2} (λέγει γοῦν ῥητῶς ἐφέηκα). Cf. Duentzer 1848, 150; Lehrs 1882, 55–56. For a similar question with another Zenodotean reading, see Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 11.439a^{1,2,3}.

34. *Sch. Il.* 1.86, 13.68a, and 13.222a; 2.520; 5.263a and 5.323; 8.349a¹ (Ariston.?) and 8.349b (ex. [Ariston.?]). Aristarchus uses analogical proportions to prove Zenodotus wrong in these cases; see Chapter 3.5, *passim*.

35. *Sch. Il.* 3.152a^{1,2}; 2.302a.b, 3.280a, and 14.274a. These examples have all been discussed in Chapter 3.5 § 7 and § 8.

36. *Sch. Il.* 2.658 and 5.638a (see below, § 1.5.2).

37. *Sch. Il.* 1.80a; 1.249b; 3.71b; 3.92; 7.114b¹; see also *Sch. Il.* 16.688b (where Zenodotus is not mentioned and the reading in -ω is attributed to anonymous τινές); cf. La Roche 1866, 302–303; Nickau 1977, 46–47; Janko 1994, 24 and 398.

38. See also Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 6.56. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 63–64; Nickau 1977, 47; van der Valk

tactic mistakes, however, were not limited to Homeric language; sometimes, in fact, they were simply mistakes of Greek grammar,³⁹ to the point that once his reading is said to make a sentence ἀκατάλληλος, ‘ungrammatical’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.616). Similarly, when Zenodotus’ text presented ἐκαθέζετο, an imperfect with augment before the preverb, Aristarchus accuses him of not allowing Homer to speak good Greek (*Sch. Il.* 1.68: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘ἐκαθέζετο’. οὐκ ἔα δὲ ἐλληνίζειν τὸν Ὅμηρον).⁴⁰ Two other cases of a wrong augment by Zenodotus (ἐμεθίει instead of μεθίει and ἤμελλον instead of ἔμελλον) are commented on along the same lines: he makes Homer speak like a barbarian (*Sch. Il.* 15.716: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘οὐκ ἐμεθίει’ ὥστε βαρβαρίζειν τὸν Ὅμηρον, and *Sch. Il.* 12.34: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘ὥς ἤμελλον ὀπισθε’. ἔστι δὲ βάρβαρον).⁴¹

The same happened with many of the syntactic peculiarities of Homer: Zenodotus seemed not to know that Homer ‘omits’ articles,⁴² and that he ‘changes’ cases,⁴³ verbal moods,⁴⁴ and verbal voices,⁴⁵ or that he uses certain forms only in specific positions of the sentence.⁴⁶

According to Aristarchus, one of Zenodotus’ main problems concerned pronouns: he misused personal,⁴⁷ possessive,⁴⁸ and reflexive pronouns.⁴⁹ Another source of concern was Zenodotus’ dealing with the dual forms of

1963–1964, II 47; Rengakos 1993, 79 n. 1; Janko 1994, 351. In fact, the Alexandrian poets use plural forms in -αται, -ατο, for the third-person singular (e.g., Euph., fr. 160 Powell; Arat. 817; Call., frs. 87 and 497 Pfeiffer). They probably took them from these Homeric variants; cf. Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 671 n. 2; Kidd 1997, 458; Magnelli 2002, 6 n. 3.

39. *Sch. Il.* 3.273a, discussed in Chapter 3.5 § 8.

40. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.611a (ἐκάθευδε). Forms like ἐκάθευδε and ἐκαθέζετο are in fact later Ionic forms; cf. Janko 1994, 306. On Zenodotus’ hyper-Ionicisms, see Chapter 5.1 § 2.1.1.

41. Cf. West 1966, 298; Montanari 1995c, 57–58.

42. *Sch. Il.* 2.1a^{1,2} and 10.1a (see Chapter 3.2.B § 2.1).

43. *Sch. Il.* 1.24a (see Chapter 3.2.B § 3.3); 5.146a; 5.156.

44. *Sch. Il.* 3.459 (see Chapter 3.2.B § 3.7).

45. *Sch. Il.* 2.626a¹ (see Chapter 3.2.B § 3.8 with footnote 180).

46. For example, that the verb ἦ, ‘he/she spoke’, is used in Homer only at the end of a speech to conclude it, but never to introduce it; see *Sch. Il.* 20.114a; 20.114b^{1,2} (Did.). Cf. Duentzer 1848, 149–150; Lehrs 1882, 95–96.

47. *Sch. Il.* 1.73b; 10.127a; cf. Matthaios 1999, 463–464 (fr. 110).

48. *Sch. Il.* 1.393c; 15.138b; 19.342c; 24.528a¹; 24.550, on which cf. Bolling 1947, 31–32; Matthaios 1999, 459–460 (fr. 105). *Sch. Il.* 11.142a, on which cf. Bolling 1947, 32; Matthaios 1999, 460 (fr. 106). *Sch. Il.* 19.384a and 19.384b (Did.), on which cf. Matthaios 1999, 481 (fr. 127). *Sch. Il.* 2.239; 11.458a (Did.); 14.118a¹ (Did.); 20.261; 24.293b, on which cf. Matthaios 1999, 483–485 (frs. 128–129). *Sch. Il.* 3.244, on which cf. Matthaios 1999, 486–487 (fr. 130).

49. *Sch. Il.* 1.271a; 14.162b; 17.551a¹; cf. Duentzer 1848, 58–59; Matthaios 1999, 470–471 (fr. 120).

personal pronouns⁵⁰ and of verbs.⁵¹ In particular, in many cases where Zenodotus read a dual form for verbs referring to more than two subjects, the Aristarchean scholia inevitably comment: συγχέει τὸ δυϊκὸν [σχῆμα], '[Zenodotus] confuses the dual'.⁵² The ignorance of the proper use of the dual also led Zenodotus to incorrect atheteseis.⁵³ He was also not aware of the fact that Homer employs the 'Alcmanic figure', that is, a verb in the plural (or dual) placed in between two singular subjects, and thus he wrongly tried to correct the text.⁵⁴ Finally, he sometimes changed Homeric parataxis into hypotaxis, making the text less clear.⁵⁵

1.2.3. Zenodotus, Homeric Style, and the Heroic World

Aristarchus judges the composition (σύνθεσις) resulting from one of Zenodotus' readings as not Homeric,⁵⁶ but this is not the only charge he lays against his predecessor. For example, he also accuses Zenodotus of not knowing the most important Homeric stylistic devices, because he eliminated typically Homeric tropes, such as παραλλήλως construction,⁵⁷ or, on the contrary, inserted tropes rarely used by Homer, like hyperbaton.⁵⁸ Moreover, his readings either removed the 'suggestiveness' (ἔμφασις) characteristic of Homeric poetry⁵⁹ or introduced it when it was out of place.⁶⁰ In fact, he even rejected lines, according to Aristarchus, because of his ignorance of certain Homeric tropes (e.g., preemi-

50. *Sch. Il.* 8.139a; 8.377a¹; 22.216a^{1,2} (νῶϊ/νῶϊν); *Sch. Il.* 1.336a (σφῶϊ/σφῶϊν); *Sch. Il.* 1.8a; 10.546b¹; 12.366a (σφῶέ); cf. Duentzer 1848, 57; La Roche 1866, 319, 356–358; Bolling 1933, 301–304; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 266–267; Matthaios 1999, 466 (frs. 113–115).

51. *Sch. Il.* 3.279a (cf. Erbse ad loc.); 23.753.

52. *Sch. Il.* 3.459; 6.112; 8.503; 13.627a; 15.347b; 18.287b; see also *Sch. Il.* 1.567a¹; cf. Duentzer 1848, 77–78; Wecklein 1919, 36–39; Bolling 1933, 300–301, 304; Matthaios 1999, 378 (frs. 72 and 80). Of course, such 'misunderstandings' are typically rhapsodic features, not conjectures by Zenodotus (as Aristarchus seems to have believed); see West 2001, 41–42. According to Bolling 1933, 304–305, Zenodotus did not have a sensibility for the dual because he was Ionic and was also working on Ionic copies of Homer, which presented many errors in this regard (on the dual in Homer, see Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.1). On the other hand, it is impossible to ascertain whether Zenodotus accepted the 'loose' use of the dual in Homer in order to solve the question of the dual referring to three people in the embassy of Book 9 (see Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.2), as suggested by Broggiato 2001, 152.

53. *Sch. Il.* 1.208–9 and 1.216b; cf. Nickau 1977, 89–90; Lührs 1992, 253–254; Matthaios 1999, 460–461 (fr. 107).

54. *Sch. Il.* 20.138a (see Chapter 3.2.B § 4.3).

55. *Sch. Il.* 14.169a (see Chapter 3.6.A § 6); 13.172a (see below, § 1.5.2).

56. *Sch. Il.* 18.230.

57. *Sch. Il.* 5.162a (see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.9); 5.194a (ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἐνίοτε παραλλήλως τάσσει τὰς ἰσοδυναμοῦσας λέξεις; see Chapter 3.2.A § 9).

58. *Sch. Il.* 15.587 (γίνεται δὲ τὸ ὑπερβατὸν οὐ καθ' Ὅμηρον; see Chapter 3.2.A § 14).

59. *Sch. Il.* 16.161a.b (see Chapter 3.2.A § 17).

60. *Sch. Il.* 2.299b; 15.470a^{1,2} (see Chapter 3.2.A § 17 with footnote 189).

nence⁶¹ and amplification⁶²). Zenodotus also did not understand that Homeric style often aims at producing a climax, which he marred with his readings,⁶³ and dulled or even eliminated some bold similes used by Homer.⁶⁴ Aristarchus also accuses him of not dealing with typical Homeric narrative techniques well, such as direct addresses to characters (by Homer himself or by other characters within a speech).⁶⁵ Zenodotus also did not recognize that in Homer events can happen ‘tacitly’ (κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον)⁶⁶ or can be narrated ‘in summary’ (κεφαλαιωδῶς), without going into details,⁶⁷ and so athetized or changed lines which could be explained by assuming that these techniques were at work.

In Aristarchus’ view, Zenodotus also had problems with the Homeric world and characters. For example, he attached the wrong epithets to proper names, like βαθύκολποι, ‘whose dress falls in deep folds,’ for the Muses,⁶⁸ ἀθάνατος, ‘immortal,’ for a human being,⁶⁹ and τειχεσιβλήτης, ‘destroyer of walls,’ for Ares (while the epithet fits Poseidon)⁷⁰—all readings of Zenodotus. He also confused Homeric characters, for instance Eris and Iris,⁷¹ and showed insufficient knowledge about how Homeric heroes behave.⁷² Furthermore, he was not well versed in Homeric geography and mixed up geographic names, as Aristarchus points out many times.⁷³ He did not know the difference between Olympus and heaven⁷⁴—in fact, he even athetized lines for that reason.⁷⁵ Finally, by deleting a line (*Il.* 21.195), he promoted Achelous to being the spring of all waters, which is plainly wrong, as the origin of waters in Homer is Oceanus.⁷⁶

61. *Sch. Il.* 2.641 (see Chapter 3.2.A § 11).

62. *Sch. Il.* 9.14b; 17.260a (see Chapter 3.2.A § 17).

63. *Sch. Il.* 14.394a^{1,2} (see Chapter 3.2.A § 4).

64. *Sch. Il.* 11.548a (see Chapter 3.2.A § 4); 12.463a.

65. *Sch. Il.* 2.12c; 3.99a; 16.697a^{1,2} (see Chapter 3.6.C § 2.5).

66. *Sch. Il.* 16.432a and 16.432b (ex. [Did. + ex.?]); 16.666b^{1,2} and 16.677; 21.17b¹ (see Chapter 3.6.C § 3.1).

67. *Sch. Il.* 2.553a (see Chapter 3.6.C § 3.2).

68. *Sch. Il.* 2.484; 18.339 (see Chapter 3.3.B § 5.2).

69. *Sch. Il.* 2.741 (see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.1).

70. *Sch. Il.* 5.31d (see Chapter 3.3.B § 5.2).

71. *Sch. Il.* 11.27a^{1,2}.

72. *Sch. Il.* 13.148a (see Chapter 3.3.B, footnote 128).

73. *Sch. Il.* 2.502 (see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.2); 2.507a and 7.9a (see Chapter 5.3 § 5.1); 2.571; 5.708a¹; 9.664a.

74. *Sch. Il.* 3.364 and 15.192 (see Chapter 3.3.B § 4.4).

75. *Sch. Il.* 8.25–6 (see Chapter 3.3.B, footnote 275).

76. *Sch. Il.* 21.195a^{1,2} (see Chapter 3.3.B § 4.1).

1.3. Zenodotus, the Anti-Aristotelian

As discussed in Chapters 3.6.A–C, Aristotelian teachings about good poetry were at the core of Aristarchus' scholarship. His judgments of Homeric lines were centered on Aristotle's views regarding the characteristics that make a poem a 'good' one: a believable story, lack of internal contradictions, and self-consistent characters. Not surprisingly, in Aristarchus' opinion, Zenodotus fell short in each of these areas: he went against the principles of believability and internal consistency, did not seem to have any sense of 'appropriateness' for characters and scenes, and even athetized lines which were necessary to the correct unfolding of the story.

1.3.1. 'Unbelievable' and 'Contradictory' Textual Choices

One of the basic principles of Aristotle was that poetry should be believable and avoid internal contradictions. Aristarchus often attacked Zenodotus on this account, because his readings were 'unbelievable' or 'contradictory'. In particular, in one instance, Zenodotus managed to choose a reading which Aristarchus judges both 'unbelievable' and 'contradictory'—the worst possible case according to Aristotle. This happens at *Il.* 10.317, when Homer introduces Dolon by saying that he was the only one 'among five sisters' (μετὰ πέντε κασιγνήτησιν):

Sch. Il. 10.317a αὐτὰρ ὁ μούνος ἦν <μετὰ πέντε κασιγνήτησιν>: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει 'κασιγνήτοισι'. παραιρεῖται δὲ τὸ πιθανὸν τοῦ ποιητοῦ· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ ἀρσένων αὐτὸν τεθραμμένον παρίστησι<ν>, οἷς ἐξισούμενος ἂν εἰς ἀνδρείαν ἐτράπη. τό τε παρακείμενον μάχεται· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι μόνος ἦν, εἰ πέντε ἦσαν;

'And he was the only one among five sisters': because Zenodotus writes 'brothers'. But he takes away believability from the poet: for [Homer] does not present [Dolon] as raised among men, with whom he could have compared himself and turned toward virtue. Also, what is next [in the line] is inconsistent [with Zenodotus' reading]: how could he be the only one, if they were five?

Zenodotus' reading, 'among five brothers' (μετὰ πέντε κασιγνήτοισι), is problematic in many respects. First, if Dolon had been raised among other men, it is 'unbelievable' that he could have grown up so attached to material goods⁷⁷ and be such a coward,⁷⁸ as he would have had other men to vie with, from whom he could learn manly virtues. With this very sexist comment, Aristarchus claims

77. As Homer shows in *Il.* 10.321–323, 391–393.

78. As Homer shows in *Il.* 10.374–381, 390.

that it is much more ‘believable’ for Dolon to be raised among women, because in this way his cowardice and greediness would be naturally explained. More acceptable to our modern standards is his second remark that reading αὐτὰρ ὁ μούνος ἔην μετὰ πέντε κασιγνήτοισι is internally contradictory, as Dolon could not possibly be ‘the only one [man?]’, if he had five brothers. In this case, at least, Aristarchus is probably right—even if at the risk of seeming excessively precise.⁷⁹

1.3.2. *Unfitting Characters and Thoughts*

Many scholia dealing with characterization target Zenodotus’ readings, which, according to Aristarchus, created an inconsistency in terms of characters. At a very basic level, Zenodotus’ readings are sometimes ‘against the character’ (παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπον)⁸⁰ or make characters behave or speak ‘in a ridiculous way’ (γελοίως).⁸¹ He also does not seem to have realized that there was one way of talking suitable for gods and another suitable for mortals. In the meeting between Achilles and Athena in Book 1, each of them utters a very similar (and formulaic) phrase. Achilles first asks Athena why she has come and then says (Il. 204–205): ‘I will tell you, and I think this will be brought to pass (ἀλλ’ ἔκ τοι ἔρέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τελέεσθαι οἴω); [Agamemnon] will soon lose his life because of his insolence’. Athena replies that she has come to make him restrain his wrath; if he limits himself to attacking Agamemnon with words rather than using violence, he will be rewarded later with three times as many gifts; and she picks up the same expression (l. 212): ‘for thus will I speak, and this shall be brought to pass (ὥδε γὰρ ἐξερέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται)’. Apparently Zenodotus’ text switched the two lines and had Achilles say τετελεσμένον ἔσται and Athena τετελέσθαι οἴω (*Sch. Il.* 1.204b; 1.212b). Aristarchus rejects this solution because the ‘uncertainty’ expressed by the phrase ‘I think it will happen’ (τετελέσθαι/τελέεσθαι οἴω)⁸² is more suitable to Achilles, a mortal man who cannot have any sure knowledge about the future (*Sch. Il.* 1.212b: τοῦτο δὲ Ἀχιλλεῖ ἥρμοζεν), whereas the certainty expressed by the future perfect τετελεσμένον ἔσται is more suitable to Athena, a goddess who knows the future (*Sch. Il.* 1.204b: τοῦτο δὲ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἀρμόζει μᾶλλον διαβεβαιοῦν).

79. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 88; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 5. A different interpretation of Zenodotus’ action is given by van Thiel 2014a, II 184, in line with his peculiar views on the activity of the Alexandrian scholars. Another case in which Aristarchus may appear to be excessively pedantic is when he rejects Zenodotus’ ‘unbelievable’ reading in *Sch. Il.* 2.55a (see Chapter 3.6.A § 3).

80. *Sch. Il.* 9.612b; 14.136a and also 14.136c^{1,2} (ex.) (cf. Nickau 1977, 163–164).

81. *Sch. Il.* 1.100a (cf. van Thiel 2014a, I 70); 13.423a^{1,2} (Did.) and 13.423b^{1,2} (cf. van Thiel 2014a, II 410); 16.666b¹.

82. According to Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 1.204c), at *Il.* 1.204 Aristarchus read τελέεσθαι, not τετελέσθαι, which is the reading of the vulgate (see West, ad loc.). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 357; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 195.

On the other hand, when gods are disguised as mortals they must behave like mortals. At *Il.* 3.423–425 Aphrodite, disguised as an old woman, takes a chair for Helen; Zenodotus found this scene ‘inappropriate’ (ἀπρεπές) for a goddess and thus eliminated it by shortening and rewriting the text.⁸³ Aristarchus reproaches him because he ‘has forgotten’ that Aphrodite is in disguise (*Sch. Il.* 3.423a: ἀπρεπές γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο τὸ τῇ Ἑλένῃ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην δίφρον βαστάζειν. ἐπιλέλησται δὲ ὅτι γραῖ εἴκασται), so that she is not the beautiful and powerful goddess, but rather an old woman—and for an old mortal woman it is fitting to bring a chair to the princess Helen.⁸⁴

Another important point raised by Aristarchus was that Zenodotus did not seem to have paid attention to the inner motivations of characters and to the specific situation when certain words were uttered. This emerges clearly in the speech of Nestor at *Il.* 1.254–284. This speech is meant to calm down both Agamemnon and Achilles; thus, the last thing that Nestor wants is to be insolent. He thus talks about his past, saying that they should listen to him because he is older and has lived among warriors who were far better ‘than us’ (l. 260: ἡέπερ ἡμῖν)—including himself. Aristarchus rejects Zenodotus’ reading ἡέπερ ὑμῖν, ‘than you’, which makes the line insolent and inconsistent with the character’s attitude (*Sch. Il.* 1.260: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ἡέπερ ὑμῖν. ἐφύβριστος δὲ ὁ λόγος).⁸⁵

The episode of single combat between Paris and Menelaus in Book 3 further demonstrates in Aristarchus’ mind Zenodotus’ lack of attention to characters’ consistency and the appropriateness of their words to the context. When Paris, taken by fear, refuses to face Menelaus, Hector assaults him with harsh words (*Il.* 39–57) and concludes by saying that the Trojans are cowards (l. 56: δειδήμονες), because otherwise they would have already stoned him to death for all the evil he has caused them. Zenodotus, however, read ἐλεήμονες, ‘pitiful’, ‘merciful’,

83. His text omitted lines 423–426 and simply had line 422 (‘the maids then quickly turned to their tasks’) followed by one line summarizing the action (αὐτὴ δ’ ἀντίον ἔξεν Ἀλεξάνδροιο ἄνακτος, ‘and she [i.e., Helen] sat in front of lord Alexander’).

84. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 333; Bouchard 2016, 112–113. Nickau 1977, 187–192, correctly notes that Zenodotus read our text, in which Helen at lines 396–412 has recognized that the old woman is in fact Aphrodite—so his sense of inappropriateness of the following episode was justified, because at that point Aphrodite is indeed not in disguise anymore. Aristarchus, on the other hand, athetized *Il.* 3.396–418 (see Chapter 3.6.B § 6), so for him Aphrodite was indeed ‘in disguise’ for Helen, and this is why he did not find anything wrong with lines 423–425. Aristarchus’ accusation against Zenodotus, that he has forgotten that Aphrodite is in disguise, thus sounds a bit disingenuous because he ignores that his predecessor retained the text in which the goddess had been recognized by Helen. Another case of Aristarchus’ critique of Zenodotus’ reading concerning a goddess (Hera) is *Sch. Il.* 2.156–69; cf. Nickau 1977, 11, 90–93.

85. Actually, Zenodotus’ reading ὑμῖν is that of the vulgate, also followed by modern editions (e.g., Allen, van Thiel, and West). Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 31; Roemer 1912, 372–373; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 109.

which is wrong according to Aristarchus because the Trojans feel hatred toward Paris, and certainly not pity. This is shown by *Il.* 3.453–454: when Paris, after being rescued from Menelaus by Aphrodite and brought back to Helen, is nowhere to be seen, Homer adds: ‘and if anyone had seen him, they would have not hidden him out of love, for he was hated by all as black death’ (*Sch. Il.* 3.56a; 3.453).⁸⁶ In the same episode, Zenodotus committed another mistake by having Menelaus tell the Greeks and the Trojans that they had suffered woes ‘because of Alexander’s *ate*’ (Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ’ ἄτης). For Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 3.100b), on this reading Menelaus would be excusing Paris since *ate* is an external, blind force, which then made Paris act badly against his will.⁸⁷ Reading ‘because of Alexander’s beginning of it’ (Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ’ ἀρχῆς)⁸⁸ is much better, because it shows that Menelaus considers Paris responsible for the whole war, as in fact was the case, at least in the mythical account known to Homer.⁸⁹

1.3.3. *Athetesis (or Deletion) of ‘Necessary’ Lines*

Another common critique that Aristarchus made against Zenodotus’ *atheteseis* or deletions was that they involved lines which were in fact ‘necessary’ (ἀναγκαῖοι),⁹⁰ in that they clarified key points in the poem. For example, Zenodotus *athetized* the lines in which Chryseis is mentioned when Agamemnon promises the ship with the hecatomb to Chryses (*Il.* 1.143) and when father and daughter are finally reunited after Odysseus has led her back to him (*Il.* 1.446–448). The reasons for Zenodotus’ choices are unknown, but Aristarchus rightly points out that the mention of Chryseis is necessary since she was the cause of the plague and thus Agamemnon must send her back to her father (*Sch. Il.* 1.143: ἀναγκαῖος δὲ ὁ περὶ τῆς Χρυσήϊδος λόγος· ταύτης γὰρ ἔνεκα

86. Furthermore, when at *Il.* 7.390 the Trojan herald Ideaus speaks to the Greek chiefs and mentions Paris, adding: ‘I wish he had died first!’, Aristarchus comments (*Sch. Il.* 7.390): ὅτι σαφῶς ὑπὸ τῶν Τρώων ἐμισεῖτο Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον γράφοντα ‘ἀλλὰ μάλα Τρῶες ἐλεήμονες’ (*Il.* 3.56) [because clearly Alexander was hated by the Trojans; with reference to Zenodotus, who wrote: ‘but the Trojans [are] certainly pitiful (ἐλεήμονες)’ (*Il.* 3.56)].

87. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 40; Kirk 1985, 277. Aristarchus rejects the same reading at *Il.* 24.28 (*Sch. Il.* 24.28b [Did.]), but it is not clear whether Zenodotus read ἔνεκ’ ἄτης here too (in fact, this is the reading of the vulgate; cf. West, ad loc.); cf. Roemer 1912, 343–345; Richardson 1993, 279; West 2001, 197–198. On *ate*, see the famous chapter by Dodds 1951, 1–27, and, more recently, Cairns 2012.

88. As modern editors have as well.

89. On the origin of the Trojan War in Homer, see Chapter 5.3 § 3.1.1. Other readings by Zenodotus which Aristarchus considers ‘unfitting’ to the Homeric characters are discussed in Chapter 5.4. On the other hand, Zenodotus *athetized* lines that he considered unbefitting for Agamemnon, Thersites, and Achilles, but Aristarchus defended them as appropriate for the specific character and/or situation: *Sch. Il.* 1.117a (see Chapter 3.6.A § 4); *Sch. Il.* 2.226b, 2.227, and 2.231–4 (see Chapter 3.6.A § 5); *Sch. Il.* 16.89 and 16.89–90 (see Chapter 5.4 § 1).

90. On this Aristotelian principle, see Chapter 3.6.A § 3.

ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ λοιμός, and *Sch. Il.* 1.446–8: τὴν δὲ ἀναγκαιοτάτην Χρυσήϊδα περιεῖλεν).⁹¹ Similarly, Zenodotus' text did not have the dream's words as retold by Agamemnon to the assembly of the Achaeans (*Il.* 2.60–70): it simply had lines 56–59 ('... a divine dream came to me ... and spoke to me), followed by two new lines ('The high-throned father, who dwells in heaven, orders you / to fight the Trojans at Ilium. So speaking,'), followed by line 71 ('it left flying away ...').⁹² Lines 60–71 are indeed an exact repetition of lines 23–34 (except for *Il.* 70–71 $\cong$ *Il.* 33–34), when the dream speaks to Agamemnon in the first place. While we do not know the real reason behind Zenodotus' text (he might have indeed been annoyed by the repetition and cut it, but he also might have found this curtailed version in his own copies), Aristarchus interprets it as a conscious cutting by Zenodotus (*Sch. Il.* 2.60–71: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος συντέτμηκεν, οὕτως εἰπὼν ...). This is wrong, for Aristarchus, because 'the reports of messengers are by necessity repeated two or three times with the same words. And this should not be avoided: for it is necessary to tell [the dream] in detail to the counselors there gathered' (*Sch. Il.* 2.60–71). The Greeks must make an important political decision—whether or not to attack Troy in a moment of crisis. Thus, Agamemnon must be very precise and detailed with the other chiefs, so that they can make the most informed decisions; this is why Agamemnon must repeat the words of the dream exactly. With (in Aristarchus' eyes) Zenodotus' butchering of this necessarily detailed account, however, such an example of good leadership is completely lost.⁹³

1.4. Zenodotus, a Careless Reader

For Aristarchus, not only was Zenodotus unaware of the principles of Homeric poetry and language as well as of the Aristotelian criteria; more than that, he was also a very sloppy reader. In fact, his lack of philological attention to the text was the origin of his shaky command of the Homeric language and style. Zenodotus' superficial reading sometimes also led him to suspect or de-

91. Still, Zenodotus kept other lines where Chryseis is mentioned as being embarked on the ship (*Il.* 439) and being led to the altar into her father's hands (*Il.* 440–443). Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 18; Nickau 1977, 97–101.

92. In Greek: ἡνώγει σε πατήρ ὑψίζυγος, αἰθέρι ναίων, / Τρῶσι μαχήσασθαι προτὶ Ἴλιον. ὥς ὁ μὲν εἰπὼν / (*Il.* 71) ὥχετ' ἀποπτάμενος.

93. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 337; Roemer 1912, 270–271; Nickau 1977, 82–86; Lührs 1992, 237. Other cases when Zenodotus athetized or deleted lines considered 'necessary' by Aristarchus are *Sch. Il.* 2.528 (see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.1); 2.612; 2.686; 2.724a (on these last three cases in Book 2, cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 17; Meijering 1987, 173–174 and 206); 11.794a (cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 399–400); 16.89 (see Chapter 5.4 § 1). Sometimes, while not being completely necessary, lines have a function in the narrative that Zenodotus seems not to have considered; see *Sch. Il.* 2.220a; 17.364 (Ariston.); 19.77a.

lete lines in order to remove what he thought were contradictions in the text but which—on closer inspection—were not. For example, he took exception to *Il.* 2.579–580, when Homer says that Agamemnon ‘was preeminent among all the heroes because he was the best (ἄριστος) and led by far the greatest army’, since he thought that this was in contradiction with *Il.* 2.768, where Ajax is said to be ‘by far the best of the warriors (ἀνδρῶν αὖ μέγ’ ἄριστος)’. Yet Aristarchus argues that there is no contradiction, as ‘they are the best in different things: Agamemnon in wealth and nobility, Ajax in military excellence’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.579–80a).⁹⁴ Because he did not read the text well, Zenodotus also chose readings inconsistent with what the poet had already said⁹⁵ or would say,⁹⁶ or adopted different readings in different places that were inconsistent with each other.⁹⁷ Two specific examples will demonstrate Aristarchus’ *modus operandi* when he had to deal with Zenodotus’ flaws in this regard.

The first example concerns *Iliad* 18, when Greeks and Trojans are fighting for Patroclus’ body and Hera sends Iris to urge Achilles to join the battle. The question pertains to lines 154–156 (describing Hector fighting around Patroclus) and lines 174–177 (Iris’ words to Achilles). The text in our vulgate (and in Aristarchus’ edition) is as follows:

Il. 18.154–156 (narrative):

Ἔκτωρ τε Πριάμοιο πάϊς φλογὶ εἵκελος ἀλκήν.
τρίς μὲν μιν μετόπισθε ποδῶν λάβε φαίδιμος Ἔκτωρ
ἐλκόμεναι μεμαῶς, μέγα δὲ Τρώεσσιν ὁμόκλα·

[for again him [i.e., Patroclus’ body] the men and the horses reached,] and Hector son of Priam, in strength similar to a flame. Three times glorious Hector took him by the feet from behind, eager to drag him away, and he incited the Trojans loudly.

Il. 18.174–177 (Iris to Achilles):

οἱ δὲ ἐρύσσασθαι ποτὶ Ἴλιον ἠνεμόεσσιν
Τρῶες ἐπιθύουσι. μάλιστα δὲ φαίδιμος Ἔκτωρ

94. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 183; Nickau 1977, 127. Other cases of lines athetized or deleted by Zenodotus because of a (falsely) perceived contradiction are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 4.88a; 5.187a.

95. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 4.139b; 15.470a^{1,2} (with *Sch. Il.* 8.328); 10.175a and 13.692b (cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 19.239).

96. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 16.150b (cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 19.400).

97. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.507a and 7.9a; 8.128 and 8.312a.

ἐλκόμεναι μέμονεν· κεφαλὴν δέ ἐ θυμὸς ἄνωγε
πῆξαι ἀνὰ σκολόπεσσι ταμόνθ' ἀπαλῆς ἀπὸ δειρῆς.

and the Trojans strive to carry him away to windy Ilium. Above all glorious Hector is eager to drag him away; and his heart urges him to cut [Patroclus'] head from his tender neck and impale it on stakes.

As Aristarchus makes clear (*Sch. Il.* 18.154–6; 18.174), Zenodotus had a different text in both places, as he read lines 176–177 after line 155, omitting them from Iris' speech, which was also altered at line 174, so that these passages read:

Il. 18.154ff (narrative):

Ἑκτωρ τε Πριάμοιο πάϊς σὺν εἵκελος ἀλκὴν,
ὅς μιν τρίς μετόπισθε ποδῶν λάβε καὶ μέγ' αὖτει,
ἐλκόμεναι μεμαώς, κεφαλὴν δέ ἐ θυμὸς ἄνώγει
πῆξαι ἀνὰ σκολόπεσσι ταμόνθ' ἀπαλῆς ἀπὸ δειρῆς.

[for again him [i.e., Patroclus' body] the men and the horses reached,] and Hector son of Priam, in strength similar to a wild boar, who three times took him by the feet from behind and shouted loudly, eager to drag him away; and his heart urged him to cut [Patroclus'] head from his tender neck and impale it on stakes.

Il. 18.174–175 (Iris to Achilles):

οἱ δὲ ἐρύσσασθαι ποτὶ Ἴλιον αἰπὺ θέλοντες⁹⁸
Τρῶες ἐπιθύουσι, μάλιστα δὲ φαίδιμος Ἑκτωρ.

and the Trojans strive and desire to carry him away to high Ilium, Hector above all.

According to Zenodotus' version, Hector thirsts for vengeance so much in Book 18 that he only desires to mutilate Patroclus' corpse. For Aristarchus, however, this attitude is wrong for Hector at this point of the narrative, as the Trojan hero wanted to cut Patroclus' head off and then give the body to the dogs

98. On the change of ποτὶ Ἴλιον ἠνεμόεσσαν into ποτὶ Ἴλιον αἰπὺ θέλοντες at *Il.* 18.174, see below, § 1.5.1.

at *Il.* 17.125–127, after despoiling him of Achilles’ armor (*Sch. Il.* 17.126), but not now (*Sch. Il.* 18.154–6; 18.174). In between these two moments, Glaucus has rebuked Hector (*Il.* 17.142–168), reminding him that he had abandoned the corpse of Sarpedon on the battlefield,⁹⁹ so that now they could use Patroclus’ body as ransom for Sarpedon’s, if only Hector had the courage to fight for it—a key passage in changing Hector’s intentions, as Aristarchus remarks (*Sch. Il.* 17.153a). Glaucus’ words indeed convince Hector (*Il.* 17.170–182), so that in *Iliad* 18 he desires to preserve Patroclus’ body for an exchange, rather than mutilating it. At *Il.* 18.174–177, however, Iris must persuade Achilles to go back to battle; in fact, as Aristarchus explains (*Sch. Il.* 18.154–6; 18.174), she intentionally presents things in the worst possible light, suggesting that Hector may mutilate Patroclus’ body if Achilles does not rescue it. Aristarchus’ point is that Zenodotus missed Hector’s fundamental change of mind as well as Iris’ subtle psychological strategy with Achilles. Consequently, his readings do not fit the moments which the poem is describing and also contradict what has happened in Book 17.¹⁰⁰

The second example concerns Agamemnon’s gifts to Achilles in Book 9. The list (*Il.* 121–135) includes some women as well, as Agamemnon says: ‘I will give him seven women of Lesbos (ἐπτὰ γυναῖκας . . . Λεσβίδας) . . . whom I chose (ἐξελόμην) for myself when [Achilles] took well-built Lesbos. . . . These I will give him, and with them there will be (μετὰ δ’ ἔσσεται) the one whom I then took away from him, the daughter of Briseus’ (*Il.* 9.128–132). This means that Briseis is to be counted *in addition to* the seven women, for a total of eight women. According to Aristarchus, however, Zenodotus was misled here by that ‘μετὰ δ’ ἔσσεται’ in line 131 and took it as meaning ‘among them there will be’, with μετὰ indicating inclusion, not addition; for him, then, Briseis was part of the group, for a total of seven women, *among whom* was Briseis (*Sch. Il.* 9.131: ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν πλανηθεὶς Ζηνόδοτος συναριθμεῖσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐπτὰ καὶ τὴν Βρισηίδα ἔδοξεν). This misunderstanding led Zenodotus to make a slight change at line 130: instead of ἐξελόμην, which is the reading adopted by Aristarchus,¹⁰¹ Zenodotus divided the *scriptio continua* ΕΞΕΛΟΜΗΝ as ἕξ ἐλόμην, so that the lines read: ‘six of whom I chose for myself when [Achilles] took well-built Lesbos’. In this way, there were six women prisoners from Lesbos, and Briseis was the seventh (*Sch. Il.* 9.130b, ex. [Ariston.?).

99. See also *Il.* 16.538–547 and 659–665; of course, the Lycians do not know that Sarpedon has been taken to Lycia by Apollo (*Il.* 16.667–683), as Aristarchus observes in *Sch. Il.* 17.126 and 17.163a. On this fundamental detail, see Chapter 5.4 § 1.

100. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 155–156; Dachs 1913, 20–21; Bolling 1925, 179–181; Nickau 1977, 203; Edwards 1991, 166, 167–168. Other cases of Aristarchus censuring Zenodotus’ order or change of lines are found in *Sch. Il.* 4.123a¹; 8.501 and 10.45 (see Chapter 3.3.B § 5.1); 10.520–2.

101. See Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 9.130a.

Aristarchus points out, however, that Agamemnon speaks of ‘seven women from Lesbos’ at lines 128–129 $\cong$ 270–271 (ἐπτὰ γυναῖκας . . . / Λεσβίδας), and so including Briseis in the group is clearly wrong because she is from Lyrnessus, as is clear from *Il.* 2.689–691 (*Sch. Il.* 9.271).¹⁰² Aristarchus also notes (*Sch. Il.* 9.131) that at *Il.* 19.245–246, when Achilles makes peace with Agamemnon and receives his gifts, Homer clearly says that there are seven women and Briseis is the eighth: ‘They quickly led out the women . . . / seven (ἐπτ’[ά]), and Briseis with beautiful cheeks was the eighth (ὀγδοάτην)’. In fact, according to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 9.131 and 19.246, ex. [Ariston.]), Zenodotus noticed the problematic passage as well, and changed the second line into ‘six (ἕξ), and Briseis with beautiful cheeks was the seventh (ἐβδομάτην),’¹⁰³ so that there were seven women in all including Briseis. Despite this additional change in Zenodotus’ text, Aristarchus draws attention to yet another passage, which in his view conclusively refutes his readings: *Il.* 9.636–638, where Ajax reproaches Achilles for not yielding and says: ‘the gods have put in your breast an implacable and evil heart for only one girl; but we now offer you seven, by far the best’. This passage rebuts Zenodotus’ interpretation because the seven girls are considered separately from Briseis (*Sch. Il.* 9.638: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος ἐλέγχεται γράφων ἕξ, ἀτὰρ ἐβδομάτη<ν> Βρισηίδα (*Il.* 19.246)· χωρὶς γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἐπτὰ).

The debate concerning the number of women given to Achilles is interesting inasmuch as it allows us to see how Aristarchus approached his predecessor’s work. According to him, Zenodotus started with a linguistic blunder, since he misunderstood the Homeric expression μετὰ δ’ ἔσσεται (*Il.* 9.131); hence, he tried to adapt the text to fit what he had (mis)understood, especially changing the passage (*Il.* 19.246) where his interpretation was most objectionable. Zenodotus also ‘improved’ the text at *Il.* 9.130 by changing the division of *scriptio continua*, so that the final number of girls would square with his earlier (mis)interpretation. On the other hand, Aristarchus correctly understands the text at line 131, which is then in agreement with all the other passages where the ‘seven women of Lesbos’ are mentioned. Yet, even if *Il.* 19.245–246 may indeed prove Zenodotus’ mistake, *Il.* 9.638 does not provide any additional evidence. Despite Aristarchus’ confidence that this line refutes (ἐλέγχειν) Zenodotus once and for all, Ajax’s words (‘. . . [for] only one [girl]; but we now offer you seven, by far the best’) do not necessarily exclude Briseis. In fact, Ajax’s comment might have been what convinced Zenodotus that in total there were seven women, including Briseis. Thus, while correctly pointing out the

102. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.690. If *Sch. Il.* 9.130b (ex. [Ariston.]) derives from Aristarchus, he also pointed out that Briseis is not a ‘gift’ like the other women, so she should be kept separate from the women of Lesbos.

103. So he read ἕξ, ἀτὰρ ἐβδομάτην Βρισηίδα καλλιπάρηον instead of ἐπτ’, ἀτὰρ ὀγδοάτην Βρισηίδα καλλιπάρηον (*Il.* 19.246).

references within the poem in support of his interpretation, Aristarchus is also using a passage that does not prove anything against Zenodotus. Moreover, his assumption that Zenodotus rewrote *Il.* 19.246 in order to fit it with his own misinterpretation of *Il.* 9.131 (*Sch. Il.* 9.131: ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν πλανηθεὶς Ζηνόδοτος . . .) should be taken with a grain of salt. In the lack of additional evidence, it is also possible that Zenodotus read a text with ἕξ, ἀτὰρ ἐβδομάτην Βρισηΐδα καλλιπάρηον at *Il.* 19.246. These slight changes in the text could have been due to a rhapsode, or simply to the tradition. At this point, Zenodotus would not have been changing the text, but only interpreting it (for example, by reading ἕξ ἐλόμην instead of ἕξελόμην at *Il.* 9.130), and perhaps even using *Il.* 9.638 to support his interpretation.¹⁰⁴

1.5. Aristarchus on Zenodotus: An Uneasy Relationship

This review of Aristarchus' comments on Zenodotus has revealed a fairly tense relationship, in which the former seems not to have missed any opportunity to remark on the latter's lack of understanding of Homeric language, style, poetic technique, and mythical world. The series of polemical notes against Zenodotus sometimes becomes almost obsessive, as some examples attest.

1.5.1. An Obsession Called Zenodotus?

At *Il.* 6.510–511, Homer compares Paris going back to the battlefield to a horse 'who [is] confident in his magnificence, and his knees nimbly bring him to the places and pastures of horses': ὁ δ' ἀγλαΐῃφι πεποιθὼς / ῥίμφα ἔ γοῦνα φέρει μετὰ τ' ἥθεα καὶ νομὸν ἵππων. With this reading, ἔ can only be the accusative of the third-person pronoun serving as object of the verb φέρει, with γοῦνα as subject. According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 6.511a), however, Zenodotus read ῥίμφ' ἐὰ γοῦνα φέρει, where ἐὰ γοῦνα became the object of φέρει, rather than the subject.¹⁰⁵ In fact, even ῥίμφ' ἐὰ γοῦνα φέρει could in theory mean 'his knees (ἐὰ γοῦνα) nimbly (ῥίμφα) bring [him]'; yet Aristarchus does not consider this possibility. This becomes clear from other scholia, commenting on the similar phrase '[his/her] feet bore [him/her] (πόδες . . . φέρον)', which is quite common in Homer, unlike the rare γοῦνα φέρει.¹⁰⁶ In order to prove Zenodotus wrong, with only one exception (*Il.* 13.515), in all the other instances where

104. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 123; Wecklein 1919, 48; van Thiel 2014a, II 90.

105. On this question, see also *Sch. Il.* 6.510–1a¹ and discussion in Chapter 3.1 § 7.

106. The phrase γοῦνα φέρει occurs only one other time in Homer, namely, at *Il.* 15.268, in a group of lines (*Il.* 15.263–268) identical to *Il.* 6.506–611, when Homer compares Paris (in *Iliad* 6) and Hector (in *Iliad* 15) rushing back to the battlefield to a horse running free over a plain (on these similes, see Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3).

πόδες . . . φέρον is used in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 6.514, 15.405, 17.700, and 18.148),¹⁰⁷ Aristarchus keeps noting that Homer does not say ‘he brings his feet/knees’, but rather ‘his feet/knees bring him’ and this ‘with reference to Zenodotus’ reading at *Il.* 6.511.¹⁰⁸ As Gregory Nagy notes,¹⁰⁹ considering ἐὰ γούνα the object of φέρει at *Il.* 6.511 is also a *lectio facilior* because the verb now would agree with the participle πεποιθώς in line 510, to mean: ‘confident (πεποιθώς) in his magnificence, he nimbly brings his knees (φέρει ἐὰ γούνα) to the places and pastures of horses’. Aristarchus probably thought that this was Zenodotus’ line of thought and fought against it in the name of Homeric usage, as both the anacoluthic construction with the pending nominative πεποιθώς¹¹⁰ and the phrasing ‘his feet/knees bring him’ are typical of Homer. And to make his point clear, he seized every possible opportunity to notice the odd, yet typically Homeric construction and prove Zenodotus wrong.

The most obsessive case perhaps concerns the name for the city of Ilium and its gender. Homer uses the feminine Ἰλῖος, belonging to the second declension; however, for Aristarchus, Zenodotus made the ‘unforgivable’ mistake of reading Ἰλιον αἰπύ at *Il.* 16.92 and 18.174 (*Sch. Il.* 16.92b; 18.174). In this way, he made the noun a neuter, a solution impossible in Homer (*Sch. Il.* 18.174: οὐδέποτε κατὰ τὸ οὐδέτερον λέγει Ἰλιον), but common in classical Greek and thereafter.¹¹¹ By itself this note would be unremarkable; however, interestingly enough, at almost every attestation of the noun Ἰλῖος accompanied by a noncompounded feminine adjective in the *Iliad*, there is a note by Aristarchus remarking that the noun Ἰλῖος is feminine.¹¹² I

107. The phrase πόδες . . . φέρον occurs once in the *Odyssey*, at *Od.* 15.555, but no scholia to this line are preserved.

108. *Sch. Il.* 6.514b (ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν ποδῶν φέρεται, οὐκ αὐτὸς τοὺς πόδας φέρει. πρὸς ἔλεγχον Ζηνοδότου); *Sch. Il.* 15.405a (ὅτι οἱ πόδες αὐτὸν ἔφερον, οὐκ αὐτὸς τοὺς πόδας. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον γράφοντα ‘ρίμφ’ ἐὰ γούνα φέρει’ (*Il.* 6.511)); *Sch. Il.* 17.700a (ἡ διπλῇ, δέ, ὅτι οὕτως εἶωθε λέγειν, οἱ πόδες ἔφερον, οὐχὶ τοὺς πόδας. πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον μεταγράφοντα ‘ρίμφ’ ἐὰ γούνα φέρει’ (*Il.* 6.511)); *Sch. Il.* 18.148a (πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον μεταγράφοντα ‘ρίμφ’ ἐὰ γούνα φέρει’ (*Il.* 6.511). καὶ ὅτι λέγει πόδες αὐτὴν ἔφερον, οὐκ αὐτὴ τοὺς πόδας).

109. Nagy 2009a, 63 n. 97.

110. See *Sch. Il.* 6.510a <ὁ δ’ ἀγλαΐῃφι πεποιθώς> πρὸς τὸ σχῆμα, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγλαΐῃφι πεποιθότα [‘confident in his magnificence’: with reference to the construction, [ἀγλαΐῃφι πεποιθώς is used] instead of ἀγλαΐῃφι πεποιθότα]. See also *Sch. Il.* 6.510–1a² and discussion in Chapter 3.2.B § 3.3 with footnote 124. On this construction, see Chantraine 1953–1958, II 323.

111. See also Steph. Byz. ι 52: Ἰλιον . . . οὐδετέρως δὲ παρὰ πᾶσι τὸ Ἰλιον, παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ δὲ θηλυκῶς. τὸ γὰρ ‘Ἰλιον αἰπύ’ (*Il.* 15.71) νοθεύει Ἀρίσταρχος [Ilium . . . the name Ilium is neuter in every [author], but in Homer is feminine; for Aristarchus considers the phrase Ἰλιον αἰπύ corrupt]. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 233; Wackernagel 1916, 62–63; Schwyzler 1950–1953, II 33 n. 2.

112. Of course, phrases with a compound adjective in the accusative, such as Ἰλιον εἰς εὖπωλον (*Il.* 5.551; 16.576) and Ἰλιον . . . εὐτείχεον (*Il.* 2.113 = 2.288 = 5.716 = 9.20) are excluded, as the feminine form in this case coincides with the masculine and, since this is an accusative, with the neuter as well. No scholium by Aristarchus discussing these epithets in agreement with Ἰλιον in

counted thirty-one scholia,¹¹³ which cover almost all the instances of Ἰλιος accompanied by a noncompound adjective (with the exception of only five cases).¹¹⁴ Of course, it is possible that such proliferation is due to a scholiast, who recopied and repeated the note any time he came across the name Ἰλιος in agreement with a feminine adjective. If, however, these notes reflect Aristarchus' *hypomnema*, this obsession is striking. Except at *Sch. Il.* 16.92b and 18.174, in all these thirty-one scholia Zenodotus is admittedly never mentioned; the short notes laconically say 'ὅτι θηλυκῶς ἀεὶ τὴν Ἰλιον λέγει' or, even more commonly, 'ὅτι θηλυκῶς τὴν Ἰλιον'. In fact, the gender of Ἰλιος was a problem in another passage, *Il.* 15.71, where the text has Ἰλιον αἰπύ. Aristarchus athetizes the line together with the surrounding ones (*Il.* 15.56–77) for various reasons (*Sch. Il.* 15.56a), among which is the issue with the neuter Ἰλιον.¹¹⁵ Thus, the insistence on the gender of Ἰλιος is also related to this athetesis, and indeed twice in these scholia the reference is to *Il.* 15.71.¹¹⁶ Yet the polemical attitude that Aristarchus constantly shows toward Zenodotus suggests that the obsessive attention paid to the gender of this noun might not have been solely due to the athetesis of *Il.* 15.56–77; rather, the reason seems to have been also (or mainly?) Zenodotus' Ἰλιον αἰπύ at *Il.* 16.92 and 18.174. Any time he found the noun Ἰλιος in agreement with a simple feminine adjective, Aristarchus remarked on it—perhaps leaving it to his attentive readers to catch a polemical hint at Zenodotus' mistake at *Il.* 16.92 and 18.174.

Even though Aristarchus criticized Zenodotus for a valid reason in many

these lines is preserved.

113. *Sch. Il.* 3.305b; 8.499; 12.115; 13.724; 23.64b; 23.297c (Ἰλιον ἡνεμόεσσαν); *Sch. Il.* 4.46b^{1,2}; 4.164d; 4.416; 5.648; 6.96b; 6.277; 6.448c; 7.20; 7.82; 7.413; 7.429; 11.196; 13.657c; 17.193; 20.216; 21.128; 21.515; 24.143; 24.383 (Ἰλιος ἱρή / Ἰλιον ἱρήν / Ἰλίου ἱρής); *Sch. Il.* 5.210 (Ἰλιον ἐρατεινήν); *Sch. Il.* 9.419a; 9.686; 13.773a; 15.558 (Ἰλιος αἰπεινή / Ἰλιον αἰπεινήν / Ἰλίου αἰπεινῆς); *Sch. Il.* 22.411a (Ἰλιος ὀφρυόεσσα). Also at *Il.* 18.174 the noun Ἰλιος is followed by a noncompound adjective (Ἰλιον ἡνεμόεσσαν, which Zenodotus read as Ἰλιον αἰπὺ θέλοντες), while at *Il.* 16.92 the noun is alone (προτὶ Ἰλιον ἡγεμονεύειν, while Zenodotus inserted the neuter adjective when he read προτὶ Ἰλιον αἰπὺ δέισθαι).

114. The only cases where the noun Ἰλιος appears in the *Iliad* accompanied by a noncompound adjective and no scholium by Aristonicus is preserved are *Il.* 15.169 (Ἰλιον ἱρήν), 15.215 (Ἰλίου αἰπεινῆς), 17.328 (Ἰλιον αἰπεινήν), 18.270 (Ἰλιον ἱρήν), and 24.27 (Ἰλιος ἱρή).

115. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.71a. In fact, at *Il.* 15.71 there was also a variant reading Ἰλιον ἐκπέρσωσιν, which got rid of the neuter adjective; see *Sch. Il.* 15.71b (Did.) and 15.71c (ex. [Ariston. + ex. + Did.]). Cf. Goedhart 1879, 77–78; Lehrs 1882, 353; van Thiel 2014a, II 535–536. The athetesis of *Il.* 15.56–77 is discussed by Lührs 1992, 129–132; cf. also Roemer 1912, 296–300; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 426; Nickau 1977, 245–250 (the latter on Zenodotus' omission of lines 64–77); Janko 1994, 234–235; on this athetesis, see also Chapter 3.2.A § 13, Chapter 3.3.A § 4.4, and Chapter 5.2 § 2.3.

116. *Sch. Il.* 4.46b²: διὰ παντὸς θηλυκῶς, ἀπαξ δὲ οὐδετέρως Ἰλιον αἰπὺ ἔλοιεν Ἀθηναίης διὰ βουλᾶς (*Il.* 15.71), and *Sch. Il.* 12.115: ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τὸ Ἰλιον αἰπὺ ἔλοιεν (*Il.* 15.71), ὅτι οὐδετέρως διὸ ἀθετεῖται.

instances, there are cases where he seems to have gone the extra mile in finding fault with him, and without a good reason. For example, concerning the variant readings of *Il.* 21.169, Zenodotus read ἰθυκτίων, ‘straight-fibered’,¹¹⁷ as an epithet of Achilles’ spear (μελίη). Aristarchus rejects the reading and instead supports ἰθυπτίων, ‘straight-flying’. The reason is not linguistic, because both compounds are formally correct; rather, it is a question of style and suitability. For Aristarchus, with this epithet Homer praises Achilles, who is highly skilled at throwing his spear and making it fly straight, as Aeneas himself acknowledges in *Il.* 20.99; on the contrary, Zenodotus’ solution is meaningless, as it is ‘redundant’ to talk about the nature of the wood (*Sch. Il.* 21.169b¹: παρέλκει δὲ νῦν τὸ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ξύλου φύσεως εἰπεῖν).¹¹⁸ Even though Aristarchus may be right from a poetic point of view, the fact remains that his reading, as far as the evidence goes, is not better justified than the one by Zenodotus. Both ἰθυκτίων and ἰθυπτίων are unattested compounds, and they are both linguistically correct. They could be variants present in different manuscripts or they could be inventions, one by Zenodotus and one by Aristarchus.¹¹⁹ Even if the latter attempts to show that his reading is poetically better and perhaps even suggested by the poet itself at *Il.* 20.99, his way of dealing with his predecessor seems unfair, since Zenodotus’ reading is certainly neither wrong nor, as far as we know, less well attested.

1.5.2. Aristarchus’ Attempt at Objectivity

Even if Aristarchus often seems to have been biased against Zenodotus, in other cases he addressed his predecessor’s critical activity with a more balanced approach—for example, when Zenodotus’ choices resulted in unmetrical lines.¹²⁰ Contrary to what one might expect from the previous overview, Aristarchus does not dismiss Zenodotus’ readings only because he makes the line unmetrical (with the phrase Ζηνόδοτος γράγει . . . ἄμετρον ποιῶν τὸν στίχον in most of the scholia). In all these cases, in fact, he also lists some other reason for why the reading is to be rejected. Most often, it is a wrong or non-Homeric morphological *schema* (*Sch. Il.* 2.520; 2.634;¹²¹ 2.658 and 5.638a; 20.484a¹), and once (*Sch. Il.* 18.222b¹) it is a syntactic *schema*. The metrical problem is thus presented as an additional objection. Similarly, at *Il.* 13.172 Zenodotus’ reading is

117. Allegedly from κτηδών, which indicates the fiber of wood. Cf. Wackernagel 1916, 242.

118. See also *Sch. Il.* 21.169c (ex. [Ariston.] | Did?). *Sch. Il.* 21.169b² is corrupt.

119. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 118; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 27; Roemer 1924, 77–78. According to Wecklein 1919, 35–36, Zenodotus followed his own manuscript evidence at *Il.* 21.169, as proven by his reading in the second hemistich of *Il.* 20.273. There, instead of προῖει δολιχόσκιον ἔγχος, read by Aristarchus, Zenodotus read μελίην ἰθυπτίωνα (*Sch. Il.* 20.273–4a^{1,2}), which corresponds to Aristarchus’ reading at *Il.* 21.169.

120. On Zenodotus’ unmetrical readings, see West 2001, 37–38.

121. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 230; van Thiel 2014a, I 245–246 (who gives a different solution for Zenodotus’ reading here, in line with his eccentric view about the activity of the Alexandrians).

dismissed because it results in hypotaxis, while Homer prefers parataxis; the fact that the line is unmetrical is given simply as further support (*Sch. Il.* 13.172a: ἀγνοεῖ δὲ ὅτι Ὅμηρος διακόπτει τὰς φράσεις, ἵνα μὴ μακροπερίοδος γένηται. ἄλλως τε καὶ κακόμετρον τὸ ἔπος ποιεῖ).¹²² The impression is that metrical peculiarities were not a sufficient justification to reject a variant; in other words, Zenodotus' reading would not have been wrong had meter been the only problem. In fact, Aristarchus recognized that Homer could sometimes have peculiar metrical patterns: for example, he could write dodecasyllabic lines, composed entirely of spondees. They are not normal, but there are some cases in Homer that Aristarchus noticed and accepted as genuine, as is clear from *Sch. Il.* 11.130a and 23.221. In particular, on *Il.* 11.130, he adds: 'the reference is to the judgment of the versification, because these lines seem to be cheap in their construction' (*Sch. Il.* 11.130a: ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς ἐπικρίσιν τῆς στιχοποιΐας ὅτι εὐτελεῖς τῇ κατασκευῇ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οἱ τοιοῦτοι). As seen in Chapter 3.6.B § 5.1, 'cheap' composition, which includes metrically odd lines (as is now clear from *Sch. Il.* 11.130a),¹²³ was not in itself reason enough for an athetesis; as it turns out, it was also not reason enough for rejecting Zenodotus' reading unless another reason was found. Even more worrying were the lines that Aristarchus noticed lacked one *mora*.¹²⁴ He might not have liked these peculiar or unmetrical lines; nevertheless, they were present in Homer,¹²⁵ as were many other linguistic and stylistic misuses (καταχρήσεις), which he accepted as specific poetic choices.¹²⁶ Accusing Zenodotus of writing ἄμετροι στίχοι would not only have been unfair, then, but also would have broken the rules that Aristarchus himself had established and used throughout his own scholarly activity to judge the poetry of Homer.

There is another case that shows Aristarchus' efforts to 'understand'

122. In *Sch. Il.* 6.34 Aristarchus says that Zenodotus' reading makes the line κακόφωνος (perhaps, a mistake for κακόμετρος, as suggested by Montanari 1995b, 281). Since the first hemistich of *Il.* 6.34 (ναῖε δὲ Σατνιόεντος) is very similar to *Il.* 13.172 (ναῖε δὲ Πήδαιον), the same problem of hypotaxis vs. parataxis is present: Zenodotus read a relative clause rather than a new independent clause: ὃς ναῖε Σατνιόεντος and ὃς νάε, or better, ὃς ναῖε Πήδαιον (see West, ad loc.; West 1966, 157). It is thus likely that the additional syntactic reason was lost. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 84; Janko 1994, 68; Montanari 1995b, 280-281.

123. See also Bachmann 1902-1904, II 29.

124. For a survey of Aristarchus' attitude toward unmetrical lines, see Montanari 1995b. On Aristarchus' 'adjustments' to possibly unmetrical lines, see also Chapter 3.1 § 2 and § 3.

125. The same idea is voiced by his pupil Dionysius Thrax in *Sch. Il.* 22.379a: . . . ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος (fr. *13 Linke) διστάζει, μὴ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τοῦ χρόνου . . . τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἐσημειοῦντο πρὸς κρίσιν ποιημάτων, ὅτι σπανίως Ὅμηρος κακομέτρους ποιεῖ [Dionysius is in doubt whether [the sign] is not with reference to the lack of a *mora*. . . . such cases [of unmetrical lines] were singled out for the judgment of poems, since rarely Homer makes lines which are metrically faulty]. Cf. Linke 1977, 42.

126. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11 (misuse of words) and Chapter 3.6.C § 1.1 (misuse of formulaic lines).

Zenodotus. In *Il.* 11.101–121 Agamemnon kills Isus and Antiphus, two sons of Priam who were fighting together on the same chariot. In this scene, the dual is used (ll. 102, 104, 106, 110) together with the plural (ll. 103, 111, 120). Homer says that the two siblings were once taken prisoner by Achilles, who freed them for a ransom. At line 104 the relative clause about how Achilles took them when they were herding sheep is introduced by the relative pronoun in the dual: ὃ ποτ' Ἀχιλλεύς . . . ('whom once Achilles . . .');¹²⁷ however, Zenodotus had the singular ὄν. Aristarchus observes that the story does not involve only one of the two brothers, since in the scene Homer uses the dual (*Sch. Il.* 11.106a) or the plural (*Sch. Il.* 11.111: καὶ οὐκ ἔστι περὶ ἐνὸς ὁ λόγος, ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον). Yet he also seems to go beyond simple criticism of Zenodotus and tries to find an 'excuse' for his reading:

Sch. Il. 11.104a¹ ὃ ποτ' Ἀχιλλεύς: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει 'ὄν ποτ' Ἀχιλλεύς'. μήποτε δὲ πεπλάνηται, γεγραμμένου τοῦ ο ὑπ' ἀρχαϊκῆς σημασίας ἀντὶ τοῦ ω, προσθεὶς τὸ ν· ἔστι γὰρ περὶ δυεῖν ὁ λόγος· διό καὶ ἐπιφέρει 'καὶ γὰρ σφε πάρος παρὰ νηυσὶν' (*Il.* 11.111).

'Whom once Achilles (ὃ ποτ' Ἀχιλλεύς)': because Zenodotus writes ὄν ποτ' Ἀχιλλεύς. Perhaps he has been misled because O was written instead of Ω in the archaic alphabet, and has added the N. For the story is about two people; therefore he adds: 'For [he had seen] them (σφε) before by the swift ships' (*Il.* 11.111).¹²⁸

Even if Zenodotus often misused the dual, this time he might have been misled by his manuscript evidence: the archaic alphabet did not differentiate between ο and ω, so he was either reading a manuscript where O = ο, ὀ (= ου) or ω, or a text where the copyists had wrongly translated an Ionic O for ω into ο. Thus, Zenodotus read an omicron, and the quickest solution was to add an N, so that the relative clause referred only to one of the brothers. Indeed, the other dual in this sentence, ποιμαίνοντ'(ε) ἐπ' ὄεσσι λαβών ('taking them while they were herding the sheep', l. 106) could also be taken as a singular: ποιμαίνοντ'(α) ἐπ' ὄεσσι λαβών. This fragment is interesting, then, because it attests to Aristarchus' awareness of the change in writing systems and of the idea that such a change had an impact on the Homeric text (the ancient theory of μεταχαρακτηρισμός).¹²⁹ In fact, he faced problems himself arising from this

127. *Il.* 11.104–106: ὃ ποτ' Ἀχιλλεύς / Ἰδης ἐν κνημοῖσι δίδη μόσχοισι λύγοισι, / ποιμαίνοντ' ἐπ' ὄεσσι λαβών, καὶ ἔλυσεν ἀποίνων [whom Achilles once tied with willow twigs on the slopes of Ida, taking them while they were herding the sheep, and he released them for a ransom].

128. See also *Sch. Il.* 11.104a²; cf. Matthaios 1999, 464 (fr. 111).

129. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 350; Wecklein 1919, 108–109; Hainsworth 1993, 237. On the problem of

change in scripts, since Didymus mentions variant readings discussed by Aristarchus and possibly generated by confusions between $\varepsilon / \bar{\varepsilon}$ (= $\varepsilon\iota$) / η (all written as E) and $o / \bar{o}$ (= ou) / ω (all written as O).¹³⁰ Therefore, Aristarchus recognized the problems that the change of alphabet had caused for scholars who tried to reestablish the ‘original’ text of Homer; hence, he tried to account for Zenodotus’ reading in this case.

These two examples—even if valuable in attesting a more moderate and understanding attitude toward Zenodotus—stand out because they involve peculiar questions which remained difficult to solve for Aristarchus himself. The criticism analyzed in the previous sections, on the other hand, centered on more established issues of Homeric scholarship that Aristarchus had solved (or believed he had solved) compared with Zenodotus’ inexperience.

1.6. Zenodotus’ Text: Deletions, Atheteseis, and Additions

Scholars have long since realized that Zenodotus’ text was shorter than our vulgate, as it lacked many lines which were present in Aristarchus’ own working text.¹³¹ Klaus Nickau,¹³² in particular, counts 138 lines that were missing in Zenodotus’ text of the *Iliad* compared to our vulgate—which in fact is not much. Still, in the Aristarchean scholia we often read that ‘Zenodotus did not write (certain lines)’ ($\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\text{t}\ddot{\epsilon}\ \text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\iota\nu$),¹³³ or that certain lines were not present ($\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\ \phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ /\ \text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\kappa\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$)¹³⁴ in his edition. By comparing his own reference text with Zenodotus’, Aristarchus thus came to realize that certain lines were

metacharacterism ($\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\chi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\eta\rho\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$), see Chantraine 1953–1958, I 5–13; Heubeck 1979, 165–167; Janko 1994, 34–37; West 2001, 21–23.

130. Didymus shows that the change of alphabet was a problem that had generated many variants in *Sch. Il.* 7.238c²: αἱ Ἀριστάρχου βῶν. ἡ Ἀριστοφάνους βοῦν. ἡ Πιανοῦ βῶ. . . . ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐγγράπτο BON, ὅπερ οὐκ ἐνόησαν οἱ διορθωταί [the editions of Aristarchus [have] βῶν; that of Aristophanes [has] βοῦν; that of Rhianus [has] βῶ . . . in the ancient [manuscripts] it was written BON, which the editors did not understand]. Among the examples of variant readings generated from metacharacterism quoted by West 2001, 22–23, Aristarchus discussed ἦδη vs. ἦδει at *Il.* 1.70 (cf. Schironi 2004, 69–76, fr. 4); δ’ αὖτε vs. δὴ αὐτ’ (ε) (*Sch. Il.* 2.225b [Did.]); εὔτε vs. ἡὔτε (*Sch. Il.* 3.10b [Did.]; 19.386a [Did.]; cf. Schironi 2004, 146–152, fr. 15). Another case discussed, among others, by Crates is attested for *Il.* 21.363; see *P.Oxy.* 221, xvii, 30–34, and *Sch. Il.* 21.363e (ex.); cf. Helck 1905, 66–76 (fr. XIII); Mette 1952, 177–178 (fr. 85e–f); Broggiato 2001, 195–197 (fr. 32).

131. See Duentzer 1848, 162–176; Pasquali 1962, 224–225; West 2001, 33.

132. Nickau 1977, 20.

133. *Sch. Il.* 1.488; 2.673–5; 4.88a; 8.535–7; 10.253a¹; 16.140a; 19.77a; 21.195a¹ (but 21.195a² has ἀθετεῖν); see also Didymus in, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 9.694a^{1,2}; 11.179–80a.b; 15.64b; 15.265b; 17.404–25. A list of all the expressions analyzed here with reference to Zenodotus can be found in Nickau 1977, 26–30.

134. *Sch. Il.* 8.37a ($\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\eta\ \text{Z}\eta\nu\text{o}\delta\acute{o}\tau\text{o}\upsilon\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\tau\text{o}$). The phrase $\text{o}\ddot{\upsilon}\kappa\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ does not appear in the scholia containing fragments of Aristarchus, but is used by Didymus, for example, in *Sch. Il.* 8.284a and 10.534a; cf. Nickau 1977, 27.

missing in his colleague's edition and concluded that he 'did not write them'. If this is the case, Zenodotus' edition could have either presented these lines in the text but canceled by striking them through,¹³⁵ or could have simply omitted them altogether. Either possibility—the strike across the lines or their complete omission—is plausible, though the latter better respects the wording of the scholia, which clearly say: οὐ γράφειν and οὐ φέρεσθαι / οὐκ εἶναι, while with the former hypothesis one must assume a mistake in the scholastic phrasing.¹³⁶

Similarly, when the scholia say that Zenodotus 'took away' ([περι]αῖρειν)¹³⁷ or 'cut' (συντέμνειν)¹³⁸ lines, the idea is that he rejected them, eliminating those lines from his text. It is impossible to know how this operation looked on the manuscript itself (perhaps a strikethrough or a complete omission of the lines); still, verbs like (περι)αῖρειν and συντέμνειν suggest a more definitive action than ἀθετεῖν, which instead means 'to consider doubtful' by marking suspicious lines with an *obelos*. This conclusion seems also to be proved by cases in which Zenodotus 'canceled' ([περι]αῖρειν) or 'cut' (συντέμνειν) lines, and then rewrote them;¹³⁹ this seems to indicate that those verbs express a real deletion, unlike ἀθετεῖν, which is never accompanied by a rewriting of the text.¹⁴⁰ Lastly, another term used in the Aristonicus scholia with reference to Zenodotus' behavior about lines is περιγράφειν.¹⁴¹ The verb περιγράφειν literally means 'to draw a line around', and hence, 'to enclose something as if it were within brackets', namely, 'to cancel', which also points to a rejection of lines. The evidence from papyri, which clearly show lines 'bracketed',¹⁴² seems to suggest that περιγράφειν was closer to an athetesis, in the sense that the lines remained in the text; whether or not it meant a more definitive rejection than

135. So Montanari 1998, 6–8.

136. As Montanari 1998, 7, does.

137. *Sch. Il.* 1.446–8; 7.482a; 9.14b; 9.26–31; 16.89 (but *Sch. Il.* 16.89–90, derived either from Aristonicus or Didymus, uses ἀθετεῖν); 16.93a; 16.677.

138. *Sch. Il.* 1.446–8 (συντετμημένως); 2.60–71; 2.111a; 2.156–69.

139. See *Sch. Il.* 1.446–8; 9.26–31; 16.89; 16.93a for (περι)αῖρειν and *Sch. Il.* 2.60–71; 2.111a; 2.156–69 for συντέμνειν. In this regard, Aristarchus remarks that when Zenodotus cuts lines and inserts substitutes for them, the result is sometimes cheaper than the original (*Sch. Il.* 16.93a: ἔστι δὲ εὐτελής καὶ τῇ συνθέσει καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ). Other cases in which Zenodotus' solution is defined 'cheap' (εὐτελής) are in *Sch. Il.* 2.314b and 11.413a. On (περι)αῖρειν and συντέμνειν, see Nickau 1977, 12–13.

140. The case of *Sch. Il.* 16.666b¹, where we read that Zenodotus διεσκεύακε γράφων line 666, and *Sch. Il.* 16.667–8b¹ (Did.), which says that Zenodotus athetized lines 666–683, is not a counter-example. These notes mean only that Zenodotus read line 666 differently from Aristarchus and that he also athetized the entire block of lines 666–683, not that he athetized line 666 and rewrote it to have a different text with his 'new' line. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 329; Bolling 1944, 154–156; Nickau 1977, 210–213; Janko 1994, 395–396; van Thiel 2014a, III 86.

141. *Sch. Il.* 2.156–69; 8.493a; 11.794a; 16.432a (while *Sch. Il.* 16.432b, an exegetical scholium, perhaps partly derived from Didymus, has οὐκ εἶναι; cf. Nickau 1977, 11). Cf. also *Sch. Il.* 2.489–90.

142. See, e.g., *P.Oxy.* 2256, fr. 3, l. 6. Cf. Turner and Parsons 1987, 16.

a simple suspicion (as the athetesis seems to mean even for Zenodotus), it is impossible to know.¹⁴³

To conclude, Aristarchus seems to have believed that Zenodotus had two different approaches to a line that he did not like: he could decide that the line was to be rejected without appeal (οὐ γράφειν, οὐ φέρεσθαι / οὐκ εἶναι, (περι)-αῖρειν, συντέμνειν) or could suspect it, but not eliminate it totally (ἀθετεῖν, perhaps περιγράφειν).¹⁴⁴ That these lexical differences indeed represent two different attitudes of Zenodotus is confirmed by some scholia which specify that he athetized certain lines *and* did not write others.¹⁴⁵

There are cases in the scholia, it should be noted, when Aristarchus shares Zenodotus' doubts on particular lines. Still, their respective approaches are often very different. Whereas Zenodotus did not write problematic lines, Aristarchus athetizes them,¹⁴⁶ or only some of them.¹⁴⁷ As discussed in Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3, Aristarchus accused his predecessor of being particularly hostile to repeated lines just because they were repeated (*Sch. Il.* 9.26–31). In fact, he sometimes shares Zenodotus' doubts about repetitions, although he seems to be more conservative than his predecessor, as he athetizes where the former had deleted and also tries to find additional reasons for why repeated lines must be rejected.¹⁴⁸ On the contrary, even if this happens much more rarely, sometimes Zenodotus' text is longer because—in Aristarchus' view—Zenodotus added (γράφειν or ὑποτάσσειν, the latter in the sense of 'appending') lines.¹⁴⁹

143. On περιγράφειν, see also Nickau 1977, 10–12, for whom this is not a technical term and was used to indicate either a deletion or an athetesis.

144. Zenodotus was not the only one to delete lines. Even Aristarchus' text sometimes did not have lines attested elsewhere, because Didymus, who compared various texts, says that a line is missing in one of the editions of Aristarchus or in both (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.807–8; 16.613; 21.73a). Since Aristonicus seems to have focused his attention on Aristarchus' exegesis and commentaries, without really considering the rest of the manuscript tradition, he could not see (or was not interested in noting) that a line was missing in Aristarchus' text. In fact, he never talks about lines 'not written' by Aristarchus. On how we can understand comments about 'deletions' of otherwise attested lines, see below, § 1.7.

145. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.488; 2.673–5; 16.140a.

146. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 10.253a¹; 11.179–80a (Ariston. | Did.) and 11.179–80b (Did.); 15.56a and 15.64b (Did.).

147. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 17.404–25 (Did.).

148. E.g., *Il.* 9.694 = 8.29 (*Sch. Il.* 9.694b and 9.694a^{1,2} [Did.]) and *Il.* 15.265–268 = 6.508–511 (*Sch. Il.* 15.265a; 15.265b [Did.]). Zenodotus did not write those lines (but kept *Il.* 15.265; cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 462; Nickau 1977, 118–119; West 2001, 232), while Aristarchus (and, for *Il.* 9.694, Aristophanes before him) athetizes them, not only because they are repeated, but for additional reasons as well (both cases are discussed in Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3). On the other hand, with *Il.* 5.734–736 = 8.385–387, Aristarchus keeps the lines in Book 5 and athetizes those in Book 8, while Zenodotus athetized those in Book 5 and did not even write those in Book 8 (*Sch. Il.* 5.734–6; 8.385–7a^{1,2} [Ariston. | Did.]); cf. Meijering 1987, 172–173; Lührs 1992, 209–211; van Thiel 2014a, I 463.

149. For example, *Il.* 5.808, discussed in *Sch. Il.* 4.390; 5.807; 5.807–8 (Did.); 5.808 (Did.? vel ex?). For Aristarchus *Il.* 5.808 was added by Zenodotus and taken from *Il.* 4.390. Aristarchus omits

As already pointed out (§ 1.1), Aristarchus mostly mentioned these *atheteseis*, deletions, or additions because he did not share them; thus, his notes were polemical and entirely dedicated to explaining his own reasons for not accepting Zenodotus' choices¹⁵⁰—yet he also mostly ignored the reasons why Zenodotus made certain choices. From this perspective, then, an analysis of Zenodotus' *atheteseis*, deletions, or additions is perhaps more informative about Aristarchus' methods and philological principles than Zenodotus'.

1.7. Is Zenodotus Really the One to Blame?

Aristarchus seems to have considered deletions and additions of lines by Zenodotus as due to Zenodotus himself who 'deleted', 'did not write', or 'added' lines. This opens up the question of how Aristarchus used manuscript evidence. The case of repeated lines involving the similar arming scenes of Patroclus in *Il.* 16.130–144 and of Achilles in *Il.* 19.367–391 becomes particularly important in this regard.¹⁵¹ *Il.* 16.141–144 = 19.388–391 describe Achilles' spear: 'heavy, huge, strong, that no other of the Achaeans could wield, but Achilles alone was able to wield it, the Pelian ash spear that Chiron had given to his dear father from the peak of Mt. Pelion to be death to heroes'. Aristarchus *athetizes* the lines when referring to Achilles, but keeps them for Patroclus' arming because there they are 'necessary (ἀναγκαίως λέγονται), in order for us to know why he did not take the spear' (*Sch. Il.* 19.388–91a),¹⁵² as clearly said in *Il.* 16.140: 'he [i.e., Patroclus] did not take only the spear of Aeacus' noble grandson'. Zenodotus made the opposite choice, however, since he kept the lines in Book 19 (about Achilles), but did not write *Il.* 16.141–144 and also *athetized Il.* 16.140 (*Sch. Il.* 16.140a: Ζηνόδοτος τοῦτον ἀθετήσας τοὺς ἐξῆς τέσσαρας οὐκ ἔγραφεν).¹⁵³ Aristarchus simply criticizes his predecessor's choice by saying that the lines

the line, which is in our vulgate but missing in some papyri (cf. West, ad loc.); Didymus, on the contrary, reads the line, even though he considers it contradictory with the context, just like Aristarchus; cf. Lührs 1992, 195–198. Other cases in which Zenodotus 'adds' lines are discussed in *Sch. Il.* 13.808a (Ariston. | Did.) and 13.808b (ex. [Ariston.?]); 14.136a; 17.456 (Did.).

150. Only very rarely do the Aristonicus scholia not explain why Zenodotus' *atheteseis* are wrong, while still condemning them; for example, *Sch. Il.* 1.46–7 (ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος ἀμφοτέρους ἠθέτηκεν, οὐ καλῶς) and 1.80b (Ariston.?) (Ζηνόδοτος δὲ 'κρείσσω' γράφει. ἀθετεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν στίχον, κακῶς). *Sch. Il.* 2.111a, on the other hand, only mentions Zenodotus' textual cuts, without expressing judgment.

151. For another disagreement between Aristarchus and Zenodotus about the arming scene of Paris at *Il.* 3.328–338, see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.9.5.

152. See also *Sch. Il.* 19.388–91b (Did.) and 19.388–91c (ex. [ex. + Ariston.]).

153. *Sch. Il.* 19.388–91a, on the other hand, says that Zenodotus only *athetized* the lines in Book 16, without mentioning any omission of lines. Hence scholars have supposed a corruption and attempted to restore the original wording with different proposals (see Erbse, app. ad *Sch. Il.* 19.388–91a); cf. Bolling 1925, 162.

are necessary in Book 16. While Aristarchus' solution may have a rationale, Zenodotus' choice, too, can make good (or even better) sense in at least two different scenarios. If it is indeed true that he canceled lines 141–144, then Zenodotus probably perceived that, if one were to eliminate them (which explain that Achilles' spear was impossible to wield by anyone except Achilles himself), line 140 (which says that Patroclus did not take that spear) would have been left unexplained—which is exactly Aristarchus' point for keeping those lines (*Sch. Il.* 19.388–91a). In fact, Zenodotus might have had his own reasons to think that the lines describing Achilles' spear were better suited to Book 19 than to Book 16—namely, the fact that they are about Achilles' strength and family history, and so better fit the arming of Achilles in his moment of glory, rather than Patroclus.¹⁵⁴ Yet there is also another way to read the sources and reconstruct Zenodotus' operation: that he did not find lines 141–144 in his Homeric text in the first place (perhaps because they do not really fit in Book 16 and so had been eliminated in the manuscript tradition to which his copy belonged). If so, he *had* to athetize line 140, which would have been puzzling in absence of the following lines. Aristarchus, however, does not seem to take into consideration either of these scenarios, nor does he try to guess the reasons behind Zenodotus' procedure and athetesis of line 140; he just criticizes him for not writing necessary lines.¹⁵⁵

In this respect, there is one further point to stress: in the scholia Aristarchus always argues against Zenodotus' readings, atheteseis, additions of lines, or changes in the text, but he never uses external evidence, that is, he never says that Zenodotus' choices are wrong because they are not present in certain (good) editions or manuscripts. Rather, Aristarchus finds an internal reason (the Homeric usage, a grammatical rule, or the internal consistency of the poem) to question them. No doubt, Aristarchus was extremely confident in his methodology, which was indeed sound and more advanced than that of his predecessors. Yet it is striking that, in the evidence at our disposal, he never considers the possibility that Zenodotus might have found his readings in manuscripts and never calls upon manuscript evidence to prove his own choices (against those of Zenodotus). To be sure, by the time of Didymus, things had changed, and Didymus seems to have been extremely careful in collecting readings from different manuscripts. On the other hand, Aristarchus and, before him, Zenodotus and Aristophanes probably limited themselves to one copy which they chose and which became their base text. Even if Aristarchus might have collected many manuscripts in order to prepare his working text

154. So Duentzer 1848, 170.

155. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 5; Roemer 1912, 266–267; Bolling 1925, 161–164; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 463; Nickau 1977, 53–54, 74–75; Janko 1994, 335; Edwards 1991, 279–280; Lührs 1992, 159–161.

of Homer and might have even rechecked them for particularly doubtful cases,¹⁵⁶ he probably did not do so consistently, especially when criticizing his predecessor's *diorthosis*. Similarly, Aristarchus might have looked at Zenodotus' copy, but did not consider it *external evidence* for alternative readings. In fact, he seems never to have doubted his own readings when the text of his predecessor was different. In such cases, he simply tried to show that his ecdotic choices were better because there were internal reasons for them. By the same token, he treated Zenodotus' text as Zenodotus' *own* product—and thus he spoke of Zenodotus 'writing' (γράφειν) certain readings or 'cutting' (συντέμνειν) and 'deleting' ([περι]αῖρειν) lines, as if the latter changed the text and produced his own text of Homer *suo Marte*. This was probably not always the case, but the fact that he never seems to have contemplated that Zenodotus might have found certain readings in manuscripts which he himself did not know or consult is indicative of Aristarchus' way of working on Homer.¹⁵⁷ Yet it may be interesting to note that Aristarchus himself became victim of the same bias. At *Il.* 19.77 Aristarchus notes (again!) that Zenodotus 'did not write' line 77, which specifies that Agamemnon speaks to the Greeks without standing up. But for Aristarchus the line is necessary, because Agamemnon cannot stand up due to a wound (*Sch. Il.* 19.77a). Yet in another note, partly derived from Porphyry (*Sch. Il.* 19.79–80a $\cong$ Porph. *QH Il.* 233.3–11 $\cong$ *QHI*, 110.3–111.9 Sodano), the scholiast defends the text without line 77 and accuses Aristarchus of having 'interpolated' (παρενέθηκε) the line because he did not understand the text correctly: Agamemnon's wound was in the elbow,¹⁵⁸ so he could stand up and there was no need of line 77. As it turns out, Aristarchus did not add line 77, which was already read by Aristophanes, as Didymus confirms in *Sch. Il.* 19.76–7.¹⁵⁹ This example is important as it shows how common it was to assume that

156. See Chapter 2.2.

157. Roemer 1912, 242, had already suggested that the lines 'not written' by Zenodotus were more likely to be simply missing from his text. My reconstruction of Aristarchus' ideas about Zenodotus' text (namely, that it was the result of Zenodotus' personal emendations) echoes Martin West's claims about modern perceptions of Zenodotus. According to West 2001, 33–45, modern scholars have missed the point when they concluded that Zenodotus prepared an 'edition' in the modern sense as the result of manuscript comparison and emendation—such an idea is simply anachronistic. Rather, Zenodotus' 'edition' was an Ionic rhapsodic text, probably from Ephesus, where he had simply added *obeloi* for lines that he wanted to athetize; most of the supposed 'variants', 'additions', or 'deletions' by Zenodotus are then simply to be considered as evidence of this rhapsodic text, and not as Zenodotus' 'choices'. That Zenodotus probably used Ionic manuscripts for his *ekdosis* was suggested also by Duentzer 1848, 50; Wackernagel 1916, 73; Janko 1994, 24; *contra* van der Valk 1963–1964, II 51–54.

158. The reference is probably to *Il.* 11.252.

159. On the specific *zetema* of *Il.* 19.77, with which Alexander of Cotiaeum (second century CE) was also involved, see Erbse, *ad loc.*; Edwards 1991, 243–245; Dyck 1991, 314–317 (who especially discusses the sources with reference to Alexander of Cotiaeum); West 2001, 252–253.

inconsistently attested lines had been ‘added’ to or ‘deleted’ from manuscripts by previous scholars. So in surmising Zenodotus’ personal interpolations Aristarchus was not particularly disingenuous, but simply followed the *modus operandi* of his other (past, present, and future) colleagues.

2. Aristarchus and Aristophanes of Byzantium

Among the Aristarchean *scholia maiora* which I have collected,¹⁶⁰ Aristophanes of Byzantium is the second most often quoted scholar,¹⁶¹ but a distant second with only 70 scholia, as opposed to the 474 scholia mentioning Zenodotus. Moreover, the large majority of the scholia that mention Aristophanes derive from Didymus (58 scholia), who most of the time limits himself to mentioning the readings of Aristarchus and of Aristophanes (and sometimes of Zenodotus or other scholars) without reporting the reasons why these scholars chose them, nor Aristarchus’ comments about his predecessors’ choices. Thus, Didymus scholia are not very useful for understanding Aristarchus’ attitude toward his colleagues. It is, however, significant that out of fifty cases in which Didymus reports readings of both Aristarchus and Aristophanes in the *Iliad*,¹⁶² the two scholars agree in twenty-nine cases;¹⁶³ Aristarchus agrees with Aristophanes’ reading but also offers an alternative solution twice,¹⁶⁴ and he disagrees with him nineteen times.¹⁶⁵ To be sure, these figures concerning the scholia by Didymus represent a conservative estimate, as I have not counted, for example, the (many) Didymus scholia which only quote Aristophanes but which can

160. For my criteria, see Chapter 1.1 § 5.

161. On Aristophanes’ scholarship, see Slater 1982; Blank and Dyck 1984; Slater 1986; Callanan 1987; West 2001, 59–60. On Aristophanes’ Homeric text and the Alexandrian poets, see Rengakos 1993, 89–96.

162. Out of a total of fifty-eight scholia in AbT attributed to Didymus which mention both Aristarchus and Aristophanes, there are in fact only fifty cases discussed, because six notes are repeated in A and T (at *Il.* 7.238, 10.306, 10.349, 14.208, 15.10, and 21.249), and so count for only one case; in addition, there are two scholia for one group of lines (*Sch. Il.* 21.130–5a¹ and 21.131c¹); finally, *Sch. Il.* 2.133a does not contain any reading but simply refers to Aristarchus’ *hypomnemata* based on the edition of Aristophanes (see below, footnote 167).

163. *Sch. Il.* 1.91; 1.108a; 1.423–4; 1.553b; 1.585a¹; 1.598a; 2.53a¹; 2.436a; 2.447b; 3.18a; 3.51; 3.57a; 3.126a; 3.227a; 6.121a^{1,2} (probably); 7.443–64b¹; 8.235b¹; 8.304a; 10.397–9a; 12.26a; 13.443b; 14.40b; 14.203a¹; 14.236b; 14.285b; 14.400b; 16.175a; 18.14a³; 21.130–5a¹ and 21.131c¹ (probably; see below).

164. *Sch. Il.* 13.658–9b (see Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2 with footnote 15); 14.36b.

165. *Sch. Il.* 3.373; 4.17a; 4.17b (ex. + Did.); 7.198a¹; 7.238c^{1,2}; 10.306a^{1,b}; 10.349a^{1,2}; 11.219a¹; 13.222b¹; 13.358a²; 13.613b¹; 13.713a; 14.208a^{1,2}; 15.10g.h; 15.197c; 19.386b¹; 21.126–7b¹ (see also Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 21.126–7a); 21.249c^{1,2}; 24.30a. On the disagreements between Aristophanes and Aristarchus, see Slater 1982, 343–345, and the reply by Blank and Dyck 1984, 20–22.

be compared with other Aristonicus scholia reporting Aristarchus' readings. This evidence would add more cases in which Aristophanes' choices could be compared to those of Aristarchus. For instance, there are several instances of agreement between the two scholars in terms of *atheteseis*, where Aristonicus informs us of an *athetesis* of Aristarchus and Didymus notes 'προηθέτει Ἀριστοφάνης', 'Aristophanes had *athetized* them earlier [than Aristarchus]'.¹⁶⁶

Nevertheless, the evidence collected here from Didymus, although incomplete, suggests that Aristarchus had a more balanced attitude toward Aristophanes than toward Zenodotus. After all, Aristarchus' choice to write his first set of commentaries using Aristophanes' *ekdosis*¹⁶⁷ shows that that he respected Aristophanes' work. Aristonicus seems to confirm this respect; although there are very few scholia by Aristonicus where Aristophanes is mentioned (I counted six cases in the scholia to the *Iliad*),¹⁶⁸ they all comment on Aristophanes as someone who made the same choices as, or choices similar to those of, Aristarchus. In four of them, in fact, Aristarchus *athetizes* lines that Aristophanes already *athetized*,¹⁶⁹ and in another one he *athetizes* a line that Aristophanes omitted altogether.¹⁷⁰ In the sixth case, he mentions Aristophanes (among others) when discussing the meaning of *Il.* 11.4, where Strife is said to hold in her hands 'a sign of war' (πολέμοιο τέρας). Ancient critics debated what this τέρας was: for Aristarchus, it is 'war represented as an image', able to stir men to active fighting (*Sch. Il.* 11.4: ὅτι 'πολέμοιο τέρας' τὸν εἰδωλοποιούμενον πόλεμον, τὸν ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἐνεργουμένου πολέμου); in support of his interpretation, he recalls *Il.* 5.593, where Enyo is said to bring 'the din of battle' among the Trojans.¹⁷¹ According to Aristophanes, on the other hand, Strife was bringing a 'lightning bolt' (ἀστραπή) on the basis of *Il.* 10.5–8, where Zeus is said to flash with lightning when he is about to send rain, hail, or snow. Finally, other scholars—left anonymous in *Sch. Il.* 11.4—thought that Strife had a sword or a torch. Aristarchus does not argue against Aristophanes' interpretation; we

166. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 14.317a (Ariston. | Did.); 15.231 and 15.231–5a (Did.); *Sch. Il.* 23.824–5a¹ (Ariston. | Did.) and 23.824–5a² (Did.); *Sch. Il.* 24.6–9a¹ (Ariston. | Did.) and 24.6–9a² (Did.); 24.614–7a (Ariston. | Did.). In other cases, Aristonicus informs us about Aristarchus' *athetesis*, while Didymus adds that Aristophanes also *athetized* the line and Zenodotus did not write it: e.g., *Sch. Il.* 11.13a¹ (Ariston. | Did.; cf. Erbse 1969–1988, VII 307) and 11.13a² (Did.; cf. Erbse 1969–1988, VII 307); 11.356a and 11.356b^{1,2} (Did.); 11.515a (Ariston. | Did.); 16.237a and 16.237b (Did.). Of course, being composite scholia, the attribution of the different parts in the note is always problematic; see discussion in Chapter 1.1 § 3 and Schironi 2015, 622–623.

167. *Sch. Il.* 2.133a (Did.): ἐν τοῖς κατ' Ἀριστοφάνην ὑπομνήμασιν Ἀριστάρχου, on which see Chapter 1.2 § 2 and § 4.

168. In total, there are eight Aristonicus scholia mentioning Aristophanes, but two are repeated in A and T (at *Il.* 10.51–52, 10.253).

169. *Sch. Il.* 10.51–2a^{1,2}; 10.253a^{1,2} (while Zenodotus did not write the line; see Chapter 3.6.C § 5); 10.387a; 14.213a.

170. *Sch. Il.* 18.597–8.

171. Cf. Meijering 1987, 27–28.

do not know why, but perhaps he held it worthy of consideration because it was based on the same principle he followed: ‘to clarify Homer from Homer’. Like Aristarchus, Aristophanes found a similar parallel in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 10.5–8) to justify his interpretation; even if he reached a different solution, his methodology was sound.¹⁷²

This example raises the question of what Aristarchus knew about Aristophanes’ decisions. A scholium by Didymus which contains a quotation from Aristarchus’ *hypomnema* gives some clues in this regard. It discusses Aristophanes’ athetesis of *Il.* 21.130–135, six lines among the angry words that Achilles speaks to Lycaon after having mortally wounded him and thrown his body into the Scamander. After wishing him a grim death in the river’s waters without the honors of a proper burial (*Il.* 122–129), Achilles concludes that not even Scamander will be able to defend the Trojans, even if they sacrificed many bulls and horses to the river; rather, they will die until they have paid the price for killing Patroclus and the other Achaeans (*Il.* 130–135):

Sch. Il. 21.130–5a¹ (Did.) οὐδ’ ὑμῖν ποταμός περ <—νόσφιν ἐμεῖο>: Ἀρίσταρχος διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων Ἀριστοφάνη φησὶ στίχους ἕξ ἡθετηκέναι ὡς παρεμβληθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποροῦντων, διὰ τί ὁ ποταμός ὀργίζεται, καίτοι σαφῶς αὐτοῦ λέγοντος τὴν αἰτίαν. ‘Ξάνθος, ἐπεὶ κεχόλωτο δαΐκταμένων αἰζηῶν, / οὓς Ἀχιλεὺς ἐδάϊζε κατὰ ῥόον οὐδ’ ἐλέαιρεν’ (*Il.* 21.146–147). καὶ τὸ ‘δηθά’ (*Il.* 131) ὡς οὐχ Ὀμηρικῶς κείμενον αἰτιῶνται. μήποτε μέντοι καὶ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος συγκατέθετο τῇ ἀθετήσει, μηδὲν ἀντειπὼν τῷ Ἀριστοφάνει.

‘Not even the river [will protect] you—[Patroclus and the Achaeans . . . whom you slew] away from me’: in his commentaries Aristarchus says that Aristophanes had athetized six lines because he thought them added by those who were at loss as to why the river gets angry, even though he [i.e., Homer] clearly states the reason: ‘Xanthus, since he was angered because of the vigorous men slain in battle whom Achilles was slaying along his stream and did not have pity’ (*Il.* 21.146–147). And they also say that *δηθά* (*Il.* 131) is not used according to the Homeric meaning. Perhaps Aristarchus, too, agreed with the athetesis, since he did not say anything against Aristophanes.¹⁷³

172. Out of the seventy scholia quoting Aristophanes which I collected, the remaining four are by Herodian, who quotes both Aristarchus and Aristophanes. In three cases he records a disagreement between the two (*Sch. Il.* 1.567b¹; 13.29b; 24.84) and once an agreement (*Sch. Il.* 5.289b¹; see Chapter 3.4. § 5). Still, this evidence does not change the general impression that Aristarchus was more often in agreement with Aristophanes than not.

173. See also Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 21.130–5a² and 21.131c^{1,2}; cf. Roemer 1912, 103–105; Nickau 1977, 5 n. 14.

In his *hypomnema*, Aristarchus reports the reasons for which Aristophanes athe-tized lines 130–135, and he does not argue against the choice, probably because he shared it. In fact, Aristophanes considered these lines an interpolation by *diaskeuastai*,¹⁷⁴ who wanted to create a reason for Scamander's anger. He also pointed out a passage where Homer himself 'clearly' (σαφῶς) explained why the river got angry at Achilles; so there was no need of these interpolated lines. This reasoning sounds extremely 'Aristarchean'; yet the phrasing of the scholium suggests that this was Aristophanes' line of thought. If this is true, it is obvious why Aristarchus had nothing to say against Aristophanes.¹⁷⁵

Aristarchus thus seems to have known the reasons behind Aristophanes' textual choices. As far as we know, Aristophanes, like Zenodotus, never wrote a commentary;¹⁷⁶ however, unlike in the case of Zenodotus, Aristarchus was aware of Aristophanes' reasons for certain philological choices. There are three possible scenarios that can explain Aristarchus' better acquaintance with his predecessor's work: (1) Aristophanes wrote a commentary, even if the sources do not mention it, and Aristarchus could consult it; (2) he only prepared an *ekdosis*, which Aristarchus used as a basis for his first commentary, and in it he had written many more comments in the margins than Zenodotus did in his; or (3) Aristarchus had listened to Aristophanes' lectures¹⁷⁷ and taken notes. He could then report Aristophanes' opinions in his *hypomnemata* when he was treating passages where his teacher had taken specific stances. All three scenarios are possible and do not exclude each other. Aristarchus was a pupil of Aristophanes; hence, he listened to his lectures and discussed with him Homeric problems and readings. The oral transmission of ideas favored by the teacher-pupil relationship alone can thus explain the different knowledge that Aristarchus had of Aristophanes' decisions compared with his ignorance of Zenodotus' reasons.¹⁷⁸ This possibility, however, does not

174. On Aristarchus and the interpolators of Homer, see Chapter 3.6.B § 7.

175. Cf. Blank and Dyck 1984, 21. Didymus says that the non-Homeric use of δηθά was another issue. Normally, in Homer the adverb δηθά means 'for a long time', but Didymus does not specify what δηθά meant in line 131 according to these critics (and perhaps Aristophanes). Yet in *Sch. Il.* 21.131a Aristarchus notes that δηθά is used here instead of πολλάκις; the Trojans 'often' made sacrifices to the Scamander. From this scholium, Aristarchus does not seem to reject this use of δηθά in this passage, but Aristophanes, like others, might have objected to it.

176. See Pfeiffer 1968, 173–174 and 212. Aristophanes also treated Homeric variant readings in his *Glossai*; see Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.567b¹.

177. As already suggested by Pfeiffer 1968, 175. Aristarchus is defined as 'pupil of the grammarian Aristophanes' by the entry in *Su. α* 3892: . . . μαθητῆς δὲ γέγονεν Ἀριστοφάνους τοῦ γραμματικοῦ . . .

178. See also Nickau 1977, 15–16, who suggested that both Zenodotus and Aristophanes, without writing any commentary, explained their textual choices only orally to their students. If so, Aristarchus could only have listened to Aristophanes' explanations, not those by Zenodotus, for

exclude that Aristophanes might have written commentaries or added notes to his *ekdoseis*, which were then completely lost.

3. Aristarchus and Other Alexandrian Scholars

Compared with the large amount of evidence from Aristarchean scholia discussing Zenodotus' exegesis and textual choices, other Alexandrian scholars seem to have been mentioned very rarely by Aristarchus. In the Aristonicus scholia, Callimachus is singled out only as a poet taking inspiration from Homer (and often misunderstanding his model) rather than as scholar.¹⁷⁹ Apollonius Rhodius is mentioned once for an athetesis;¹⁸⁰ in another instance, Aristarchus argues against a reading by him, showing that it does not make sense within the context.¹⁸¹ Two other Aristonicus scholia mention Eratosthenes, both concerning the fact that he, like Zenodotus, did not completely understand the use and meaning of the dual in Homer.¹⁸²

Istrus, a pupil of Callimachus and author of *ὑπομνήματα*, probably dealing with epic poetry and Homer, seems to have been much more 'popular' as a target. In Chapter 3.3.B, Istrus has been mentioned with reference to the identity of the Homeric 'heroes'¹⁸³ as well as concerning the question of the recovery of corpses (*νεκρῶν ἀναίρεσις*) on the battlefield.¹⁸⁴ In both cases Aristarchus argues that Istrus' ideas are not well founded because an attentive reading of the Homeric poems proves them untenable.

Two additional polemical targets of Aristarchus were Comanus and Philitas—to the point, in fact, that he wrote two works dedicated to arguing with them, the *Πρὸς Κομανόν* and the *Πρὸς Φιλίταν*. There are only a few quotations from these two works, and those come only from Didymus. As was discussed in Chapter 1.2 § 1, however, in these five scholia,¹⁸⁵ besides mentioning Aristarchus' opinion, Didymus does not relate any of Aristarchus' criticisms against these two scholars; for this reason, these fragments are not

which he probably had very few records (perhaps notes by previous students or notes in copies preserving Zenodotus' edition; cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 108).

179. *Sch. Il.* 3.371b; 11.62a¹; both scholia are discussed in Chapter 5.3 § 1.

180. *Sch. Il.* 11.97; cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 148. On Apollonius Rhodius as Homeric scholar, see Rengakos 1994; Rengakos 2001.

181. *Sch. Il.* 1.3b¹ (Did.?), 1.4a, and 11.55b, discussed in Chapter 3.2.A § 6 (with footnote 90).

182. *Sch. Il.* 10.364b; 24.282 (see below, § 4.2). Whether the use of dual for plural in Eratosthenes was due to his efforts to solve the question of the dual in the embassy of Book 9 (as suggested by Broggiato 2001, 152) is uncertain, though possible; on this question, see Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.2.

183. *Sch. Il.* 2.110a; 13.629a¹; 15.230a; 19.34—all treated in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.1.

184. *Sch. Il.* 8.491a; 10.199a; 10.298b—all treated in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.6.

185. *Against Comanus* in *Sch. Il.* 1.97–9; 2.798a; 24.110b¹, and *Against Philitas* in *Sch. Il.* 1.524c; 2.111b.

useful for understanding Aristarchus' attitude toward his colleagues. More interesting from this point of view are the Aristonicus scholia that mention Philitas and Aristarchus' polemical argument against him.¹⁸⁶ It is impossible to know whether Aristonicus' source was the work *Against Philitas* or the *hypomnema*; still, given that his work focused on Aristarchus' critical signs, which were closely connected with the *hypomnema*, the latter hypothesis seems more likely. There are five scholia by Aristonicus mentioning Philitas, and they refer to three passages where variant readings are at stake. Twice Aristarchus accuses Philitas of choosing a reading which is against the Homeric usage, at *Il.* 2.269 (*Sch. Il.* 2.269c)¹⁸⁷ and at *Il.* 21.126–127 (*Sch. Il.* 6.459; 7.171a; 21.126–7a)¹⁸⁸—in the last case Aristarchus also argues against Callistratus, another pupil of Aristophanes.¹⁸⁹ In the third case, concerning *Il.* 21.252 (*Sch. Il.* 22.308a¹), Aristarchus' criticism against Philitas is not expressed.¹⁹⁰

As the brief survey allows us to conclude, even in the rarer cases when his polemical target was not Zenodotus, Aristarchus proceeded in the same way: he looked for other parallels in the poem in order to demonstrate that his predecessors made mistakes because of their imprecise knowledge of the poems themselves and their consequent ignorance of Homer's lexicon, grammar, style, and mythical universe. The same attitude is at work in his polemical notes against the Glossographers, as discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 3, and against the Chorizontes, as we will see in Chapter 5.2 § 2.

4. Aristarchus and Crates of Mallos

Crates and Aristarchus have often been opposed in studies on ancient scholarship as the leaders of opposite schools, Alexandria and Pergamum, respectively. According to this interpretation, whereas Aristarchus was the champion of analogy, Crates was the anomalist par excellence; in addition, Crates was all for an allegorical reading of Homer—an approach against which Aristarchus vehemently fought.¹⁹¹ There is certainly a kernel of truth to these claims: without a

186. Aristonicus never mentions Comanus.

187. Cf. Dettori 2000, 166 (fr. 26); Spanoudakis 2002, 380–381 (fr. 56).

188. See also Porph. *QH I*, 37.7–38.10 and 39.17–46.8 Sodano; cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 2–4; Dettori 2000, 167–172 (fr. 27); Spanoudakis 2002, 381–383 (fr. 57); cf. also Lehrs 1882, 46 and 90.

189. Cf. Barth 1984, 155–174, who offers a very detailed analysis of the question.

190. Cf. Dettori 2000, 173–174 (fr. 28); Spanoudakis 2002, 383–384 (fr. 58); Schironi 2004, 417–425 (fr. 54).

191. This is, for example, the approach taken by Rudolf Pfeiffer in his chapter about Crates (Pfeiffer 1968, 234–245, esp. 240); cf. also Ribbach 1883, 34; Fraser 1972, I 463 and 465–466. On the supposed controversy between analogy and anomaly, see Chapter 3.5 § 9.

doubt, Aristarchus and Crates did have many points of disagreement, and some pupils of Aristarchus, such as Parmeniscus and Dionysius Thrax, wrote works entitled *Against Crates* (Πρὸς Κράτητα),¹⁹² just as Crates' pupils wrote monographs against Aristarchus.¹⁹³ What complicates the picture is that, while for Aristarchus we can rely on the VMK tradition, which is derived from his own original work, the sources on Crates are far less abundant, and above all they lack a tradition comparable to the VMK. In the Homeric scholia, for example, Crates is mentioned both by the VMK scholia and the exegetical scholia. Yet these quotations are very indirect and filtered through several layers of scholarship. In particular, the 'Alexandrian' VMK authors (Aristonicus, Didymus, Herodian, and Nicanor) might have read Crates with some bias because Crates belonged to a different school and because he was not the focus of their work: they might have quoted him either when his views were opposed to theirs in order to censure them or, on the contrary, when they were useful to support their own claims. This is what modern scholars do when quoting or referring to colleagues' work, and it is a different type of operation than writing treatises focused on preserving the work of a previous colleague, considered the founder of a school—the type of work that Aristonicus and Didymus did with Aristarchus. In addition, we are not even certain that Aristarchus himself had direct access to Crates' work, which adds a further level of uncertainty to the analysis. Therefore, discussing Crates' fragments in relation to Aristarchus is even more difficult than discussing Zenodotus' work, which at least was produced at Alexandria and must have been available to Aristarchus in some form.¹⁹⁴

4.1. Aristarchus' Knowledge of Crates' Work (and Vice Versa)

The first question is whether—and, if so, how—Aristarchus and Crates knew each other's work.¹⁹⁵ Aristarchus' knowledge (albeit incomplete) of what Zenodotus or Aristophanes thought about a line or a passage in Homer is not difficult to envisage: the *ekdoseis* of Zenodotus and Aristophanes (or copies of them), even if meager and sometimes reticent in their explanations, were available in the Library, and Aristarchus could consult them whenever he wanted. What about the scholarly products from Pergamum? Though the evidence about the connections between these two intellectual capitals is paltry, con-

192. See Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 8.513a¹ (Parm., fr. 2 Breithaupt) and 9.464b (Dion. Thr., fr. 15 Linke); cf. Broggiato 2001, 138–140 (T 28 and T 29).

193. Zenodotus of Mallos wrote a work entitled *Against the Lines Athetized by Aristarchus* (Πρὸς τὰ ὑπ' Ἀριστάρχου ἀθετούμενα); cf. Broggiato 2014, 111–112, 120–121 (T 2*).

194. The main studies on Crates are Wachsmuth 1860; Helck 1905; Mette 1936; Mette 1952; Porter 1992; Nagy 1998; Broggiato 2001.

195. Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 240; Broggiato 2001, xix.

tact between the two courts involving their respective intellectuals is attested. Aristophanes of Byzantium apparently tried to flee from Alexandria and move to the service of king Eumenes II (king in 197–159 BCE);¹⁹⁶ later, Demetrius Ixion, a pupil of Aristarchus, may have gone to Pergamum and worked there.¹⁹⁷ In the globalized Hellenistic world, scholars were in touch with each other and scientific ideas circulated, as proven by the famous case of Archimedes: from Syracuse, he not only sent and dedicated his works to Eratosthenes, Conon, and Dositheus at Alexandria, but was also engaged in a continuous scientific dialogue with them.¹⁹⁸ A book produced in Pergamum could thus easily reach Alexandria and vice versa. Since the sources state that Crates and Aristarchus were contemporary,¹⁹⁹ it is also necessary to assume that book circulation was efficient for them to have known each other's work, so that a book written by Crates or by Aristarchus could reach the other library in Alexandria or Pergamum within a few years of its 'publication'. Such a scenario is not impossible per se, given that in the Hellenistic period goods, ideas, and people could move rapidly within the Mediterranean basin. It is therefore conceivable that Crates and Aristarchus could in principle have known each other's work through book circulation. Yet the *Suda*'s entry on Aristarchus says that he argued considerably with Crates 'in Pergamum';²⁰⁰ if taken literally, this note might suggest

196. *Su.* α 3936: διασκευασθείς δὲ ὡς βουλευόμενος πρὸς Εὐμενῇ φυγεῖν, ἐφυλάχθη ἐν εἰρκτῇ χρόνον τινά [[Aristophanes of Byzantium] preparing himself as he wanted to take refuge with Eumenes, was put in prison for some time]. The lemma is Ἀριστῶνυμος, but these words belong to a previous entry on Aristophanes of Byzantium (*Su.* α 3933); see Adler, ad *Su.* α 3936, who quotes Meineke, *Quaest. scen.* 2.41. On this episode, see Pfeiffer 1968, 172; Schironi 2019a, 6.

197. As his entry in *Suda* states (*Su.* δ 430); but cf. Ascheri 2003, 1–9. On Demetrius Ixion, who was a pupil of Aristarchus, but also wrote works against his teacher (Πρὸς τὰς ἐξηγήσεις and Πρὸς τοὺς ἡθετημένους), see Staesche 1883; Cohn 1901, 2845–2846; Ascheri 2003; Ascheri 2004; Broggiato 2014, 3 and 6. In particular, for Paola Ascheri (*per litteras* to me) Demetrius' stay at Pergamum is possible, but without implying that he moved there because he was in disagreement with Aristarchus or because he left Alexandria after Ptolemy VIII came to power in 145 BCE, since the sources are silent about the date and his reasons for going to Pergamum. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether Apollodorus ever worked at Pergamum, even if this is often assumed (see, e.g., Pfeiffer 1968, 253). He dedicated his *Chronika* to Attalus II (king in 159–138 BCE), but there is no clear evidence of his working there. After leaving Alexandria, he may have moved back to Athens; cf. Münzel and Schwartz 1894, 2856.

198. The incipit of Archimedes' letter to Eratosthenes (the dedicatee of the *Method*) can be taken as proof of their continuous scholarly dialogue (*Meth.* 426.3–7): Ἀρχιμήδης Ἐρατοσθένει εὖ πράττειν. ἀπέστειλά σοι πρότερον τῶν εὑρημένων θεωρημάτων ἀναγράψας αὐτῶν τὰς προτάσεις φάμενος εὐρίσκειν ταῦτας τὰς ἀποδείξεις, ἃς οὐκ εἶπον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος [Archimedes greets Eratosthenes. Before, I sent you some theorems that I found, describing their propositions and telling you to find out these demonstrations, which I did not indicate at that time]. Cf. Fraser 1972, I 400–402.

199. See Strabo 13.1.55; cf. Broggiato 2001, xvii and 131–132 (T 2–6).

200. *Su.* α 3892: Ἀρίσταρχος . . . Κράτητι τῷ γραμματικῷ Περγαμηνῷ πλεῖστα διημιλλήσατο ἐν Περγᾷ [Aristarchus . . . had many disagreements with the Pergamene grammarian Crates in Pergamum].

that the two scholars met in Pergamum and even discussed Homer and other philological questions. In principle, once he left Alexandria in 145 BCE, Aristarchus might have briefly visited Pergamum before settling on Cyprus and dying there the following year; still, it would have been fairly a busy year for an old man with dropsy.²⁰¹ Otherwise, we could speculate that Aristarchus might have visited Pergamum on ‘business trips’ to discuss ideas with Crates. Except for the note in the *Suda*, however, there is no evidence of this type of personal encounter; moreover, the tense relationships between Pergamum and Alexandria would surely have made such trips difficult. When Aristophanes of Byzantium tried to flee to Pergamum, he was put in jail by the king (i.e., Ptolemy V, king from 204 to 180 BCE); an attempt by Aristarchus to go to Pergamum might have stirred a similar reaction. The lack of clearer and firmer evidence of personal exchanges between Aristarchus and Crates together with the political risks that such encounters might have entailed thus make it unlikely that the two scholars met in Pergamum.²⁰²

In fact, the evidence of each scholar’s knowledge of the other’s work is thin, even though not completely absent. As mentioned in Chapter 2.1 § 1, the *Anecdota Romana* and the *Anecdota Veneta* say that Aristarchus used the *diple periestigmene* as a sign to mark points of disagreement not only against Zenodotus, but also against Crates.²⁰³ The claim is questionable, because only these two of all the compendia on critical signs, albeit among the most complete ones, mention Crates as one of the targets of the *diple periestigmene*.²⁰⁴ At the lines of the *Iliad* corresponding to the three scholia by Aristonicus where Crates is mentioned (at *Il.* 9.169, at 23.679, and at 24.282), the *Venetus A* has a simple *diple*. Of course, a scribe might have left out the two *stigmai* of the original *diple periestigmene*, as certainly happened with some of the lines where Aristarchus argues against Zenodotus.²⁰⁵ Even so, it is a fact that there is no firm evidence that Aristarchus indeed used the *diple periestigmene* for Crates. If he did, this would be secure proof that he had Crates’ work at his disposal and, moreover, that he had so many points to discuss against him that he decided to dedicate a specific sign to mark out the points of disagreement with Crates. If the evidence

201. *Su.* α 3892: Ἀρίσταρχος . . . τελευτᾷ δὲ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἑαυτὸν ὑπεξαγαγὼν ἐνδεία τροφῆς, νόσῳ τῇ ὕδρωπι ληφθεὶς. ἔτη δὲ αὐτοῦ τῆς ζωῆς οὐβ’ [Aristarchus . . . died in Cyprus, letting himself starve to death, affected by dropsy. He was seventy-two years old].

202. Cf. also Fraser 1972, II 491 n. 211.

203. *An. Rom.* 54.16–18 (see Chapter 2.1, footnote 14); *Anecdota Veneta* in Nauck 1867, 275.19–20. Cf. Wachsmuth 1860, 20–21; Helck 1905, 55–56; Pfeiffer 1968, 240; Broggiato 2001, 134–135 (T 17*).

204. In the other compendia (*Anecdota Harleiana*, *Anecdota Parisina*) and Isidorus of Seville (*Et.* I 21) the *diple periestigmene* is said to be used only against Zenodotus.

205. See above, § 1.1 with footnote 8.

from the *Anecdotum Romanum* and the *Anecdotum Venetum* are instead due to a false interpolation,²⁰⁶ this probably arose from a misunderstanding of a later scholar, who grouped Crates with Zenodotus because in later periods they were probably considered the main targets of Aristarchus' criticism, thus concluding that the *diple periestigmene* was also used for Crates.

Another alleged piece of evidence about Aristarchus' knowledge of Crates' work can be found in Varro. In one instance, he seems to imply that Aristarchus was responding to Crates,²⁰⁷ and in another he says that Crates was opposed to Aristarchus.²⁰⁸ Varro thus seems to suggest an exchange of polemical debates between Aristarchus and Crates. As already noticed,²⁰⁹ however, Varro is an unreliable source for Crates and Aristarchus; his testimony, then, must be taken with extreme caution.

4.2. The Aristonicus Scholia Discussing Crates' Views

In the *scholia maiora* to the *Iliad*, Aristonicus mentions Crates only three times (*Sch. Il.* 9.169a; 23.679a; 24.282). If Aristonicus took these references from Aristarchus' *hypomnema*, they would prove that Aristarchus indeed knew Crates' work and reacted to it; yet there is no absolute certainty that Aristarchus' *hypomnema* was Aristonicus' exclusive source.²¹⁰ Maria Broggiato,²¹¹ on the other hand, singles out one of these three scholia, *Sch. Il.* 9.169a, as the only case which could report Crates' response to Aristarchus:

Sch. Il. 9.169a αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' Αἴας τε μέγας <καὶ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς>: ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι τὸ ἔπειτα Ἀρίσταρχος ἀντὶ χρονικοῦ παραλαμβάνει, ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὡς καὶ Ἑρμείας μὲν ἔπειτα (*Od.* 10.307)· βούλεται γὰρ πρῶτον τὸν Φοῖνικα ἀπεληλυθότα εἰς τὸ σκήνωμα, εἶτα τὸν Ὀδυσσεά καὶ τὸν Αἴαντα ὡς πρεσβεύοντας. ὁ δὲ Κράτης (fr. 9 Broggiato) τὸ ἔπειτα ἀντὶ τοῦ δὴ συνδέσμου λαμβάνει.

'And then (ἔπειτ') great Ajax and noble Odysseus': the *diple* because Aristarchus understands ἔπειτα [being used] instead of a temporal [adverb], instead of μετὰ ταῦτα, also like: 'And then (ἔπειτα) Hermes [went back to Olympus]'

206. So Wachsmuth 1860, 20, and Gudeman 1922, 1920.

207. Varro *LL* 8.68: *sic enim respondere voluit Aristarchus Crateti* (fr. 103 Broggiato) [for this is how Aristarchus wanted to reply to Crates].

208. Varro *LL* 9.1: *Crates* (fr. 104 Broggiato) . . . *contra analogian atque Aristarchum est nixus* [Crates . . . contended against analogy and Aristarchus]. On these two passages by Varro, see Taylor 1983.

209. See Chapter 3.5 § 9 with footnote 115.

210. See Chapter 1.1 § 4.1.

211. Broggiato 1998, 141; Broggiato 2001, xix and 153 (fr. 9).

(*Od.* 10.307). For he wants Phoenix to go to the hut first, and then Odysseus and Ajax [to go] as ambassadors. Crates (fr. 9 Broggiato), on the other hand, understands ἔπειτα [as being used] instead of the conjunction δῆ.

The scholium is connected with the question of the dual in Book 9, which represented a problem for the ancients (as well as for modern scholars), as dual forms are extensively used in the episode of the embassy, though there are three ambassadors: Odysseus, Ajax, and Phoenix. Aristarchus maintains that in fact the text is correct because Phoenix is not part of the embassy, and thus the dual refers only to Ajax and Odysseus.²¹² The scholium discusses a key passage for Aristarchus' point of view. At *Il.* 9.168–169 Nestor says: 'Let Phoenix, dear to Zeus, precede first (πρώτιστα); *and then* (αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ') great Ajax and noble Odysseus [will go]'. For Aristarchus, ἔπειτα has a temporal sense, so as to distinguish clearly between Phoenix and the other two heroes: the former leaves right away to go to Achilles (as a friend), and only after a while do Odysseus and Ajax (the real envoys) leave and go on their mission. Crates, however, interprets the meaning of these lines differently: he maintains that ἔπειτα is equivalent to the conjunction δῆ, and thus has a connective function,²¹³ so that the lines mean: 'First (πρώτιστα), let Phoenix, dear to Zeus, precede *and also* (αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ') great Ajax and noble Odysseus [will go]'. In this way, the embassy consists of three members, Phoenix, Ajax, and Odysseus, who leave at the same time.²¹⁴

Broggiato suggests that the phrasing of *Sch. Il.* 9.169a makes it likely that it is Crates who is opposing Aristarchus, and not vice versa. Yet it is hard to find any mark of priority of one opinion over the other in the wording of the scholium, since the δέ here only opposes Crates' interpretation to Aristarchus. In fact, the obstinacy with which here and in other scholia²¹⁵ Aristarchus tries to show that the dual in Book 9 is correct seems to indicate that he had some polemical target in mind. Aristarchus did indeed accuse Zenodotus of misusing the dual in Homer,²¹⁶ but there is no evidence that the latter took an interest in the question of the duals in Book 9. On the other hand, *Sch. Il.* 9.169a clearly testifies that Crates did take a stance on this question and had a view about the members of the embassy which was very different from Aristarchus' solution. Furthermore, in at least three scholia Aristarchus observes that ἔπειτα means μετὰ ταῦτα, recalling *Il.* 9.169 (*Sch. Il.* 11.93; 13.586a; 23.551–2: ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τὸ 'Φοῖνιξ μὲν πρώτιστα, / αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' Αἴας τε μέγας'). As we have seen above

212. This question will be analyzed in Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.2.

213. On the connective δῆ, see Denniston 1950, 236–240.

214. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 150; Broggiato 1998, 139–141, and Broggiato 2001, 151–153 (fr. 9); Matthaios 1999, 379–380 and 539–540 (fr. 155).

215. See Chapter 5.1 § 2.2.2.

216. See above, § 1.2.2 and § 1.5.2.

(§ 1.2), in the Aristonicus scholia the formula ἡ δὲ ἀναφορά πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον, ‘the reference is to Zenodotus’, is specifically used to underscore a disagreement which Aristarchus has with his predecessor on another line and to prove him wrong on the basis of the specific Homeric passage singled out in the scholium. Similarly, the formulas ἡ δὲ ἀναφορά πρὸς + accusative or, simply, πρὸς + accusative indicate a reference to a *zetema* or an otherwise difficult passage which Aristarchus explains (often in opposition to other scholars’ solutions) by pointing out another clarifying passage. This is what he does in these three scholia: *Il.* 11.93, 13.586, and 23.551–552 all make clear that in Homer ἔπειτα means ‘afterward’, and Aristarchus recalls *Il.* 9.169, which is the key passage for his discussion of the dual in Book 9 in general. We also know that Crates, too, gave a very specific interpretation of that line, which went against Aristarchus’ ideas. It thus seems possible that, *if* there is a polemical dialogue here, it is Aristarchus rebutting Crates and not vice versa.²¹⁷

Indeed, in a second scholium Aristonicus mentions Crates in connection with the dual in Homer:

Sch. Il. 24.282 κῆρυξ καὶ Πρίαμος <——ἔχοντες>: ὅτι εἰ μὴ προσέθηκε τὸν στίχον, οἱ θέλοντες συγχεῖσθαι τὰ δυϊκὰ παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ, Ἐρατοσθένης καὶ Κράτης (fr. 36 Broggiato), ἔλεγον ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐννέα Πριαμιδῶν τετάχθαι ‘τὼ μὲν ζευγνύσθην’ (*Il.* 24.281).

‘The herald and Priam who had [heavy thoughts in their minds]’: because if he had not added the line, those who want the dual to be confused in Homer, Eratosthenes and Crates (fr. 36 Broggiato), would have said that τὼ μὲν ζευγνύσθην (*Il.* 24.281) referred to the nine sons of Priam.

In Book 24, Priam shouts to all his nine sons and orders them to help him to prepare for his trip to the Greek camp (*Il.* 248–264). They obey and bring the wagon, the yoke, and the ransom for Hector (*Il.* 265–280), and Homer concludes: ‘so the two of them had their chariot yoked (ζευγνύσθην) in the high palace, / the herald and Priam, who had heavy thoughts in their minds’ (*Il.* 281–282). Aristarchus explains that, had Homer not added the second line (l. 282) to specify the subject of the dual ζευγνύσθην (in a causative sense), those who maintained that Homer uses the dual for the plural would have said that the ζευγνύσθην (in an active sense) referred to the nine sons of Priam (mentioned at *Il.* 249–251). Not only is the phrasing here again fairly polemical; more than that, the scholium explicitly mentions Crates and Eratosthenes. While for the latter, just as for Zenodotus, there is no evidence that he took an interest in the

217. As already suggested by Schmidt 1976, 249.

question of the duals in Book 9, Crates did discuss a key passage for such a *zetema*, as *Sch. Il.* 9.169a proves. Thus, this note, too, may be connected to the question of the dual in the embassy of Book 9.²¹⁸ If so, it would further prove that in *Sch. Il.* 9.169a it is more likely that Aristarchus is replying to Crates than vice versa. In the *zetema* of the duals of Book 9, then, the former maintained that Homer did know how to use the dual, and that in the embassy episode the dual was correctly applied to Odysseus and Ajax, the only real envoys; in this claim, he was also arguing against Crates, who noticed the problem and ‘solved’ it by concluding that Homer could also use the dual for plurals (and so there were three envoys).²¹⁹

The third scholium by Aristonicus concerns the antecedent of a relative clause (*Sch. Il.* 23.679a: ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦ Μηκιστέως ἀκουστέον ‘ὅς ποτε Θήβας ἦλθεν’, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ Εὐρυάλου, ὡς ὁ Κράτης).²²⁰ Aristarchus disagrees with Crates but it is unclear whether the reference to Crates was found in the commentary or added by Aristonicus, just as with *Sch. Il.* 9.169a and 24.282. In this case, moreover, the available evidence does not even allow making any hypothesis about who is replying to whom, as we did with the other two scholia.

To conclude, these Aristonicus scholia specifically mentioning Crates prove that Aristarchus knew the Pergamene’s opinions and reacted to them *only if* we assume that all the notes preserved there derive from Aristarchus. Since the evidence offered by scholia is by its nature extremely complex to assess, a definitive answer is impossible to reach. Yet this survey seems to suggest that, while there is no secure evidence that Crates knew about Aristarchus’ work, the Alexandrian might have been aware of Crates’ work on Homer,²²¹ provided that Aristonicus reports only what he read in Aristarchus’ *hypomnema*.²²² This does not mean that Crates did not know about Aristarchus’ work—there is simply no secure evidence of that.

The other Iliadic scholia that allow for a comparison between Aristarchus and Crates are those in which either Didymus²²³ or Herodian²²⁴ quotes both Aristarchus and Crates, or groups of scholia independently preserving the views of these two scholars on the same topic or on the same lines. Some of

218. As Broggiato 1998 first suggested.

219. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 15 n. 2; Callanan 1987, 53–54; Broggiato 1998, 137–138, and Broggiato 2001, 199–200 (fr. 36); Matthaios 1999, 378–381 (fr. 80).

220. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 103–104; Broggiato 2001, 197–198 (fr. 34).

221. So also Schmidt 1976, 189.

222. But see Chapter 1.1 § 4.1.

223. *Sch. Il.* 24.253b; cf. Helck 1905, 78–80 (fr. XV); Matthaios 1999, 225–226 (fr. 9); Broggiato 2001, 199 (fr. 35).

224. *Sch. Il.* 11.754a and 15.365a (both discussed in Chapter 3.4 § 7); 21.323b¹, on which, cf. Helck 1905, 63–66 (fr. XII); Broggiato 2001, 195 (fr. 31); Schironi 2004, 434–438 (fr. 56).

these instances have been analyzed in the previous chapters²²⁵ and have allowed us to observe the two scholars at work on the same problems and thereby to compare their solutions and methodology. Yet, even if Aristarchus discussed the same Homeric lines as Crates, this evidence cannot prove beyond doubt that Aristarchus was directly replying to Crates or vice versa, even if in some cases, such as the question of the dual in the embassy of *Iliad* 9, we might be tempted to speculate that the polemical tone of some of Aristarchus' comments is directed against Crates.²²⁶

5. Conclusions

The fragments preserving Aristarchus' engagement with colleagues suggest that he measured other critics on the basis of the 'golden standard' that he himself had established and then applied for himself. Scholars, in his view, first had to be attentive readers of Homer in order to identify what was typically Homeric in terms of language, style, myths, and worldview. Only after having equipped themselves with such knowledge could they hope to address problems and textual choices in the Homeric text with sound criteria to follow. Otherwise, scholars ran the risk of ruining, rather than improving, the text. Aristarchus did not refrain from criticizing his predecessors, even though our evidence is most likely biased due to the selection process, either undertaken by Aristarchus himself (who did not quote them when he agreed with them), or by Aristonicus and later scholiasts (who cut the references to other scholars when they agreed with Aristarchus, 'the best of the grammarians', since his preeminence made any reference to other authorities unnecessary). Yet it is telling that among the grammarians quoted in the Aristarchean scholia, only Aristophanes of Byzantium seems to be mentioned in a neutral or even positive attitude. Aristophanes was Aristarchus' teacher and this can partly explain the respect which he paid to him. In addition, the few scholia where he engages with Aristophanes also show that the latter was somehow a precursor of Aristarchus' own 'scientific' approach to the text in paying attention to the context and the Homeric usage.

225. See, for example, Chapter 3.2.A § 5 with footnote 77 (on *Il.* 13.358–360); Chapter 3.3.B § 2.3 with footnote 55 (on the heroes' diet), § 3.5.1 (on *Il.* 14.30–36), § 4.1 (on *Il.* 21.195).

226. Perhaps another such case may be offered by Eust. 814.15–21 (ad *Il.* 10.394) and Heracl. *QH* 45 (= Crates, fr. 11 Broggiato); cf. Mette 1936, 55–57; Schmidt 1976, 136–139; Broggiato 2001, 155–156 (fr. 11). Both Schmidt and Broggiato suggest that *Sch. Il.* 10.394c (ex.) preserves Aristarchus' reply to Crates. Cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, I 590; Erbse, ad loc. On the other hand, *Sch. Il.* 11.754a and 15.365a (both discussed in Chapter 3.4 § 7) are more ambiguous—it is impossible to decide whether Aristarchus had Crates' views in mind when discussing variant readings to those two lines.

The polar opposite was Zenodotus, who seems to have taken up most of Aristarchus' (polemical) attention. Such a different attitude might also be due to the fact that, before Aristarchus superseded him, Zenodotus had gained an immense respect as *the editor* of Homer, becoming the model to top, unsurpassed even by Aristophanes. The latter became famous more as a scholar of comedy and lyric poetry than of Homer,²²⁷ while Zenodotus was famous mainly for his Homeric *ekdosis*. Thus, as much as Aristarchus respected his own teacher, his real rival when it came to editing and commenting on Homer was Zenodotus. This is probably also the reason why he seems to have argued against other scholars such as Philitas, Istrus, Apollonius Rhodius, Eratosthenes, and perhaps even Crates only with regard to specific topics or specific passages, whereas he consistently (and almost obsessively) criticized Zenodotus in every aspect of his scholarly activity.

Zenodotus was the main target of Aristarchus' criticism—far more, in fact, than Crates, who is generally considered his 'adversary' par excellence. Indeed, while there are very few cases where Aristarchus might be arguing against Crates, all of which are ambiguous, there are many scholia in which we find him disputing Zenodotus' choices. In all likelihood, this evidence in fact is biased, because Aristarchus probably did not mention Zenodotus when he agreed with him, and so Aristonicus has not preserved traces of such cases of agreement, which sometimes surface from Didymus' notes. Even considering these biases in our sources, however, it is a matter of fact that more often than not Aristarchus criticizes his predecessor, especially when we compare the sheer number of his scholia arguing against Zenodotus with the much smaller number of notes in which he argues against other scholars. In Aristarchus' opinion, Zenodotus often skipped the important first step of scholarship, namely, an attentive reading of the Homeric text in order to discover the Homeric usage in terms of *glossai*, *schemata* and tropes, worldview, style, and narrative techniques. Without this background analysis, he made many mistakes due to his ignorance of what was typically Homeric. In addition, Zenodotus did not seem to have read Aristotle well, since he did not take into account what the latter postulated about plot (μῦθος), characters (ἥθη), thought (διάνοια), and diction (λέξις). As a consequence, his readings were often unbelievable or inconsistent, or he attributed unfitting words to characters, or he athetized lines that were necessary to the plot. In Aristarchus' opinion, then, Zenodotus did not follow the golden rules of scholarship: the principle of clarifying Homer from Homer (Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν) and the Aristotelian precepts about good poetry. On the other hand, Aristarchus was much more 'lenient' and objective when Zenodotus had

227. See Pfeiffer 1968, 171–209, esp. 181–192.

problems in areas which were problematic for him as well, such as metrical oddities and issues arising from metacharacterism.

Aristarchus' criticism of Zenodotus is without question controversial. For example, according to him, Zenodotus often eliminated lines completely from the text (οὐ γράφειν, αἶρειν, συντέμνειν). It is impossible to know the reasons that led Zenodotus either to get rid of a line completely or to athetize it, because—aside from Aristarchus' testimony—the sources are scarce, and Zenodotus did not leave any commentary explaining his choices. Rather than 'deleting' or 'not writing' lines, it is also possible that Zenodotus did not find those lines in his text; if so, he did not always delete lines, but just had a reference text that was shorter than the one that Aristarchus used. Yet the latter seems to have never even considered the possibility that Zenodotus' readings and deletions of lines might have arisen from manuscript evidence. Or perhaps he knew that his predecessor used manuscripts that were very different from his own, but did not think that this was an excuse for making wrong (at least, for him) textual choices. Thus he simply deemed Zenodotus responsible for all changes, without considering that perhaps the latter, rather than 'writing'/'not writing', simply 'read' or 'did not read' certain lines or variants in his copy (because they were present or not there in the first place) and tried to justify his text exactly as Aristarchus himself did, without adding or deleting anything. In Aristarchus' defense, he probably did not have any *hypomnema* by Zenodotus wherein he could have found some explanations for those choices; rather, he had to guess Zenodotus' reasons from his *ekdosis*, which was in all likelihood reticent. Aside from this excusable situation, it is beyond doubt that Aristarchus' criticism fell short when he did not realize that the critiques he made against Zenodotus could be made against his own readings as well.²²⁸

The biased evidence given by the Aristarchean fragments thus makes it difficult to assess Zenodotus' achievements, even though Nickau's attempt to 'save' and defend him at all costs seems sometimes to go too far.²²⁹ Without

228. See, for example, the cases of *Sch. Il.* 21.169b¹ and 19.79–80a (discussed above, at § 1.5.1 and § 1.7). Indeed, Wecklein 1919 first attempted to rescue Zenodotus from the criticism of many nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars who, in the wake of the so-called Aristarchomania (see Pfeiffer 1968, 232–233), accused Zenodotus of 'inventing' his readings (against Aristarchus' rigorous practice based on manuscript evidence). Wecklein surveyed a huge number of readings of both Zenodotus and Aristarchus, concluding that both scholars proceeded by conjectures as well as by manuscript evidence. See also Pfeiffer 1968, 108 and 114 (on Zenodotus' text).

229. Cf. Bodson 1978; Slater 1979. It is risky at any rate to use Aristarchus' fragments to reconstruct Zenodotus' work for at least two reasons: (1) Aristarchus' lack of information about Zenodotus' rationale for certain choices; and (2) his bias toward his predecessor. On the other hand, to say, for example, that Zenodotus chose a variant because he found it in his manuscripts (hence, his is an old variant) is a reasonable speculation; yet this cannot be proved, unless external evidence such as

trying to reconstruct Zenodotus' work according to more objective criteria, we can definitely say that Aristarchus seems to have 'used' Zenodotus as a polemical target. By censuring his predecessor, Aristarchus could in fact show that his new method was founded on sound criteria, far from Zenodotus' lack of rigor in approaching the Homeric text. From this perspective, even if he leveled the same criticism against other colleagues like Philitas, Eratosthenes, and Apollonius Rhodius, he became especially critical of Zenodotus, 'the editor' of Homer, turning him into a foil for himself as a critic and scholar to highlight his own abilities to understand and interpret 'the poet' par excellence.

Ptolemaic Homeric papyri or quotations in pre-Zenodotean authors attest that such a variant was circulating before Zenodotus' time.

Part 5

5.1

Aristarchus and Homeric Language

1. A Synchronic or Diachronic Perspective?
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 - 1.2. Some Diachronic Clues
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 - 2.3. Aeolic
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3. *Scriptio Continua* and Dialectal Solutions
4. Conclusions

This final part of the book will take a step back from the analysis of the ‘parts of grammar’ and from the polemical debates in which Aristarchus was involved, in order to address a broader question: Aristarchus’ view of Homer and Homeric poetry. In particular, I have selected four topics: (1) the question of Homeric language and, consequently, of Homer’s land and date; (2) the relationship between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*—using a modern label: the ‘Homeric Question’; (3) the relationship between Homer and the later poets—again in modern terms: the ‘reception’ of Homer in later authors; and (4) the analysis of Homeric characters and their characterization. While the issues treated in the following chapters could fit within the six parts of grammar analyzed in the central part of this volume (e.g., analysis of *glossai* and *historiai*, discussion of tropes and figures, or etymology), it has seemed better to group them in a separate part to provide an additional perspective on Aristarchus’ work on Homer.

This chapter will focus on Aristarchus' view of Homeric language. The previous survey (especially the analysis of tropes and *schemata* in Chapters 3.2.A and 3.2.B) has already outlined a picture of the main differences that he found between Homeric language and Koine.¹ There are, however, several other linguistic observations in the scholia to the *Iliad* derived from Aristarchus; many of them have been already analyzed by Matthaios 1999, and I will not discuss them here. Rather, my goal will be to investigate whether Aristarchus had a specific idea of the type of language which Homer used: whether he thought it was an archaic form of Greek, and whether he recognized a specific dialectal nuance in it.²

1. A Synchronic or Diachronic Perspective?

Given the difficulties of Homeric language for a Hellenistic reader, the first task of the exegete was to 'translate' it into a Greek closer to his own contemporary language. Indeed, the preceding chapters, and especially Chapter 2.3 and Chapter 3.2.B, have shown that Aristarchus carried out his analysis of Homeric language essentially by paraphrasing it into Koine Greek. His paraphrases were not only accurate and systematic but went beyond the simple understanding of the text, since he also used them to discuss exegetical problems, as well as to correct the text itself.³ In Chapter 3.2.B § 8, we concluded that, when explaining Homeric syntax, Aristarchus had a very practical, goal-oriented approach to the text, namely, to make the syntax clear, without delving into a historical analysis of Homeric language. Here I would like to ask a different and broader question: in acknowledging the existence of these two languages, Homeric Greek and Koine Greek, did he have a sense that the former was linguistically more archaic than Koine Greek, or did he consider these two languages as unrelated, as simply two objects to compare with no temporal relationship? Although Aristarchus limited himself to paraphrasing Homer into 'modern' Greek in his exegesis without any interest in 'historical linguistics', it does not necessarily follow that he did not know that there was a diachronic connection between these two different versions of Greek.

1. On the concept of Koine (as opposed to κοινή διάλεκτος), see Chapter 2.3, footnote 9, and below, footnote 109.

2. This chapter is a revised and improved version of Schironi 2018a, with some additional sections (e.g., § 2.2.2); the original article was submitted for publication in 2010, but was not published until 2018. I would like to thank Philomen Probert and Albio Cesare Cassio for discussing some of the dialectal questions here analyzed with me.

3. See especially Chapter 2.3 § 4 and § 5.

1.1. Homer versus Us: The Otherness of Homeric Diction

Answering these questions is difficult because, while there is much evidence that Aristarchus perceived Homeric Greek as something different from Koine Greek, there is much less evidence that he considered it more ancient than Koine. In fact, realizing that one form of speaking is different from another and comparing them does not necessarily imply that one is older than the other. There are plenty of scholia where Aristarchus opposes the Homeric usage to the Koine usage, both in terms of words or *glossai*⁴ and in terms of syntax, which he analyzes by using rhetorical/grammatical *schemata* as tools to reinterpret and explain these differences.⁵ When comparing Homeric and Koine Greek, Aristarchus sometimes indicates the latter by referring to a first-person plural ‘we’: Homer (ὁ ποιητής) or ‘they’ (the speakers in the poem?) are opposed to ‘us’ (ἡμεῖς),⁶ or to ‘our usage’ (ἡμετέρα χρῆσις/συνήθεια).⁷ The opposition ‘he/they’ versus ‘we’ is not significant, however, since it only highlights the ‘otherness’ of Homeric diction, not its diachronic relationship with ‘our’ language.

1.2. Some Diachronic Clues

There are some scholia, though, where Aristarchus seems to interpret the difference between Homeric and Koine Greek in temporal terms. One is from a direct quotation of his monograph *Against Comanus*, as reported by Didymus:

Sch. Il. 1.97–9 (Did.) αἰκέα λοιγὸν . . . ἀπριάτην: λέξεις ἐκ τῶν Πρὸς Κομανόν, . . . ‘ἀπριάτην’ δὲ σαφές, ὡς ἄνευ τοῦ πρίασθαι καὶ ταῦτόν τῳ νῦν λεγομένῳ δωρεάν.

‘Shameful ruin . . . without ransom’: quotation from *Against Comanus*: [he says that] . . . ἀπριάτην instead is clear, that [it is] ‘without buying her’, and [is] the same as δωρεάν (‘freely’) in today’s language.

The Homeric word is opposed to what is said ‘now’ (νῦν). The same expression can be found in *Sch. Il.* 2.500b (Ὑλην . . . νῦν δὲ καλοῦνται Ὑλαι πληθυντικῶς). On the other hand, Aristarchus considers certain words as ‘neoteric’ (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 7.475a; 18.413a). In fact, he primarily used this label (νεωτερικόν) to define

4. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.1.

5. See Chapter 3.2.B.

6. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.36c; 2.56b; 2.135a; 2.148a; 2.807; 3.99a; 3.206a; 3.297a; 10.383b; 10.461c; 10.466b; 11.71; 12.46a¹; 13.493a; 17.47a (Ariston.); 17.201d; 17.202a¹; 18.560a; 18.614; 20.290b; 21.126–7a; 23.270a; 23.638–42; 24.304a¹.

7. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 5.121; 9.219b; 9.481a¹; 9.682; 16.57a.

the ‘more recent’ poets, that is, all the poets after Homer, including Hesiod. This temporal distinction between Homer and the newer poets was also operative in terms of vocabulary and syntax, as Aristarchus often notices linguistic differences between Homer and the Neoterói.⁸ These examples thus prove that he was aware of a relative chronology between Homeric and later forms of Greek used by ‘more recent’ poets.

Other evidence is more ambiguous, however. For example, in three cases Aristarchus defines a Homeric word as being used by οἱ παλαιοί or οἱ ἀρχαῖοι (*Sch. Il.* 9.489a; 9.542a; 11.630c). Interestingly enough, in all these three instances, the word belongs to *realia*—more specifically, it is a name of food: ὄψον at *Il.* 9.489 and 11.630 (which for the ancients was ‘every food which was eaten’)⁹ and μῆλον at *Il.* 9.542 (which for the ancients was ‘every type of fruit’).¹⁰ But the fact that Aristarchus mentions the ‘ancients’ as the users of those Homeric words is not definitive proof, as he could be referring to the heroes depicted by Homer, and not to Homer himself. These comments thus do not prove that ‘all’ Homeric language was ‘ancient’, but only that certain names of *realia* were employed ‘by the ancients’; according to these scholia, then, it is the language of Achilles, Agamemnon, etc. that is ancient, not necessarily that of Homer himself.¹¹

Far more significant are cases in which Aristarchus defines a particular feature of the syntax within the narrative as ‘ancient’, rather than a single word referring to daily life.¹² For instance, he labels as ἀρχαϊκῶς a case of double accusative for the part and for the whole (μιν πῆχυν . . . βάλε, ‘he hit him on the forearm’; *Sch. Il.* 21.166a) and calls ἀρχαϊκώτερον the construction of δέχεσθαι with dative rather than παρ’ αὐτοῦ, for ‘to take from him’ (*Sch. Il.* 2.186a).¹³ Another example is the anticipatory and resumptive γάρ, which precedes the clause that it explains, a typical trait of Homeric syntax.¹⁴ He notes that it is

8. See also Lallot 2011, 250 n. 14. On the Neoterói, see Chapter 5.3; in particular, on the linguistic differences between Homer and the Neoterói, see Chapter 5.3 § 1.

9. While in Attic and Koine ὄψον normally indicates a ‘sauce’ or a ‘delicacy’ (esp. fish); cf. *LSJ*, s.v.

10. While in Attic and Koine μῆλον normally indicates an ‘apple’; cf. *LSJ*, s.v. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 101.

11. Even more so because in two of the three attestations, *Il.* 9.489 (ὄψον) and *Il.* 9.542 (μῆλον), the word ‘used by the ancients’ occurs in a direct speech of a character (the same long speech of Phoenix to Achilles in Book 9). Nünlist 2012b, 155, on the other hand, seems to think that Aristarchus is instead referring specifically to the Homeric language.

12. Nünlist 2012b, 157, discusses the same examples. Nünlist and I worked independently on this topic of Aristarchus’ view of language development (neither of us was aware of the other’s work; see Chapter 3.2.B, footnote 238) and reached similar conclusions, often analyzing the same evidence.

13. On these Homeric ‘figures’, see Chapter 3.2.B § 3.3 (enallage of case) and § 3.4 (enallage of case and ellipsis of preposition).

14. See Monro 1891, § 348.2; Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904, II 332–334; Denniston 1950, 68–73.

typical of Homer to start a sentence with γάρ (*Sch. Il.* 2.284a.b: ἔθος δὲ αὐτῷ [τῷ ποιητῇ] ἀπὸ τοῦ γάρ ἄρχεσθαι)¹⁵ and once calls this use ‘archaic’ (*Sch. Il.* 7.328b: ἀπὸ τοῦ ‘γάρ’ αἰτιώδους εἰσέβαλεν ἀρχαϊκῶς). These examples suggest that Aristarchus did in fact see Homeric Greek not only as ‘different’ from, but also as ‘older’ than, Koine Greek because it had a more archaic syntax.

A sense of history was thus certainly present in Aristarchus’ view of Homeric language, which in his opinion was more ancient than the language of ‘more recent’ poets as well as of Koine, i.e., contemporary, Greek.¹⁶ This, however, does not mean that in analyzing Homeric language his focus was diachronic or historical. He did not need to engage in historical analysis in order to explain the text of Homer to his students, but simply needed the ability to notice the differences between the Homeric idiolect and the currently spoken Greek. And for that, a keen sense of the Greek language, a skilled use of paraphrase, and an understanding of rhetorical figures were more than enough.¹⁷

2. Aristarchus and Homeric Dialectal Nuances

The second aspect to investigate is whether Aristarchus realized that Homeric Greek included elements from a variety of Greek dialects and, if so, whether he categorized Homeric language as belonging to a particular dialect.¹⁸ The fact that Aristarchus often substitutes the corresponding Attic/Koine form for an Ionic or Aeolic one in his paraphrases—for example, οἶα, ἀνέμου, and ὀρνυμένου for οἶη, ἀνέμοιο,¹⁹ and ὀρνυμένοιο in *Sch. Il.* 5.864 or Τρωσί for the Aeolic dative plural Τρώεσσιν in *Sch. Il.* 5.177a—is not significant per se. Although the different endings are in this case characteristic of the different dialects (Ionic or Aeolic/Thessalian versus Attic and Koine), these scholia provide no comment or explanation about what the two forms are. As they are, these

15. See also *Sch. Il.* 17.221; 23.627a; and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 18.182c; cf. Lehrs 1882, 8.

16. The same conclusions are reached by Nünlist 2012b.

17. Lallot 2011 depicts a very similar picture when discussing the ‘sense of history’ of the *Techne* of Dionysius Thrax and Apollonius Dyscolus.

18. On dialectal glosses in the Homeric scholia, see Montanari 2012.

19. The ending in -οιο for the genitive in the o-stems is Mycenaean and Thessalian, but the origin of these forms in Homer is still debated; see Chantraine 1953–1958, I 194 and 507; Buck 1955, § 106; Cassio et al. 2016, 24, 83, 154. Nevertheless, both Herodian (*Sch. Il.* 1.493a and 11.35a¹) and Aristarchus recognized the genitives in -οιο as Thessalian (Ap. Dysc. *Pron.* 109.4–5): ἡ ‘ἐμοῖο’, ‘σοῖο’, ‘οῖο’ ἦτοι μετὰ διαιρέσεως τὸ ι προσέλαβον, ἢ Θετταλικάι εἰσιν, ὡς καὶ Ἀριστάρχῳ ἤρεσκεν [the [pronouns] ‘ἐμοῖο’, ‘σοῖο’, ‘οῖο’ took the ι either with resolution of the diphthong or they are Thessalian, as Aristarchus wanted]. Cf. Wathelet 1970, 240–241. There are no Aristarchean scholia, however, commenting on these genitives in the *Iliad*.

three cases (and the examples could be multiplied) are just another instance of a ‘paraphrase’ of Homeric forms into Koine. Therefore, in order to inquire about the ‘dialectal’ competence of Aristarchus, some more significant evidence is needed, namely, fragments where he explicitly labels one form as belonging to a particular dialect. Indeed, there are such fragments, and I will discuss them in the following sections according to the main dialectal groups.²⁰

2.1. Ionic

Although it is generally seen as the main component of the idiosyncratic Homeric language, Ionic is not often recognized as such in the Aristarchean scholia. Of course, one reason for the apparent lack of interest in singling out Ionic elements could be that Aristarchus considered this dialect to be the basis of the Homeric language, with the result that specifically ‘Ionic’ features of Homer were seen to be the norm and thus not deserving of comment. This reason seems to be confirmed by a series of cases where he picks up forms that *prima facie* contradict the Ionic rules and explains that they are indeed Ionic, but modified. This is the case, for instance, with non-Ionic vocalism.

2.1.1. *η instead of α and Ionic Shortenings*

Aristarchus, who knew about the substitution of η for long α as an Ionic feature, criticized cases of hyper-Ionicism by Zenodotus,²¹ when the latter chose forms with a ‘wrong’ η. Thus, in *Sch. Il.* 1.530a he argues against the genitive κρητός (instead of κρατός, from the nominative κράς, ‘head’) read by Zenodotus: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ Ἰακόν—Aristarchus concludes—since Homer uses the accusative κράτα in *Od.* 8.92.²² The same happens for the hyper-Ionic reading ὀρητο that Zenodotus gave instead of ὀρατο (imperfect of ὀράω) in *Il.* 1.56 and 1.198. Aristarchus argues that Zenodotus wrote ὀρητο with η thinking it was Ionic, but that such a form is in fact Doric, and hence it is wrong (*Sch. Il.* 1.56c: ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος ‘ὀρητο’ γράφει. ἀγνοεῖ δὲ ὅτι Δωρικόν γίνεται, and *Sch. Il.* 1.198b¹:

20. This survey has mainly used the scholia to the *Iliad* as evidence, so it is by no means complete. For example, I have not systematically looked at Apollonius Dyscolus, who is a fundamental source for the dialectal views of the Alexandrians, as shown by the above footnote on the ‘Thesalian’ genitive endings. Thus, the results presented here are to be taken as a preliminary analysis of Aristarchus’ view on Greek dialects based on the Iliadic scholia, without any claim to being definitive or exhaustive.

21. Indeed there were several hyper-Ionic forms in Zenodotus’ Homeric text; see Wackernagel 1916, 73; West 2001, 43–44; cf. also La Roche 1866, 301–302. One case (ἀρνέων instead of ἀρνῶν in *Sch. Il.* 3.273a) has been discussed in Chapter 3.5 § 8 with footnote 91.

22. On these forms, see Wackernagel 1916, 113; Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 583. A different interpretation of the scholium is given by van Thiel 2014a, I 141.

ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ‘ὀρήτο’. τοῦτο δὲ Δώριον).²³ The form ὀρήτο is unattested elsewhere; however, ὀρήτο would in fact be the expected outcome of ὀράετο in Doric.²⁴ In addition, Aristarchus could probably compare the indicative ὀρήs, used by Alcman, fr. 1.50 *PMG*, or the imperative ὀρη, used by Theocritus in *Id.* 7.50 and 15.2, 12. So it must have been obvious to him that ὀρήτο was a Doric form.

On the other hand, Aristarchus dealt with forms with a non-Ionic α by saying that they were Ionic but ‘shortened’. This was the doctrine of ‘Ionic shortening’, very common in antiquity, to which he subscribed. A typical example is the epic perfect λελασμένος from λήθομαι/λανθάνομαι:²⁵

Sch. Il. 16.776a κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί, <λελασμένος ἵπποσυνάων>: . . . καὶ ὅτι Ἰακῶς ‘λελασμένος’ ἀντὶ τοῦ λελησμένος, πρὸς τὸ ‘ἐν καρὸς αἴση’ (*Il.* 9.378), ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν κηρὸς μοίρα.

‘He lay great in his greatness, having forgotten (λελασμένος) the art of horsemanship’: . . . and because λελασμένος is Ionic, instead of λελησμένος, with reference to ἐν καρὸς αἴση (*Il.* 9.378), because [it is used] instead of ἐν κηρὸς μοίρα.

In explaining λελασμένος as a (shortened) Ionic participle instead of the more regular λελησμένος, Aristarchus refers to another problematic phrase, pronounced by Achilles at *Il.* 9.378: τίω δέ μιν ἐν καρὸς αἴση, which is normally understood as meaning ‘I do not care at all’. Κάρ is a hapax of uncertain gender and meaning, but for Aristarchus it is identical with κήρ, ‘death’, ‘doom’, with Ionic shortening—καρὸς standing for the regular genitive κηρὸς (*Sch. Il.* 9.378b: ὅτι συνέσταλται Ἰακῶς ἐν ‘καρὸς’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν κηρὸς). Even if in all probability καρὸς is not connected with κήρ²⁶ and Aristarchus’ analysis

23. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.198b²: Ζηνόδοτος ἀγνοήσας τὸ τῆς διαλέκτου ἰδίωμα ὡς Ἰωνικὸν ἐξέθετο <ὀρήτο>. ἔστι δὲ Δώριον· οἱ γὰρ Δωριεῖς τῆς δευτέρας συζυγίας τῶν περισπωμένων τὸ α εἰς η τρέπουσιν [Zenodotus, not recognizing the peculiarity of the dialect, took ὀρήτο as Ionic. But it is Doric, for the Dorians change α into η in the second conjugation of verbs pronounced with circumflex accent].

24. Cf. Ahrens 1839–1843, II 195; Buck 1955, § 41. For Wathelet 1970, 48, ὀρήτο is a hyper-Ionic form, but Wackernagel 1916, 71, preferred it to ὀρᾶτο because the similar ὀρήαι is also attested (at *Od.* 14.343); ὀρᾶτο, on the contrary, would be a modernization; cf. also Wecklein 1919, 36. According to Nussbaum 2002, 179–183, on the other hand, ὀρήτο is Zenodotus’ conjecture by analogy with the genuine epic form ὀρήαι.

25. Cf. Monro 1891, § 22.1, and Chantraine 1953–1958, I 434.

26. Κάρ is now generally connected with the verb κείρειν, ‘to shave’, ‘to chip’, to indicate something worthless; so *Il.* 9.378 would mean, literally: ‘I value him like a chip, i.e., nothing worthy’. Aristarchus, on the contrary, must have understood the phrase in the sense of ‘I value him like death’, namely, ‘I hate him’. See Chantraine, *DELG*, Frisk, *GEW*, and *LfgreE*, s.v. καρὸς; Hainsworth

is flawed, it is still interesting how he applies the theory of Ionic shortening to explain an otherwise obscure word in Homer. Of course, the explanation of ‘Ionic shortening’, even for λελασμένος, is not linguistically correct. Perfect participle forms with zero-grade ablaut are just archaic, not an innovation of Ionic.²⁷ The ancients understood them as ‘Ionic’, probably because they found them in Homer. Thus, they coined the rule of ‘Ionic shortening’ for these zero-grade ablaut participles.²⁸ This rule was then applied to cases like κάρ, now explained as a ‘shortened Ionic’.

Another case which Aristarchus similarly (and, again, wrongly) understood as ‘Ionic shortening’ concerned the forms of compound adjectives in -κλής. He (*Sch. Il.* 2.115a) notes that Homer has the accusative singular δυσκλέᾱ (*Il.* 2.115 = 9.22) and ἀκλέᾱ (*Od.* 4.728) with the last vowel abbreviated (κατὰ συστολήν) in the Ionic fashion (Ἰωνικῶς), while speakers of Attic lengthen it, that is, they pronounce these words as δυσκλεᾶ and ἀκλεᾶ. Along the same lines, he contrasts the shortened Homeric accusative plural εὐκλειᾶς (contracted from εὐκλεέας) with the corresponding Attic εὐκλειῆς, which has a long final syllable (*Sch. Il.* 10.281a: ὅτι Ἰακὸν τὸ συστέλλειν, . . . οἱ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ἐκτείνουνσι). The forms in -ᾶ and -εῖς are indeed Attic;²⁹ forms in -ᾱ and in -ᾶς, however, are not only Ionic, but widespread in non-Attic dialects. They are also not ‘abbreviated’, as Aristarchus claimed, but simply regular forms (of the type -κλεφέος > -κλειῖος, so -κλεφέᾱ > -κλειῖᾱ).³⁰ He probably defined them as ‘Ionic’ and ‘abbreviated’, in opposition to the normal Attic ones.

2.1.2. Other Ionic Features: Omission of Articles, Morphology, and Aspiration

As discussed in Chapter 3.2.B § 2.1, for Aristarchus the omission of the article was characteristic of Homeric style, which expressed itself ἀσυνάρθρως, ‘without the article’. A scholium from the *Odyssey* quoting him gives an additional, important detail:

1993, 112 (against Schwyzer 1922, 17–18, who supported the ancient derivation from κήρ; cf. also Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 569 and 584). Cf. also Wecklein 1919, 67–68.

27. Cf. Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 769–770; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 420, 429–430; Leumann 1959, 251–258.

28. See also Aristarchus in *Sch. H Od.* 12.85 (for λελακυῖα). This theory was also applied to the aorist λάκε, as some interpreted it as an Ionic shortening of ἐλήκει with omission of iota in *Sch. Il.* 14.25 (οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐλήκει ἐνδεία τοῦ ι, . . . καὶ Ἰωνικῇ συστολῇ τοῦ η εἰς α λάκε); cf. Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 748; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 389.

29. E.g., Eur. *Hipp.* 405, 717; Soph. *Phil.* 1422 (δυσκλεᾶ and εὐκλεᾶ); Pl. *Menex.* 247d5; Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.53 (εὐκλειῆς).

30. The Homeric forms in -εᾱ, with both short -ε- and short -α-, are more problematic, however. For example, δυσκλέᾱ Ἄργος in *Il.* 2.115 = 9.22 was probably originally δυσκλεῖ Ἄργος, as suggested first by Payne Knight; cf. Kühner and Blass 1890–1892, I 433–434 (Anm. 8), 437; Monro 1891, § 105.4 and 5; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 7, 10, 74.

Sch. Od. 2.206b¹ εἵνεκα τῆς ἀρετῆς: ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος λείπειν φησὶ τὸ ἄρθρον, ἵν' ᾗ 'εἵνεκα τῆς ταύτης ἀρετῆς'. Ἰακὸν δὲ τὸ ἔθος εἶναι.

'Because of her virtue': Aristarchus says that the article is missing, so that it is εἵνεκα τῆς ταύτης ἀρετῆς, and that this is an Ionic usage.

As we saw in Chapter 3.2.B § 3.1, Aristarchus maintains that τῆς in the Homeric line looks like an article, but is in fact used instead of ταύτης, with enallage. Therefore, the 'real', modern article is missing. Rather than considering it an archaism, as we now understand it,³¹ Aristarchus judges this omission to be an Ionic feature.³²

Among other typically Ionic forms, Aristarchus singles out the athematic aorist participle of φθάνειν, ὑποφθάς in *Il.* 7.144 and παραφθάς in *Il.* 22.197, explaining that they are used Ἰακῶς instead of the regular sigmatic aorist participle -φθάσας (*Sch. Il.* 7.144a; 22.197a).³³

Finally, commenting on *Il.* 11.589, Αἴανθ', ὃς βελέεσσι βιάζεται, '[ward off (ἀμύνετε) the fatal day] from Ajax, who is oppressed by the missiles', Aristarchus wonders how to divide the sequence of letters ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣΒΕΛΕΕΣΣΙ which he found in Zenodotus' edition. If it is Αἴαντος βελέεσσι, with the genitive, the phrase does not work syntactically; if, on the other hand, the *scriptio continua* is divided into Αἴαντ' ὃς βελέεσσι, the result would work in terms of syntax, but it is wrong from a dialectal point of view. In fact, the T present in the manuscript means that the relative pronoun must lack aspiration (i.e., it is ὃς) and this is incorrect, because 'it is not typical of the Ionic of Homer to pronounce such words with a smooth breathing' (*Sch. Il.* 11.589a¹: οὐκ ἔστι τῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον Ἰάδος τὸ ψιλοῦν τὰ τοιαῦτα).³⁴

2.2. Attic

More numerous are the comments on Attic traits found in Homer. For example, the Aristonicus scholia single out the following features: the use of the nominative instead of the vocative (*Sch. Il.* 3.277a²),³⁵ the prepositional phrase ἐπί +

31. See Schwyzer 1950–1953, II 22–23; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 165; Cassio et al. 2016, 156.

32. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 432–433 and 438 (fr. 100 B).

33. Homer has only the forms in -φθάς, while those in -φθάσας are indeed the only ones attested in Attic: see Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 742 and n. 4.

34. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 69. East Ionic of Asia is indeed psilotic (cf. Buck 1955, § 57) and there are some psilotic forms in Homer due to this dialect; yet in general Homeric language does have initial aspiration (probably due to Attic influence); see Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 106; Cassio et al. 2016, 125, 164, 165, 175.

35. In fact, at *Il.* 3.277 the nominative Ἡἷλιος is used with τε after another vocative (*Il.* 3.276–277: Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων κύδιστε μέγιστε, / Ἡἷλιός θ', ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις).

genitive to indicate movement toward a place instead of εἰς (or ἐπὶ) + accusative (*Sch. Il.* 3.5; 5.249c; 5.700a),³⁶ and the verb κελεύειν, ‘to order’, with the accusative instead of the dative for the addressee of the command (*Sch. Il.* 20.4b³).³⁷

Most interestingly, among the Attic elements found in Homer Aristarchus counted the ending -ντων of the third-person plural of the present imperative, as is demonstrated by *Sch. Il.* 9.47a, where he explains that φευγόντων, ‘let them flee’, is used Ἀττικῶς instead of the regular Koine form φευγέτωσαν.³⁸ The standard ending for the third-person plural of the imperative became -τωσαν and -σθωσαν (rather than -ντων and -σθων) in literary authors toward the end of the fifth century,³⁹ for example in Thucydides, Euripides, and Xenophon,⁴⁰ and in inscriptions after 300 BCE.⁴¹ Therefore, by ‘Attic’ Aristarchus must have meant an older form of Attic, used before the middle of the fifth century BCE, when the third-person plural of the present imperative ended in -ντων and -σθων.⁴²

This is an Indo-European use; see *Monro* 1891, § 164; *Chantraine* 1953–1958, II 36. Yet in the scholia (*Sch. Il.* 3.277a^{1,2}) Aristarchus notes other parallels (*Il.* 21.106 and *Od.* 17.415) where there is only one nominative, φίλος, used as vocative, for metrical reasons. Nominatives instead of vocatives (especially φίλος) are indeed used by Attic authors (Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Euripides; cf. *Schwyzler* 1950–1953, II 63–64), which is probably the reason why Aristarchus considers this feature ‘Attic’.

36. Cf. *Monro* 1891, § 200; *Chantraine* 1953–1958, II 108. The construction with ἐπὶ + genitive to indicate direction toward a place (often connected with the idea of reaching a goal) is used, for example, by Thucydides and Xenophon; cf. *Kühner and Gerth* 1898–1904, I 496; *Schwyzler* 1950–1953, II 470.

37. Κελεύειν with the accusative and infinitive is indeed the normal Attic construction; cf. *Kühner and Gerth* 1898–1904, I 411 (Anm. 7); *Smyth* 1956, § 1465. The use of ἀφαιρείσθαι ‘to deprive someone of something’, with double accusative might also have been singled out as ‘Attic’; however, the evidence (*Sch. Il.* 1.275a.b) is doubtful. Only one scholium defines it as ‘Attic’ (*Sch. Il.* 1.275a: τὸ δὲ ἀποαίρεο Ἀττικόν), while *Sch. Il.* 1.275b calls it ἀρχαϊκῶς. The latter reading is considered corrupt by Erbse, ad loc., who suggests reading Ἀττικῶς on the basis of *Sch. Il.* 22.18, an Aristonicus-derived exegetical scholium, which also calls this construction Attic. The double accusative with verbs of ‘depriving’ is not in fact a specifically Attic usage, but it is very well attested in Attic authors, such as Euripides, Sophocles, and Demosthenes; cf. *Kühner and Gerth* 1898–1904, I 324–325 (c); *Schwyzler* 1950–1953, II 82 (δ). On *Sch. Il.* 1.275a.b, cf. also *Nünlist* 2012b, 161–162.

38. Aristarchus often notices these imperatives but without adding any dialectal label: *Sch. Il.* 2.438; 8.517; 8.521; 23.160d and, for the middle form (i.e., -σθων instead of -σθωσαν), *Sch. Il.* 9.67b; 9.170c.

39. See *Kühner and Blass* 1890–1892, II 49–51; *Schwyzler* 1950–1953, I 802; *Smyth* 1956, § 466.3.

40. Thucydides and Xenophon, however, use also the forms in -ντων and -σθων; see *Kühner and Blass* 1890–1892, II 51.

41. See *Buck* 1955, § 140.6.

42. In fact, as *Kühner and Blass* 1890–1892, II 50, observe, aside from 1.147.1 with ἔστωσαν, Herodotus always uses the forms in -ντων and -σθων (e.g., λεγόντων in 1.89.3 and ἐχόντων in 3.155.5). The fact that Aristarchus labels as ‘Attic’ something that is also used by Herodotus is significant (see below, § 4).

2.2.1. The Dual

The conclusion that by ‘Attic’ Aristarchus meant an old form of Attic seems to be reinforced by his analysis of another feature of Homeric idiolect: the dual.⁴³ According to Aristarchus, the use of the dual was typical of Homer’s language.⁴⁴

Sch. Il. 13.197 {ἴμβριον αὐτ’} Αἴαντε <μεμαότε>: ὅτι συνεχῶς κέχρηται τοῖς δυϊκοῖς. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τὰ περὶ τῆς πατρίδος· Ἀθηναίων γὰρ ἴδιον.

‘The two Ajaxes eager [of furious strength]’: because he has used the dual continuously. The reference is to the question of [his] homeland: for [this is] typical of the Athenians.

Homer’s ability to use the dual correctly and continuously when referring to the two Ajaxes in an entire scene containing a simile (*Il.* 13.197–202)⁴⁵ is evidence for the question of the country of Homer: he was Athenian, because the dual truly was at home only at Athens (Ἀθηναίων γὰρ ἴδιον). In fact, the dual, while absent in Ionic, is present in Attic but disappears there as well in the fourth century BCE, just like the imperatives in -ντων and -σθων. So, while now we consider the dual an archaism in Homer,⁴⁶ for Aristarchus both the dual and those ‘old-fashioned’ imperatives were proof that Homer spoke an archaic form of Attic.

Aristarchus seems to have always been very attentive to duals. For example, he singles them out as a Homeric peculiarity (*Sch. Il.* 8.109a: ὅτι τετήρηται παρ’ αὐτῷ καθαρῶς τὰ δυϊκά) and very often explains why Homer is right in using a dual.⁴⁷ Exactly because Homer is able to use the dual well, incorrect duals are a reason to suspect a line (*Sch. Il.* 4.407a);⁴⁸ on the other hand, Aristarchus can invoke Homer’s ability with duals to ‘prove’ that Homeric chariots have two, not four horses—because the verbs employed in these contexts are often in the

43. On the dual in Homer, see *Monro* 1891, § 173; *Chantraine* 1953–1958, II 22–29.

44. On Aristarchus and the dual, see *Friedländer* 1853, 15 n. 2; *Ribbach* 1883, 18; *Matthaios* 1999, 378–382; *Ascheri* 2004.

45. In fact, Aristarchus was particularly attentive to these duals referring to the two ‘Ajaxes’ in the *Iliad*; see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.5.3.

46. See *Chantraine* 1953–1958, II 22; *Cassio et al.* 2016, 77–78, 156, 429.

47. See *Sch. Il.* 5.153a; 13.66a; 17.387 (Ariston.); cf. also *Sch. Il.* 5.233a. In *Sch. Il.* 5.560a (Did.) Aristarchus chooses a dual rather than a plural to harmonize it with the other duals in the sentence. Not all types of duals were accepted by Aristarchus in Homer, however. For example, for the nouns in -α, he accepted the dual in the masculines (e.g., Ἀρτεῖδα) but not in the feminines (which is correct, as in Homer dual forms of the first declension are attested only for the masculines); cf. *Schironi* 2004, 164–165, and especially *Ascheri* 2004.

48. But the odd dual is not the only reason for the athetesis of *Il.* 4.407–409, as other motivations are listed in *Sch. Il.* 4.407a; cf. *Roemer* 1912, 170–172 (with a different interpretation of the question, in line with his method; see Preface § 2); *van der Valk* 1963–1964, II 408.

dual.⁴⁹ When there are mistakes in the Homeric use of the dual, on the other hand, Aristarchus seems to have tried to ‘save the poet’ by showing that he took poetic license and the dual had to be understood as referring to more than two subjects. This happens in the following case:

Sch. Il. 10.578a δείπνῳ ἐφιζανέτην: ὅτι ἐπὶ πάντων τοῦ<το> νοητέον, οὐκ ἐπὶ μόνου Διομήδους καὶ Ὀδυσσέως.

‘The two of them sat for a meal’: because we must understand that this refers to everyone, not only to Odysseus and Diomedes.

This is the meal that Diomedes and Odysseus take after the expedition in Book 10, just before dawn (in fact, this is the early meal, breakfast, as explained in the omitted part of the scholium). They are obviously not eating alone; thus, when Homer says that ‘the two of them sat for a meal’ using the dual, this slip is to be forgiven—it is another *κατάχρησις* and we must understand the dual as referring to all the diners, instead of the correct plural (especially because the plural is also used in this passage).⁵⁰

Since in Aristarchus’ mind Homer was an Athenian and knew how to use the dual, he often attacked his colleagues who thought that the dual ‘was confused’ in Homer, allowing it to refer to more than two people: Zenodotus,⁵¹ Eratosthenes,⁵² and Crates.⁵³ The reason for this insistence in pointing out that Homer was able to use the dual correctly was probably polemical: one of the most famous *zetemata* of ancient (and modern) times centered around this issue, namely, the question of the duals in the episode of the embassy in Book 9—a question on which at least one of these colleagues (Crates) took the opposite stance of Aristarchus’ solution.

2.2.2. *The Dual in the Embassy to Achilles in Book 9*

Aristarchus’ best ‘defense’ of a Homeric dual is surely the one concerning the problematic duals in Book 9 during the embassy to Achilles. The dual, which is

49. *Sch. Il.* 5.224a; 5.230; 5.272a; 6.38a; 8.109a; 8.185a; 8.186; 8.191a; 23.276; see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.8.

50. Aristarchus also notes when a plural is used instead of the dual: see *Sch. Il.* 17.628; 21.287. These scholia are very scanty (and there are problems with one of them: see Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 21.287); perhaps Aristarchus found some way to ‘excuse’ the poet in these cases as well. Otherwise, he might have allowed for such a use, given the frequency in which the plural rather than the dual referring to two subjects occurs in Homer; cf. Schwyzler 1950–1953, II 44 (δ). On other cases of Homeric *κατάχρησις*, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11 and Chapter 3.6.C § 1.1.

51. See Chapter 4 § 1.2.2.

52. See Chapter 4 § 3.

53. See Chapter 4 § 4.2.

used in the early narrative of the embassy (at lines 182–198) and then dropped (from line 199 onward), has puzzled many critics, since in the embassy there are not two, but three envoys: Phoenix, Odysseus, and Ajax.⁵⁴ According to Aristarchus, however, the *zetema* is easily solved: the ‘real’ embassy is formed by Odysseus and Ajax, while Phoenix is only accompanying them. He finds proof of his interpretation in lines 168–169 of Book 9, when Nestor proposes that an embassy be sent to Achilles and concludes: ‘Let Phoenix, dear to Zeus, precede first (πρώτιστα); and then (αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα) great Ajax and noble Odysseus [will go]’. Aristarchus understands the adverbs πρώτιστα and ἔπειτα as temporal adverbs. In particular, ἔπειτα is used instead of μετὰ ταῦτα (*Sch. Il.* 9.169a), to mean that Phoenix will leave first (πρώτιστα) and then, after that (αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα), Odysseus and Ajax—the real ambassadors—will follow; in this way, Aristarchus adds, the duals are not confused (*Sch. Il.* 9.168a: ὁ Φοῖνιξ προέρχεται καὶ οὐ συμπρεσβεύει τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα ὥστε μὴ συγχεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν ἐξῆς τὰ δυϊκά).

Sch. Il. 9.169a also preserves a completely different solution to this line: according to Crates, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα is equivalent to αὐτὰρ δὴ, and thus the lines mean that Phoenix and ‘moreover also’ great Ajax and noble Odysseus depart. With this reading—which is the traditional one—there are three ambassadors, which means that Homer uses the dual for the plural too.⁵⁵ But for Aristarchus this is impossible, and his analysis of the rest of the episode shows his unflinching determination to prove (against Crates?) that Homer is indeed correct in using the dual for two ambassadors, while he uses the plural when the group of three (Phoenix and the two ambassadors) is meant. Thus, in *Il.* 9.180, after propitiatory libations have been poured, Nestor gives some final instructions, ‘glancing at each of them (ἐς ἕκαστον)’. Aristarchus observes that here Homer has rightly used ἕκαστος, which refers to a plurality of people, and not ἐκάτερος, which refers to two, because Phoenix is still present, so a ‘dual’ form would be inappropriate (*Sch. Il.* 9.180a). Yet two lines below, at line 182,

54. For a survey of some solutions suggested by ancient and modern scholars, see Page 1959, 297–315; Hainsworth 1993, 85–87 (with bibliography); in particular, Bolling 1933, 307–308, Schadewaldt 1938, 138–139, and Mazon et al. 1948, 176–177, are close to Aristarchus’ solution in claiming that Phoenix was not originally part of the embassy. A more recent and articulated discussion of the problem is in Pötscher 1993; cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 258–259; Nagy 1999, 49–58.

55. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 379–380 and 539–540 (fr. 155) and Broggiato 2001, 151–153 (fr. 9). To save the embassy episode in Book 9 Crates thus reasoned that the dual could be ‘confused’ in Homer. Indeed, the σύγχυσις τοῦ δυϊκοῦ σχήματος was probably often invoked to ‘save’ Homer; for example, an Aristonicus scholium (*Sch. Il.* 8.73–4) mentions this principle as a way that ‘some’ might use to defend a line which Aristarchus wants to athetize. On the question of the *dualis pro plurali* in Homer and other authors, see Debrunner 1926; Wackernagel 1926–1928, I 78–79; Chantraine 1953–1958, II 25–29.

the dual τὼ δὲ βήτην is correct, as it refers only to Odysseus and Ajax, while Phoenix has already left just after the final words of Nestor (*Sch. Il.* 9.182). Of course, one would like to ask when Phoenix has left, since at lines 180–181 all three are present according to Aristarchus' interpretation, while line 182 describes only the 'two' ambassadors (Odysseus and Ajax) leaving.⁵⁶ Aristarchus probably considered this poetic license: Homer might have skipped a period of time (during which Phoenix left) between line 181 and 182, assuming Phoenix's departure κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον.⁵⁷

The envoys arrive at Achilles' hut and find him⁵⁸ playing the lyre: 'But the two of them came forward (τὼ δὲ βήτην) and noble Odysseus led the way (ἡγεῖτο δὲ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς)' (l. 192). Aristarchus again comments that the dual refers only to Ajax and Odysseus. The proof this time is that in the second hemistich the poet says that Odysseus is leading, a statement repeated at the end of the episode, when Ajax and Odysseus leave Achilles' hut (l. 657: ἦρχε δ' Ὀδυσσεύς). The leading position of the king of Ithaca can only be explained if he is preeminent among the group, and this is possible only if Phoenix is not included (*Sch. Il.* 9.192a). In addition, the fact that Phoenix remains with Achilles, while Odysseus and Ajax leave, proves that he is not part of the embassy; otherwise, he would have led the contingent and gone back to report to Agamemnon (*Sch. Il.* 9.657b: οὐ συμπρεσβεύει ὁ Φοῖνιξ, ἐπεὶ τοὶ καὶ ἀποπρεσβεύων ἡγεῖτο).⁵⁹ Another proof that the people who enter Achilles' hut are only Odysseus and Ajax is found in lines 193–197, when Homer says that Achilles is taken by surprise by their entrance, leaps up (l. 193: ταφῶν δ' ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεύς), and greets them using the dual (χαίρετον and ἰκάνετον at l. 197). The hero's surprise shows that Phoenix is not present, as he is Achilles'

56. *Il.* 9.179–182: τοῖσι δὲ πόλλ' ἐπέτελλε Γερήνιος ἱππότης Νέστωρ / δειδίλλων ἐς ἕκαστον, Ὀδυσσῆϊ δὲ μάλιστα, / πειρᾶν ὡς πεπιθοῖεν ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα. / Τὼ δὲ βήτην παρὰ θῖνα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης [and the horseman Nestor of Gerenos gave them many orders, / glancing at each of them, and above all at Odysseus, / (saying) that they should try to persuade the blameless son of Peleus. / Then **the two of them** went along the shore of the resounding sea].

57. On this principle, see Chapter 3.6.C § 3.1.

58. The verb at line 186 is the plural εὔρον, but there are no scholia that comment on this 'wrong' use of the plural referring to Ajax and Odysseus only. Perhaps for Aristarchus this was a case of 'plural instead of dual', which he seems to have admitted (see above, footnote 50).

59. This is how Homer describes Ajax and Odysseus taking leave from Achilles at *Il.* 9.656–657: ὡς ἔφαθ', οἱ δὲ ἕκαστος ἐλὼν δέπας ἀμφικύπελλον / σπείσαντες παρὰ νῆας ἴσαν πάλιν· ἦρχε δ' Ὀδυσσεύς [so [Achilles] spoke and each of them taking a double-handled cup poured a libation and then went back to the ships; and Odysseus was leading]. In these lines Aristarchus has also another problem: to explain (again) the use of ἕκαστος instead of ἐκάτερος, given that there were two people leaving and Homer knows the difference between ἐκάτερος and ἕκαστος. He suggests two solutions (*Sch. Il.* 9.656b): if ἕκαστος refers to Ajax and Odysseus, then the apparent mistake is due to the meter, as ἐκάτερος would not fit the meter (so it is a κατάχρησις, of the type analyzed in Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11 with footnote 118); otherwise, ἕκαστος also refers to the heralds who went with them, Odys and Eurybates (see *Il.* 9.170), so it applies to more than two people.

old acquaintance, who would not be considered an ‘unexpected’ visitor in his hut (*Sch. Il.* 9.197a).⁶⁰ A further proof that Phoenix is not part of the embassy is found when, to convince Achilles to give up his anger, Phoenix himself points out that Agamemnon has promised many gifts and has sent the best heroes to beseech him (*Il.* 9.515–522). These words, which are full of admiration for the ambassadors, prove that Phoenix does not consider himself as part of the group—hence, the embassy again consists of only two people, referred to with dual verbs (*Sch. Il.* 9.520).

The customs of heroic society finally confirm Aristarchus in his own interpretation, as shown by a note to *Il.* 4.377:

Sch. Il. 4.377a ξείνος ἄμ’ ἀντιθέω <Πολυνείκεϊ λαὸν ἀγείρων>: . . . | ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λειτουργίας δύο ἐπέμποντο κατάσκοποι πρέσβεις. ἡ ἀναφορὰ δέ, ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁ Φοῖνιξ ἐν ταῖς Λιταῖς (cf. *Il.* 9.168–198) πρεσβεύει.

‘As a guest together with godlike Polynices to gather an army’: . . . | we must know that for these offices two were sent as senior envoys. The reference [is to the fact] that Phoenix in the Prayers (*Il.* 9.168–98) is not part of the embassy.

During the review of the troops in Book 4, Agamemnon rebukes Diomedes for his fear before the battle and reminds him of the courage of his father Tydeus, who went on an embassy to Mycenae together with Polynices to gather soldiers to attack Eteocles at Thebes. This proves that such embassies were always carried out by two (and not three) people: hence, the embassy to Achilles must be formed by two envoys, Odysseus and Ajax.⁶¹

This interpretative tour de force clearly shows Aristarchus’ attitude toward the Homeric text: given certain premises (in this case, Homer was Athenian and knew how to use the dual), his aim as exegete was to explain the text without changing it arbitrarily. Rather, he needed to show that the text was sound as it was, in terms of grammar and of internal plot consistency. In addition, Aristarchus was probably also arguing against other scholars who gave a different solution to this *zetema*. The insistence in reconfirming his own *lysis* was certainly due to his belief that Homer was an Athenian, but might have also been fostered by his willingness to prove that his solution was better than the one proposed by other scholars, perhaps even in polemics with Crates.⁶²

60. In *Sch. Il.* 9.190a Aristarchus also observes that Phoenix is already in Achilles’ hut; this of course follows from his assumption (*Sch. Il.* 9.169a; 9.182) that Phoenix has preceded the other two in going to Achilles.

61. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 195; Schmidt 1976, 249–250.

62. And perhaps by Zenodotus and Eratosthenes as well, even if there is no secure evidence of their involvement in the question of the duals in Book 9; see Chapter 4 § 4.2.

2.3. Aeolic

Unlike Herodian or other grammarians who often used dialectal labels other than Ionic or Attic to explain some Homeric features,⁶³ Aristarchus seems to have found far fewer traces of Doric or Aeolic in Homer. Once he selects an Aeolic form as a *comparandum* to show that the language of Homer is different:

Sch. Il. 16.856b¹ {ψυχὴ δ'} ἐκ ρεθέων: ὅτι πάντα τὰ μέλη ρέθη Ὅμηρος προσαγορεύει. οἱ δὲ Αἰολεῖς μόνον τὸ πρόσωπον.

‘[His life flying] from his limbs (ἐκ ρεθέων)’: because Homer calls all the limbs ρέθη. The Aeolians, on the other hand, [call] only the face [ρέθος].⁶⁴

Aristarchus notes a semantic difference between Homer and the Aeolians. It is impossible to decide whether in this case Αἰολεῖς are the speakers of an Aeolic dialect or the Aeolic poets. The word ρέθος is attested in Sappho (fr. 22.3 Voigt), but the fragmentary status of the papyrus does not make it possible to decide whether it indicates the face or the body. The lack of documentation of spoken Aeolic also does not help to answer this question. Yet, even if it is a rarely used poetic term, ρέθος occurs in the tragedians to mean ‘face’⁶⁵ and, above all, in the Hellenistic poets, normally to mean ‘face’ but sometimes (even in the same authors) also to mean ‘limb’.⁶⁶ It is interesting, then, that Aristarchus notices such a dialectal nuance for a term which was also used by non-Aeolic authors with that meaning (i.e., ‘face’). He might have had reasons to consider it an Aeolic form, but we have no other evidence to prove such a dialectal origin.⁶⁷

63. For example, in the phrase ἀχνύμενοί περ ἑταίρων, according to Hellanicus (a grammarian probably contemporary with Aristarchus) πέρ is the Aeolic form for περί, so that it is not a case of ellipsis of περί, as Aristarchus believes (*Sch. Il.* 15.651a). Cf. Montanari 1988, 65–67 (fr. 2).

64. Almost identical is *Sch. Il.* 22.68a (καὶ ὅτι ρέθη πάντα τὰ μέλη, οἱ δὲ Αἰολεῖς τὸ πρόσωπον); see also *Sch. Il.* 22.362b (ex. [Ariston.]). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 150; Dimpfl 1911, 7–8; Montanari 2012, 137.

65. E.g., *Soph. Ant.* 529; *Eur. Her.* 1204.

66. E.g., *Call.*, fr. 67.13 Pfeiffer (‘face’); *Ap. Rh.* 2.68 (‘face’); *Theoc. Id.* 23.39 (‘limbs’), 29.16 (‘face’, in an ‘Aeolic’ poem); *Lyc. Al.* 862 (‘limbs’), 1137 (‘face’); *Nicand. Alex.* 438, 456 (‘face’); *Rhian.*, fr. 71.5 Powell (‘face’).

67. The meaning of ρέθος/ρέθη in Homer has been much discussed, as it can be both ‘face’ and ‘limbs’ according to context (see *Lfgre*, s.v.); yet scholars tend to agree that the original meaning of ρέθος is ‘face’, from which the secondary one (‘body’ for the plural ρέθη) developed later; see Chantraine, *DELG*, and Frisk, *GEW*, s.v.; Snell 1946, 24–26 [= Snell 1953, 10–12]; Leumann 1950, 218–222; Janko 1994, 420; Harder 2012, II 563. On the contrary, Schwyzler 1922, 23–26, tried to show that the original meaning of ρέθος was ‘body’. *Sch. Il.* 22.68b (D | ex.) adds that the Aeolians call those with a beautiful face ρεθομαλίδας, ‘with an apple-like face’. The fragment is unattributed but according to Schwyzler 1922, 25, the word is a made-up compound from an Aeolic song (so ρέθος here is used in a new, not original meaning); thence the tragedians took ρέθος with the meaning of

As we saw,⁶⁸ Apollonius Dyscolus informs us that Aristarchus recognized the genitives in -οιο as Thessalian, but the scholia to the *Iliad* do not offer any explicit comments by the latter that clearly label a certain linguistic feature in Homer as Aeolic. For example, it is difficult to assess the following scholium by Herodian, already analyzed as an example of analogical reasoning in Chapter 3.5 § 7:

Sch. Il. 5.299b (Hrd.) ἀλκί: . . . Τρύφων δὲ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀναγνώσεως (fr. 97 Velsen) φησὶν ὅτι Ἀρίσταρχος λέγει ὅτι ἔθος αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ λέγειν τὴν ἰωκὴν ἰῶκα (*Il.* 11.601) καὶ τὴν κρόκην κρόκα (*Hes. Op.* 538) καὶ τὴν ἀλκὴν ἄλκα ὡς σάρκα. εἰ δὲ σάρκα ὡς ἄλκα, καὶ ἀλκί ὡς σαρκί.

‘[Trusting] in his strength (ἀλκί)’: . . . But in *On the Ancient Reading* (fr. 97 Velsen) Tryphon reports that Aristarchus says that their custom is to say ἰωκὴν as ἰῶκα (‘rout’) (*Il.* 11.601) and κρόκην as κρόκα (‘weft’) (*Hes. Op.* 538) and ἀλκὴν (‘strength’) as ἄλκα, like σάρκα (‘flesh’). If σάρκα is like ἄλκα, then ἀλκί is like σαρκί.

Tryphon, quoted by Herodian, reports Aristarchus’ opinion that ‘they’ use (ἔθος αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ λέγειν) third-declension accusatives, such as ἰῶκα (in *Il.* 11.601), κρόκα (found in Hesiod), and ἄλκα for nouns whose nominative follows the first declension. Previously in the scholium, Herodian also says that the lemma ἀλκί is Aeolic for some scholars.⁶⁹ Thus, one is tempted to conclude that the αὐτοῖς mentioned by Aristarchus might indeed indicate the Aeolians—but this is only an inference (though perhaps a likely one). Since the quotation comes from Tryphon’s *On the Ancient Reading*, in theory one could just as easily think that by ‘their custom’ Aristarchus simply means ‘the custom of the ancients,’ as he quotes examples from Homer and Hesiod. In fact, here he seems only to refer to ‘odd’ accusatives of the third declension for nouns which otherwise follow the first declension. Moreover, aside from the Homeric ἰῶκα and the Hesiodic κρόκα, ἄλκα is never attested and σάρκα is a purely common Greek accusative for σάρξ, used by Aristarchus as an example of the normal declensional pattern. Thus, of these ‘supposed’ Aeolic accusatives only the Homeric ἰῶκα and the Hesiodic κρόκα can indeed be classified as dialectal peculiarities attested in literary authors; yet the fragment is too problematic to be sure that Aristarchus considered these Homeric (and Hesiodic) forms to be Aeolic.⁷⁰

‘face’. The same scholium also reports that, according to Dionysius Thrax, the meaning of ῥέθη in Homer was ‘face’ as well, at least in *Il.* 22.68 (in contrast with his teacher Aristarchus—see above, footnote 64); cf. Linke 1977, 57–58 (fr.*34).

68. See above, footnote 19.

69. For the entire scholium, see Chapter 3.5 § 7.

70. According to Wathelet 1970, 223, Aristarchus considered the dative ἀλκί (which is the

More interesting is a scholium by Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 16.430b), in which he explains that the perfect participle *κεκλήγοντες* is Aeolic but that there was *κεκληγῶτες* in the other edition of Aristarchus (*ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τῶν Ἀριστάρχου*), and that there was no need to use the Aeolic form if the meter would allow the more regular one.⁷¹ From another Didymus scholium to the *Odyssey* we know that *κεκλήγοντες* was Aristarchus' other reading (*Sch. HQ Od.* 14.30: *κεκληγῶτες καὶ κεκλήγοντες διχῶς αἱ Ἀριστάρχου*). If *κεκλήγοντες* was the reading from the first edition of Aristarchus, which he then substituted with *κεκληγῶτες* in his second edition (as the phrase *ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τῶν Ἀριστάρχου* in *Sch. Il.* 16.430b seems to suggest), it might be worth speculating about this choice. Aristarchus might have started with a text with *κεκλήγοντες*; however, he found *κεκληγῶτες* in many manuscripts, since in *Sch. Il.* 16.430b Didymus also says that most editions (*αἱ πλείους*) in his time had it; he might have thus eventually chosen it because this reading allowed him to eliminate an odd Aeolicism in Homer.⁷² This idea is voiced by Didymus when he says that there is no need for this form unless the meter absolutely requires it.⁷³ If this interpretation is correct, then we can conclude that while Aristarchus must have accepted more common Aeolic forms such as *ἄμμες/ῥμμες*, the ending *-εσσι* for the dative plural of the third declension, and infinitives in *-μεναι* (all of which he probably

lemma to which the explanation of *Sch. Il.* 5.299b refers) as Aeolic without barytonesis; yet the way Herodian phrases it (*Sch. Il.* 5.299b: . . . *τινὲς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ †ἀλκίς† Αἰολικοῦ αὐτό φασιν* [but some say that it is from the Aeolic *†ἀλκίς†*]) makes it impossible to be certain that Aristarchus, too, considered it Aeolic. Similarly ambiguous are *Sch. Il.* 9.6b¹ (Hrd.) and 20.114c^{1,2} (Hrd.), both on the 'Aeolic' reading *ἄμυδις*. Even if Wathelet 1970, 47, thinks that Aristarchus chose this reading since it was Aeolic, the dialectal comments cannot be securely attributed to him; rather, it is Herodian who defines them as Aeolic (in fact, in *Sch. Il.* 20.114c^{1,2} Herodian does not even mention Aristarchus). Wathelet (1970, 47–48) also quotes other Aeolic readings by Aristarchus to demonstrate that, though he considered Homer an Athenian, he allowed Aeolic forms in the poems: Aristonicus at *Sch. Il.* 1.168a and Didymus at *Sch. Il.* 10.176a¹. Yet in these scholia the supposedly 'Aeolic' readings of Aristarchus are never defined as such; for all we know, he might have considered those forms purely 'Homeric'. Wathelet (1970, 49–50), however, rightly notes that Herodian recognized many more 'Aeolic' traits in Homer, as opposed to Aristarchus, who was generally more favorable to finding Attic traits in Homer.

71. In fact, *κεκληγῶτες* is not really regular because one would expect *κεκληγότες*, with omicron instead of omega. *Κεκληγῶτες* is due to metrical reasons; it is in fact metrically identical to *κεκλήγοντες*, and in both passages where these variant readings are attested (*Il.* 16.430 and *Od.* 14.30), the penultimate syllable must be long. On these forms of perfect participles, see Ahrens 1839–1843, I 148 and n. 2; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 430–431; Wathelet 1970, 48, 324–329. Cf. also La Roche 1866, 296.

72. Modern scholars, however, prefer the Aeolic form *κεκλήγοντες*, which is also the one of the vulgate; cf. Janko 1994, 374, and West, ad *Il.* 16.430.

73. For example, in *Sch. Il.* 2.264b Didymus mentions two readings, the regular *πεπληγῶς* of Aristarchus (as confirmed by Aristonicus in *Sch. Il.* 2.264a.b) and the Aeolic *πεπλήγων* read by *τινὲς*. Cf. Wecklein 1919, 51; West 2001, 164–165.

considered simply ‘Homeric’), he tried to avoid more idiosyncratic Aeolic forms, especially when they were not necessary.⁷⁴

2.4. Doric

With Doric, which is mostly absent from Homeric language,⁷⁵ the situation is even more obscure. Even if ancient grammarians did allow for Doric forms in Homer, there is no clear evidence that Aristarchus recognized any feature in Homer as Doric.⁷⁶ According to Herodian, the athematic aorist of the first-person singular κατέκταν chosen by Aristarchus at *Il.* 4.319 was Doric, but—Herodian goes on—then became a common Attic form (*Sch. Il.* 4.319c¹: κατέκταν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ν αἱ Ἀριστάρχου καὶ ἐν ἐκτάσει τοῦ α Δωρικῇ οὔσῃ, ὡς ἔβαν ἐγὼ’ (*Soph. Aj.* 868). ἡ γὰρ χρῆσις τοιαύτη ἦν παρὰ Ἀττικοῖς). It is plausible, then, that for Aristarchus κατέκταν was indeed Attic (in fact, Herodian goes on listing other occurrences of this form in Aeschylus and Euripides). Another dubious piece of evidence concerns the pronoun τύνη: it is once labeled as Doric (*Sch. Il.* 6.262a: ἄκρον Δώριον τὸ ‘τύνη’); elsewhere, however, Aris-tonicus notes that ‘some’ consider it Doric (*Sch. Il.* 19.10b: σημειοῦνται τινες ὅτι Δωρικὸν τὸ τύνη). Hence, it is impossible to know Aristarchus’ position: whether he judged τύνη to be Doric, or (what is perhaps more likely) whether he argued against others (τινές) who claimed it to be Doric, while for him τύνη was only a Homeric pronoun.⁷⁷

74. *Sch. Il.* 2.694a, in which Aristarchus rejects a reading by Zenodotus (ἀστήσασθαι or ἀστήσεσθαι instead of ἀνστήσεσθαι) as ‘Aeolic’ and says that not even the Aeolians speak in this way, might support our conclusions. The scholium, however, is corrupt, especially when it introduces Zenodotus’ reading, so the evidence which it affords is tenuous. Cf. Wackernagel 1955, I 824–825; Cassio 1993, 78.

75. Though rare, some Doric or Western Greek forms have been recognized in Homer (e.g., the pronoun τύνη and the possessive adjectives ἀμός and ὑμός) by West 1988, 167–168. The presence of Doric forms in Homer, however, is denied by other scholars, e.g., Janko 1994, 8 n. 2, 87, and 324.

76. Cf. Giangrande 1970 (on Greek grammarians, Hellenistic poets, and Doric forms; he is not precise, however, about the evidence for Aristarchus).

77. Another dubious case is *Sch. Il.* 14.199a¹ (ex. [Hrd.?.]) δαμνᾶ: οἱ μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ ‘πειρᾶ ἐμεῖο, γεραιέ’ (*Il.* 24.390). οἱ δὲ Δώριον αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ δάμνασαι· οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχός φησιν ἐπίστα, δύνᾳ, ὅλον δὲ ἐπίστασαι [‘you subdue (δαμνᾶ)’: some write [δαμνᾶ] like ‘πειρᾶ ἐμεῖο, γεραιέ’ (*Il.* 24.390). Others [consider] it Doric, from δάμνασαι [i.e., they read δάμνᾳ]. In the same way Aristarchus says that it is ἐπίστα, δύνᾳ, and [says that] the full form is ἐπίστασαι]. As the scholium is phrased, there is no real evidence for Aristarchus saying that δάμνᾳ is Doric, nor, in fact, that this was his reading in this specific passage. The scholiast might have simply added the reference to Aristarchus in support of the scholars who read δάμνᾳ. But, as far as we can say, Aristarchus might have only commented on ἐπίστα (from ἐπίστασαι) and δύνᾳ, forms which, though typical of Doric, are also attested in Attic tragedy (see Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 668). On δάμνᾳ in *Il.* 14.199, cf. also Chantraine 1953–1958, I 301; Giangrande 1970, 261; Janko 1994, 180 (who all attribute this reading to Aristarchus).

These doubts are legitimate, since there is at least one case where Aristarchus seems to reject a Doric form as not compatible with the language of Homer. In *Sch. Il.* 5.269d he argues against Hellanicus, who read the plural accusative $\theta\eta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\varsigma$ with a short final syllable for metrical reasons, but kept the accent on the same syllable as in the normal accusative form $\theta\eta\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, attested at *Il.* 2.767 and 11.681.⁷⁸ For Aristarchus, the right form is $\theta\acute{\eta}\lambda\epsilon\alpha\varsigma$ (from $\theta\eta\lambda\upsilon\varsigma$),⁷⁹ while Hellanicus' reading would imply a Doricism on the part of the poet; this is incorrect, because short feminine plural accusatives are never found in Homer but only in Hesiod (*Sch. Il.* 5.269d: ὅτι οἱ περὶ Ἑλλάνικον ἀνεγίνωσκον ἄθηλέας ὡς ταχέας, ὡς Δωρικῶς ἐκτιθεμένου τοῦ ποιητοῦ. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτο παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ πλεονάζει, Ὅμηρος δὲ οὐ χρῆται).⁸⁰ This evidence must be compared with *Sch. Il.* 1.56c and 1.198b^{1,2} (analyzed above, at § 2.1.1), where Aristarchus rejects Zenodotus' reading ὀρήτο because it is Doric. These examples thus seem to suggest that according to Aristarchus Doric was alien to Homeric language.

3. *Scriptio Continua* and Dialectal Solutions

The distinction among different dialects also played a role in the editorial process. The most common 'dialectal solution' involved verbal forms in the past. A series of scholia by Didymus report that Aristarchus chose to have past tenses without the augment ἰακῶς, 'according to the Ionic dialect'. The lack of augment is not an Ionic feature, but merely an archaism characteristic of poetic diction, and of Homeric diction in particular.⁸¹ Herodotus, however, uses the past of iterative verbs in -σκον without the augment,⁸² so perhaps Aristarchus could have felt that a form without the augment belonged to the Ionic dialect.⁸³

This morphological choice is closely connected with the division of the *scriptio continua*. In fact, to avoid the augment 'according to the Ionic', it is often just a question of attaching the ε of the syllabic augment to the preceding word, as in σφωε πόρεν instead of σφώ ἔπορεν (*Sch. Il.* 10.546a^{1,2}).⁸⁴ At times,

78. Cf. La Roche 1866, 280–281; Giangrande 1970, 260; Montanari 1988, 63–65 (fr. 1).

79. See also *Sch. Il.* 5.269c^{1,2} (Hrd.).

80. In *Th.* 60, 267, 401, 534, 653, and perhaps 804; *Op.* 564, 663, 675; cf. West 1966, 85. It is extremely difficult to decide whether these short accusative feminine plurals are really Doric features. In fact, they probably are not; see Morpurgo Davies 1964, 152–165.

81. See Chantraine 1953–1958, I 479–484; Cassio et al. 2016, 156. On the augment in the *Iliad*, see West 1998–2000, I xxvi–xxviii.

82. E.g., Hdt. 1.148 (ἄγεσκον), 2.151 (ἀνεύρισκον), 2.174 (κλέπτεσκε, ἄγεσκον), 4.130 (λάβεσκον).

83. Nünlist 2012b, 163, however, doubts that Didymus preserves Aristarchus' terminology here.

84. Cf. also Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 10.546b^{1,2}.

though, in addition to the division of *scriptio continua*, a slight intervention in the text is also required, because a letter is changed. This happens in many cases where the verb in the past with syllabic augment is preceded by a word ending in a vowel. The solutions are either to keep the syllabic augment and elide the final vowel of the preceding word, or to eliminate the syllabic augment and keep the preceding word without elision. According to Didymus, Aristarchus often chose the latter option; for example, he reads σπλάγχνα πάσαντο instead of σπλάγχν' ἐπάσαντο (*Sch. Il.* 1.464d; 2.427b);⁸⁵ ἀντὶ τέτυξο instead of ἀντ' ἐτέτυξο (*Sch. Il.* 8.163b); πολλὰ πάθον καὶ πολλὰ μόγησα instead of πόλλ' ἔπαθον καὶ πόλλ' ἐμόγησα (*Sch. Il.* 9.492).⁸⁶ In the many instances of this choice,⁸⁷ Didymus defines Aristarchus' reading as Ἰακῶς, 'according to the Ionic dialect'.⁸⁸ A similar case happens when the verb has a preverb ending in a vowel, which is often maintained instead of the augment, as in καταμύξατο instead of κατεμύξατο (*Sch. Il.* 5.425a¹) and ἀνακυμβαλίαζον instead of ἀνεκυμβαλίαζον (*Sch. Il.* 16.379a^{1,2,3}).⁸⁹ In these instances too, Aristarchus' solution is called 'Ionic'.⁹⁰ A bit more invasive are the cases in which Aristarchus deletes the syllabic augment, as when he reads ᾠ δῶκε instead of ᾠ ἔδωκε (*Sch. Il.* 2.205b), or Γλαῦκος τίκτεν instead of Γλαῦκος ἔτικτεν (*Sch. Il.* 6.155a); in these cases, however, the meter is not affected by the deletion.⁹¹ When there is a temporal

85. In fact, we know from Herodian that Aristarchus also read the first verb (κάη) without augment in the same line, adding the E to the preceding word (*Sch. Il.* 1.464a): Πτολεμαῖος (p. 41 Baeye) τὸ ε τελευταῖον λαμβάνει τοῦ 'μῆρε', ἵνα Ἰακώτερον ἐκδέξηται τὸ 'κάη'. καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ οὕτως [Ptolemy [of Ascalon] takes the final E [as part] of μῆρε, so that he understands κάη more according to the Ionic dialect, and so does Aristarchus]. In sum, Aristarchus' reading of *Il.* 1.464 = 2.427 is αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μῆρε κάη καὶ σπλάγχνα πάσαντο instead of αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μῆρ' ἐκάη καὶ σπλάγχν' ἐπάσαντο; see also *Sch. Il.* 1.464b¹ (Did.) and *Sch. Il.* 2.427a (Hrd.); cf. Schironi 2004, 96–102 (fr. 8); van Thiel 2014a, I 131.

86. And he also read πολλὰ μόγησα instead of πόλλ' ἐμόγησα at *Il.* 1.162 (*Sch. Il.* 1.162); cf. van Thiel 2014a, I 84–85.

87. Other cases are Τρηχίνα νέμοντο instead of Τρηχίν' ἐνέμοντο (*Sch. Il.* 2.682); ἔργα νέμοντο instead of ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο (*Sch. Il.* 2.751); ἔκπαγλα φίλησα instead of ἔκπαγλ' ἐφίλησα (*Sch. Il.* 3.415); μοῖρα πέδησε instead of μοῖρ' ἐπέδησε (*Sch. Il.* 4.517b); κακὰ μήσατο instead of κάκ' ἐμήσατο (*Sch. Il.* 6.157a¹); ἄμα στεῖχον instead of ἄμ' ἔστειχον (*Sch. Il.* 9.86); μηρία καῖε instead of μηρί' ἔκηε (*Sch. Il.* 11.773a); θαμὰ βάζετε instead of θάμ' ἐβάζετε (*Sch. Il.* 16.207c¹); ἀμφὶ φόβηθεν instead of ἀμφεφόβηθεν / ἀμφ' ἐφόβηθεν (*Sch. Il.* 16.290); ἔργα τέτυκτο instead of ἔργ' ἐτέτυκτο (*Sch. Il.* 17.279); θαῦμα τέτυκτο instead of θαῦμ' ἐτέτυκτο (*Sch. Il.* 18.549); σῆμα τέτυκτο instead of σῆμ' ἐτέτυκτο (*Sch. Il.* 23.455a); ἄρα στόρεσαν instead of ἄρ' ἐστόρεσαν (*Sch. Il.* 24.648a).

88. With the exception only of *Sch. Il.* 8.163b, 9.492, 11.773a, and 17.279.

89. Similarly, Aristarchus also reads ποδῶν ὑπο σείετο (with anastrophe of the preposition ὑπό) instead of ποδῶν ὑπεσείετο (*Sch. Il.* 14.285b). On *Il.* 10.354, where according to Didymus (*Sch. Il.* 10.354b), he read ἐπεδραμέτην with augment and not ἐπιδραμέτην, cf. La Roche 1866, 427; Ludwig 1884–1885, I 317.17–23; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 10.354b.

90. With the exception only of *Sch. Il.* 5.425a¹.

91. He also reads καὶ λάμπετο instead of καὶ ἐλάμπετο (*Sch. Il.* 20.156) and αὖτις δῶκε instead of αὖτις ἔδωκε (*Sch. Il.* 21.84). In these cases, too, the meter is not affected. In *Sch. Il.* 16.120a^{1,2}

augment, on the other hand, he eliminates it, if meter allows it: so he reads οἰνοχόει instead of ὀνοχόει (*Sch. Il.* 1.598a), ἔχθαιρε instead of ἧχθαιρε (*Sch. Il.* 17.270), ἔλπετο instead of ἧλπετο (*Sch. Il.* 17.603).⁹² I have gone into this fairly long survey to show how consistent Aristarchus' choices seem to have been. These Didymus scholia leave the impression that whenever possible—namely, whenever the meter allowed—Aristarchus often chose a form without augment, either syllabic or temporal, especially in certain metrical positions.⁹³ In doing so, he could either divide up the sequence of letters differently, or change a vowel, or even eliminate a vowel within the letter sequence in the line, as long as the meter was not disturbed.

Some other cases of Ionic readings by Aristarchus are attested by Didymus, who, for example, says that he read κείνος rather than ἐκεῖνος, again—and this time correctly⁹⁴—Ἰακῶς (*Sch. Il.* 15.94a). This choice is made especially when the pronoun is preceded by καί: in these cases, Aristarchus writes καὶ κείνος rather than the form with crasis κάκεῖνος, which implies the full form ἐκεῖνος.⁹⁵ These are again very slight changes in the text, which consist in taking away a letter without disrupting the meter. The initial ε- is also eliminated without affecting the meter when he reads αὐτὰρ νέρθε instead of αὐτὰρ ἔνερθε according to the Ionic dialect (*Sch. Il.* 20.57a: Ἀρίσταρχος Ἰακῶς 'αὐτὰρ νέρθε'). Why νέρθε is considered Ionic is not clear, and the sources are silent. Did ancient scholars consider it Ionic by analogy with κείνος versus ἐκεῖνος (and κείθεν versus ἐκεῖθεν) and/or because it occurs in Homer? Both reasons might be possible, but it is also true that νέρθε(ν) is used by the Attic poets Aeschylus,⁹⁶ Sophocles,⁹⁷ and Euripides,⁹⁸ as well as by the Doric poet Theocritus.⁹⁹ More ambiguous are cases when Aristarchus selects the more Ionic form, but such

Didymus says that at the end of line, instead of the present κείρει, Aristarchus read the imperfect κείρε, Ἰακῶς without augment.

92. Other instances are ἔλκε instead of εἶλκε (*Sch. Il.* 4.213b¹; 11.457b¹; 13.383a; 16.406a; 16.504a¹; see also *Sch. Il.* 17.395 [Did.?]); ὀπλίζοντο instead of ὠπλίζοντο (*Sch. Il.* 8.55a¹); σάκει ἔλασ'(ε) instead of σάκει ἧλασεν (*Sch. Il.* 20.259a¹; cf. West 2001, 256–257).

93. For a survey of all these cases of augment deletion, see La Roche 1866, 423–428, who tries to detect the principles followed by Aristarchus (for example, the preference for lack of augment in specific positions of the hexameter). Cf. also Lehrs 1882, 356; Ribbach 1883, 18; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 181–182.

94. See Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 613; Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ἐκεῖ.

95. *Sch. Il.* 15.45a; 15.179b; 16.648b¹; similarly, he reads καὶ κείθεν (*Sch. Il.* 21.62). In the cases where Aristarchus gives καὶ κείνος and καὶ κείθεν, his solution is never called 'Ionic' by Didymus; still, the clear case of *Sch. Il.* 15.94a, where κείνος is called 'Ionic', suggests that this is Aristarchus' rationale in all the cases where he reads καὶ κείνος and καὶ κείθεν. Cf. La Roche 1866, 247–250.

96. Aesch. *Pers.* 639, *Cho.* 40.

97. Soph. *Trach.* 1202, *OT* 416, *OC* 1707.

98. Eur. *Alc.* 875, 1139, *Hel.* 966, *Ba.* 752, etc.

99. Theoc. *Id.* 21.13. See Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ἔνερθε(ν). Cf. La Roche 1866, 255.

readings are not defined as Ionic, as when he chooses the datives *πλεκτοῖσιν τάλάροισι*, with the Ionic (but also early Attic)¹⁰⁰ ending and no preposition, rather than *πλεκτοῖς ἐν τάλάροισι* (*Sch. Il.* 18.568a^{1,2}).¹⁰¹

Cases of supposedly ‘Attic’ readings are even more uncertain. When Aristarchus reads *μή* with the aorist imperative (rather than the usual aorist subjunctive), Herodian calls this solution ‘Attic’, quoting the similar use in Aristophanes, *Thesm.* 870, as a parallel (*Sch. Il.* 4.410a).¹⁰² Yet the label ‘Attic’ might be only Herodian’s comment; Aristarchus could have simply read this form in his text. This is in fact the only variant attested in the manuscript tradition and the only options (discussed by Herodian in the scholium) are whether to read the verb as a compound, *ὁμοίῃ ἔνθεο τιμῇ* or *ὁμοίῃ ἐν θεο*, meaning ‘[do not] place [our fathers] in the same honor [as us]’. On the other hand, Didymus says that Aristarchus wrote *εἶπας* instead of *εἶπες*, a reading which Didymus himself does not share (*Sch. Il.* 1.106e: τὸ δὲ ‘εἶπες’ ‘εἶπας’ Ἀρίσταρχος γράφει, κακῶς).¹⁰³ Even if *εἶπας* is the usual Attic form, it is by no means limited to Attic,¹⁰⁴ and Didymus actually does not define it as such. The same Didymus, on the other hand, labels as Attic the accusative *Μίνων*, read by Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 14.322a²: Ἀρίσταρχος ‘Μίνων <τε>’ Ἀττικῶς).¹⁰⁵ This accusative belongs to the Attic declension, but this declension is not limited to the Attic dialect.¹⁰⁶ In fact, both *εἶπας* and the accusative *Μίνων* may occur in an Ionic author like Herodotus (*Μίνων* at 7.171 and *εἶπας* at 7.234)¹⁰⁷—so for Aristarchus they probably were not specifically Attic but belonged to the Ionic-Attic family in general.

It is impossible to say whether Aristarchus chose these Ionic-Attic readings on the basis of manuscript evidence. Did he find them in an Ionic copy or, for

100. See Buck 1955, § 106.4.

101. In this case, however, the reason for Aristarchus’ reading is more likely the elimination of the preposition *ἐν*, as he does elsewhere (see Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 8.337; 18.579); cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 18.568a^{1,2}.

102. Schwyzer (1950–1953, II 343) and Chantraine (1953–1958, II 230) consider this an ancient injunctive, not an Atticism; in fact, as Schwyzer also observes, the example of Aristoph. *Thesm.* 870 is almost unique and, according to the scholia, Aristophanes was here parodying Sophocles (*TrGF* 4, fr. 493), who himself might have been imitating Homer.

103. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.108a (Did.); cf. La Roche 1866, 239–240; Chantraine 1953–1958, I 385–386; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 174.

104. See Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 745; Buck 1955, § 144.

105. Aristarchus’ reading was opposed to Zenodotus, who read *Μίνω*, and to others, who read the epic accusative *Μίνωα*. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 131.

106. See Schwyzer 1950–1953, I 557–558, who calls it ‘der ionische und bes. attische Typus’.

107. These are the readings offered by modern editions (e.g., Hude’s and Wilson’s *OCT*). However, according to Wilson, most manuscripts (d in Wilson’s apparatus), including the *Laurentianus plut.* 70.3 (A) at 7.171 have *Μίνεω*; on the other hand, at 7.234 the *Laurentianus* (A) has *εἶπας*, while the other group of manuscripts (d in Wilson’s apparatus) has *εἶπες*.

the Ionic-Attic ones, in the copy from Athens? Or did he himself correct the text? Even if they are emendations, these dialectal corrections do not imply consistent changes in the text. For the most part, they involve a different division of the *scriptio continua*, a substitution, an addition, or an elimination of a letter, all operations which do not disturb the metrical pattern. This is in line with Aristarchus' methodology: when the text could not be explained or when it presented ambiguities in terms of readings, he always chose the reading that best suited the Homeric usage and required the fewest changes in the received text. It is also impossible to ascertain whether Aristarchus consistently used the same readings in the same circumstances, given that his fragments do not cover every single line of the *Iliad*. At any rate, whatever their origin is (manuscripts or emendation), these readings all seem to suggest that for Aristarchus anything that was Ionic or, alternatively, Attic was suitable in Homer.¹⁰⁸

4. Conclusions

The above survey allows us to reach some conclusions about Aristarchus' view of Homeric language. He not only perceived it as fundamentally different from Koine (referred to as 'our' language, or the way 'we' speak), but also as somehow more ancient. As for the dialectal nuances of this language, Aristarchus seems to have recognized essentially Attic and Ionic peculiarities in Homeric diction. He may also have allowed for some Aeolic forms, while he probably rejected readings that he considered Doric. In describing the Homeric language, Aristarchus noted Attic peculiarities, but did not normally point out Ionic ones, except when a particular Ionic feature did not appear in the standard form; in this case, he took care to explain that these peculiar forms were indeed Ionic, but modified (for example, the 'shortened' α instead of the regular η). On the other hand, when it was a question of correcting the text and changing it, Aristarchus often chose the 'more Ionic' reading of verbs without augment and other Ionic variants. Additionally, he tended to understand phenomena that we now consider more as archaisms in Homer, such as past verbal forms without

108. A similar case might be that of the readings θαμειαί and ταρφειαί, which Aristarchus accentuates as oxytone in analogy with πικιναί (Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 1.52; 19.357a). Aristarchus does not mention dialectal reasons for such readings, and in Chapter 3.5. § 9 it was suggested that he was following an old accentuation (compared with the more regular θαμείαι and ταρφεΐαι). This is probably the linguistically correct explanation. Yet, interestingly enough, Herodian, without naming Aristarchus, elsewhere says that the oxytone forms θαμειαί and ταρφειαί are 'more Ionic' (*Sch. Il.* 5.502b). Perhaps Aristarchus, too, considered these forms (which he might have found marked with such an accent in old manuscripts) more Ionic.

the augment or the use of the dual, not as archaisms but rather as traits belonging to a specific dialect, Ionic and Attic respectively.¹⁰⁹

These sets of data seem to correspond to the evidence for ancient beliefs about Homer's origin and ancient forms of Greek. According to the ancients, the Attic dialect could be diachronically divided into two phases, παλαιὰ Ἀτθίς, which lasted until the end of the fifth century, and νέα Ἀτθίς, the postclassical Attic.¹¹⁰ Παλαιὰ Ἀτθίς was identified with Ἰάς, the Ionic dialect, as Strabo explains:

Strabo 8.1.2: ἐπὶ τούτοις μὲν οὖν πολλὰ ἔθνη γεγένηται, τὰ δ' ἀνωτάτω τοσαῦτα, ὅσας καὶ διαλέκτους παρειλήφαμεν τὰς Ἑλληνίδας· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν, τὴν μὲν Ἰάδα τῇ παλαιᾷ Ἀτθίδι τὴν αὐτὴν φαμέν (καὶ γὰρ Ἴωνες ἐκαλοῦντο οἱ τότε Ἀττικοί, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν εἰσιν οἱ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐποικήσαντες Ἴωνες καὶ χρησάμενοι τῇ νῦν λεγομένη γλώττῃ Ἰάδι), τὴν δὲ Δωρίδα τῇ Αἰολίδι.

On these [lands], thus, there have been many peoples, but the most ancient ones are as many as the dialects that we have also accepted as Greek dialects. Though there are four of them, we say that the Ionic dialect is the same as the ancient Attic (for the Attic people of that time were called Ionians and from there come the Ionians who colonized Asia and who used what is now called the Ionic language) and that the Doric dialect is the same as the Aeolic.¹¹¹

This is not an isolated notion. In his commentary on the *Iliad*, for example, Eustathius remarks that there is affinity between Attic and ancient Ionic (130.43, ad *Il.* 1.434: δῆλον δὲ ὅτι κοινωνία τις ἦν τῇ παλαιᾷ Ἰάδι καὶ Ἀτθίδι)—where by 'Attic' he probably means 'ancient Attic'. Indeed, Herodian (via Choeroboscus) confirms that Homer was seen as speaking παλαιὰ Ἀτθίς, when he says ὄντος δὲ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς παλαιᾶς Ἀτθίδος.¹¹²

109. Perhaps Aristarchus held this opinion also because he shared the widespread ancient view that the so-called κοινή διάλεκτος, 'common [Greek] dialect', was a sort of original language, from which other variants (dialectal or poetic) were derived. This meant that all the deviations from it were not considered by the ancients as archaisms or poetic forms, but rather as dialectal variations; see Morpurgo Davies 1987; Cassio 1993. For example, *Sch. Il.* 19.1b (ex.) considers the genitive plural ῥοάων a Boeotian word (ῥοάων: Βοιωτός ἢ φωνή). Yet ῥοάων is not Boeotian (or Thessalian), but simply an archaism (I would like to thank Albio Cesare Cassio for bringing this example to my attention). The same attitude might be behind Aristarchus' idea that the lack of augment was Ionic and the use of the dual was Attic. Yet, as we have seen above, Aristarchus did also have some diachronic sense of the Greek language and explained some deviations from Koine Greek also as 'archaisms'.

110. *Su.* τ 1049 quotes Eupolis, Cratinus, Aristophanes, and Thucydides as representatives of 'ancient Attic', while 'new Attic' is represented by Menander. 'Ancient Attic' thus continued until 400 BCE; see Schwyzler 1950–1953, I 778; Cassio et al. 2016, 364–365.

111. This passage is echoed by Eust. in *Dion. Per.* 361.23–27.

112. Choerob. in *Theod. Can.* 2.86.20 (= *Hrd.* 2.326.16). On the equivalence between 'ancient

Homer thus spoke ‘ancient Attic’, which was very similar, if not identical, to Ionic. Such an idea fits with the evidence provided by Homer’s *Lives*. Many cities claimed to be Homer’s hometown, and Athens was one of them.¹¹³ In particular, Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax are quoted as the scholarly authorities who supported the view of an Athenian Homer¹¹⁴—both also believing that Homer had lived during the Ionic colonization.¹¹⁵ The data collected in the scholia and the information of the *Lives* reinforce each other and make it possible to conclude that, according to Aristarchus, Homer was an Athenian, who lived during the colonization of Ionia and who spoke the dialect known as ‘ancient Attic’ (παλαιὰ Ἀτθίς). Perhaps he even went to Ionia, whose language—Ἰάς—was basically the same as, or at least very similar to, παλαιὰ Ἀτθίς. As a consequence, Aristarchus could explain linguistic uses which were different from Koine by saying that they were ‘more ancient’ than the current ones, and that they were Attic (i.e., they belonged to παλαιὰ Ἀτθίς) or Ionic (i.e., they belonged to Ἰάς).¹¹⁶ There were certainly differences between the two variants of the same dialect, but both forms could be found in Homer (and in other ‘archaic’ Ionic authors such as Herodotus). This also explains why Aristarchus seems to have rejected Doric elements: Homer was simply never part of the Doric world.¹¹⁷

Attic’ and Ionic, see Kayser 1855, 318–319; Kayser 1862, 658–659; Ludwich 1884–1885, II 417–418; Schironi 2004, 73 (fr. 4).

113. See *Hom. Vita* IV 245.8; Eust. 4.21 (*Proemium*); *Su.* o 251 (pars III, 525.10–16); Gell. 3.11.6–7.

114. [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 2: [Ὅμηρον] . . . Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ Θράξ (fr. 47 Linke) [οὐκ ᾔκνησαν εἰπεῖν] Ἀθηναῖον, and *Hom. Vita* V 247.7–8: [Ὅμηρος] κατὰ δ’ Ἀρίσταρχον καὶ Διονύσιον τὸν Θράκα Ἀθηναῖος. Cf. Linke 1977, 68–69.

115. Procl. *Chrest.* 101.13–17: τοῖς δὲ χρόνοις αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἀρίσταρχόν φασι γενέσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῆς Ἰωνίας ἀποικίαν, ἥτις ὕστερεϊ τῆς Ἡρακλειδῶν καθόδου ἔτεσιν ἐξήκοντα, τὸ δὲ περὶ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας λείπεται τῶν Τρωϊκῶν ἔτεσιν ὀγδοήκοντα [as for [Homer’s] dates, Aristarchus and his school say that he lived during the Ionic colonization, which happens sixty years after the return of the Heraclids, and the events concerning the Heraclids occur eighty years after the Trojan War]. [Plut.] *Hom.* 2 § 3 is very similar.

116. In this, I do not accept the sharp distinction between diachronic and dialectal explanations, as suggested by Nünlist 2012b, 163–164, who concludes that “the hypothesis that arguments based on dialect superseded diachronic explanations is plausible”. The evidence from the scholia seems rather to suggest that Aristarchus employed both a diachronic approach and a dialectal one, and could make them agree with the theory of ‘ancient Attic’.

117. In the passage quoted above, Strabo explicitly identifies Doric and Aeolic, as if they were closely connected, just like Attic and Ionic. If Aristarchus had the same view, then, while denying the Doric elements, he had to recognize the presence of some Aeolic elements in Homer such as the ending in -οιο; yet the evidence here surveyed seems to suggest that he never changed the text to make it ‘more Aeolic’ (and certainly not more Doric!).

5.2

The ‘Homeric Question’

1. The Poet Is the Same (ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα ποιητής)
2. The Polemics with the Chorizontes
 - 2.1. Who Were the Chorizontes?
 - 2.2. Fighting the Chorizontes
 - 2.3. Some Weaker Arguments against the Chorizontes
3. Clarifying the *Odyssey* from the *Iliad* (and Vice Versa)
 - 3.1. Linguistic and Stylistic Parallels
 - 3.2. Solving *Zetemata* with the Help of the Other Poem
 - 3.3. Atheteseis between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*
4. Conclusions

Long before the ‘modern’ Homeric Question was inaugurated by German philologists in the wake of Friedrich August Wolf’s *Prolegomena ad Homerum* (1795),¹ ancient scholars had raised doubts regarding the authorship of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Indeed, by the time of Aristarchus the identity and uniqueness of the author of these two poems were already at the center of a heated debate. Having worked so extensively on an edition of both poems, Aristarchus could hardly have avoided taking a position in such a dispute. As the analysis of many examples in the previous chapters has shown, he had no doubt that Homer composed both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. On the one hand, in this view he was simply following the authority of Aristotle, who took Homeric authorship of both poems for granted (e.g., *Poet.* 1448b34–1449a2). In addition, Aristarchus might have confirmed this idea through his ‘empirical’ approach to Homer: in his editorial work he encountered so many cross-references and characteristics

1. For an introduction to Wolf’s *Prolegomena* and their impact, see Grafton in Wolf 1795/1985, 3–35. In fact, the Abbé d’Aubignac (1604–1676) is sometimes considered the ‘inventor of the Homeric Question’; see, e.g., Lambin 2010, 289–292.

shared between the two poems that he had no doubt that they had been written by the same person. His certainty about Homer as the author of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* can be glimpsed from the numerous notes where Aristarchus points out the similarities between the two poems. In this regard, he had to defend his opinion against some of his contemporaries, known as Chorizontes ('Separatists'), who were convinced of the opposite position. This chapter will thus focus on Aristarchus' arguments against these *ante litteram* Analysts and on how his idea of the uniqueness of the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* was applied in his work on Homer.

1. The Poet Is the Same (ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα ποιητής)

Aristarchus often emphasized similarities between the two poems to support the claim that they were both the product of the same artist. Some scholia where these common elements between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are discussed, even explicitly add: 'the poet is thus the same' (ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα ποιητής), a comment that clearly points to the fact that Aristarchus was calling attention to these parallels because the single authorship was not universally accepted. One important proof that the two poems were closely connected and written by the same author was the fact that they shared one character, Odysseus, and that this character had the same characteristics in both poems. For example, the Odysseus of the *Iliad* is as deceitful as the one in the *Odyssey*, because he is addressed by Socus in *Il.* 11.430 as 'Odysseus, much praised, insatiable of wiles and toils', a line that Aristarchus singles out to confirm that Homer's depiction of the hero is consistent in both poems (*Sch. Il.* 11.430b: ὅτι ἐμφαίνει τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα ἐξ ἱστορίας παρειληφὼς δόλιον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ διαβεβλημένον).² He also observes that in *Il.* 4.354 Odysseus refers to himself as 'the dear father of Telemachus':

Sch. Il. 4.354a Τηλεμάχοιο: ὅτι προτετυπωμένος τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν μνημονεύει τοῦ Τηλεμάχου. τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα ποιητοῦ καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια.

'[The dear father] of Telemachus': because having shaped beforehand the facts of the *Odyssey*, he remembers Telemachus. The *Odyssey* too, then, is by the same poet.

2. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 9–10; Roemer 1924, 134; Schmidt 1976, 166 n. 28. On Aristarchus' view of Odysseus, see Chapter 5.4 § 4.

Similarly, in another instance when Odysseus again calls himself father of Telemachus,³ Aristarchus comments that Homer is anticipating the topic of the *Odyssey* (*Sch. Il.* 2.260a: ἡ διπλῇ δὲ <ὅτι> προδιασυνίστησιν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδυσσειαν μέλλοντα λόγου τυχεῖν πλείονος).⁴ For him, then, Homer already had in mind the plot of the *Odyssey* while composing the *Iliad*, so that he could construct both poems consistently and with continuous intertextual references to each other, especially in terms of mythical background. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, in Aristarchus' opinion the most important difference between Homer and the other poets, the Neoteroi, was indeed the fact that the latter did not share the mythical universe of the former: they might present the same characters but their characteristics or family stories were very different. Homer, on the other hand, was 'mythologically' self-consistent.

If myth was probably the most important element for proving the uniqueness of Homer as the author of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Aristarchus also considered similarities in style a relevant factor. So he concludes that 'the poet is the same', when calling attention to the fact that Homer in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* likes to play with etymologies (*Sch. Il.* 9.137a: ὅτι παρετυμολογεῖ . . . καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα τὰ ὀνόματα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐτύμου λαμβάνει . . . ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα ποιητής).⁵

Poetic techniques common to both poems were also used to support this assumption. Aristarchus, for example, notes that in both poems Homer sometimes intervenes in the narrative with comments (*Sch. Il.* 16.46c¹).⁶ In both poems, moreover, the Homeric persona is different from that of his heroes; in particular, Aristarchus points out that for Homer the sun rises from and sets into Oceanus, but for his characters the sun's rising and setting occur from and into the earth, both in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey* (*Sch. Il.* 7.422: τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα).⁷

As already discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2, Aristarchus also believed that the society described in the *Iliad* was identical to, or at least comparable with, the one in the *Odyssey*; thus, when discussing heroic society, he often takes examples from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.⁸ Parallels between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are also found in shared geographic denominations, such as the names 'Achaean Argos' (*Il.* 9.141, 9.283, etc.) and 'Iasian Argos' (*Od.* 18.246)

3. On Odysseus defining himself as 'the father of Telemachus' in the *Iliad* and the intertextual relationship between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* around the figure of Odysseus, see Lentini 2006.

4. Cf. Meijering 1987, 203–204. On Homeric anticipations, see Chapter 3.6.C § 2.3.

5. On this scholium, see Chapter 3.4 § 8.1.

6. See Chapter 3.6.C § 2.2.

7. Cf. Schmidt 1976, 117. See Chapter 3.3.B § 4.2.

8. In *Sch. Il.* 3.261–2a; 13.736b; 18.505a; 23.58, discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.1, § 2.2, § 2, and § 5.1 respectively. See also *Sch. Il.* 20.84a and Erbse, ad loc.

given to the Peloponnese as opposed to Thessaly, called ‘Pelasgian Argos’ (*Il.* 2.681) (*Sch. Il.* 9.141a).⁹ Aristarchus also finds similarities in the games of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. For example, he notes that boxing is mentioned before wrestling both by Achilles, when he names the contests in the funeral games of Patroclus (*Il.* 23.621–623), and by Alcinous in the *Odyssey*, when he enumerates the athletic skills of the Phaeacians to Odysseus (*Od.* 8.246). For Aristarchus, this is evidence that the author of the two poems is the same—perhaps because, in his view, the same ranking of athletic events would arise from common societal customs (*Sch. Il.* 23.621: ὅτι προτάσσει τὴν πυγμὴν ὡς καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα . . . ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα ποιητής).¹⁰ He also compares the archery contest in *Iliad* 23 (*Il.* 23.850–883) with the one in *Odyssey* 21 (*Od.* 21.120–430), noting that the manner (τρόπος) is the same, since in the *Odyssey* the contestants must shoot through a number of axes,¹¹ while in the *Iliad* the axes are the prize of the game (*Sch. Il.* 23.851a: ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος· πελέκεις γὰρ τίθησι, δι’ ὧν παρακελεύει τοξεύειν τοὺς μνηστῆρας. καὶ νῦν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔπαθλον γίνεται). The τρόπος is not the same, in fact—exactly because in the *Odyssey* the axes are the targets, while in the *Iliad* they are the prize. One way to understand Aristarchus’ comment is to suggest that he simply wanted to stress the ‘mental background’ of Homer who, after describing the archery games at the funeral of Patroclus, somehow ‘remembered’ the detail of the axes when he described a similar competition in the *Odyssey*.¹² Similarly, Aristarchus praises Homer’s care in depicting women’s quarters in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (*Sch. Il.* 6.248b: ἐπιμελῶς δὲ Ὅμηρος καὶ διὰ τῆς Ἰλιάδος καὶ διὰ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας τοὺς γυναικείους θαλάμους συνίστησιν):¹³ this relatively brief note might imply that such a sensitivity for what is ‘proper’ gender-wise¹⁴ and such an unsurpassed descriptive talent are difficult to find in two poets at the same time.

9. See Chapter 3.3.B § 3.1.

10. In fact, Aristarchus points out that Nestor follows the same order in *Il.* 23.634–635, when he is talking about the funeral games in honor of Amarynceus at Buprasium, which he attended in his youth (*Sch. Il.* 23.634–5).

11. See *Od.* 19.572–581 and 21.75–76.

12. Some scholars consider the archery contest in the *Odyssey* as the primary one; e.g., Whallon 1964, 11–12. On the problems in the funeral games, see Richardson 1993, 201–203 and 265–266 (specifically on the archery contest). In particular, according Richardson 1993, 266, one point of similarity between the two scenes is the fact that the axes in the *Odyssey* are also of iron and are themselves a prize won by Odysseus (*Od.* 21.61–62).

13. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 23.

14. See Chapter 3.3.B § 2.2.

2. The Polemics with the Chorzontes

Aristarchus took pains to stress all these similarities between the two poems because the authorship of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* was far from established. It is clear from the sources that already at this time (and perhaps even before)¹⁵ there were two schools of thought: those, like Aristarchus himself, who believed the two poems to be written by the same author, and those who denied it. The latter based their belief on the many conflicting details that the two poems also showed. These had troubled Aristarchus too, as is proved by the many *zētemata* that he tried to solve, as well as the many *atheteseis* which he made due to inconsistencies with other Homeric passages, even within the same poem.¹⁶ The evidence for this debate consists of several fragments wherein Aristarchus argues against these scholars, whom he calls ‘Chorzontes’ (Χωρίζοντες), that is, ‘Separatists’.

2.1. Who Were the Chorzontes?

The Chorzontes do not have a precise characterization and we know relatively little about them. They are mentioned only in a small group of scholia (ten in total), which are all derived from Aristarchus, and always with the generic label of ‘Chorzontes’.¹⁷ While no individual name or identity emerge from the scholia, some information may be obtained from other sources. Proclus mentions a Xenon and a Hellanicus in his *Chrestomathy*, saying that they did not believe that the *Odyssey* was by Homer.¹⁸ Thus, they might be part of the group of the Chorzontes, though it is not clear whether they were directly the target of Aristarchus’ criticism, and Proclus in fact never says that Xenon or Hellanicus were among the Chorzontes. Moreover, the surviving fragments where Hellanicus is quoted do not concern any explicit discussion about the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* and their authorship.¹⁹ Xenon, on the other hand, is never

15. Cf. Kohl 1921, 209–210; Montanari 1995a, 13–19.

16. See especially Chapter 3.6.B § 4.1 and Chapter 3.6.C § 5.

17. On the Chorzontes, see Kohl 1917 and Kohl 1921. The ten scholia where the name ‘Chorzontes’ occurs are the ‘*fragmenta certa*’ in Kohl 1917; however, he also selects a consistent group of other ‘*fragmenta probabilia et dubia*’ in scholia which discuss inconsistencies between the two poems and even within the same poem. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 23–26, also discusses some of the scholia against the Chorzontes.

18. Procl. *Chrest.* 102.2–3: γέγραφε δὲ ποιήσεις δύο, Ἰλιάδα καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν, ἣν Ξένων καὶ Ἑλλάνικος ἀφαιροῦνται αὐτοῦ [[Homer] has written two poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the latter of which Xenon and Hellanicus deny to him]. Cf. Montanari 1988, 62–63 (test. 2).

19. On Hellanicus, see Kohl 1921, 208–211; Montanari 1988, 45–73, esp. 54.

quoted anywhere else in our sources.²⁰ The only other evidence at our disposal is Aristarchus' monograph *Against the Paradox of Xenon* (Πρὸς τὸ Ξένωνος παράδοξον), which is quoted by Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 12.435a¹. In this scholium the discussion concerns a variant, and it is difficult to see any link with the Chorizontes.²¹ Still, the possibility cannot be excluded that this is due to Didymus' method of excerpting, and that indeed the work *Against the Paradox of Xenon* contained Aristarchus' refutations against Xenon, who 'paradoxically' wanted to deny Homer's authorship of the *Odyssey*.

2.2. Fighting the Chorizontes

The ten scholia that mention the Chorizontes are all by Aristonicus.²² From this evidence it becomes clear that Aristarchus used several different arguments to refute these scholars, but they all shared the same simple, underlying strategy: he explicitly or implicitly accused them of being misled in their judgments by their own careless reading of both poems. In applying this tactic, which recalls his polemical notes against the Glossographers, Zenodotus, and other scholars,²³ Aristarchus capitalized on his exceptional familiarity with the two Homeric poems, which allowed him to find the counterevidence to debunk the Separatists' arguments.

Perceived linguistic differences between the two poems were the most important field where Aristarchus' deep knowledge of the Homeric idiolect could be best employed to demonstrate the errors of his opponents. One of the favorite arguments of the Chorizontes, in fact, was that the two poems had significant linguistic differences. For example, they argued that the adverb προπάροιθε is used with a different meaning in the two poems: in the *Iliad* it is an adverb of place ('before', 'in front'), while in the *Odyssey* it is an adverb of time ('before', 'first'). Aristarchus remarks that in *Il.* 10.476 προπάροιθε in fact indicates time, since Odysseus saw Rhesus 'first' and pointed him out to Diomedes (*Sch. Il.* 10.476a: καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι νῦν τὸ 'προπάροιθεν' ἐπὶ χρόνου τέταχεν, . . . οὐχ ὥς οἱ Χωρίζοντες ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ μόνον, ἐν Ἰλιάδι δὲ τοπικῶς). Elsewhere, too, Aristarchus highlights the temporal meaning of προπάροιθε in the *Iliad* (*Sch. Il.* 11.734a^{1,2}) or explains that it can either have a temporal or a

20. On Xenon, see Kohl 1921, 207–208; Montanari 1988, 119–121.

21. Cf. Montanari 1988, 120–121 (test. 2); on this monograph, see Chapter 1.2 § 1. Kohl 1921, 208, tried to explain the quotation of Xenon in *Sch. Il.* 12.435a¹ by linking it to the discussion on prosaic and ordinary words used in the *Odyssey* (see below, § 2.2, on *Sch. Il.* 11.147a).

22. *Sch. Il.* 2.356a¹ (fr. 1 Kohl); 2.649 (fr. 2 Kohl); 10.476a (fr. 3 Kohl); 11.147a (fr. 4 Kohl); 11.692a (fr. 5 Kohl); 12.96 (fr. 6 Kohl); 13.365a (fr. 9 Kohl); 16.747a (fr. 7 Kohl); 21.416a (fr. 8 Kohl); 21.550a (fr. 10 Kohl). These fragments will all be surveyed in the following pages.

23. See Chapter 3.3.A § 3 (Glossographers) and Chapter 4 § 1 and § 3 (Zenodotus and other scholars).

local meaning (*Sch. Il.* 22.197a), so that the perceived semantic difference of the word in the two poems is shown to be nonexistent.²⁴

A similar argument is adopted to counter the Chorizontes' claim that the poet of the *Odyssey* uses common, low-register words, like χοῖνιξ, 'choenix', a dry measure (*Od.* 19.28), and λύχνος, 'lamp' (*Od.* 19.34), while ordinary words never occur in the *Iliad*. Aristarchus, on the contrary, argues that words from everyday language are also used in the *Iliad*, for example the hapax ὄλμος, which indicates 'a round smooth stone', a 'mortar'²⁵ (*Sch. Il.* 11.147a: καὶ ὅτι <καὶ> ἐν Ἰλιάδι εὐτελέσι κέχρηται λεξιδίοις, οὐ μόνον ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα, 'χοίνικος' καὶ 'λύχνου'. πρὸς τοὺς Χωρίζοντας).²⁶ The note simply emphasizes the use of low-register words (εὐτελεῖ λεξίδια) but does not expand on what Aristarchus judged to be the Chorizontes' flaws in their arguments, aside from not reading Homer with enough attention. For him, they probably also missed the fact that the *Odyssey* deals with daily life much more than the *Iliad*, so that it was easier to find examples of everyday language in the former than in the latter; this did not mean, though, that the poems were by two different authors.²⁷

With similar arguments, Aristarchus also disputed the claim that the heroic worlds depicted in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey* conflicted. In particular, the Chorizontes claimed that the diet in the *Iliad* was different from that in the *Odyssey*, since the heroes of the *Iliad* do not eat fish, while in the *Odyssey* they do (*Od.* 4.368–369, 12.330–332). Aristarchus points to *Il.* 16.745–748, however; in this passage, Patroclus mocks Cebriones when, mortally wounded, he falls down from his chariot, and compares him to someone diving into the sea to fish for oysters:

Sch. Il. 16.747a πολλοὺς ἂν κορέσειεν ἀνὴρ <ὅδε τήθεα διφῶν>: ὅτι ἅπαξ εἶρηκε 'τήθεα'. ἔστι δὲ εἶδος τῶν θαλασσίων ὀστρέων. πρὸς τοὺς Χωρίζοντας (fr. 7 Kohl). φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τῆς Ἰλιάδος ποιητῆς οὐ παρeisάγει τοὺς ἥρωας

24. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 115; Kohl 1917, 21–22 (fr. 3); Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 11.734a¹.

25. Cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, and *Lfgre*, s.v. On Aristarchus and hapaxes, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.10.

26. So also Aristonicus in *Sch. HQ Od.* 19.28 χοίνικος ἄπτηται: . . . ἅπαξ ἐνταῦθα ἡ φωνή. καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο χωριστέον τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὴν Ὀδύσειαν. κάκει γὰρ εἰσι τοῦδε εὐτελέστερα ὀνόματα. 'ὄλμον δ' ὡς ἔσσευε βαλὼν' (cf. *Il.* 11.147) 'ἀμφ' ἀστραγάλοισι χολωθεὶς' (*Il.* 23.88), 'πτύον' (cf. *Il.* 13.588) ['[whoever] eats my daily portion [of bread]': . . . the expression [χοῖνιξ] is used only here; and we need not separate the *Iliad* from the *Odyssey* because of this. For there are nouns of a lower register than this one there [i.e., in the *Iliad*] as well: 'he struck and sent [his head rolling] like a round stone' (cf. *Il.* 11.147), 'angered at the dice' (*Il.* 23.88), 'sieve' (cf. *Il.* 13.588)]. Of these two additional examples of 'low register' words, no Aristarchean note is preserved at *Il.* 13.588, while at *Il.* 23.88 Aristarchus simply observes that Homer has mentioned the game of dice only on that occasion (*Sch. Il.* 23.88b: ἅπαξ τῆς διὰ τῶν ἀστραγάλων παιδιᾶς μέμνηται). See also *Sch. HQV Od.* 19.34 and Carnuth 1869, 149. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 25; Kohl 1917, 22–24 (fr. 4).

27. This strategy is used by Aristarchus when discussing the different meanings of ὄμιλος ('crowd' and 'battle'), discussed below, at § 3.1.

χρωμένους ἰχθύσιν, ὁ δὲ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας (cf. *Od.* 4.368; 12.331). φανερόν δὲ ὅτι, εἰ καὶ μὴ παράγει χρωμένους, ἴσασιν, ἐκ τοῦ τὸν Πάτροκλον ὀνομάζειν ‘τήθεα’. νοητέον δὲ τὸν ποιητὴν διὰ τὸ μικροπρεπὲς παρητῆσθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ λαχάνοις παρεισάγει χρωμένους. ἀλλ’ ὅμως φησὶ ‘δμῶες Ὀδυσσεύς τέμενος μέγα κοπρήσοντες’ (*Od.* 17.299).

‘And this man would satiate many by searching for oysters (τήθεα)’: because he has said τήθεα only once. It is a species of sea oyster. With reference to the Chorizontes (fr. 7 Kohl), for they say that the poet of the *Iliad* does not represent heroes as eating fish, whereas the poet of the *Odyssey* (cf. *Od.* 4.368. 12.331) [does]. It is clear that, even if he does not represent them as eating fish, they do know [about fish], from the fact that Patroclus mentions ‘oysters’ (τήθεα). We must understand that the poet avoids [fish as food] because it is petty. In fact, he also does not represent characters as eating vegetables, but still says: ‘[so that] the slaves of Odysseus [should take the dung] to manure his wide land’ (*Od.* 17.299).

This simile in the mouth of Patroclus proves that the characters of the *Iliad* also know how to use fish as a source of food. But Homer does not mention fish because it is less noble a food than roasted meat and so it is not fitting for his heroes. In fact, something similar occurs in the *Odyssey*, where Homer never presents characters eating vegetables, but *Od.* 17.299 proves that they do grow vegetables.²⁸ In a way, Aristarchus turns the Chorizontes’ argument on its head—here to his favor: he shows that in both poems Homer, in fact, adopts the exact same strategy. He cannot ignore that his heroes eat less than dignified foods (fish and vegetables), yet he tries to avoid showing them enjoying that petty diet as much as possible.

In other cases, Aristarchus accused the Separatists of being ignorant of specific syntactic figures used by Homer²⁹ with the result that they misinterpreted his poetry. For example, he employs this argument to discuss a myth present in both poems:

Sch. Il. 2.356a¹ τίσασθαι δ’ Ἑλένης <ὀρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε>: πρὸς τοὺς Χωρίζοντας· ἔφασαν (fr. 1 Kohl) γάρ τὸν μὲν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ποιητὴν

28. *Sch. Od.* 4.368c (Ariston.?) notes that in the *Odyssey*, too, heroes eat fish only when they are in desperate need of food (as openly said at *Od.* 4.369 = 12.332). Cf. Hofmann 1905, 7 and 33–34; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 25; Kohl 1917, 27–31 (fr. 7); Schmidt 1976, 182–187; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 110; on the heroes’ diet, see also Chapter 3.3.B § 2.3. The debate about the heroic diet predates Aristarchus and the Chorizontes, as the comic poet Eubulus (*PCG* 5, fr. 118) and the philosopher Plato (*Resp.* 404b10–c4) had already taken an interest in it; cf. Montanari 1995a, 13–16.

29. On Homeric syntactic ‘figures’, see Chapter 3.2.B.

δυσανασχετοῦσαν συνιστάνειν καὶ στένουσαν διὰ τὸ βία ἀπῆχθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου, τὸν δὲ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας ἐκοῦσαν, οὐ νοοῦντες ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ' αὐτῆς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν πρόθεσιν τὴν 'περί' δεῖ λαβεῖν, ἢ ἢ περί' Ἑλένης. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος, τιμωρίαν λαβεῖν ἀνθ' ὧν ἐστενάξαμεν καὶ ἐμεριμνήσαμεν περί' Ἑλένης· παραλειπτικός γὰρ προθέσεών ἐστιν ὁ ποιητής.

'[Before . . .] avenging the worries and laments of Helen (Ἑλένης)': with reference to the Chorizontes. For they said (fr. 1 Kohl) that the poet of the *Iliad* represents Helen as being greatly vexed and lamenting, because she was carried away by [Paris] Alexander by force, while the poet of the *Odyssey* [represents her] as willing [to go], but they do not realize that this sentence does not refer to her, but one must supplement the preposition περί from outside, so that it is περί' Ἑλένης. And what is being said is: '[before] taking revenge for what we groaned and worried about Helen'. For the poet tends to omit prepositions.

Nestor in the assembly of Book 2 urges the Greeks not to leave Troy 'before . . . avenging the worries and laments of Helen (Ἑλένης ὀρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε)'. The genitive Ἑλένης is problematic, since in principle it can be either a subjective or an objective genitive. If Ἑλένης is taken as a subjective genitive, the sentence implies that Helen suffered when she left Sparta with Paris; this would contrast with the *Odyssey*, however, where she admits that she followed Paris willingly, albeit under Aphrodite's spell (*Od.* 4.259–264). This interpretation was used by the Chorizontes to argue that the poet of the *Iliad* was different from that of the *Odyssey* because they followed different traditions regarding Helen. To this claim, Aristarchus objects that it is simply a mistake in interpreting Homeric language, as Ἑλένης in the phrase is an objective genitive, which means that the pain and laments are not those of Helen, but those of the Greeks who suffered 'for Helen', 'because of Helen'. Without speaking of 'subjective' and 'objective' genitives, Aristarchus considers Ἑλένης a case of the omission of a preposition, in this particular case of περί.³⁰ The Chorizontes thus did not know that 'the poet tends to omit prepositions' (παραλειπτικός γὰρ προθέσεών ἐστιν ὁ ποιητής), and this ignorance led them to give the wrong mythical interpretation.³¹

30. See Chapter 3.2.B § 2.2 (ellipsis of prepositions) and § 7 (syntactic supplements). In *Sch. Il.* 2.356a¹ Aristarchus ends his explanation by paraphrasing the Homeric [πρὶν] τίσασθαι δ' Ἑλένης ὀρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε into the Koine [πρὶν] τιμωρίαν λαβεῖν ἀνθ' ὧν ἐστενάξαμεν καὶ ἐμεριμνήσαμεν περί' Ἑλένης, '[before] taking revenge for what we groaned and worried about Helen'. This example thus also demonstrates how Aristarchus employed paraphrases to debate more complex exegetical problems such as the 'Homeric Question'. On paraphrase in Aristarchus' activity, see Chapter 2.3.

31. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 25; Roemer 1912, 404–406; Kohl 1917, 15–17 (fr. 1); Bouchard 2016, 204.

Aristarchus also accused the Chorzontes of misunderstanding the Homeric use of epithets and claimed that this also led them to false conclusions about the authorship of the two poems. As shown in Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2, he stressed that in Homer there are epithets that should not be taken according to their literal meaning, but the Chorzontes did not seem to realize this. For example, they objected that in the *Iliad* Crete is called ‘of the hundred cities’ (*Il.* 2.649), while in the *Odyssey* Crete is said to have ‘ninety cities’ (*Od.* 19.174); for them, this discrepancy was again evidence that the two poems were written by different authors. Against this claim Aristarchus argues that the expression island ‘of the hundred cities’ is a generic one, meaning ‘with many cities’, while in the *Odyssey* ‘ninety cities’ refers to the precise number (*Sch. Il.* 2.649).³²

Finally, in one case the Chorzontes seem also to have pointed out discrepancies within the same poem, as they observed that Πριάμοιο θυγατρῶν εἶδος ἀρίστη, ‘the most beautiful of the daughters of Priam’, is used both for Cassandra (*Il.* 13.365–366) and for Laodice (*Il.* 3.124, 6.252). How could Cassandra and Laodice both be ‘the most beautiful’ daughter of Priam? In a brief note, Aristarchus simply points to this issue ‘with reference to the Chorzontes’ and claims that there is no contradiction (*Sch. Il.* 13.365a: καὶ οὐ μάχεται. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τοὺς Χωρίζοντας). In all likelihood, he solved the problem by suggesting that the superlative was used instead of a simple adjective (ἀρίστη to mean ‘preeminent’)—which is a well-known Homeric *schema*, as he points out elsewhere.³³ In fact, an exegetical scholium, which might reflect Aristarchus’ ideas, claims that ἀρίστη is used instead of the simple form (*Sch. Il.* 3.124 εἶδος ἀρίστην: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ).³⁴ In other words, Homer is simply praising both daughters of Priam, using a *formula*—which he does elsewhere, as Aristarchus observes when he notes that Homer calls many heroes καλλίστοι, ‘most beautiful’ (*Sch. Il.* 20.233a: ὅτι, ὡς ἂν ἀρμόζη πρὸς τὸ ἐγκώμιον, τίθησι τὸ ‘καλλίστος’. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλους καλλίστους λέγει).³⁵

Interestingly, in this specific case, the problem does not concern the two poems,³⁶ so it suggests the Chorzontes were singling out contradictory

32. See also *Sch. V Od.* 19.174; cf. Carnuth 1869, 150; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 26; Kohl 1917, 17–20 (fr. 2). Aristotle, Heraclides Ponticus, and Ephorus had already discussed the question (see Porph. *QH Il.* 48.25–49.13 and Strabo 10.4.15); cf. Bouchard 2016, 252–256. On the basis of this example and the other one on the heroic diet (see above), Montanari 1995a, 16–19, rightly concludes that the debate about the authorship of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* predates the Hellenistic period.

33. See *Sch. Il.* 17.80 and Erbse, ad loc.; other superlatives are said to be used instead of the positive ones in *Sch. Il.* 1.176; 4.139b; 5.754; 8.3; 22.172a and 22.172b (ex. [Ariston.]); see Chapter 3.2.B § 3.9 with footnote 189.

34. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 31; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 3.124.

35. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 342; Roemer 1924, 232–233.

36. This *formula* referring to the daughters of Priam is not applicable to the *Odyssey* because

elements within the *Iliad* itself as well. This might lead us to speculate that the Chorizontes were not only concerned with the inconsistencies between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, but also with contradictions present in each of the poems separately, almost anticipating the German Analytical School.³⁷

2.3. Some Weaker Arguments against the Chorizontes

The debate involving the epithet *πολίπορθος* is more difficult to judge. Aristarchus notes that the epithet is often used for Odysseus and once, at *Il.* 21.550, for Achilles:

Sch. Il. 21.550a Ἀχιλλῆα πολίπορθον: ὅτι πλεονάζει ἐπ' Ὀδυσσέως τὸ πολίπορθος (*Il.* 2.278, 10.363, *Od.* 8.3, etc.), νῦν δὲ ἅπαξ ἐπ' Ἀχιλλέως. πρὸς τοὺς Χωρίζοντας (fr. 10 Kohl). τούτοις γὰρ χρῶνται. τινὲς δὲ Ἀχιλλέα Πηλείωνα' ποιοῦσι, ξενισθέντες πρὸς τὸ ἐπίθετον.

'Achilles sacker of cities (*πολίπορθος*): because he often uses *πολίπορθος* for Odysseus (*Il.* 2.278, 10.363, *Od.* 8.3, etc.), and here only once for Achilles. With reference to the Chorizontes. For they use this [argument]. And some, being puzzled at the epithet, make it into 'Achilles son of Peleus (Πηλείωνα).'

The reference to the Chorizontes suggests that they had probably pointed out that the epithet *πολίπορθος* is used for Achilles, Odysseus, and other heroes in the *Iliad*,³⁸ but only for Odysseus in the *Odyssey*. Such a discrepancy was for them proof of the different authorship of the two poems.³⁹ The epithet *πολίπορθος* referring to Achilles in *Il.* 21.550 was indeed a problem, to the

none of them is mentioned in those terms in the *Odyssey*. Yet *εἶδος ἀρίστη* is used elsewhere both in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey*: at *Il.* 2.715 it refers to Alcestis and at *Od.* 7.57 to Periboea; at *Il.* 13.378, on the other hand, the phrase is a true superlative, as it indicates 'the most beautiful' of Agamemnon's daughters in a very specific sense (i.e., the Greeks would give Othryoneus the most beautiful daughter of Agamemnon as a bride if he were to join them against the Trojans).

37. Thus Kohl 1917, 34–36 (fr. 9), who (1917, 40) suggested that fr. 10, on the epithet *πολίπορθος* applied to Achilles (discussed in the next section), was also part of this analytical approach to the *Iliad*. In fact, Kohl considered many scholia where Aristarchus discusses problems of inconsistencies within the *Iliad* as directed against the Chorizontes (Kohl 1917, 74–120, in the section of *fragmenta probabilia et dubia*); for example, the scholia dealing with Pylaemenes (see Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2), which Kohl listed as fr. *42 (Kohl 1917, 99–103); this might be possible, but there is no evidence of it.

38. The epithet also refers to Achilles in *Il.* 8.372, 15.77, and 24.108 (see below); it is also used for Odysseus in *Il.* 2.278 and 10.363, for Oileus in *Il.* 2.728, for Enyo in *Il.* 5.333, for Ares in *Il.* 20.152, and for Otryntes in *Il.* 20.384. On this epithet in Homer, see Parry 1971, 148–149 [= Parry 1928, 186–187].

39. So also Friedländer 1853, 315.

extent that some scholars chose the more canonical Ἀχιλλέα Πηλείωνα. In this note Aristarchus does not seem to solve this question. Two other scholia by Aristonicus commenting on the other instances of πολίπορθος give some clues in regard to Aristarchus' strategy here: he explains that Enyo is so called because she is a warrior-goddess (*Sch. Il.* 5.333a: ὅτι πολεμικὴ ἡ θεός), while Odysseus owes this epithet to the episode of the Trojan horse (*Sch. Il.* 2.278a: καὶ πρὸς τὸ πολίπορθον, ὅτι διὰ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας δέδεικται τὰ κατὰ τὸν δούρειον ἵππον).⁴⁰ Aristarchus thus seems to be attempting to show that this epithet is always applied with a reason, to Odysseus as well as to Enyo. In addition, he might have also used the last note on Odysseus being defined as 'sacker of cities' in the *Iliad* against the Chorizontes (though they are not explicitly mentioned in that scholium). His argument might have been as follows: the epithet πολίπορθος for Odysseus in the *Iliad* makes sense only if the episode of the wooden horse is known; the story of the Trojan horse is absent from the *Iliad*, however, and is only mentioned in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 4.271–289). Thus, Homer, the author of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, would once again connect the two poems when using the epithet πολίπορθος for Odysseus in the *Iliad*.⁴¹

More problems arise when the epithet is applied to Achilles, though. An exegetical scholium, which Erbse considers as derived from Aristonicus (*Sch. Il.* 21.550b), quotes *Il.* 9.328, when Achilles, replying to Odysseus' offer on behalf of Agamemnon, complains that he has sacked twelve cities and then another eleven in the Troad but has never received as rich a prize as Agamemnon's allotment (*Il.* 328–333). Hence—the argument goes—even if the epithet πολίπορθος is especially apt for Odysseus qua 'sacker of Ilium', Achilles too is a 'sacker of cities', after all.⁴² So far, it seems that Aristarchus, though noting that the epithet πολίπορθος was particularly suitable for Odysseus, did not exclude the possibility that it could also be applied to warlike characters, such as the goddess Enyo and Achilles. This is plausible, but problems arise with his claim that Achilles is called πολίπορθος only once in the *Iliad*, namely, at *Il.* 21.550 (*Sch. Il.* 21.550a: νῦν δὲ ἅπαξ ἐπ' Ἀχιλλέως). This is not true, at least in our *Iliad*, where Achilles receives this epithet also in *Il.* 8.372, 15.77, and 24.108. There are no Aristarchus scholia on *Il.* 24.108; however, Aristarchus certainly athetized *Il.* 8.371–372 and 15.56–

40. See also Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 2.278b.c^{1,2}; cf. Matthaios 1999, 441.

41. As Tyler Mayo points out in a personal note to me, Odysseus is defined as 'sacker of cities' in *Il.* 2.278 and 10.363, both times in the main narrative, namely, when the poet is speaking. This is correct, because Odysseus can become 'the sacker of cities' for the characters only *after* the *Iliad*, and so no character in this poem calls the king of Ithaca πολίπορθος, but only the poet when speaking ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου/ποιητικοῦ προσώπου, 'from his own persona / from his poetic persona' (see Chapter 3.6.C § 2.1). This point, too, might have been part of Aristarchus' reasoning when discussing this epithet.

42. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 162 and 315, and Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 9.328.

77 (*Sch. Il.* 8.371–2a; 15.56a). *Sch. Il.* 8.371–2a does not mention the epithet at all, because perhaps the comment on it was lost,⁴³ but *Sch. Il.* 15.56a cites the fact that the epithet is never given to Achilles as one of the reasons for the athetesis of *Il.* 15.56–77 (*Sch. Il.* 15.56a: φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος ὅτι οὐδαμῇ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα 'πολίπορθον' εἶρηκεν, ἀλλὰ 'ποδάρκη' καὶ 'ποδώκη'). The point is repeated in *Sch. Il.* 15.77a (ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα 'πολίπορθον').⁴⁴ This all contradicts Aristarchus' claim at *Il.* 21.550, regarding both the uniqueness of the epithet as applied to Achilles as well as the reason why it can be used for this hero as well. One possibility is that Aristarchus simply got it wrong at *Il.* 15.77 and forgot the other two instances at *Il.* 21.550 and 24.108, where the epithet was applied to Achilles (not counting *Il.* 8.372, which he also athetized together with *Il.* 15.77).⁴⁵ Alternatively, we can assume a mistake in the transmission of the scholia.⁴⁶ Whatever the case, a possible, yet hypothetical reconstruction might run as follows. First, the Chorizontes pointed out that the 'typical' epithet for Odysseus was wrongly applied to Achilles in the *Iliad*. Aristarchus 'solved' the question simply by getting rid of the occurrences of Achilles πολίπορθος wherever he could. Hence the atheteseis of *Il.* 8.371–372 and *Il.* 15.56–77, which were, however, based on other reasons as well. Perhaps he also athetized or changed the reading in *Il.* 24.108, but we have lost any evidence for this (the line could be dropped without any syntactic problem).⁴⁷ If he went for an athetesis also at *Il.* 24.108, then what we read in *Sch. Il.* 21.550a, namely, that the epithet is used only once for Achilles, would be true. Athetizing problematic lines is certainly not an elegant solution, but Aristarchus adopted this shortcut in other cases as well.⁴⁸ As for *Il.* 21.550, Aristarchus could not athetize it because the line was necessary within the sentence. So he had to find an alternative solution. He does not seem to have

43. Cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 8.371–2a. On this athetesis, see Lührs 1992, 139–140, and Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4 (with further bibliography).

44. On the athetesis of *Il.* 15.56–77, see Lührs 1992, 129–132; Janko 1994, 234–235; West 2001, 230–231; this athetesis is also treated in Chapter 3.2.A § 13, Chapter 3.3.A § 4.4, and Chapter 4 § 1.5.1.

45. So van der Valk 1963–1964, II 189; cf. also van Thiel 2014a, II 536–537.

46. So Friedländer 1853, 240, and Martinazzoli 1953, 48.

47. Cf. Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 21.550 and ad *Sch. Il.* 24.108a; Bolling 1925, 109.

48. See discussion in Chapter 3.6.C § 5. According to Cicero, this epithet is used for Odysseus, not for Achilles or Ajax (*Fam.* 389.2: *itaque Homerus non Aiace nec Achillem sed Ulixem appellavit πολίπόρθιον*). Even if Cicero's text has the variant πολίπόρθιος, employed only for Odysseus in *Od.* 9.504 and 530 (but in the latter case Allen corrects it into πολίπορθος), in all probability Cicero meant the more common πολίπορθος (yet Shackleton Bailey does not record any variant in the manuscripts, nor does Purser in his OCT [*Fam.* 10.13.2]). Since Cicero seems to have known Aristarchus' text (see van der Valk 1963–1964, II 148), he might have been aware that Aristarchus (whom he considered the best of the critics; see *Att.* 14.3, *Fam.* 75.5, 217.1; cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 232) generally rejected this epithet for Achilles.

accepted the variant reading Ἀχιλλέα Πηλείωνα, as others did. More probably, he tried to show that even if the epithet πολίπορθος was much better suited to Odysseus, it could also work for Achilles on the basis of *Il.* 9.328, as explained in *Sch. Il.* 21.550b (ex. [Ariston.]). In fact, Aristarchus used this strategy for another case (Enyo in *Il.* 5.333) in which the epithet is applied to a character other than Odysseus. Since there is no evidence that he tried to get rid of all cases in which πολίπορθος refers to other characters (Oileus in *Il.* 2.728, Enyo in *Il.* 5.333, Ares in *Il.* 20.152, Otrynteus in *Il.* 20.384), he must have found similar ‘excuses’ for those cases as well. At the very least, he could have always said against the Chorizontes that while πολίπορθος was especially apt for Odysseus, it also worked in its other occurrences in the *Iliad*, as it was always applied to warriors (so it was never used ἀκαίρως), even though it was perhaps employed in a ‘more generic’ sense.⁴⁹

There are some other instances which are easier to analyze but where Aristarchus’ arguments seem weaker or constructed ‘ad hoc’. This is the case with the Chorizontes’ claim that resumption (ἐπανάληψις) is commonly used in the *Iliad*, but not in the *Odyssey*.⁵⁰ With his usual strategy, Aristarchus shows that Homer employs this stylistic device at least once in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 1.23), thus refuting the Separatists’ point (*Sch. Il.* 12.96).⁵¹ This is true, but as we observed in Chapter 3.2.A § 18, Aristarchus’ claim is less convincing than in other cases because the two poems indeed use this trope differently—as he himself admits when he notes in several scholia that Homer ‘often’ (συνεχῶς/πυκνῶς) uses resumption in the *Iliad*, but only once (ἅπαξ) in the *Odyssey* (*Sch. Il.* 6.154; 7.138a; 12.96; 20.372b; 23.642a).

The Chorizontes also saw inconsistencies between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* concerning ‘minor’ myths; for example, they noticed that in the *Iliad* Neleus has twelve children (*Il.* 11.692), while in the *Odyssey* he has only three (*Od.* 11.281–286). The *Odyssey*’s account of Neleus’ children is taken from the catalog of the heroines in the *Nekyia*, when Odysseus speaks of Chloris, married to Neleus, to whom she gave birth to Nestor, Chromius, and Periclymenus. Aristarchus

49. On ‘generic’, ‘nongeneric’, and ‘out-of-place’ epithets, see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.1 and § 1.2.2. Kohl 1917, 36–40 (fr. 10), on the other hand, conjectured that the problem with this epithet was raised by Zenodotus, and not by Aristarchus, so that the atheteseis of *Il.* 15.77 and 8.372 were made by Zenodotus. According to *Sch. Il.* 8.371–2b^{1.2} (Did.?) and *Sch. Il.* 15.64b (Did.), Zenodotus did not write *Il.* 8.371–372 and *Il.* 15.64–77; still, Aristonicus mentions the atheteseis of both these passages, and so they should go back to Aristarchus. Perhaps Aristarchus did athetize the passages, but the comment about the inappropriateness of Achilles’ epithet is due not to Aristarchus, but to Zenodotus (who would have read the variant Ἀχιλλέα Πηλείωνα at *Il.* 21.550)—yet this is speculative. On this question, cf. also Roemer 1912, 54 and 116; Martinazzoli 1953, 46–48; Richardson 1993, 100.

50. See Chapter 3.2.A § 10.

51. Cf. Kohl 1917, 26–27 (fr. 6).

'solves' the apparent inconsistency by saying that Homer is listing the children that Neleus had from Chloris, but he may have had other children from other women. After all—he points out—Priam (as the king himself says to Achilles in *Il.* 24.495–497) had fifty sons, nineteen from his wife Hecuba and the remaining thirty-one from his concubines (*Sch. Il.* 11.692a).⁵² In this case, however, Aristarchus' explanation, though reasonable, is not based on clear and unambiguous evidence taken from the text. In fact, even the parallel with Priam (in line with the principle of 'clarifying Homer from Homer') does not really hold; Priam is a barbarian king and, as Aristarchus himself observes elsewhere, it is the custom of barbarians to have children from more than one woman (*Sch. Il.* 5.70a: ὅτι βαρβαρικὸν ἔθος τὸ ἐκ πλειόνων γυναικῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι). But Neleus is a Greek, not a barbarian, so the alleged explanation that the other children were born from other women is not really valid. In this case, then, Aristarchus seems to be looking for any justification in order to 'excuse' a real mythical inconsistency between the two poems that might have strengthened the Chorizontes' claim of multiple authorship. Similar arguments on the part of Aristarchus concern the marital status of Aphrodite:

Sch. Il. 21.416a τὸν δ' ἄγε χειρὸς ἐλοῦσα <Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη>: ὅτι οἱ Χωρίζοντες (fr. 8 Kohl) φασὶ τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ποιητὴν εἰδέναι συνοῦσαν τῷ Ἄρει τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, τὸν δὲ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας διαφώνως Ἡφαίστῳ. λέγειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτι οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ χρόνοι ἦσαν τῆς συμβιώσεως.

'Aphrodite, Zeus' daughter, taking him [i.e., Ares] by the hand, led him away': because the Chorizontes (fr. 8 Kohl) say that the poet of the *Iliad* knows that Aphrodite lives with Ares, while in disagreement [with this view] the poet of the *Odyssey* [knows that she lives] with Hephaestus. It is necessary to state that the times of the relationship are not the same.

The episode of the *Odyssey* in question is the account by Demodocus in *Od.* 8.266–366 of the love affair between Ares and Aphrodite, while Aphrodite is married to the lame Hephaestus. In the *Iliad*, there is no mention of Aphrodite being married to anyone, but when Ares is wounded by Athena in the battle of the gods, Aphrodite saves him (*Il.* 21.416–422). From this episode, the Chorizontes concluded that Aphrodite was married to Ares in the *Iliad*, while she was married to Hephaestus in the *Odyssey*. As in the case of Neleus' children, Aristarchus explains the inconsistency by stating that Aphrodite may have been married to (or lived with) both Hephaestus and Ares, but at different times. Accordingly, the story sung by Demodocus in the *Odyssey* would refer

52. Cf. Kohl 1917, 24–26 (fr. 5).

to a prior time, when Aphrodite first lived with Hephaestus. Then, after the affair with Ares and the harsh punishment of Hephaestus, she left the latter and started a new liaison with Ares. Therefore, the song about the affair of Ares and Aphrodite refers to the past, while during the war of Troy and Odysseus' wanderings Aphrodite is married to Ares.⁵³ This is a clever solution, based on a plausible inference—but, again, not on any textual, 'hard' evidence.

The Chorizontes' remarks in these cases might not convince everyone, yet when Aristarchus rebuts their claims, he seems to be on the defensive. In fact, he had to defend the assumptions that were so important to him, namely, that Homer was the author of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, as well as that he was an excellent and self-consistent poet, according to Aristotle's teachings.⁵⁴ So in these debates Aristarchus was probably trying to discard any element that might have contradicted these assumptions—even when he could not draw any evidence from the Homeric texts themselves. Still, he tried to give as reasonable an account as possible of the problematic points between the two poems. The 'different timing' for both Neleus' fathering and Aphrodite's romantic relationships is indeed the most plausible explanation that saves the principle that Homer, being the author of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, is self-consistent and describes a self-consistent mythical world. Still, when one compares these *lyseis* of Aristarchus with his polemical notes against the Neoterioi, namely, the poets after Homer (which will be discussed in depth in the next chapter), the picture becomes more complicated. While he exerted significant effort to prove that, in fact, Homer did not present contradictory versions of the same myth, he was always ready to accuse the Neoterioi of reusing Homeric myths in an inconsistent manner or according to different versions.⁵⁵ Aristarchus' behavior in these cases recalls how he dealt with the question of resumption (ἐπανάληψις), which was also directed against the Chorizontes and which Aristarchus 'solved' in a less than convincing manner, by stating that one case only of resumption in the *Odyssey* against many in the *Iliad* would be enough to counterbalance the separatist argument that the trope is extensively used in the *Iliad* but not in the *Odyssey*, and so the poet is not the same.⁵⁶ To conclude, Aristarchus seems to have adopted a double standard and to have

53. Cf. Kohl 1917, 31–34 (fr. 8). The episode of the love affair between Ares and Aphrodite raised many problems in antiquity, and was athetized by some scholars (see *Sch. Aristoph. Pac.* 778), but we do not know whether Aristarchus, too, athetized it (cf. Carnuth 1869, 82). And even if he did, as Roemer (1912, 22–23, 127–128 n. 1; 1924, 158) firmly believes, his rejection does not necessarily allow us to dismiss Aristonicus' testimony and Aristarchus' reasoning against the Chorizontes; indeed, an athetesis did not prevent Aristarchus from commenting upon interesting features of the rejected line (see, e.g., *Sch. Il.* 11.767a¹).

54. See Chapter 3.6.A and Chapter 6 § 2.

55. See Chapter 5.3 § 3 and § 7.

56. See Chapter 3.2.A § 18.

judged what happened in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey* differently compared with how he dealt with 'other' poets. For him, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* never contradicted each other, because Homer was self-consistent and composed both poems; on the contrary, he took pains to prove that the mythical stories found in later poets were *always* different from those presented by Homer, because the Neoterioi were not Homer.

3. Clarifying the *Odyssey* from the *Iliad* (and Vice Versa)

Aristarchus so obstinately defended his assumption that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were written by the same author because a great part of his work on Homer rested on it. If the author of the two poems was the same, then it was reasonable to assume that the two poems had to share the same style, language, background, and characters—and, in general, that they needed to be consistent with each other. The identical authorship of the two poems thus allowed Aristarchus to have more evidence at his disposal (namely, two poems rather than one) to discuss difficult passages, as the characteristics of one poem could be used to explain, analyze, comment on, and edit the other.

3.1. Linguistic and Stylistic Parallels

The most common case was language. There are countless scholia to the *Iliad* in which Aristarchus quotes examples from the *Odyssey* to discuss the meaning of words,⁵⁷ their orthography and morphology,⁵⁸ syntactic constructions and 'figures',⁵⁹ dialectal variants,⁶⁰ as well as tropes⁶¹ and other stylistic peculiarities in the *Iliad*.⁶² For example, the internal accusative μάχην ἐμάχοντο of *Il.* 15.673 finds a parallel in δαίτην δαινυμένους of *Od.* 7.50 (*Sch. Il.* 15.673). Likewise, ἀντί + genitive in Homer means ἴσος + dative, so that in *Il.* 21.75 ἀντί . . . ἰκέταο is used instead of ἴσος ἰκέτη, 'like a suppliant', exactly as in *Od.* 8.546 ἀντὶ κασιγνήτου is used instead of ἴσος κασιγνήτω, 'like a brother' (*Sch. Il.* 21.75a).⁶³ The linguistic link between the two poems is also present in the scholia where

57. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.99a; 9.165a; 10.573a; 11.163a; 11.621a; 16.41a; 18.392b; 21.75a; 21.281a¹; 21.320a; 21.366a; 21.424a; 22.80a; 22.494a; 24.18b¹; 24.522.

58. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.85e; 7.135a; 19.26a.

59. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.215c; 2.284a; 9.554; 10.277a; 14.284a; 16.57a; 16.559a; 17.221; 17.237; 21.37b; 21.185a¹; 22.67b.

60. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 1.530a.

61. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 16.106c; 17.48a.

62. E.g., *Sch. Il.* 15.679a (see Chapter 3.3.B § 6).

63. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 114; Schironi 2004, 166–171 (fr. 18).

Aristarchus analyzes hapax or quasi-hapax legomena.⁶⁴ In a few instances, he notes that a word occurs only once in the *Iliad* and only once in the *Odyssey*: λικριφίς, ‘sideways’, attested in *Il.* 14.463 and *Od.* 19.451 (*Sch. Il.* 14.463a: δις κέχρηται τῇ λέξει, νῦν καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ), or ἄριστον, meaning ‘breakfast’, used once in *Il.* 24.124 and once in *Od.* 16.2 (*Sch. Il.* 24.124a^{1,2}: ἅπαξ νῦν ἐν Ἰλιάδι καὶ ἅπαξ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ, and *Sch. H Od.* 16.2: ἅπαξ ἐνθάδε τὸ ἄριστον καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι).⁶⁵ In other cases, there are two hapaxes, one in the *Iliad* and one in the *Odyssey*, which are clearly related: ἐπιλίγδην, ‘superficially’, in *Il.* 17.599, and the similar λίγδην of the same meaning in *Od.* 22.278 (*Sch. Il.* 17.599b: καὶ ὅτι ἅπαξ καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ λίγδην, ἄκρον δὲ <ρίνον δηλήσατο χαλκός>’ and *Sch. Q Od.* 22.278: ἅπαξ δὲ ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ἅπαξ ἐν Ἰλιάδι ἐπιλίγδην). The simultaneous use of both poems was thus key to understanding the meaning of these otherwise unattested words.

Cross-references between the two poems occurred also when using a passage of the *Iliad* to explain a more dubious passage in the *Odyssey*:

Sch. Il. 7.482a κοιμήσαντ’ ἄρ’ ἔπειτα <καὶ ὕπνου δῶρον ἔλοντο>: ὅτι διέστειλε τὸ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ ὑπνῶσαι. τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ (*Od.* 20.4). ‘Εὐρυνόμη δ’ ἄρ’ ἐπὶ χλαῖναν βάλε κοιμηθέντι· ἐπιφέρει γὰρ ‘κεῖτ’ ἐγρηγορόων’ (*Od.* 20.6).

‘And they lay down and then enjoyed the gift of sleep’: because he distinguished between ‘to lie down’ (κοιμηθῆναι) and ‘to sleep’ (ὑπνῶσαι). This with reference to the passage in the *Odyssey*: ‘Eurynome threw a mantle on him who was lying down (κοιμηθέντι)’ (*Od.* 20.4), for he adds: ‘he lay and was awake’ (*Od.* 20.6).

Aristarchus observes that in Homer κοιμηθῆναι often means ‘to go to bed’, ‘to lie down’, without necessarily implying that one is asleep, as is clear from *Il.* 7.482, where it is stated that first the Achaeans κοιμήσαντο, i.e., they went to bed, and then (ἄρ’ ἔπειτα καὶ) could enjoy sleep (ὕπνος). In other words, κοιμηθῆναι is the action before ὑπνῶσαι, which actually means ‘to sleep’.⁶⁶ This interpretation is used to explain a passage in the *Odyssey*, which apparently was problematic: in *Od.* 20.4–6 Odysseus disguised as a beggar spreads an oxhide and some fleeces to sleep, and lies down (κοιμηθῆναι), and Eurynome throws a cloak over him. At line 6, however, Homer specifies that Odysseus is lying down, though awake (κεῖτ’ ἐγρηγορόων). Perhaps readers were puzzled because they thought

64. On Aristarchus and hapax legomena, see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.10.

65. On λικριφίς, see Chapter 3.4 § 1.2; on ἄριστον, see Chapter 3.3.B § 2.3.

66. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 114.

that at line 4 Odysseus was already asleep, since κοιμηθῆναι often means 'to sleep' or, in the active, 'to put to sleep', in classical and Hellenistic authors as well as in Homer (e.g., *Il.* 14.236, with the imperative active κοίμησον, or *Il.* 11.241, with κοιμήσατο χάλκεον ὕπνον, in the sense of 'he died').⁶⁷ Thus, Aristarchus clarifies the situation by recalling a passage in the *Iliad* which shows that Homer can also distinguish between κοιμηθῆναι and ὑπνῶσαι.⁶⁸

The linguistic parallels between the two poems did not exclude some discrepancies, of course, especially in the use of certain words. In Aristarchus' opinion, however, they were due more to the different context and different stories told in the poems rather than to a real difference in language. An example is the word ὄμιλος. Aristarchus explains (*Sch. Il.* 10.338) that the word means 'crowd', 'throng', both in the *Iliad* (e.g., *Il.* 10.338) and in the *Odyssey* (e.g., *Od.* 1.225, 8.109), but that in the *Iliad* it also indicates the 'battle' (e.g., *Il.* 4.445, 5.353).⁶⁹ In drawing these distinctions, Aristarchus' point probably is that ὄμιλος in the *Odyssey* only means 'crowd' and derivatively 'assembly of people', and not 'battle', not because the author is different but rather because the content is (that is, the poem is not about a war).⁷⁰

A direct quotation of Aristarchus made by Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 24.8a, already discussed in Chapter 3.5 § 7, shows how the 'sole author' assumption could also be used when applying analogy to find an inflectional form. In this verbatim quotation, Aristarchus says "πεῖρε (*Od.* 2.434) teaches us that the participle πείρων (*Il.* 24.8) is also barytone, for as ἔκειρε κείρων, so ἔπειρε πείρων". When applying analogy to the discussion of the accentuation of a problematic participle, Aristarchus finds the other term of the analogical proportion (πεῖρε) not in the *Iliad*, but in the *Odyssey*. The analogical link between πεῖρε and πείρων is legitimate because the two forms come from the same author, albeit from different works, which however share the same language. By the same token, particular stylistic features of the *Iliad* are shown to be 'typically' Homeric by recalling another example from the *Odyssey*: hyperbole (*Sch. Il.* 2.489–90: ἡ ιδιότης τῆς ὑπερβολῆς Ὀμηρικῆ. καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ . . .),⁷¹ the Alcmanic *schema* (*Sch. Il.* 20.138a),⁷² fixed epithets (*Sch. Il.* 21.218a),⁷³ and odd metrical patterns (*Sch. Il.* 11.130a: ὅτι δωδεκασύλλαβος ὁ στίχος, καὶ σπανίως χρῆται, ὥς καὶ ἐν

67. E.g., Hdt. 1.9.2; Call. *Epigr.* 9.1–2 (ἱερὸν ὕπνον / κοιμᾶται).

68. No Aristonicus scholia are preserved at *Od.* 20.4–6; cf. Carnuth 1869, 153.

69. For Aristarchus, in fact, the latter meaning was closer to the etymology of the term; see *Sch. Il.* 11.502 and 11.523, discussed in Chapter 3.4 § 3.1 with footnote 59.

70. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 144; Kohl 1917, 58–59 (fr. *18).

71. See Chapter 3.2.A § 16.

72. See Chapter 3.2.B § 4.3.

73. See Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.2.

Ὀδυσσεΐα . . .).⁷⁴ The reverse is also true: an attested peculiarity in the *Iliad* is invoked to remove doubts from a similar use in the *Odyssey*, for example an epithet which might sound unfitting (*Sch. Il.* 15.15a).⁷⁵

Lastly, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* could be combined even to explain a modern linguistic use, for example the idiomatic expression διέπτατο δ' ὥστε νόημα, '[he/she] flew like thought':

Sch. Il. 15.80 ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἄν αἰξῇ νόος ἀνέρος: . . . καὶ ὅτι τὸ παροιμιακὸν τὸ 'διέπτατο δ' ὥστε νόημα' ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν (*Od.* 7.36) σύγκειται 'τῶν νέες ὠκεῖαι ὡσεὶ πτερὸν ἢ νόημα', οὐκ ὄν παρ' οὐδενὶ ποιητῇ.

'As when the mind of a man darts': . . . and because the proverbial [phrase] '[he/she] flew like thought' is created from these [lines] and from those in the *Odyssey*: 'and their ships are swift like wing or thought' (*Od.* 7.36), since [this comparison] cannot be found in any [other] poet.⁷⁶

Since he cannot find the link between 'thought' and 'flight' in any other poet,⁷⁷ Aristarchus concludes that the contemporary phrase '[he/she] flew like thought' originated in the conflation of two hyperbolic phrases in Homer, in which human thought is connected to the activity of 'flying'. The two are a simile in *Iliad* 15, where Homer compares the swiftness of Hera flying from Ida to Olympus to the swiftness of human thought conceiving different desires (*Il.* 15.80–83), and *Od.* 7.36, where the Phaeacians' ships are said to be as swift as a bird or a thought. The fact that an otherwise unknown image was present in both poems was probably further proof for Aristarchus that the poems were written by the same imaginative mind. Someone inspired by these daring images coined the proverbial 'to fly like thought'. Thus, not only was Homer the poet of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, but he was an inspiration for some figurative expressions in Koine.

3.2. Solving *Zetemata* with the Help of the Other Poem

Aristarchus looked at parallels between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* beyond linguistic and stylistic uses. For example, Mt. Neritus on Ithaca is cited to discuss

74. See Chapter 4 § 1.5.2. On the metrical analysis of Aristarchus, see Montanari 1995b.

75. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.15b (ex. [Ariston.]); cf. Pontani, ad *Sch. Od.* 1.65. See Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.2.

76. See also *Sch. BET Od.* 7.36 ἢ νόημα: ἐντεῦθεν τὸ παροιμιώδες 'διέπτατο δ' ὥστε νόημα' ['[like wing] or thought': from here [comes] the proverbial [phrase] '[he/she] flew like thought'].

77. Aristarchus is imprecise here. Similar phrases, in fact, are attested in Hes. *Sc.* 222 (ὃ δ' ὥς τε νόημ' ἐποτάτο 'he [i.e., Perseus] flew like thought') and *Hy. Ap.* 448 (ἐνθεν δ' αὐτ' ἐπὶ νῆα νόημ' ὥς ἄλτο πέτεσθαι, 'from here he [i.e., Apollo] leapt again like thought to rush to the ship'); cf. Janko 1994, 237.

the *zetema* of Olympus and to show that the latter is indeed a mountain (*Sch. Il.* 15.193a.b¹).⁷⁸ Similarly, he recalls characters in the *Odyssey* with the same name as those of the *Iliad* when discussing questions of homonymy.⁷⁹

In the same way, the *Iliad* can help to deal with problems found in the *Odyssey*. In *Il.* 9.346–347, for example, Achilles rejects the gifts of Agamemnon, telling Odysseus that he (i.e., Odysseus), Agamemnon, and the other kings should now start thinking about how to defend their camp from the Trojans. According to Aristarchus, these words are helpful for explaining an obscure passage in the *Odyssey*:

Sch. Il. 9.347a φραζέσθω: πρὸς τὸ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ ζητούμενον 'νεῖκος Ὀδυσσῆος καὶ Πηλεΐδew Ἀχιλλῆος' (*Od.* 8.75), ὅτι ἐμφαίνει καὶ νῦν ἀναιρῶν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν περὶ Ὀδυσσεά, λεγόντων βουλῇ καὶ λόγῳ αἰρεθήσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν· νῦν γὰρ οἶον ἐπισαρκάζων λέγει.

'Let him think': with reference to the question in the *Odyssey* concerning 'the dispute of Odysseus and Achilles son of Peleus' (*Od.* 8.75), because now, too, he is clearly undermining the attempt of Odysseus' party, who maintain that the city will be taken with counsel and reasoning: for now he talks, so to speak, with sarcasm.

At Alcinous' feast in *Odyssey* 8, Demodocus sings of a νεῖκος between Odysseus and Achilles: the two heroes contended with terrible words, and Agamemnon rejoiced in their dispute because the oracle of Apollo at Delphi had predicted it as the turning point of the Trojan War (*Od.* 8.75–82). The allusion gave rise to a famous *zetema*, as scholars wondered about this mysterious dispute, which is nowhere else mentioned by Homer. A scholium to the *Odyssey* (*Sch. HQV Od.* 8.75) explains that, after the death of Hector, Achilles and Odysseus had a fight when drinking wine at a banquet, because the former praised bravery and wanted to use force to take Troy, while the latter praised intelligence and suggested using cunning to win the war. Agamemnon took pleasure in their clash, as Apollo's oracle had told him that Troy could only be taken once the best of the Achaeans quarreled with each other. Since the oracle was then accomplished, he knew that the time of the victory was close.⁸⁰ Aristarchus instead gives a different solution, at least in terms of relative chronology. He, too, agrees

78. See Chapter 3.3.B § 4.4.

79. Agelaus (*Sch. Il.* 11.302a), Laertes (*Sch. Il.* 16.197, ex. [Ariston.]), Mentès (*Sch. Il.* 17.73a); see Chapter 3.3.B § 1.1 with footnote 2.

80. See also *Sch. E Od.* 8.75; *Sch. BEQ Od.* 8.77; none of these scholia seem to be derived from the VMK. This allusion to a νεῖκος between Achilles and Odysseus in Demodocus' song has been much discussed by modern Homerists as well; among the most recent discussions, see Clay 1997, 96–112; Nagy 1999, 42–58; Lentini 2006, 94–102. The latter also gives a survey of the *status quaestionis* and bibliographical references.

that the *veĩkoç* between Achilles and Odysseus originated from the fact that Odysseus wanted to take Troy ‘with counsel and intelligence’ (βουλῇ καὶ λόγῳ), while Achilles aimed at using strength and bravery. Yet this dispute happens much earlier than in the tenth year of war, and certainly before Hector’s death. In fact, according to him, the sarcastic words of Achilles in Book 9 hint at this dispute between the two heroes, which then must have happened earlier on in the war.⁸¹ With this solution, not only does Aristarchus find a ‘plausible’ explanation for the *veĩkoç* between Achilles and Odysseus mentioned in the *Odyssey*; he also finds some words in the *Iliad* that refer to it, making the two poems appear even more closely interconnected, as the episode sung by Demodocus is in fact alluded to in the *Iliad*.⁸²

3.3. Atheteseis between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*

Aristarchus supported some atheteseis in the *Iliad* with evidence from the *Odyssey*. As discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 2.3, for instance, the athetesis of *Il.* 24.476 is supported with the evidence of *Od.* 19.61, which ‘proves’ the dining habits of the Homeric heroes (*Sch. Il.* 24.476a, ex. [Ariston.]). On the other hand, many scholia to the *Iliad* refer to atheteseis in the *Odyssey*, as the former poem provides evidence against lines in the latter. For example, Aristarchus athetizes *Od.* 12.374–390,⁸³ where Lampetia goes as a messenger to Helios to inform him that Odysseus’ companions have killed and eaten his cows, and Helios obtains from Zeus the promise that he will punish them. For Aristarchus, this is inconsistent with *Il.* 3.277, when Agamemnon prays to Zeus and to Helios ‘who sees everything and hears everything’: if Helios is all-seeing, why does he need Lampetia to reveal to him what has happened to his cows? (*Sch. Il.* 3.277a¹: καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀθέτησιν τῶν ἐν Ὀδυσσειᾷ ὥκέα δ’ Ἡελίῳ Ὑπερίονι ἄγγελος ἦλθεν περὶ τῆς ἀπωλείας τῶν βοῶν τῷ πάντα ἐφορῶντι).⁸⁴

Aristarchus athetized the second *Nekyia* in *Odyssey* 24 (ll. 1–204) for various reasons (*Sch. MV Od.* 24.1), among which is the fact that the souls of the Suitors, who did not receive any burial, meet those of Agamemnon and Achilles in Hades. This is incorrect because in the mythical world of Homer

81. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 174.

82. Aristarchus’ reasoning is the same as with the references to Odysseus as father of Telemachus analyzed above, at § 1.

83. There are no scholia by Aristonicus to this passage in the *Odyssey*. There are *obeloi* in M at lines 375–389, but the syntax also requires the athetesis of lines 374 and 390; see Carnuth 1869, 116–117.

84. *Sch. BQ Od.* 12.374, *Sch. H Od.* 12.374, and *Sch. V Od.* 12.374, which do not stem from Aristarchus, offer alternative solutions to avoid the contradiction with *Il.* 3.277. Cf. Roemer 1912, 91–92 (also with a different interpretation of *Sch. BQ Od.* 12.374); Bouchard 2016, 62–65 (on Aristotle’s treatment of this episode).

the souls of those who do not receive proper burial cannot go through the gates of Hades but remain outside of it, without crossing the river, as is proved by *Il.* 23.71–74, when Patroclus begs Achilles to give him a proper burial in order for him to finally go to Hades (*Sch. Il.* 23.73: ἐκτὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ ὑποτίθεται τὰς τῶν ἀτάφων ψυχὰς καὶ μὴ ἐπι<μι>σγομένας ταῖς <έν> τῷ ἐρέβει. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τὰ ἀθετούμενα ἐν τῇ <δευτέρᾳ> Νεκυίᾳ).⁸⁵ Another reason for the athetesis of *Od.* 24.1–204 is that Hermes is not *psychopompos* in Homer, as stated in *Od.* 24.1–10, 99–100. Again, Aristarchus finds proof in the *Iliad*, since in *Il.* 22.361–363 the soul of Hector reaches Hades alone, without any help from Hermes (*Sch. Il.* 22.362a).⁸⁶

The first *Nekyia* also created many problems to Aristarchus, who athetized its second part, from line 568 (or 565?) to line 627.⁸⁷ In *Od.* 11.584, for example, Homer speaks about Tantalus, who στεῦτο δὲ διψῶν; the context requires these words to mean 'he was standing up, thirsty'. In the scholia, which cover all the instances where the verb occurs in the *Iliad*,⁸⁸ Aristarchus observes that στεῦται and στεῦτο (the only two forms attested in Homer) mean 'to determine with the mind', but never 'to stand on one's feet' (e.g., *Sch. Il.* 2.597: ὅτι τὸ 'στεῦτο' κατὰ διάνοιαν ὠρίζετο, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ποδῶν στάσεως). In most of these scholia,⁸⁹ moreover, there is a specific reference to the athetesis of *Od.* 11.584. Indeed, the στεῦτο referring to Tantalus in *Odyssey* 11 is the only instance where the verb cannot possibly indicate a disposition of the soul, but clearly means a position in space. Aristarchus thus athetizes the line, considering it the work of an interpolator, who did not know Homeric language well (*Sch. V Od.* 11.584: ἴστατο. νῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ποδῶν. κέχρηται δὲ τῇ λέξει ὁ διασκευαστὴς παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ συνήθειαν).⁹⁰ Similarly, *Od.* 11.593–600, describing the punishments of Sisyphus, is inconsistent with the *Iliad*, and Aristarchus asks how is it possible that someone who is defined as 'most cunning' (κέρδιστος) in *Il.* 6.153 is now punished in Hades (*Sch. QT Od.* 11.593: πῶς τε κολάζεται ὁ ἐν Ἰλιάδι κέρδιστος ὢν καὶ συνετώτατος;).⁹¹ According

85. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 163; Lehrs 1882, 173; Meijering 1987, 123. A solution for this inconsistency with *Iliad* 23 is offered by a non-Aristarchean note in *Sch. H Od.* 24.187 (cf. Carnuth 1869, 164): ἔστιν οὖν ταῦτα (i.e., *Od.* 24.186–190) μὲν ἀληθῆ, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ψευδῆ Ἀχιλλέως οὕτω φαντασθέντος. The episode of Elpenor (*Od.* 11.51–83) might have posed similar problems; see Carnuth 1869, 101.

86. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 184.

87. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 108; Lehrs 1882, 156. On the *Nekyia*, see Chapter 3.6.A § 3.

88. *Sch. Il.* 2.597; 3.83a^{1,2}; 5.832; 9.241a; 18.191b; 21.455a. In the *Odyssey* the verb recurs only one other time in *Od.* 17.525, but no scholia are preserved for this passage.

89. In *Sch. Il.* 2.597; 9.241a; 18.191b; 21.455a.

90. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 109; Lehrs 1882, 98–100. The meaning of this verb in *Od.* 11.584 is still a problem even for modern scholars; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. στεῦται; Leumann 1950, 211.

91. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 110. *Sch. TV Od.* 11.385 presents a rebuttal of Aristarchus' reason: Sisyphus is indeed a sinner, but in *Iliad* 6 Glaucus has turned his ancestor's mischievousness into intelligence (τὸ κακότροπον ὁ Γλαῦκος τοῦ προγόνου εἰς σύνεσιν μετήνεγκεν).

to him (*Sch. Il.* 6.153a), later poets (i.e., the Neoterói) misunderstood the Homeric κέρδιστος ('most cunning') and turned it into a negative concept, 'most greedy'.⁹² Aristarchus thus seems to have considered the interpolation in the *Odyssey* due to someone who followed this later interpretation and added Sisyphus to the group of the great sinners in the *Nekyia*; yet this was wrong, as the negative view of Sisyphus did not belong to Homer. By the same token, Aristarchus also rejects *Od.* 11.602–604, where Heracles is said to be immortal and married to Hebe, because in the *Iliad* Hebe is a virgin (*Sch. Il.* 4.2d; 5.905a)⁹³ and Heracles is mortal (*Sch. Il.* 18.117a),⁹⁴ making their depiction in the *Odyssey* faulty (*Sch. HQT Od.* 11.601).⁹⁵

A different case occurred when Aristarchus, discussing an athetesis in the *Iliad*, referred to a similar athetesis in the *Odyssey*. One example is the athetesis of *Il.* 22.329. In *Il.* 22.326–328 Homer describes Achilles giving the fatal blow to Hector: the spear reaches Hector's neck, but does not cut his throat 'so that (ὅφρα) he could speak in answer to him' (l. 329). Aristarchus athetizes this line because it is ridiculous: it looks like the spear decided not to cut Hector's throat to allow him to speak.⁹⁶ He then recalls the similar athetesis of *Od.* 17.359, where Homer describes Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, listening to Phemius and eating: 'But when he had dined, the divine minstrel finished [singing]'. This line is also ridiculous, because it suggests that Phemius stopped because Odysseus, a beggar whose presence is barely noticed in the hall, had finished eating—absurdly connecting two unrelated actions just as in *Iliad* 22 (*Sch. Il.* 22.329: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι γελοῖος . . . διὰ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀθετεῖται καὶ κεῖνο (*Od.* 17.359). 'εὖθ' ὁ δεδειπνήκει, ὁ δὲ παύσατο θεῖος ἀοιδός').⁹⁷

Another instance of 'exegetical interplay' between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* consisted of the groups of identical or quasi-identical lines occurring in both poems and athetized either in the *Iliad* or in the *Odyssey*, because they were wrongly 'transferred' from one poem to the other.⁹⁸ For example, Aristarchus maintains that the description of Ajax throwing the discus in *Il.* 23.843 is wrongly copied from *Od.* 8.192: in the latter passage, Odysseus throws the

92. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 117; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 33; Roemer 1924, 165–166; Severyns 1928, 390–392. See Chapter 5.3. § 3.2.3.

93. See also *Sch. Od.* 3.464b. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 28–31; Schmidt 1976, 173–174, 177.

94. See also *Sch. Il.* 18.117b^{1,2} (Ariston?).

95. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 110–111; Lehrs 1882, 183, 443–444; Roemer 1912, 472–474; Kohl 1917, 46–51 (fr. *13); Severyns 1928, 130–132, 175–177; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 441–442; see discussion in Chapter 5.3 § 3.2.5.

96. See Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2.

97. No scholia to the *Odyssey* report the athetesis of *Od.* 17.359; cf. Carnuth 1869, 142. Friedländer 1853, 323, expressed doubts about this athetesis, but there is no reason to question it (see Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 22.329); cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 7 n. 1.

98. On Aristarchus' attitude toward repeated lines, see Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3.

discus after many Phaeacian youths have done the same (*Od.* 8.110–119, 129, 186–188) and his discus surpassed 'the marks of all' (σήματα πάντων). In the case of Ajax, however, this phrase is wrong, because—even if there are four contenders, Polypoetes, Leonteus, Ajax, and Epeius (*Il.* 23.836–838)—Ajax makes his attempt after only Epeius and Leonteus have thrown the discus. Thus, in this case one should have σήματα ἀμφοτέρων, as Ajax's discus surpasses the marks of *both* Epeius and Leonteus, but *not* the marks of *all* of the contenders; in fact, Polypoetes, the fourth to throw, will win (*Sch. Il.* 23.843a: μετενήνεκται δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας· καὶ ἐκεῖ εὐλόγως ἔστιν ὑπέρβαλε σήματα πάντων· πλείονες γὰρ δισκεύουσιν).⁹⁹

There are also cases of the opposite phenomenon, that is, of lines transferred from the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey* and hence athetized by Aristarchus in the *Odyssey*:

Sch. Il. 10.158a λάξ ποδὶ κινήσας, <ᾧ τρυνέ τε νείκεσέ τ' ἄντην>: ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὴν Ὀδύσειαν (*Od.* 15.45) μετὰκειται ἐπὶ τοῦ Πεισιστράτου <ἐπὶ> κλινιδίου καθεύδοντος παρὰ Μενελάῳ. πρὸς τί οὖν ποδί, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῇ χειρὶ; νῦν μὲν γὰρ εἰκότως <ἐπὶ> τῆς γῆς κοιμώμενον οὕτως ἐγείρει.

'Shaking him with his foot, he urged and rebuked him': because from here [the line] is transferred to the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 15.45) [and applied] to Pisistratus, who is sleeping in a small bed in Menelaus' palace. Why then [does Telemachus shake him] with the foot, but not with the hand? For here he wakes up in this way someone who sleeps on the ground in an appropriate manner.

When Nestor goes and wakes Diomedes up for the night assembly, he can wake him with a foot as Diomedes is sleeping on the ground (*Il.* 10.154–158). Additionally, Nestor is an old man, who might have had problems in bending to wake Diomedes up, as the corresponding scholium to the *Odyssey* makes clear.¹⁰⁰ But

99. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 80; Roemer 1912, 50; Lührs 1992, 170–172. In *Od.* 8.192 the phrase is ὁ δ' ὑπέρπτατο σήματα πάντων, 'and it [i.e., the discus] flew beyond the marks of all', while in *Il.* 23.843 Ajax is the subject: καὶ ὑπέρβαλε σήματα πάντων, '[Ajax] threw [the discus] beyond the marks of all'. So the lines are not really identical, except in the final part. Yet *Sch. Il.* 23.843a quotes *Od.* 8.192 as ὑπέρβαλε σήματα πάντων; is it a slip of memory, an error in the scholia, or the reading Aristarchus had in front of him? Whatever the reason, according to the scholium the lines are identical in both poems. In the *Iliad*, we find another example of an athetesis of lines repeated between both poems: *Il.* 11.705 ≅ *Od.* 9.42 (*Sch. Il.* 11.705a)—in fact, the line also occurs at *Od.* 9.549 (in the episode of the Cyclops), but *Sch. Il.* 11.705a only refers to the occurrence in the episode of the Cicones (*Od.* 9.42); cf. Carnuth 1869, 87; Erbse, ad loc.; Lührs 1992, 224–226.

100. *Sch. H Vind.* 133 *Od.* 15.45: νοθεύεται ὡς διαπεπλασμένος ἐξ ἡμιστιχίου τῆς κ' Ἰλιάδος (l. 158). ἐκεῖ γὰρ προσηκόντως Νέστωρ κοιμώμενον Διομήδην ἀνίστησι, κύψαι κατοκνήσας διὰ τὸ γῆρας [[the line] is considered spurious as formed on the basis of the hemistich in *Iliad* 10; for there Nestor raises up Diomedes, who is sleeping, in an appropriate way [i.e., using the foot], as he hesitates to bend because of his old age]. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 133; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 4.

the same first hemistich (λὰξ ποδὶ κινήσας) is wrongly used in *Od.* 15.45, when Telemachus wakes up Nestor's son Pisistratus: in this case Pisistratus is comfortably sleeping on a couch, and so Telemachus could wake him up with his hand. Similarly, Aristarchus believes that the lines describing the enraged Agamemnon, angry at Calchas' words in *Il.* 1.103–104, were wrongly transferred to *Od.* 4.661–662 to describe Antinous being angry at Telemachus, but he does not explain why they do not fit in the latter passage (*Sch. Il.* 1.103–4a; *Sch. Od.* 4.661a).¹⁰¹

There are also at least three cases of 'triplets', that is, a group of lines found in three places; in these cases, Aristarchus could athetize one or two of these repetitions. One example is when Hector tells Andromache to go home and take care of the housework, while the men will take care of the war effort (*Il.* 6.490–493: 'but go home and attend to your works, the loom and the distaff, and order the maids to carry out their work; war will be the care of all men that are born in Ilium, and of me above all').¹⁰² These words with minimal changes are also used in other two places in the *Odyssey*, in *Od.* 1.356–359 and 21.350–353, and in both cases by Telemachus to Penelope.¹⁰³ According to Aristarchus, however, such harsh words are appropriate in *Iliad* 6 in Hector's mouth and also when said by Telemachus to his mother Penelope in *Odyssey* 21 just before the archery contest, but they are out of context in *Odyssey* 1, when Penelope comes out from her rooms to ask Phemius to stop singing the returns of the Achaean heroes and to choose another song (*Sch. Il.* 6.490–3: νῦν μὲν ὀρθῶς κεῖνται καὶ πρὸ τῆς μνηστηροφονίας, ἐν δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ ῥαψωδίᾳ τῆς Ὀδυσσεύας οὐκέτι).¹⁰⁴ Aristarchus does not give a reason for his judgment; it is a matter of fact, however, that whereas in *Iliad* 6 and *Odyssey* 21 such a harsh command is meant to defend the woman and keep her away from danger (war in *Iliad* 6 and the archery contest with the ensuing mass execution of the Suitors in *Odyssey*

101. *Sch. Il.* 1.103–4a (ὅτι ἀμφοτέρωθεν εἰς τὴν Ὀδυσσεύαν μετακίεσθαι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς); *Sch. Od.* 4.661a (ἐκ τῆς Ἰλιάδος μετηνέχθησαν οὐ δεόντως οἱ στίχοι). Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 42–43, who suggests a possible reason for Aristarchus' athetesis in *Odyssey* 4. Other examples of lines common to both poems where those in the *Iliad* are the original while those in the *Odyssey* must be athetized are *Il.* 2.56 = *Od.* 14.495 (*Sch. Il.* 2.56b and *Sch. H Od.* 14.495; cf. Carnuth 1869, 130); *Il.* 16.776 = *Od.* 24.40 (*Sch. Il.* 16.776a; cf. Carnuth 1869, 164); *Il.* 20.235 = *Od.* 15.251 (*Sch. Il.* 20.235a; cf. Carnuth 1869, 135).

102. *Il.* 6.490–493: ἀλλ' εἰς οἶκον ἰοῦσα τὰ σ' αὐτῆς ἔργα κόμιζε / ἰστόν τ' ἡλακάτην τε, καὶ ἀμφιπόλοισι κέλευε / ἔργον ἐποίχεσθαι· πόλεμος δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει / πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ' ἐμοί, τοὶ Ἰλίῳ ἐγγεγάασιν.

103. Of these four lines (see footnote above), the first two lines are identical. In the third line, πόλεμος, 'war', is substituted with μῦθος, 'song', in *Od.* 1.358 and with τόξον, 'archery contest', in *Od.* 21.352. In the fourth line, the second hemistich changes in the *Odyssey* where it becomes τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔσθ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ ('for mine is the power in the house') rather than the Iliadic τοὶ Ἰλίῳ ἐγγεγάασιν ('that are born in Ilium').

104. See also *Sch. Od.* 1.356a¹ (Did.) and *Sch. Od.* 1.356a^{2,3} (V [Did.]); no Aristonicus scholia are preserved at *Od.* 21.350–353; cf. Carnuth 1869, 157.

21), in *Odyssey* 1 it is rude and almost gratuitous—after all, Penelope has only been attracted by the songs of Phemius. This was probably Aristarchus' reason for the athetesis of the lines in *Odyssey* 1.

Another example of triplets occurs with the description of the beautiful sandals that Hermes wears before going on a mission ('divine, golden, which bore him over the sea and over the boundless earth, together with the wind's blasts'). This description is appropriate in *Il.* 24.341–342, when Hermes is going to lead Priam to Achilles' hut, as well as when Homer describes Hermes going to Calypso in *Od.* 5.45–46, but is out of place when used to describe the sandals of Athena, when the goddess goes to give advice to Telemachus in *Od.* 1.97–98 (*Sch. Il.* 24.341–2a^{1.2}; *Sch. Od.* 5.43a).¹⁰⁵ In fact, golden winged sandals are not a part of Athena's iconography, as they are for Hermes, as Didymus observes in *Sch. Od.* 1.97b (καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις μᾶλλον ἀρμόσειαν ἐπὶ Ἑρμοῦ· ἴδιον γὰρ ἀγγέλων τοιούτοις ὑποδήμασι κεχρῆσθαι).¹⁰⁶

Aristarchus, therefore, did not see the interpolation process as happening only within one poem or in one direction; rather, in his view, the *diaskeuastai* reworked and 'ruined' both poems, taking inspiration from one to insert spurious lines into the other. More importantly, assuming that interpolators worked across poems and took lines from one poem to insert them into the other was an excellent way to explain why certain formulaic lines, which did not sound correct in one poem, could be disposed of. When it came to judging the poems in terms of authenticity, then, working on two poems rather than one was useful, as it gave Aristarchus more 'evidence' to employ. Yet, as the case of the triplets in which Aristarchus athetized only one occurrence shows us, it is clear that he did not believe that repetition per se was enough to suspect lines and always found another reason why certain lines in either one of the poems were to be rejected *within their specific context*. The fact that they were repeated was simply a further confirmation that the athetesis was the correct solution.

4. Conclusions

When working on Homer Aristarchus considered both poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and used them both in order to explain, comment, and make editorial decisions on each of them. This practice was justified by the assumption

105. *Sch. Od.* 5.43a is attributed by Pontani to Didymus. Yet both its content (repeated lines and athetesis) and its wording suggest that it might derive from Aristonicus; cf. Carnuth 1869, 56. On this triplet, cf. Roemer 1912, 119–120; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 464–465 (according to whom Aristarchus also athetized the description in *Odyssey* 5).

106. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 8. Of the third triplet of lines repeated between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Aristarchus athetizes both *Il.* 8.390–391 and *Od.* 1.99–101, while he keeps *Il.* 5.746–747 (*Sch. Il.* 5.746–7; 8.390–1; *Sch. Od.* 1.99a).

that the same author wrote both poems, which thus had to share the same characteristics and form an entire microcosm: self-consistent, self-explicatory, and complete in itself. To 'prove' this assumption, Aristarchus continually stressed that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were consistent with each other even in small details: they shared a common mythical background, they were written in the same style, they constantly cross-referenced each other, and they displayed a homogeneity of linguistic and semantic devices—all of which could only be explained by assuming that they had been written by the same author.

By reading both poems as representative of the same poetic and mythical universe, Aristarchus thus had more 'evidence' available to build up his idea of what was 'typically Homeric' and thus define Homer's language, style, and mythical world. Of course, the assumption was not only that Homer wrote both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, but also that Homer was self-consistent, so that in both poems—and in every passage of both poems—he used the same language, the same stylistic devices, and the same mythical background.

With these premises, and equipped with a deep knowledge of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Aristarchus could then analyze specific passages of one poem and comment on or correct them using the evidence collected from the other poem. In this way, for example, one word could be explained by a similar one in the other poem, a *zetema* in the *Odyssey* could be solved with reference to the *Iliad*, and an athetesis of the *Iliad* could be supported with evidence taken from the *Odyssey*. Similarly, when discussing repeated lines, he took into account repetitions extending across the two poems and could thus, for instance, athetize a line of the *Iliad* for being 'transferred' from another, more fitting passage, even if the latter passage was in the *Odyssey*.

Since his work on the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* greatly benefited from the 'sole author' assumption, Aristarchus had to defend this assumption as steadfastly as he could against the attacks of the Chorizontes, the 'Separatists', who instead supported the opposite notion. Aristarchus based his arguments on the poems themselves. He used his extensive knowledge of the actual Homeric text to demonstrate on a case-by-case basis that the interpretation of the Chorizontes was wrong and that there was no inconsistency (in terms of myth, language, or style) between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. As an additional consequence, in fact, his polemical notes against the Separatists could further prove that the two poems were written by the same hand.

This method and Aristarchus' approach to the 'Homeric Question' were not completely free from problems, however. His two basic assumptions, (1) that Homer was the author of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and (2) that Homer was self-consistent, often led him either to give forced explanations to show that the two poems were in agreement or to correct their text when it violated such assumptions. If his treatment of the mythical contradictions between the

Iliad and the *Odyssey* sounds not very convincing in some cases—for example, with Aphrodite's lovers and Neleus' sons—his methodological flaws emerge particularly in the case of the *atheteseis* in one poem justified as inconsistent with evidence from the other. Such *atheteseis* include the episodes of Sisyphus and Heracles in *Odyssey* 11 on the grounds that the depictions of these heroes contradicted their portrayals in the *Iliad*. By doing this, to some extent Aristarchus practically 'forced' Homer to be the author of both poems and to be self-consistent. Looking for passages which 'did not fit' and correcting the text was certainly the duty of a philologist; still, when dealing with oral poetry and with two poems like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (which are in many respects not similar at all), Aristarchus' method revealed its own weakness. As has been already pointed out,¹⁰⁷ it would be unfair to accuse him of not being sensitive to oral poetry. In fact, this is not my point here. Even without any knowledge of oral poetry, Aristarchus could have realized that his assumptions about Homer were intruding on and affecting his own approach to the text to the extent that he changed it to make it square with them. As much as his assumptions and rules were logically plausible and consistently implemented, his application of these rules 'without exception' worked in a circle from which Aristarchus could not free himself. Further consequences of this methodological weakness will become evident when examining how Aristarchus dealt with the *Neoteroi*, which is the topic of the next chapter.

107. See Chapter 3.6.B § 8.

5.3

Homer and the Neoterói

1. Homer versus the Neoterói: Language
2. Homer versus the Neoterói: Geography
3. Homer versus the Neoterói: Myths
 - 3.1. Myths and Characters of the Trojan War
 - 3.1.1. The Origin of the Trojan War and Its Beginnings
 - 3.1.2. Achilles and His Family
 - 3.1.3. Ajax the Great
 - 3.2. Other Myths Where Homer Is Different from the Neoterói
 - 3.2.1. Atreus and His Family
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 - 3.2.4. Niobe
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 - 3.3. Neoteric Narratives Inspired by Homer
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As shown in the previous chapter, Aristarchus considered Homer the author of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Once he had established this ‘fact’, it was almost natural to compare Homer’s poems—self-consistent and closely interconnected—with the rest of Greek literature. Indeed, he spent a considerable amount of time trying to show the differences between Homer and the other poets, as shown by the large number of scholia that discuss the use of Homeric material by the Neoterói, the ‘newer’ poets, namely, those later than Homer. The main field where such discrepancies occurred was myth, because, in Aristarchus’ view, Homer’s mythical background was remarkably different from that of the later poets. This chapter thus will be mainly dealing with the myths present and alluded to in the Homeric poems compared with that of the later poets. As discussed in the introduction to Chapter 3.3.B, myths and mythological questions belonged to the third part of grammar, which dealt with the ‘explanation of *historiai*’. Nevertheless, since the opposition between Homer and the Neoterói was fundamental for Aristarchus, it has seemed more convenient to treat it as a separate chapter. The differences between the Neoterói and Homer, moreover, were not limited to discrepancies in myths. The language and the geographic knowledge of Homer were remarkably different from that of later poets as well. The analysis of all the different areas where Aristarchus dealt with the ‘modern’ poets will thus shed further light on his view of Homer as different from (and better than) all other Greek authors.¹

1. Homer versus the Neoterói: Language

As seen in the previous chapters, linguistic analysis was a fundamental step for Aristarchus in order to study and work on the Homeric poems. Given his sophisticated analysis of Homeric language, from *glossai* to morphological and syntactic *schemata*, it is not surprising that he stressed linguistic differences between Homer and the later poets, since the ‘otherness’ of the Homeric idiolect compared with later literary uses was one of the first characteristics that readers would notice.² In several cases, Aristarchus seems to have limited himself to pointing out a difference in meaning of a word between Homer and the Neo-

1. On Aristarchus and the Neoterói, see Severyns 1928 and Rengakos 2000, to both of whom I will often refer in the following pages; cf. also Lehrs 1882, 174–191 (‘Mythologica’); Bachmann 1902–1904, I 15–16 and II 29–34; Roemer 1924, 87–170 (‘mythologische Exegese’).

2. On Aristarchus’ analysis of Homeric idiolect, see Chapter 3.2.A and Chapter 3.2.B (on tropes and syntactic figures), Chapter 3.3.A (on Homeric *glossai*), and Chapter 5.1 (on Homeric language and Greek dialects). On Aristarchus’ analysis of Homeric language with specific reference to the neoteric uses, see Dimpfl 1911 and Severyns 1928, 103–116.

teroi. For example, ὄσσα is 'divine voice' in Homer, but simply (ψιλῶς) 'voice' in the Neoteri (Sch. Il. 2.93b);³ τλήμων is 'steadfast', 'brave' in Homer, but becomes 'unlucky' in the Neoteri (Sch. Il. 5.670a; 10.231a; 21.430a);⁴ μῆλα means 'goats' and 'sheep' in Homer, but indicates all 'quadrupeds' in the Neoteri (Sch. Il. 10.485b).⁵ Sometimes, Aristarchus compared Homer with a specific poet. For instance, κεδνός is 'wise', 'chaste', and 'faithful' in Homer, but in Simonides it means 'friend' (Sch. Il. 9.586a);⁶ ἀμαθύνειν is a Homeric hapax which means 'to level with the dust' in Il. 9.593, but it is simply (ψιλῶς) 'to destroy' in Aeschylus (Sch. Il. 9.593a);⁷ the verb ἦ, 'he/she said', in Homer always occurs after a speech, but Plato always uses it to introduce a speech in the expression ἦ δ' ὅς, 'he said' (Sch. Il. 1.219a [Did. vel Ariston]).⁸

In some cases, it looks like that for Aristarchus the neoteric meaning of a word originated from a misunderstanding of the Homeric use by a later author. This seems to be the reasoning behind his comment that Archilochus took the verb κροαίνειν, said of a horse 'rattling' and 'galloping' over the plain in Il. 6.507, to mean 'to desire' (Sch. Il. 6.507b^{1,2}).⁹ Similarly, Patroclus places a κρεῖον, 'meat tray', on the fire, but Euphorion misunderstood it to mean simply 'meat' (Sch. Il. 9.206a¹).¹⁰ In Il. 14.214 κεστός, 'embroidered', is used to describe Aphrodite's girdle (ἱμάς), but Callimachus took it as a proper name for the girdle itself and so called Aphrodite 'the mistress of the *kestos*'.¹¹ Yet for Aristarchus this is wrong, as in Homer κεστός is obviously an adjective since it also appears as a member of the compound πολύκεστος in Il. 3.371 (Sch. Il. 3.371b; 14.214a).¹²

3. E.g., Hes. *Th.* 701, 832; *Hy. Merc.* 443. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 88; Dimpfl 1911, 17–18; Severyns 1928, 113. See also Chapter 3.3.A § 2.4.

4. E.g., Aesch. *Pers.* 912, *Ag.* 1588, *PV* 614; Soph. *Phil.* 161, *OT* 1175; Eur. *Hipp.* 1177. Indeed, Sch. Il. 21.430b (ex. [Ariston.]) specifies that the tragedians use τλήμων to mean 'unlucky' (but the word is also used with the same meaning by Aristoph. *Pax* 723 and Xen. *An.* 3.1.29). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 91; Dimpfl 1911, 21; Severyns 1928, 115.

5. E.g., Pind. *O.* 7.63, 80; Aesch. *Ag.* 1057. In fact, the semantic watershed between the Homeric and neoteric usage is not well defined in this case: in Hes. *Op.* 786, 795 and Soph. *Aj.* 1061 μῆλα, for example, are 'sheep'. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 100; Dimpfl 1911, 3–4; Roemer 1924, 42; Severyns 1928, 111. See also Chapter 3.3.A § 1.1. Other cases of different meanings given to words in Homer and in the Neoteri are μέλεος (Sch. Il. 10.480a; 16.336a^{1,2}; 23.795a^{1,2}; see Chapter 3.3.A § 2.1) and ἐπίηρα (Sch. Il. 1.572a; cf. Severyns 1928, 107–108; Schironi 2004, 110–117, fr. 10).

6. Simon., fr. 622 *PMG*, which coincides with the scholium.

7. Aesch. *TrGF* 3, fr. *244, about the dogs devouring their master Actaeon; cf. Severyns 1928, 105. See also Chapter 3.3.A § 2.4.

8. The phrase is widely used by Plato (see Brandwood 1976, 438). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 95; Dimpfl 1911, 9; Schironi 2004, 85–90 (fr. 6) and 545–553 (fr. 72); Schironi 2005.

9. Archil., fr. 272 West, which coincides with the scholium; no poetic fragment by Archilochus is preserved where this verb is used. Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 17; Severyns 1928, 110.

10. Euph., fr. 155 Powell (but the fragment consists simply of the scholium and similarly derived sources, such as Eustathius and *EGen.*). Sch. Il. 9.206a² does not mention Euphorion but generally speaks of the Neoteri. Cf. Severyns 1928, 109; Rengakos 2000, 331.

11. Call., fr. 43.53 Pfeiffer: κεστ[ο]ῦ [δ]εσπότη[ι]ς. Cf. Rengakos 2000, 330; Harder 2012, II 332–333.

12. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 191. Another case is θῦσαι, 'to burn so as to produce smoke', which for Aris-

There were also words introduced by the Neoterói which Homer did not know. As a consequence, whenever a ‘neoteric’ word occurred in Homer, the line was to be considered suspicious. For example, Aristarchus athetizes *Il.* 7.475 because, among other reasons, ἀνδράποδον, ‘captive’, is neoteric (*Sch. Il.* 7.475a: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι νεωτερικὴ ὀνομασία τοῦ ἀνδράποδον).¹³ Sometimes the difference between the Homeric and neoteric use of language became the decisive factor in choosing between two different readings. For instance, φή introducing a comparison is neoteric, as the use in Antimachus¹⁴ and Callimachus¹⁵ proves; therefore, for Aristarchus it cannot be accepted in Homer, as Zenodotus did at *Il.* 2.144 (*Sch. Il.* 2.144b) and *Il.* 14.499 (*Sch. Il.* 14.499–500a^{1,2} [Hrd.]).¹⁶ Similarly, ‘box’, ‘coffer’ in Homer is λάρναξ, while κιβωτός, Aristarchus’ gloss for λάρναξ, is a more recent noun (*Sch. Il.* 18.413a ὅτι λάρνακα τὴν κιβωτόν· νεωτερικὸν γὰρ ὄνομα ἢ κιβωτός).¹⁷ In this regard, there is an interesting note from an exegetical scholium:

Sch. Il. 24.228b¹ (ex.) {καὶ} φωριαμῶν: . . . Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ φησι τὴν κιβωτόν λέξιν νεωτέρων εἶναι· ἀγνοεῖ δὲ ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης (fr. 623 *PMG*) καὶ Ἑκαταῖος (*FGrHist* 1, F 368) μέμνηται αὐτῆς.

‘Of the chests’: . . . Aristarchus says that κιβωτός is a word of the Neoterói, but he is not aware of the fact that Simonides (fr. 623 *PMG*) and Hecataeus (*FGrHist* 1, F 368) mention it.

The scholiast who wrote this note seems not to have known what ‘neoteric’ meant for Aristarchus.¹⁸ He probably thought that ‘neoteric’ meant ‘Hellenistic’ or late (which is also the modern meaning of the expression), while for Aris-

tarchus is wrongly used by Philoxenus and Timotheus (*Sch. Il.* 9.219b), discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 2.1. There are also cases of incorrect etymologies by the Neoterói: νήδυμος/ἡδυμος (*Sch. Il.* 2.2b; see Chapter 3.1 § 3) and ὑπέρτερος (*Sch. Il.* 11.786a¹; see Chapter 3.4 § 3.3).

13. The vulgate and some papyri have the epic dative plural ἀνδραπόδεσι, ‘captives’ (cf. West, ad loc.), but Aristarchus read ἀνδραπόδοισι (*Sch. Il.* 7.475b [D]), hence the ἀνδράποδον in the Aristonicus scholium; see also *Sch. Il.* 7.475c (Did. | Ariston.). Wackernagel 1916, 154–155, indeed considers the form a ‘neoteric word’ and the dative ἀνδραπόδοισι read by Aristarchus ‘nur eine modernisierende Variante’ (see also *LSJ*, s.v.; cf., however, Kirk 1990, 291). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 34; Roemer 1912, 155–156; Roemer 1924, 43; Severyns 1928, 42–43 and 105; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 449.

14. Antim., fr. 156 Matthews. Cf. Matthews 1996, 360–362; Schironi 1999, 287–288.

15. Call., fr. 737 Pfeiffer.

16. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 85; Roemer 1924, 43; Severyns 1928, 46 and 115; Rengakos 2000, 329–330. In *Sch. Il.* 14.500 the reading φή is attributed to anonymous ‘τινές’ and not to Zenodotus (ὅτι ἀναγνόντες τινὲς φή κώδειαν ὑφ’ ἑν, ἵν’ ἧ ὡς κώδειαν . . .).

17. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 149; Dimpfl 1911, 31; Severyns 1928, 109.

18. So already Dimpfl 1911, 48; Severyns 1928, 61; Nünlist 2012c, 205; cf. also Wackernagel 1916, 243.

tarchus 'neoteric' indicated every author, word, or myth that postdated Homer, including Hecataeus and Simonides.¹⁹

Nevertheless, it is clear that rejecting certain words in Homer because they were 'neoteric' was an operation open to criticism. How could Aristarchus know that these words belonged only to a later period? His reasoning seems to have proceeded as follows: if a word was common among the Neoterioi and occurred only once in Homer, the Homeric use was doubtful because the word was 'neoteric'. Yet this was not conclusive evidence, as it could have been a Homeric hapax, which had then become popular among later authors. In fact, Aristarchus himself accepted hapaxes in Homer,²⁰ so his behavior in these cases is puzzling. In the (admittedly scanty) scholia where he discusses these neoteric words, he does not explain why the word at issue is indeed 'newer' and so cannot be a hapax in Homer, as with other singularly attested words. As our evidence allows us to infer, he does not seem to have looked for any 'external' evidence to prove that what he defined as a 'neoteric' word was indeed such. But we might have lost important evidence in this regard where he argued for his choices.

On the other hand, sometimes Aristarchus used the Neoterioi as evidence to confirm or explain the peculiarities of the Homeric language. For example, enallage of prepositions (ἐναλλαγή τῆς προθέσεως) finds parallels in archaic and classical poets, such as Archilochus (*Sch. Il.* 18.492b)²¹ and Sophocles (*Sch. Il.* 1.423–4);²² in the same way, the meaning of the adjective ἀστεμφής, 'unshaken', used only twice in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 2.344, 3.219), is made clear with an example from Anacreon (*Sch. Il.* 3.219a).²³ When Aristarchus chooses the reading οὐλιος ἀστήρ, 'the deadly star', i.e., Sirius, in *Il.* 11.62, he says that some (τινές) wrote αὐλιος ἀστήρ, 'the star of the fold', namely, the star which bids the shepherd to lead his flocks back to their fold (αὐλή), i.e., the evening star. As a parallel for this variant, he mentions Callimachus, who used the word αὐλιος to mean the star 'which rises after the setting of the sun' in his poetry (*Sch. Il.* 11.62a¹).²⁴ These examples suggest that, when he could not 'clarify Homer

19. The word is not preserved in any of the fragments of Simonides (fr. 623 *PMG* is simply the quotation in *Sch. Il.* 24.228b¹). One could speculate that Simonides used the word in the ode on Danae and the little Perseus carried in the 'chest' (fr. 543 *PMG*; still, in the lines preserved of this ode, he calls the chest λάρναξ).

20. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.10.

21. Archil., fr. 58.12 West.

22. Soph. *TrGF* 4, fr. 898. On enallage of prepositions, see Chapter 3.2.B § 3.2.

23. Anacr., fr. 367 *PMG*.

24. Call., fr. 177.6 Pfeiffer = fr. 54c.6 Harder. From *Sch. Il.* 11.62a¹, it is not clear whether Aristarchus also thought that Callimachus read *Il.* 11.62 with the reading αὐλιος ἀστήρ (and was thus alluding to Homer in his work), or whether he just mentioned Callimachus as a parallel for the

from Homer', Aristarchus turned to classical and later poets in order to explain a poetic use or support a reading,²⁵ or simply quoted them as a parallel for a variant (as in the last case).²⁶

2. Homer versus the Neoterói: Geography

Closely connected to the different language used by Homer and the Neoterói was the question of geographic discrepancies between them. In fact, these discrepancies mostly concerned geographic names that had changed from the time of Homer to that of later poets.²⁷ For example, Aristarchus notes that in Homer Agamemnon is king of Mycenae, and not of Argos, as in the Neoterói (*Sch. Il.* 11.46).²⁸ In fact, Argos indicates not the city but the Peloponnese in the Homeric poems (*Sch. Il.* 4.171d), since Homer does not know the name 'Peloponnese' for the region, as Hesiod does (*Sch. Il.* 9.246).²⁹

Other changes in geography were, in Aristarchus' opinion, due to mistakes made by the Neoterói, who misunderstood Homer. For example, a problem of *scriptio continua* could give rise to a variant of a geographic name, as with the population called Σελλοί/Ἑλλοί, whom Achilles mentions in his prayer to Zeus of Dodona: 'and around live the Selli (ἀμφὶ δὲ Σελλοί), your interpreters, who do not wash their feet and sleep on the ground' (*Il.* 16.234–235). Aristarchus calls attention to a problem of ambiguity in the script (*Sch. Il.* 16.234b: πρὸς τὸ τῆς γραφῆς ἀμφίβολον), because instead of ἀμφὶ δὲ Σελλοί others divided the line differently to obtain ἀμφὶ δὲ σ' Ἑλλοί, 'and around you [i.e., Zeus] the

adjective αὔλιος. Cf. Montanari 1995c, 57; Rengakos 2000, 328; West 2001, 211; Harder 2012, II 441–442 (with bibliography).

25. Aristarchus also quotes Stesichorus to explain Ares' epithet τεῖχεσιπλήτης in *Sch. Il.* 5.31d (see Chapter 3.3.B § 5.2 with footnote 296), and Euripides as a parallel for 'ornamental' epithets in Homer in *Sch. Il.* 2.45a (see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.2.3). Cf. Nünlist 2012c, 201.

26. Similar is the case of the adjective σπιδής, where Aristarchus gives forms in Aeschylus and Antimachus as parallels (*Sch. Il.* 11.754a [Hrd.]); see Chapter 3.4 § 7.

27. Cf. Severyns 1928, 116–119.

28. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 176. According to Severyns 1928, 294, Aristarchus' target was the *Cypria*—that might be, but Agamemnon is king of Argos also in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* as well as in Euripides' *Electra* and *Orestes* (but of Mycenae in Sophocles' *Electra*); cf. *Sch. Eur. Or.* 46, i 102.21–24 Schwartz. Agamemnon is perhaps also said to be ruling over Argos in Hesiod, fr. 195.6 M-W (the name Argos is a supplement, though fairly certain).

29. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 224; Dimpfl 1911, 31; Severyns 1928, 116–117. Argos also indicates Thessaly in Homer, who distinguishes Argos-Thessaly from Argos-Peloponnese through the use of different epithets (see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.1); on the other hand, Argos also is the city ruled by Diomedes (in *Il.* 2.559 and 4.52).

Helli live'. Aristarchus has no doubt that the correct reading is ἀμφὶ δὲ Σελλοί, as the name of the population derives from the nearby river, the Selleis (*Sch. Il.* 16.234b: καὶ γὰρ ὁ συνορίζων τοῖς τόποις ποταμὸς Σελλήεις, ἀφ' οὗ εἰκὸς τοὺς παροίκους Σελλοὺς καλεῖσθαι).³⁰ Yet the incorrect division in *Il.* 16.234 'misled' the Neoterioi who used the name Helli (*Sch. Il.* 2.659: οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι Ἑλλοὺς λέγουσι πλανηθέντες).³¹ The note does not specify the identity of those later poets, but they most certainly include Hesiod, who calls Dodona Ἑλλοπία,³² and Pindar.³³

Another geographic 'confusion' of the Neoterioi concerns the word ἀπία, which in Homer is the feminine of the adjective ἄπιος, 'far away', 'distant', and is found in the phrase ἐξ ἀπίης γαίης, used twice in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 1.270, 3.49). According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 1.270a; 3.49a^{1,2}) the Neoterioi took it to mean the Peloponnese; this is indeed what 'Apian land' means in Aeschylus³⁴ and Sophocles.³⁵ Even if the scholia do not add any further comment, Aristarchus might even have thought that the Neoterioi had been misled by the occurrences in the *Iliad*: in *Il.* 1.269–270 Nestor speaks of himself as coming 'from Pylos, from a distant land', and in *Il.* 3.49 Paris is said to have abducted Helen 'from a distant land'. It is clear that in both passages the Peloponnese is the 'distant land'—yet this does not imply that ἀπία/ἀπίη means Peloponnese in Homer. Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 3.49a²) 'proves' the neoteric mistake by recalling *Od.* 16.18, where ἐξ ἀπίης γαίης is used with a very generic meaning in a simile comparing Eumaeus greeting Telemachus when he comes back to Ithaca to a father greeting his son after he comes back 'in the tenth year from a distant land'. Here ἀπία/ἀπίη obviously can only mean 'distant'.

These discrepancies might have sparked some discussion on different geographic denominations in mythical traditions and on why later authors diverged from the Homeric model. Aristarchus' focus, however, simply lay in showing the Neoterioi's lack of attention in reading Homer—for him, this

30. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.531a. On the river Selleis, see Chapter 3.3.B § 3.1.

31. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 231; Dimplf 1911, 30; Severyns 1928, 117; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 233–234; Janko 1994, 350; Schironi 2004, 371–378 (fr. 47).

32. Hes., fr. 240.1 M-W. See also Philochorus, *FGrHist* 328, F 225.

33. See Strabo 7.7.10 (Ἑλλοὺς, ὡς Πίνδαρος); *Sch. Il.* 16.234c (Did.); *Sch. D Il.* 16.234. The fragment of Pindar is not preserved in these later sources, but a papyrus fragment could contain it (Pind., fr. 59.3 = *P.Oxy.* 2442, fr. 96 A). Among later poets, Sophocles has Σελλοί (*Trach.* 1167), Alexander Aetolus (quoted in *Sch. D Il.* 16.235) speaks of Ἑλλοί (perhaps in his Homeric exegesis; cf. Magnelli 1999, 256–258, fr. 15), and Callimachus uses both forms, Σελλοί (fr. 23.3 Pfeiffer; cf. Harder 2012, II 222) and Ἑλλοί (fr. 675.1 Pfeiffer).

34. Aesch. *Ag.* 256 and *Supp.* 260–270, where a new etymology is invoked: Apia comes from Apis, the healer and seer, son of Apollo, who freed the land from monsters. More prosaically, Istrus claimed that Apia came from ἄπιον, 'cultivated pear' (as opposed to 'wild pears'), as the Peloponnese was famous for its pears (*FGrHist* 334, F 39a/b). Cf. Jackson 2000, 123–129.

35. Soph. *OC* 1301–1303. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 224; Dimplf 1911, 28; Severyns 1928, 117.

was the main reason for such discrepancies.³⁶ Another example is the question of Phrygia. He often remarks that the Homeric Phrygia is a different region from the Troad.³⁷ The distinction between the two regions is clear from at least three passages: *Il.* 2.862–863, where the Phrygians are listed among the allies of the Trojans (who in Homer are the inhabitants of the Troad, not of Ilium only³⁸); *Il.* 3.184–189, where Priam remembers his journey to Phrygia; and *Il.* 24.545, where Achilles describes Priam's kingdom as limited by Phrygia in the north. All these lines make clear that Phrygians and Trojans are two different ethnic groups. In the scholia to these 'clarifying' passages, Aristarchus notices the difference and adds that these two regions are 'confused' by the Neoterói (*Sch. Il.* 3.184a and 24.545a: οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι συγχέουσιν) and, in particular, by Aeschylus (*Sch. Il.* 2.862a^{1,2}: Αἰσχύλος δὲ συνέχεεν). Indeed, Aeschylus wrote a tragedy entitled *Phrygians* or *The Ransom of Hector* (Aesch. *TrGF* 3, pp. 364–370), and this play was probably one of Aristarchus' targets,³⁹ as he criticizes it on another occasion (see below, § 3.4.1). The use of the verb συγχεῖν, if original, betrays a certain criticism by Aristarchus,⁴⁰ who seems to be saying that the later poets, starting with Aeschylus, were not as good as Homer at geography and, above all, did not read the poet well, since they missed these three very clear passages which underscore the difference between Troad and Phrygia—if they had paid attention to them, they would not have committed such a mistake.⁴¹ Similarly, when noting that Oechalia, the city of Eurytus, is in Thessaly and not in Euboea, as it is for the Neoterói (*Sch. Il.* 2.596; 2.730),⁴² Aristarchus again points out that the latter did not pay enough attention to Homer and simply missed the one passage, *Il.* 2.729–733, which makes it clear that Eurytus' city was in Thessaly: here Oechalia is mentioned with the Thessalian Tricca and Ithome under the leadership of Machaon and Podaleirius.⁴³

36. On Aristarchus' attitude toward Homeric geography, see Chapter 3.3.B § 7.

37. *Sch. Il.* 10.431a; 16.719a; 18.291a^{1,2}; cf. also *Sch. Il.* 20.216.

38. See Chapter 3.3.B § 3.4.

39. Aesch. *TrGF* 3, fr. 446, consists, however, of only this reference in *Sch. Il.* 2.862a^{1,2} (and in similar sources) and is placed by Radt among the fragments '*incertarum fabularum*'. Euripides (*Hec.* 4) calls Troy 'the city of the Phrygians'. Strabo (12.8.7) adds that not only tragedians but historians, too, confuse Trojans and Phrygians. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 229; Roemer 1924, 93; Severyns 1928, 117–118; van Thiel 2014a, I 277.

40. He uses the same expression for Zenodotus, who 'confuses' the dual in Homer; see Chapter 4 § 1.2.2.

41. For other geographic mistakes of Aeschylus, see Strabo 12.8.21.

42. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 182 and 229; Severyns 1928, 117 and 189; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 247–248. The location of Oechalia in Euboea was probably already attested in the *Sack of Oechalia*; see Severyns 1928, 188–191. Sophocles also places Oechalia in Euboea when in *Trach.* 74–75 he has Hyllus saying that Heracles is marching against 'the region of Euboea, the city of Eurytus'.

43. On the other hand, no secure geographic information can be gained from *Il.* 2.596, the only other passage where the city is mentioned in the *Iliad* (even if here, too, just as in *Il.* 2.730, Oechalia

Aristarchus even criticizes Thucydides as a ‘sloppy reader’, because in *Hist.* 1.3.3 he says that Homer never used the name *barbaroi*, which is more modern. *Il.* 2.867, however, with ‘the Carians who speak a barbarous language (βαρβαροφώνων)’, demonstrates that Thucydides is wrong:

Sch. Il. 2.867a βαρβαροφώνων: ὅτι Θουκυδίδης (1.3.3) λέγει τὴν ὀνομασίαν τῶν βαρβάρων νεωτερικὴν εἶναι. ἐλέγχεται δὲ ἐντεῦθεν.

‘Who speak a barbarous language’: because Thucydides (1.3.3) says that the name *barbaroi* is neoteric. But he is refuted by this passage.⁴⁴

Even Thucydides committed mistakes, and Aristarchus had no problem in pointing them out, just as he did with the blunders made by Zenodotus and other scholars, or the slips of the tragedians—all were guilty of not reading the greatest of all poets closely enough.

This brief survey of geographic mistakes on the part of Neoterioi also confirms our previous analysis of Aristarchus’ attitude toward geography in Homer. As concluded in Chapter 3.3.B § 7, Aristarchus engaged with geographic details only when it was a question of clarifying the text, but never went beyond this exegetical and fairly bookish attitude. Similarly, here his comments are all geared toward proving that an attentive reading of Homer would dispel any doubt about geographic names and the exact location of the many places mentioned by Homer. More importantly, there is no evidence that he might have conceived of different mythical traditions, which generated different geographies in the Neoterioi. Rather, our fragments seem to suggest that he assumed that Homer was the only legitimate authority and that later poets too agreed on this, since they strove to imitate Homer. Yet they did not read their model with enough attention; so they were misled (as in *Sch. Il.* 2.659: οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι . . . λέγουσι *πλανηθέντες*) and created ‘geographic monstrosities’. Once again, Aristarchus is the champion of ‘slow and close reading’—at the cost, however, of a more nuanced and correct understanding of ancient poetic traditions. But we probably cannot expect that from him.

is said to be ‘the city of Eurytus’). Demetrius of Scepsis and Apollodorus discussed the identity of this Oechalia at *Il.* 2.596 (see Strabo 8.3.6 and 8.3.25). The location of Oechalia in the *Sack of Oechalia* was also discussed (see Strabo 9.5.17). See also Steph. Byz. ο 37; Hecat., *FGrHist* 1, F 28. Cf. Kirk 1985, 216; Visser 1997, 516–519, 693–694.

44. Strabo (8.6.6 and 14.2.28) echoes Aristarchus’ point. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 225; Nünlist 2012b, 154–155. Oddly, Severyns 1928, 246 n. 5, expresses doubts about the Aristarchean origin of this note, which in fact sounds perfectly in line with Aristarchus’ method and attitude in analyzing Homeric poetry.

3. Homer versus the Neoterói: Myths

The main point of difference between Homer and the poets after him concerned their mythological background, as reflected in their stories. From the sheer number of scholia in which Aristarchus discusses mythical episodes and characters in Homer and compares them with later narratives, this was certainly one of his main concerns. Just as, through an attentive reading of Homer's poems, he was able to reconstruct Homeric idiolect and recognize it as a self-consistent language, different from Koine Greek but to be respected without emending it according to modern usage, in the same way did he approach myths and stories alluded to in Homer. In this case too, his attentive reading of both poems allowed him to map out the mythical traditions known to Homer, which were self-consistent and different from the ones surfacing in later poets.

In carrying out this operation Aristarchus was aware that, aside from the myths concerning the Trojan War at the core of the *Iliad*, many other myths were often alluded to in Homer, without a complete narrative.⁴⁵ Still, he was able to identify these hints and reconstruct the mythological universe beyond the Trojan saga. Sometimes, however, he had to admit that Homer did not narrate a myth completely—for example, he observes that Homer does not say why Poseidon and Apollo had to serve Laomedon for a year (*Sch. Il.* 21.444b^{1,2}).⁴⁶ Even though his approach is completely different from modern views about the Homeric poems and their mythical traditions,⁴⁷ Aristarchus' ability to pick up brief allusions to a specific myth and connect them with its later variants is noteworthy. It allowed him to point out the differences (or similarities) between the myths known to Homer and those known to the Neoterói.

3.1. Myths and Characters of the Trojan War

The *Iliad* became the foundational text for the Trojan saga, but very near to the time of Homer the cyclic poets were already composing other poems that 'com-

45. See Chapter 3.6.C § 3.4.

46. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 177. *Sch. Il.* 21.444d (ex.) and Eust. 1245.46–56 (ad *Il.* 21.444) list two main reasons, among others: (1) Poseidon and Apollo had tried to revolt against Zeus (cf. *Il.* 1.399–400), and this was their punishment (see also *Sch. Tzetz. Lyc.* 34); or (2) Apollo and Poseidon wanted to test the hubristic Laomedon (see also [Apollod.] *Bibl.* 2.5.9). The latter story was supported by Hellanicus (*FGrHist* 4, F 26), quoted in *Sch. Il.* 21.444c (ex.). Eustathius also adds that all the different explanations were, however, given by 'the poets after Homer' (οἱ μεθ' Ὀμήρου).

47. On the very complex problem of the mythical traditions of ancient epic (Homer and the Cycle) and their transmission, and on the different approaches taken by scholars, especially oral theory and Neoanalysis, see, among others, the important studies by Kakridis 1949; Kullmann 1960; Kullmann 1984; Burgess 2001; West 2003b; West 2013, 1–54; Nagy 2010; and the articles collected in Montanari, Renkagos, and Tsagalis 2012 and Fantuzzi and Tsagalis 2015.

pleted' the Trojan myth by narrating the events before the war or those after the death of Hector. The distinction between Homer and the cyclic poets, as well as praise for the former over the latter, was already present in Aristotle, though he never used the label 'cyclic'.⁴⁸ Not surprisingly, Aristarchus followed the path inaugurated by the philosopher and in his commentaries emphasized that the later poets took inspiration from Homer or failed in recasting the Trojan saga.

3.1.1. *The Origin of the Trojan War and Its Beginnings*

There is a series of Aristonicus scholia which point out the differences between Homer and the neoteric traditions which concern the origin of the Greek expedition to Troy. The facts that led to the Trojan War were narrated in the *Cypria*, which seems to be the target of these notes. The name of the poem is never mentioned in these scholia, however, and Aristarchus' criticism is aimed against 'the Neoterioi' generically. A well-known *zetema* in antiquity connected with the origin of the Trojan War concerned the 'will of Zeus' that was brought to fulfillment, as Homer declares at line 5 of the proem:

Sch. Il. 1.5–6 Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή, / ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα: Ἀρίσταρχος συνάπτει, ἵνα μὴ προοῦσά τις φαίνεται βουλή καθ' Ἑλλήνων, ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὗ χρόνου ἐγένετο ἡ μῆνις, ἵνα μὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις πλάσματα δεξώμεθα.

'And the will of Zeus was accomplished, / from the time when first': Aristarchus connects [the two lines], so that a certain will [of Zeus] against the Greeks clearly does not preexist, but [starts] from the time when [Achilles'] wrath began, so that we do not accept the inventions of the Neoterioi.

Aristarchus connects the second hemistich of line 5 'and thus the will of Zeus was accomplished' with lines 6–7 'from when (ἐξ οὗ) first Atreus' son, lord of men, and the noble Achilles stood apart quarreling'. In this way, then, Zeus' will is closely linked with the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon and refers specifically to Zeus' promise to Thetis to honor Achilles, who has been offended by Agamemnon, as Homer recounts in *Il.* 1.503–530. Others, however, connected the temporal clause in lines 6–7 not to line 5, but backward to line 1, so as to have 'The wrath sing, goddess, of Peleus' son Achilles . . . from when (ἐξ οὗ) first Atreus' son, lord of men, and the noble Achilles stood apart quarreling'. This solution works syntactically, but leaves the second hemistich of line 5 isolated; in

48. The only allusion to the Epic Cycle may be in *An. Post.* 77b32–34 (= T 1, p. 1 Bernabé): ἄρα πᾶς κύκλος σχῆμα; ἂν δὲ γράψῃ, δῆλον. τί δέ; τὰ ἔπη κύκλος; φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν [is every circle a figure? If one draws it, it is clear [that it is]; and so, are the epic poems a circle? It is clear that they are not]. Aristotle seems thus to suggest that there was a sense that epic poems could be considered as a 'cycle', which is confirmed by Callimachus' famous statement: ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν (*Epigr.* 28.1 Pfeiffer). Yet Aristotle never speaks of the Cycle elsewhere; in the *Poetics*, for example, he refers to the specific titles of the cyclic poems. See also below, § 6.

this way, the phrase ‘and thus the will of Zeus was accomplished’ can only refer to the entire war of Troy, which would have been brought to pass by Zeus’ will. What was Zeus’ will then? According to the Neoterói—and, in particular, the *Cypria*—Zeus caused the Trojan War to solve the problem of overpopulation, as a D scholium to *Il.* 1.5 explains.⁴⁹ But this is not the Homeric reason for Aristarchus, as this story is completely extraneous to the poem, which never alludes to it. Moreover, as seen in Chapter 3.6.C § 2.3, Aristarchus maintains that Homer does not engage in prolepsis for events so far back in time (*Sch. Il.* 11.604b); if indeed the ‘will of Zeus’ was his desire to end overpopulation, then the proem would refer to a fact that happened at least ten years before, which would be too far back in time. To conclude, for Aristarchus only ignorance of Homer’s narrative style and a syntactic misreading of the proem of the *Iliad* could lead to such a misinterpretation and to the Neoterói’s mythical ‘inventions’ (πλάσματα).⁵⁰

In the tradition, the other, immediate cause of the Trojan War was the judgment of Paris. This episode was mentioned in the *Cypria*⁵¹ and became the main reason for the war in later poets and artists. According to Aristarchus, however, Homer does not know this episode; for this reason, he athetizes *Il.* 24.25–30 (*Sch. Il.* 24.25–30), which is the only place in the *Iliad* that alludes to the judgment of Paris. In these lines, Homer says that only Hera, Poseidon, and

49. *Sch. D Il.* 1.5 (*Cypr.*, fr. I Allen = fr. 1 Bernabé): Διὸς δὲ τελείετο βουλή: . . . ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ ἱστορίας τινὸς εἶπον εἰρηκέναι τὸν Ὅμηρον· φασὶ γὰρ τὴν γῆν βαρουμένην ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων πολυπληθείας, μηδεμιᾶς ἀνθρώπων οὔσης εὐσεβείας, αἰτῆσαι τὸν Δία κουφισθῆναι τοῦ ἄχθους. τὸν δὲ Δία, πρῶτον μὲν εὐθὺς ποιῆσαι τὸν Θηβαϊκὸν πόλεμον, . . . ὕστερον δὲ πάλιν συμβούλῳ τῷ Μώμῳ χρησάμενος . . . τὴν Θέτιδος θνητογαμίαν, καὶ θυγατρὸς καλὴν γένναν, ἐξ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων πόλεμος Ἑλλησὶ τε καὶ βαρβάροις ἐγένετο. ἀφ’ οὗ συνήβη κουφισθῆναι τὴν γῆν, πολλῶν ἀναιρεθέντων. ἡ δὲ ἱστορία παρὰ Στασίῳ τῷ τὰ Κύπρια πεποιηκότι . . . καὶ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἱστορούμενα περὶ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς βουλῆς, ἐστὶ τάδε. ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἀριστάρχειον καὶ Ἀριστοφάνους δόξαν, τὴν Θέτιδος εἶναι βουλήν, ἣν ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς φησὶν λιτανεύουσιν τὸν Δία ἐκδικῆσαι τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἀτιμίαν (*Il.* 1.508), καθάπερ καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ κεῖται τῆς ποιήσεως [‘And the will of Zeus was accomplished’: . . . others claimed that Homer was saying so on the basis of some mythical account; for they say that the earth, oppressed by the great number of people, asked Zeus to relieve her from the burden, since there was no reverence toward the gods on the part of the human beings. First Zeus straightaway made the Theban War happen . . . and then again, consulting Momos as an adviser, . . . [Zeus arranged for] Thetis’ marriage with a mortal and the outstanding birth of a daughter [i.e., Helen]; from these two events the war between Greeks and barbarians came about, which resulted in the earth being relieved [from overpopulation], as many were killed. This story is found in Stasinus, who composed the *Cypria*. . . These are the stories told by the Neoterói concerning the will of Zeus. But we follow the opinion of Aristarchus and Aristophanes and say that it is the will of Thetis, whom in the following lines [Homer] presents as entreating Zeus to punish the dishonor done to her son (*Il.* 1.508), just as the main points also are present in the proem of the poem]. This scholium says that for Aristarchus it was Thetis’ will, rather than Zeus’, but of course the reference is to the same episode. Cf. Severyns 1928, 245–249; West 2013, 65–68.

50. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 189; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 14–15 and II 30; Roemer 1924, 101 and 166; Severyns 1928, 47, 246–247; Kirk 1985, 53; van Thiel 2014a, I 46–47; Bouchard 2016, 187–188.

51. Procl. *Chrest.* 102.14–19 = *Cypr.* 38.4–39.8 Bernabé. Cf. Severyns 1928, 261–264; West 2013, 73–75, 77–79.

Athena did not rejoice at Hermes stealing Hector's body from Achilles, since they still hated Ilium, 'because of the folly of Paris who insulted (νείκεσσε) the goddesses when they came to his pen, and he praised the one who gave him grievous lust' (*Il.* 24.28–30). Aristarchus lists several reasons for rejecting these lines: they are ridiculous and contain words not used according to the Homeric meaning, such as the verb νεικεῖν (l. 29), which he considers to be used here for 'to judge',⁵² or μαχλοσύνη (l. 30) for 'lust', which is Hesiodic (*Sch. Il.* 24.25–30: Ἡσιόδειος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ λέξις).⁵³ More importantly, Homer does not know about the judgment of Paris—otherwise, he would mention it elsewhere (*Sch. Il.* 24.25–30: τὴν τε περὶ τοῦ κάλλους κρίσιν οὐκ οἶδεν· πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἂν ἐμνήσθη). An exegetical scholium (*Sch. Il.* 24.23) mentions Aristarchus' athetesis and is more specific in explaining why Homer does not know the story of Paris' judgment: if that was the reason of the war, why would Homer make Zeus ask Hera in *Il.* 4.31–33 what Priam and his sons did to her to make her furious at them? A short note by Aristonicus to this passage (*Sch. Il.* 4.32a: ἀγνοεῖ δὲ τὴν κρίσιν) shows that the comment goes back to Aristarchus. Other reasons listed in the exegetical scholium to *Il.* 24.23 are the following: in *Il.* 3.164–165 Priam blames the gods for the war and not Paris' judgment; Helen does not mention it—neither in her speech to Hector (*Il.* 6.344–358), nor in the lamentation over Hector (*Il.* 24.762–775), nor when she talks to Priam and the other Trojan elders (*Il.* 3.172–242); rather, she speaks only of her flight with Paris. Finally, Homer defines the ships that Paris used to go to Sparta as ἀρχέκακοι, 'origins of evil' (*Il.* 5.63); thus, the poet considers Helen's relationship with Paris the starting point for the hostilities, without any divine beauty contest preceding it. Furthermore—the same scholium explains—a beauty contest among Aphrodite, Athena, and Hera is strange (ἄτοπον): Aphrodite is far superior to Athena in beauty;⁵⁴ Hera, on the other hand, calls Aphrodite 'child' and recognizes her erotic power at *Il.*

52. See also *Sch. Il.* 7.161a: πρὸς τὸ 'νείκεσσαν', ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπέπληξεν, οὐδέποτε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔκρινεν ὡς ἐν τῷ 'ὅς †νείκεσσαν τε† θεάς' (*Il.* 24.29) [with reference to νείκεσσαν, because it is used instead of 'he rebuked', but is never [used] in the sense of 'he judged', as in ὅς νείκεσσε θεάς]. So Aristarchus thought that *Il.* 24.29 (ὅς νείκεσσε θεάς ὅτε οἱ μέσσανλον ἴκοντο) meant '[Paris] who judged the goddesses when they came to his pen'. In fact (as he also observes in *Sch. Il.* 7.161a) the verb νεικεῖν never means 'to judge' but 'to quarrel' and 'to scold', whence 'to insult' at *Il.* 24.29 ('who insulted [the goddesses]'; cf. Richardson 1993, 279). Perhaps Aristarchus, who had other reasons to suspect these lines, also concluded that the interpolator incorrectly used the verb νεικεῖν to mean 'to judge'—which, in a way, can also be a quite obvious sense given that the lines speak about the judgment of Paris. In this way, Aristarchus had further support for his athetesis. On Aristarchus' attitude toward interpolators, see Chapter 3.6.B § 7.

53. In the note Aristarchus also explains that Hesiod used it first for the daughter of Proetus (fr. 132 M-W). Aristophanes had a different text and avoided this word here; see Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 24.30a. Cf. Dimpfl 1911, 19; Richardson 1993, 279; Nünlist 2012c, 201.

54. The scholium compares a beauty contest between Aphrodite and Athena to one between Adonis and Heracles!

14.190, 198–199—so how could Hera ever think to compete with Aphrodite in attractiveness? It is impossible to know whether all these arguments in this bT scholium go back to Aristarchus; still, they certainly sound Aristarchean in their use of the principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’ and in their logical (overly logical?) argumentation.⁵⁵

Once Aristarchus rejected the judgment of Paris from the Homeric mythical background, he needed to explain why Hera and Athena are so averse to the Trojans and constantly help the Greeks in the *Iliad*. For him, Hera provides the answer for herself at *Il.* 4.51–52, when in response to Zeus’ question about why she is so enraged with Priam and his sons (*Il.* 4.31–33, mentioned above) she says that there are three cities that are dearest to her: Argos, Sparta, and Mycenae. Hence, Hera is anti-Trojan because she is attached to the cities that are home to the preeminent Greek heroes, Diomedes,⁵⁶ Menelaus, and Agamemnon, and not because of the judgment of Paris (*Sch. Il.* 4.52: οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀποκεκρίσθαι ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὸ κάλλος αὐτῶν, ὅπερ οὐκ οἶδεν Ὅμηρος).⁵⁷

Aristarchus also noted that Homer and the Neoterói gave different accounts of the journey from Aulis to Troy as well. According to Homer, it was straightforward, that is, the Greeks reached Troy directly. In the *Cypria*, however, the Greeks arrived by mistake in Mysia; in the ensuing battle against the Mysians, their king Telephus was wounded by Achilles; after having been cured later on in Argos by the rust of Achilles’ spear, to return the favor Telephus led the Greeks to Troy.⁵⁸ The story is unknown to Homer, but in Aristarchus’ opinion some words in *Iliad* 1 ‘inspired’ later poets to invent it. When Achilles has gathered the assembly because of the plague and suggests consulting Calchas, he starts his speech with these words: ‘Son of Atreus, now I think that we, going back, shall return home (παλιμπλαγχθέντας . . . ἄψ ἀπονοστήσειν)—if we should escape death—if indeed war and pestilence together kill the Achaeans’ (*Il.* 1.59–60). Aristarchus observes that the Neoterói used these lines as a source to invent the story of a previous expedition to Mysia and the wounding of Telephus (*Sch. Il.* 1.59c: πρὸς τὴν τῶν νεωτέρων

55. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 185; Roemer 1912, 76–77, 117, 435–439; Wecklein 1919, 97–98; Roemer 1924, 130–131, 163; Severyns 1928, 262–264; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 436–437. For a survey of ancient and modern opinions on this passage, see Richardson 1993, 276–278.

56. In this case, of course, Argos must mean the city under Diomedes (as in *Il.* 2.559–567), not the entire Peloponnese, as elsewhere in Homer.

57. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 15–16; Roemer 1912, 465–466; Severyns 1928, 261–262. We do not know what Aristarchus thought about Athena; perhaps, in his view, Athena’s close bond with Odysseus explained her pro-Greek attitude.

58. Procl. *Chrest.* 104.4–11 = *Cypr.* 40.36–41.42 Bernabé. Cf. Severyns 1928, 291–295; West 2013, 105–107, 108–109. A slightly different version of this myth (according to which Telephus kidnapped baby Orestes in order to force Achilles to cure him) serves as the basis of Euripides’ *Telephus* (*TrGF* 5, pp. 680–718), famously parodied by Aristophanes in the *Acharnians*.

ἱστορίαν, ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν τὴν κατὰ Μυσίαν ἱστορίαν ἔπλασαν). Aristarchus' point is made clear in *Sch. Il.* 11.326a: when he is commenting on the dual participle παλινορμένω, 'rushing back', which he reads as a compound,⁵⁹ he remarks that it is used instead of ὀπισθεν ὀρμώντες, just like παλιμπλαγχθέντας.⁶⁰ This brief note is further explained by the many scholia in which Aristarchus notes that πάλιν in Homer only means 'back, backward', of place, and never 'again', of time, as in Koine.⁶¹ His point, thus, seems to be that at *Il.* 1.59 Achilles is saying that the Greeks should return home, going *back* (παλιμπλαγχθέντας). Some scholars, however, gave πάλιν a temporal sense and thus understood the verb as 'to wander *again*'. With this (incorrect) interpretation, Achilles' speech sounded like an allusion to a previous, unplanned adventure in the Aegean Sea because he would say 'we shall be wandering *again*'—and from this misunderstanding, the Neoterioi 'invented' (ἔπλασαν) the story of the Greek fleet being sidetracked to Mysia.⁶² Aristarchus finds further evidence that this myth is unknown to Homer some lines below, when Homer introduces Calchas, saying that he is the one 'who led the ships of the Achaeans to Ilium with his prophetic skill, which Phoebus Apollo had given him as a gift' (*Il.* 1.71–72). These words demonstrate that Telephus never was part of the story as the hero who, after regaining his health from Achilles, led the Greeks to Troy (*Sch. Il.* 1.71a: καὶ ὅτι Κάλχας ἡγήσατο τοῖς Ἑλλήσι καὶ οὐχὶ Τήλεφος, ὥς τινες νεώτεροι).⁶³

Another very famous myth of the beginning of the Trojan expedition was the sacrifice of Iphigenia, which happened when the Greeks gathered again in Aulis after the Mysian adventure. This myth was very well known due to Aeschylus' and Euripides' dramas, but was already present in the *Cypria*.⁶⁴ Aristarchus explains that Homer does not know this myth because to appease Achilles at *Il.* 9.145 Agamemnon offers to him as a wife one of his three daughters: Chrysothemis, Laodice, or Iphianassa. Since Iphianassa is another name for Iphigenia, she is still alive when the Greeks are at Troy (*Sch. Il.* 9.145a: ὅτι οὐκ οἶδε τὴν παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις σφαγὴν Ἰφιγενείας).⁶⁵

59. See *Sch. Il.* 11.326b (Hrd.); 11.326c (ex. [Hrd.]).

60. Aristarchus also reads παλιμπλαγχθέντας as a compound (rather than πάλιν πλαγχθέντας); see *Sch. Il.* 1.59d (Hrd.).

61. *Sch. Il.* 2.276a.b^{1,2}; 5.257a; 5.836a; 6.189b; 9.56–7; 10.281a; 10.356a; 24.462 (ex. [Ariston.]).

62. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 91–92; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 32; Dimpfl 1911, 11; Roemer 1924, 102, 107, 118; Severyns 1928, 292; Schironi 2004, 280–289 (fr. 34); van Thiel 2014a, I 59.

63. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 187; Severyns 1928, 293.

64. Procl. *Chrest.* 104.12–20 = *Cypr.* 41.42–49 Bernabé. Cf. Severyns 1928, 295–298; West 2013, 109–111.

65. According to Severyns 1928, 296–297, who considers *Sch. Il.* 1.106b (ex.) and 1.108–9b (D?) derived from Aristarchus, this mythological question was also connected to a *zetema* in *Il.* 1.106–108: why does Agamemnon call Calchas 'prophet of evil'? It is not because of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, which is unknown to Homer, but because Calchas said in Aulis that it would take ten years to seize Troy (*Il.* 2.329). Cf. also Lehrs 1882, 176; Dachs 1913, 22; Roemer 1924, 96 and 143.

On the other hand, the story of Philoctetes, which was also narrated in the *Cypria*,⁶⁶ is known to Homer, who expressly tells his story and his abandonment on the island of Lemnos in *Il.* 2.718–725. Aristarchus observes, however, that there is a difference between the version known to Homer and the one known to the Neoterói: in Homer Philoctetes is left on Lemnos, and not in a little desert island, as told by the Neoterói (*Sch. Il.* 2.722: ὅτι ἐν Λήμνῳ ἔμενε καταλελειμμένος ὁ Φιλοκτήτης. οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι ἐν νησιδίῳ ἐρήμῳ). The target of Aristarchus' note here is probably not the author of the *Cypria*, but Sophocles, who in the eponymous drama altered the tradition and made Lemnos a desert island to add pathos to his protagonist's condition.⁶⁷ Aristarchus does not seem to be interested in the reasons for Sophocles' choice; he simply wants to emphasize the difference between Homer (who explicitly calls Lemnos 'well-inhabited', ἐϋκτιμένη, at *Il.* 21.40; cf. also *Od.* 8.283) and the later tragedy.⁶⁸

3.1.2. Achilles and His Family

Aside from other minor differences in the characters of the *Iliad* compared with more modern versions,⁶⁹ the hero that attracted most of Aristarchus' attention was, unsurprisingly, Achilles. Furthermore, his story underwent some significant changes from Homer to the Neoterói. First, in the Homeric myth, Achilles was not raised by Chiron, as in the later tradition. This change occurred early, since already in a papyrus fragment from Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women* it is clearly said that Chiron 'took care' (ἐκόμιζε) of Achilles when he was a child.⁷⁰ Chiron's role in Achilles' upbringing was due to the fact that Thetis had abandoned Peleus, and so the young Achilles needed someone to take care of him, as Aristarchus also observes (*Sch. Il.* 18.57a: ἡ Θέτις . . . καταλιποῦσα τὸν Ἀχιλλέα,

66. Procl. *Chrest.* 104.21–23 = *Cypr.* 41.50–51 Bernabé. Cf. Severyns 1928, 298–301; West 2013, 112–113.

67. As we know from Dio Chrys. *Or.* 52, who compares the dramas about this Greek hero by the three main tragedians and informs us that Aeschylus and Euripides presented a chorus of Lemnians. This means that in their versions Lemnos was not a deserted island and that Sophocles innovated in presenting Lemnos as inhabited (*Phil.* 1–2) and in having the chorus made of Neoptolemus' soldiers.

68. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 185; Severyns 1928, 299, who suggests that Aristarchus also reproaches the author of the *Cypria* because he had the Greeks abandoning Philoctetes on Lemnos, while Homer said that he remained on the island willingly (cf. also Roemer 1924, 164; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 250–252); such an explanation may be voiced in *Sch. D Il.* 2.721, but there is no evidence that it goes back to Aristarchus. On the other hand, the Aristonicus note in *Sch. Il.* 2.722 (fully reported above) is scanty and does not suggest anything like this. In fact, Homer clearly says that the Greeks 'left' Philoctetes on Lemnos, where he lay in pain (*Il.* 2.722–724: Λήμνῳ ἐν ἡγαθέῃ, ὅθι μιν λίπον υἱὲς Ἀχαιῶν . . . ἐνθ' ὃ γε κεῖτ' ἀχέων), but without any clear statement that he willingly stayed there.

69. For example, in *Sch. Il.* 16.718a Aristarchus observes that in Homer Hecuba is the daughter of Dymas (*Il.* 16.718), while in Euripides she is the daughter of Cisseus (*Hec.* 3). Cf. also [Apollod.] *Bibl.* 3.12.5; Hyg. *Fab.* 91, 111, 243; *Sch. Eur. Hec.* 3, i 12.16–17 Schwartz.

70. Hes., fr. 204.87–89 M-W.

ὁ δὲ Πηλεὺς Χείρωνι παραδέδωκεν, ἵνα τραφῇ). The story is first attested in Sophocles (*TrGF* 4, fr. 151) and then in Apollonius Rhodius (4.866–879),⁷¹ but in Homer Achilles did not need a caretaker because Thetis remained with Peleus,⁷² as Aristarchus points out in many scholia.⁷³ This conclusion leads him to give a specific interpretation to *Il.* 1.396, where Achilles asks his mother to intercede on his behalf with Zeus, as he often heard her boasting that she had helped Zeus once:

Sch. Il. 1.396b¹ (Hrd.) πολλάκι γὰρ σεο: Ἀρίσταρχος ἐγκλιτικὴν παρέλαβε τὴν ἀντωνυμίαν, λέγων τὸ δηλούμενον εἶναι τοιοῦτο, πολλάκις γὰρ σου, ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρός μου δόμοις, ἤκουσα καυχωμένης· ἐὰν γὰρ, φησί, κατ' ὀρθὸν τόνον ἀναγνῶμεν, ἔσται ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Νηρέως οἴκοις ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς αὐτῆς ἀκηκοώς. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἱστορίαν οὐκ οἶδεν Ὅμηρος. τοσαῦτα ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

‘For often [I heard] you (σεο)’: Aristarchus took the pronoun [σεο] as enclitic, saying that this is what it means: ‘I often heard you (σου) boast in the house of my father’. For if we read it with an acute accent (σέο), he says, Achilles will have heard her in the house of Nereus. But Homer does not know this story. So Aristarchus and those from his school.⁷⁴

Aristarchus reads ‘for often I heard (ἤκουσα) you (σεο) boasting in the halls of [my] father (πατρός ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν)’, with the enclitic σεο that serves as the personal pronoun of the second-person singular depending on ἤκουσα. He rejects σέο with an acute accent (in the sense of σεαυτοῦ)⁷⁵ because that would have a possessive meaning and refer to πατρός, with the sense ‘for often I heard [you] boasting in the halls of your (σέο, lit., ‘of yourself’) father’. His grammat-

71. See *Sch. Ap. Rh.* 4.816 (which is the source of Sophocles’ fragment); [Apollod.] *Bibl.* 3.13.6. The reason for Thetis’ departure, as recounted by Apollonius Rhodius and Pseudo-Apollodorus, is that Peleus became upset when he saw Thetis placing baby Achilles into the fire to make him immortal. Hesiod (fr. 300 M-W, which is also preserved by *Sch. Ap. Rh.* 4.816) mentions a similar episode: Thetis immersed all the children she had from Peleus in a boiling cauldron to see whether they were immortal and only Achilles was saved by Peleus. From this fragment, it is impossible to know whether Thetis left Peleus in Hesiod as well. Yet, since Hesiod also presents Chiron as caretaker of Achilles, he might have also had Thetis abandon Peleus.

72. See *Il.* 16.574, 18.55–60 ≅ 18.432–441, 18.330–332.

73. *Sch. Il.* 16.222b; 16.574b; 18.57a; 18.60; 18.90; 18.332a^{1,2}. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 188; Severyns 1928, 254–256. In particular, *Sch. Il.* 16.222b and 18.57a specify that in the Neoteroi Thetis left Achilles twelve days after she gave birth to him. The additional detail about Thetis leaving after twelve days is not attested elsewhere.

74. In the rest of the scholium (omitted in the quote), Herodian goes into a detailed grammatical discussion of the accentuation of these forms. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.396b² (Hrd.); cf. van Thiel 2014a, I 119.

75. Cf. Matthaios 1999, 474, 489–490 (fr. 132), and also Severyns 1928, 256–257.

ical explanation, however, is functional to addressing a mythological problem: he rejects the second reading as it would imply that Thetis abandoned Peleus' house and returned to her father Nereus, which is contrary to the myth known to Homer.

When at *Il.* 18.57 = 18.438 Thetis explicitly states that she raised Achilles, Aristarchus has definitive proof that Chiron never took care of him (*Sch. Il.* 18.57a and 18.438a: ὅτι καθ' Ὅμηρον ἡ Θέτις ἔθρεψε τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, οὐ Χείρων, ὡς οἱ νεώτεροι). On the other hand, from *Il.* 9.485–491, where Phoenix says that he used to feed baby Achilles, and from *Il.* 11.830–832, where Achilles is said to have learned 'soothing drugs' (ἥπια φάρμακα) from Chiron, Aristarchus concludes that Chiron did not care for the young Achilles, who, aside from his mother Thetis, was raised by Phoenix;⁷⁶ the centaur only taught him medicine (*Sch. Il.* 9.489a; 11.832a).⁷⁷

Finally, when at *Il.* 9.667–668 the poet briefly alludes to Achilles' taking Scyros, Aristarchus remarks that, according to Homer, Scyros, among other cities, was sacked by Achilles (*Sch. Il.* 9.668a). The comment in itself does not seem particularly informative, but it might be pointing out another difference in the myth of Achilles. According to Homer, Achilles also left a son, Neoptolemus, at Scyros (*Il.* 19.326–333). He was probably born from Achilles' union with Deidamia after the hero took the island, even if Homer is silent about it. According to a later tradition, however, Achilles met Deidamia when he was brought to Scyros by Thetis before the expedition to Troy in order to prevent him from joining it and thus from dying prematurely. An exegetical scholium (*Sch. Il.* 9.668b) mentions the Neoterói as supporters of this alternate version of the myth, proving that the difference between these two myths was the point at issue.⁷⁸ The later, hardly heroic story of Achilles hidden at Scyros and dressed like a girl was present in the cyclic poets (perhaps in the *Cypria*),⁷⁹

76. Since at *Il.* 9.481 Phoenix states that Peleus loved him as a father loves his son, Aristarchus concludes that in Homer Phoenix is younger than Peleus, unlike in the tragedians, who represent Phoenix as old (*Sch. Il.* 9.481a²: ὅτι νεώτερος Πηλέως, οὐχ ὡς οἱ τραγικοί). The reference to the τραγικοί is ambiguous, since no literary text describing an old Phoenix has reached us. Yet Sophocles (*TrGF* 4, p. 490), Euripides (*TrGF* 5, pp. 845–855), Ion (*TrGF* 1, pp. 105–108), and Astydamas the Younger (*TrGF* 1, p. 206, fr. 5d) wrote tragedies entitled *Phoenix*. Aristarchus might be referring to any of these plays or even to all of them; cf. Lehrs 1882, 185; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 9.481a (who suggests that the target is Euripides).

77. Cf. Hofmann 1905, 12. Severyns 1928, 259–261, assumes that 'Thetis' divorce' (as he calls it) and so also Chiron as the educator of Achilles were both present in the *Cypria*, and that Aristarchus was again arguing against this poem of the Cycle. This might be true, but there is no firm evidence for such a supposition; see West 2013, 41 and 104.

78. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 174; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 45, II 30 and 31; Severyns 1928, 285; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 249.

79. *Sch. D Il.* 19.326 mentions the story of Peleus hiding Achilles dressed like a woman at Scyros when the expedition was first gathered, and concludes ἡ ἱστορία παρὰ τοῖς κυκλικοῖς. Cf.

in mythographers,⁸⁰ and also in the lost tragedy by Euripides entitled *Skyrioi*, as the *hypothesis* preserved on papyrus (PSI 1286) clearly states.⁸¹ Moreover, Polygnotus depicted the young Achilles living with maidens at Scyrus in a painting in Athens.⁸² Aristarchus probably took care to single out the allusion to the sack of Scyrus in the *Iliad* in order to show that Homer did not know of this ‘cowardly’ interlude in the myth of Achilles, where the hero, dressed like a girl, tried to escape the war. Rather, the Homeric Achilles was always shown as a heroic character.⁸³

3.1.3. *Ajax the Great*

Aristarchus points out that, according to Homer, Ajax is not invulnerable on two occasions when the hero risks his life in combat (*Sch. Il.* 14.406a; 23.822). This statement may seem puzzling at first, but later poets did in fact describe Ajax as invulnerable. For us, the first to do so is Pindar in *Isthmian* 6 (ll. 35–54): Heracles is a guest in the house of Telamon, and in exchange for the hospitality he prays to Zeus to give Telamon a son as invulnerable as his lion skin; Zeus agrees and sends an eagle (αἰετός) as a sign; because of this, the son of Telamon, once born, is called Ajax (Αἶας) and is invulnerable.⁸⁴ A similar story is narrated by Lycophron in the *Alexandra* (ll. 455–461): when Heracles arrived at Salamis, he found the newly born Ajax and wrapped him in his lion skin to make him immortal; the baby was made invulnerable except in the point where the lion skin had not covered him. Indeed, the tradition that Ajax was invulnerable except in one spot of his body was old: the armpit for Aeschylus,⁸⁵ a rib or the neck according to other sources.⁸⁶ Even if there are no Aristonicus scholia referring

West 2013, 107. Bernabé considers the scholium as preserving a fragment from the *Cypria* (fr. 19 Bernabé); and so also Severyns 1928, 285–291. However, according to Proclus’ account (*Chrest.* 104.8–9 = *Cypria* 41.39–40 Bernabé), in the *Cypria* Achilles went to Scyrus and married Deidamia after the first failed expedition to Troy (when the Greeks arrived in Mysia). Since the story in *Sch. D Il.* 19.326 is incompatible with Proclus’ account, Davies places the former among the *fragmenta incerti loci intra cyclum epicum* (Davies 1988, 75, fr. 4). It is also possible that Proclus knew a version of the *Cypria* different from the one at the basis of the note in *Sch. D Il.* 19.326. On the multiformity of the *Cypria*, see Finkelberg 2000. On the contrary, for West 2013, 104 and 184, this story was absent from the *Cypria* and rather comes from Euripides’ *Skyrioi*.

80. [Apollod.] *Bibl.* 3.13.8; Hyg. *Fab.* 96.

81. Eur. *TrGF* 5, pp. 665–670.

82. See Paus. 1.22.6.

83. See Chapter 5.4 § 1.

84. *Sch. Pind. I.* 6.53a says that the same story was reported in the *Great Ehoiai* of Hesiod (fr. 250 M-W), but the scholium’s wording suggests that Hesiod was only describing Heracles’ visit and the origin of Ajax’s name, and did not talk about his invulnerability. According to Severyns 1928, 325–328, the invulnerability of Ajax was also recounted in the *Aethiopis* on the basis of pictorial evidence; see, however, West 2013, 162.

85. Aesch. *TrGF* 3, fr. 83 (ex *Sch. Il.* 14.404–6 [ex.], *Sch. Soph. Aj.* 833a Christodoulou).

86. See *Sch. D Il.* 23.821; *Sch. Lyc.* 455a; *Hyp. Soph. Aj.* 58–60 Christodoulou. Pindar does not

to those later authors, Aristarchus probably noted the difference between Homer and these Neoterói in the treatment of Ajax.⁸⁷ Perhaps he even considered it another case of ‘misunderstanding Homer’. An exegetical scholium (*Sch. Il.* 14.404–6) does in fact say that the idea of Ajax’s invulnerability originated from the fact that he is never wounded in Homer. In addition, *Il.* 23.820–823 could have even suggested that the neck was the only vulnerable part of Ajax’s body. Here Homer says that in the armed combat during the funeral games Diomedes tries to aim at Ajax’s neck and that all the Greeks, filled with fear, decide to put an end to the fight. Someone might have read this scene as proof that the neck was the only vulnerable part of Ajax, and the duel could have resulted in the death of the hero. On the contrary, for Aristarchus, *Il.* 23.820–823 together with *Il.* 14.402–406, where Hector casts his spear at Ajax’s chest and only the leather straps protecting his ‘tender flesh’ save him, prove that the hero is in fact vulnerable (*Sch. Il.* 23.822: ὅτι ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων [i.e., *Il.* 14.402–406] φαίνεται καθ’ Ὅμηρον μὴ ὦν ἄτρωτος ὁ Αἴας). With this comment, he might have also been arguing against those who misunderstood this scene and created a ‘false’ myth of an invulnerable Ajax.⁸⁸

3.2. Other Myths Where Homer Is Different from the Neoterói

Homer’s background of mythical traditions goes far beyond the main story of the Trojan War, and in many ways this surfaces throughout both poems. Aristarchus was attentive to these minor mythical allusions as well.⁸⁹ Since many of the Neoterói recast and used those myths which were only alluded to or briefly recounted by Homer, Aristarchus stressed how they significantly altered them with respect to the version given in the Homeric poems.

3.2.1. Atreus and His Family

In Homer the family of Atreus is less cursed than in the later tradition. Aristarchus points out that not only does Homer not know about the sacrifice of Iphigenia (see above, § 3.1.1), but he also seems unaware of the hatred between Atreus and Thyestes. In *Il.* 2.100–108 Homer tells the story of Agamemnon’s scepter: Hephaestus made it and gave it to Zeus; Zeus gave it to Hermes, who

specify whether a part of Ajax was vulnerable; Lycophron instead says that Heracles’ quiver prevented the lion’s skin from touching Ajax in one place, but does not specify which one. The myth of an invulnerable Ajax is also known to Plato (*Symp.* 219e1–2).

87. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 176; Severyns 1928, 326–327.

88. Another interesting point about Ajax is his role in the episode of the death of Achilles discussed below, at § 3.4.1.

89. For example, an exegetical scholium tentatively attributed to Aristonicus (*Sch. Il.* 7.468) points out that Homer knows the myth of the Argonauts, as he mentions that Euneus is the king of Lemnos and the son of Jason and Hypsipyle at *Il.* 7.467–469; cf. Roemer 1924, 167.

in turn gave it to Pelops; when Pelops died, the scepter passed to Atreus, who left it to Thyestes at his death, who then passed it on to Agamemnon. For Aristarchus, the fact that Atreus gave the scepter to his brother Thyestes rather than to his own sons when he died means that he certainly did not hate Thyestes (*Sch. Il.* 2.106a: ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι <οὐ> γινώσκει τὴν ἔχθραν Ἀτρέως καὶ Θυέστου). In the same way, at Thyestes' death, the scepter went not to Aegisthus, but to Agamemnon, proof again of the good relationship between the two branches of the family (*Sch. Il.* 2.107a).⁹⁰

3.2.2. *Helen and Theseus*

In some scholia Aristarchus discusses the myth of Helen, observing that Homer does not know of her abduction by Theseus. In fact—he explains—she was a virgin when she married Menelaus because her husband calls her κουριδίη ἄλοχος, 'legitimate wife' (*Sch. Il.* 7.392; 13.626a).⁹¹ Aristarchus' target is probably the cyclic poets since the story of the abduction of Helen by Theseus might have been recounted in the *Cypria*,⁹² even though Alcman also referred to it.⁹³ An exegetical scholium, perhaps derived from Aristonicus, adds that Homer does not know that Helen gave birth to Iphigenia from Theseus (*Sch. Il.* 13.626b). This was yet another version of the myth, according to which Helen swore to her brothers that she had remained a virgin after Theseus abducted her; when she gave birth to Iphigenia, she gave her to her sister Clytemnestra to raise. The story, according to Pausanias (2.22.6), was told by Stesichorus,⁹⁴ Euphorion,⁹⁵ and Alexander Aetolus.⁹⁶ Aristarchus was certainly aware of all these later versions of Helen's myth; if the note goes back to him, he pointed out that in Homer she has a less turbulent life.

3.2.3. *Sarpedon and His Family*

The story of Sarpedon's family is known through Glaucus' genealogy at *Il.* 6.152–211: Sisyphus fathered Glaucus, who fathered Bellerophon, who fathered

90. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 178; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 15; Roemer 1924, 159; Severyns 1928, 229–234, who places the rivalry between Atreus and Thyestes in the *Alcmeonis*.

91. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 183; Severyns 1928, 271–272.

92. *Sch. D Il.* 3.242 = *Cypr.*, fr. X Allen = fr. 13 Bernabé. Cf. Severyns 1928, 271–274; West 2013, 87–89.

93. Alcman, fr. 21 *PMG*. The story is also mentioned by Isoc. *Helen*, 18–20; Hyg. *Fab.* 79. According to Hellanicus (*FGrHist* 4, F 168), Theseus was fifty when he abducted Helen, who was not even of marriageable age!

94. Stesich., fr. 191 *PMG*, from the *Helen*. Cf. Massimilla 1990, 376–380.

95. Euph., fr. 90 Powell; cf. also Lightfoot 2009, 316–319 (fr. 86).

96. Alex. Aet., fr. 12 Powell = fr. 11 Magnelli. The myth is mentioned also by Duris of Samos (*FGrHist* 76, F 92) and Lycophron (*Al.* 102–107). Cf. Massimilla 1990, 380–381; Magnelli 1999, 249–250.

Isander, Hippolochus, and Laodameia; Laodameia gave birth to Sarpedon from Zeus, while Hippolochus fathered Glaucus. The Neoterói made several changes to the characterization and story of this family, starting with the patriarch, Sisyphus. In *Il.* 6.153 he is called κέρδιστος ἀνδρῶν. Aristarchus explains that κέρδιστος in Homer means ‘most cunning’, as demonstrated by the similar phrase βουλῆς / κερδαλέης, ‘clever advice’, in *Il.* 10.43–44 (*Sch. Il.* 10.44); however, the Neoterói understood κέρδιστος as ‘greedy’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.153a).⁹⁷ Even though the note does not say it, it is likely that for Aristarchus this misunderstanding of the Homeric *glossa* began the negative tradition of Sisyphus as a great sinner punished in Hades.⁹⁸ In fact, as seen in Chapter 5.2 § 3.3, Aristarchus athetizes the lines in the *Nekyia* where Sisyphus appears to be punished in the Underworld (*Od.* 11.593–600), exactly because this depiction of an evil Sisyphus is inconsistent with Glaucus’ characterization of his ancestor.

The myth of Bellerophon, narrated by Glaucus (*Il.* 6.155–197), was especially popular. In this case too, Aristarchus noticed some changes, starting with the names of the main characters. Thus, the lustful Antea, wife of Proetus, became Stheneboea (*Sch. Il.* 6.160a), and her father, who is never mentioned by name in the Homeric poems, was given the name Iobates by the Neoterói (*Sch. Il.* 6.170b).⁹⁹ Under the label ‘Neoterói’ here, Aristarchus probably means not only the tragedians—Euripides wrote a tragedy entitled *Stheneboea*¹⁰⁰ and Sophocles one entitled *Iobates*¹⁰¹—but also Hesiod, who used the name Stheneboea¹⁰² and might also have introduced the name Iobates.¹⁰³ The adventures of Bellerophon were also developed by the Neoterói into something different from the Homeric tale. For instance, Aristarchus points out that the Homeric Bellerophon does not ride Pegasus when he fights against the Chimaera (*Sch. Il.* 6.183a; 6.191a^{1.2}). Even if these two scholia do not mention the Neoterói, the target of Aristarchus’ criticism is easily identifiable, since the version of the myth where Bellerophon fights the Chimaera riding Pegasus is told both by Hesiod (*Th.* 319–325)¹⁰⁴ and Pindar (*O.* 13.84–90).¹⁰⁵

97. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 117; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 33 (who suggests that the Neoterói here are the tragic poets); Roemer 1924, 165–166; Severyns 1928, 390–392.

98. The superlative κέρδιστος is of course derived from κέρδος, ‘gain’, ‘profit’; cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. κέρδος. In Homer, however, it is used in a positive sense (‘craftiest’), while the neoteric interpretation, according to Aristarchus, was based on a negative interpretation: ‘the one who seeks to gain as much as possible’.

99. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 177; Roemer 1924, 158; Severyns 1928, 393.

100. Eur. *TrGF* 5, pp. 645–656.

101. Soph. *TrGF* 4, p. 268. The use of the new names becomes standard in later mythographers; see [Apollod.] *Bibl.* 2.2.1 and 2.3.1–2; Hyg. *Fab.* 57.

102. Hes., frs. 129.18–20 and 131 M–W.

103. The name Iobates is integrated in lacuna in fr. 43a.88 M–W.

104. See also Hes., fr. 43a.84 M–W; cf. West 1966, 256.

105. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 178; Severyns 1928, 240–241 (who, in line with his own interests, suggests

Aristarchus also observes that the Homeric Sarpedon, cousin of Glaucus, is born from Bellerophon's daughter, Laodameia, and Zeus, and he is not the son of Europa and the brother of Minos, as in the version of the Neoterioi (*Sch. Il.* 6.199). The neoteric genealogy, already attested in Hesiod (fr. 140 M-W) and Bacchylides (fr. 10 Maehler), makes Sarpedon, together with Minos and Rhadamanthys, the offspring of Zeus and Europa.¹⁰⁶ This myth obviously implies that Sarpedon lived much earlier than in the original Homeric tale, and in Crete rather than in Lycia. In the same scholium, Aristarchus also adds that the Homeric chronology is clear (*Sch. Il.* 6.199: καὶ γὰρ οἱ χρόνοι εὐδῆλοι). The reference is probably to *Il.* 13.449–453, when the Cretan Idomeneus speaks of his ancestry: Zeus fathered Minos, who fathered Deucalion, who fathered Idomeneus. Consequently, Idomeneus is two generations younger than Minos. Since Sarpedon is a contemporary of Idomeneus, he is also two generations younger than Minos, and thus he is too young to be his brother and the son of Europa.¹⁰⁷

3.2.4. Niobe

Another famous myth alluded to in the *Iliad* is the story of Niobe. In this case too, Aristarchus singled out the differences between the Homeric story and later versions.¹⁰⁸ With regard to the number of the sons and daughters of Niobe, twelve in Homer, six daughters and six sons (*Il.* 24.603–604), he states that 'the Neoterioi disagree about the number of the children of Niobe: some say fourteen and some twenty' (*Sch. Il.* 24.604a). Even though other numbers are attested,¹⁰⁹ fourteen and twenty are the most popular ones: twenty is largely

that, even in this case, the target was the cyclic poems). When Homer describes the Chimaera as lion in front, snake behind, and she-goat in the middle (*Il.* 6.181: πρόσθε λέων, ὀπίθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα), Aristarchus explains that the monster is one body only (*Sch. Il.* 6.181a). *Sch. Il.* 6.181b (ex.) observes that Hesiod's depiction of the Chimaera as a three-headed monster (*Th.* 321) originated from Hesiod's misunderstanding of the Homeric description, as he thought that the Chimaera had three heads, not that the body only was made up of three different animals. It is impossible to know whether this criticism goes back to Aristarchus. Cf. Severyns 1928, 201; West 1966, 256.

106. See *Sch. D Il.* 12.397; cf. also *Sch. D Il.* 5.629; *Sch. Il.* 12.292–3 (D); *Sch. Eur. Rhes.* 29, ii 327.22–24 Schwartz.

107. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 187; Roemer 1924, 91–92 and 164–165; Severyns 1928, 241–243. The Cretan location and the early chronology of the neoteric Sarpedon became a problem, as the myth affected the origin of the Lycians, whose ancestor was Sarpedon. For example, Herodotus (1.173) says that the Lycians were originally from Crete; Sarpedon had to abandon Crete after losing his fight against Minos over the succession at Crete. Others tried to solve the chronological problem by stating that Sarpedon, the brother of Minos, was the grandfather of the Sarpedon fighting in the *Iliad* (Diod. Sic. 5.79.3); still others, in turn, thought that Zeus granted Sarpedon a lifespan of three generations ([Apollod.] *Bibl.* 3.1.1–2).

108. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 184; Severyns 1928, 239–240.

109. Three daughters and four sons in Hellanicus (*FGrHist* 4, F 21), twelve (six and six) in Phere-

used in the archaic epic and lyric poets,¹¹⁰ while fourteen is common among the poets working in Athens.¹¹¹

Another difference between the Homeric and the neoteric versions of the myth of Niobe concerns the end of her story. Aristarchus claims that, according to the Neoterai, Niobe is turned into stone, while Homer does not say that (*Sch. Il.* 24.613a).¹¹² The note is to be understood in connection with the fact that Aristarchus athetizes lines 614–617, when Homer openly states that Niobe was at the end turned into stone:¹¹³

Sch. Il. 24.614–7a (Ariston. | Did.) νῦν δέ που ἐν πέτρῃσιν <—πένθει>: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τέσσαρες, ὅτι οὐκ ἀκόλουθοι τῷ ‘ἢ δ’ ἄρα σίτου μνήσατ’, <ἐπεὶ κάμε δάκρυ χέουσα>’ (*Il.* 24.613). εἰ γὰρ ἀπελιθώθη, πῶς σιτία προ<σ>ηνέγκατο; καὶ ἡ παραμυθία γελοία· φάγε, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ Νιόβη ἔφαγε καὶ ἀπελιθώθη. ἔστι δὲ καὶ Ἡσιόδεια τῷ χαρακτήρι, καὶ μᾶλλον γε τὸ ‘ἀμφ’ Ἀχελώϊον ἐρρώσαντο’ (l. 616). καὶ τρεῖς κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τὸ ἐν (*Il.* 614, 615). πῶς δὲ καὶ λίθος γενομένη ‘θεῶν ἐκ κήδεα πέσσει’ (l. 617); | προηθετοῦντο δὲ καὶ παρ’ Ἀριστοφάνει.

‘And now among the rocks . . . she broods over [her cares]’: four lines are athetized, because they do not follow from ‘and she gave thought to food, after she was tired of shedding tears’ (*Il.* 24.613): if she was turned into stone, how could she take food? And the exhortation is ridiculous: ‘eat, since Niobe also ate and was turned into stone’. The lines are also Hesiodic in character and more so ‘[the Nymphs] who dance along the Achelous’ (l. 616). And ἐν is used continuously three times (*Il.* 614, 615). How then does she ‘brood over her cares sent by the gods’ (l. 617) once she is a stone? | The lines had been athetized before by Aristophanes.

cydes (*FGrHist.* 3, F 126) and in Euphorion (fr. 102 Powell), eighteen in Sappho (fr. 205 Voigt), ten (or perhaps sixteen or twenty-one; see Allen 1974 and Haslam 1976) in Alcman (fr. 75 *PMG*). The main sources for the various traditions about Niobe’s children are [Apollod.] *Bibl.* 3.5.6; Ael. *VH* 12.36; Gell. 20.7.

110. Nineteen or twenty in Hesiod (fr. 183 M-W); twenty in Mimnermus (fr. 19 West), Pindar (ad fr. 52n), Bacchylides (fr. 20D.4–6 Maehler), and Xanthus of Lydia (*FGrHist* 765, F 20c).

111. Lasus (fr. 706 *PMG*), Aeschylus (*TrGF* 3, fr. 167b), Sophocles (*TrGF* 4, fr. 446), Euripides (*TrGF* 5, fr. 455), Aristophanes (*PCG* 3.2, fr. 294); also Hyginus (*Fab.* 11) lists fourteen children.

112. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.613b (ex. [Ariston.]).

113. *Il.* 24.614–617: νῦν δέ που ἐν πέτρῃσιν ἐν οὐρεσιν οἰοπόλοισιν / ἐν Σιπύλῳ, ὅθι φασὶ θεῶν ἔμμεναι εὐνάς / νυμφάων, αἳ τ’ ἀμφ’ Ἀχελώϊον ἐρρώσαντο, / ἔνθα λίθος περ ἐοῦσα θεῶν ἐκ κήδεα πέσσει [and now among the rocks on solitary mountains in Sipylus, where they say there are the abodes of the Nymphs who dance along the Achelous, there, though a stone, she broods over her cares sent by the gods].

Aristarchus has several objections to these lines: the preposition ἐν is used three times, one after the other (ll. 614–615: ἐν πέτρῃσιν ἐν οὔρεσιν οἰοπόλοισιν / ἐν Σιπύλῳ); the image of the Nymphs dancing along the Achelous (l. 616) sounds ‘Hesiodic’ (hence, neoteric); urging Priam to eat using Niobe as an exemplum is ridiculous, since hers is not an enviable destiny, especially if she turned into stone just after taking food.¹¹⁴ Finally and more importantly, the lines are contradictory or simply impossible: if Niobe finally gave thought to food (l. 613) but was then turned into stone (l. 617), how could she eventually eat and how could she think about her sad destiny (l. 617)?¹¹⁵

Without lines 614–617 the ring composition is perfect: Achilles starts by saying that they should eat (l. 601) because Niobe, too, remembered to eat (l. 602) after all twelve of her children were killed by Apollo and Artemis (ll. 603–609). After nine days when they remained unburied, as Zeus had turned the people into stone, on the tenth day the gods buried Niobe’s children (ll. 610–612) and she finally thought to eat (l. 613); this line is now immediately followed by Achilles’ circular conclusion: for this reason, they, too, should eat (ll. 618–619). This phrasing also works much better as an exemplum. Moreover, by eliminating the story of Niobe being turned into stone, the strange repetition of the petrification of the people (l. 611) and then of Niobe herself (l. 617) is avoided.

There is a problem, however, in Aristarchus’ operation. He claims that, unlike the Neoterioi, Homer does not know about Niobe being turned into stone (*Sch. Il.* 24.613a: πρὸς τὴν διαφωνίαν τῶν νεωτέρων· φασὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴν ἀπολελιθῶσθαι, Ὅμηρος δὲ οὔ). This explanation is circular, though, as he actually eliminates the only point where Homer mentions it. In his defense, lines 614–617 were certainly problematic for someone like Aristarchus who was unaware of certain features of oral poetry and of how folktale motifs (like the turning into stone repeated twice here) or paradigmatic exempla in archaic poetry function.¹¹⁶ For a rational mind such as his, the lines did not really work as an exemplum, because Achilles’ point is that, despite all her sorrows, Niobe ate—hence she must have been alive, and not a block of stone. Thus, Aristarchus uses an internal inconsistency (namely that Niobe being turned into stone is not a good exemplum and is inconsistent both with line 613, where she finally remembers to take food, and with line 617, where she nurses her grief) to show that a mythical episode mentioned in Homer is actually an interpolation. Yet the circular reasoning present in this philological practice should be not overlooked.

114. See also Chapter 3.6.A § 5.

115. Cf. Roemer 1912, 58–59 (who agrees with Aristarchus); van der Valk 1963–1964, II 385–386 (who, on the other hand, is critical of the athetesis).

116. As this passage is now interpreted; see Willcock 1964, 141–142; Richardson 1993, 339–342 (with further bibliography).

3.2.5. *Heracles and Oedipus*

Aristarchus also pointed out some significant differences in the Homeric version of the myth of Heracles. For example, Homer does not know that Hebe is married to Heracles. Aristarchus deduces this from Hebe's portrait in the *Iliad*: she pours nectar for the other gods (*Il.* 4.2–3) and at the end of Book 5 she bathes the wounded Ares—both these tasks typically being performed by virgins and not by married women (*Sch. Il.* 4.2d; 5.905a).¹¹⁷ As a consequence, Aristarchus athetizes *Od.* 11.602–604, when Heracles is said to be in the Underworld and to have Hebe as wife:

Sch. HQT *Od.* 11.601 βίην Ἡρακληεῖν: καὶ τοῦτο νεωτερικόν. οὐ γὰρ οἶδε τὸν Ἡρακλέα ἀπηθανατισμένον, οὐδὲ τὴν Ἥβην γεγαμημένην, ἀλλὰ παρθένον. διὸ καὶ παρθενικὰ ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· οἰνοχοεῖ γὰρ καὶ λούει.

‘Heracles’ force’: this is neoteric too. [Homer] does not know of a Heracles made immortal nor of a married Hebe, but [he knows her as] unmarried. Therefore she also performs tasks typical of unmarried women: for she pours wine and bathes [other gods].¹¹⁸

As indicated in the scholium, these lines are also suspect to Aristarchus because Heracles is said to rejoice with the immortal gods at banquets, which is another neoteric intrusion, since in Homer Heracles is mortal. This is clear from *Il.* 18.117, where Achilles consoles his mother by saying that ‘not even Heracles’ force escaped death’ (*Sch. Il.* 18.117a: ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν ἀθάνατον τὸν Ἡρακλέα).¹¹⁹

117. That bathing someone was a task for young virgins and not married women is proved, according to Aristarchus, by *Od.* 3.464–465, when Telemachus is bathed by Polycaste, the youngest daughter of Nestor (*Sch. Od.* 3.464b): ὅτι ὑπὸ παρθένων ἔθος ἦν τοὺς ἥρωας λούεσθαι. πρὸς τὰ περὶ τῆς Ἥβης· λούει γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ τὸν Ἄρεα ὡς παρθένος. πῶς οὖν διὰ τῶν ἀθετουμένων Ἡρακλεῖ συνοικεῖ; [because it was customary for the heroes to be bathed by virgins. With reference to the question of Hebe; for she herself gives a bath to Ares, because she is a virgin. Thus, how can she be living with Heracles in the lines which are athetized?]. As for serving as cupbearer, Aristarchus could observe that in Homer this is a typical task of young men; for example, young Ganymede is said at *Il.* 20.234 to have been taken by the gods to serve as cupbearer for Zeus (a passage he commented upon for other reasons; see *Sch. Il.* 20.234a, discussed below, at § 4.1). Similarly, Megapenthes, Menelaus’ son, pours wine at the banquet at *Od.* 15.141. Indeed, *Sch. H Od.* 15.141 connects this scene with Hebe’s function in the *Iliad* (but the scholium is missing from Carnuth’s collection of Aristonicus’ fragments to the *Odyssey*; see Carnuth 1869, 134). Cf. Hofmann 1905, 28–31; Roemer 1912, 474 n. 1; Schmidt 1976, 173–180.

118. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 110–111. See also *Sch. BQ Od.* 11.602.

119. See also *Sch. Il.* 18.117b^{1,2} (Ariston?). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 183, 443–444; Roemer 1912, 472–474; Kohl 1917, 46–51 (fr. *13); Severyns 1928, 130–132, 175–177; van der Valk 1963–1964, II

Another episode of Heracles' saga was different in later poets: his killing of Neleus, father of Nestor. At *Il.* 11.690–693 Nestor says that Heracles attacked Pylos and killed all of Neleus' eleven sons except himself. Aristarchus points out that among the Neoteroi Neleus, too, was killed by Heracles on that occasion, but in Homer Neleus survived the slaughter and took part in the battle between the Pylians and the Eleans which occurred after the sack by Heracles, as Nestor himself states at *Il.* 11.682–689 (*Sch. Il.* 11.683a).¹²⁰ It is not possible to determine with any certainty the identity of these Neoteroi. Hesiod reports the episode in his *Catalogue of Women* (fr. 35.5–9 M-W), but seems to agree with Homer, as he does not mention the killing of Neleus explicitly. Only late mythographical collections describe this episode,¹²¹ but Aristarchus is certainly not referring to them. According to Albert Severyns,¹²² he was opposing the Homeric version of the myth to the *Sack of Oechalia*, because this episode is connected with the killing of Iphitus by Heracles recounted in that cyclic poem: Heracles went to Pylos to beg Neleus to purify him for the murder; because he refused, the hero waged war on Pylos and killed Neleus and his sons.¹²³ As for Heracles' Labors, Homer mentions only one: his descent to Hades, which Athena recalls to Hera at *Il.* 8.366–369. In particular, the goddess only speaks of a 'hound' in her account, without using the name Cerberus, which was commonly employed by the Neoteroi, as Aristarchus points out (*Sch. Il.* 8.368: κύνᾱ μόνον λέγει, Κέρβερον δὲ οὐκ ὀνομάζει, ὡς οἱ νεώτεροι).¹²⁴

441–442. In fact, an immortal Heracles married to Hebe is already present in Hesiod, *Th.* 950–955—a passage, however, which had already been athetized in antiquity; see *Sch. Hes. Th.* 947; this scholium does not reveal the identity of who proposed the athetesis, but it might have been Aristarchus; cf. West 1966, 416–417. In fact, a papyrus of the *Catalogue of Women* (fr. 25 M-W) also has the lines which present Heracles as married to Hebe (ll. 26–33) marked with *obeloi* (another fragment, fr. 229 M-W, reports the same story but its left margin is missing, so we cannot say whether the lines were athetized).

120. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 184.

121. [Apollod.] *Bibl.* 2.7.3; Hyg. *Fab.* 10.

122. Severyns 1928, 193–195. Cf. also Roemer 1924, 161–162.

123. See Eust. 879.12–14 (ad *Il.* 11.690): εἶλε δὲ κατὰ τινὰς τὴν Πύλον ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ὡς μὴ προσδεχθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Νηλέως, ὅτε τὸν καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ δηλοῦμενον τοῦ Ἰφίτου φόνον παρ' αὐτῷ καθήρασθαι ἤθελε. τοῦτο δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις οὐκ ἀρέσκει, διότι τε, φασίν, οὐκ οἶδεν Ὅμηρος φονέα καθαιρόμενον ἀλλὰ ἢ ποινὴν τίνοντα ἢ φυγαδεύομενον . . . [according to some, Heracles took Pylos because he had not been received as a guest by Neleus when he wanted to be purified by him of the murder of Iphitus as recounted in the *Odyssey*. But the more accurate [critics] do not accept this story because, they say, Homer does not know of a murderer being purified, but [a murderer] either pays a blood-price or is sent into exile]. The refusal of Neleus to purify Heracles is told also by [Apollod.] *Bibl.* 2.6.2 and Diod. Sic. 4.31, who, however, do not connect this with Heracles' attack on Pylos.

124. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 179 and 183; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 16; Severyns 1928, 206. Hesiod is the first to call the hound Cerberus (*Th.* 311), inaugurating a tradition that will last through the centuries in Greek, Roman, and European cultures.

The myth of Oedipus, too, is different from the later tradition. In the *Iliad* Homer mentions him at *Il.* 23.679–680, talking about Euryalus, son of Mecisteus, who ‘once came to Thebes for the burial of Oedipus’:

Sch. Il. 23.679a ὅς ποτε Θήβας δ’ ἦλθε <δεδουπότος Οἰδιπόδαο>: . . . καὶ ὅτι οἱ νεώτεροι παρὰ τὸν Ὅμηρον τὸν Οἰδίπουν φασὶν ἑαυτὸν τυφλώσαντα ποδηγούμενον εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐλθεῖν καὶ ἐκεῖ τελευτῆσαι· νῦν δὲ ὁμολογὸν ὅτι ἐν Θήβαις ἐτελεύτησεν.

‘Who once came to Thebes [for the burial] of Oedipus when he had died’: . . . And because against Homer the Neoterói say that Oedipus, having blinded himself, was led and reached Athens and there he died. But here it is admitted that he died in Thebes.

This time the target is most likely to be Sophocles, who in the *Oedipus at Colonus* presents the most famous version of a blind Oedipus, who exiles himself from Thebes and goes to die in Athens. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 3, since for Aristarchus the verb δουπῆσαι is used only for someone who dies by falling and ‘emitting a heavy sound’ (the literal meaning of the verb), Oedipus in Homer must have died in a violent way, either in battle or by suicide, throwing himself off a precipice (*Sch. Il.* 23.679a: ὅτι ἦτοι ἐν πολέμῳ τετελεύτηκε· . . . ἢ κατεκρήμνισεν ἑαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ θάνατος μετὰ ψόφου)—again another point of difference with later traditions, beyond Sophocles.¹²⁵

3.3. Neoteric Narratives Inspired by Homer

Rather than thinking in terms of a common tradition of myths dealing with the Trojan saga, as modern scholars do,¹²⁶ Aristarchus saw Homer as an endless source of inspiration for later poets, who by elaborating upon brief allusions in the *Iliad* and in the *Odyssey* crafted entirely new stories. In fact, he seems to have taken a deep interest in signaling these borrowings or ‘inspired’ rewritings by the Neoterói.

Hector’s family was particularly popular and Aristarchus noticed several neoteric ‘reuses’.¹²⁷ For instance, he singles out the meeting with Andromache, when Hector predicts her future life as servant of a Greek lord and, as an example,

125. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 104, 185; Severyns 1928, 49–50, 215–216.

126. Modern scholarship generally agrees that Homer was well acquainted with earlier versions of the same stories; see bibliography quoted in footnote 47.

127. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 176–177; Severyns 1928, 86 and 384–385, 365–366.

imagines her forced to fetch water from the spring Messeis or Hypereia in Argos. This passing comment, which was just a possible future scenario in Homer, was developed into a new story by the Neoterioi, who showed Andromache as actually carrying water (*Sch. Il.* 6.457a: ὅτι κατὰ τὸ προστυχὸν οὕτως εἰπόντος Ὀμήρου οἱ νεώτεροι τῷ ὄντι ὑδροφοροῦσαν εἰσάγουσιν αὐτήν). In this case, Aristarchus is probably referring to a lost tragedy.¹²⁸ The tragedian Astydamas the Younger, on the other hand, borrowed from the scene where Hector takes the helmet from his head in order not to scare his son Astyanax, when in one of his dramas he had Hector say: ‘attendant, take the helmet, so that my son is not frightened’ (*Sch. Il.* 6.472a).¹²⁹ Similarly, later descriptions of Astyanax’s murder were inspired by *Il.* 24.734–735, when Andromache imagines her son’s death: ‘or some of the Achaeans, taking you by the arm, will throw you from the tower, a miserable death.’ According to Aristarchus, several poets started from this line and described Astyanax thrown off of the walls by the Greeks (*Sch. Il.* 24.735a: ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν κινηθέντες οἱ μεθ’ Ὀμηρον ποιηταὶ ῥιπτόμενον κατὰ τοῦ τείχους ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰσάγουσι τὸν Ἀστυάνακτα). Indeed, Astyanax’s pitiless murder along these lines became very popular and was recounted by Arctinus in the *Iliou Persis*,¹³⁰ by Lesches in the *Ilias Parva*,¹³¹ by Stesichorus in his *Iliou Persis*,¹³² by Euripides in both *Trojan Women* and *Andromache*,¹³³ and by mythographers,¹³⁴ all of whom Aristarchus might have considered to have ‘taken inspiration’ from the Homeric passage.

Even marginal stories alluded to in the *Iliad* were developed by the Neoterioi. For example, the story of Meleager, as told by Phoenix in Book 9, was at the basis of Sophocles’ tragedy entitled *Meleager*.¹³⁵ Aristarchus specifically notes that the chorus of priests in that tragedy originated from *Il.* 9.575, when Phoenix says that the Aetolians sent priests to beg Meleager to come back to fight (*Sch. Il.* 9.575a¹: ἐντεῦθεν Σοφοκλῆς ἐν τῷ Μελεάγρῳ τὸν χορὸν ἀπὸ ἱερέων παρήγαγεν).¹³⁶ Another marginal Homeric character with a long future was Troilus, mentioned only once in the entire *Iliad* (*Il.* 24.257), when Priam lists his dead sons: Mestor,

128. So the scholium has been inserted among the ‘*adespota*’ of the tragic fragments (*TrGF* 2, fr. *40b). Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 33; Bouchard 2016, 186.

129. Astyd. II *TrGF* 1, p. 203, fr. 2 (but the quotation of the line in *Sch. Il.* 6.472a is corrupt).

130. Procl. *Chrest.* 108.8 = *Il. Per.* 89.20 Bernabé and *Il. Per.*, fr. II Allen = fr. 5 Bernabé. Cf. Severyns 1928, 365–369; West 2013, 240–241.

131. *Il. Par.*, fr. XIX.3–5 Allen = fr. 21.3–5 Bernabé. Cf. West 2013, 219–221.

132. Stesich., fr. 202 *PMG*.

133. Eur. *Tro.* 725, 1134–1135, *Andr.* 9–11. Cf. *Sch. Eur. Andr.* 10, ii 249.3–11 Schwartz.

134. [Apollod.] *Epit.* 5.23; Hyg. *Fab.* 109. The myth was also used by the later epic poets, such as Triphiodorus (third century CE), in his *Capture of Troy* (*Il.* 644–646).

135. Soph. *TrGF* 4, pp. 345–347.

136. *Sch. Il.* 9.575a², on the other hand, is corrupt, since it speaks of the chorus of the priests of the *Oedipus* instead of the *Meleager*. Cf. Severyns 1928, 91.

Hector, and Troilus, the ‘warrior fighting from a chariot (ἵπποχάρμης)’. Aristarchus comments that the Neoterói described Troilus as riding a horse because of this epithet (*Sch. Il.* 24.257b).¹³⁷ Yet this is incorrect because Homer does not present heroes riding horses,¹³⁸ but only fighting from chariots—which is exactly what the epithet ἵπποχάρμης means. Moreover, in the same scholium Aristarchus adds that some described him as a boy, even though Homer makes clear it that he is an adult, exactly because he calls him a ‘warrior fighting from a chariot’. The reference is to the story of the killing of Troilus by Achilles in an ambush, while Troilus accompanies his sister Polyxena to fetch water. The myth was probably described in the *Cypria*,¹³⁹ and it was at the core of Sophocles’ *Troilus*,¹⁴⁰ which is mentioned in the exegetical scholium to the same line (*Sch. Il.* 24.257a). In this case, the target is likely to be not the cyclic poem, but Sophocles himself, as in one fragment of this tragedy he calls Troilus ἀνδρόπαις.¹⁴¹ A youngish Troilus is contrary to Homer’s depiction of this character, according to Aristarchus, who seems to have expected tragedies based on stories from the Trojan myth to follow the Homeric imprint without any innovation.¹⁴²

3.4. They Got It Wrong: When the Neoteric Inspiration Is Flawed

As some of the examples analyzed in the previous section show, according to Aristarchus one of the characteristics of the Neoterói’s appropriation of traditional myths originated in their incorrect understanding of Homer’s wording. In particular, they seem to have taken some images too literally and recast them as real scenes in their rewritings. Aristarchus thus censured the later ‘reception’ of Homer because in their attempt to follow the model faithfully, the Neoterói simply got it wrong.

3.4.1. Misunderstanding of Homeric Scenes and Images

Aeschylus famously stated that his tragedies were ‘slices from Homer’s great banquets.’¹⁴³ Yet in Aristarchus’ opinion he sometimes went too far in his pseudolit-

137. Indeed, in Attic poetry ἵπποχάρμης means ‘horseman’ rather than ‘warrior fighting from a chariot’ (e.g., Aesch. *Pers.* 29, 105).

138. See Chapter 3.3.B § 6.

139. Procl. *Chrest.* 105.12 = *Cypr.* 42.63 Bernabé; see also [Apollod.] *Epit.* 3.32. Cf. Severyns 1928, 304–307; West 2013, 121–122.

140. Soph. *TrGF* 4, pp. 453–458.

141. Soph. *TrGF* 4, fr. 619 (ex *Sch. Pind. P.* 2.121c); cf. also Hsch. α 4768.

142. On Aristarchus and the myth of Troilus, cf. Lehrs 1882, 188; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 30; Roemer 1924, 166; Severyns 1928, 306–307; Richardson 1993, 299–300.

143. Athen. 8.347e: τὸ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ λαμπροῦ Αἰσχύλου, ὃς τὰς αὐτοῦ τραγωδίας τεμάχη εἶναι ἔλεγεν τῶν Ὀμήρου μεγάλων δείπνων [the saying of the noble and illustrious Aeschylus, who used to say that his own tragedies were slices from Homer’s great banquets].

eral reworking of Homer. One scene that apparently made a great impression on Aeschylus was Zeus' weighing of the Homeric heroes' destinies (κῆρες):¹⁴⁴

Sch. Il. 8.70a ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κῆρε <τانهλεγέος θανάτοιο>: . . . καὶ ὅτι τὰς θανατηφόρους μοίρας λέγει. ὁ δὲ Αἰσχύλος νομίσας λέγεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς ἐποίησε τὴν Ψυχοστασίαν, ἐν ᾗ ἐστὶν ὁ Ζεὺς ἰστὰς ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ τὴν τοῦ Μῆμνονος καὶ Ἀχιλλέως ψυχὴν.

'And [Zeus] put on them two destinies of woeful death': . . . And because he means the fates that bring death. But Aeschylus, thinking that he meant the souls, composed *The Weighing of Souls*, in which Zeus is putting the souls of Memnon and of Achilles on the scale.¹⁴⁵

In Homer Zeus weighs the two fates (κῆρε) that bring death. Yet Aeschylus, recasting these scenes in his tragedy entitled *Weighing of Souls* (ἡ Ψυχοστασία), had Zeus weigh the souls of Achilles and Memnon against one another¹⁴⁶—a powerful scene which, however, in Aristarchus' view betrays a basic misunderstanding of the original (*Sch. Il.* 22.210a²: ἐντεῦθεν Αἰσχύλος τὴν Ψυχοστασίαν ἐτυπώσατο, φαύλως ἐκδεξάμενος τὸ εἰρημένον). Another similar misunderstanding originated from Book 22: when Hector is mortally wounded by Achilles, he beseeches him to give his body back to his parents, who will offer many gifts (Il. 338–343); Achilles in his rage answers that, even if they would pay Hector's weight in gold, he would never return his corpse to them (Il. 351–354). According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 22.351b),¹⁴⁷ this is hyperbole, but Aeschylus took it literally and thus had Hector's body weighed against gold in his tragedy entitled *Phrygians* or *The Ransom of Hector*.¹⁴⁸

Another case of a literal and flawed reworking of Homer occurs in the later accounts of Achilles' death, when his corpse was carried away by Ajax, while Odysseus covered them with his shield and fought off the Trojans, as recounted

144. As happens in *Il.* 8.69–72 (Zeus weighs the fates of the Trojans and of the Achaeans) and in *Il.* 22.209–213 (Zeus weighs the fates of Achilles and Hector).

145. Aristarchus' comment on the other passage where Zeus weighs fates is similar: *Sch. Il.* 22.210a¹ ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κῆρε <τانهλεγέος θανάτοιο>: ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν ἡ Ψυχοστασία Αἰσχύλῳ πέπλασται ὡς τοῦ Διὸς τὰς ψυχὰς ἰστάντος, οὐ θανατηφόρους μοίρας ['And [Zeus] put on them two destinies of woeful death': because from here Aeschylus has modeled *The Weighing of Souls*, as if Zeus was weighing the souls and not the fates that bring death]. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.210a².

146. Aesch. *TrGF* 3, pp. 374–377. See also Plut. *Aud. Poet.* 17a1–10. Cf. Severyns 1928, 91, 318–320.

147. See also *Sch. Il.* 22.351c¹ (ex. [Ariston.?.]) and 22.351c² (ex. [Ariston.]).

148. Aesch. *TrGF* 3, pp. 364–370 (esp. p. 365). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 183; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 32; Roemer 1924, 106. See also Chapter 3.2.A § 16.

in the *Aethiopsis*¹⁴⁹ and in the *Ilias Parva*.¹⁵⁰ This episode is not narrated by Homer, but nonetheless Aristarchus believes that the later narratives of it were influenced by the passage in Book 17 where Ajax suggests that Menelaus and Meriones take Patroclus' body and bring it away from the battle, while he and the other Ajax cover them by fighting against Hector and the Trojans (*Il.* 17.717–721):

Sch. Il. 17.719 νῶϊ μαχησόμεθα: ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν τοῖς νεωτέροις ὁ βασταζόμενος Ἀχιλλεὺς ὑπ' Αἴαντος, ὑπερασπίζων δὲ Ὀδυσσεύς παρῆκται. εἰ δὲ Ὅμηρος ἔγραφε τὸν Ἀχιλλέως θάνατον, οὐκ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸν νεκρὸν ὑπ' Αἴαντος βασταζόμενον, ὥς οἱ νεώτεροι.

'The two of us will fight': because from here Achilles has been represented by the Neoterói as being carried off by Ajax, and Odysseus as covering them with the shield. But if Homer had written about the death of Achilles, he would not have made his body be carried by Ajax, like the Neoterói.

Aristarchus does not explain why, in his opinion, Homer would not have made Ajax carry the body of Achilles if the poet had indeed narrated Achilles' death. It is likely, however, that he did not find such an image fitting for Ajax, whom he saw as the quintessential hero,¹⁵¹ who would have been more suitably recruited to fight and cover the other companions carrying the corpse. In fact, even though in the *Iliad* and in the cyclic poems the pattern is the same (one or two companions take the body, and one or two other companions cover them), the roles are reversed, especially for Ajax: Ajax in the *Iliad* is the one who defends and fights for the body, while in the *Aethiopsis* and in the *Little Iliad* he is the one who carries it. So the Neoterói changed Ajax's role in this pattern, and perhaps Aristarchus thought that this 'reversed' scene missed the point about Ajax's characterization in Homer. If this reconstruction is correct, then Aristarchus seems to have thought that, even when the Neoterói used Homer as a model, their solutions were below Homeric standards because they missed the characterization of some important heroes in the *Iliad*.¹⁵²

149. Procl. *Chrest.* 106.9–11 = *Aethiopsis* 69.16–18 Bernabé. Cf. Severyns 1928, 320–322; West 2013, 151–153.

150. *Il. Par.*, fr. II Allen = fr. 2 Bernabé; see also [Apollod.] *Epit.* 5.4. Cf. West 2013, 175–176. Ajax carrying the corpse of Achilles is also a common topic for art, especially Greek vase painting: see *LIMC*, vol. 1, s.v. Achilleus, 185–193 (nos. 860–896).

151. See Chapter 5.4 § 3.

152. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 174; Bachmann 1902–1904, I 18 and 26, II 30 and 31; Roemer 1912, 426; Severyns 1928, 320–321. According to Severyns (1928, 320), this question is linked to *Od.* 5.308–310, where Odysseus remembers the day 'when the throngs of the Trojans hurled upon me bronze-tipped spears, fighting around the body of the dead son of Peleus'. No doubt, this passage indicates

In this specific case, Aristarchus' remarks might remind one of Neoanalysis.¹⁵³ Given his ideas about the priority of Homer and his greatness, this is, however, a reverse kind of Neoanalysis: Aristarchus did not claim that scenes of the *Iliad* had been inspired by scenes in other earlier poems, but exactly the reverse. In his view, the rescue of Achilles' body was rewritten by later poets on the model of the similar episode concerning Patroclus' corpse in the *Iliad*. Regardless of whether this idea is correct or not, Aristarchus' ability to see 'narrative patterns' which could be adapted from one myth or character to another is astonishingly modern.

3.4.2. Misunderstanding of Homeric Language

In Aristarchus' opinion, misunderstanding the meaning of Homeric words and syntax could also lead later poets to 'reinterpret' certain episodes or heroic characters. We have already seen the case of Sisyphus turning from 'smart' to 'greedy' (see above, § 3.2.3). Another mistake which originated from the misunderstanding of a Homeric word concerns *Il.* 2.594–600, when Homer says that the Muses made Thamyras 'πηρός' since he boasted that he would beat them with his singing. In *Sch. Il.* 2.599a Aristarchus argues that πηρός does not mean 'blind', as the Neoterioi thought, but 'deprived of voice', since blinding a singer would not be a punishment—many singers are blind and are in fact good singers because of that, as blindness gives them a sharper poetic sensitivity, for example with Demodocus;¹⁵⁴ rather, a much more effective punishment is to deprive Thamyras of his voice. The target might be Hesiod, who mentions the blinding of Thamyras (fr. 65 M-W), and Euripides, who in *Rhesus* 924–925 has the Muses say that they blinded Thamyras for his insults against their art.¹⁵⁵ For Aristarchus, however, a blind Thamyras is nonsense, originating from the misinterpretation of a rare *glossa* (πηρός is a hapax in Homer).¹⁵⁶

A fairly embarrassing neoteric misunderstanding of Homeric syntax

that Homer knew about the battle for Achilles' body and Odysseus' participation in it, but does not say anything about the role of Ajax (and of Odysseus for that matter). Yet a scholium on that line makes the following point (*Sch. Od.* 5.310a): ὅτι ὑπερεμάχησαν τοῦ σώματος Ἀχιλλέως Ὀδυσσεὺς καὶ Αἴας. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐβάστασεν, ὁ δ' Αἴας ὑπερήσπισεν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ [because Odysseus and Ajax fought for Achilles' body; and one [i.e., Odysseus] carried him, while Ajax protected them with the shield, just like with Patroclus]. Pontani, ad loc. (quoting Severyns), considers this note to be by Aristonicus; Carnuth 1896, 60, however, denied such an attribution.

153. For an introduction to Neoanalysis in English, see Kullmann 1984 and Willcock 1997. See also the bibliography quoted above in footnote 47.

154. As Homer clearly says about Demodocus: 'whom the Muse loved very much, and gave him a blessing and an evil; she deprived him of his eyes but gave him sweet song' (*Od.* 8.63–64), a passage which Aristarchus quotes in the scholium.

155. Even Sophocles might have described Thamyras as blind in his tragedy with this title (*TrGF* 4, pp. 234–238). Thamyras was also depicted as having one gray and one black eye (see *Sch. Il.* 2.595 [ex.]), a feature that became traditionally attached to his character (Poll. 4.141). Cf. Whallon 1964.

156. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 188; Severyns 1928, 184–185.

involves Deimos and Phobos ('Terror' and 'Rout'), mentioned in *Il.* 15.119–120: καὶ ῥ' ἵππους κέλετο Δεῖμόν τε Φόβον τε / ζευγνύμεν. In this phrase, it is not clear whether Δεῖμόν τε Φόβον are to be considered in apposition to ἵππους, and thus are the names of Ares' horses ('and he [i.e., Ares] ordered to yoke his horses Deimos and Phobos'), or whether instead they are the object of κέλετο ('and he [i.e., Ares] ordered Deimos and Phobos to yoke his horses'). Aristarchus makes clear that the latter is the correct solution, because Homer often uses the accusative instead of the dative with commands;¹⁵⁷ however, the problematic syntax of *Il.* 15.119–120 caused someone to understand Phobos and Deimos as the names of Ares' horses (*Sch. Il.* 15.119: ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ Δεῖμου καὶ Φόβου, καὶ ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν ἡ πλάνη γέγονε τοῖς δεξαμένοις Δεῖμον καὶ Φόβον ἵππων ὀνόματα). Aristarchus reveals the identity of one of his targets in another note to *Il.* 4.439–440, where Deimos and Phobos are again mentioned together with other deities: Antimachus did not understand the syntax in *Il.* 15.119–120 and made these two the horses of Ares (*Sch. Il.* 4.439–40: πλανηθεὶς δὲ Ἀντίμαχος ἵππων Ἀρεως ὀνόματα ἀποδέδωκεν).¹⁵⁸ Antimachus' problem was not only misinterpreting the syntax in those specific lines, which is indeed difficult; most importantly, he also did not read Homer carefully, because at *Il.* 13.299 Homer himself explains who Deimos and Phobos are, when he calls Phobos the 'dear son' (φίλος υἱός) of Ares:

Sch. Il. 13.299a τῷ δὲ Φόβος φίλος υἱός: ὅτι ῥητῶς Ἀρεως υἱός Φόβος. ἡ δὲ ἀναφορὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν τοῦ 'καὶ ῥ' ἵππους κέλετο Δεῖμόν τε Φόβον τε / ζευγνύμεν' (*Il.* 15.119–120).

'And him [i.e., Ares] [followed] Phobos, his dear son': because Phobos is explicitly said to be the son of Ares. The reference is to the ambiguity of καὶ ῥ' ἵππους κέλετο Δεῖμόν τε Φόβον τε / ζευγνύμεν (*Il.* 15.119–120).¹⁵⁹

Claiming that this passage solves the ambiguity of *Il.* 15.119–120, Aristarchus seems to be suggesting that a more careful reading would have saved Antimachus from turning minor deities into horses.¹⁶⁰

A more famous case of misunderstanding of syntax occurred with the myth

157. On Homeric 'changes' of case, see Chapter 3.2.B § 3.3.

158. Antim., fr. 34 Matthews: Δεῖμος τ' ἡδὲ Φόβος πόδας αἰνετῶ, υἱε θυέλλης [Deimos and Phobos, praised for their feet, children of tempest]. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 177–178; Severyns 1928, 92; Matthews 1996, 150–151; Schironi 1999, 289; Rengakos 2000, 332.

159. Cf. Nünlist 2012a, 117.

160. See also *Sch. Il.* 13.299b (ex. [Ariston.]): πῶς οὖν Ἀντίμαχος τὸν Φόβον ἵππον Ἀρεός φησι; [how thus does Antimachus say that Phobos is the horse of Ares?]. If the scholium preserves Aristarchus' words, the comment clearly betrays some annoyance at Antimachus.

of the two jars on Zeus' threshold as recounted by Achilles to Priam (*Il.* 24.527–533). Aristarchus explains that Hesiod took the story of Pandora's *pithos* in *Op.* 84–104 from this Homeric passage (*Sch. Il.* 24.527–8a: ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν Ἡσιόδῳ τὸ περὶ τοῦ πίθου μύθευμα). He also adds that 'some' of the Neoteroi understood that there was one jar of good and two of evil. The reference is probably to Pindar, who in *P.* 3.81–83 says: 'you [i.e., Hieron] have learned and know [the saying] of the ancients: the immortals distribute to humans two pairs of evils for each blessing'.¹⁶¹ For Aristarchus, the misunderstanding originated from the text of Homer itself: 'on Zeus' floor lie two jars (δοιοὶ . . . πίθοι) / of gifts which he gives (οἷα δίδωσι), of ills (κακῶν), the other of blessings (ἕτερος δὲ ἐάων)' (*Il.* 527–528). As he observes, ἕτερος at line 528 refers to two items, but no more (*Sch. Il.* 24.528a¹). This short comment is clarified by a longer note by Nicanor (still *Sch. Il.* 24.528a¹), in which it is explained that the correct punctuation implies a pause after δίδωσι, so as to have then κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἐάων, which stands for ὁ μὲν ἕτερος κακῶν, ὁ δὲ ἕτερος ἀγαθῶν, '[one] of evils, and the other of blessings'. Pindar, however, linked the 'two jars' at line 527 with κακῶν and then considered ἕτερος δὲ ἐάων a third *pithos*, ending up with two *pithoi* of evils and one of blessings. Even if Nicanor does not mention Aristarchus in this note, Aristarchus was obviously pointing to the same syntactic mistake. Thus, if Hesiod only took inspiration from the myth of the *pithoi* in *Iliad* 24, Pindar misunderstood the Homeric syntax and created a new, non-Homeric mythical image.¹⁶²

Finally, Homer inspired not only poets, but also painters when he described Odysseus' helmet, made of boar's tusks and lined inside with felt (πίλος) (*Il.* 10.261–265). Aristarchus notes that Homer distinguishes what is common (κοινόν) to any helmet—i.e., the felt lining—and what is accidental (συμβεβηκός) to Odysseus' helmet—i.e., the boar's tusks. Out of this description, painters and sculptors depicted Odysseus wearing a πιλίον, that is, a close-fitting little cap made of felt (*Sch. Il.* 10.265a: ζωγράφοι καὶ πλάσται πιλίον ἐπέθεσαν τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ).¹⁶³ The scholium does not say anything else, but Aristarchus seems to be criticizing later artists who made a mistake, because felt is common, while what is peculiar to Odysseus' helmet is the fact that it is made with boar's tusks, a detail which later artists seem (again) to have missed.¹⁶⁴

161. Pindar's 'reuse' of the Homeric image in *P.* 3 is also discussed in the Pindar scholia (*Sch. Pind. P.* 3.141a.b). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 189; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 230; Severyns 1928, 90, 203; Richardson 1993, 330–331.

162. Another mistake involving misinterpretation (by Simonides) of Homeric syntax and of the habits of Homeric society is discussed in *Sch. Il.* 2.872a; cf. Kirk 1985, 261. A 'misunderstanding' of Homeric imagery (a metaphor) by Pindar is at the core of *Sch. Il.* 2.670; see Chapter 3.2.A § 3.

163. The iconography of Odysseus with the *pilos* is indeed extremely common, especially in late classical and Hellenistic art; see *LIMC*, vol. 6, s.v. Odysseus, 967 (e.g., nos. 14, 36–38, 47, 48, 66, 77, 156, 195).

164. *Sch. Il.* 10.265b (ex.) and Eust. 804.16–18 (ad *Il.* 10.265) specify that the first painter to

4. Homer versus the Neoterói: Gods

Closely connected with his mythical universe is Homer's portrayal of the gods, their attributes, and their lives. Not surprisingly, Aristarchus was meticulous in pointing out the discrepancies between Homer and the Neoterói in this field as well.

4.1. The Divine World

Homeric gods are different from the gods of later times, particularly from a moral point of view, and Xenophanes already questioned them (21 B 11–12 D–K); this issue led to the development of allegorical readings for many Homeric stories concerning the gods, an approach which Aristarchus rejected.¹⁶⁵ He was also not interested in discussing the 'moral' and 'ethical' differences between the Homeric gods and the classical or Hellenistic gods. His concerns were more pragmatic. For example, he notes that ambrosia is a dry food (*Sch. Il.* 19.347a); the specific passage in Homer is not clear about the consistency of ambrosia, but Aristarchus probably opposed it to nectar, which is clearly a liquid, since it is poured (e.g., *Il.* 1.598, 4.3). Yet, according to him, 'some' thought that ambrosia was liquid, because they were misled by *Il.* 14.170–171, where Hera is said to be cleansing her body with ambrosia (*Sch. Il.* 14.170a: ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου πλανηθέντες τινὲς ὑπέλαβον τὴν ἀμβροσίαν εἶναι ὑγρὰν τροφήν).¹⁶⁶ In these scholia, there is no mention of the Neoterói, but the nature of nectar and ambrosia was indeed the subject of some debate. For example, Athenaeus (1.39a) reports that Ganymede ate nectar and drank ambrosia in the Middle Comedy author Anaxandrides,¹⁶⁷ Alcman speaks of 'eating nectar',¹⁶⁸ and Sappho mentions a '*krater* of ambrosia'.¹⁶⁹ In all likelihood, Aristarchus thus singled out *Il.* 14.170 to make clear that, even if this passage created the confusion about ambrosia, in Homer—unlike in the lyric and later poets—ambrosia was a dry food and nectar a liquid. In another scholi-

depict Odysseus with a *pilos* was the σκιογράφος Apollodorus (an Athenian painter of the end of the fifth century BCE). Eustathius also adds that the Neoterói understood that the *pilos* was peculiar to Odysseus and 'convinced' painters to adopt such iconography; however, he might be misreading his sources, because here Aristarchus seems to be referring to painters and sculptors only (*Sch. Il.* 10.265a does not speak of 'Neoterói'). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 184; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 33; Severyns 1928, 21, 32, 152, 424–425 (according to whom Eustathius preserves Aristarchus correctly; thus Aristarchus targeted the Neoterói as well, possibly some cyclic poets).

165. On ancient *allegoresis*, see bibliography listed in Chapter 3.2.A, footnote 78.

166. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 190; Roemer 1924, 7–10, 116–117.

167. Anaxandr. *PCG* 2, fr. 58. The title of the comedy is unknown.

168. Alcman, fr. 42 *PMG*.

169. Sappho, fr. 141 Voigt.

um (*Sch. Il.* 18.369) as well, the Neoteroi are not explicitly mentioned, but comparative evidence suggests that Aristarchus is again distinguishing the Homeric divine world from that of the Neoteroi. Here he claims that Homer places Hephaestus' workshop on Olympus, as shown by *Il.* 18.142–148, where Thetis goes to Olympus to ask Hephaestus to forge new armor for Achilles.¹⁷⁰ This note makes sense in light of another Aristonicus scholium to the *Odyssey* (*Sch. Q Od.* 8.274)¹⁷¹ which states that Homer does not know of Hephaestus working in Lemnos or Lipari. In fact, Hephaestus' workshop is placed under a volcano in later authors, either Aetna in Sicily,¹⁷² or the volcano of Hiera/Thermessa (now Vulcano) in the Lipari (or Aeolian) Islands,¹⁷³ or in Lemnos, the island traditionally sacred to the god.¹⁷⁴

One more difference between Homer and the later poets concerned the myth of Ganymede. Aeneas mentions him when he tells Achilles about his genealogy in *Il.* 20.200–241, saying that the gods took Ganymede up to Olympus to be Zeus' cupbearer because of his beauty (*Il.* 232–235). Hence Aristarchus concludes that Ganymede was not abducted by Zeus because the latter fell in love with him, as reported by later poets¹⁷⁵ (*Sch. Il.* 20.234a: ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς νεωτέροις . . .)¹⁷⁶—one also wonders whether Aristarchus is not raising a moralistic point here. What characterizes these examples, however, is the usual Aristarchean precision in defining what is properly Homeric on the basis of internal evidence; the difference between the self-consistent mythical universe of Homer and that of later poets is brought out as a second step, sometimes (as in the case of ambrosia) by critiquing the latter because they misunderstood the Homeric original.

4.2. Enyalios and Paeon

The epithets of the gods were at the core of ancient scholars' interests because they believed that epithets revealed the nature of the gods. As already discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 5.2, Aristarchus was interested in explaining why certain epithets were suitable to certain gods. In particular, gods' epithets also repre-

170. And by *Il.* 18.616–617, where she leaves Olympus with it (even though the scholium does not refer to this passage). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 183.

171. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 82.

172. E.g., Aesch. *PV* 365–367; see also Ael. *NA* 11.3.

173. E.g., Thuc. 3.88.3; see also Strabo 6.2.10.

174. E.g., Antim., fr. 52 Matthews; *Sch. Tzetz. Lyc.* 227; see also Soph. *Phil.* 800; Aristoph. *Lys.* 299; *Lyc. Al.* 227 ('Lemnian fire').

175. E.g., Ibycus, fr. 289 *PMG*; Pind. *O.* 1.44–45; Thgn. 1345–1348 West; Soph. *TrGF* 4, fr. 345; Ap. Rh. 3.115–117.

176. Herodian discusses this line as well in *Sch. Il.* 20.234c^{1,2}. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 182; Severyns 1928, 346–347.

sented a topic whereon he could point out several errors made by the Neoterói. An excellent example is a famous epithet for Ares, 'Enyalíus', which raised two different questions:

Sch. Il. 17.211a {δεινός} Ἐνυάλιος: ὅτι ἐπιθετικῶς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐννοῦς πολεμικῆς οὔσης ὁ Ἄρης Ἐνυάλιος, ὡς καὶ Ἀρήϊος (cf. *Il.* 2.698, etc.) τίς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἄρεως, οὐχ ὡς οἱ νεώτεροι Ἐννοῦς υἱὸν οὐδὲ ὡς Ἀττικοὶ διαφέροντα τοῦ Ἄρεως θεὸν τινα.

'[Ares the terrible] Enyalíus': because Ares [is called] 'Enyalíus' with an epithet from Enyo, who is a warrior [goddess], as someone [is called] also Ἀρήϊος (cf. *Il.* 2.698, etc.) from Ares; [it is] not, as the Neoterói [think], that [Enyalíus] is the son of Enyo nor, as the Attic poets [think], that [Enyalíus] is a different god from Ares.

Enyalíus is an epithet for Ares and is derived from Enyo, a warrior goddess. The connection between Ares and the goddess Enyo is the warlike quality of these two divinities: just as a good warrior (for example, Protesilaus at *Il.* 2.698) can be called Ἀρήϊος, from Ares, so too can Ares be called Ἐνυάλιος, from Enyo. This explanation is aimed at correcting two different, later misinterpretations: the Neoterói, who considered Ἐνυάλιος a matronymic of Ares, namely, 'son of Eyno', and the Attic poets, who even thought that Enyalíus was a different god.¹⁷⁷ The neoteric idea of Ares Enyalíus as 'son of Enyo' is not attested in any poet but only in later mythographical accounts;¹⁷⁸ yet for Aristarchus, this is not possible because Homer is very clear about who gave birth to Ares, as Zeus states in *Il.* 5.891–892, when he reproaches Ares for having the same bad character as his mother Hera (*Sch. Il.* 5.892a: ἡ διπλῇ, ὅτι σαφῶς Ἡρας ὁ Ἄρης, οὐκ Ἐννοῦς, ὡς τινες).¹⁷⁹ The other polemical target, the Ἀττικοί, who thought that Enyalíus was another god, distinct from Ares, are easier to identify. A god Enyalíus occurs frequently in archaic and classical authors, even non-Attic ones.¹⁸⁰ Normally, in these cases Enyalíus is taken as a 'byword' for Ares, but since it is never accompanied by the noun Ares, the identification of Ares with Enyalíus cannot be proved beyond doubt, except for the fact that Enyalíus is certainly a warlike god. There is at least one case, however, where Ares and Enyalíus are clearly distinguished: Aristophanes, *Pax* 457,¹⁸¹ which might be indeed the

177. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 177; Severyns 1928, 21, 48, 198–199.

178. See *Sch. D Il.* 5.333; Corn. *Theol.* 21.

179. Moreover, Homer does not use matronymics; see below, § 5.1.

180. E.g., Archil., fr. 1 West; Pind. *O.* 13.106, *N.* 9.37, *I.* 6.54; Soph. *Aj.* 179; Eur. *Andr.* 1015–1016; Thuc. 4.67.2.

181. Aristoph. *Pax* 457 (the line attribution is according to Olson's text):

target of Aristarchus when he speaks of ‘Attic poets’.¹⁸² The idea of Enyalios as a ‘distinct’ god could have in fact arisen from Homer, since in almost all cases the epithet Enyalios is not accompanied by the noun Ares, so that he could indeed seem to be another god.¹⁸³ The exception is *Il.* 17.210–211, the passage which Aristarchus singles out in the scholium reported above as definitive proof that Enyalios is not another god, because here the epithet is attached to the noun: Ἄρης / δεινὸς Ἐνυάλιος.¹⁸⁴ Once he has established this point, Aristarchus can then further explain that in the other passages where Ἐνυάλιος is used alone, it indicates Ares and not another god (*Sch. Il.* 22.132b and 20.69a: ὁ Ἄρης ἐπιθετικῶς, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερος θεός).

Another famous *zetema* involved the identification of Apollo with Paean made by the Neoterioi, such that Paean (Παιάν, Ionic Παιήων) even became an epithet of Apollo, often used to invoke him as a defender or as a healer.¹⁸⁵ Aristarchus argues against the identification, because the god Paean (Παιήων), mentioned in *Il.* 5.401, 899, 900, is the physician of the gods, and is clearly different from Apollo (*Sch. Il.* 5.899: ὅτι ἱατρὸν τῶν θεῶν ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα παραδίδωσι τοῦτον).¹⁸⁶ This identification came after the time of Homer; in fact, in Hesiod, too, the two gods are still distinguished:

Sch. Od. 4.232a (V [Ariston.]) ἡ γὰρ Παιήονος: Παιήων ἱατρὸς θεῶν, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι, ἀλλὰ κεχωρισμένος. παρὰ μέντοι τοῖς νεωτέροις ὁ αὐτὸς νομίζεται εἶναι. καὶ Ἡσίοδος δὲ μάρτυς ἐστὶ τοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι τὸν Παιήονα τοῦ

Xo.: Ἄρει δὲ μή.

Tr.: μή.

Xo.: μὴδ’ Ἐνυαλίῳ γε.

Tr.: μή.

182. *Sch. Aristoph. Pac.* 457a points out that the passage in Aristophanes goes against those Neoterioi who think that Ares and Enyalios are the same god (*Sch. Aristoph. Pac.* 457a: πρὸς τοὺς οἰομένους τῶν νεωτέρων τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι Ἄρεα καὶ Ἐνυάλιον). The note represents a different exegetical tradition taking up Aristarchus’ vocabulary, but using it from a different perspective: Aristophanes becomes ‘the poet’, who is compared with other more modern poets (whose identity remains unknown). See also *Sch. Aristoph. Pac.* 457b.c. Cf. Severyns 1928, 199 n. 5.

183. *Il.* 2.651 = 7.166. = 8.264 = 17.259; 13.519; 18.309; 20.69; 22.132.

184. In fact, in *Il.* 13.518–522 it is also clear that Ares is Enyalios: ‘with his spear [Deiphobus] hit Ascalaphus, son of Enyalios, and the strong spear went through the shoulder; and he fell in the dust and clutched the ground with his palm. But loud-voiced strong Ares had not yet heard that his son had fallen in the fierce battle’. There are no Aristarchean scholia to these lines.

185. E.g., Aesch. *Ag.* 146; Soph. *OT* 154, *Trach.* 221; Call. *Hy.* 2.21, 97, 103.

186. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 177; Severyns 1928, 197–198; Usener 1948, 153–155. Perhaps also for this reason Aristarchus reads Apollo’s epithet ΗΙΟΣ with a rough breathing, ἥϊος, and connects it with ἥϊμι and thus with archery, a typical activity of Apollo. On the contrary, Crates’ reading ἥϊος, with smooth breathing, connects the epithet with ἰᾶσθαι, ‘to heal’, which may suggest the identification with Paean; see Chapter 3.4 § 7.

Ἀπόλλωνος, λέγων 'εἰ μὴ Ἀπόλλων Φοῖβος ὑπὲκ θανάτοιο σαώσαι, / ἢ καὶ Παιήων, ὃς ἀπάντων φάρμακα οἶδεν' (fr. 307 M-W).

'For [they are the race] of Paean': Paean is the physician of the gods and he is not the same as Apollo, but is distinguished [from him]. Still, among the Neoteroi, he is considered to be the same [god]. And Hesiod is witness to the fact that Paean is different from Apollo when he says: 'unless Phoebus Apollo does not save from death or even Paean, who knows cures for all things' (fr. 307 M-W).¹⁸⁷

This post-Hesiodic invention still probably arose from Homer himself, since the word παιήων in Homer means both the god Paean and the 'paean,' the song in honor of Apollo (*Il.* 1.473 and 22.391).¹⁸⁸ For Aristarchus, the misunderstanding started at *Il.* 1.472–474:

οἳ δὲ πανημέριοι μολπῇ θεὸν ἰλάσκοντο
καλὸν ἀείδοντες παιήονα κοῦροι Ἀχαιῶν
μέλποντες ἐκάεργον· ὃ δὲ φρένα τέρπετ' ἀκούων.

For the entire day, with a dance accompanied by a song, they appeased the god,
The sons of the Achaeans, chanting the beautiful paean,
Singing of the far-shooting [god]; and he rejoiced in his heart hearing them.

Aristarchus explains that παιήων in line 473 means the hymn to Apollo, and not the gods Apollo or Paean (*Sch. Il.* 1.473a^{1,2}: οὔτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα οὔτε τὸν ἰατρὸν τῶν θεῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ὕμνον τὸν ἐπὶ καταπαύσει τοῦ λοιμοῦ). 'Some,' however, understood the phrase καλὸν ἀείδοντες παιήονα not as meaning 'chanting the beautiful paean'—that is, the hymn of Apollo—but rather 'celebrating the beautiful Paean'—that is, Paean as the epithet of Apollo. Thus, they added line 474 to complete the sense of the sentence:

Sch. Il. 1.474a μέλποντες ἐκάεργον· <ὃ δὲ φρένα τέρπετ' ἀκούων>: ἀθετεῖται, ὅτι νομίσας τις τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα Παιήονα εἰρῆσθαι προσέθηκεν αὐτόν. καὶ γίνεται δισσολογία· προείρηκε γάρ 'οἳ δὲ πανημέριοι μολπῇ θεὸν ἰλάσκοντο' (*Il.* 1.472).

187. See also *Sch. Od.* 4.231a (Did.). Cf. Carnuth 1869, 44, and Pontani, ad loc.

188. Of course, the word 'paean' for the hymn and the name of the god Paean are closely connected; though this is still a debated issue, the general consensus is that the god gave the name to the hymn. For a thorough discussion on the hymn as a genre and of the god Paean and his identification with Apollo, see Rutherford 2001, 3–17.

‘Singing the far-shooting god; and he rejoiced in his heart hearing them’: [the line] is athetized because someone thinking that Apollo was called Paeon added it. And it becomes a repetition; for he has already said ‘for the entire day, with a dance accompanied by a song, they appeased the god’ (*Il.* 1.472).¹⁸⁹

In Aristarchus’ opinion, someone who identified Paeon with Apollo corrupted the Homeric text. The proof that line 474 is a later addition is its redundancy: it is not necessary for the poet to say that Apollo rejoiced (φρένα τέρπετ’ ἀκούων), as ἰλάσκοντο at line 472 already implies that the god is appeased. Aristarchus probably had an additional reason for suspecting line 474: the fact that μέλπειν is never used in Homer with the meaning of ‘singing’ alone, but of ‘dancing’ and ‘playing’, often together with music. This last point is missing in the scholium quoted above but is mentioned in several Aristonicus scholia to the *Odyssey*, which note that μολπή in Homer never means simply ‘song’.¹⁹⁰ One scholium in particular, commenting on *Od.* 4.17, ‘among them the divine bard was celebrating with song and dance (ἐμέλπετο)’, recalls *Il.* 1.474 (*Sch. Od.* 4.17e: ὅτι οὐ τὴν ὦδὴν, ἀλλὰ τὴν παιγνίαν λέγει οὕτω, πρὸς τὸ ‘μέλποντες ἐκάεργον’). The point seems to be that for Aristarchus μολπή and μέλπειν are always used to indicate ‘music together with dancing’—often connected with the idea of a pastime—but never simply for ‘singing’. Yet at line 474 μέλποντες can only mean ‘singing’ because of the direct object ἐκάεργον, and this is against the Homeric usage, so the line must be athetized.¹⁹¹

No doubt the line is redundant (in both hemistichs). We can also agree that in Homer μέλπειν means ‘to dance with musical accompaniment’ (e.g., *Il.* 16.182) and sometimes even ‘to play’ (e.g., *Od.* 6.101).¹⁹² These might have been

189. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.474b and Eust. 138.1–6 (ad *Il.* 1.472–474).

190. *Sch. Od.* 6.101a τῇσι δὲ Ναυσικάα: μεταλαβὼν τὸ ‘σφαίρη ται δ’ ἄρ’ ἔπαιζον’ (*Od.* 6.100) εἶπε ‘τῇσι δὲ Ναυσικάα λευκώλενος ἤρχετο μολπῆς’ (*Od.* 6.101), πᾶσαν παιδιὰν μολπὴν λέγων. οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τὴν ὦδὴν. ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἦδεν ἡ Ναυσικάα, ἀλλ’ ἐσφαίριζε, δηλοῖ τὸ ‘σφαῖραν ἔπειτ’ ἔρριψε μετ’ ἀμφίπολον βασιλεια’ (*Od.* 6.115) [‘and among them [white-armed] Nausicaa’: paraphrasing ‘they were playing ball’ (*Od.* 6.100) he said: ‘and among them white-armed Nausicaa started the game (μολπῆς)’ (*Od.* 6.101), as he calls every sort of pastime μολπή. The Neoterioi [call] song [μολπή]. That Nausicaa was not singing but playing with a ball is clear from ‘and the princess threw the ball at a maid’ (*Od.* 6.115)]. See also *Sch. Od.* 6.101b. Cf. Friedländer 1853, 53; Lehrs 1882, 138–140; Roemer 1924, 42; Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 1.472a.

191. At line 472, on the other hand, μολπή can indeed mean ‘dance’ (‘for the entire day, with a dance accompanied by a song, they appeased the god’), so this line is not a problem for Aristarchus.

192. Indeed the meaning of μέλπειν is ‘to perform a song of a choral dance’ and ‘to sing and dance’ (in a chorus). Thus dancing (or rhythmic movement) is always included in the idea of μέλπειν; μολπή is then the ‘dancing song’; see Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. μέλπω; *Lfgre*, s.vv. μέλπω and μολπή. Yet the use in *Il.* 1.474 (μέλποντες ἐκάεργον) is not wrong, as the verb can have an internal object. For an in-depth survey of the meaning of μέλπεσθαι and μολπή in ancient scholiastic and lexicographical sources, see Bielohlawek 1924–1925.

issues for Aristarchus. Yet the main problem seems to have been the equation of Apollo with Paeon, which could happen when line 474 ('singing of the far-shooting god') followed line 473, because now it was possible to understand the latter as meaning not 'chanting the beautiful paeon' but rather 'celebrating the beautiful Paeon'. Thus Aristarchus could use the other two oddities (i.e., the redundancy and the non-Homeric use of a word) to get rid of the 'neoteric' intrusion, explaining it with the usual 'excuse' of interpolators who added lines because they felt that the passage was incomplete, thereby also betraying their lack of knowledge of the Homeric idiolect.¹⁹³

4.3. The Aegis

In the *Iliad*, Zeus is the only one called αἰγίοχος, 'aegis-bearer' (e.g., *Il.* 1.202, 222), but the aegis is also used by Apollo¹⁹⁴ and Athena.¹⁹⁵ Homer, however, twice makes it clear that the aegis does not belong to them, but Zeus lends it to his children: at *Il.* 5.733–742 Homer describes Athena wearing the armor of Zeus (l. 736) and the aegis is part of it; at *Il.* 15.229–230 Zeus tells Apollo to take his aegis before going to battle to help Hector. Aristarchus singles out the latter passage as evidence that the aegis is a weapon belonging to Zeus, which he gives to Apollo (*Sch. Il.* 15.229a).¹⁹⁶ Definitive proof that the aegis is Zeus' property is found later in the same episode, though, when Apollo meets Hector on the battlefield and the god has 'the aegis . . . which the smith Hephaestus gave to Zeus to bear in order to strike terror in men' (*Il.* 15.308–310), where Aristarchus observes that it is clear that the aegis was made for Zeus and is not Athena's, as the Neoterói claim (*Sch. Il.* 15.310: ὅτι σαφῶς Διὶ ἐσκεύασται ἡ αἰγίς, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν Ἀθηνᾶς, καθὼς οἱ νεώτεροι ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν). To reinforce his argument that the aegis belongs to Zeus, Aristarchus brings etymology into play. He claims that the aegis (αἰγίς) is etymologically connected with καταιγίς, 'storm', and is the weapon with which Zeus stirs storms (*Sch. Il.* 4.167b). This

193. On the Homeric 'interpolators', see Chapter 3.6.B § 7. On this athetesis, cf. Lehrs 1882, 140; Roemer 1912, 194–196; Wecklein 1919, 73–74; van der Valk 1963–1964, I 242 n. 199 and II 443; Lührs 1992, 106–108 (for whom it is due to a repetition of content or δισσολογία—the third type of 'unnecessary line' according to his classification; see Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4); and van Thiel 2014a, I 133.

194. *Il.* 15.307–311, 318–322, and 360–361; 24.20–21 (on which, see below, footnote 196).

195. *Il.* 2.446–451; 5.738–742; 18.203–204; 21.400–401.

196. The fact that the aegis is a weapon of Zeus which he lends to Apollo but which the younger god cannot use as he pleases, especially for impure tasks, is one of the many reasons (including the lack of necessity and contradiction) for the athetesis of *Il.* 24.20–21, where Apollo uses the aegis to cover the body of Hector and protect him from Achilles' shameful treatment; see *Sch. Il.* 24.20–1a^{1,2}. Cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 407; Lührs 1992, 133–136.

etymology is supported by Homer himself, since at *Il.* 17.593–595 Zeus does shake the aegis and produces a thunderstorm (*Sch. Il.* 17.594a).¹⁹⁷ When Zeus stirs a thunderstorm, then, even if the aegis is not mentioned (*Il.* 12.252–254), Aristarchus concludes that he must have shaken it (*Sch. Il.* 12.253a).¹⁹⁸

In fact, the aegis becomes an attribute of Athena in fifth-century art, in Herodotus, and in the tragedians.¹⁹⁹ Different etymologies were provided for the aegis of Athena: for Herodotus (4.189.2), it is a garment made of ‘goatskin’ (αἰγίς, -ίδος); for Euripides (*Ion* 989–997), it is a corselet teeming with snakes made of the skin of the Gorgon, which the goddess killed while ‘darting’ (ἀίσσειν) in the battle of the gods.²⁰⁰ Even if the Aristonicus scholia are silent in this regard, Aristarchus’ etymology (αἰγίς from καταιγίς, ‘storm’) was probably directed against these ‘neoteric’ etymologies which linked the aegis to Athena.²⁰¹ Moreover, since he singles out the lines where the aegis is said to have been made by Hephaestus (*Il.* 15.308–310), Aristarchus must have also realized that the god there is specifically said to be a smith, not a tanner; he must also have noticed that the aegis is described as ‘very bright’ (*Il.* 15.309) and with ‘one hundred golden tassels’ (*Il.* 2.448)—all these Homeric hints must have confirmed in his mind that the aegis could hardly have been made of hide, as both Herodotus and Euripides thought.

197. See also *Sch. Il.* 17.594b (ex. [Ariston.]) and 21.401a. Aristarchus also censures Zenodotus, who, in his view, did not understand the real function of the aegis, as at *Il.* 17.595 he read γῆν δ’ ἐτίναξε, ‘he shook the earth’, rather than τὴν δ’ ἐτίναξε, ‘he shook it [i.e., the aegis]’ (*Sch. Il.* 17.595). Surely, the earth can shake during strong storms and divine interventions, but according to Aristarchus there is no necessity for such a change here, as ‘shaking of the aegis’ to produce thunderstorms is typical of Zeus (*Sch. Il.* 17.594a: ὅτι ἴδιον ὑποτίθεται τῆς αἰγίδος τὸ ἀνέμων ποιεῖν συστροφάς). Cf. Meijering 1987, 123–124.

198. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 190; Dimpfl 1911, 13 n. 1; Severyns 1928, 203–204; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 100. Dionysius Sidonius, who was a pupil of Aristarchus, thought that there were two aegides, one belonging to Zeus (which he lends to Apollo) and one to Athena (*Sch. Il.* 15.229b [ex.]). It is impossible to determine whether this interpretation was also circulating in Aristarchus’ time and whether Aristarchus was arguing against it; in the Aristonicus scholia, there is no hint of this controversy. Cf. Schwartz 1881, 436–437.

199. E.g., Hdt. 4.189.1–2; Aesch. *Eu.* 404; Eur. *Ion* 995–997.

200. From this etymology, in fact, comes the usual depiction of the aegis as the shield of Athena with the Gorgon’s head on it. The etymology, aspect, and function of the aegis are still debated; cf., for example, H. Borchhardt 1977, 53–56 (with bibliography) and Fowler 1988.

201. Ap. Soph. 18.5, who probably preserves Aristarchean material here, argues against the Neoterioi, who understood Zeus’ epithet αἰγίοχος not as ‘the one who bears the aegis’, but rather as ‘the one who took food (ὀχή) from a goat (αἰγός)’, with a reference to the myth of Zeus raised by the goat Amalthea (cf. Call. *Hy.* 1.48–49). Because they denied the aegis to Zeus, the Neoterioi also had to give an alternative interpretation for αἰγίοχος.

5. Homer versus Hesiod

As has become clear by now, Aristarchus identified all the poets after Homer as ‘Neoterói’, including the poets of the Cycle and Hesiod. The latter was a unique case, however, because of his chronological proximity with Homer, as well as because he wrote poems which in many respects were similar to (or less at odds with) those of Homer. These similarities gave Hesiod a privileged position with respect to other neoteric authors when Aristarchus commented on the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

5.1. Clarifying Homer from Hesiod

Because of his canonical status as well as his similarities in genre and mythical background, Aristarchus considered Hesiod the closest poet to Homer, and often used the former to clarify the latter.²⁰² In the scholia, Hesiod is sometimes quoted as a parallel to explain Homeric uses: for having a masculine dual participle with two feminine subjects (*Sch. Il.* 8.455a), for the same pleonastic use of δέν when οὐδέν means only οὐ (*Sch. Il.* 24.370b, ex. [Ariston.]),²⁰³ and for odd morphological forms, for instance when Aristarchus compares the accusatives ἰῶκα in Homer with κρόκα in Hesiod (*Sch. Il.* 5.299b [Hrd.]; 11.601a¹).²⁰⁴ Aristarchus also refers to Hesiod to justify his own interpretation of some Homeric *glossai*, for example when analyzing the adjective ἄξυλος (*Sch. Il.* 11.155b).²⁰⁵ He also explains that the noun ἱππότης means ‘horseman’ and not ‘fugitive’,²⁰⁶ as is also proved by Hesiod, who uses the synonymous ἱππηλάτης (*Sch. Il.* 14.119a).²⁰⁷ Another note (*Sch. Il.* 14.120) also adds that the meaning ‘fugitive’ was the one adopted by the Neoterói, who in this case must not include Hesiod.²⁰⁸ Interestingly, in this case Aristarchus does not recall the same

202. Cf. Roemer 1924, 131–132.

203. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.370a and Chapter 3.2.B § 1.3.

204. See Chapter 3.5 § 3, § 4, and § 7 with footnote 84; Chapter 5.1 § 2.3.

205. See Chapter 3.4. § 1.3.

206. Aristarchus’ interpretation of the *glossa*, as usual, is based on internal evidence—the fact that Oeneus, the grandfather of Diomedes, to whom the noun ἱππότης is applied, is not described as a fugitive in *Il.* 14.117–120 (*Sch. Il.* 14.117): ὅτι ἐλέγχονται οἱ τὸν ἱππότην ἀποδιδόντες φυγάδα· ὁ γὰρ Οἰνεὺς κατέμεινεν ἐπὶ τῆς πατρίδος [because those who explain ἱππότης as meaning ‘fugitive’ are here refuted; for Oeneus remained in his land]. This interpretation was given by the Glossographers (fr. 12 Dyck), who based it solely on *Il.* 2.628–629, which speaks of ‘horseman’ (ἱππότης) Phyleus who left his country angered with his father (hence the possible understanding of ἱππότης as ‘fugitive’); see Eust. 305.5–6 (ad *Il.* 2.625–630). Cf. Lehrs 1882, 105–106; Dimpfl 1911, 12, 43; Severyns 1928, 94, 109; Dyck 1987, 142–143.

207. Hes., fr. 228 M-W (on which, cf. Merkelbach and West 1965, 303).

208. There is in fact no attestation of ἱππότης meaning ‘fugitive’ in later poets who have reached

word in Hesiod but a similar one. We now know that *ἱππότα* and *ἱππηλάτα* are closely connected from a linguistic and formulaic point of view, as they are both masculine with a nominative in -α and are used by both Homer and Hesiod for the same heroes, especially Nestor, Peleus, and Tydeus.²⁰⁹ It is impossible to know if Aristarchus, too, noticed these similarities; yet this case may show the special status of Hesiod, whom Aristarchus felt comfortable to quote as a parallel to Homer against later poets, even when Hesiod did not provide identical examples.²¹⁰

Aristarchus also appealed to Hesiod to discuss (and reject) Zenodotus' readings.²¹¹ Yet Hesiod's helpfulness went beyond using a language similar to Homer's:

Sch. Il. 2.507a Ἄρνην ἔχον· ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει Ἄσκηρην ἔχον· οὐ δύναται δὲ πολυστάφυλος ἢ Ἄσκηρ λέγεσθαι· ἀξιопιστότερος γάρ ἐστιν Ἡσίοδος λέγων· Ἄσκηρ χειμᾶ κακὴ, θέρει ἀργαλή· (*Op.* 640)· ὥστε οὐδὲ πολύκαρπος λέγοιτο ἄν.

‘[Those who] had [rich-in-grapes] Arne’: because Zenodotus writes ‘[those who] had [rich-in-grapes] Ascre’. But Ascre cannot be called ‘rich-in-grapes’. For Hesiod is fairly trustworthy when he says: ‘Ascre terrible in winter, awful in summer’ (*Op.* 640), so that [Ascre] could not be said to be fertile.

In the Catalog of the Boeotian forces, Zenodotus' reading ‘Ascre’ (rather than ‘Arne’) is wrong because, while Homer defines the place as ‘rich in grapes’, Hesiod describes Ascre as very cold in winter and very hot in summer—hardly a good place for vineyards.²¹²

As discussed in Chapter 3.3.A § 4.1, Hesiod is also used as a source to solve

us. Severyns 1928, 218–219, 236, suggests that the target might be the *Thebais*, where Tydeus was exiled for a crime (and Tydeus is called *ἱππότα* at *Il.* 5.126), or the *Alcmeonis*, where the same fate happened to Peleus (who is called *ἱππότα* at *Il.* 18.331). There are no Aristarchean scholia concerning these two occurrences of *ἱππότα* in the *Iliad*; yet *Sch. Il.* 5.126 (ex.) mentions the story of Tydeus' crime (but attributes it to Pherecydes, not to the *Thebais*) and *Sch. Il.* 18.331 (ex.) notes that *ἱππότα* does not mean ‘fugitive’ as in the Neoterioi.

209. See Frisk, *GEW*, s.v. ἵππος; *LfggrE*, s.v. ἱππηλάτα and ἱππότα; Risch 1981, 335–336.

210. Yet Hesiod has *ἱππότα* (*Sc.* 216, fr. 10a.55 M-W, fr. 35.7 M-W) and Homer often uses *ἱππηλάτα* (e.g., *Il.* 4.387, 7.125, 9.432, etc.). Since *Sch. Il.* 14.119a is scanty (καὶ ὁ Ἡσίοδος δὲ οὕτως ἀκήκοεν· ἰδὼν δ' ἱππηλάτα Κῆρυξ, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἱππικός), it is impossible to know if Aristarchus had a specific reason to quote a Hesiodic line with *ἱππηλάτα* rather than one with *ἱππότα*. It might be that fr. 228 M-W was a key passage to show that *ἱππότα*/*ἱππηλάτα* meant ‘horseman’ and not fugitive. Another example might be offered by *Sch. Il.* 16.34a (Ariston. | . . . | Ariston.?) and 16.34b (ex. [ex. | Ariston.?]), which quote Hesiod for using γλαυκή (alone) to mean the sea in *Th.* 440; yet this parallel is used to explain a slightly different use in Homer (only in *Il.* 16.34): γλαυκή employed as an epithet with (and not without!) θάλασσα. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.748a.

211. See *Sch. Il.* 8.349b (ex. [Ariston.?]); 16.748a.b; 18.222b¹.

212. See also *Sch. Il.* 7.9a and Strabo 9.2.35. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 225–226. A different interpretation, in line with his views about the activity of the Alexandrians, is given by van Thiel 2014a, I 232.

the famous *zetema* of the Actorione, defined by Homer as δίδυμοι (*Il.* 23.641). According to Aristarchus (*Sch. Il.* 23.638–42), the epithet does not mean ‘twins’, but rather ‘of double nature’, i.e., conjoined twins, and this is proved by Hesiod (fr. 18 M-W), who depicted the two sons of Actor as such. Even though Hesiod can offer a parallel for the *lysis* of this *zetema*, the Hesiodic rendering of the myth is still different from Homer’s. In particular, Aristarchus points out that Hesiod took Ἀκτορίωνε Μολίωνε at *Il.* 11.750 as indicating the parents’ names, Actor and Molione, both offspring of Poseidon.²¹³ Since Actor is the father,²¹⁴ then Molione must be a matronymic. But Homer never uses matronymics, so this is Hesiod’s invention (*Sch. Il.* 11.750: οὐδέποτε δὲ Ὅμηρος ἀπὸ μητρὸς σχηματίζει).²¹⁵ Rather, for Aristarchus the epithet Molione is perhaps derived from their grandfather Molos (*Sch. Il.* 11.709a).²¹⁶

5.2. Hesiod Is Not Homer: The Hesiodic Otherness

The Hesiodic use of matronymics, unknown in Homer, is in fact only one of the linguistic, stylistic, and mythical differences between the two poets singled out by Aristarchus. For example, he notes that Hesiod shows Doric forms, while Homer never does (*Sch. Il.* 5.269d).²¹⁷ More importantly, Aristarchus seems to have often noticed that, even though Homer and Hesiod generally shared the same depiction of the divine world,²¹⁸ they only partially agreed on the genealogy of the major gods. So, for example, he observes that Athena is born only from Zeus (*Sch. Il.* 5.875a)²¹⁹ and that Aphrodite, too, is his daughter, as is clear from *Il.* 20.107, when Apollo refers to her as ‘daughter of Zeus’ (*Sch. Il.* 20.107). The two scholia do not mention Hesiod, but Aristarchus must have had in mind the genealogies of the *Theogony*, where Athena is indeed born from Zeus only (*Th.* 886–900, 924–926) but Aphrodite is born from Ouranos’ genitalia (*Th.* 188–206).²²⁰ The other main difference between the two poets concerns Hephaestus: in Hesiod he is the son of Hera only (*Th.* 927–928), but in Homer Zeus is his father. For Aristarchus this is clear from *Il.* 14.338–339, where Hera while addressing Zeus speaks of ‘your son Hephaestus’, and from *Od.* 8.311–312, where Hephaestus accuses his ‘two’ parents of having made him lame (*Sch.*

213. Hes., fr. 17b M-W.

214. See Hes., fr. 17a.12 M-W.

215. See also *Sch. Od.* 4.343b^{1,2}.

216. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 175; Severyns 1928, 89, 128–130, 206–209; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 253. On this dual, see *Lfgre*, s.v. Μολίων; Wackernagel 1955, I 543.

217. See Chapter 5.1 § 2.4.

218. On Aristarchus’ analysis of the Homeric gods, see also Chapter 3.3.B § 5.

219. Cf. *Sch. D Il.* 8.31.

220. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 177 (Aphrodite) and 178 (Athena); Roemer 1924, 159; Severyns 1928, 195–196 and 199.

Il. 14.338b: ὅτι ἐκ Διὸς καὶ Ἥρας καθ' Ὅμηρον ὁ Ἥφαιστος . . . ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ δὲ αὐτὸ σαφῶς λέγει ὁ Ἥφαιστος. ὁ δὲ Ἡσίοδος ἐκ μόνης Ἥρας).²²¹ In this specific case, then, Aristarchus could again conclude that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* shared the same mythological background,²²² and this in opposition to Hesiod.

Another point of difference between Homer and Hesiod is that the former has a less detailed view of groups of mythical figures, which, on the contrary, are named individually by Hesiod. For example, Aristarchus remarks (*Sch. Il.* 11.270d) that Homer sometimes speaks of the Eileithyiae in the plural (e.g., *Il.* 11.270), sometimes in the singular (e.g., *Il.* 16.187), and does not give them specific names, just as he does not provide the names of the Muses.²²³ He also notes (*Sch. Il.* 14.267b) that for Homer there are two generations of Charites, the older and the younger ones, because Hera promises one of the 'younger' Charites (Pasithea) as a wife to Sleep (*Il.* 14.267–269).²²⁴ Again, neither *Sch. Il.* 11.270d nor *Sch. Il.* 14.267b mentions Hesiod; however, he is probably the target of these comments too, since he knows of a goddess Eileithyia (*Th.* 922) and considers her a single deity; he also provides the names of the nine Muses (*Th.* 75–79) and lists three Charites—Aglaea, Euphrosyne, and Thalia (*Th.* 907–909)—but does not know a younger generation of Charites and considers Pasithea a Nereid (*Th.* 246).²²⁵

These examples suggest that, despite the undeniable similarities between the two poets, for Aristarchus Hesiod was definitely not Homer; hence, when words or lines sounded 'Hesiodic', they were suspicious.²²⁶ In fact, 'Hesiodic' words in the Homeric poem could be one of the reasons for athetesis, as in the athetesis of *Il.* 24.25–30, analyzed above (§ 3.1.1), with the Hesiodic μαχλοσύνη, 'lust'. Lines with a 'Hesiodic character' were also candidates for athetesis, such as the last part of Niobe story (*Il.* 24.614–617) with the Hesiodic description of the Nymphs dancing along the streams of Achelous around Sipylus (*Sch. Il.* 24.614–7a; see above, § 3.2.4). This is also one of the reasons why Aristarchus (like Zenodotus before him) athetizes the catalog of the Nereids in Book 18:²²⁷

221. See *Sch. T Od.* 8.312. Cf. Carnuth 1869, 83; Lehrs 1882, 183; Severyns 1928, 202; Nünlist 2012a, 121.

222. See Chapter 5.2 § 1.

223. See also *Sch. MV Od.* 24.1 (καὶ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν τὰς Μοῦσας (*Od.* 24.60) οὐχ Ὀμηρικόν). Cf. Carnuth 1869, 164; Lehrs 1882, 182 and 184. In *Sch. Il.* 19.119b, on the other hand, Aristarchus observes that in that line (speaking of Hera who held back the Eileithyiae from Alcmena) Eileithyiae indicate not the goddesses, but the pangs of childbirth; *Sch. Il.* 19.119a^{1,2} (ex.) call it an instance of metonymy, without however quoting Aristarchus.

224. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 179–180; Severyns 1928, 200–201; Meijering 1987, 123.

225. Cf. West 1966, 180 (Muses), 409 (Charites and Pasithea), 411–412 (Eileithyia).

226. On the 'Hesiodic character' of lines as a reason for athetesis, cf. also Lehrs 1882, 337; Bachmann 1902–1904, II 29; Roemer 1912, 304–316; Roemer 1924, 137.

227. The other reason (omitted in the quote of the scholium below) is that its final lines are ridiculous; see Chapter 3.6.A § 5.

Sch. Il. 18.39–49 (Did. + Ariston.) ἐνθ' ἅρ' ἔην Γλαύκη τε <—ἦσαν>: ὁ τῶν Νηρεΐδων χορὸς προηθέτηται καὶ παρὰ Ζηνοδότῳ ὡς Ἡσιόδ<ε>ιον ἔχων χαρακτηῖρα. Ὅμηρος γὰρ κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν Μούσας λέγει (cf. *Il.* 1.604, etc.) καὶ Εἰλειθυίας (cf. *Il.* 11.270, 19.119), ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀνόματα.

‘And there were Glaucē . . . [and the other Nereids who] were [in the depth of the sea]’: the group of Nereids had already been athetized by Zenodotus, since he thought that it had a Hesiodic character. For Homer speaks of the Muses (cf. *Il.* 1.604, etc.) and Eileithyiae (cf. *Il.* 11.270, 19.119) in general, but does not [mention] their names.²²⁸

Homer’s habit of referring to the Muses and Eileithyiae without specifying their names is here applied to the Nereids: Homer would not list all the names of the sea goddesses because, with divinities that are usually considered as a group, he never distinguishes among individuals. In addition, Hesiod does have a catalog of Nereids (*Th.* 240–264), in which he simply lists many names—this was probably what made Zenodotus and Aristarchus especially suspicious, because the Homeric list sounds like an abridged version of the Hesiodic one.²²⁹ The ‘Hesiodic character’ criticized here might not only be a question of ‘theological background’ and repeated lines between the two poems, however. In this case, Aristarchus (and probably Zenodotus before him) seems also to imply that catalogs and lists are not typical of Homer, while they are staples of Hesiod. This conclusion seems to be suggested by another instance, when Aristarchus remarks that in some copies *Il.* 23.538 was followed by two additional lines with the names of the competitors in the chariot race; for him, however, such a list does not have either a ‘Homeric character’ or a real purpose (*Sch. Il.* 23.538c¹: χωρὶς δὲ τοῦ μηδὲ τὸν χαρακτηῖρα ἔχειν Ὀμηρικόν, ἔτι καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν γίνεται ἢ ἐξαρίθμησις τῆς τάξεως). For Aristarchus, it seems, lists were not typical of Homer, but rather of Hesiod;²³⁰ hence, they had to be rejected in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

5.3. He Got It Wrong: Hesiod Misreads Homer

There were also cases where Aristarchus thought that Hesiod—like the other Neoterói—misunderstood Homer. One instance involves the name of the father of the lesser Ajax, who is often defined as ‘(son) of Oileus’. Aristarchus shows that the correct form is the genitive Ὀϊλῆος, ‘of Oileus’, and not Ἰλῆος, ‘of

228. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 337; Roemer 1912, 307–308; Severyns 1928, 418; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 437–439; Nickau 1977, 230–236; West 2001, 244–245.

229. On the Hesiodic catalog, see West 1966, 235–237.

230. Aristarchus also recognized the ‘gnomic character’ of Hesiodic lines; see *Sch. Il.* 24.45a, discussed in Chapter 3.6.B § 7.2.

Ileus'. The latter was a 'neoteric' creation originating from the incorrect division of the *scriptio continua* in *Il.* 2.527 as ὁ Ἰλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας, rather than as Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας. The Aristonicus scholium speaks only of Neoterioi (*Sch. Il.* 2.527–31: ὅτι τινὲς τῶν νεωτέρων ἀνέγνωσαν χωρὶς τὸ ο, ὡς ἄρθρου ὄντος, εἶπα Ἰλῆος. ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος σὺν τῷ ο λέγει τὸν Ὀϊλῆα), but Eustathius and an exegetical scholium to *Il.* 15.336²³¹ specifically mention Hesiod as one of the proponents of the name without the omicron (together with Zenodotus and Stesichorus²³²) as he adopted the name Ἰλεύς in the *Catalogue of Women* (fr. 235.1 M-W).²³³ In the *formula* Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας, it is impossible to decide whether to divide the *scriptio continua* ΟΙΛΗΟΣ as ὁ Ἰλῆος or as Ὀϊλῆος. Aristarchus himself recognizes this when observing that these passages 'misled' Zenodotus into detaching the omicron from the iota (*Sch. Il.* 14.442: ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι τόποι ἐπλάνησαν τὸν Ζηνόδοτον ὥστε δέξασθαι χωρὶς τοῦ ο Ἰλῆος').²³⁴ In other cases, where Zenodotus is criticized because of his similar choice for the patronymic Ἰλιάδης (instead of Ὀϊλιάδης),²³⁵ the *scriptio continua* can also be easily adjusted to fit Zenodotus' readings. Thus, as typical of him, Aristarchus calls attention to an unambiguous instance: *Il.* 13.694 = 15.333, ὁ μὲν νόθος υἱὸς Ὀϊλῆος θείοιο ('the bastard son of godlike Oileus'). Here it is clear (σαφῶς) that the correct form is Ὀϊλῆος, as the preceding ὁ refers to υἱός, making it syntactically wrong to divide ὁ μὲν νόθος υἱὸς ὁ Ἰλῆος (*Sch. Il.* 13.694a; 15.333a).²³⁶ Aristarchus does not provide many details, and his notes seem to be mostly directed against Zenodotus (who is specifically mentioned in *Sch. Il.* 13.694a) rather than Hesiod. Still, the implication is the same: Hesiod, like Zenodotus and Stesichorus, was confused by one specific *formula* which was indeed ambiguous—yet he did not bother looking for other passages which would have shown that the right form was Ὀϊλῆος.²³⁷

231. Eust. 101.19 (ad *Il.* 1.264), 277.1–5 (ad *Il.* 2.527), and *Sch. Il.* 15.336d (ex.); see also *Sch. Il.* 1.264a¹ (Hrd.).

232. Stesich., fr. 226 PMG.

233. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 176; Dimpfl 1911, 9; Severyns 1928, 20, 98–99, 112, 365; West 2013, 237.

234. In fact, the *formula* Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας at the end of line is very common in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 2.527, 13.66, 14.442, 17.256, 23.473, 23.488, 23.754), as are the equally ambiguous Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς υἱός (*Il.* 13.701, 14.520) or Ὀϊλῆος νόθος υἱός (*Il.* 2.727). Aside from those at *Il.* 2.527 and 14.442 discussed in the main text, there are no other Aristarchean scholia to these lines that treat this question.

235. In *Sch. Il.* 12.365; 13.203a; 13.712; and Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 23.759, all on Ὀϊλιάδης; see also *Sch. Il.* 13.697b (where Zenodotus' reading is not mentioned—but the passage is equally ambiguous: ἦν ἔχ' Ὀϊλεὺς at line end).

236. Cf. Nünlist 2012a, 119. As Janko 1994, 51, observes, Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας is an odd *formula* because it is unusual to have the father's name in the genitive without 'son of'; cf. also West 2001, 179. By recalling *Il.* 13.694 = 15.333, 'the bastard son (ὁ μὲν νόθος υἱός) of godlike Oileus (Ὀϊλῆος θείοιο)', Aristarchus might have also wanted to make clear that Ὀϊλῆος belonged to θείοιο and was a genitive depending on υἱός, which in this case was present and preceded by an article.

237. Zenodotus' choice is discussed in detail by Nickau 1977, 36–42; cf. also La Roche 1866, 322–324. The correct orthography of this name is still debated; see Chantraine 1953–1958, I 116–117; Janko 1994, 51.

According to Aristarchus, Hesiod also misunderstood the meaning of words used by Homer. One case may be λευγαλέος;²³⁸ the adjective means ‘ruinous’ or ‘miserable’, but in *Sch. Il.* 21.281a¹ we read that the Neoterói were misled by that line into thinking that λευγαλέος meant ‘watery’. In *Il.* 21.281 the adjective refers to ‘death’, so a meaning ‘miserable’ or ‘ruinous’ is obvious. Yet, as this is a death by drowning, one could understand the expression as figurative, meaning ‘watery death’ rather than ‘miserable death’. Nevertheless, the polemic against the Neoterói is obscure at first, since λευγαλέος never means ‘watery’ in later poets.²³⁹ *Sch. Il.* 21.281b (ex. [Ariston.]) specifies that the target is Hesiod.²⁴⁰ He uses λευγαλέος twice, but with the usual meaning of ‘miserable’: in *Op.* 525 Hesiod speaks of the octopus who gnaws his foot ‘in his fireless house and miserable abode (ἥθεσι λευγαλέοισιν)’, in *Op.* 754–755 he announces a ‘miserable penalty (λευγαλή . . . ποινή)’ if a man cleans himself with the water in which a woman has bathed. Aristarchus’ comments ‘against the Neoterói’ can thus only be explained either by assuming that he targeted a ‘neoteric’ text lost to us or that he himself misunderstood Hesiod. In the latter case, since water is at the core of both passages, he might have indeed interpreted the adjective as meaning ‘watery’: the octopus could live in a ‘watery’ abode, and one who washes himself with the wrong water could incur a ‘watery’ penalty (i.e., he could drown).²⁴¹ Whether or not this was the case, Aristarchus certainly points out the other places in Homer in which the adjective clearly means ‘miserable’ and not ‘watery’, against the Neoterói (*Sch. Il.* 9.119a; 20.109a).²⁴²

Finally, an Aristonicus note criticizes a Hesiodic rewriting of *Il.* 24.624, where Homer describes Achilles and his companions preparing dinner for Priam: ‘they roasted [them] skillfully (περιφραδέως) and drew everything off the spits’. Hesiod recast the line with a different word order: ‘they first roasted

238. See also Chapter 3.4 § 1.2.

239. See *LSJ* and Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. A Sophoclean fragment (*TrGF* 4, fr. 785, from *EGen.* λ 72 Alpers and *EM* 561.27) reads μύρω λευγαλέω, ‘liquid perfume’; if correct, Sophocles might be the target of Aristarchus’ criticism against the Neoterói. The fragment, however, is doubtful, and it has been suggested that the right reading is μύρω λευγαλέω, ‘miserable fate’, which is the reading of one (A) of the two manuscripts of the *Etymologicum Genuinum* (see app. ad *EGen.* λ 72 Alpers); if this is the correct reading, the sense of λευγαλέος in this Sophoclean fragment would be very close to *Il.* 21.281. Cf. Pearson 1917, III 31 (ad fr. 785).

240. *Sch. Od.* 5.312a, on the other hand, mentions the Glossographers (fr. 18 Dyck) as the polemical target of Aristarchus. As we saw in the case of ἱππότα above (§ 5.1 with footnote 206) the neoteric meaning of a word could be influenced by the Glossographers’ interpretation. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 106; Dimpfl 1911, 12; Severyns 1928, 19, 83–84, 110; Dyck 1987, 123–124, 125, 147–148.

241. The interpretation of λευγαλέος as ὑγρός comes back in the scholia to Hesiod for *Op.* 525 (*Sch. Hes. Op.* 524–526) but is left anonymous.

242. *Il.* 9.119: φρεσὶ λευγαλέησι, ‘to my ruinous passion’, and *Il.* 20.109: λευγαλέοις ἐπέεσσιν, ‘destructive [i.e., offensive] words’.

[them] and skillfully (περιφραδέως) drew [them] off the spits' (fr. 316 M-W). This phrasing, however, is incorrect, for Aristarchus, because no one draws meat 'skillfully' off the fire, but rather roasts 'skillfully' (*Sch. Il.* 24.624: οὐδεὶς δὲ περιφραδέως ἐξέλκει κρέα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀπτᾷ).²⁴³

5.4. Aristarchus on the Age of Hesiod (πρὸς τὰ περὶ ἡλικίας Ἡσιόδου)

The relative chronology of Homer and Hesiod was a point of great debate among the ancients. Herodotus discussed when they lived (2.53.2),²⁴⁴ and the Peripatetic Heraclides Ponticus wrote a work on the topic,²⁴⁵ concluding that Homer was older than Hesiod (fr. 177 Wehrli).²⁴⁶ This was also the opinion of Aristarchus,²⁴⁷ who solved the *zetema* 'περὶ ἡλικίας Ἡσιόδου' by mentioning some 'proofs' that demonstrated that Hesiod was a later poet. First of all, Hesiod takes inspiration from Homer, and not vice versa, as discussed in the previous section. Commenting on the rivers of the Trojan plain in *Il.* 12.20–22, Aristarchus makes this point explicit:

Sch. Il. 12.22a καὶ Σιμόεις, ὅθι πολλὰ <βοάγρια καὶ τρυφάλαιαι>: . . . καὶ ὅτι ἀνέγνω Ἡσιόδος τὰ Ὀμήρου ὡς ἂν νεώτερος τούτου· οὐ γὰρ ἐξενήνοχε τοὺς ποταμούς, μὴ ὄντας ἀξιολόγους, εἰ μὴ δι' Ὀμηρον. καὶ τῷ Σιμοῦντι προσέθηκεν ἐπίθετον τὸ 'θεῖόν τε Σιμοῦντα' (*Th.* 342).

'And Simoeis, where many oxhide shields and helmets [fell]': . . . And because Hesiod knew the poems of Homer as if he were younger than him. For [in his poetry] he has not put forth the rivers which were not famous, unless through Homer. And he also gave the Simoeis an epithet, 'divine Simoeis' (*Th.* 342).

In *Th.* 342 the Simoeis, a small river which flows in the Troad, far from mainland Greece, is called 'divine'. Since Hesiod mentions only famous rivers, he could only have given it such importance if Homer had already made it famous through the *Iliad*; so Hesiod is younger than Homer.²⁴⁸

According to Aristarchus, the more modern geographic names used by Hesiod were also proof of his being later than Homer. In particular, Homer does

243. Cf. Merkelbach and West 1965, 315.

244. See also *Certamen* 227.44–45. The question was still debated in the Imperial period; see, for example, Paus. 9.30.3; Gell. 3.11.1–5.

245. The title is given by Diog. Laert. 5.87: Περὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου ἡλικίας α' β'. See also Diog. Laert. 5.92 (= Heracl. Pont., fr. 176 Wehrli).

246. From *Hom. Vita* VI 252.34–35. Cf. Wehrli 1953, 122–123.

247. Cf. also Nünlist 2012b, 154.

248. Cf. West 1966, 260.

not know the name of Lydia, calling the inhabitants of that region ‘Maeonians’, while Hesiod knows the name ‘Lydians’ (*Sch. Il.* 10.431a: καὶ ὅτι Ὅμηρος οὐκ οἶδεν καλουμένους Λυδοὺς, ἀλλὰ Μήονας. πρὸς τὰ περὶ ἡλικίας Ἡσιόδου).²⁴⁹ One can thus wonder whether a similar ‘geographic proof’ for the relative chronology of these two poets occurs when Aristonicus reports that ‘some note’ (σημειοῦνται τινες) that Homer does not know the name ‘Peloponnese’, while Hesiod knows it (*Sch. Il.* 9.246),²⁵⁰ even if the scholium does not specifically mention the question περὶ ἡλικίας Ἡσιόδου. As noted many times, the identity of these τινές is unclear,²⁵¹ but could refer either to Aristarchus himself or to other scholars, perhaps his pupils.

6. Aristarchus and the Cycle

As this survey has demonstrated, ‘οἱ Νεώτεροι’ for Aristarchus were not only the poets of the Cycle. The label covered a much wider concept, which included all the authors after Homer. Many of the Aristarchean references to the Neoteroi in the scholia point to the cyclic poets, however, simply because the Homeric story and myths largely overlapped those of the Cycle.

The best study on Aristarchus and the Cycle is *Le cycle épique dans l'école d'Aristarque* by Albert Severyns. Even though his interest was the Cycle and not Aristarchus,²⁵² Severyns did a commendable job in collecting the evidence about the Neoteroi, an expression which he rightly understood as meaning ‘the poets after Homer’—and not only the poets of the Cycle.²⁵³ While it is certainly

249. Hes., fr. 334 M-W (1967). See also *Sch. Il.* 18.291a². Cf. Lehrs 1882, 229; Severyns 1928, 118. Schroeder 2007 has claimed that the phrase πρὸς τὰ περὶ ἡλικίας Ἡσιόδου, which we read in *Sch. Il.* 10.431a, is a reference to a lost monograph of Aristarchus entitled *On the Age of Hesiod*. Such a claim is incorrect, since the phrase πρὸς τὰ περὶ ἡλικίας Ἡσιόδου does not mean, as Schroeder believes, ‘refer to περὶ ἡλικίας Ἡσιόδου’. Rather, it means ‘with reference to the *zetema* about the age of Hesiod’, and is a typical phrasing to introduce *zetemata* in scholia, such as those on Olympus/heaven, on Pylaemenes, and on the Actorione; see Chapter 4, footnote 22; cf. also Nünlist 2012a, 123–124.

250. Hes., fr. 189 M-W (1967).

251. On the phrase σημειοῦνται τινες in the Aristonicus scholia, see Chapter 1.1 § 4.1.

252. Severyns’ book on the Epic Cycle in Aristarchus’ school, published in 1928, was part of his research on the Cycle, a topic on which he widely published, culminating in his main work, *Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclus* (4 vols., Paris 1938–1963). Severyns’ goal was to reconstruct the Epic Cycle and the ancient discussion about it on the basis of ancient scholia, rather than to understand Aristarchus’ methodology (all the more since he often, though not always, follows Roemer’s method in dealing with scholia). Some reviewers of Severyns’ book (Scott 1929 and Allen 1930), however, observed that his attempt was founded largely on mere conjectures.

253. Severyns 1928, 31–61. On the contrary (and most probably incorrectly), for Roemer 1924, 109–122, the expression οἱ Νεώτεροι is so vague and inaccurate that it cannot be attributed to Aristarchus; rather, this was a shorthand used by Aristonicus and later excerptors when summariz-

true that Aristarchus made a clear distinction between Homer and the later poets, one of the limitations of Severyns' analysis is his idea that Aristarchus, condemning the cyclic poets by default, used to label elements that he did not like as κυκλικά, in the sense that they were worthy of the 'cyclic poets' and not of Homer.²⁵⁴ This idea had an impact upon other scholars,²⁵⁵ but it does not seem well founded, since, at least in the scholia to the *Iliad* unambiguously derived from Aristarchus (i.e., those by Aristonicus), the expression 'the cyclic poets' (οἱ κυκλικοί) is never used,²⁵⁶ while the word 'cyclic' occurs only three (or perhaps four) times—and never in relation to the poets of the Cycle. Rather, in these scholia κυκλικῶς/κυκλικώτερον means 'cyclic' only in the sense of 'repetitive', 'redundant', which is the standard meaning of the word. In two scholia (*Sch. Il.* 6.325a and 9.222a) the phrase κυκλικῶς/κυκλικώτερον κατακέχρηται indicates that a formulaic line is 'useless', 'redundant', in the sense that it does not fit with the context (*Il.* 6.325) or is wrongly repeated from before (*Il.* 9.222)—so it indicates a 'formulaic' misuse (κατάχρησις).²⁵⁷ Once the phrase καὶ κυκλικῶς ταυτολογεῖται, 'he says the same things in a repetitive way', is used to support the athetesis of *Il.* 15.610–614, as line 610 repeats what has been said at lines 603–604 (*Sch. Il.* 15.610–4a).²⁵⁸ Finally, the fourth possible occurrence is in *Sch. Il.* 2.160a, if we accept Pfeiffer's suggestion to read κυκλικώτερον rather than †κυμικώτερον†, which is the reading of A.²⁵⁹ If so, Aristarchus claims that a set of repeated lines, spoken by Hera (*Il.* 2.160–162) and then identically by Athena (*Il.* 2.176–178), are uttered οἰκειότερον by Athena and κυκλικώτερον, that is, 'redundantly', by Hera. Hence he rejects the first set of lines.²⁶⁰ These examples show that there is no evidence that Aristarchus meant κυκλικῶς/κυκλικώτερον as something different from 'repetitive' or simply 'bad', and that he never, at least explicitly, connected these terms with the cyclic poets.²⁶¹ This does not

ing the more precise notes of Aristarchus, who had accurately named the specific authors he was discussing (see esp. Roemer 1924, 114 and 122); on Roemer's method, see Preface § 2.

254. Severyns 1928, 155–159.

255. See, e.g., Pfeiffer 1968, 227, 229–231; Lührs 1992, 254–260 (but he is less strict in linking the idea of κυκλικός with the cyclic poets; see below).

256. The phrase 'cyclic poets' is absent in the scholia to the *Iliad* that go back to Aristarchus (i.e., those by Aristonicus); in the scholia to the *Odyssey*, though, *Sch. Od.* 4.248a, which Pontani attributes to Aristonicus, speaks of a cyclic poet as 'ὁ κυκλικός' (cf. West 2013, 46–47, 196–197). Yet this is an isolated case and in a corpus of scholia (those to the *Odyssey*) whose tradition is more problematic to assess; see Chapter 1.1, footnote 27.

257. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 25; on *Sch. Il.* 9.222a, see Chapter 3.6.C § 1.1.

258. See also Chapter 5.4 § 5.

259. Pfeiffer 1968, 230 with n. 2; the same suggestion was made in apparatus by Erbse, ad loc. Cf. also Erbse 1969, 543.

260. See also *Sch. Il.* 2.176–8; cf. Roemer 1912, 273; Lührs 1992, 249–252.

261. This was also the opinion of Friedländer 1853, 253. Severyns 1928, 156–158, instead inter-

mean that he did not consider the poets of the Cycle worse than Homer; yet there is not enough evidence to conclude that he devised an ‘aesthetic’ label judging inferior lines as ‘typical of the poets of the Cycle’.

To conclude, Aristarchus certainly noted the difference between Homer and the poets of the Cycle, but does not seem to have labeled them as ‘cyclic poets’;²⁶² more probably, he simply called them ‘Neoterói’, as he did with Hesiod and the tragedians. In fact, this is exactly what Aristotle did, since he never used *κυκλικοί* or *κυκλικῶς* to indicate the poets of the Cycle.²⁶³ Aristarchus also picked up on the mistakes committed by the poets of the Cycle in recasting Homeric stories; yet there is no evidence that he specifically accused them of repetitiveness, or that he used the word ‘cyclic’ as a byword to criticize repetitive lines in Homer with the meaning ‘worthy of the cyclic poets’.²⁶⁴

7. Conclusions

Given the overwhelming influence of Homer on the rest of Greek literature, the profound analysis that Aristarchus carried out on the Homeric poems inevitably put him in touch with later Greek poets, whom he also studied independently from Homer in his scholarly activity.²⁶⁵ Sometimes he turned to the later poets (the Neoterói) to find examples that could help him to explain difficult passages or linguistic peculiarities in the Homeric poems. Most of the time, however, he considered the Neoterói ‘different’ from Homer, because of the dissimilarities

preted all these cases as meaning ‘à la manière des Cycliques’.

262. The label ‘cyclic poets’, on the other hand, occurs more often in the D scholia and in the exegetical scholia that use the expression ‘cyclic’ in phrases like *ἡ ἱστορία παρὰ τοῖς Κυκλικοῖς* (*Sch. D Il.* 18.486; *Sch. D Il.* 23.346; *Sch. D Il.* 23.660) or *οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ Κύκλῳ* (*Sch. Il.* 23.347 [ex.]). In fact, Severyns himself (Severyns 1928, 70) admitted that references to the cyclic poets in the Homeric scholia were scarce.

263. But unlike Aristarchus, Aristotle in the *Poetics* specifically mentions the titles of the cyclic poems to which he refers; see also above, footnote 48.

264. For this reason, as much as I agree with Lührs’ view of repeated lines (see Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3), I do not think that his analysis needs the concept of *κυκλικὴ κατάχρησις* to mean that certain lines are ‘worthy of the cyclic poets’ to explain Aristarchus’ attitude toward repetitions in Homer (see Lührs 1992, 254–260; cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 31). No doubt, when he used expressions such as *κυκλικῶς*, Aristarchus was criticizing Homer (so I agree with Lührs in this) but he was not necessarily equating him with the cyclic poets. On the other hand, Lotz’s claim (Lotz 1909, 5–7, 20–22) that *κυκλικὴ κατάχρησις* is equivalent to *κοινὴ κατάχρησις*, ‘catachresis according to the common usage (*nach Art der Umgangssprache*)’ and that it is a *Lösungsprinzip*, so a way to defend Homer rather than a critique, is certainly incorrect; see Chapter 3.6.C, footnote 14.

265. See the introduction to Chapter 1.2.

between them and the poet of the *Iliad* and of the *Odyssey* in terms of language, myths, and, in general, the world they depicted. Homer, as the author of the *Iliad* and of the *Odyssey*, was thus clearly separated from the more recent poets. The label ‘Neoteroi’ included Hesiod and the authors of the cyclic poems, but also the tragedians and even later poets. Aristarchus’ position thus seems to have been fully centered on Homer: according to him, Homer was the source of later poetic inspiration in countless ways—to the point that he does not seem to have accepted any variation in these mythical traditions. Rather, when he found myths that were unattested or different in Homer, his explanation was always the same: the Neoteroi ‘invented’ new myths out of Homer, often because they did not understand him.²⁶⁶ The idea of a ‘Homero-centric’ Aristarchus might be influenced by the circumstance that the present study is in fact about his *hypomnema* on the *Iliad*, where of course his focal point was Homer, and other mythological traditions were disregarded or analyzed only with reference to Homer. Still, Aristarchus certainly held that Homer had a distinct mythological background which was fundamentally different from later developments, and that other mythological traditions were born after Homer. This attitude also seems to have led him to believe that myths were ‘fixed’ stories, so that he could isolate the ‘original’ and ‘true’ ones, deeming the others (i.e., those attested in later poets) as ‘misunderstandings’ or incorrect versions of a sole, real story. This view is in line with Aristarchus’ idea that the Homeric poems themselves were fixed texts, written by a single author, and whose original and true nature he could recover through his *diorthosis*.²⁶⁷ As already observed, we should not fault Aristarchus for this shortcoming; rather we should probably appreciate his constant effort in drawing distinctions between the Homeric world and the later poetic traditions. Nevertheless, the fundamental difference between Aristarchus and us in looking at myths and poetic tradition should also be kept in consideration.²⁶⁸

In his attitude toward myth, we might also wonder whether he was following Aristotle’s precept, according to which poets should not change traditional stories, even if they were allowed some freedom to deal with them at best:

266. A similar point is also made by Rengakos 2000, 331.

267. See Chapter 3.6.B § 8.

268. Similar conclusions were reached by Bachmann 1902–1904, II 33–34. On the other hand, and in line with his views about the excellence of Aristarchus as a critic and following his questionable methodology in dealing with scholia (see Preface § 2), Roemer 1924, 104–109, denied that Aristarchus considered neoteric myths that were different from the Homeric ones as originating from a misunderstanding of the Homeric model, as the Aristonicus scholia consistently suggest; rather, Aristarchus simply made sure to single out these differences, because he recognized that there were different mythical traditions (i.e., the Homeric and the neoteric ones), which needed to be kept separate. In fact, for Roemer (1924, 135–136) Aristarchus applied the principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’ only in his linguistic analysis, while, when discussing mythological questions, he was fully aware of different mythical traditions and respected them.

Aristot. *Poet.* 1453b22–26: τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρειλημμένους μύθους λύειν οὐκ ἔστιν, λέγω δὲ οἷον τὴν Κλυταιμῆστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τὴν Ἐριφύλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέωνος, αὐτὸν δὲ εὐρίσκειν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρῆσθαι καλῶς.

It is not possible to destroy the traditional stories; I mean, for example, that Clytemnestra is killed by Orestes and Eriphyle by Alcmeon; but one must himself also discover good uses for the stories provided by the tradition.²⁶⁹

Indeed, in Aristarchus' view the Neoterói did exactly that: they changed those 'traditional' stories ('traditional' because they had been established by Homer, who was the first, and best, poet) without any purpose, but simply because they misunderstood their model or did not read it well. Beyond this specific point, Aristarchus' approach to the Neoterói was also fundamentally Aristotelian. The philosopher believed that both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (as well as the *Margites*) were by Homer (*Poet.* 1448b34–1449a2). Moreover, he opposed the great art of Homer to the mediocre art of other poets who composed poems on other mythological sagas. For example, in *Poet.* 1451a16–35, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are praised as good examples of poems centered around one single action, in contradistinction to the various authors of *Theseids* or *Heracleids*, which had a single character, but not a unified μῦθος.²⁷⁰ As with the criteria for athetesis or his linguistic analysis, then, in the discussion about Homer and later poets Aristarchus was fundamentally a disciple of the Athenian philosopher. There were, however, differences between Aristotle and Aristarchus. While the former discussed in general terms the differences between Homer and later epic poets, since his focus was the 'art of poetry' (ἡ ποιητικὴ τέχνη) from a theoretical point of view, and considered Homer the best example of it, Aristarchus focused on precise points related to specific lines. In fact, in his *hypomnemata* he was not setting out rules for good poems, but simply describing and commenting on the Homeric text, as well as noticing the neoteric reception of some Homeric lines. In addition, although—as far as we can tell from his surviving works—Aristotle never used words like κυκλικοί or κυκλικῶς to refer to the poets of the Cycle, he still quoted specific titles and specific authors. Aristarchus, on the other hand, chose a simpler method: even if sometimes he referred to a specific author or a specific work, he normally opposed Homer to the generic group of the Neoterói. Such a fundamental distinction between Homer and what was 'newer' was sufficient, because—unlike Aristotle—Aristarchus had one precise goal: commenting on and explaining Homer as well as tracing the differences between him and *all* other poets.

269. On scholia discussing the use of traditional stories by poets, see Meijering 1987, 158–162.

270. See also *Poet.* 1459a30–1459b7 (where Aristotle opposes the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to the *Cypria* and the *Ilias Parva*). Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 73–74; Richardson 1993, 33 and 35. On Aristotle's theory of epos, see Koster 1970, 42–80.

When commenting on the Neoterói's mistakes, Aristarchus often talked about their 'going astray' (πλάνη) or observed that a later poet was 'led astray' (πλανηθείς) by a difficult or ambiguous passage in Homer. As the cases here examined have shown, according to Aristarchus, the Neoterói were misled by real ambiguities in Homer; however, the problem was that they did not seem to have looked for other passages which would have made the ambiguous point clear and helped them to avoid mistakes. In the end, then, the criticism that he launched against the neoteric poets was the same as the one he launched against scholars like Zenodotus or the Glossographers: they did not read Homer attentively enough, which led them, in turn, to make mistakes—Zenodotus in his *ekdosis* of Homer, the Glossographers in their analysis of Homeric words, and the Neoterói in their 'remaking' of Homeric stories.

This chapter has also called attention to a problem in Aristarchus' analysis and distinction between the Homeric and the neoteric mythical universe. Once he had decided that a myth was unknown to Homer, Aristarchus purged from the poems all the lines which alluded to that myth, as in the cases of Paeon/Apollo in *Il.* 1.474, of Niobe turned into stone in *Il.* 24.614–617, and of Paris' judgment in *Il.* 24.25–30. Not all these *atheteseis* are wrong; in fact, the Niobe exemplum is problematic, as is the passage mentioning the judgment of Paris. Still, Aristarchus' behavior in these cases was identical to his attitude when he *athetized* lines in order to create a Homer that would correspond to the Aristotelian ideal poet. This behavior becomes even more striking if we compare it with his attitude when he argued against the Chóizontes' claim about discrepancies between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. As seen in Chapter 5.2 § 4 with the cases of Aphrodite's partners, Sisyphus' sins, and Heracles' divine status, Aristarchus was willing to 'adjust' the evidence and find *ad hoc* excuses in order to reinforce his assumption that 'Homer did not contradict himself' in his mythological universe and between his two poems; still, he was passionate regarding the same inconsistencies between Homer and the Neoterói. Yet, in the end, the two approaches were sides of the same great endeavor to prove that Homer was the best poet of all.

5.4

Aristarchus and Homeric Characters

1. Achilles
2. Agamemnon
3. Ajax
4. Odysseus
5. Hector
6. Priam
7. Andromache
8. Conclusions

When discussing the category of ἦθος, Aristotle (*Poet.* 1454a16–28) states that the actions and words of a given character should fit and be consistent with the nature of that character. The previous chapters have investigated the application of this theory in Aristarchus’ practice: when characters did not behave or speak according to what was expected from them (τὸ ἀρμόττον/πρέπον), Aristarchus intervened in the text, either by explaining or correcting it, so that consistency and appropriateness were respected, or by athetizing the incongruous lines.¹ With this Aristotelian framework as a premise, this chapter will focus more specifically on Aristarchus’ view of certain individual Homeric characters. There are several scholia by Aristonicus and Didymus that preserve comments on this topic.² Their analysis reveals some interesting aspects of Aristarchus’ personal attitude toward the main characters of the *Iliad*. If, on the one hand, the results of this analysis reconfirm his unflinching attention to characters’ consistency, they might, on the other, surprise us as well, since they in part conflict with the mainstream modern views about those same Homeric characters.

1. See especially Chapter 3.6.A § 4 and Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2.

2. On Aristarchus’ view of Homeric characters and their ‘psychology’, see also Bachmann 1902–1904, I 39–46, and Dachs 1913 (on Aristarchus’ λύσεις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου).

1. Achilles

Recognizing the special relationship that Homer has with Achilles, Aristarchus devoted many comments to Achilles' portrayal in the *Iliad*.³ Since Homer depicted him as the greatest hero, whatever diminished Achilles' heroic status was suspicious to Aristarchus—whether it was unnecessary aid from the gods, a speech that would make him seem petty, or any action that would make him ridiculous, disrespectful of the gods or, in general, inconsistent with the heroic code of the Homeric world. This is the case with Hera's words at *Il.* 20.125–128, where, after having urged Poseidon and Athena to give Achilles strength for his fight with Aeneas, she states that they have all come down from Olympus to defend the Greek hero so that he will not suffer any harm from the Trojans. Aristarchus athetizes those lines, as they contradict Zeus' statements at the beginning of Book 20, when he invites all the Olympians to fight in favor of whomever they want, because, if Achilles and the Trojans were to fight alone with no divine help, Achilles would unquestionably exterminate the Trojans (*Il.* 20.26–27). Aristarchus prefers Zeus' comment over Hera's words, as the former gives Achilles more honor (*Sch. Il.* 20.125–8a: ἀθετοῦνται στίχοι τέσσαρες, ὅτι τοῦναντίον ὁ Ζεὺς λέγει . . . καὶ σῶζει μᾶλλον τὴν Ἀχιλλέως ἀξίαν).⁴ For the same reason, he athetized passages or dismissed readings that were not consistent with Achilles' heroic nature. For example, in Book 9, when rejecting Agamemnon's many gifts, the hero says that 'for me nothing is worth a life' (l. 401: οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον). Instead of ἐμοὶ ψυχῆς, some wrote ἐμῆς ψυχῆς, so that Achilles would say: 'nothing is worth my life'. Aristarchus, however, condemns this reading as boastful (*Sch. Il.* 9.401a: ὅτι τινὲς γράφουσιν 'οὐ γὰρ ἐμῆς ψυχῆς'. ἀλαζονικὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος);⁵ rather, with ἐμοὶ ψυχῆς, Achilles more suitably states the worth of life in general, and not only his own life, as if he were better than the others. Similarly, despite his wrath, in *Il.* 16.237 Achilles cannot say to Zeus: 'You did me honor and greatly oppressed the army of the Achaeans', as he cannot rejoice over the defeat of his own people; so Aristarchus athetizes the line, considering it wrongly transferred from Book 1, where it is aptly spoken by the 'enemy' Chryses (*Sch. Il.* 1.454: οὐ γὰρ εἰκότως Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐπιχαίρει τῇ ἥττῃ τῶν Ἑλλήνων).⁶ By the same token, Achilles cannot wish for everyone

3. Schenkeveld 1970, 165–170, already treated the topic of 'Homer and Achilles' according to Aristarchus, discussing several of the scholia analyzed here as well. Cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, I 44–45.

4. Moreover, *Il.* 20.128 ≡ *Il.* 24.210; see *Sch. Il.* 24.210. The fact that *Il.* 20.128 recurs elsewhere, however, is in itself not reason enough for an athetesis (see Chapter 3.6.B § 5.3). Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 45; Roemer 1912, 387–388; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 411.

5. See also Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 9.401b.

6. See also *Sch. Il.* 15.75a (ex. [Did.?]); 16.236a; 16.237a, and discussion in Chapter 3.6.A § 4; cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, I 44; Lührs 1992, 198–202.

to die except himself and Patroclus, since he is sympathetic toward his fellow Greeks; the line, according to Aristarchus, was added by those who thought that Achilles and Patroclus were lovers, but by inserting it they distorted the character's ethos (*Sch. Il.* 16.97–100a).⁷

The refusal of any pettiness from the mouth of Achilles leads Aristarchus to athetize several lines in the speech that he addresses to Aeneas when they are about to fight in Book 20. First, Achilles asks Aeneas whether he is challenging him in the hope of getting the throne of Troy (l. 180), and tells him to forget about it because Priam has many other sons aside from Hector and he is not a fool (ll. 181–183);⁸ or perhaps—Achilles insinuates—the Trojans have set aside for Aeneas an outstanding estate if he slays him, yet that will not be easy (ll. 184–186). Aristarchus athetizes these seven lines because their content and style are cheap, and the words are not appropriate for Achilles (*Sch. Il.* 20.180–6a: οἱ λόγοι οὐ πρόποντες τῷ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως προσώπῳ)—the greatest Greek warrior does not need to use such petty remarks to belittle his adversary. In the same episode, Achilles reminds Aeneas of other times when they fought, how he drove him away, and that Aeneas would have been hurt seriously, had gods not saved him (*Il.* 20.187–194); Achilles then concludes:

I do not think [the gods] will save you now, as you believe in your heart; but I invite you to withdraw and go back to your crowd; do not stand against me before you suffer something bad; even a fool can understand things after they have happened (*Il.* 20.195–198).⁹

According to Aristarchus, these lines do not belong to this episode, but are taken from Book 17, during the battle for Patroclus' body, when they are much more suitably spoken by Menelaus (*Sch. Il.* 17.29–32; 20.195–8a^{1,2}). At the beginning of Book 17, Euphorbus faces Menelaus, bragging about his might and threatening to kill him (ll. 12–17); Menelaus (ll. 19–28) wisely advises him against excessive boasting since Hyperenor already paid with his life after offending him (cf. *Il.* 14.516–519), concluding with the words at issue (ll. 30–32).¹⁰ As Aristarchus remarks, these same words, which should convince Aeneas not to

7. See also *Sch. Il.* 16.97–100b (ex. [Did.?]), and discussion in Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2. We are left to wonder whether Aristarchus' comment in this case had anything to do with 'moralistic' preoccupations; cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 397.

8. On Aeneas' less-than-perfect relationship with Priam, see also *Sch. Il.* 20.298.

9. *Il.* 20.195–198: ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν ἐρῦεσθαι οἶομαι, ὥς ἐνὶ θυμῷ / βάλλεαι· ἀλλὰ σ' ἔγωγ' ἀναχωρήσαντα κελεύω / ἐς πληθύν ἵεναι, μηδ' ἀντίος ἴστασ' ἐμεῖο, / πρὶν τι κακὸν παθεῖν· ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνων.

10. While *Il.* 20.196–198 is identical to *Il.* 17.30–32 (except for the first word: στήης at *Il.* 17.30 and βάλλεαι at *Il.* 20.196), *Il.* 20.195 is not similar to *Il.* 17.29; yet the athetesis needs to include line 195 to respect the συνέπεια (see Chapter 3.6.B § 2); cf. also Erbse, ad *Sch. Il.* 20.195–8a.

fight on the basis of past episodes, do not fit in the passage in Book 20. In Book 17, Menelaus aimed at avoiding battle with Euphorbus because his goal was only to recover Patroclus' body; here, however, Achilles' aim is indeed to fight—and kill—as many Trojans as he can. These words, on the contrary, make him appear weak and lacking strength (*Sch. Il.* 20.195–8a¹: νῦν δὲ παντελῶς ἐκλελυμένος τις ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς φαίνεται, τῷ πρώτῳ συστάντι τοιαῦτα λέγων). This piece of 'advice' to Aeneas is thus grossly inconsistent with Achilles' attitude in this episode. Moreover, at *Il.* 20.174–175 Homer has openly stated that Achilles is driven by his fury and brave spirit (μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ) to fight with Aeneas; Aristarchus thus wonders how it is possible now to have an Achilles who tries to dissuade his adversary from combat.¹¹

Similarly suspicious is *Il.* 22.393–394, when Achilles addresses the Greeks after killing Hector: 'we have gained a great glory; we killed noble Hector, to whom the Trojans in their city prayed as if he were a god.' According to Aristarchus, these lines should be athetized because they are 'contrary to the dignity of Achilles' (*Sch. Il.* 22.393–4a: παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν Ἀχιλλέως οἱ λόγοι), as they contradict what Achilles said in Book 16, where he seemed to think that Hector was not very strong and that he could be beaten by Patroclus alone (*Il.* 16.242–244)—which of course implies that Achilles had no doubt that he himself was much stronger than Hector. Even though the athetesis takes away a comment on the greatness of Hector which shows the respect that Achilles feels for his enemy, this fact does not seem to have bothered Aristarchus as much as the perceived contradiction with Achilles' words in *Iliad* 16 and with his status of being the greatest hero of the poem.¹²

According to Aristotle's doctrines, a 'serious' epic or tragic character cannot show any ridiculous trait; for this reason, Aristarchus athetizes *Il.* 19.365–368, which describe Achilles 'grinding his teeth', a detail that he finds ridiculous (*Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹ [Did.]: γελοῖον γὰρ τὸ βρυχᾶσθαι τὸν Ἀχιλλέα).¹³ Since Achilles is also powerful as a leader, it is odd that he has only 50 ships with 50 men each (*Il.* 16.168–170), but Aristarchus explains that these are only the rowers, as is

11. On the atheteseis of *Il.* 20.180–186 and 195–198, cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 45; Roemer 1912, 383–387; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 398; Schenkeveld 1970, 167–168; Edwards 1991, 311–312 and 313; Lührs 1992, 191–194. On atheteseis due to the unsuitability of lines to the situation, see Chapter 3.6.B § 4.2.

12. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 45; Roemer 1912, 369–370; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 398–399; Schenkeveld 1970, 166; Richardson 1993, 146. Bolling 1944, 177, instead assumes a lacuna in the scholium, but his explanation seems to make things unnecessarily complicated.

13. According to *Sch. Il.* 19.365–8a¹ (Did.), Dionysius Sidonius thought that Aristarchus first athetized the lines and then changed his opinion, considering them a poetic image; but Ammonius did not mention any second thoughts on Aristarchus' part. Cf. Lehrs 1882, 341; Roemer 1912, 101–102; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 399; West 2001, 253–254; Schironi 2015, 621–624 (with further bibliography); Bouchard 2016, 116. On Ammonius, see Chapter 1.2 § 2.1.

clear from a detail which Homer adds: that there were fifty men ‘on the rowing benches’;¹⁴ many more warriors accompany Achilles in his fleet, but Homer did not mention them here (*Sch. Il.* 16.170a^{1.2} [ex.]). This is certainly ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’. Yet this explanation may also be due to a preoccupation with ‘saving’ Achilles’ majesty in comparison with, for example, the Boeotians, who are said to have 50 ships with 120 men each (*Il.* 2.509–510).¹⁵

As the hero par excellence, Achilles fully embraces the heroic code, with all its flaws and violent reactions. Thus, in the quarrel with Agamemnon in Book 1, Aristarchus defends Achilles’ injurious words to Agamemnon against Zenodotus’ rejection of them (*Sch. Il.* 1.225–33).¹⁶ In the same episode, Achilles accuses all the Greeks (and not only Agamemnon) of depriving him of Briseis, when he shouts: ‘since you [i.e., all you Achaeans] are taking away [Briseis] after having given her to me (ἐπεὶ μ’ ἀφέλεσθέ γε δόντες)’ (*Il.* 1.299). Zenodotus’ text, however, made Achilles seem a bit more ‘balanced’ in accusing only Agamemnon and not all the Greeks, as it read: ‘since you [i.e., Agamemnon] want to take [Briseis] away (ἐπεὶ ῥ’ ἐθέλεις ἀφελέσθαι)’. Aristarchus rejects this variant: Achilles is not a champion of the oppressed nor a fine diplomat, but a hero angered by the idea of getting less honor than he deems right; it makes perfect sense, then, that without inquiring into the question further he accuses all the Greeks of dishonoring him (*Sch. Il.* 1.299b: ἔργῳ δὲ κοινωνεῖ εἰς ἅπαντας, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως ἀγνοῶν [but [Achilles] lays responsibility on all the Greeks for what happened, ignoring the reason for the abduction]).¹⁷

This attention to the heroic ethos of Achilles sometimes led Aristarchus to an active intervention in the text. An example comes from the opening of Book 16, when Patroclus reaches Achilles’ hut after having witnessed the slaughtering of the Greeks in the battle; as soon as Patroclus enters, ‘seeing him, swift-footed noble Achilles pitied him’ (l. 5). Aristarchus does not consider such a reaction fitting:

Sch. Il. 16.5 (Did.) <ὥκτιρε> Ἀρίσταρχος γράφει ‘θάμβησεν’. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔπαιξεν ἐν τῷ πυνθάνεσθαι, εἴπερ ὥκτιρεν.

‘He pitied [him] (ὥκτιρε)’: Aristarchus writes ‘he was astonished’ (θάμβησεν): for, if he pitied him, he would have not jested in asking why.

14. *Il.* 16.169–170: ἐν δὲ ἐκάστη / πεντήκοντ’ ἔσαν ἄνδρες ἐπὶ κληῖσιν ἑταῖροι.

15. Cf. Linke 1977, 73; Janko 1994, 340.

16. Cf. Roemer 1912, 366; Dachs 1913, 15–16; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 400; Kirk 1985, 76; van Thiel 2014a, I 98.

17. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 41; Roemer 1912, 423; Dachs 1913, 19–20. In line with his view about Alexandrian editions (see Chapter 1.2 § 2.2), van Thiel 2014a, I 108, states: “Zenodots Notiz ist Kommentar: ‘Es überrascht, dass er nicht Agamemnon allein beschuldigt’ ”.

The feeling of ‘pity’ is not fitting with what Achilles says to Patroclus upon seeing him, as he teases him, saying (Il. 7–11): ‘Why, Patroclus, are you crying, like a girl, a baby, who running to her mother asks her to take her up, clutching her gown, and prevents her from walking and in tears looks at her till her mother takes her up? Like her, Patroclus, you shed tender tears.’ Such teasing words would be not fitting, were Achilles really ‘pitying’ (ὤκτιρε) Patroclus in this situation. Therefore, Aristarchus changes the verb and reads θάμβησεν, ‘he was astonished’ to say that Achilles is surprised to see Patroclus, as teasing can also arise from surprise. Even though this is mostly a question of internal consistency, it also reveals Aristarchus’ view of Achilles’ personality, which seems to have been less sentimental than ours.¹⁸

Yet even an Achilles who is less prone to pity and has a more detached attitude toward his friends should still be respectful of the gods. Probably for this reason, in the same episode, Aristarchus does not like it when Achilles says to Patroclus: ‘I do not care for any oracle that I know (ἤν τινα οἶδα)’ (Il. 16.50), and therefore changes it into: ‘I do not care for oracles, if I know one (εἴ τινα οἶδα)’, so as to be ‘more in line with the character of Achilles’ (Sch. Il. 16.50a [Did.]: ἔν’ ἢ ἡθικώτερον)—the conditional clause expresses doubts about Achilles’ capacity of knowing something about the future, while the relative clause of the vulgate simply denies his belief in any oracles.¹⁹

In line with the typical values of a ‘shame culture’,²⁰ Achilles always strives for others’ recognition, even against his friends’ interests. For example, before sending him out to battle, he urges Patroclus to stop fighting against the Trojans once he has driven them away from the ships, since continuing would make him (i.e., Achilles) dishonored (Il. 16.89–90). While Zenodotus rejected those lines (Sch. Il. 16.89–90),²¹ Aristarchus defends them because they highlight the real aim of Achilles: preserving his own honor in case Patroclus should become too powerful (Sch. Il. 16.89: ἀναγκαῖοι δέ εἰσιν· σκοπὸς γὰρ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ μὴ ἀτιμωθῆναι τούτου κατευημερήσαντος).²² In turn, Achilles shows his regard for old and respectable heroes when he also gives a prize to Nestor, who does not take part in the games, out of respect for his authority (Sch. Il. 23.616a:

18. Cf. Janko 1994, 315.

19. Cf. Janko 1994, 322.

20. On Homeric society as a ‘shame culture’, see Dodds 1951, 17–18, 28–32.

21. Sch. Il. 16.89–90 (Ariston. vel Did.) speaks of athetesis; Sch. Il. 16.89, on the other hand, suggests deletion (Ζηνόδοτος τοῦτον καὶ τὸν ἐξῆς ἤρκεν). On the question of athetesis vs. deletion of lines in Zenodotus’ practice, see Chapter 4 § 1.6.

22. Cf. Duentzer 1848, 201; Lehrs 1882, 334; Roemer 1912, 370–372; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 22; Janko 1994, 327–328; a different reason for Zenodotus’ athetesis (or deletion) is suggested by Nickau 1977, 226–227.

οἰκονομικῶς²³ ὑπολείπεται ἔπαθλον, ἵνα μὴ ὁ Νέστωρ ἄτιμος γένηται ἐν τῷ ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ ἀγῶνι).

The fine and delicate balance between Achilles' positive heroic values and his drive toward personal recognition within a shame culture also seems to be present in Aristarchus' mind when he deals with a famous episode in Book 1. After Agamemnon announces that he will take Briseis, Achilles becomes furious: 'and his heart / in his shaggy breast was in doubt (διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν) / whether, drawing his sharp sword from his thigh, / he should dispel the others and kill the son of Atreus, / or whether he should put an end to his anger and restrain his temper' (ll. 188–192). Aristarchus athetizes the last line, which contains the second alternative, because the line diminishes Achilles' wrath (*Sch. Il.* 1.192a: ἐκλύεται τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς). For Aristarchus, then, it is much more 'dramatic'—and in line with Achilles' character—to have the hero pondering only the possibility of killing Agamemnon without even considering the alternative of restraining his anger and adopting a tamer course of action. As he explains, Achilles is not in doubt between two opposing choices; he simply 'ponders' whether he should kill Agamemnon *and* break up the assembly, as stated at lines 190–191²⁴—which are not conflicting options (*Sch. Il.* 1.189c: ὅτι δύο ἐμερίμνησεν οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις).²⁵ Aristarchus might have also thought

23. Here οἰκονομικῶς probably refers to Achilles' 'diplomatic' move and has nothing to do with the technical term οἰκονομία used in literary criticism to mean the 'artificial order' of the events as presented in a poem, that is, the 'plot'. The οἰκονομία of the Homeric poems is the object of many exegetical scholia, but no Aristarchean scholium on the *Iliad* uses this technical term (even though Aristarchus did discuss Homer's presentation of events within the poem, as seen in Chapter 3.6.C § 3; cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, I 36–37). On οἰκονομία in ancient literary criticism with a survey of exegetical scholia to Homer and tragic scholia, see Meijering 1987, 134–138, 177–200; Nünlist 2009, 24–27. In particular, Meijering 1987, 181, notices *Sch. Il.* 23.616a and tries to fit it within the standard meaning of 'economy' in literary criticism (cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, I 44, II 6); she, however, rightly observes that the sense of οἰκονομικῶς in this note is unclear and unparalleled in the A scholia.

24. The point is clarified in the same scholium in a part which Erbse attributes to Nicanor (*Sch. Il.* 1.189c): . . . βραχὺ δὲ διασταλτέον ἐπὶ τὸ 'μερμήριξεν'. ὁ γὰρ λόγος, διχῶς ἐλογίσαστο, τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσαι, τὸν δὲ Ἀγαμέμνονα ἀνελεῖν [we must make a short pause after μερμήριξεν; for what is being said [is]: he was considering two things, to dispel the others and to kill Agamemnon].

25. In the same scholium, in the part attributed to Aristonicus, Aristarchus also explains that someone indeed took διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν at line 189 to mean that Achilles debated two opposite options within himself, and so added line 192 to have the second option (*Sch. Il.* 1.189c). Aristarchus faces a similar problem regarding *Il.* 8.167–168, where Diomedes is in doubt whether he should turn his horses and fight (ὥς φάτο, Τυδεΐδης δὲ διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν / ἵππους τε στρέψαι καὶ ἐναντίβιον μαχέσασθαι). Here, too, Aristarchus observes (*Sch. Il.* 8.168) that διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν does not involve the choice between two opposite actions; however, some scholars added an additional line (ἢ μήτε στρέψαι μήτ' ἀντίβιον μαχέσασθαι, l.168a) to make the 'opposite' choice explicit, exactly as happened with *Il.* 1.192. The additional line in Book 8 is not attested in the manuscript tradition; if indeed Aristarchus found it somewhere, he was right in rejecting it, since line 168a is

that his interpretation was further supported by the need of a divine intervention to convince Achilles not to slay Agamemnon. For the same reason—namely, Achilles’ acute sense of honor and his inflexible desire to punish whoever does not respect him—Aristarchus also athetizes the lines in Book 24 where Achilles asks Patroclus for forgiveness for having returned the body of Hector, as Priam offered many gifts:

Sch. Il. 24.594–5a πατρὶ φίλω, ἐπεὶ οὐ μοι <——ὅσσ’ ἐπέοικεν>: ἀθετοῦνται, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔνεκα δῶρων λέγει ἀπολελυκέναι τὸν νεκρόν· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ Διὸς ἠναγκάσθη, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν τὴν ὑπὲρ Πατρόκλου τιμωρίαν δῶρων ἡλλάξατο.

‘To his dear father, because he did not [give] me [an unworthy ransom. Of these things I will share with you] what is fitting’: [the lines] are athetized because he is not right in saying that he has given back the body because of the gifts: for he was forced by Zeus, since he would have never exchanged his revenge for Patroclus with gifts.

Achilles yielded because Zeus, through Thetis, had ordered him to do so (*Il.* 24.107–137), not because of Priam’s gifts, as his desire for vengeance was overwhelming. Aside from noticing the contradiction with Zeus’ words in the same book, Aristarchus’ comment also shows a fine sense of Achilles’ character and of his heroic ethos—even if we might not agree with his decision to athetize those lines.²⁶

Last but not least, Aristarchus was even able to justify Achilles’ most bestial behavior: the shaming of Hector’s body. At *Il.* 17.125–131 Hector, who has despoiled Patroclus, drags his body with the intention to shame it, until he is stopped by Ajax. Then Glaucus rebukes him (*Il.* 17.142–168), stating that it would be much better if they could recover the corpse in order to use it as a ransom for Sarpedon’s, who was abandoned on the battlefield when he was killed. Hector is convinced by Glaucus’ words (*Il.* 17.179–182), and, in the ensuing battle, the Lycians and Trojans fight against the Greeks to get Patroclus’ body. This episode is of paramount importance in Aristarchus’ view. After noting (*Sch. Il.* 17.126) that this is possible because the Trojans, the Lycians, and the Greeks do not know that Sarpedon has been taken to Lycia by Apollo (at *Il.* 16.667–683),²⁷ he then observes:

simply the negation of line 168; cf. Kirk 1990, 310–311. Of course, the case of *Il.* 8.167–168 may have also convinced him that *Il.* 1.192, too, had to be rejected. On the athetesis of *Il.* 1.192, cf. Roemer 1912, 20 and 176–178; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 469–470; Lührs 1992, 97. On the interpolators (*diaskeuastai*) who added lines in the *Iliad*, see Chapter 3.6.B § 7.

26. Cf. Roemer 1912, 16–17, 380–382; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 398; Schenkeveld 1970, 167 (for whom it is a question of internal consistency).

27. See also *Sch. Il.* 17.163a.

Sch. Il. 17.126 ἔλχ', ἵν' ἀπ' ὤμοιιν <κεφαλὴν τάμοι ὁξεί χαλκῷ>: . . . ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος, ἵν' ἐπιφανῇ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιήσῃ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος Πατρόκλου, ταῦτα ὑπέθετο· οἱ τε γὰρ Τρῶες ὥς ὑπὲρ Σαρπηδόνοσιν κινδυνεύειν κρίνουσιν, οἱ τε Ἀχαιοὶ τὸν Σαρπηδόνα οὐκ ἔχοντες μάχονται ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰκίας τοῦ Πατρόκλου. χαλεπὴ ἡ αἰκία καὶ συγγνωστὸς ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς αἰκιζόμενος τὸν Ἑκτορα ἐπ' ἐκδικίᾳ τοῦ φίλου (cf. *Il.* 22.395–404, 24.14–18). χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὸ ἄρξαι τινὸς ἀδικήματος.

'[Hector] dragged [Patroclus' body] so that he could cut his head from the shoulders with his sharp sword': . . . Homer has devised this in order to make the fight for the body of Patroclus remarkable. For the Trojans decide to run a risk on behalf of Sarpedon, and the Achaeans, who do not have [the corpse of] Sarpedon, fight to avoid outrage to Patroclus. The outrage is terrible, and Achilles is pardonable when he commits an outrage upon [the body of] Hector to avenge his friend (cf. *Il.* 22.395–404, 24.14–18). For it is crueler to start an injustice.²⁸

According to Aristarchus, the lack of knowledge on the part of the Greeks, the Trojans, and their allies about Sarpedon's destiny as well as Hector's intentions toward Patroclus' body have a pivotal function within the poem, because they offer a justification for the final rage of Achilles. Since the first outrage occurs on Patroclus' body, Achilles is thus forgivable when he shames Hector's body at the end of the *Iliad*. In fact, Hector is the worse offender of the two, since he is the one who first disgraced a dead body—even though many modern readers might not agree with Aristarchus' 'logical' excuse of Achilles' savage behavior.

2. Agamemnon

Agamemnon is not a sympathetic character in the *Iliad*, at least for modern readers. Aristarchus, however, seems to have had a different attitude: he showed respect for him and athetized lines in which Agamemnon behaved unheroically, also underscoring how respected and honored the king was. Both attitudes emerge in Aristarchus' treatment of *Il.* 1.29–31: here, after telling old Chryses to go away, Agamemnon adds that he is not going to release Chryseis; rather, she

28. Cf. Meijering 1987, 125. Friedländer 1853, 274, denied that this part of the scholium stemmed from Aristonicus. Yet it is not inconsistent with the previous part and fits well with Aristarchus' ideas about Homer's art and Achilles' character, as already pointed out by Erbse, ad loc. This episode was also discussed by Aristarchus to argue against a reading by Zenodotus in Book 18, as discussed in Chapter 4 § 1.4.

will come to Argos and wait for old age there as his slave and concubine. Aristarchus athetizes those lines, because they weaken the intensity of the king's threat since Chryses might in fact rejoice at the idea of having his daughter become a concubine at the court of Agamemnon.²⁹ We may not share Aristarchus' view on this point, but it is surely fitting with the Homeric (and Hellenistic) attitude toward women: what better fate for a relatively unknown young woman than being part of the king's court? In addition to finding these words counterproductive, with their offer of a 'good' life for Chryseis, Aristarchus also considers them 'unfitting' for Agamemnon (*Sch. Il.* 1.29–31: ἀθετοῦνται ὅτι ἀναλύουσι τὴν ἐπίτασιν τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀπειλήν . . . ἀπρεπὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα τοιαῦτα λέγειν).³⁰ Similarly, he objects to the lines, still in Book 1, where Agamemnon challenges Achilles, asking him: 'Do you really want that, while you keep your prize, I sit here without mine, and you order me to give her back?' (*Il.* 133–134). Aside from being 'cheap' (εὐτελεῖς) in style and thought, these words are to be athetized because they are unworthy of Agamemnon (*Sch. Il.* 1.133–4: καὶ μὴ ἀρμόζοντες Ἀγαμέμνονι).³¹ This is an interesting choice, because by eliminating these lines Aristarchus removes one of the main characteristics of Agamemnon—one which distinguishes him sharply from Achilles: Agamemnon is greedy and disrespectful of others' rights.

These two atheteseis in Book 1 might suggest that Aristarchus did not read the *Iliad* as we do.³² In his mind, the opposition between Achilles and Agamemnon did not necessarily favor Achilles: both of them were great heroes, and he respected them both, suspecting all the lines that did not do justice to their heroic character.³³

3. Ajax

At *Il.* 2.768–769 Homer says that Telamonian Ajax was the best warrior (ἄριστος) as long as Achilles was refusing to fight. Even though Homer has just said of Agamemnon (*Il.* 2.579–580) that 'he was preeminent among all the

29. *Sch. Il.* 1.29–31 is corrupt at this point (ἡσμένισε γὰρ καὶ ὁ Χρύσης †εἰπούσης† αὐτῆς τῷ βασιλεῖ), but this must be the meaning (all the proposed emendations for εἰπούσης listed by Erbse, *ad loc.*, suggest that this is the sense required).

30. See also *Sch. Il.* 1.29a; cf. Roemer 1912, 168–170, 444.

31. Cf. Roemer 1912, 390, and van der Valk 1963–1964, II 395, who considers Aristarchus' atheteseis of both *Il.* 1.29–31 and *Il.* 1.133–134 (as well as of *Il.* 1.139) as due to the presence of 'indecencies' with regard to Agamemnon.

32. Indeed, both atheteseis are harshly criticized by Kirk 1985, 56 and 67!

33. The same view of Agamemnon as a hero who is also attentive to the needs of his army is shown by Aristarchus' handling of *Il.* 1.117 (*Sch. Il.* 1.117a, discussed in Chapter 3.6.A § 4).

heroes because he was the best (ἄριστος) and led by far the greatest army, for Aristarchus there is no need to athetize those lines about Agamemnon, as Zenodotus did;³⁴ rather, the epithet ἄριστος can be applied to both heroes, since it indicates different areas of ‘excellence’: Ajax is the best in terms of fighting ability; Agamemnon is the best, on the other hand, for nobility and wealth (*Sch. Il.* 2.579–80a: ἐν διαφόροις δὲ πράγμασιν εἰσιν οὗτοι ἄριστοι, ὁ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ εὐγενείᾳ, ὁ δὲ τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῇ). While these comments confirm Aristarchus’ respect for Agamemnon, they also suggest his views about Ajax.

Indeed, it is precisely because Ajax is the next after Achilles in *arete* that he is a full-fledged hero. For this reason, Aristarchus did not tolerate any ‘ridiculous’ trait in him, any more than he did with Achilles. Thus, he athetizes five lines in which Ajax, who has been chosen to meet Hector in battle, is eager to fight and invites the other leaders to pray to Zeus (*Il.* 7.195–199): ‘in silence by yourselves, so that the Trojans will not know about it, or [pray] openly, since we do not fear anyone in any case. For no one will willingly chase me by force, if I am not willing, nor by his skill; because I think I was not born and raised in Salamis without skills.’ These words are considered unworthy of Ajax (*Sch. Il.* 7.195–9: ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὸν Αἴαντα οἱ λόγοι), probably because they are naive and boastful. Moreover, Aristarchus also finds it ridiculous that Ajax almost responds to himself saying that, in fact, the Greek leaders should pray openly, since he is afraid of no one (*Sch. Il.* 7.195–9: καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἀνθυποφέρει γελοίως).³⁵

No one can deny, however, that Ajax is a fairly hot-headed character—and Aristarchus knew that. In *Il.* 15.504–505, urging the Greeks to resist Hector’s attack on their ships, Ajax asks: ‘if Hector of the glancing helmet takes the ships, do you hope to reach, each of you, his homeland on foot (ἐμβαδόν)?’ According to Aristarchus, these lines can be interpreted in two ways:

Sch. Il. 15.505a ἐμβαδόν ἵξεσθαι <ἦν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἕκαστος>: ὅτι ἦτοι ἠθικῶς λέγει ἐλπίζετε ἐμβήσεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰς καησομένας ναῦς, ἢ καὶ ἐλπίζετε ἐμβάντες ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἀφίξεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰς πατρίδας, ἐστὶ βάδην ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης πορευόμενοι.

‘[Do you hope] to reach, each of you, his homeland on foot (ἐμβαδόν)?’: because either he says according to his character: ‘you hope to embark (ἐμβήσεσθαι) on the ships when they are on fire’ or also: ‘you hope to go home stepping on (ἐμβάντες) on the sea’, that is, ‘marching on the sea on foot.’³⁶

34. See also Chapter 4 § 1.4.

35. See also *Sch. Il.* 7.198a¹² (Did.) and Chapter 3.6.A § 4. Cf. Roemer 1912, 389; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 396.

36. For us ἐμβαδόν only means ‘on foot’, ‘by land’; see *LSJ* and *Lfgre*, s.v. Aristarchus, on the other hand, seems to read it through its etymological origin, so that he understands it either from

The hero is making fun of his comrades by asking them if they believe that burned ships could be of any use. By defining Ajax' words ἡθικῶς, 'according to the character', Aristarchus is probably pointing out that such a sarcastic joke is perfectly in line with Ajax's personality, a blunt and straightforward hero, far removed from the deceptive rhetorical ability of a hero like Odysseus.³⁷

4. Odysseus

Aristarchus considered Odysseus the quintessential trickster. In his view, Homer himself confirms this by having Socus call Odysseus 'much praised, insatiable of wiles and toils' (*Il.* 11.430):

Sch. Il. 11.430b δόλων ἄτ' ἡδὲ πόνοιο: ὅτι ἐμφαίνει τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα ἐξ ἱστορίας παρειληφώς δόλιον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ διαβεβλημένον.

'Insatiable of wiles and toils': because he is evidently taking Odysseus from the mythical tradition as being deceitful and blamed for this.³⁸

In addition, in *Il.* 23.725 Homer says that Odysseus did not forget his craftiness when he was about to trick Ajax to get him on the ground in the wrestling match, a line which Aristarchus singles out as further confirmation of Odysseus' deceitful nature (*Sch. Il.* 23.725b: ὅτι τὸ δόλιον τοῦ ἥρωος καὶ διὰ τούτων δείκνυται). Perhaps the same idea is behind Aristarchus' comments on *Il.* 9.677–688, when Odysseus reports to Agamemnon the result of their embassy to Achilles. He tells him that Achilles refuses to fight again and that he is planning to leave (which is what Achilles said at *Il.* 9.356–363), but omits that he has also told Ajax that he will fight again if Hector reaches the ships of the Myrmidons (at *Il.* 9.644–655). According to Aristarchus, these details have been omitted on purpose by Odysseus, so that the Greeks would not trust so much in Achilles' help, but rather would take serious measures to defend themselves (*Sch. Il.* 9.680b: τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, . . . παραλέλοιπεν, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶσι τοῦ βοηθεῖν). In his report, Odysseus also adds that according to Achilles

ἐμβαίνειν in the sense of 'to embark' or from ἐμβαίνειν in the sense of 'to step upon', so 'to walk'. Another interpretation is given by Eustathius (1029.54–57, ad *Il.* 15.505) who connects ἐμβαδόν with the ἐμβατήριος ῥυθμός, the 'marching tune' of the Spartans.

37. For other notes of Aristarchus about Ajax as depicted by Homer in opposition to the Neoteroi (*Sch. Il.* 14.406a and 23.822), see Chapter 5.3 § 3.1.3.

38. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, II 9–10 (with a different interpretation of the meaning of ἐξ ἱστορίας in the scholium); Roemer 1924, 134; Schmidt 1976, 166 n. 28. See also Chapter 5.2 § 1.

the others, too, should leave and go home ‘since you will not reach the goal (δήετε τέκμωρ) of taking high Ilium’ (Il. 685–686). Aristarchus remarks (*Sch. Il.* 9.685a) that Odysseus has changed the speech here, since Achilles did not say to him ‘*they* will not reach the goal (δήουσιν τέκμωρ)’, but ‘*you* will not reach the goal (δήετε τέκμωρ)’ (*Il.* 9.418). There are no further comments in the scholium and we should no doubt understand that Aristarchus wanted to highlight that Odysseus reporting this ‘speech within speech’ did not change the grammatical person.³⁹ This is certainly the case, but we might also wonder whether Aristarchus took the use of the same second-person plural both in Achilles’ own words and in Odysseus’ speech to Agamemnon as a further sign of Odysseus’ cunning and tricky nature. In this way, by not using the first person in reporting Achilles’ speech (‘*we* will not reach the goal’, as expected from Achilles’ original use of ‘*you*’), the king of Ithaca would not include himself in the group of the ‘losers’ and thus eschew the responsibility for losses and a bad outcome in the war.⁴⁰

5. Hector

Hector is a hero of the same rank as Achilles and Ajax; therefore, according to Aristarchus, he should behave accordingly. For example, he should not insult his enemies beyond what is proper. In Book 8, when Diomedes, convinced by Nestor, retreats from the battle, Hector mocks him by telling that, even if the Greeks honor him greatly, he does not seem any better than a woman (Il. 161–163). Aristarchus keeps those lines, but rejects the rest of Hector’s speech (Il. 164–166) wherein he calls Diomedes a ‘worthless puppet’ (κακή γλήνη) and assures him that he will not be able to set his foot on Troy’s walls and carry away Trojan women, since he will kill him first. For Aristarchus, these strong words are unfitting for both characters (*Sch. Il.* 8.164–6a: ἀνάρμοστα δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα τοῖς προσώποις), probably because they sound too mean for Hector and too offensive for Diomedes.⁴¹

39. So Matthaios 1999, 398–399, and Nünlist 2009, 325.

40. If this is correct, then Aristarchus might have also seen here another hint of the *veikos* between Achilles and Odysseus, which originated because the latter wanted to take Troy ‘with counsel and intelligence’, while the former wanted to rely on using his heroic strength (on this dispute, see Chapter 5.2 § 3.2). Here Odysseus would absolve himself from the responsibility of losing Troy because his suggestions had not (yet) been followed by the Greeks, who instead insisted on taking Troy by force.

41. For Roemer 1912, 375–376, the athetesis was by Aristophanes, not Aristarchus. Similarly, Dachs 1913, 37 n. 2, thought that Aristonicus had wrongly preserved the original note, as Aristarchus could not possibly have disliked these lines, which correspond well to Hector’s bold attitude

Since Hector's heroic status should always be maintained, Aristarchus athetized any lines that diminished it (as he did with Achilles).⁴² In Book 12, during the battle at the wall, for example, Hector throws a huge stone against the gate and breaks it (ll. 445–462); Homer says that two men would not be able to lift it, but Hector could easily carry it (ll. 447–449), adding (l. 450): 'and the son of crooked-counseling Cronus made it light for him', a line that Aristarchus athetizes, because it lessens the hero's might (*Sch. Il.* 12.450: ἐκλύει τὴν τοῦ βασιτάζοντος δύναμιν).⁴³ To preserve Hector's heroism, Aristarchus likewise athetizes *Il.* 15.610–614. In this episode Hector presses against the Greek ships under the urging of Zeus (ll. 596–604) and his burgeoning courage is compared to Ares and to the fire raging on a mountain (ll. 605–609). The comparison ends with the following comment (ll. 610–614): 'of Hector [i.e., the helmet of Hector, described at ll. 608–609]: from heaven Zeus himself was his defender, who gave honor and glory to him who was alone among so many warriors. For he was not going to live long, since already Pallas Athena was preparing the day of his doom under the force of Peleus' son'. Aristarchus objects to those lines because they do not add anything (even the name 'Hector' at the beginning of line 610, referring back to the previous lines, is unnecessary, as we know that he is the subject of this episode); on the contrary, they intrude in the narrative by weakening Hector's impetus inspired by the god (*Sch. Il.* 15.610–4a: ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ ὅτι περὶ Ἑκτορός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος. καὶ τὴν ἐνθουν ὁρμὴν τοῦ Ἑκτορος ταῦτα παρεννεύμενα ἐκλύει).⁴⁴

Because he is a hero, Hector has attitudes different from those of more 'normal' characters, even in relation to the most trivial aspects of life. Thus in Book 6 when Hecuba wishes to bring Hector some wine to make a libation and then drink some (ll. 258–260), she concludes that wine will be good for him, since it increases the strength of tired men (ll. 261–262). Hector refuses, however, as wine will make him weak, and he might forget his strength (ll. 264–265). Aristarchus explains that these two statements are not in contradiction, because the characters are different and each of them speaks with a different purpose (*Sch. Il.* 6.265: ἔστι δὲ διάφορα τὰ λέγοντα πρόσωπα, καὶ ἑκάτερον πρὸς τι εἴρηται): namely, Hecuba talks as a mother, who wants her son to relax a bit; Hector instead speaks as a leader and a warrior, who feels the responsibility

at the moment. While Hector is indeed extremely confident and bold in Book 8 (see below, footnote 49), Aristarchus suspects these lines for other reasons as well, listed in the scholium. Cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 396–397.

42. Yet Achilles' heroic status is higher than Hector's, as seen above (§ 1) with the athetesis of *Il.* 22.393–394: in that case Achilles' heroism prevails over Hector's.

43. As Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 12.450 informs us, Aristophanes already athetized it, and Zenodotus did not even write the line. Cf. West 2001, 220–221.

44. Cf. Roemer 1912, 44–45, 60, 112–113; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 408; Schenkeveld 1970, 174–175; Lührs 1992, 52–58; Janko 1994, 295; West 2001, 234.

toward his city and does not want to abandon his duty even for a moment.⁴⁵ For the same reason, Hector should show more courage than a simple herald: in *Il.* 7.273–282 the duel between Hector and Ajax is interrupted by the heralds Idaeus (of the Trojans) and Talthylbius (of the Greeks). Idaeus invites them to stop fighting, since Zeus loves them both and they have showed their valor. Moreover, ‘night is falling, and it is good to obey night’ (l. 282). This same line is repeated by Hector in his reply (l. 293), when he accepts and invites Ajax, whom he praises for his strength and courage, to stop and resume their duel in the near future, not without first exchanging gifts to show their mutual respect and friendship (ll. 288–302). In this noble and ‘heroic’ speech, however, Aristarchus does not want Hector to look relieved at nightfall: line 293 is in fact wrongly repeated from the speech of the heralds, where it is more fitting to the context. Heralds can afford these comments, but a hero like Hector does not need such a cheap excuse like night falling to stop fighting:

Sch. Il. 7.282a νύξ δ’ ἤδη τελέθει· <ἀγαθὸν καὶ νυκτὶ πιθέσθαι>: ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὰ ἐξῆς (*Il.* 7.293) μετενήνεκται· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κῆρυξ αἰτίαν λέγει, δι’ ἣν οὐ πολεμητέον, ὁ δὲ Ἑκτωρ ἑαυτὸν μετὰ προφάσεως μὴ συλλυέτω.

‘Night is falling and it is good to obey night’: because from here the line is transferred in what follows (*Il.* 7.293); for the herald says the reason why they must not duel, but let Hector not come to terms using an excuse.⁴⁶

Hector is a ‘larger than life’ character, just like Achilles and Ajax, and so he sometimes indulges in boasting, bordering on *hybris*. This seems to be the idea behind two scholia against Zenodotus, who had a different text in two of Hector’s speeches to his soldiers. In *Il.* 8.489, after a day of battle when the Trojans have been victorious, Hector gathers his soldiers. In an extended speech (ll. 497–541), he urges them to rest and prepare dinner, without going back to Troy, so that they can watch over the enemy to prevent them from escaping; the following day they will be ready to give the decisive blow to the Achaeans. Hector also adds: ‘In hope (ἐλπόμενος) I pray (εὔχομαι) to Zeus and the other gods (Διὶ τ’ ἄλλοισίν τε θεοῖσιν) to drive out from here these dogs brought by the Keres [i.e., the Greeks]’ (ll. 526–527). Aristarchus interprets the phrase ἐλπόμενος εὔχομαι as ‘I boast, having been given good hope by Zeus and the other gods’ (*Sch. Il.* 8.526a: καυχῶμαι ἐλπιδοποιούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν).⁴⁷ He also rejects Zenodotus’ reading, which inverted the main

45. Cf. Dachs 1913, 10–11; Roemer 1924, 253–254; Bouchard 2016, 258–259.

46. See also *Sch. Il.* 7.293a. Cf. Roemer 1912, 274–275; Lührs 1992, 247–249.

47. This is because for Aristarchus εὔχεσθαι in Homer generally means ‘to boast’, and not ‘to pray’ as in Koine Greek (*Sch. Il.* 19.100a; 21.183b; 21.501b), even if there are exceptions (*Sch. Il.*

verb and the participle, resulting in ‘Praying (εὐχόμενος) to Zeus and the other gods (Διὶ τ’ ἄλλοισιν τε θεοῖσιν), I hope (ἔλπομαι) that . . .’ For Aristarchus, Homer cannot use this pious and god-fearing phrase in relation to Hector at this point in the story, exalted by the recent victories (*Sch. Il.* 8.526a: οὐ κατὰ τὸν Ἑκτορα δὲ τὸν οὕτως ἐπηρμένον λέγει).⁴⁸ Now Hector cannot simply ‘pray and hope’, but rather ‘boasts’ that they will win because the gods have decided so. This interpretation was probably suggested to Aristarchus by what Hector says at the beginning of the attack: at *Il.* 8.173–183, in a very self-confident speech to his soldiers, he claims that Zeus has given him victory and glory (νίκη and κύδος) and destruction to the Greeks (*Il.* 175–176). The boasting at *Il.* 8.526 is thus in line with the boldness of Hector throughout the day⁴⁹ as well as with the overconfidence typical of heroes—a more hesitant Hector, ‘who hopes praying’, would be unfitting, and in fact contrary to his heroic characterization.⁵⁰ The distinction is subtle, but very revealing of the attention Aristarchus paid to the text and its nuances, as well as of how he viewed Hector’s characterization throughout the poem. The same opposition between ἔλπεσθαι and εὔχεσθαι, the latter in the sense of ‘to boast’, comes back again in another scholium against Zenodotus. In *Il.* 14.364–377 Poseidon urges the Greeks to react against Hector, who now ‘says and boasts (εὔχεται) [that he will take the Greek ships], because Achilles remains inactive by the hollow ships, angry in his heart’ (*Il.* 366–367). Zenodotus read ἔλπεται, ‘he is hopeful’,⁵¹ instead of εὔχεται, ‘he boasts’, but Aristarchus again argues that it is fitting for Hector to ‘boast’ and not only to ‘hope’ to defeat the Greeks (*Sch. Il.* 14.366a: ἀρμόζει δὲ τῷ προσώπῳ τὸ ‘εὔχεται’, καυχᾶται). Even if these two examples could simply

5.121; 10.461c); see Chapter 3.3.A § 1.2 and § 2.2; cf. also Lehrs 1882, 146. As the paraphrase makes clear, Aristarchus also believes that the datives Διὶ τ’ ἄλλοισιν τε θεοῖσιν are used instead of ὑπὸ and genitive.

48. See also Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 8.526b. Even if εὔχομαι ἐλπόμενος is the vulgate’s reading, both Allen and West choose Zenodotus’ variant, ἔλπομαι εὐχόμενος.

49. In all of Book 8 Hector is overconfident, almost hubristic. In particular he strongly mocks Diomedes for fleeing at *Il.* 8.161–166 (see discussion above), has two boasting speeches to his soldiers and his horses (*Il.* 8.173–183, 185–197), at the end of which Homer comments (*Il.* 8.198): ‘so he said, boasting (ὥς ἔφατ’ εὐχόμενος)’. Hector’s overconfidence even stirs the anger of Hera (*Il.* 8.198–207). The characterization of Hector as overconfident is carried out throughout the book (e.g., *Il.* 8.337, 348–349, 355–356); this final speech (*Il.* 8.497–541), aside from the line at issue, is entirely in keeping with Hector’s elated spirit of the entire day. In fact, Aristarchus emphasizes Hector’s boastfulness elsewhere in the same speech (*Sch. Il.* 8.535–7; cf. Schironi 2017, 611–614).

50. According to Aristarchus, Hector’s bold threats at *Il.* 8.526 are also referred to by Agamemnon in *Il.* 14.44–48, when, seeing so many of his soldiers wounded and killed by the Trojans, he tells Nestor that Hector’s threat against the Achaeans is coming true (*Sch. Il.* 14.45a).

51. Perhaps, with reference to his reading ἔλπομαι εὐχόμενος in *Il.* 8.526? On these two passages, cf. Wecklein 1919, 106–107; Nickau 1977, 156–157; Kirk 1990, 338; Janko 1994, 206.

be seen as another instance in which Aristarchus looks for self-consistency within the narrative (and the use of the same verb for the same hero), they also reveal how he viewed the most (for us) sympathetic of the Iliadic heroes: for him, Hector qua hero can (and should) boast about his military success, even though this sometimes borders on *hybris* against the gods.

6. Priam

Even Priam has to submit his words to the heroic code in his meeting with Achilles in Book 24, when he refuses to be seated as long as Hector lies with no care (ll. 553–554), saying to the Greek hero (ll. 555–558):

- λύσον ἴν' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἶδω· σὺ δὲ δέξαι ἄποινα
 — πολλά, τὰ τοι φέρομεν· σὺ δὲ τῶνδ' ἀπόναιο, καὶ ἔλθοις
 — σὴν ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν, ἐπεὶ με πρῶτον ἔασας
 [[αὐτόν τε ζῶειν καὶ ὄρᾱν φάος ἡελίοιο]].

- But release him so that I can see him with my eyes. And accept the ransom,
 — worth much, which we bring. May you enjoy it and go back
 — to your fatherland since in the first place you let me
 [[live and see the light of the sun]].

Aristarchus probably did not read the last line, since many manuscripts omit it, and the ancients do not seem to have known it.⁵² He also athetizes lines 556–557 because the good wishes for Achilles are ‘unbefitting’ to Priam and clearly hypocritical (*Sch. Il.* 24.556–7: ἀνάρμοστοι τῷ προσώπῳ αἱ εὐχαὶ καὶ ἐπαιτόφωρος ἢ ὑπόκρισις). Notwithstanding the moving scene and the sharing of feelings between Achilles and Priam, the latter is still a Trojan, and he is in front of the man who has killed so many of his sons—and, above all, his beloved Hector, whose body Achilles disgraced. Priam has come to meet the

52. For example, Herodian in *Sch. Il.* 24.557a quotes the passage without line 558; cf. van der Valk 1963–1964, II 218 and 220–221 (who thinks that the line is authentic but was removed from the text by Aristarchus); Richardson 1993, 335; West, ad loc., who omits it in his text. Without line 558, ἔασας has an absolute meaning: ‘since in the first place you let me be’ (as in *Il.* 21.221). In the *Venetus A* line 558 is marked with what looks like an *antisigma*; the sign is, however, very small and has a triangular shape, so it is probably a later addition and has nothing to do with the more rounded ‘Aristarchean’ *antisigma*; cf. Schironi 2017, 610–611 n. 16.

Greek hero to get his son's corpse back; yet showing so much sympathy for his enemy is too much—at least for Aristarchus, who was probably reading the poem with much less sentimentalism than we do.⁵³

Lastly, in the same episode, after Priam and Achilles have shared their sorrow and Achilles has agreed to give Hector's corpse back, Priam asks to rest (Il. 635–636): 'so that now lulled by sweet sleep we may enjoy it (ταρπώμεθα)'. Aristarchus again does not find such words appropriate to the context and opts for the more serious παυσώμεθα, so that Priam would more fittingly say: 'so that now lulled by sweet sleep we may rest (παυσώμεθα)'. For a father who has lost his best and favorite son, as well as many other sons, there is no joy left—in fact, hoping for enjoyment is utterly inappropriate (Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 24.636a: οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναπαυσώμεθα· ἀπρεπὲς γὰρ τὸ λέγειν τὸν Πρίαμον 'ταρπώμεθα').⁵⁴

7. Andromache

There are very few women in the *Iliad*, and Aristarchus does not seem to have been particularly interested in them. Only Andromache drew his attention, as some of the scholia analyzed in the previous chapters show.⁵⁵ Another interesting note concerns the famous scene in Book 22, when Andromache is waiting for Hector at home:

Sch. Il. 22.440a ἀλλ' ἢ γ' ἰστόν ὕφαινε <μυχῷ δόμου ὑψηλοῖο>: ὅτι ἀσυμπαθὴς ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἐν τοσοῦτῳ θορύβῳ κατ' οἶκον ἀτρεμοῦσα, καὶ ταῦτα τὴν Ἀχιλλέως ἔφοδον οὐκ ἀγνοοῦσα. ἔοικεν οὖν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, προκαταχρησάμενος ὁ ποιητὴς τῷ τῆς Ἀνδρομάχης προσώπῳ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς Ἑκτορα κοινολογίαν (*Il.* 6.394–502) ἀπεσχῆσθαι νῦν τοῦ προσώπου.

'But she was weaving a web in the innermost part of the lofty palace': because Andromache [remains] unaffected in such confusion, at home without fear, and this without being unaware of the attack by Achilles. Therefore, Aristarchus says, the poet, who has before presented the character of Andromache in the dialogue with Hector (*Il.* 6.394–502), now seems to have distanced himself from the character.

53. Not surprisingly, Roemer 1912, 106–108, denied this athetesis to Aristarchus. Cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 396.

54. See also *Sch. Il.* 24.636b¹ (Did.). Cf. Roemer 1912, 355.

55. *Sch. Il.* 6.433–9 (see Chapter 3.6.A § 4) and *Sch. Il.* 22.468a (see Chapter 3.6.C § 4).

In Book 22 Homer portrays Andromache at home completely unaware of her husband's death in the plain (ll. 437–446), until she hears the cries and wailing from the towers and rushes there, eventually discovering the tragic truth (ll. 447–465). For modern readers, this is a compelling example of the craftsmanship of Homer, who contrasts the quietness of Andromache at home preparing a hot bath for Hector to the devastating reality of war, which she will soon discover. Yet this scene is not equally appreciated by Aristarchus, who feels that Andromache is shown to be detached from the action and not worried about Hector's welfare. Her quiet attitude right at the moment when her husband is facing Achilles is unjustified, for Aristarchus, because she could suspect what is happening outside the walls of Troy. Indeed, at the beginning of Book 22, Priam and Hecuba tried to convince Hector to come inside and were crying from the tower (ll. 25–91). Aristarchus probably thought that, if Andromache could hear the cries of despair now that Hector has died (l. 447), she must have also heard the cries of Priam and Hecuba earlier, when they were beseeching their son to come inside the gates. In other words, he objects to this scene because, in his view, Andromache is devoted to her family, yet seems unperturbed by Hector's current situation—an attitude which is also inconsistent with the sympathetic words that she addressed to her husband when they met in Book 6 (ll. 407–439);⁵⁶ he thus concludes that Homer seems to have distanced himself from the character in Book 22.⁵⁷ Although this analysis may not convince us, Aristarchus' remark interestingly suggests that he was attentive to the relationship between an author and his characters. Perhaps his comments may even hide some dissatisfaction concerning how Homer portrayed Andromache in Book 22.⁵⁸ Yet Aristarchus does not athetize these lines, true to his usual 'indulgent' attitude toward Homeric 'mistakes'. He might have liked another Andromache here, but his personal feelings about her characterization were not a sufficient reason for suspecting those lines.⁵⁹

56. In fact, Aristarchus athetized *Il.* 6.433–439 in Andromache's speech since she gives military advice to Hector in these lines (*Sch. Il.* 6.433–9; see Chapter 3.6.A § 4)—yet the rest of her speech is still very sympathetic and shows much worry for her husband and their family.

57. *Sch. D Il.* 22.447 tries to explain Andromache's odd behavior, which was an object of dispute (a *zetema*): she keeps her composure and stays home because Hector's reproach in Book 6 has made her behave with much more control (σωφρονεῖν)! The anonymous scholiasts of *Sch. Il.* 22.442–5 (ex.) and 22.448a (ex.), on the other hand, do appreciate the pathos of the scene. Cf. Bachmann 1902–1904, I 20 and 37–38; Griesinger 1907, 64; Roemer 1912, 393–398; Roemer 1924, 214–216; van der Valk 1963–1964, II 230–231 (with a different, unlikely reading of the scholium); Richardson 1993, 154–155.

58. Indeed Aristarchus is also not happy about the following scene, when Andromache has reached the wall and sees her husband dragged away by Achilles across the plain (*Sch. Il.* 22.468a, discussed in Chapter 3.6.C § 4).

59. On Aristarchus' 'respectful' attitude toward Homeric lines which he did not necessarily like, see Chapter 3.6.C § 6.

8. Conclusions

This survey has shown another interesting aspect of Aristarchus' analysis of Homeric characters. For him, Hector, Achilles, Ajax, and Agamemnon were all heroes and, as heroes, had a code of behavior which did not admit of any deviation; Odysseus was different, as he was additionally characterized by deceitfulness. In particular, and interestingly for us, in Aristarchus' opinion Achilles and Agamemnon were very similar; both of them were 'heroes' and they both followed the same code of behavior: hard, excessive, but never petty. While this is acceptable for Achilles, modern readers might find it more difficult to adopt such views for the greedy and unjust Agamemnon. Yet, since Aristarchus seems to have completely embraced the shame-culture ethos as a staple of Iliadic society, he did not find anything wrong with Agamemnon's behavior. He even accepted Achilles' shaming of Hector's body, which for modern readers is one of more problematic points of the poem.

The rules of the heroic code applied, according to Aristarchus, even to characters that are now seen as the most human and tender ones in the *Iliad*: Andromache and Priam. The latter is usually seen today not as a typical Homeric hero, but as a *pater dolorosus*, far from questions of honor and shame. Similarly, the description of Andromache's daily life in the palace while she prepares a warm bath for her husband exactly at the moment when Hector is brutally killed by Achilles is praised as one of the most touching moments of Homeric poetry, in that it is able to depict peace and war together in a dramatic contrast. Aristarchus does not seem to have noticed such psychological nuances, however. For him, Andromache and Priam were part of the same world as Achilles and Hector, and therefore they were expected to follow the same parameters: to abide by the honor-shame code, to be sympathetic to their own *philoï*, and to avoid any behavior which appeared weak or more in line with 'normal', 'everyday' life. Aristarchus thus seems to have sought heroic consistency in all the characters of the poem—and he judged all the heroes, from Achilles to Agamemnon, from Ajax to Priam, according to this parameter (with the exception of Thersites).⁶⁰ The Aristotelian lesson was followed even in this case, then, without much interest in emphasizing the psychological depth or humanity of these larger-than-life heroes.

We might raise doubts about Aristarchus' indifference to the most attractive, touching elements of Homeric poetry. Yet his view can perhaps also offer a healthy counterbalance to the anachronistic, morality-imbued excesses that modern critics have sometimes engaged in when reading Homer and other Greek texts. At the very least, Aristarchus' opinion of what was proper for those

60. See Chapter 3.6.A § 5.

epic characters may give us a glimpse into how Hellenistic readers approached Homer's poetry, and what they enjoyed in it, even if it is very different from our literary tastes.

In fact, there is a note among the Aristonicus scholia which seems to betray nostalgia on the part of Aristarchus for the good old days when heroes were heroes—and heroines were heroines, too. This comment occurs when for several reasons Aristarchus athetizes the lines in Book 20 in which Aeneas tells Achilles that they should not insult each other like women in a street. Aristarchus observes that the words are unworthy of these characters; rather, this is typical of barbarians, who are used to women abusing each other in the streets—'just like the Egyptians' (*Sch. Il.* 20.251–5a¹: καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀνάξια τῶν προσώπων· καὶ παρὰ βαρβάροις δέ ἐστι τὸ τὰς γυναῖκας προερχομένας λοιδορεῖσθαι ὡς παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις). We cannot but wonder whether this short, nasty comment about the Egyptians was inspired by Aristarchus' own experiences in the streets of Alexandria.⁶¹ Whether or not this was the case, he seems to have considered the Homeric heroes (both Greeks and Trojans, as is clear from this specific passage, where Aeneas is speaking) much better than his contemporaries—just as Homer was the best poet ever.

61. On this athetesis, see Lührs 1992, 117–120, who suggests that these lines were superfluous (περισσοί) for Aristarchus and that he thought that an interpolator inserted them 'inspired' by 'modern' barbarians, that is, the Egyptians, whose women were accustomed to abuse each other in the streets; cf. also van der Valk 1963–1964, II 140 and 397. A more complicated (and less convincing) explanation of the note is given by Bolling 1944, 169.

Part 6

Conclusions

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10. Aristarchus' Legacy

This study has had two main goals: on the one hand, to present and discuss a fairly rich collection of fragments from Aristarchus' *hypomnema* on the *Iliad*; on the other, to use these examples to map the details, principles, and attitudes of Aristarchus' approach to Homer. This final chapter will be dedicated to reassessing the conclusions reached in the previous chapters in order to place Aristarchus' work not only in the milieu of the Alexandrian Library, but also in a larger context. The following discussion will thus have a broader focus: to investigate whether and how Aristarchus' mind-set was related to the intellec-

tual environment of his time, vis-à-vis at least two very strong cultural influences: the Aristotelian approach to knowledge and the ‘scientific revolution’ which took place in the Hellenistic world and, in particular, at Alexandria.

1. Aristarchus in Context

Aristarchus was certainly not the first *grammatikos*, i.e., philologist, to address the Homeric poems, since by the time he appeared on the cultural stage of Alexandria a considerable amount of work on these texts had already been done by several other famous scholars: Antimachus,¹ Zenodotus,² Apollonius Rhodius,³ and Aristophanes,⁴ to name just a few. Nonetheless, the great fame that Aristarchus enjoyed in life and, above all, long after his death obscured the work of the other grammarians before and also after his time. Even though none of his editions, commentaries, or monographs has survived by direct tradition, it was indeed Aristarchus’ fame that has allowed for many fragments of his work to survive in excerpted form and be copied in later commentaries, scholia, and lexica for several centuries. This fame, which earned him the nickname of ὁ γραμματικώτατος, ‘the ultimate grammarian,’ was mostly due, I argue, to the method that he developed and applied to his studies—an approach that to a large extent gave a shape to an entire discipline.

Indeed, Aristarchus’ philology seems to have been fairly different from that of his contemporaries. This difference did not lie so much in the specific tools that he used. As seen in Chapter 4, dedicated to analyzing his work side by side with that of his colleagues, as well as in other chapters where his opinions have been compared to those of other grammarians, he employed many of the tools already available to his predecessors Zenodotus and Aristophanes, as well as to Crates and other scholars. Paraphrases, etymology, analogical proportions, and other (more or less sophisticated) concepts to discuss linguistic phenomena had been used long before Aristarchus. Scholars before him had already availed themselves of some ‘critical’ concepts in analyzing poetry, such as tropes and figures, and were aware of specific narrative techniques employed by poets.⁵ Similarly, previous editors of Homer, for example Zenodotus or Aristophanes,

1. On Antimachus’ Homeric scholarship, see Matthews 1996, 46–51; West 2001, 52–54.

2. On Zenodotus’ Homeric scholarship, see Duenzter 1848; Pusch 1890; Nickau 1977; West 2001, 33–45.

3. On Apollonius’ Homeric scholarship, see Rengakos 1994; Rengakos 2001.

4. On Aristophanes’ scholarship, see Slater 1982; Blank and Dyck 1984; Slater 1986; West 2001, 59–60.

5. Aristotle, for example, anticipated some of the critical concepts utilized by Aristarchus in his exegesis; see, e.g., Chapter 3.2.A § 3 and § 4 (Aristotle on metaphors and similes); Chapter 3.6.C § 2.5 (Aristotle and direct addresses to audience/characters) and § 3.5 (Aristotle and time-handling in poetry).

all had employed athetesis and had chosen among variants to edit and improve the text, furnishing it with critical signs. As far as we can tell, what most differentiates Aristarchus' activity from that of those around him—both before and often even after his time—was the systematic attitude of his approach, namely, his ability to develop a rigorous methodology for textual analysis and (perhaps just as important) the precision he displayed in following it. In this regard, it must be recognized that one of the reasons why we can appreciate the novelty of Aristarchus' method over his predecessors is that his work is by far the best preserved among the Alexandrian grammarians. In a sense, then, the available sources bias our judgment in his favor. Yet the fact that his fragments have been preserved in such a large quantity compared with those of other grammarians does suggest that he was indeed better than the others—or, at least, that he was perceived as such by the successive generations of scholars who had to decide what to preserve. In any case, even if Aristarchus is favored over other scholars due to the number of fragments of his work available to us, and even if he used the same tools as his predecessors and contemporaries, his fragments do show a remarkable attention to detail and a methodological consistency that are sometimes lacking in the other scholars—at least on the basis of the evidence we have.

The cultural environment in which Aristarchus was immersed must not be neglected in assessing the true significance of his work. I am not only talking of the Alexandrian Library, with its vast collection of books from every kind of discipline. More importantly, by the time Aristarchus took up his post as the director of the Library in around 185–175 BCE, Alexandria was the greatest center of learning and erudition in the ancient world, where scholars of all kinds were working at the forefront of knowledge in their respective disciplines.⁶ In such an intellectually rich environment, he seems to have found ideas and inspiration for his own work from fields that might at first sight seem far removed from Homeric textual analysis. The cultural landscape of Alexandria is thus fundamental to appreciating the real value of Aristarchus' work, as well as to understanding how he crafted his own methodology.

2. Aristarchus' Assumptions

While the various chapters of this book—each on a specific topic—have surveyed, explained, and analyzed Aristarchus' scholarship in detail, now the focus will be on giving a broad overview of his methodology, its main characteristics

6. For an overview of Hellenistic Alexandria, also from a cultural point of view, Fraser 1972 is still the standard study.

and principles, and then placing those elements within the cultural and intellectual context from which, in my view, they emerged.

In order to carry out his scholarly work on Homer, Aristarchus in the first place had to make some assumptions about the very nature of the Homeric poems. Even though these assumptions are never fully spelled out in the available evidence (because Aristarchus' fragments do not derive from a theoretical work), they clearly emerge from the analysis of his comments or textual choices. In particular, he seems to have adopted three different yet closely connected assumptions, by which he abided without exception throughout his philological work: (1) Homer was a flawless poet; (2) Homer was internally self-consistent; and (3) Homer was the sole author of the *Iliad* and of the *Odyssey*. These were all assumptions, because they could not be 'proved', either because they were based on subjective judgments (especially for no. 1) and/or because there were not hard, external data to substantiate them beyond doubt (especially for no. 3). Even so, they were reasonable hypotheses for a scholar to adopt. In fact, for Aristarchus they were absolutely necessary premises for any serious philological and exegetical work on Homer.

2.1. Assumption 1: Homer Was a Flawless Poet

In his fragments Aristarchus never explicitly says that Homer is the best poet ever. Yet this was certainly a tacit premise of his entire work. In making this assumption,⁷ he was following the Aristotelian doctrine closely. For Aristotle, Homer was the greatest poet, who had been able not only to write the best epic poems, but also to become the model for the successive genres of tragedy (with the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*) and comedy (with the *Margites*). His plots were written according to probability and were remarkable for narrative consistency and appropriateness of characters and ideas.⁸ Aristarchus perceived the same qualities in Homeric poetry, as is demonstrated by his criticism—and often rejection—of lines that in his view did not comply with the Aristotelian principles of good poetry. In fact, a major consequence of Aristarchus' assumption of Homer's greatness was that if there was a flaw in the poem, it had to be discussed and corrected or otherwise eliminated, because Homer was incapable of such mistakes.

2.2. Assumption 2: Homer Was Internally Self-Consistent

Homer was not only an excellent poet; more than that, he was very precise and never contradicted himself in his work. This is probably the most important

7. In passing, Meijering 1987, 176, also calls it an 'assumption' of Aristarchus.

8. See Chapter 3.6.A.

assumption in the whole of Aristarchus' philological work. Only by assuming that the Homeric poems had internal, self-consistent, rational norms and conventions could the grammarian really make a serious attempt at understanding, explaining, and correcting the text. Since Homer was internally consistent, a questionable word, phrase, or episode could be explained or rejected using the Homeric text itself as evidence. This fundamental assumption, in other words, allowed Aristarchus to 'clarify Homer from Homer' (Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὀμήρου σαφηνίζειν). In fact, even though this specific phrase was not laid out by Aristarchus himself, but is a later coinage by Porphyry,⁹ it aptly describes Aristarchus' approach to Homer, as the previous survey has consistently showed.

2.3. Assumption 3: Homer Was the Sole Author of Both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*

Aristarchus' third and last assumption was that Homer was the sole author of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. This was clearly an assumption because this statement could not be proved, notwithstanding the undeniable similarities between the two poems. Yet for him it was extremely important to conceive of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as written by the same author. At the very least, the principle of 'clarifying Homer from Homer' benefited from this assumption, as two poems could be considered rather than just one, giving Aristarchus far more evidence with which to work. In fact, if the two poems were written by the same author who was moreover internally consistent, it was reasonable to assume that they described the same world and used the same linguistic, stylistic, and mythical framework. The consequence of assumptions 2 and 3 together was that Aristarchus could use a passage or a word from the *Odyssey* to explain a passage or a word in the *Iliad*, and vice versa. The combination of these two assumptions also meant that whenever he found some statement, sentence, or feature in one poem that seemed to contradict the other poem, he needed to remove the inconsistency either by athetizing one of the two passages, or by otherwise 'fixing' the apparent inconsistency in one of the two poems.

9. Porph. *QHI*, 56.3–6 Sodano: ἀξιῶν δὲ ἐγὼ Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὀμήρου σαφηνίζειν αὐτὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἑαυτὸν ὑπεδείκνυον, ποτὲ μὲν παρακειμένως, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐν ἄλλοις [considering it right to clarify Homer from Homer, I have shown that Homer interprets himself sometimes in passages which are nearby, sometimes in other [more remote] passages]. In his prefatory letter to Anatolius, Porphyry also comes back to the idea that Homer is his own exegete (Porph. *QH I*, 1.9–14 Sodano): πολλάκις μὲν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους συνουσίαις Ὀμηρικῶν ζητημάτων γινομένων, Ἀνατόλιε, κάμοῦ δεικνύναι πειρωμένου, ὥς αὐτὸς μὲν ἑαυτὸν τὰ πολλὰ Ὅμηρος ἐξηγεῖται . . . [since Homeric problems have often come up in our conversations, Anatolius, and since I tried to demonstrate that Homer explains himself for the most part . . .]. I would like to thank Matteo Milesi for bringing this passage to my attention. On the maxim 'clarifying Homer from Homer', see Pfeiffer 1968, 226–227; Wilson 1971; Lee 1975; Wilson 1976; Schaublin 1977; on this principle within Aristarchus' work, see Porter 1992, 70–84, and Nünlist 2015.

3. Aristarchus' Methodological Rules

These assumptions were a necessary premise to work on Homer. Yet they were not enough. Aristarchus needed to outline some methodological rules to follow in his daily activity. As mentioned above, we must not think of him as a pioneer discovering an entirely new field, since many other scholars before him had already worked extensively on editions of Homer—and Aristarchus was deeply aware of them. Moreover, Aristotle had developed some fundamental theories on poetry, which had a decisive influence on Aristarchus. The great difference between the two, on the other hand, is that whereas Aristotle was interested in understanding how poetry was made and by which types of people, why it was appealing, and what the characteristics that made it more successful were, Aristarchus was not interested in any such 'theoretical' speculation. For example, in the preserved fragments to the *Iliad* he very rarely comments on the literary quality of Homer. As seen above, Homer's excellence was a given, an assumption: he was the best poet by default, and this fact did not require any justification. A literary discussion of Homeric poetry also does not seem to have been Aristarchus' focus. Rather, his goal was to prepare a good edition of and a good commentary on Homer. In this sense, Aristarchus' work was extremely practical and result-driven: he borrowed Aristotle's ideas and put them systematically into practice. In order to do that, though, he also had to develop a few methodological rules of his own that could guide him in his sometimes very difficult analysis. These rules are all more or less derived from the Aristotelian idea that poetry—in fact even each author and each genre—is a universe per se, each with its own proper conventions, which a scholar must know in order to say anything meaningful about them. In practice, this theoretical background can be translated into the principle of 'clarifying Homer from Homer' ('Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν'), which has come up so often in the pages of this study. Yet we can now try to define more specifically what this principle really meant in terms of 'practical rules'.

The main 'rules' of Aristarchus' methodology when working on Homer can be summarized as follows: (1) to read the text attentively; (2) to make use of contextual information; (3) to have a full knowledge of the Homeric poems; and (4) to consider the Homeric poems as a self-sufficient microcosm with their specific characteristics. As is clear, all these 'rules' were strictly connected and in a way one followed from another; yet they all had some specific characteristic and served a distinct goal in Aristarchus' philological work.

3.1. Rule 1: To Read the Text Attentively

A fundamental rule constantly present in Aristarchus' work was the idea that slow and attentive reading was the fundamental first step toward any good phil-

ological and exegetical work. Indeed, if philology is ‘the art of reading slowly’,¹⁰ Aristarchus was certainly a master philologist. For him, slow and attentive reading was, in fact, key for producing high-quality philological analysis, for at least two reasons. First, attentive reading was fundamental to ‘mapping out’ the Homeric usage in all its forms (language, narrative techniques, characterization, mythological background, etc.). Second, passages that seemed at first sight difficult or even inconsistent often could be found—if read with attention—not to be problematic. Aristarchus applied this rule with particular zeal against Zenodotus, who in his view was a sloppy reader and, hence, a sloppy scholar.¹¹ In many cases, passages that had created problems for Zenodotus to the point that he changed or rejected them¹² were shown to be unproblematic and in fact correct, once a careful and in-depth reading was performed. This methodological principle was thus also an invitation to caution: before changing the text or athetizing, the scholar needed to read the transmitted text slowly and with great attention.¹³

3.2. Rule 2: To Make Use of Contextual Information

The attentive reader, however, should not simply ‘slowly’ read the text but also scrutinize its context. A methodological rule that Aristarchus constantly used in his work was indeed to relate particular words, sentences, or episodes to the context in which they were found. This was important because words and details that *prima facie* might have seemed odd or even incorrect could then be justified within that specific context. By considering the ‘poetic setting’, so to speak, of each debated word or passage, Aristarchus could show that peculiar features, which would have been considered out of place under normal circumstances, were correct within the situation in which they occurred or for an individual character acting or speaking with some context-related specific goal. This operation allowed Aristarchus to avoid unnecessary emendations or rejections of lines which might have sounded unfitting at first sight.¹⁴ In addition, in countless cases contextual information provided vital clues as to the real meaning of a word, about the right interpretation of an episode or a myth, or about the right reading. This second rule, thus, was crucial both to respecting the text and to explaining it—so the rule served both the editing process and the exegesis.

10. As famously claimed by Nietzsche in the Preface of *Daybreak*, § 5: “It is not for nothing that I have been a philologist, perhaps I am a philologist still, that is to say, a teacher of slow reading” (Nietzsche 1881/1982, 5).

11. See Chapter 4 § 1.4.

12. At least, this is how Aristarchus interpreted the discrepancies in Zenodotus’ text compared to his own; see Chapter 4 § 1.6 and § 1.7.

13. On Aristarchus’ respectful attitude toward the text, see also Chapter 3.6.C § 5 and § 6.

14. See, e.g., Chapter 3.3.A § 4.1; Chapter 3.6.C, *passim*; Chapter 5.4, *passim*.

3.3. Rule 3: To Have a Full Knowledge of the Homeric Poems

The third rule was the application of rules 1 and 2 to the full extent of the evidence, that is, in this case, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* taken together. According to this rule, one had to approach a literary work in its entirety, and not focus on a particular detail in isolation. In other words, the philologist had to start from the details, reading the text attentively and using contextual information (rules 1 and 2); yet when explaining and discussing a specific passage, he should not limit himself to that scene but also keep in mind the entire ‘literary universe’ he was working on (rule 3). Only by zooming out over the entire production of that specific author could the scholar have a complete overview of the evidence at his disposal and so be better equipped to explain and, if necessary, correct any passage at issue. In his analysis, then, Aristarchus made full use of both Homeric poems, by cross-referencing words, grammatical constructions, episodes, and myths.¹⁵ By employing this practice he showed an intimate knowledge of the work he was analyzing (i.e., the *Iliad*) and of other works by the same author (i.e., the *Odyssey*), as well as an excellent memory.

Aristarchus’ application of this methodological principle can be well illustrated by the cases where he cited a number of different places in the poems where a difficult word occurred in order to justify his own interpretation of it. Considering the whole corpus in order to decide about the meaning of a word or expression also became of paramount importance when he had to argue against other scholars. This is the origin, for example, of Aristarchus’ relentless criticism against the Glossographers, whom he accused of considering only single examples in their linguistic analysis, without bothering to find other passages in the Homeric poems where the same word or other, similar words were used. Since they ignored critical evidence, according to Aristarchus, their analysis and conclusions could not but be incorrect.¹⁶

3.4. Rule 4: To Consider the Homeric Poems as a Self-Sufficient Microcosm

The principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’ could be rephrased as meaning that the first and most secure evidence for solving problems in Homer was in fact Homer himself. This tenet depended on the assumption of Homer’s self-consistency. Yet this fourth rule went beyond it, as Aristarchus seems to have seen Homer’s work as a universe per se, with proper conventions and usages which had to be respected. As already observed, this is an Aristotelian idea, which Aristarchus applied consistently, for example when dealing with the

15. See Chapter 5.2 § 3.

16. See Chapter 3.3.A § 3.

many issues raised by the Homeric idiolect. While reading Homer, any Greek speaker from the classical period onward would have felt that his words and syntactic constructions sounded strange or even wrong. However, Aristarchus recognized that the language of Homer, while not in line with Koine Greek, was still a coherent and self-consistent language—simply put, it was different from current Greek, but not incorrect because of this difference.¹⁷ This attitude allowed him to retain many features in the original text that might have sounded uncommon, strange, or even wrong to the ear of a Koine speaker. The reason was that, for Aristarchus, Homer lived much earlier than his own time, namely, during the Ionic colonization; in addition, he was originally from Athens and might have moved to Ionia at a certain point in his life.¹⁸ In this way, then, Aristarchus could legitimately explain why Homer's language was so different from his own, and at the same time he could save the transmitted text of Homer, against all possible (at least, in Aristarchus' view) attempts to 'normalize' and adapt it to Koine Greek or to any other language.

As another consequence of this fourth rule, parallels with later poets were less reliable, exactly because they did not belong to the same microcosm. According to Aristarchus, the so-called Neoteroi (the poets that came after Homer) often used Homeric words incorrectly or recast Homeric myths in their own works improperly, as they sometimes misunderstood the Homeric model—either because Homer's language was different from theirs, or because the text of Homer was so rich in interpretative problems at many levels.¹⁹ For this reason, the use of other poets to explain or, worse, to correct Homer was to be avoided. Even so, it was not always possible to find a parallel in Homer. In these cases, then, when no other clues about the meaning of a word or a myth in Homer were available, Aristarchus had to resort to looking at other poets roughly contemporary with or later than Homer. Because of the similarities in date, genre, and mythical background, Aristarchus considered Hesiod the poet closest to Homer, so that the scholar often used the former to explain difficult words or passages in the latter.

4. Aristarchus' Assumptions and Rules at Work

When we read Aristarchus' fragments preserved in the scholia to the *Iliad*, one point becomes immediately apparent: his absolutely consistent, even inflexible, approach to interpreting the text. In other words, one aspect of his work that

17. See Chapter 3.2.B, Chapter 3.3.A § 2, and Chapter 5.1.

18. See Chapter 5.1 § 4.

19. See Chapter 5.3.

clearly emerges from the Aristonicus scholia is that once Aristarchus identified a specific Homeric usage (in vocabulary, syntax, style, or mythology), he would *always* recall it every time the same circumstances occurred and would explain or, if necessary, adapt the text according to that usage. In fact, even when he seems to have been flexible, for example in accepting Homeric mistakes (καταχρήσεις) of various types, or to have applied a double standard, his choices had indeed been determined by other, more important goals, such as defending the ideas that Homer was a great poet²⁰ or that he wrote both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, against scholars who disagreed.²¹

This behavior can now be understood in the light of assumptions versus rules. Aristarchus' decisions about the meaning of a word, a specific syntactic or stylistic use in Homer, his interpretation of a myth or a societal custom in the poems all came from following his methodological rules, for example the attentive reading of Homer and the use of contextual information. These rules allowed him to know the Homeric usage (τὸ Ὀμηρικόν) at all levels. Yet there was something that was more crucial to him than the definition of the 'typically Homeric'—the respect for his three assumptions about Homer, namely, Homer's greatness as a poet, his self-consistency, and his authorship of both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Those assumptions could never be contradicted, because otherwise Aristarchus' own activity would have lost its entire 'scientific' basis. Hence, when he came across to a passage which contradicted a Homeric usage found through internal evidence and following the four rules, if he could not otherwise explain or emend the text, Aristarchus became more flexible and accepted 'exceptions to the rules' in order to save his own assumptions. No doubt, this is circular reasoning, as we have observed many times in the previous chapters. However, by looking at Aristarchus' method in terms of assumptions versus rules, we can understand it better—and perhaps even justify it.

5. Aristarchus and Aristotle

A leitmotif of the present study has been the Aristotelian imprint on much of Aristarchus' criticism and of Alexandrian scholarship in general. At a very fundamental level, the main impact Aristotle had on the Alexandrians was by teaching them to organize sets of data by amassing and then cataloging a vast amount of knowledge. This was the idea behind the Library and the Muse-

20. See Chapter 3.3.A § 2.11 and Chapter 3.6.C § 1.1 (both on καταχρήσεις).

21. See Chapter 3.2.A § 18 and Chapter 5.2 § 2.3 (both on double standards).

um at Alexandria,²² which, unsurprisingly, were developed also with the help of Demetrius of Phalerum, a pupil of Theophrastus.²³ Aristotle's influence on the scholars working in the Library might also have been fostered by the presence of Aristotle's works there. It is still debated whether or not Aristotle's personal library was acquired by the Ptolemies and included in the Alexandrian Library,²⁴ but the Alexandrians seem to have known some of the Aristotelian works on poetry, perhaps the dialogue *On Poets* and the *Homeric Problems*.²⁵ Beyond Aristotle and Demetrius of Phalerum, the Alexandrian grammarians might have also been influenced by later Peripatetic critics who worked on literary topics and whose approach—the systematic study of authors, works, and genres—were very much in line with the work carried on at Alexandria.²⁶

Chapter 3.6.A has shown that many of the criteria which Aristarchus adopted for commenting on Homer were fundamentally Peripatetic; in fact, his exegetical comments and his arguments for *atheteseis* as transmitted in the scholia often overlap strikingly, almost verbatim, with Aristotle's principles in the *Poetics* and in the *Rhetoric*. For both Aristotle and Aristarchus the content of poetry did not need to be 'real' but rather 'plausible' and 'appropriate' in terms of narrated events, characterization, and ideas expressed by characters as well as by the authors themselves. This was a general criterion and operated at many levels of Aristarchus' activity, differentiating him from contemporary scholars.²⁷ The Alexandrian scholar also held several other principles and ideas in common with Aristotle. Both of them distinguished between Homer and the cyclic or neoteric poets, and both considered Homer as *the* model for epic

22. For example, when Strabo says that Aristotle was the first collector of books and the one who taught the kings of Egypt how to put together a library (Strabo 13.1.54: ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης . . . πρῶτος, ὃν ἴσμεν, συναγαγὼν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν), he probably refers to the Peripatetic influence on the Library of Alexandria. On the 'art' of data accumulation at Alexandria, see Jacob 1998b.

23. The *Letter of Aristeas* describes Demetrius of Phalerum as being 'in charge of the Royal Library' (§ 9: κατασταθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως βιβλιοθήκης) and depicts him as working under Ptolemy II Philadelphus (§§ 35, 41, 180). The latter information is certainly wrong, since Ptolemy II (king in 282–246 BCE) was hostile to Demetrius (Diog. Laert. 5.78–79); rather, Demetrius (ca. 360–280 BCE) worked under Ptolemy I Soter (king in 306–282 BCE), who was the founder of the Library and the Museum (Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* 5.8.11).

24. As Athen. 1.3b says, when claiming that Ptolemy Philadelphus purchased the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus from Neleus and brought them to Alexandria together with those purchased at Athens and Rhodes. On the destiny of Aristotle's library, see Moraux 1973, 3–31; Canfora 1988, 34–37, 59–66; Richardson 1994, 9–13; Nagy 1998, 198–206; Barnes 1997; Canfora 2002.

25. See Richardson 1993, 35–36; cf. also Nickau 1977, 138–139, with n. 16; Lührs 1992, 14–15. See also Chapter 3.6.A § 1 and § 2.

26. For a survey of Peripatetic scholarship, see Podlecki 1969. The Aristotelian elements in Alexandrian scholarship are discussed by Richardson 1994 and Bouchard 2016, as well as by the studies quoted in Chapter 3.6.A, footnote 5.

27. See below, § 6.

poetry.²⁸ They also agreed on the selection of top priorities for being a good poet. They singled out plot (μῦθος) as the core of a poem, and, on a stylistic level, *glossai* as typical of poetic language, however also emphasizing the need in poetic language for words used according to the standard meaning (κυρίως) in order to achieve clarity.²⁹ Both of them highlighted metaphors and similes as a means to enhance the epic style.³⁰ Aristarchus also agreed with Aristotle in considering epic poetry capable of describing multiple, simultaneous events (unlike, for example, tragedy).³¹ Even in his lack of antiquarian and geographic interests when commenting on Homer, Aristarchus seems to have been a pupil of Aristotle.³² In fact, this limitation can now be seen as arising from one rule that he set for himself and which was derived from Aristotle: rule 4, which prescribed that one should look at a work of poetry as a self-standing microcosm, almost ‘boxed’ in itself, with no relationship with the world outside. What was seen as a limitation in Aristarchus’ exegesis, then, could now also be regarded as the coherent application of an Aristotelian idea: poetry is not history—in fact, it has very little to do with history. Hence a Homeric scholar should not turn into a historian or a geographer, as this would mean going ‘beyond Homer’, violating rule 4.

6. Aristarchus and Crates, *Grammatikoi* and *Kritikoi*

The close connection between Aristotle and Aristarchus becomes even more meaningful when we compare the latter (and to a lesser extent the other *grammatikoi* at Alexandria) with other scholars working in other parts of the Hellenistic world.³³ In his focused concern with textual evidence, Aristarchus was very different, for example, from Crates of Mallos, who—while using the same philological tools, like etymology and linguistic and (con)textual analysis—called himself a *kritikos*, because he wanted to go ‘beyond’ the text and read the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* into a broader intellectual program.³⁴

28. See Chapter 5.3 § 6 and § 7.

29. See Chapter 3.3.A, introduction, § 1 (*glossai*), and § 2.3 (standard meaning vs. peculiar meaning); Chapter 3.6.A § 3 (plot/μῦθος) and § 6 (diction/λέξις).

30. See Chapter 3.2.A § 3 and § 4.

31. See Chapter 3.6.C § 3.5.

32. See Chapter 3.3.B § 7.

33. I would like to thank Maria Broggiato and Richard Janko for discussing this question with me.

34. Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* I § 79: . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε διαφέρειν τὸν κριτικὸν τοῦ γραμματικοῦ, καὶ τὸν μὲν κριτικὸν πάσης, φησί, δεῖ λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔμπειρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ἀπλῶς γλωσσῶν ἐξηγητικὸν καὶ προσωδίας ἀποδοτικὸν καὶ τῶν τούτοις

Indeed, Aristarchus and Crates seem to have approached the text at a theoretical level in a very different way. While Aristarchus considered poetry a universe per se, with conventions of its own, Crates tended to go beyond the poetic fantasy to find objective truths in the Homeric poems. In other words, Aristarchus followed Aristotle in regarding the poetic world as a fictional one with no contact with the ‘real’ world,³⁵ whereas Crates willingly took the Homeric poems ‘beyond’ their fictional status. For him these literary works reflected the nonfictional world because Homer, being the wisest of all poets, knew everything. In particular, in his vast learning (πολυμάθεια),³⁶ Homer already knew that the cosmos was spherical and that at its center lay the earth, which was also spherical, and he expressed these cosmological truths in his poetry. This is what has been known as the doctrine of *sphairopoia* (σφαιροποιία), a term that Philodemus and Geminus use to define Crates’ doctrine.³⁷ Crates also availed himself of *allegoresis* to make Homer’s poems consistent with this ‘spherical’ view of the universe.³⁸ He also interpreted certain Homeric gods as symbols of physical elements—identifying Apollo with the sun,³⁹ for example, and perhaps Zeus with some other natural phenomenon.⁴⁰ As Peter Struck has put it,⁴¹ the difference lies between two opposed views of the nature of poetry: while Aristarchus, following Aristotle, considered it a virtue of poetry to be ‘clear’ (the ‘poetics of clarity’, as defined by Struck), for Crates and the other allegorists poetry was beautiful and engaging exactly because of its obscurity and αἰνίγματα, ‘riddles’ (the ‘poetics of the riddle’, in Struck’s terminology). This divide between Crates and Aristarchus thus also reconfirms the fundamentally Aristotelian approach in the scholarship of the latter.

παραπλησιῶν εἰδήμονα· παρὸ καὶ εἰκέναι ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀρχιτέκτονι τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ὑπηρετῇ [for he [i.e., Crates] also said that the critic was different from the grammarian; the critic—he says—must be an expert in the entire logical science, while the grammarian must simply be an interpreter of *glossai*, an establisher of prosody, and someone with knowledge of matters related to these. Therefore, [he said] that the former is like a master craftsman and the grammarian is like his servant]. See discussion in Chapter 3.0.

35. See Chapter 3.3.B § 7 and Chapter 3.6.A § 3.

36. On Crates’ view of Homeric πολυμάθεια, see Broggiato 2001, lv–lix. On Homer as source of all knowledge in antiquity, see Hillgruber 1994–1999, I 5–35.

37. See Philodemus, *On Poems* 2 col. 53 (I owe this reference to Richard Janko, who is preparing the new edition of Philodemus’ *On Poems*, Book 2); cf. Broggiato 2001, 257–259 (fr. 99). See also Gem. 16.21–28, on which cf. Broggiato 2001, 200–203 (fr. 37). Geminus alternatively calls Crates’ doctrine σφαιρικὸς λόγος in Gem. 6.10–12, on which cf. Broggiato 2001, 217–218 (fr. 50).

38. On Crates’ use of *allegoresis*, see Wehrli 1928, 40–52; Pfeiffer 1968, 237–238; Broggiato 2001, lx–lxiii (with an overview of past scholarship). Mette 1936 specifically discusses Crates’ *allegoresis* within the *sphairopoia* doctrine.

39. See Broggiato 2001, 188–189 (fr. 26), and Chapter 3.4 § 7 with footnote 122.

40. The fragment (fr. 131 Broggiato) is difficult to interpret because the sources offer conflicting evidence; see discussion in Broggiato 2001, 278–282 (fr. 131).

41. Struck 2004, 23–24, 63–68, 69–71.

Aristarchus was also very different from other Hellenistic *kritikoi*, whose main concern was the τέχνη ποιητική, exactly because he was not interested in elaborating a general theory of poetics; he simply *applied* theoretical principles (especially those elaborated by Aristotle) in order to comment on Homer. One popular theory of poetics developed by many *kritikoi* was so-called ‘euphony’.⁴² According to it, the only important criterion for judging poetry was acoustic, and thus a poem was considered beautiful only on the basis of simple auditory pleasure. As a consequence, the *kritikoi* focused their interest on a poem’s effects on the readership, since euphony was really about how the readers perceived the text. Although he certainly did appreciate the poetry of Homer, Aristarchus does not seem to have been concerned with euphony, since—as far as we can tell from his fragments—he never commented on the auditory effects of the poems. This does not mean that he and the Alexandrians thought that poetry did not please; on the contrary, they opposed the view that poets taught specific technical disciplines (e.g., generalship, agriculture, rhetoric, geography) or philosophical truths, because in their view the goal of poetry was, in fact, to entertain, as a famous fragment of Eratosthenes (polemically) preserved by Strabo makes clear:

Strabo 1.1.10 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὃ φησιν Ἐρατοσθένης, ὅτι ποιητὴς πᾶς στοχάζεται ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας.⁴³ τάναντία γὰρ οἱ φρονιμώτατοι τῶν περὶ ποιητικῆς τι φθεγξαμένων πρώτην τινὰ λέγουσι φιλοσοφίαν τὴν ποιητικὴν.

It is not true what Eratosthenes maintains, that every poet aims at enthrallment and not at instruction. For, on the contrary, the most sensible among those who speak about poetry say that poetry is a sort of first philosophy.⁴⁴

42. On the *kritikoi* and euphonists’ theories, see Porter 1995 and especially Janko 2000a, 120–189, who (2000a, 125–127) clearly defines what the label *kritikoi* means when referring to this group of euphonist critics. On the *kritikoi* and Aristarchus, see also Schironi 2009, 304–312.

43. I follow the text edited by Meineke (Teubner 1877) and Jones (Loeb 1917), not the one by Aujac in the Budé collection (which I normally use), which here reads: ποιητὴς πᾶς στοχάζεται ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας χάριν. The reading ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας in Strabo 1.1.10 seems also to be confirmed by the almost identical wording of Strabo 1.2.3 (see next footnote), which Aujac also reads as ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας.

44. The same exact idea, with the same words, is repeated by Strabo at the opening of 1.2.3 (ποιητὴν γὰρ ἔφη πάντα στοχάζεσθαι ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας. τοῦναντίον δ’ οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινὰ λέγουσι πρώτην τὴν ποιητικὴν); in this chapter Strabo then goes on arguing against Eratosthenes’ idea that we should not measure the excellence of a poet on the basis of his display of vast knowledge in every field—the relevant passage has been translated in Chapter 3.3.B § 7.

As Klaus Geus suggests,⁴⁵ Eratosthenes had probably developed this idea in his geographic and not in his grammatical or philological studies. Whatever the specific origin of this statement is, Eratosthenes' focus here is the value of a poetic text as a source of factual knowledge,⁴⁶ and this is exactly the point that interests us. The contention that poetry's aim is enthrallment (ψυχαγωγία) and not instruction (διδασκαλία) seems to have been a point in common between the *kritikoi* and the Alexandrians.⁴⁷ Aristarchus expressed the same idea when he said that we should take poetry as a fiction (μυθικώτερον), without reading too much into it or going beyond what the poet has said (*Sch. D Il.* 5.385).⁴⁸ Yet we might wonder whether the very concept of enthrallment (ψυχαγωγία) was not interpreted differently by the *kritikoi* and by the Alexandrians. While for the *kritikoi* the pleasure of poetry derived exclusively from how it sounded (euphony), for the Alexandrians the means through which poetry 'charmed' its readers' minds went beyond simple sound effects. The Alexandrian idea of poetic enthrallment appears to have derived once again from Aristotle. In the *Poetics* he clearly says that, aside from diction (λέξις), which is the part creating 'euphony', the fundamental elements of poetry are plot (μῦθος), characters (ἥθη), thought (διάνοια), and, for tragedy, also spectacle (ὄψις) as well as music (μελοποιία). All of them contribute to generating ψυχαγωγία, but two elements are particularly suitable for 'enthralling' (ψυχαγωγεῖν) the mind (*Poet.* 1450a33–35): reversals (περιπέτειαι) and recognitions (ἀναγνώσεις), and they both belong to the plot (μῦθος).⁴⁹ On the basis of all the other similarities between Aristotle and Aristarchus, it is reasonable to conclude that the latter agreed with this idea: for him too, the goal of poetry was 'enthrallment' (ψυχαγωγία), and the elements that contributed to it were mostly related to the content of the poem rather than the sound of the letters.

Crates differed from the *kritikoi* because, even if he shared their interest in euphony and was convinced that auditory pleasure was paramount for poetry, he also considered content a fundamental aspect of poetry.⁵⁰ In brief,

45. Geus 2002, 265–267.

46. As well outlined by Broggiato 2012. Cf. also Pfeiffer 1968, 166–167; Bouchard 2016, 123–132.

47. So also Janko 2000a, 147–148. On the ancient debate about the aims of poetry (i.e., ψυχαγωγία vs. διδασκαλία), see also Meijering 1987, 5–12.

48. See Chapter 3.2.A § 5.

49. Tragedy, on the other hand, can also count on spectacle (ὄψις) as particularly enthralling (*Poet.* 1450b16–17).

50. See Janko 2000a, 155. In particular, Janko personally pointed out to me a fragment of Crates which in his view conveys Crates' attitude on how to judge poems: μ[ήτε τὰ α]ἰσθήσει [γ]' (suppl. Janko) ἐπιτ[ερπ]ῇ μ[ήτε τὴν διάν[οιαν δ]εῖν κρίνειν τῶ[ν] ποιημάτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ λογικά θεωρήματα τὰ φύσει ὑπ[άρχο]ντα δι' αἰσθήσεως κρ[ίειν] καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ τῶν [νοο]υμένων, οὐ μέντοι τὰ νοούμενα

he was an euphonist who was also interested in the content. Yet his interest in content was very different from Aristarchus'. As stated above, Crates sought 'astronomical truths' in Homer. In fact, his fragments suggest that, though he recognized that poetry could both 'enthrall' (through euphony) and 'teach', he considered instruction (διδασκαλία)—in particular, teaching of cosmological truths—to be the main goal of poetry because of the 'vast learning' (πολυμάθεια) of ancient poets.⁵¹ In this aspect, Crates was different from both the *kritikoi* and the Alexandrians, but seems to have been part of the group mentioned by Strabo in the quotation above: 'those most sensible' among the experts of poetry who considered poetry some kind of elementary philosophy. In his search for cosmological truths in Homer, then, Crates did the opposite of Aristotle, Eratosthenes, and Aristarchus, who held the view that Homer qua poet dealt exclusively with fiction, and that poetry was not history and philosophy, and so it did not need to teach anything.⁵² Since to teach anything 'beyond the text' was not within the scope of poetry, Aristarchus did not like to read into it more than what it expressly said (*Sch. D Il.* 5.385). Thus, even though Strabo does not mention him in the passage reported above, it is clear that Aristarchus, too, considered the main goal of poetry to be enthrallment (ψυχαγωγία), and not teaching (διδασκαλία) technical and scientific truths, unlike his contemporary Crates.

In conclusion, when comparing the *grammatikoi* with the *kritikoi*, the very concept of 'exegesis' is at stake. For Crates, the Pergamene school, and the *kritikoi*, exegesis was a means to go beyond the text, either through philosophy and *allegoresis* or through euphonist theories, while for the Alexandrians exegesis instead involved preparing a good edition and, in the case of Aristarchus, a good commentary as well. Aristarchus analyzed poetic language, decided what was authentic and what was spurious, and discussed textual as well as interpretative problems. This empirical attitude—with its obsessive attention to

[one must judge neither those aspects of verses that please one's sensation nor their content, but one must judge by means of sensation the rational principles that naturally exist [in them], and [judge] not without what is meant, but not what is meant] (trans. Janko 2000a, 123, fr. V 11). For a survey of the sources (mainly Philodemus' *On Poems*) and the problems involved in reconstructing Crates' views about poetics and his polemical stand against the euphonists, see Broggiato 2001, xxvii–xxxiii.

51. Cf. Broggiato 2001, lv–lix. The same approach is attested for Crates' pupils; see Broggiato 2011 and Broggiato 2014, 4.

52. For Aristotle (*Poet.* 1451a38–b7, briefly discussed in Chapter 3.3.B § 7) poetry deals with universals rather than particulars, as history does, so it is more philosophical and more serious than history (*Poet.* 1451b5–6: διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν). Even so, this does not mean that Aristotle regarded poetry as philosophy. For him also, just as for Eratosthenes and Aristarchus, the 'serious' side of poetry did not include scientific, technical, or historical truths. Hence, it was pointless to look for this type of teaching in Homer, because none of this was poetry's aim.

the text itself in order to find patterns of ‘poetic behavior’ and to determine the rules of Homeric diction—was inspired by the Aristotelian approach to poetry and to knowledge in general.

Unlike Aristotle and Aristarchus, who considered poetry a self-inclusive universe with its own conventions and characteristics, and Homer a master of the poetic τέχνη, for Crates Homeric poetry also explained the real world—in particular, the shape and order of our universe. Thus he felt he could go beyond what the text literally said in order to show that Homer was not only a great poet, but also possessed full knowledge of cosmological truths. This is a step that Aristarchus never took, as he remained firmly attached to the Aristotelian ideas of poetry, whose only goal was to enthrall.

7. Aristarchus and Hellenistic Science

The Hellenistic period coincided with a boom in scientific knowledge of all sorts. Within this cultural movement, however, two disciplines stood out: geometry and medicine. Both of them, already developed in the classical period, showed an exceptional growth in the third and second centuries BCE. In addition, other *technai* closely linked to geometry flourished in that period: for example, astronomy, optics, mechanics, and mathematical geography. In these sciences too, the influence of Aristotle was paramount: not only were some of these *technai* developed by Aristotle and his school, such as physics, botany, and zoology, but—more importantly—Aristotle gave Hellenistic science a language and principles with which to express itself.⁵³

In particular, Alexandria offered an extraordinary environment for the development of sciences. Even though we know very little about the Museum, the Ptolemies certainly embarked on many types of patronage;⁵⁴ in addition, many intellectuals and scientists found themselves working together at Alexandria around the same period, whether or not their presence was directly supported by the kings’ patronage. In this culturally diverse environment, it was inevitable that ideas and questions circulated among the intellectual elites. There is evidence, in fact, that an exchange of ideas and interdisciplinary dialogues took place, even if not necessarily within the Museum itself. For instance, between the

53. This is true, even if Aristotle’s theory of syllogistics (as presented mainly in the *Prior Analytics*) and theory of demonstrative science (as presented in the *Posterior Analytics*) are primarily conceived as tools to ‘transmit knowledge’ (through teaching) rather than as tools to ‘acquire knowledge’, as demonstrated by Kapp 1975 and especially by Barnes 1975. Cf. also Russo 2004, 171–173.

54. For a survey, see Fraser 1972, I 305–319; Schironi 2019a.

fourth and the third century BCE, the physicians Herophilus and Erasistratus⁵⁵ not only adopted a Peripatetic approach to knowledge (e.g., teleological explanations), but also showed interconnections with other disciplines flourishing at Alexandria, especially mathematics and mechanics.⁵⁶ An example is the portable water-clock which Herophilus (ca. 330/20–260/50 BCE) built to measure the pulse and which seems to have been influenced by the technology for water-clocks invented by his contemporary Ctesibius, a mechanic who worked at Alexandria under Ptolemy I Soter (king in 306–282 BCE) and Ptolemy II Philadelphus (king in 282–246 BCE).⁵⁷ Similarly Philo of Byzantium, who wrote about military tactics in the early second century BCE, shared technical vocabulary with Andreas of Carystus (who died in 217 BCE), a pupil of Herophilus and personal physician of Ptolemy IV Philopator (king in 222–204 BCE).⁵⁸ In particular, Philo's machines and parts of machines are often named after parts of the human or animal body.⁵⁹ The terminological influence between medicine and mechanics was reciprocal, because the human body was then seen as a machine and described using technical terms taken from mechanics; for example, Erasistratus described the heart as a pump with valves similar to the water pump invented by Ctesibius in the same period (fr. 201 Garofalo).⁶⁰

Scientists in Alexandria also communicated with colleagues from elsewhere, as attested by the famous case of Archimedes and Eratosthenes discussing geometrical problems between Syracuse and Alexandria.⁶¹ Moreover, as the case of Eratosthenes illustrates, the intellectuals working at Alexandria often focused on multiple disciplines and had many disparate interests.⁶² Their vast learning and interdisciplinary expertise must have favored exchanges among different branches of knowledge, both for individual thinkers as well as among

55. While it is certain that Herophilus worked at Alexandria, whether Erasistratus too worked there is debated, but many modern scholars think that he did. For a brief survey of the positions and bibliography, see von Staden 1996, 91 and 102–103 nn. 36 and 37.

56. See von Staden 1996 and 1997; Russo 2004, 145–150.

57. See von Staden 1996, 89–90; cf. also von Staden 1989, 282–283, 353–354 (fr. 182).

58. See von Staden 1998.

59. For example, his torsion catapult has supporting 'legs' (σκέλη, in Ph. Bel. 54.9), 'arms' (ἀγκῶνες, in Ph. Bel. 68.11, 18, 23) with 'heels' (πτέρναι τῶν ἀγκῶνων, in Ph. Bel. 69.27, 78.12), 'eyebrows' (ὄφρῦς, in Ph. Bel. 57.6; it is the edge around the hole carrier), a tortoise shell (χελώνιον, in Ph. Bel. 54.13, 61.31, 68.4; it is the slider; see Marsden 1971, 161), a 'hand' or 'claw' (χεῖρ, in Ph. Bel. 68.4), and 'little wings' (πτερύγια, in Ph. Bel. 54.12; it is the front frame); see the pictures in Marsden 1971, 162, 180, 181, and the list of all these parts in Marsden 1971, 266–267, 268–269. Cf. also Russo 2004, 150–151.

60. See von Staden 1996, 93–95; von Staden 1997, 202–203.

61. An example is Archimedes' letter to Eratosthenes which opens the *Method* (dedicated to Eratosthenes himself). The incipit (*Meth.* 426.3–7) is reported in Chapter 4, footnote 198. Cf. Fraser 1972, I 400–402.

62. Blomqvist 1992 gives an overview of Eratosthenes as a polymathic scientist working at Alexandria. A comprehensive study of Eratosthenes' work according to topics is Geus 2002.

different personalities, as the attested reciprocal influences between mechanics and medicine prove. Intellectuals of various fields thus benefited from the same intellectually rich environment, further developing a common vocabulary and methodological attitude to do scientific work, at Alexandria and, in general, in the Hellenistic world.⁶³

In comparison with mathematical sciences and medicine, scholarship (i.e., ‘grammar’) as an ‘empirical *techne*’⁶⁴ was a new subject and needed to develop its own methodology and principles. Indeed, it seems that the grammarians looked at other, more advanced *technai*, while trying to organize their own discipline and give it scientific basis and a firm methodology. In particular, they used Aristotle to give their discipline a foundation and borrowed from other sciences some specific principles, terminology, and methodological approaches. Such a close relationship between disciplines apparently so remote from each other should not surprise us; after all, Eratosthenes was both a grammarian and a mathematician, as well as having many other interests in addition to those two. He was even perhaps the first to apply the mathematical tool of proportion to grammar and to develop the method of analogy.⁶⁵ Another example of cross-fertilization among different disciplines also originated with Eratosthenes. As a geographer, he worked on a *diorthosis*, that is, a ‘correction’, of the previous maps (see, e.g., Strabo 1.4.1; 2.1.2): as the grammarians wanted to revise the different editions of Homer, making thus their *diorthosis* of the Homeric text, so too did Eratosthenes want to revise the different maps of the *oikoumene*.⁶⁶ This specific exchange of ideas across disciplines has yet another level, as the very term *diorthosis* (διόρθωσις) together with the derived verb διορθόω, ‘to correct’, ‘to revise’, originally came from medicine: they are first attested in Hippocrates in the sense of ‘making straight’, in the context of setting a broken limb (e.g., Hp. *Off.* 16; *Art.* 23, 24; *Mochl.* 25.2, 32.2, 38.1, 41.2).⁶⁷ In this case, then, a medical term was used by geographers and grammarians at the moment when they wanted to name a specific activity in their own field. Indeed, the cross-fertilization of technical terminology was particularly rich between grammar and medicine. Grammar took from medicine the name of some

63. The question of the interactions of disciplines at Alexandria has been discussed also by Jacob 1998b, 19–24.

64. I am referring here to the definition of Dionysius Thrax (*Ars* § 1), who connects the two terms *empeiria* and *techne*. He starts by defining grammar as ‘experience (γραμματική ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία) of what is for the most part said by poets and prose writers’, and concludes the list of the six parts of grammar by calling it a *techne* (ἕκτον κρίσις ποιημάτων, ὃ δὴ κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ). On this definition, see Chapter 3.0.

65. On the link between grammatical analogy and mathematics, see Siebenborn 1976, 56–66, Schironi 2007, and Schironi 2018b.

66. See Jacob 1998b, 30–34.

67. See Siebenborn 1976, 116–118.

technical concepts, such as ἄρθρον, ‘joint’, for ‘article’,⁶⁸ and πάθος, ‘illness’, to indicate a change in the form of a word, from which the famous branch of ‘pathology’, namely, the study (and the justification) of irregular grammatical forms, developed.⁶⁹

In its turn, scholarship on Homer and other literary authors had an influence on medicine, when glossography and exegesis were developed on medical texts, especially on Hippocrates, an author whose works (with their exegetical problems and issues of authorship) were often as problematic as Homer’s poems. The lexicon of Bacchius of Tanagra (ca. 250–200 BCE) was the first of a long series of Hippocratic glossaries that are all lost with the exception of the lexicon of Erotianus (first century CE).⁷⁰ Similarly, Hippocrates was object of philological study by many Hellenistic physicians; whether or not we consider the polemical and ‘selective’ commentary written by Apollonius of Citium (ca. 70 BCE) on Hippocrates’ *On Joints* (Περὶ ἁρθρῶν) a real *hypomnema*,⁷¹ we know that exegetical works on Hippocrates were certainly written at Alexandria.⁷² That grammar and medicine had a particular strong relationship and saw themselves as somewhat similar is further testified to by the common debate about their own definition, namely, whether they were *technai* or *empeiriai*.⁷³

Aside from these reciprocal influences in terminology, theoretical debates, and interests, further similarities between specific points in Hellenistic sciences and Aristarchus’ work can also be found. An interesting instance of terminological overlap between Aristarchus and the scientists occurs, for example, with Erasistratus, who said that nature is ‘fond of *technē*’ (φιλότεχνος) and without superfluity (ἀπέρिटτος).⁷⁴ Both qualities were also typical of Homer in Aristarchus’ view: he praised Homer’s *philotechnia*⁷⁵ and rejected lines that were ‘superfluous’ (περισσοί).⁷⁶ Without implying a direct

68. See Boehm 2007 (who also discusses σύνδεσμος, ‘conjunction’, and παράγωγος/παραγωγός, ‘derivative’/‘derived [word]’, and their connection with medical terminology).

69. On pathology in Greek grammar, see Blank 1982, 41–49; Lallot 1995.

70. See von Staden 1992; Smith 2002, 202–204; Manetti 2015, 1147–1153.

71. Edited by J. Kollesch and K. Kudlien in *CMG* xi.1.1 (Berlin 1965). On the nature of this text, see Potter 1993; Roselli 1998; Smith 2002, 212–215.

72. See von Staden 1989, 453–456; Manetti 2015, 1153–1164. Perhaps even Aristarchus worked on Hippocrates; see Erot. 5.14–19 (on which cf. Manetti 2015, 1144–1145).

73. See Siebenborn 1976, 118–139. On the empirical school and their criticism of the so-called ‘rationalist’ school, see Frede 1987. The various ancient definitions of grammar are discussed by Blank 2000.

74. Erasistr., fr. 83 Garofalo: πανταχοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβὴς καὶ φιλότεχνος καὶ ἀνελλιπὴς καὶ ἀπέρिटτος [for in everything nature is precise, fond of *technē*, not lacking anything, and not having anything superfluous]. Cf. von Staden 1996, 95.

75. *Sch. Il.* 2.681a (τοῦ Ὀμήρου φιλοτέχνως ὥσπερ προοιμιαζομένου), on which see Schenkeveld 1970, 163–164 and 176; Meijering 1987, 173 and 176.

76. See Chapter 3.6.B § 4.4.

influence of one over the other, we can note that the concepts were the same, suggesting a similar approach to the object of research: nature, in the case of the physician, and the Homeric text, in the case of Aristarchus. Even in this case, the Peripatetic tradition was again probably the ultimate source of this shared vocabulary; however, in addition to this common ground, Hellenistic scientists and scholars working in different disciplines also seem to have benefited from the same lively intellectual climate. These similarities thus point to a common cultural atmosphere at Alexandria more than to a direct borrowing from one field to the other. If this is correct, Aristarchus, like Eratosthenes and the other Alexandrian scholars, is best seen as working in a much more complex and stimulating environment than the infamous ‘birdcage of the Muses’.⁷⁷

8. Aristarchus the Empiricist

Aristarchus’ approach to scholarship, therefore, acquires a new dimension when analyzed within the context of the scientific development of the Hellenistic times. In this respect, a fundamental basis for science is the attention paid to physical data. Anaxagoras had stated that ‘phenomena are a glimpse into what is hidden’ (59 B 21a D-K: ὅψις γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα). Aristotle, too, often states the importance of τὰ φαινόμενα in sciences. The meaning of this expression in Aristotle has been much debated, and it is not clear that for him φαινόμενα always mean ‘phenomena’ in the sense of ‘physical/perceptible data’, as the Aristotelian *phainomena* sometimes seem to be closer to *endoxa*, ‘shared common opinions’.⁷⁸ Sometimes, however, Aristotle does speak of φαινόμενα as ‘real’ sensory data, emphasizing their importance for scientific research as opposed to simple logical arguments or predetermined ideas, for example in two famous passages of *De caelo* and of *De generatione animalium*:

Aristot. *Cael.* 306a3–17: οὔτε γὰρ εὐλογον . . . , οὔτε φαίνεται κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, . . . συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων λέγουσι μὴ ὁμολογούμενα λέγειν τοῖς φαινομένοις. τούτου δ’ αἴτιον τὸ μὴ καλῶς λαβεῖν τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βούλεσθαι πρὸς τινὰς δόξας ὠρισμένας ἀνάγειν . . . ἅπαν γὰρ ὑπομένουσι τὸ συμβαῖνον ὡς ἀληθεῖς ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνίας δέον κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, καὶ μάλιστα ἐκ τοῦ τέλους. τέλος δὲ τῆς

77. The expression comes from Timon, fr. 786 SH: πολλοὶ μὲν βόσκονται ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ πολυφύλῳ / βιβλιακοὶ χαρακίται ἀπείριτα δηριόωντες / Μουσέων ἐν ταλάρῳ [numerous pedants fenced in by books are fed in Egypt with many tribes, and they endlessly quarrel in the birdcage of the Muses].

78. The fundamental article is Owen 1961. I would like to thank Victor Caston for discussing this question with me.

μὲν ποιητικῆς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἔργον, τῆς δὲ φυσικῆς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀεὶ κυρίως κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν.

It [i.e., a cosmological theory held by the Platonists] is not reasonable . . . , nor does it appear according to perception . . . and all that they say about the phenomena does not happen to be in agreement with the phenomena themselves. The reason for this is that they do not assume the first principles correctly but want to bring everything back to some predetermined opinions. . . . Since they hold their principles as true, they accept anything that follows from them, as if one should not judge some of these principles on the basis of their consequences, and especially from their result. And the result of productive knowledge is the product; that of natural science is the phenomenon, always and authoritatively according to perception.

Aristot. GA 760b27–33: ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦ λόγου τὰ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τῶν μελιττῶν τοῦτον ἔχειν φαίνεται τὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐκ τῶν συμβαίνειν δοκούντων περὶ αὐτάς· οὐ μὲν εἴληπται γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ποτε ληφθῇ τότε τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον τῶν λόγων πιστευτέον, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἐὰν ὁμολογούμενα δεικνύωσι τοῖς φαινομένοις.

The question of the generation of bees appears to be along these lines on the basis of logical argument and on the basis of what seem to be the facts about them; the facts, however, have not been grasped enough; if they are ever grasped, then we must trust perception more than logical arguments,⁷⁹ and logical arguments [only] if they show results that agree with the phenomena.

Aside from the precise meaning of τὰ φαινόμενα in the whole of Aristotle’s corpus, empirical data certainly were fundamental for him, especially in approaching natural sciences, as these two passages clearly show.⁸⁰ The attention to physical data then became a staple of Hellenistic science, not only in the most obvious fields (e.g., astronomy), but in other disciplines as well, such as medicine. For instance, this was the time when dissection and perhaps even vivi-

79. On the question of how to translate μᾶλλον in τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον τῶν λόγων πιστευτέον (‘more than’ or ‘rather than’), see Karbowski 2016, 145.

80. On Aristotle’s method in natural sciences, see, e.g., Bolton 2009, who distinguishes a ‘λογικῶς argumentation’, i.e., the dialectical mode, and ‘φυσικῶς argumentation’, i.e., the empirical scientific mode. More recently, Karbowski 2016 has suggested that Aristotle has two main strategies to prove a thesis in natural sciences: ‘justification by argument’, which is different from λογικῶς/ dialectical argumentation and is based on general per se principles, and ‘justification by perception’, which corresponds to Bolton’s φυσικῶς argumentation. According to Karbowski, Aristotle uses both ‘justification by argument’ and ‘justification by perception’ in his scientific enquiries (for example, he can defend general principles with empirical induction).

section were practiced by Herophilus. In fact, the importance of phenomena in ancient medicine was explicitly stated by Herophilus himself, who claimed that τὰ φαινόμενα must be described first (fr. 50a von Staden).⁸¹

In his work Aristarchus paid the same level of attention to empirical data as did the other scientists, if by ‘empirical data’ we understand the text and textual evidence. ‘Textual data’ was where Aristarchus started, as his four rules outlined above are all about the need to look at the text. As we have seen in the course of this study, starting from the text itself was almost a constant in his method, especially when compared with that of Crates, who instead approached the Homeric text with the preconceived idea that Homer knew about Stoic cosmology and continually alluded to it in his poems. From this perspective, at least, Crates certainly did not start from ‘empirical data’; rather, he began from a theory—one which he forced upon the Homeric text and confirmed by means of a circular argument, just like the Platonists mentioned by Aristotle in the above passage from *De caelo*, who ‘bring everything back to some predetermined opinions’. Aristarchus, on the other hand, started from the text and always kept close to it: he searched for the Homeric usage in every aspect of the poet’s activity (vocabulary, grammar, style, myths, worldview, characters’ ethos), and from these empirical findings which he collected ‘within the text’ he built up his understanding of Homer. Aristarchus’ constant attention to ‘data’, which in philology is the text itself, was pervasive in his work: he was an acute, ‘empirical’ observer, not only in his analysis of the Homeric lexicon and grammar, but also in his examination of the poet’s style and the myths known to him. As he himself postulated, the scholar should not force the text to say anything beyond the poet’s intentions (*Sch. D Il.* 5.385: μηδὲν ἔξω τῶν φραζομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ).⁸² *Mutatis mutandis*, this statement echoes Aristotle’s points in the two passages quoted above, when he claims that ‘we must trust perception more than logical arguments, and logical arguments [only] if they show results that agree with the phenomena’ and criticizes the Platonists because ‘all that they say about the phenomena does not happen to be in agreement with the phenomena themselves’.

This attention to the data—to the ‘physical evidence’ as the starting point of any research—was a characteristic of hard sciences like physics and astronomy. Yet ‘softer’ *technai* also showed attention to bare data, as when, for example, Hellenistic physicians studied the human body through dissection and (perhaps) vivisection. In his own work, Aristarchus, too, followed the same

81. See von Staden 1989, 115–124 and 134, who also contextualizes this important statement by Herophilus within the debate between the empirical and rationalist schools of medicine; cf. also von Staden 1996, 90–91, and Hankinson 1990, 213–215, who discusses another possible meaning of the fragment.

82. See Chapter 3.2.A § 5.

principle, which in his case was the unique attention paid to the actual text of Homer. From this perspective, the phrase ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’ (Ὁμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν) also summarizes Aristarchus’ scientific approach to the text.⁸³

9. Some Problems in Aristarchus’ Method

The analysis of the assumptions, rules, and methodology used by Aristarchus shows just how consistent and advanced his analysis was when compared with other scholars of his own time and beyond. If, as seems to emerge from the available evidence, Antimachus, Zenodotus, and Aristophanes made editions of Homer, but wrote no commentaries, then Aristarchus might not have had any previous example to follow to achieve his specific goal, namely, to write a commentary closely connected to an edition, which was probably his own innovation.⁸⁴ Thus, to a large extent, he had to invent a methodology to carry out his project, establishing assumptions and rules to work on Homer. This approach finds a parallel in mathematics. Already Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics* had postulated the need for some ‘starting principles’ for any knowledge,⁸⁵ because every demonstrative science must start from necessary premises.⁸⁶ The

83. It is thus interesting that the ‘scientist’ Galen adopted the same idea with reference to Hippocrates (*De dignoscendis pulsibus libri iv*, VIII, 958.6–8 Kühn): καὶ γὰρ μοι καὶ νόμος οὗτος ἐξηγήσεως, ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ σαφηνίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ καιναῖς [κεναῖς Kühn] ὑπονοίαις καὶ φάσεσιν ἀναποδείκτοις ἀποληρεῖν, ὃ τι τις βούλεται [for I have also this rule in the exegesis: to clarify each author from himself and not to ramble and say whatever one wants, basing [one’s interpretation] on odd [or: empty] hidden meanings and undemonstrated statements]. Cf. Manetti and Roselli 1994, 1564, 1573, and 1598. In general, the attitude of Galen toward Hippocrates was very similar to that of Aristarchus toward Homer: both Aristarchus and Galen wanted to find out the ‘real’ author in a tradition that, in many respects, was interpolated and uncertain.

84. Even if commentaries as a genre already existed, as proven by the Derveni papyrus, a commentary on an Orphic text dating to the fourth century BCE. Also at Alexandria, at the end of third century BCE, so before Aristarchus’ time, Euphronius, the teacher of Aristophanes of Byzantium, wrote a commentary (*hypomnema*) on Aristophanes’ *Plutus* (*Lex. Mess.* f. 283, 10–12, p. 411 Rabe). Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 160–161.

85. Aristot. *An. Post.* 71b19–25: εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ’ εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου. συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ’ οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην [if, then, to know something is what we have established, it is also necessary that demonstrative science derives from [things that are] true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and explanatory of the conclusion; for in this way the first principles will also be suitable to what is being demonstrated. For there will be a syllogism even without them, but not a demonstration; for [a demonstration without first principles] will not create knowledge].

86. The ‘starting (or first) principles’ should be kept separated from the ‘methodological princi-

most famous example is, of course, the mathematician Euclid, who organized his *Elements* into definitions, postulates, and ‘common notions’ (though Archimedes and Apollonius of Perga also did something similar in their works).⁸⁷ I do not want to push the comparison between Aristarchus and Euclid too far, especially since the fragments of the former seem to indicate that he never wrote anything like the *Elements*, which is a theoretical treatise. Yet this parallel is useful for understanding Aristarchus’ work, because—despite the similarities in methodology—there was a fundamental difference between Aristarchus’ and Euclid’s respective fields of research. In mathematics, the ‘common notions’ are self-evident general truths⁸⁸ and so do not need any further proof. Aristarchus’ assumptions, on the other hand, were not at all self-evident. They were also different from postulates, which have been recently defined as ‘primitive material rules and assertions’.⁸⁹ Nor could they be equated with Euclid’s definitions, which are ‘explications’ and ‘abbreviations’ of mathematical terms.⁹⁰ Finally, as observed above, Aristarchus’ assumptions could not even be demonstrated, as if they had been similar to mathematical theorems.

This difference is crucial because it led to a problem in Aristarchus’ ‘scientific’ methodology. In many instances, his explanations or *atheteseis* served to remove a contradiction in the text because ‘Homer was self-consistent and never contradicted himself’ (assumption 2). A most significant example of this is Aristarchus’ efforts to explain that the various heroes who died and were then ‘resurrected’ by Homer (such as Schedius, Chromius, and Pylaemenes) were not the same characters, but were homonymous.⁹¹ This was a rational solution and Aristarchus had a point; yet, by adopting it, he basically *forced* Homer not to contradict himself. Similarly, his assumption that Homer was the sole author of both poems (assumption 3) had significant consequences

ples’ (or simply ‘principles’) mentioned above. The former are like ‘assumptions’, while the latter are ‘rules of behavior’ in scientific enquiry. The same ambiguity occurs in modern scientific vocabulary, where ‘principle’ can cover both meanings. For example, the ‘principle of noncontradiction’ is actually a *rule* of mathematics and logic rather than a true principle (it is in fact also called ‘law of noncontradiction’), while Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’, the foundational principle of quantum mechanics, corresponds to an *assumption*.

87. The differences and similarities between Aristotle’s first principles and Euclid’s definitions, postulates, and common notions are still subjects of debate among scholars; see, for example, Heath 1926, I 117–124; Lee 1935; Mueller 1991; McKirahan 1992, 133–143; Acerbi 2013.

88. So Heath 1926, I 124, and Mueller 1991, 66.

89. So Mueller 1991, 64 and 66. It is indeed difficult to give a comprehensive definition of Euclid’s postulates; as Acerbi 2013, 680, notes: “since antiquity it has been recognized that the postulates naturally split into two groups of quite different character: the first three are rules licensing basic constructions, the fourth and the fifth are assertions stating properties of particular geometric objects”.

90. So Mueller 1991, 63 and 66.

91. See Chapter 3.3.B § 1.2.

for the results of his work. In fact, this assumption led him to edit both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* so as to remove any possible inconsistency between the two poems, for example by athetizing lines in one poem which were in conflict with others in the other poem.⁹² His attempts to harmonize the two poems and avoid contradiction were the natural consequence of two of his fundamental assumptions: that Homer was internally self-consistent (assumption 2) and that he wrote both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (assumption 3). In trying to harmonize the poems, however, Aristarchus actually *caused* the two poems to be self-consistent. In other words, by enforcing consistency between the two poems *as if* they had been written by the same person, he removed any evidence of the contrary, thus altering the poems in favor of his assumption. The same occurred with language. To suppose that Homer was self-consistent (assumption 2), even in linguistic matters, and so, when editing his text, to respect Homer's language, keeping it distinct from Koine (rule 4) certainly saved Aristarchus from misunderstanding peculiar features of Homer's language as errors and thus from unnecessarily manipulating the text. Yet these two ideas could also bring him to enforce linguistic consistency between the two poems and within each poem in the same way he enforced character and narrative consistency so as to avoid any flaw in Homer. Likewise, Aristarchus used his 'Aristotelian' assumption that Homer was a flawless poet (assumption 1) to re-create a poem that in fact did not show any flaws. This is especially evident in the cases of atheteseis, many of which were justified by the fact that lines or longer passages contained details 'unworthy' of Homer's perfection.⁹³ Even though Aristarchus sometimes simply noticed problems without emending the text to clear them out, he normally suspected all the lines where *bonus dormitat Homerus* (Hor. *AP* 359). The problem is that Homer does, in fact, 'doze' sometimes—and this is also the beauty of his poetry, at least for us. But Aristarchus' approach was different and, in this regard at least, it is indeed disputable.

These are real issues in Aristarchus' methodology and should not be denied. Yet this was the price that he had to pay at the moment when he inaugurated a discipline and wanted to base it on rational and consistent rules. He *had* to have assumptions and methodological principles, as Aristotle prescribed and as Euclid used. Unfortunately, however, Homer does not work like geometry—and, therefore, strict rules and assumptions were risky when applied to his poetry. This was the flaw in Aristarchus' method. Still, it would be anachronistic (and unfair) to criticize him for it given the revolutionary nature of his enterprise.

92. See Chapter 5.2 § 3.3 and § 4; Chapter 5.3 § 3.2.5.

93. See Chapter 3.6.B § 4 and § 9.

10. Aristarchus' Legacy

By preparing his working text where he deleted lines which were probably spurious (for example, lines which were not well attested in the manuscript tradition), Aristarchus to a large extent determined the text of Homer that we still read today, as the disappearance of the 'wild papyri' seems to prove.⁹⁴ Yet the importance of his work goes far beyond that. Aristarchus established a method for his—and our—own discipline. He did not invent philology from nothing: he was certainly influenced by Aristotle and knew the works of his predecessors who had already prepared editions of the Homeric poems. Nevertheless, at least to our knowledge, nobody before him had ever produced such an in-depth work on Homer, a complete commentary in connection with an edition; for this project, then, he had to develop an entirely new methodology. He mastered the tools that were already commonly used to read literary authors, such as paraphrases, etymology, or critical signs. His real achievement, however, was adding rational principles and following them consistently in his work. His awareness of this methodology, as emerges from his polemics against other scholars, and his constant application of it are in my view what makes Aristarchus a fundamental figure in Greek thought. I have defined his methodology as 'scientific' because it largely relied on 'empirical facts', that is, the text itself. In this way, then, Aristarchus went beyond all his predecessors and contemporaries (at least, in the state in which they have reached us), who had either a more limited approach, like the Glossographers or Zenodotus, or an excessively theoretical one, like Crates.

Marchinus van der Valk stigmatized the 'overgreat [*sic*] precision'⁹⁵ and 'pedantry'⁹⁶ shown by Aristarchus in explaining and correcting the text. No doubt, by following his usual method of (1) identifying the 'typically Homeric' by a close reading of the Homeric text itself, (2) generating a 'rule' of how Homeric poetry is and should be, and then (3) applying that rule to the text, Aristarchus seems more like a scientist working on a dry topic than a literary scholar working on some of the most sublime poetry ever written. Yet we also saw that he could be respectful of poetic license as well of many characteristics of oral poetry, even if he did not know what oral poetry was.⁹⁷

94. See Chapter 1.2 § 3.

95. Van der Valk 1963–1964, II 165.

96. Van der Valk 1963–1964, II 154: "One of Aristarchus' outstanding characteristics is his precision which even degenerates into pedantry. Though in principle as well as in practice he allowed Homer a certain amount of poetical licence and made concessions in this respect . . . , he, nevertheless, could not get rid of a dominating trait of his character viz. a painful accuracy which induced him to offer many unnecessary alterations. In fact, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that Arist. had a very prosaic frame of mind, which is a serious disadvantage in a critic of poets".

97. See Chapter 3.6.C § 1 and § 6.

He also showed some sophisticated ideas about Homeric narrative techniques, which allowed him to understand and preserve the received text much more than his predecessors had done.⁹⁸ In addition, he also avoided forcing current knowledge into Homer, as other contemporary critics did. All this is indeed proof of a refined scholar, who had his limits (like everyone), but who also had a relatively advanced understanding of Homeric poetry, at least for his time.⁹⁹

Still, it is undeniable that, in order to save and respect the ‘first principles’ about Homer which he himself had established (i.e., his three assumptions), Aristarchus often adopted circular reasoning, which made him change the text itself to respect those very assumptions, as discussed in the previous section.¹⁰⁰ This excess of precision and the consequent circular logic of some of his philological choices are certainly questionable aspects of Aristarchus’ methodology—but the job of the *πρῶτοι εὗρεται* is always risky. Indeed, his ‘obsessive’ precision had a positive side as well: establishing principles and applying them consistently and precisely is the basis for any sound scientific method. By setting down his assumptions and methodological rules, Aristarchus actually founded a new discipline; in fact, to our knowledge, he was the first to develop a consistent and systematic method to explain, analyze, and correct a text. Aside from these inevitable flaws, his main legacy is thus the foundation of philology as an empirical and scientifically based *technē*.

The culturally rich environment of Alexandria certainly played a major role in this foundational effort. Despite all the uncertainties about the role and activity of the Museum, Alexandria was at the core of Hellenistic intellectual life. If this cultural context could lead to contact and cross-borrowing between medicine and mechanics, mathematics and astronomy, we can also

98. See Chapter 3.6.C § 3.

99. In this regard, Bachmann 1902–1904, I 26–35, gives a fairer assessment of Aristarchus than van der Valk. While maintaining that ‘der logischer denkende Aristarch’, as he calls him (Bachmann 1902–1904, I 29), missed aspects of Homeric poetry because of his rational, all too rational, approach, as well as because he also applied Hellenistic moral and aesthetic rules to Homer, Bachmann also recognizes that Aristarchus committed many fewer mistakes than other scholars, before and contemporary with him. Cf. also Bachmann 1902–1904, II 34–35. More recently, Nünlist 2015 also gave a balanced view of Aristarchus’ method, even though he is more confident than I am that Aristarchus was a cautious and undogmatic critic; while I agree on Aristarchus’ sophisticated approach to exegesis, in this study I have also tried to show some of the pitfalls into which his ‘precise’ methodology inevitably led him.

100. In a way, and quite ironically, this is the same flaw as in Roemer’s approach to Aristarchus (Roemer 1912; Roemer 1924). The German philologist selectively interpreted the available evidence in order to respect his own assumption about Aristarchus, namely, that the Alexandrian philologist was a flawless and modern scholar, so that he disregarded, dismissed, or even emended all the evidence which seemed to show that Aristarchus, too, might have committed mistakes (see, e.g., Roemer 1912, 6–8). Roemer’s approach may further convince us of how ‘modern’ the case of Aristarchus still is: all scholars (even great scholars!) have biases and preconceived ideas, which impact their work.

see Aristarchean philology as a part of this rich intellectual arena. In the Library and in the Museum, moreover, Aristotle's influence was of paramount importance in shaping a certain way of thinking and of organizing knowledge and research. Last but not least, Aristarchus worked during the Hellenistic period—an era when, for the first time in the Greek world, a shared global culture allowed for the rapid exchanges of ideas among people living in distant places. His surviving fragments suggest that he was able to take advantage of all these different cultural stimuli, bringing them together and combining them to create a consistent methodology.

Despite some errors that Aristarchus committed and that are inevitable at the beginnings of any discipline, his ability to identify a few, specific, rational assumptions and rules and to follow them consistently is, in my view, the most important legacy he has left us and what has earned him a place in the history of ideas. Thus, if Homer is, in Aristarchus' eyes, the best poet because he is self-consistent, Aristarchus is without doubt the best of the grammarians (ὁ γραμματικώτατος), because he—like his poet—never contradicts himself.

Technical Terms Often Used in This Book

asteriskos (ἀστερίσκος, *): Aristarchean critical sign. It marked repeated lines.

athetesis (ἀθέτησις; pl.: **atheteseis**, ἀθετήσεις): literally ‘setting aside’; it indicated the rejection of a line considered spurious. Athetized lines were not eliminated from the text but signaled with an *obelos* in the margin.

Chorizontes (Χωρίζοντες): ‘Separatists’; they were scholars who denied that Homer composed both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

diaskeuastai (διασκευασταί): anonymous ‘interpolators’ of the Homeric poems, often invoked by Aristarchus to explain why un-Homeric lines were present in the text and so had to be athetized.

diorthosis (διόρθωσις): literally ‘correction’; it indicates the scholarly work of ‘recension’ of a text, that is, the establishment of the correct text by critical analysis and choice of specific readings. The edition (*ekdosis*, ἔκδοσις) and the commentary (*hypomnema*, ὑπόμνημα) were the final result of the *diorthosis*.

diple (διπλῆ, >): Aristarchean critical sign. It marked lines that needed discussion for various reasons (e.g., linguistic issues, variant readings, exegetical questions).

diple periestigmene (διπλῆ περιεστιγμένη >:): Aristarchean critical sign. It marked lines where Aristarchus argued against the philological choices of his predecessor Zenodotus.

ekdosis (ἔκδοσις; pl. **ekdoseis**, ἐκδόσεις): ancient ‘critical edition’; it was not a text revised and corrected according to the scholar’s judgment; rather, it was a standard Homeric text (selected by the scholar, probably on the basis of its authoritativeness), ‘edited’ with marginal variants and critical signs. The *ekdosis* together with the commentary (*hypomnema*) was the result of the scholar’s recension (*diorthosis*).

glossa (γλῶσσα; pl. **glossai**, γλῶσσαι): a difficult or rare word used by a poet, according to Aristotle’s definition (*Poet.* 1457b1–5). It must be kept distinct

from the English ‘gloss’, which in this study is used for the explanation given by an ancient interpreter to a *glossa*.

Glossographers (Γλωσσογράφοι): anonymous scholars, mentioned only in the scholia of Aristonicus and criticized for their interpretation of difficult Homeric words (*glossai*).

hypomnema (ὑπόμνημα; pl. *hypomnemata*, ὑπομνήματα): running commentary, organized by lemmata (the lines or the beginning of lines commented upon) followed by the explanations. In Aristarchus’ case the lemmata might have also been furnished by the critical signs, which pointed to the same signs in the *ekdosis*. In the commentary, exegetical problems as well as variant readings were discussed. The *hypomnema* together with the edition (*ekdosis*) was the result of the scholar’s recension (*diorthosis*).

Koine: in this book it indicates the modern concept of Koine, i.e., the Greek language spoken in the Hellenistic period, which was also the variety of Greek spoken by Aristarchus. This modern sense of Koine must be kept distinct from the ancient idea of κοινή διάλεκτος, ‘common dialect’. The latter was considered another language, namely, ‘standard’ Greek, and was counted as another Greek dialect for a total of five Greek dialects: Ionic, Attic, Aeolic, Doric, and ‘common dialect’.

lyseis (λύσεις; sing., *lysis*, λύσις): ‘solutions’ offered by the ancient exegetes (including Aristarchus) to famous ‘problems’ (*zetemata*).

Neoteroi (Νεώτεροι): ‘newer’ poets; for Aristarchus, all the poets later than Homer.

obelos (ὀβελός, –): Aristarchean critical sign. It marked suspicious lines which Aristarchus athetized.

semeia (σημεῖα; sing., *semeion*, σημεῖον): critical ‘signs’ used by the Alexandrian critics; they were placed in the margin of an edition and (in Aristarchus’ case) probably also on the margin of the lemmata in commentaries. Aristarchus employed mostly the following *semeia*: *obelos*, *asteriskos*, *asteriskos* with *obelos*, *diple*, and *diple periestigmene*.

syngamma (σύγγραμμα; pl., *syngammata*, συγγράμματα): monograph on a specific exegetical topic, often with a polemical content. Those written by Aristarchus include *Against Comanus*, *Against Philitas*, *Against the Paradox of Xenon*, *On the Iliad and the Odyssey*, and *On the Camp*.

vulgate: even if this is a debated term now, I use it in the standard meaning of ‘the form of the text given by the consensus of the medieval manuscripts’ (West 2011b, 926). It is usually marked by Ω in modern critical apparatus.

zetemata (ζητήματα; sing., *zetema*, ζήτημα): famous ‘problems’ that ancient interpreters (including Aristarchus) found in the Homeric poems (often inconsistencies or contradictions in the plot) and tried to solve by suggesting ‘solutions’ (*lyseis*).

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Index I: General Index

This index collects keywords and concepts discussed in this book. The focus is on ancient concepts and authors, not on modern views or modern scholars and their ideas on those concepts—yet readers will easily find references to modern scholars and their views on the same topics by consulting the pages listed under the specific entries. While the lemma normally refers to the exact word itself in the text, sometimes (especially for more abstract concepts, like ‘unsuitability’, ‘consistency’, etc.) the lemma refers to concepts, without a word-to-word correspondence. This index also includes all the occurrences of these concepts when expressed by Greek words; therefore I have given in brackets the standard Greek keywords for that concept (for an index of Greek technical words only, see Index II).

For particularly complex and/or long entries, I have signaled in **bold** the pages that are specifically dedicated to the topic under consideration (footnotes included).

Aside from standard abbreviations for authors or grammatical concepts, I have used the following abbreviations in the entries: Ar. = Aristarchus, Zen. = Zenodotus, and Aristoph. Byz. = Aristophanes of Byzantium.

Ablaut: 344, 372, 376, 604

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- Zielinski’s Law: 527–528 with nn. 113 and 115, 529–530, 531, 543
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Index II: Index of Greek Technical Terms Connected with Aristarchus' Exegesis

This index offers a selection of the most common Greek terms occurring in the scholia or other primary sources which treat Aristarchus' exegesis and which are often discussed in this study. Without claiming to represent Aristarchus' original terminology, the terms listed here can still be profitably used to navigate scholiastic corpora as they represent the technical terminology used in those texts. For other technical terms not listed here, the reader should refer to Index I, the General Index.

Greek words are listed in their 'generic' form (e.g., nominative masculine singular for adjectives and infinitive for verbs). However, for formulas always used in a specific grammatical form, the declined form has been used (e.g., σημειοῦνται and not σημειοῦσθαι).

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- ἀθέτησις, ἀθετεῖν: in general, as a technical term: 50, 573, 574, 763; for specific occurrences, *see* Index I: Athetes(e)is
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- αἶρειν: referring to lines in a Homeric edition (in general, as a technical term): *see* (περί) αἶρειν
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Index III: Index of the Homeric Words Commented Upon by Aristarchus

This index includes the most important Homeric words and phrases discussed by Aristarchus and analyzed in this book either from a semantic, etymological, or grammatical point of view. Occurrences of these same words that do not deal with their meaning, etymology, morphology, or syntax are not listed.

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Index IV: Index of the Homeric Scholia

This is a list of all the Homeric scholia discussed or mentioned in this study.

This index should also be considered an index of passages discussed by Aristarchus, as a scholium normally corresponds to the passage of the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* commented upon.

I have put the origin of the note according to Erbse 1969–1988 in brackets. For the *Odyssey*, I have adopted Pontani's attributions for the scholia to *Odyssey* 1-6; for the scholia to *Odyssey* 7-24, I have followed the collections of Carnuth 1869 (Aristonicus), Ludwich 1884–1885, I 507–631 (Didymus), Lentz 1868, 129–165 (Herodian), and Carnuth 1875 (Nicanor). When a scholium from *Odyssey* 7-24 is missing from these collections I have tentatively labeled it as exegetical (ex.); of course, these attributions are far from certain especially in the lack of a modern edition of the *Odyssey* scholia for books 7-24. For composite scholia, that is, scholia that Erbse and Pontani attribute to more than one source, I mention only the source of the portion of the scholium which I discuss.

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Index V: Index of Other Ancient Sources

This index collects all the sources other than Homeric scholia used in this study as well as all the ancient authors and works mentioned in relation to linguistic usages, myths, and questions discussed by Aristarchus. This index does not include either sources/ancient authors quoted as a simple example of a linguistic usage in the course of a discussion, or authors mentioned in the scholia but not discussed in the main text. References to collections of fragments of ancient grammarians are also not included; to find passages where the opinions of specific grammarians other than Aristarchus are discussed, readers should refer to Index I (under the name of the grammarian) or Index IV (under the scholium which contains the fragment of the grammarian).

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Eugène Ionesco, *La Leçon*

